THE HINGIR-RAMPUR COAL CO., LTD. AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 November 1960 | [1961] 2 S.C.R. 537 | 1960 INSC 211
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 November 1960
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 87/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1961] 2 S.C.R. 537
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 211
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
THE HINGIR"RAMPUR COAL CO., LTD.
AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA
RAO, K. N. WANCHOO and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Mining Areas, Development of--Enactment by State Legislature authorising constitution of mining areas and development
fund-Imposition of cess-Constitutional validity-Competency of
State Legislature-Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act,
z952 (Orissa XXV II of I952), s. 4-Constitution of India, Art. 372,
Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 23, 66, List I, Entries 52, 54, 84Adaptation of Laws Order, z950, els. z6, 2I.
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of
the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952, which
by s. 3 empowered the State Government to constitute mining
areas for the purpose of providing them with certain amenities
after hearing objections from the lessees, by s. 4 to impose and
collect a cess not exceeding 5% of the valuation of the minerals
at the pit's mouth and by s. 5 created a fund to which the cess
was to be credited. The petitioners' case, inter alia, was that the
impugned Act and the rules made thereunder were ultra_vires the
powers of the State Legislature, the cess levied thereunder was
not a fee but a duty of excise on coal within Entry 84 of List I
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and repugnant to
Coal Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1947 (Act XXXll of 1947),
and, alternatively, even supposing it was a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 of List II, it was hit by Entry 54 of List I read
with the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act
1948 (Act Lill of 1948), or. by Entry 52 of List I read with the
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act •. 1951 (Act LXV of
1951). It was urged on behalf of the State, inter alia, that the
cess was a fee and not a duty of excise and the competence of
the State Legislature to levy it was not affected by the Central
Acts.
Held (per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ.), that the cess imposed by the Act was a fee relatable to
Entries 23 and 66 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution and the Constitutional validity of the impugned
Act was beyond question.
Although there. can be no generic difference between a tax
and a fee since both are compulsory exactions of money by public
11 u~horities, there is this distinction between them that whereas
a tax is imposed for public purposes and requires no consideration to support it, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered
and there must be an element of quid pro quo between the person
November 111.
538
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
who pays it and the public authority that imposes it. While a
tax invariably goes into the consolidated fund, a fee is earmarkTh• Hingired for the specified services in a fund created for the purpose.
Rampur Coal Co .. Whether a cess is one or the other would naturally depend on
Lid. &- Others the facts of each case. If in the guise of a fee, the Legislature
v.
imposes a tax, it is for the Court on a scrutiny of the scheme of
The Slat• of the levy, to determine its real character. The distinction is
Orissa ..S- Olhers recognised by the Constitution which while empowering the
appropriate Legislatures to levy taxes under the Entries in the
three lists refers to their power to levy fees in respect of any
such matters, except the fees taken in court, and tests have been
laid down by this Court for determining the character of an impugned levy.
Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board, 60 C.L.R. 263, The
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, [1954] S.C.R.
1005, Mahant Sri ]agannath Ramanuj Das & Anr. v. The State of·
Orissa, [1954) S.C.R. 1046, and Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The
State of Bombay, [r954] S.C.R. 1055, referred to.
P. P. Kutti Keva & Ors. v. The State of Madras, A.LR. 1954
Mad. 621, Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Esquimalt and
Nanaimo Railway Co., (1950) A.C. 87 and Parton & Anr. v. Mils
Board (Victoria). (1949) 80 C.L.R. 229, considered and held inapplicable.
In determining whether a levy is a fee the true test must be
whether its primary and essential purpose is to render specific
services to a specified area or class, it being of no consequence
that the State may ultimately and indirectly be benefited by it.
So judged, the scheme of the impugned Act leaves no manner of doubt that the levy authorised by it is a fee and not a
tax.
The amount of the levy must depend on the extent of the
services sought to be rendered and if they are proportionate, it
would be unreasonable to say that since the impost is high it
must be a duty of excise. The rate specified by s. 4(2) of the
Act, therefore, cannot by itself alter the character of the levy
and constitute a trespass by the State Legislature on the legislative powers of the Parliament under Entry 84 of tb.e List I.
Nor can the method prescribed by the Legislature for recovering the levy by itself alter its character. The method is a
matter of convenience and, though relevant, has to be tested in
the light of other relevant circumstances. It is not permissible
to challenge tb.e vires of a statute relatable to an Entry in List
II solely on the ground that the method adopted for the recovery of the impost can . and generally is adopted in levying a
duty of excise.
Ralla Ram v. The Province of East Punjab, [1948] F.C.R. 207,
Byramjee ] eejeebhoy v. The Province of Bombay & Anr. I.L.R.
z960
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
1940 Born. 58 and Governor-General in Council v. Province of
I96o
Madras, (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 91, considered.
. .
The limitation imposed by the latter part of Entry 23 of The H•ngirList II is a limitation on the legislative competence of the State Rampur Coal Co.
Legislature itself and the test whether a statute passed by the Ltd. cS- Others
State Legislature thereunder was ultra vires would be whether
v.
the requisite declaration under Entry 54, List I, has been made Th• Stal• 01
by Parliament by law :covering the same field or not; it is not Orissa cS- Others
necessary in order to make the declaration effective that rules
should also be made and enforced.
Although by operation of Art. 372 of the Constitution Act
LIU of 1948 was an existing Act substantially covering the
same field as covered by the impugned Act, there was no adaptation of s. 2'of that Act whereby a declaration implied by it could
be said to have been adapted to a declaration by Parliament.
Clause 16 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, properly construed, cannot be held to refer to the Dominion Legislature and
equate it with the Parliament. It can be resorted to only where
the existing law expressly refers to some authority that c.an be
equated with the :corresponding new authorities. Since the
Dominion Legislature was not so referred to, its competence
under the Constitution Act of 1935, repealed by the Constitution
of India, was 'clearly outside the clause. Nor can cl. 21 of the
order be of any help to the petitioners.
Consequently, in the absence of the requisite Parliamentary
declaration, the competence of the Orissa State Legislature
under Entry 23 read with Entry 66 of the List II was not
impaired and the imp11gned Act must be deemed to have repealed the Central Act, so far as that State was concerned.
This case incidentally discloses that in regard to the requisite
Parliamentary declaration prescribed by Entry 54 in List I in its
application to the pre-constitution Acts under corresponding
Entry 36 in List I of the Cpnstitution Act of 1935, there is a
lacuna which has not been covered by any clauses of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950.
Nor was the impugned Act ultra vires the State Legislature by
operation of Entry 52 of List I read with s. 2 of the Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (LXV of 1951). That
Act, in pith and substance, deals more directly with the co11trol
of certain specified industries including the coal industry, while
the impugned Act is concerned with the development of the
mining areas notified under it. The field covered by the two
Acts was not, therefore, the same.
Per Wanchoo, J.-In order to determine whether a levy is
a tax or a fee, what has to be considered is the pith and substance of the levy. Where the levy in pith and substance is not
essentially different from a tax, it cannot be converted into a
fee by crediting it to a special fund and attaching certain services to it.
540
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
The Commissiontr, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, v.
Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mull, [1954]
The HingirS.C.R. 1005, Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of
Rampur Coal Co., Orissa, [1954] S.C.R. rn46 and Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The
Ltd. & Others State of Bombay, [1954] S.C.R. rn55, discussed.
v.
A duty of excise in pith and substance is primarily a duty
The State of
levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commoOrissa <!>Others dity manufactured or produced. It is different and distinct from
a sales tax and in law they do not overlap.
Governor-General in Councilv. Province of Madras, 72 I.A. 91,
referred to.
What the impugned Act did was to provide for the levying
of the cess on the goods produced at a rate not exceeding five
per centum of the value at ·the pit's mouth. The cess was,
therefore, in pith and substance a duty of excise falling within
Entry 84 of List I, which the State legislature could not levy.
It was not correct to say that the method employed by the
impugned Act for realising the cess was a mere method of quantification and did not affect its character which was that of a fee.
In the present case the very mode of the levy of the cess is
nothing other than the levy of a duty of excise, and, therefore,
the principle of quantification for purposes of a fee could not be
so extended as to convert what was in pith and substance a tax
into' a fee.
Sri Byramjee Jeejeebhoy v. The Province of Bombay, I.L.R.
1940 Born. 58, Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Patel Gordhandas Horgovandas, I.L.R. 1954 Born. 41 and Ralla Ram v. The
Province of East Punjab, [1948] F.C.R. 207, considered.
K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa, [1954]
S.C.R. l, referred to.
.
The cess levied under s. 4 of the Act could not be justified
as a tax on mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule and the impugned Act was in effect a colourable piece of legislation.
I960
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 87 of 1959.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
M. P. Amin, Dara P. Mehta, P. lJf. Amin, S. N.
Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.
Vohra for the petitioners.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer, P. Kesava Pillai and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar, for the Intervener.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
1960. November, 21. The Judgment of P. B.
r96o
Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sar~ar, K. Subba R~o and The HingfrJ. R. Mudholkar, JJ., was delivered by P. B. GaJendra- Rampur Coal Co.,
gadkar J., K. N. W anchoo, J., delivered a. separate Ltd. &- Another
.:-... ..J,........... __ ....
v.
The State of
Orissa &- Others
JUU!::;ll.lt'11~.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This is a petition filed
under Art. 32 of the Constitution in which the validity
of the Orissa Mining Areas Development ]'und Act, Gajendragadkar ].
1952 (XXVII of 1952), is challenge'd. The first petitioner is a public limited company which has its registered office at Bombay. A large majority of its shareholders are citizens of India; some of them are themselves companies incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. Petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 are the Directors
of Petitioner No. 1, the second petitioner being the
Chairman of its Board of Directors. These petitioners
are all citizens of India. At all material times the
first petitioner carried on and still carries on the business of producing and selling coal excavated from its
collieries at Rampur in the State of Orissa. Two leases
have been executed in its favour; the first was executed on October 17, 1941, by the Governor of Orissa
whereby all that piece or parcel of land in the registration district of Samba.lpur admeasuring about
3341. 79 acres has been demised for a period of 30
years commencing from September 1, 1939, in consideration of the rent reserved thereby and subject to the
covenants and conditions prescribed thereunder; and
the second is a surface lease executed in its favour by
M.r. Mohan Brijraj Singh Deo on April 19, 1951, in
relation to a land admeasuring approximately 211.94
acres for a like period of 30 years ·commencing from
.February 4, 1939, in consideration of the rent and
subject to the terms and conditions prescribed by it.
Pursuant to s. 5 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act,
1951, all the right, title and interest of the Zamindar
of Rampur in the lands demised to the first petitioner
under the second lease vested in respondent 1,. the
State of Orissa. Since then the first p~titioner has
duly paid the rent reserved, by the said lease to the
appropriate authorities appointed by respondent 1,
~
.
542
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961)
·and has observed and performed all the conditions and
w .
convenants of the said lease. In exercise of its rights
Ramp'.., ';0~;-co. under the said two leases the first petitioner entered
Ltd. & Others 'upon the lands demised and has been carrying on the
v.
J::irrsinesg of excavating and producing coal at its collieTh• state of
ries at Rampur.
Onssa & Others
In December, 1952, the Legislature of the State of
Ga
1. Orissa passed the impugned Act.; and it received the
1
g
assent of the Governor of Onssa on December 10,
1952. It was, however, not reserved for the consideration of the President of India nor has it received
his assent. In pursuance of the rule-making power
conferred on it by the impugned Act respondent 1 has
purported to make rules called the Orissa Mining
Areas Development Act Rules, 1955; these rules have
been duly notified in the State Gazette on January
25, 1955.
Subsequently, the Administrator, respondent 2,
appointed under the impugned Act issued a notification on June 24, 1958, whereby the first petitioner's
Rampur colliery has been notified for the purpose of
liability for the payment of cess under the impugned
Act. The area of this colliery has been determined
at 3341 ·79 acres. In its appeal filed under rule 3
before the Director of Mines the first petitioner objected to the issue of the said notification, inter alia, on
the ground that the impugned Act and the rules
framed under it were ultra vires and invalid; no action
has, however, been taken on the said appeal presumably because the authority concerned could not entertain or deal with the objections about the vires of the
Act and the rules.
Thereafter on March 26, 1959, the Assistant Administrative Officer, respondent 3, called upon the
first petitioner to submit monthly returns for the
assessment of the cess. The first petitioner then
represented that it had filed an appeal setting forth
its objections against the notification, and added that
until the said appeal was disposed of no returns would
be filed by it. In spite of this representation respondent 3, by his letter of May 6, 1959, called upon the
r96o
Th
-..a:::-:a""'
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
543
z96o
first petitioner to submit monthly returns in the prescribed form and issued the warning that failing com- Th H" .
pliance the first petitioner would be prosecuted under Ramp;.,
s. 9 of the impugned Act. A similiar demand was Lid. <?>-Other$ '
made and a similar warning issued by respondent
v.
3 by his letter dated June 6, 1959. It is under The State of
these circumstances that the present petition has been Orissa & Others
filed.
G · a-elk J
The petitioners contend that the impugned Act and a;en raga ar •
the rules made thereunder are ultra vires the powers of
the Legislature of the State of Orissa, or in any event
they are repugnant to the provisions of an existing
law. According to the petition the cess levied under
the impugned Act is not a fee but is in reality and in
substance a levy in the nature of a duty of excise on
the coal produced at the first petitioner's Rampur colliery, and as such is beyond the legislative competence
of the Orissa Legislature. Alternatively it is urged
that even if the levy imposed by the impugned Act is'
a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II of the
Seventh Schedule, it would nevertheless be ultra vires
having regard to the provisions of Entry 54 in List I
read with Central Act LUI of 1948. The petitioners
further allege that even if the said levy is held to be
a fee it would be similarly ultra vires having regard
to Entry 52 in List I read with Central Act LXV
of 1951. According to the petitioner,s the impugned
Act is really relatable to Entry 24 in List III, and
since it is repugnant with Central Act XXXII of 1947
relatable to the same Entry and covering the same
field the impugned Act is invalid to the extent of the
said repugnancy under Art. 254. On these allegations
the petitioners have applied for a writ of mandamus
or a writ in the nature of the said writ or any other
writ, order or direction prohibiting the respondents
from enforcing any of the provisioil.s of the impugned
Act against the first petitioner; a similar writ or order
is claimed against respondent 3 in respect of the
letters addressed by him to the 1st petitioner on
March 3, 1959 and June 6, 1959.
This petition is resisted by respondent 1 on several
grounds. It is urged on its behalf that the levy
i;;;;-co.
544
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
imposed by the impugned Act is a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II and its validity is not affected
";;';"c0 either by Entry 54 read with Act LIII of 1948 or by
Ltd. ~ 01 :,.. "Entry 52 read with Act LXV of 1951. In the alternav.
·
tive It is contended fo;;t if the a;;,id levy is held to be
Th• s1a1e ?f
a tax and not a fee, it would be a tax relatable to
Orissa & Others Entry 50 in List II, and as such the legislative com• d-dk
petence of the State Legislature to impose the same
G a1en raga ar 1.
.
cannot b e success f u lly ch a JIenged . Respondent 1 disputes the petitioner's contention that the impugned
Act is relatable to Entry 24 in List III; and so, according to it, no question of repugnancy with the Central
Act XXXII of 1947 arises.
After this appeal was fully argued before us Mr.
Amin suggested-and Mr. Sastri did not object-that
we should hear the learned Attorney-General on the
question as to whethe.r even if the levy imposed by the
impugned Act is a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66
in List II of the Seventh Schedule, it would nevertheless be ultra vires having regard to the provisions of
Entry 54 in List I read with Central Act LIII of 1948.
Accordingly we directed that a notice on this point
should be served on the learned Attorney-General and
the case should be set down for hearing on that point
again. For the learned Attorney-General the learned
Additional Solicitor-General appeared before us in
response to this notice and we have ha~ the benefit of
hearing his arguments on the point in question.
The first question which falls for consideration is
whether the levy imposed by the impugned Act amounts to a fee relatable to Entry 23 read with Entry 66
in List II. Before we deal with this question it is
necessary to consider the difference between the concept of tax and that of a fee. The neat and terse
definition of tax which has been given by Latham,
C. J., in Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board(1) is
often cited as a classic on this subject. "A tax", said
Latham, C. J., "is a compulsory exaction of money by
public authority for public purposes enforceable by
law, and is not payment for services rendered". In
bringing out the essential features of a tax this defini196°
T
H"
Ram;:,
.
(1) (1938) 6o C.L.R. 263, 276.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
tion also assists in distinguishing a tax from a fee. It
1960
is true that between a tax and a fee there is no generic
. .
·cc
Both are compulsory exact'10ns of money R The
d luerence.
P HingirCo 1 c
0
by public authorities; but whereas a tax is imposed for a~d~~ ot:ers "
public purposes and is not, and need not, be supported
v.
by any consideration of service rendered in r~turn, a The State of
fee is levied essentially for services rendered and as _orissa & Othm
such there is an elenient of quid pro quo between the G . d-dk.
person who pays the fee and the public authority aJtn raga ar 1 •
which imposes it. If specific services are rendered to
a specific area or to a specific class of persons or trade
or business in any local area, and as a condition precedent for the said services or in return for them cess
is levied against the said area or the said class of
persons or trade or business the cess is distinguishable
from a tax and is described as a fee. Tax recovered
by' public authority invariably goes into the consolidated fund which ultimately is utilised for all public purposes, whereas a cess levied by way of fee is not intended to be, and does not become, a part of the consolidated. fund. It is earmarked and set apart for th-e purpose
of services for which it is levied. There is, however,
an element of compulsion in the imposition of both
tax and fee. When the Legislature decides to render
a specific service to any area or to any.class of persons, it is not open to the said area or to the said class
of persons to plead that they do not want the service
and therefore they should be exell).pted from the payment of the cess. Though there is an element of quid
pro quo between the tax-payer and the public authority there is no option to the tax-payer in the matter
of receiving the service determined by public authority. In regard to fees there is, and must always be,
co-relation between the fee collected and the service
intended to be rendered. Cases may arise where under
the guise of levying a fee Legislature may attempt to
impose a tax; and in the case of such a colourable
exercise of legislative power courts would have to
scrutinise the scheme of the levy very carefully and
determine whether in fact there is a co-relation bet,
ween the service and the levy, or whether the levy is
either not co-related with service or is levied to such an
546
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
excessive extent as to be a pretence of a fee and not a
fee in reality. In other words, whether or not a parti· d by a s t atute amounts to a "iee or tax
Rampu' coal co. cu Iar cess 1evie
Ltd. o;. Others 'would always be a question of fact to be determined in
v.
the circumstances of each case. The distinction betThe State of
ween a tax and a fee is, however, important, and it is
Orissa & Othm recognised by the Qonstitution. Several Entries in the
Gajma,.gadka' . Three Lists empower the appropriate Legislatures to
1
levy taxes; but apart from the power to levy taxes
thus conferred each List specifically refers to the power
to levy fees in respect of any of the matters covered in
the said List excluding of course the fees taken in any
Court.
The question about the distinction between a tax
and a fee has been considered by this Court in three
decisions in 1954. In The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Mailras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(') the vires of the Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,
1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951), came to be examined.
Amongst the sections challenged was s. 76(1). Under
this section every religious institution had to pay to
the Government annual contribution not exceeding
5% of its income for the services rendered to it by the
said Government; and the argument was that the contribution thus exacted was not a fee but a tax and as
such outside the competence of the State Legislature.
In dealing with this argument Mukherjee, J., as he
then was, cited the definition of tax given by Latham,
C.J., in the case of Matthews('), and has elaborately
considered the distinction between a tax and a fee.
The learned . judge examined the scheme of the Act
and observed that "the material fact which negatives
the theory of fees in the present case is that the
money raised by the levy of the contribution is not
earmarked or specified for defraying the expense that
the Government has to incur in performing the services. All the collections go to the consolidated fund
of the State and all the expenses have to be met not
out of those collections but out of the general revenues
by a proper method of appropriation as is done in the
i96o
. .
Th e H ingit'-
(t) [1954] S.C.R. 1005.
(2) (1938) 60 C.L.R. 263.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
547
case of other Government expenses". The learned
r96o
judge no doubt added that the said circumstance was Th H" .
not conclusive and pointed out that in fact there was Ramp:, ~::~'~0 .,
a total absence of any co-relation between the expenses Ltd. c;. Others
incurred by the Government and the amount raised by
v.
contribution. That is whys. 76(1) was struck down T.h• State of
as ultra vires.
Orissa s. Others
The same point arose before this Court in respect of Gajendragadkar J.
the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939, as
amended by amending Act II of 1952 in Mahant Sri
Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa (1).
Mukherjea, J.; who again spoke for the Court, upheld
the validity of s. 49 which impose¢!. the liability to pay
the specified contribution on every Mutt or temple
having an a~nual income exceeding Rs. 250 for services rendered by the State Government. The scheme
of the impugned Act was examined and it was noticed
that the collections made under it are not merged in
the general public revenue and are not appropriated
in the manner laid down for appropriation of expenses
for other public purposes. They go to constitute a fund
which is contemplated by s. 50 of the Act, and this
fund to which the Provincial Government contributes
both by way of loan and grant is specifically set apart
for the rendering of services involved in carrying out
the provisions of the Act. The same view was taken
by this Court in regard to s. 58 of the Bombay Public
Trust Act, 1950 (Act XXIX of 1950) which 'imposed a
similar contribution for a similar purpose in Ratilal
PanacharuL GaruLhi v. The State of Bombay (2). It would
thus be seen that the tests whfoh have to be applied
in determining the character of any impugned levy
have been laid down by this Court in these three decisions; and it is in the light of these tests that we have
to consider the merits of the rival contentions raised
before us in the present petition.
On behalf of the petitioners Mr. Amin has relied on
three other decisions which may be briefly considered.
In P. P. Kutti Keya v. TM State of Madras (8), the
Madras High Court was called upon to consider, inter
(1) [1954) S.C.R. 1046.
(2) [1954) S.C.R. 1055.
(S) A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 621,
\
548
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
alia, the validity of s. 11 of the Madras Commercial
Crops Markets Act 20 of 1933 and Rules 28(1) and 28(3)
framed thereunder. Section 11(1) levied a fee on the
sales of commercial crops within the notified area and
s. 12 provided that the amounts collected by the Mar.
ket Committee shall be constituted into a Market
Fund which would be utilised for acquiring a site for
Gajendragadkar J. the market, constructil}g a building, maintaining the
market and meeting the expenses of the Market Committee. The argument that these provisions amounted
to services rendered to the notified area and thus made
the levy a fee and not a tax was not accepted by the
Court. Venkatarama Aiyar, J., took the view that the
funds raised from the merchants for a construction of
a market in substance amounted to an exaction of a
tax. Whether or not the construction of a market
amounted to a service to the notified area it is unnecessary for us to consider. Besides, as we have already pointed out we have now three decisions of this
Court which have authoritatively dealt with this matter, and it is in the light of the said decisions that the
present question has to be considered.
In Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Go. (1 ), the Privy Council
had to deal with the validity of forest protection impost levied by the relevant section of the Forest Act
R. S. B. C. 1936. The lands in question were statu.
torily exempted from taxation, and it was urged
against the validity of the impost that the levy of the
said impost was not a service charge but a tax; and
since it contravened the exemption from taxation
granted to the land it was invalid. This plea was upheld by the Privy Council. The Privy Council did
consider two circumstances which were relevant; the
first that the levy was on a defined class of interested
individuals, and the second that the fund raised did
not fall into the general mass of the proceeds of taxation but was applicable for a special and· limited purpose. It was conceded that these consideratfons were
relevant but the Privy Council thought that the
weight to be attached to them should not be exaggex96o
Th H' .
Ramp:,
Ltd. & Othm
v.
The State of
Orissa & Others
i;:;;·Co.,
(1) (1950) A.C. 87.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
549
rated. In appreciating the weight of the said relevant
1960
circumstances the Privy Council was impressed by the 1 .h . .
. quest"ion iorme
£
d an important
.
e H1ngir·
f:act t h a t th e 1ands lll
Rampur Coal Co
part of the national wealth of the Province and their Ltd. W-Anothe• ·•
proper administration, including in particular protecv.
tion against fire, is a matter of high public_conci!'lrn as ~he State of
well as one of particular interest to individuals. In Onssa .s. Othm
other words, the effect of the impugned p_rovisio:i;i WaSGajendragadhar ].
that the expenses of what was the public serv10e of
the greatest importance for the Province as a whole
had been divided between the general body of taxpayers and those individuals who had a special interest in having their property protected. It would thus
appear that this decision proceeded on the basis that
what was claimed to be a special service to the lands ·
in question was in reality an item in public service
itself, and so the element of quid pro quo was absent.
It is true that when the Legislature levies a fee for rendering specific services to a specified ij.rea or to a specifi~
ed class of persons or trade or business, in the last analysis such services may indirectly form part of services to
the public in general. If the special service rendered
is distinctly and primarily meant for the benefit of a
specified class or area the fact that in benefitting the
specified class or area the State as a whole may ultimately and indirectly be benefitted would not detract
from the character of the levy as a, fee. Where, how·
ever, the specific service is indistinguishable from public service, and in essence is directly a part of it, diffe~
rent considerations may arilile. In such a case it is
necessary to enquire what is the primary object of the
levy and the essential purpose which it is intended to
achieve. Its primary object and the essential purpose
must be distinguished from its ultimate or incidental
results or consequences. That is the true test in rletermining the character of the levy.
In Parton v. Mille Board (Victoria) (1), the validity
of the levy imposed on dairymen and owners of milk
depots bys. 30 of the Milk Board Act of 1933 as
amended by subsequent Acts of 1936-1939 wa.e
(I) (1949) So C.L.R. az9.
• 10
550
,SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
challenged, and it was held by Dixon, J., that the levy
of the said contribution a.mounted to the imposition of
Ra!;:~~:~~~o., a duty of excise. This decision was substantially based
Lid. .s. Others on the ground that the statutory boa.rd "performs no
v.
particular service for the dairyman or the owner of
Th• Slate of
a milk depot for which his contribution may be cono,issa .s. Others sidered as a fee or recompense"; that is to say the
G • d-dk
element of quid pro quo was absent qua the persons on
•J•n raga ar 1·whom the levy had been imposed. Therefore none of
the decisions on which Mr. Amin has relied can assist
his case.
Let us now examine the scheme of the impugned
Act. As the preamble shows it has been passed because
it was thought expedient to constitute mining areas
and a Mining Areas Development Fund in the State
of Orissa. It consists of 11 sections. Section 3 of the
Act provides for the constitution of a mining area
whenever it appears to the State Government that it
is necessary and expedient to provide amenities like
communications, water-supply and electricity for the
better development of any area in the State of Orissa.
wherein any mine is situated, or to provide for the
welfare of the residents or to workers in any such areas
within which persons employed in a mine or a. group
of mines reside or work. Under this section the State
Government has to define the limits of the area. and
is given the power to include within such area. any
local area. contiguous to the same or to exclude from
such area any local area. comprised therein; that is the
effect of s. 3(1). Section 3(2) empowers the owner or
a. lessee of a. mine or his duly constituted representative in the said area to file objections in respect of any
notification issued under s. 3(1) within the period specified, and the State Government is required to take
the said objection into consideration. After considering objections received the State Government is authorised to issue a notification constituting a mining area
under s. 3(3). Section 4 deals with the imposition and
collection of cess. The rate of the levy authorised
shall not exceed 5 per centum of the valuation of the
minerals at the pit's mouth. Section 5 provides for the
constitution of the Orissa Mining Areas Development
z96o
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.I
I
•.
551
Fund. This fund vests in the State Government
z96o
a.nd ha.a to be ~ministered by such officer or ?fficers The Hingira.s ma.y be a.ppomted by the State Government m that Rampur coal co.
behalf. Section 5(2) requires that t~ere shall be pa.id Lttl• .s. 011t#r1 '
to the credit of the· said fund the proceeds of th.e cess
v.
recovered under s. 4 for ea.ch mining area. during the T_he State of
quarter after deducting expenses, if any, for collectiqn Orissa .s. Otlim
and recovery. Section 5(3) contemplates tha.t to theGajentlragailllar 1.
credit of the said fund shall be pla.ced all collections of
ceBB under s. 5(2) as well as a.mounts from State Go~
vernment and the local authorities and public subscriptions specifically given for any of the purposes of Lhe
fund. Section 5(4) deals with the topic of the a.pplica.tion of the said fund. The fund has to be utilised
to meet expenditure incurred in connection with such
measures which in the opinion of the State Government a.re necessary or expedient for providing amenities like communications, water supply and electricity,
for the better development of the mining areas, and to
meet the welfare of the la.hour and other persons residing or working in the mining areas. Section 5(5) lays
down that without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing provisions the fund may be utilised to defray any of the purposes specified in els. (a) to (e). Under s. 5(6) the State Government is given the power to
decide whether any particular expenditure is or is not
debitable to the fund and their decisjon is ma.de final;
and s. 5(7) imposes on the State Govemm~nt an obligation to publish annually in the gazette a report of
the activities fin11inced from the fund together with an
estimate of receipts a.nd expenditure of the fund a.nd
a statement of account. Section 6 prescribes the mode
of constituting a.n advisory committee. It has to consist of such number of members and .chosen in such
manner as ma.y be prescribed, provided however that
ea.ch committee shall include representatives of mineowners a.nd workmen employed in mining industry.
The names of ·the members of the committee a.re
required to be published in the gazette. Section 7
dea~ with the appointment and functions of .the· s~tu·. tory authorities to carry out the purpose of the Ao~
while ·s. 8 confot.s on the State· Gove:tnm~nt power to
552
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
make rules. Section 9 prescribes penalties and provides for prosecutions; and s. 10 gives protection to the
. respect of a.nyth.mg
Ramp co 1 c spe01•fied au th on•t•ies or offi cers m
Ltd~~ 01:.,,°" done or intended to be done by them in good faith in
v.
pursuance of the Act or any rules or order ma.de
Th• SW• of
thereunder. Section 11, which is the last section, conOrissa .s. Olhm fers on the State Government the power to do any.
G . ,-dk
thing which may appear to them to be necessary for
41
'" rag• ar 1 ·the purpose of removing difficulties in giving effect to
the provisions of the Act.
The scheme of the Act thus clearly shows that it
has been passed for the purpose of the development
of mining areas in the State. The basis for the operation of the Act is the constitution of a. mining area.,
and it is in regard to mining areas thus constituted
that the provisions of the Act come into play. It is
not difficult to appreciate the intention of the State
Legislature evidenced by this Act. Orissa is an underdeveloped State in the Union of India. though it has
a lot of mineral wealth of great potential value. Unfortunately its mineral wealth is located generally in
areas sparsely populated with bad communications.
Inevitably the exploitation of the minerals is handicapped by lack of communications, and the difficulty
experienced in keeping the labour force sufficiently
healthy and in congenial surroundings. The mineral
development of the State, therefore, requires that provision should be ma.de for improving the communications by constructing good roads and by providing
means of transport such as tramways; supply of water
and electricity would also help. It would also be
necessary to provide for amenities of saruta.tion and
education to the labour force in order to attract workmen to the area.. Before the Act was passed it appears
that the mine-owners tried to put up small-length
roads and tramways for their own individual purpose,
but that obviously could not be as effective as roads
constructed by the State and tramway service provided by it. It is on a. consideration of these factors
that the State Legislature decided to take an active
pa.rt in unsystematic development of its mineral areas
which would help the mine-owners in moving their
r96o
. .
T he H1ng11·
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
553
z960
minerals quickly through the shortest route and
would attract labour to assist the excavation of the n H" .
minerals. Thus there can be no doubt that the pri- R
;;c·;~0
mary and the principal object of the Act is to develop a':id~~ 0~=ers '
the mineral areas in the State and to assist more
v.
efficient and extended exploitation of its mineral Tha Stata of
wealth.
.
.
Orissa & Others
The constitution of the advisory committee as pres- G . d-dk
cribed by s. 4 emphasises the fact that the policy of a;en raga ar 1•
the Act would be to carry out with the assistanee of
the mine-owners and their workmen. Thus after a
mining area is notified an advisory committee is constituted ~n respect of it, and the task of carrying out
the objects of the Act is left to the care of the said
advisory committee subject to the provisions of the
Act. Even before an area is notified the mine-owners
are allowed an opportunity to put forward their objections. These features of the Act are also relevant
in determining the question as to whether the Act is
intended to render service to the specified area and
to the class of persons who a.re subjected to the levy
of the cess.
Section 5 shows that the cess levied does not become a part of the consolidated fund and is not subject to an appropriation in that behalf; it goes into the
special fund earmarked for carrying out the purpose
of the Act, and thus its existence establishes a corelation between the cess and the purpose for which it
is levied. It was probably felt that some additions
should be made to the special fund, and so s. 5(3) contemplates that grants from the State Government and
local authorities and public subscriptions may be collected for enriching the said fund. Every year a report of the activities financed by the fund has to be
published together with an estimate of receipt and
expenditure and a statement of accounts. It would
thus be clear that the administration of the fund
would be subject to public scrutiny and person!> who
are called upon to pay the levy would have an opportunity to see whether the cess collected from them has
been properly utilised for the purposes for which it is
intended to be used. It is not alleged by the petitioners
;e
554
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
that the levy imposed is unduly or unreasonably
Th H" .
excessive so as to make the imposition a coloura.ble
Ramp:, i;;::;-co., exercise of legislative p~wer. Indeed the fact that the
Ltd.<!> Others accounts have to be published from year to year affords
v.
an indication to the contrary. Thus the scheme of
The St••• of the Act shows that the cess is levied against the class
Orsssa <!> Others of persons owning mines in the notified area and it is
levied to enable the State Government to render speci. ,-,.
G•J•n raga ""' 1 ·
•
~
by developmg
· the notified
fie services
to t he sai"d c,ass
mineral area. There is an element of quid pro quo in
the scheme, the cess collected is constituted into a
specific fund and it has not become a part of the con119lidated fund, its application is regulated by a statute
and is confined to its purposes, and there is a definite
co-relation between the impost and the purpose of the
Act which is to render service to the notified area.
These features of the Act impress upon the levy the
character of a. fee as distinct from a. tax.
It is, however, urged that the cess levied by s. 4(2)
is in substance and reality a. duty of excise. As we
have already noticed s. 4(2) provides that the rate of
such levy shall not exceed 5 per centum of the valuation of the minerals at the pit's mouth; in other words
it is the value of the minerals produced which is the
basis for calculating the cess payable by mine-owners,
and that precisely is the nature in which duty of
excise is levied under Entry 84 in List I. The said
Entry empowers Parliament to impose duties of excise,
inter a.lia, on goods manufactured or produced in India.
When minerals a.re produced from mines and a duty
of excise is intended to be imposed on them it would
be normally imposed at the pit's mouth, and that is
precisely what the impugned Act purports to do. It is
also contended that the· rate prescribed by s. 4(2)
indicates that it operates not as a mere fee but as a
duty of excise. This argument must be carefully examined before the character of the cess is finally determined. It is not disputed that under Entry 23 in
List II read with Entry 66 in the said '.List the State
Legislature can levy a fee in respect of mines and
mineral development. Entry 23 reads thus: "Regulation of Mines and mineral development subject to
z960
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
555
the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and
r96o
development under the control of the Union". We Th H' .
will deal. with the condition imposed b~ ~he latter Ramp:, ~:!~'~0.,
part of this Entry later. For the present it is enough Ltd . .s. Others
to state that regulation of mines and mineral developv.
ment is within the competence of the State I,.egisla- T~e Stal• of •
tu re. Entry 66 provides that fees in respect of any Omsa 0- Others
of the ma~ters in the ~a.id List ca.n be imposed by ~he Gajendragatlhar J.
State Legislature subJect of course to the exception
of fees taken in any Court. The argument is that
though the State Legislature is competent to levy a.
fee in respect of mines and mineral development, if
the statute passed by a State Legislature in substance
and in effect imposes a duty of excise it is travelling
outside its jurisdictiOn and is trespassing on the legis· ·
lative powers of Parliament.
This argument is based on two considerations. The
first relates to the form in which the levy is impose~,
and the second relates to the extent of the levy
authorised. The extent of the levy authorised would
always depend upon the nature of the services intended to be rendered and the financial obligations incurred thereby. If the services intended to be rendered to the notified mineral areas require that a. fairly
large cess should be collected and co-relation can be
definitely established between the proposed services
and the impost levied', then it would be unreasonable
to suggest that because the rate of 'the levy is high it
is not a. fee but a. duty of excise. In the present ca.se,
if the development of the mining areas involves considerable expenditure which necessitates the levy of
the prescribed rate it only means that the services being
rendered to the mining areas are very valuable and,
the rate-payer in substance is compensating the State
for the services rendered by it to him. It is significant that the petitioners do not seriously suggest
that the services intended to be rendered are a cloak
and not genuine, or that the taxes ievied have no
relation to the said services, or that they are unreasonable and excessive. Therefore, in our opinion, the
extent of the rate allowed · to be imposed by s..4(2)
oannot by itself alter the character of the levy from a.
556
z96o
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
fee into that of a duty of excise. If the co-relation
Th H" .
between the levy and the services was not genuine or
Ramp:, -;;:;;~ •. real, or if the levy was disproportionately higher than
'the requirements of .the services intended to be rendered it would have been another matter.
The s101e of
Then as t-0 the form in which the impost is levied,
011 ssa &- 01/"'s it is difficult to appreciate how the method adopted
GajendTagadkar J. ?Y the Legislature in recovering the impost can alter
its character. The character of the levy must be determined in the light of the tests to which we have already referred. The method in which the fee is recovered is a matter of convenience, and by itself it cannot
fix upon the levy the character of the duty of excise.
This question has often been considered in the past,
and it has always been held that though the method
in which an impost is levied may be relevant in determining its character its significance and effect cannot
be exaggerated. In Balla Ram v. The Province of
East Punjab (1 ) the Federal Court had to consider the
character of the tax levied by s. 3 of the Punjab
Urban Immoveable Property Tax Act XVII of 1940.
Section 3 provided as follows : "There shall be charg ed, levied and paid an annual to tax on buildings and
lands situated in the rating areas shown in the schedule to this Act at such rate not exceeding twenty
per centum of the annual value of such buildings and
lands as the Provincial Government may by notification in official gazette direct in respect of each such
rating area". The argument urged before the Federal
Court was that the tax imposed by the said section
was in reality a tax on income within the meaning of
Item 54 in List I of the Seventh 'Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935, and as such it was not covered
by Item 42 in List II of the said Schedule. This argument was rejected on the ground that the tax levied
by the Act was in pith and substance a tax on lands
and buildings covered by Item 42. It would be noticed that the basis of the tax was the annual value of
the building which is the basis used in the Indian
Income-tax Act for determining income from property;
and so, the attack against the section was based on
Ltd. c;. Othm
v.
(1) (1948) F.C.R. •O'/·
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
557
the ground that it had adopted the same basis for
z960
levying the impost as the Income-tax Act and the Th H" .
said basis determined its character whatever may be Ramp:r ~;;;-Co
the appearance in which the impost was purported to Ltd. &- Others "
be levied. In repelling this argument Fazl Ali, J.
v.
observed that the crucial question to be answered was na State of
whether merely because the Income-tax Act has Orissa &- Others
adopted the annual value as the standard for deter- Gaj•ndragatlkar 1
mining the income it must necessarily follow that if
·
the same standard is employed as a. measure for any
other tax that tax becomes a tax on income. The
learned judge then proceeded to add that if the .answer
to this question is to be given in the affirmative then
certain taxes which cannot possibly be described a.s
income-tax must be held to be so. In other words,
the effect of this decision is that the adoption of the
standard used· in Income-tax Act -for getting at the
income by any other act for levying the tax authorised by it would not be enough to convert the said tax
into an income-tax. During the course of this juclgment Fazl Ali, J. also noticed with approval a similar
view taken by the Bombay High Court in Sir Byramjee Jeejeehhoy v. The Province of Bombay(1 ).
This decision has been expressly approved by the
Privy Council in Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras (9 ). Consistently with the decision of
the Federal Court their Lordship~ ·expressed the
opinion that "a duty of excise is 'primarily a duty
levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the
commodity manufactured or produced. It is a tax on
goods and not on sales or the proceeds of the sale of
goods. The two taxes, the one levied on the manufacturer in respect of his goods and the other on the
vendor in respect of his sales may in one sense overlap, but in law there is no overlapping; the taxes are
separate and distinct imposts. If in fa.ct they overlap that may be because the taxing authority· imposing a duty of excise finds it convenient to impose
that duty at the moment when th,e. exciseable article
{I) I.L.R. 1940 Bom. 58.
(2) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 91.
7t
558
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
'9 60
leaves the factory or workshop for the first time on the
TA• Hi•&i•occasion of its sale". In that case the question was
Rampvr coal co. whether the tax a~thorised by the Madras General
J.1d. If>- Othm Sales Tax Act, 1939, was a tax on the sale of goods
v.
or was a duty of excise, and the Privy Council held
TA• Stat• 01 it was the former and not the .latter. Therefore,
Orissa If>- OIAers in our opinion, the mere fact that the levy imposed by
Gaj••dragadka• J. the impugned Act has adopted the
method of determining the rate of the levy by reference to the
minerals produced ,by the mines would not by itself
make the levy a duty of excise. The method thus
adopted may be relevant in considering the character
of the impost but its effect must be weighed along
with and in the light of the other relevant circumstances. In this connection it is always necessary to
bear in mind that where an impugned statute passed
by a State Legislature is relatable to an Entry in
List II it is not permissible to challenge its vires only
on the ground that the method adopted by it for the
recovery of the impost can be and is generally adopted in levying a duty of excise. Thus considered the
conclusion is inevitable that the cess levied by the
impugned Ac.t is neither a tax nor a duty of excise but
is a fee.
The next question which arises is, even if the cess is
a. fee and as such may be relatable to Entries 23 and
66 in List II its validity is still open to challenge
because the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to the provisions of
List I with respect to regulation and· development
under the control of the Union; and that takes us to
Entry 54 in List I. This Entry reads thus: "Regnlation of mines and mineral development to the extent
t.o which such regulation and development under the
control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law
to be expedient in the public interest". The effect of
reading the two Entries together is clear. The jurisdiction of the State Legiillature under Entry 23 is subject to the liniitation imposed by the latter part of the
said Entry. If Parliament by its law has declared
that regulation and development of mines should in
public interest be under the control of the Union, to
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
559
8 60
the extent of such declaration the jurisdiction of the
9
State Legislature is excluded. In other words, if a n -;;· .
Central Act has been passed which contains a declara- Ramp:, ~:!~'~0•
tion by Parliament as required by Entry 54, and if Ltd. o$. Olhm '
the said declaration covers the field occupied by the im- . v.
pugned Act the impugned Act would be ultra virea, not Th• s1a11 of
because of any repugnance between the two statutes Orissa .s. OIMri
but because the State Legislature had no jurisdiction G .,,., agadliar J
to pass the law. The limitation imposed by the latter v '
·
part of Entry 23 is a limitation on the legislative
competence of the State Legislature itself. This
position is not in dispute.
It is urged by Mr. Amin that the field covered by
the impugned Act has already been covered by the
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)
Act, 1948, (Liii of 1948) and he contends that in view
of the declaration made by s. 2 of this Act the
impugned Act is ultra vires. This Central Act was
passed to provide for the regulation of mines and oil
fields and for the development of minerals. It may
be stated at this stage that by Act LXVII of 1957
which ha.s been subsequently passed by Parliament,
Act Liil of 1948 has now been limited only to oil
fields. We a.re, however, concerned with the operation
of the said Act in 1952, and at that time it applied to
mines as well as oil fields. Section 2 of the Act contains a declaration as to the expediency and control
by the Central Government. It reads thus: "It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest
that the Central Government should take under
its control the regulation of mines and oil fields
and the development of minerals to the extent
hereinafter provided". It is common ground that
at the relevant time this Act applied to coal mines.
Section 4 of the Act provides that no mining
lease shall be granted after the commencement of
this Act otherwise than in accordance with the
rules made under this Act. Section 5 empowers
the Central Government to make rules by notification for regulating the grant of mining leases or
for prohibiting the grant of such leases in respect
of any mineral or in· any area. Sections 4 and 5 thus
560
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
purport to prescribe necessary conditions in accordance
with which mining leases have to be executed. This
Rampur coal co., part of the Act has no relevance to our present purLtd . .s. Othm pose. Section 6 of the Act, however, empowers the
v.
Central Government to make rules by notification in
n. State 01 the official gazette for the conservation and developoross• &- Others ment of minerals. Section 6(2) lays down several
Gaj•nd;;;;dAar ;. matters in respect of which rules can be framed by the
Central Government. This power is, however, without prejudice to the generality of powers conferred on
the Central Government by s. 6(1). Amongst the
matters covered by s. 6(2) is the levy and collection of
royalties, fees or taxes in respect of minerals mined,
quarried, excavated or collected. It is true that no
rules have in fact been framed by the Central Government in regard to the levy and collection of any fees;
but, in our opinion, that would not make any difference. If it is held that this Act contains the declaration referred to in Entry 23 there would be no difficulty in holding that the declaration covers the field
of conservation and development of minerals, and
the said field is indistinguishable from the field covered by the impugned Act. What Entry 23 provides is
that the legislative competence of the State Legislature is subject to the provisions of List l with respect
to regulation and development under the control of the
Union, and Entry 54 in List I requires a declaration
by Parliament by law that regulation and development of mines should be under the control of the
Union in public interest. Therefore, if a Central Act
has been passed for the purpose of providing for the
conservation and development of minerals, and if it
contains the requisite declaration, then it would not
be competent to the State Legislature to pass an Act
in respect of the subject-matter covered by the said
declaration. In order that the declaration should be
effective it is not necessary that rules should be made
or enforced; all that this required is a declaration by
Parliament that it is expedient in the public interest
to take the regulation and development of mines under
the control of the Union. In such a case the test must
be whether the legislative declaration covers the field
'9
Th• Hingir-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
561
or not. Judged by this test there can be no doubt that
1960
the field covered by the impugned Act is covered by
H' .
the Central Act LUI of 1948.
·
~0C,:;~ 0
It still remains to consider whether s. 2 of the said Ltd. & Others ·•
Act amounts in law to a declaration by Parliament as
v.
required by Art. 54. When the said Act was passed 1'hs State of
in 1948 the legislative powers of the Central and the Orissa & Others
Provincial Legislatures were governed by the r~lev~nt Gajendragadkar J.
Entries in the Seventh Schedule to the Const1tut10n
Act of 1935. Entry 36 in List I corresponds to the
present Entry 54 in List I. It reads thus: "Regula~ion
of Mines and Oil Fields and mineral development to
the extent to which such regulation and development
under Dominion control is declared by Dominion law
to be expedient in public interest". It would be noticed that the ·declaration required by Entry 36 is a
declaration by Dominion law. 'Reverting then to s. 2
of the said Act it is clear that the declaration contained in the said section is put in the passive voice; but
in the context there would be no difficulty in holding
that the said declaration by necessary implication has
been made by Dominion law. It is a declaration contained in a section passed by the Dominion Legislature, and so it is obvious that it is a declaration by a
Dominion law; but the question is: Can this declaration by a Dominion law be regarded constitutionally
as declaration by Parliament which is required by
Entry 54 in List I .
It has been urged before us by the learned Additional Solicitor-General and Mr. Amin that in dealing
with this question we should bear in mind two general
considerations. The Central Act has been continued
under Art. 372(1) of the Constitution as an existing
law, and the effect of the said constitutional provision
must be that the continuance of the existing law
would be as effective and to the same extent after the
Constitution came into force as before. It is urged
that after the said Act was passed and before the Constitution came into force no Provincial Legislature
could have validly made a. law in respect of the field
covered by the said Act, and it would be commonsense
to assume that the effect of the continuance of the
Ra!;:,
-
•
'
562
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
said law under Art. 372(l)·ca.nnot be any different. In
other
words, if no Provincial Legislature could have
T
nl •ngir"
Ra,.pur
Coal co. t respassed on th.e fi eld covere d by t h e sa1'd Act be1ore
Ltd. & Others 'the Constitution, the position would and must be the
v.
same even after the Constitution came into force.
TA• s1a11 of
It is also contended that for the purpose of bringing
Orissa & Others the provision of existing -laws into accord with the
Gajendragadhr l· provisions of the Constitution th~ President 'Yas given
power to make by order appropriate adaptations and
modifications of such Jaws, and the object of making
such adaptations obviously was to make the continuance of the existing laws fully effective. It is in the
light of these two general considerations, so the argument runs, must the point in question be considered.
The relevant clause in the Adaptation of Laws
Order, 1950, on which reliance has been placed in
support of this argument is cl. 16 in the Supplementary Pa.rt of the said Order. This clause provides that
subject to the provisions of this Order any reference
by whatever form of words in any existing law to any
authority competent at the date of the passing of that
law to exercise any powers or authorities, or to discharge any functions, in any part of India. shall, where
a. corresponding new authority has been constituted
by or under the Constitution, have effect until duly
repealed or amended as if it were a. reference to that
new authority. The petitioners contend that as a.
result of this clause the declaration ma.de by the
Dominion Legislature in s. 2 of the Central Act must
now be held to be the declaration ma.de by Parliament.
Is this contention justified on a fair and reasonable
construction of the clause? That is the crux of the
problem.
In considering this question it would be relevant to
recall the scheme of the Adaptation of Laws Order,
1950. It consists of Thre'e Parts. Pa.rt I deals with
the adaptation of Central Laws and indicates the
adaptation ~a.de therein; Part II deals with the
adaptation of Provincial Laws and follows the same
pattern; and Part III is a. Supplementary Pa.rt which
contains provisions in the nature of supplementary
provisions. A perusal of the clauses contained in Pa.rt
z960
• H'
.
...
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
563
1 60
I would show that though some adaptation was made
9
in Act LIU of 1948 it w&s not thought necessary to. Th n· .
make an adaptation in s. 2 of the said Act whereby Ramp:. ~;;;-co
the declaration implied in the said section has been Lta.h Others '
expressly adapted into a declaration by Parliament.
v.
:Now, the effect of cl. 16 in substance is to equate an T~e State 0 1
authority competent at the date of the passing of the Omsa .s. Olhm
existing law to exercise any powers or authorities, or Ga ·enaragadkar 1
to discharge any functions with. a corresponding new ~
·
authority which has been constituted by or under the
Constitution. Referenge to ·the authority in the context would suggest oases like reference to the Governor-General eo nomine, or Central Government . which
respectively would be equated with the President or
the Union Government. Prima fa.oie the reference to
authority would not include reference to a Legislature;
in this connection it may be relevant to point out that
Art. 372(1) refers to a competent Legislature as distinguished from other competent authorities. That is
the first difficulty in holding that cl. 16 refers to the
Dominion Legislature and purports to equate it with
the Parliament.
It is clear that for the application of this clause it
is necessary that a reference should have been made to
the authority by some words whatever may be their
form. In other words it is only where the existing law
refers expressly to some authority that this clause can
be invoked. It is difficult to construe the first pa.rt of
this clause to include authorities to whic.h no reference
is made by any words in terms, but to which such
reference may be implied; and quite clearly the Dominion Legislature is not expressly referred to in s. 2. In
construing the present clause we think it would be
straining the language of the clause to hold that an
authority to which no reference is made by words in
any pa.rt of the eXisting law could claim the benefit of
this clause.
Besides, there is no doubt that when the clause
refers to any au~hority competent to exercise any
powers or authorities, or to discharge any functions, it
refers to the powers; authorities or functions attributable tQ the existing law itself; that is to say, authorities
..
564
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
which are competent to exercise powers or to discharge
functions under the existing laws are intended to be
Ramp:, i;;;;;~ 0 • equated with corresponding new authorities. It is
Ltd. & others 'impossible to hold that the Dominion Legislature is an
v.
authority which was competent to exercise any power
~h• Stat• 0!
or to discharge any function under the existing law.
Omsa~Others Competence to exercise power to discharge functions
Gaj•ntlragadkar ;. to which the clause refers must inevitably be related
to the existing law and not to the Constitution Act of
1935 which would be necessary if Dominion Legislature was to be included as an authority under this
clause. The Constitution Act of 1935 had been repealed by the Constitution and it was not, and could not
obviously be, the object of the Adaptation of Laws
Order to make any adaptation in regard to the said
Act. Therefore, the competence of the Dominion
Legislature which flowed from the relevant provisions
of the Constitution Act of 1935 is wholly outside this
clause. We have carefully considered the arguments
urged before us by the learned Additional SolicitorGeneral and Mr. Amin but we are unable to hold that
cl. 16 can be pressed into service for the purpose of
supporting the conclusion that the declaration by the
Dominion Legislature implied iri s. 2 of Act LUI of
1948 can, by virtue of cl. 16, be held to be a declaration by Parliament within the meaning of the relevant
Entries in the Constitution. If that be the true position then the alternative challenge to the vires of the
Act based on cl. 16 of the Adaptation of Laws Order
must fail.
There is another possible argument which may
prima f acie lead to the same conclusion. Let us assume
that the result of reading Art. 372 and cl. 16 of the
Adaptation of Laws Order is that under s. 2 of Act
LIU of 1948 there is a declaration by Parliament as
suggested by the petitioners and the learned Additional
Solicitor-General. Would that meet the requirements
of Entry 54 in List I of the Seventh Schedule? It is
difficult to answer this question in the affirmative
because the relevant provisions of the Constitution
are prospective and the declaration by Parliament
specified by Entry 54 must be declaration made by
i96o
Th H'
.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
565
Parliament subsequent to the date when the Constitux96o
tion came into force .. Unless a·declaration is made by Th H" .
Parliament after the Constitution came into force it Ramp:, ~:~·;~0 •
will not satisfy the requirements of Entry 54, and that Ltd . .s. Ano.llur '
inevitably would mean that the impugned Act. is
v.
validly enacted under Entry 23 in List II of the ~he State of
Seventh Schedule. If that be the true position then it Omsa .s. Others
would follow that even on the a~umption that cl. 16 Gajendragadkar 1
of the Adaptation of Laws Order and Art. 372 can be
·
construed as suggested by the petitioners the impugned Act would be valid.
·
Faced with this difficulty, both the learned Additional Solicitor-General and Mr. Amin argued that
cl. 21 of the said Order may be of some assistance.
Clause 21 reads thus: "Any Court, Tribunal, or autho.rity required or empowered to enforce any law in
force in the territory of India immediately before the
appointed day shall, notwithstanding that this Order
' makes no provision or insufficient provision for the
adaptation of the law for the purpose of bringing it
into accord with the provisions of the Constitution,
construe the law with all such adaptations as are
necessary for the said purpose". Assuming that this
clause is valid we do not see how it is relevant in the
present case. All that this clause purports to do is to
·· empower the Court to construe the law with such adaptations as may be necessary for the purpose Qf bring~
ing it in accord with the provisions of the Constitution. There is no occasion to make any adaptation in
construing Act LIII of 1948 for bringing it into accord
with the provisions of the Constitution at all. The
said Act has been continued under Art. 372(1) and
there is no constitutional defect in the said Act for
the avoidance of which any adaptation is necessary.
In fact what the petitioners seek to do is to read in
s. 2 of the said Act the declaration by Parliament
required by Entry 54 so as to make the impugned Act
ultra vireB. Quite clearly cl. 21 cannot be pressed· into
service for such a purpose. Therefore, we reach this',
position that the field covered by Act LIII of 1948 is
substantially the same as the field covered by the
'/'I
566
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
impugned Act but the declaration made by s. 2 of the
. .
said Act does not constitutionally amount to the requiR 1 ;• H';;g~r~ site declaration by Parliament, and so the limitation
•;,/~ ;,~.., o., imposed by Entry 54 does not come into operation in
v.
the present case. Act LIII of 1948 continues in opera.Th• State 0 1
tion under Art. 372; with this modification that so far
. Oriss• .s. Othm as the State of Orissa is concerned it is the impugned
Ga 'endragadhr . Act t~at governs. an~ not the C~ntral Act. Arti~le
'
·1 372(1) m fact provides for the contmuance of the ex1s.
ting law until it is altered, repealed or amended by a
competent Legislature or other competent authority.
In the absence of the requisite parliamentary declaration the legislative competence of the Orissa Legislature under Entry 23 read with Entry 66 is not impaired, and so the said Legislature is competent either to
repeal, alter or amend the existing law which is the
Central Act LIII of 1948; in effect, after the impugned
Act was passed, so far as Orissa is concerned the
Central Act must be deemed to be repealed. This
position is fully consistent with the provisions of
Art. 372. The result is that the material words used
in els. 16 and 21 being unambiguous and explicit, it is
difficult to give effect to the two general considerations
on which reliance has been placed by the petitioners.
Incidentally the present case discloses that in regard
to the requisite parliamentary declaration prescribed by Entry 54 in List I in its appHcation to the preConstitution Acts under corresponding Entry 36 in
List I of the Constitution Act of 1935, there is a
lacuna which has not been covered by any clauses of
the Adaptation of Laws Order; that, however, is a
matter for Parliament to consider.
There is one more point which is yet to be considered. Mr. Amin contends that Entry 23 in List II is
subject to the provisions in List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the
Union, and according to him Entry 52 in List I is one
of such provisions. In this connection he relies on
the said Entry which deals with industries the control
of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by
law to be expedient in the public interest, and Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (LXV
1960
.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
_,
,.
•
567
of 1951). This Act has been passed to provide for the
r960
development and regulation of certain industries one Th H' .
of which undoubtedly is coal mining industry. Sec- Ramp:, ~;;;~0
tion 2 of this Act declares that it is expedient in the Lia. &- Others "
public interest that the Union should take under its
v.
control the industries specified in the First Schedule. The State of
This declaration is a declaration made by Parlia:tnent, Orissa & Others
and if the provisions of the Act read with the said G . a-ak 1
' covered by t h e a;en raga ar •
• covere d t h e same fi eld as. is
d ec1arat ion
impugned Act, it would undoubtedly affect the vires
of the impugned Act; but in dealing with this question it is important to bear in mind the doctrine of
pith and substance. We have already noticed that in
pith and substance the impugned Act is concerned
with the development of the mining areas notified
under it. The Central Act, on the other ha.nd, deals
more directly with the control of all industries including of course the industry of coal. Chapter II of this
Act provides for the constitution of the Central Advisory Council and Development Councils, chapter III
deals with the regulation of scheduled industries,
chapter IHA provides for the direct management or
control of industrial undertakings by Central Government in certain cases, and chapter IIIB. is concerned
with the topic of control of supply, distribution, price,
etc:, of certain articles. The last chapter dell.ls with
miscellaneous incidental matters. 'J_'he functions of
the Development Councils constituted under this Act
prescribed by s. 6(4) bring out the real purpose and
object of the Act. It is to increase the efficiency or
productivity in the scheduled industry or group of
scheduled industries, to improve or develop the service
that such industry or group of industries renders
or could render to the community, or to enable
such industry or group of industries to render such
service more economically. Section 9 authorises the
imposition of cess on scheduled industries in certain
cases. Section 9(4) provides that the Central Government may hand over the proceeds of the cess to
the Development Council there specified and that the
Development Council shall utilise the said propeeds to
achieve the objects mentioned in els. (a) to (d). These
568
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
objects include the promotion of scientific and industrial research, of improvements in design and quality,
Ramp:, ";;;;co. and the provision for the training of technicians and
Ltd. & Others 'labour in such industry or group of industries. It
v.
would thus be seen that the object of the Act is to
The State of
regulale the scheduled industries with a view to imOnssa & Othm provement and development of the service that they
Gajendragadkar ]. may render to the society, and thus assist the solution
of the larger problem of national economy. It is difficult to hold that the field covered by the declaration
made by s. 2 of this Act, considered in the light of its
several provisions, is the same as the field covered by
the impugned Act. That being so, it cannot be said
that as a result of Entry 52 read with Act LXV of
1951 the vires of the impugned Act can be successfully
challenged.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the impugned Act
is relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II of the
Seventh Schedule, and its validity is not impaired or
affected by Entries 52 and 54 in List I read with Act
LXV of 1951 and Act LIII of 1948 respectively. In
view of this conclusion it ~s unnecessary to consider
whether the impugned Act can be justified under
Entry 50 in List II, or whether it is relatable to Entry
24 in List III and as such suffers from the vice of
repugnancy with the Central Act XXXII of 1947.
The result is the petition fails and is dismissed with
costs.
WaHehoo J.
WANCHOO, J.-I have read the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Gajendragadkar J. and
regret that I have not been able to persuade myself
that the cess levied in this case on all extracted minerals from any mine in any mining area at a rate not
exceeding five per centum of the value of the minerals
at the pit's mouth by the Orissa State Legislature
iinder s. 4 of the Orissa Mining Areas Development
Fund Act, No. XXVII of 1952, (hereinafter called the
Act) is a fee properly so called and not a duty of excise. The facts are all set out in the judgment just
delivered and I need not repeat them.
The scheme of the Act, as appears from s. 3 thereof
is to give power to the State Government, whenever it
i96o
Th H'
. _
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
569
1 9 60
thinks it necessary and expedient to provide amenities,
like communications, water-supply and electricity for Th ,1 . .
~
d eve1opment of any area in
. th
' " ingirth
. e b etLer
·. e Sta t e wh ere- Rampur
Coal co.
in any mine is situated or to provide for the welfare Ltd. &- Others '
of residents or workers in any such area within which
v;
persons employed in a mine or a group of mines reside The State of
or work, to constitute such an area to be a mining Orissa &- Others
area for the purposes of the Act, to define the limits of Wanchoo J.
the area, to include within such area any local area
contiguous to the same and defined in the notification
and to exclude from such area any local area comprised therein and defined in the notification. ,.A notification under s. 3 is made, after hearing objections from
owners or lessees of mines. After such an area is constituted under s. 3, a cess is imposed under s. 4 on all
extracted minerals from any mine in any su'ch area at
the rate not exceeding five per centum of the value of
the minerals at the pit's mouth. The cess· so. collected
is credited to a fund called the Orissa Mining Area
Development Fund· created under s. 5 of the Act,
besides other amounts with which we are not concerned in this case. The Fund is to be applied to meet
expenditure incurred in connection with such measures, which in the opinion of the State Government, are
necessary or expedient for providing amenities like
communications, water-supply and electricity, for the
better development of mining areas and to meet the
welfare oflabour and other persons residing or working in the mining areas. Then come other provisions
for working out the above provisions including s. 8,
which gives power to the State Government to frame
rules to carry into effect the purposes of the Act.
The Rules were framed under tl:ie Act in January,
1955.
The constitutional competence of the Orissa State
Legislature to levy the cess under the Act is attacked
on two maii:t grounds.· In the first place, it is urged
that the cess is in pith and substance a duty of exc.ise
under item 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule and
therefore the levy of such a cess is beyond the competence of the Orissa State Legislature. In the' second
place, it is urged that even if the cess is a fee, in view
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
of the two Acts of the Central Legislature and Parliamen t, namely, The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Th• Hc'" 8' '"c Development) Act, No. LUI of 1948 and The IndusR ampur oa1 o,
.
l
d R egu latrnn
. ) Act, No. LXV of
Ltd. c;. Others tries (Deve opment an
v.
1951, the Orissa Legislature was not competent to pass
The State of the Act.
Orissa c;. Others
The petition has been opposed on behalf of the
wanchoo /.
State of Orissa and the main contentions urged on its
behalf are that the cess is a fee properly so called and
not a duty of excise and therefore the Orissa State
Legislature was competent to levy it and the two Central Acts dg not affect that competence. In the alternative it has been urged that even if the cess is a tax
the State Legislature was competent to levy it under
item 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.
The first question therefore that falls for. considera.
tion is whether the cess in this case is a tax or a fee.
Difference between a tax properly so called and a fee
properly so called came up for consideration before
this Court in three cases in 1954 and was considered
at length. In the first of them, namely, The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt('),
it was pointed out that"though levying of fees is only a particular form
of the exercise of the taxing power of the State, our
Constitution has placed fees under a separate category
for purposes of legislation and at the end of each one
of the three legislative lists, it has given a power to
the particular legislature to legislate on the imposition
of fees in respect to every one of the items dealt with
in the list itself"
It was also pointed that"the essence of a tax is compulsion, that is to say,
it is imposed under statutory power without the taxpayer's consent and the payment is enforced by law.
The second characteristic of a tax is that it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to
any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the
tax. This is expressed by saying that the levy of tax
is for the purposes of general revenue, which when
z960
. .
(I) [1954] S.C.R. 1005.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
571
collected forms part of the public revenues of the
i96o
Stat~. As the object of a ta~ is n~t ~o. confer any The Hingirspemal benefit upon any particular md1v1dual, there Ranzpur Coal Co.
is, as it is said, no element of quid pro quo between Ltd. c;. Others '
the tax-payer and the public authority. Another fea.
v.
ture of taxation is that as it is a part of the common The State 01
burden, quantum of imposition upon the tax-payer Orissa & Others
depends generally upon his capacity to pay."
Wanchoo .
1
As to fees, it was pointed out that"a 'fee' is generally defined to be a charge for a
special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the
Government in rendering the service, though in many
cases the costs are. arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily,
the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the
varying abilities of different recipients to pay."
Finally, it was pointed out that"the distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a
common burden, while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege,. ............. Public i.."lterest seems
to be at the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it is
some special benefit which the individual receives."
The consequence of these principles was that,"if, as we hold, a fee is regarded as a sort of return or consideration for services rendered, it is absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should, on . the
face of the legislative provision be co-related to the
expenses incurred by Government in rendering the
services ...............If the money thus paid is set apart
and appropriated specifically for the performance of
such work and is not merged in the public revenues
for the benefit of the general public, it could be counted as fees and not a tax."
Having laid down these principles, that case then
considered the vires of s. 76 of the Madras Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, No. XIX
of 1951, and it was pointed out that the material fact
which negatived the theory of fees in that case was
that the money raised by levy of the contribution was
not ear-marked or specified for defraying the expenses
572
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
that the Government had to incur in performing the
services.
All the collections went to the consolidated
Th e H ingirf
f h S
d
Rampur Coal co., und o t e tate an all the expenses had to be met
Ltd. & Others
not out of those collections but out of the general revev.
nues by a proper method of appropriation as was done
The State 0 !
in the case of other government expense~. That in
Orisso & Othe>s itself might not be conclusive, but in that case there
Wanchoo J.
was total absence of any co-relation between the expenses incurred by the Government and the amount
raised by contribution under the provision of s. 76
and in those circumstances the theory of return or
counter-payment or quid pro quo could not have any
possible application to that case. Consequently, the
contribution levied under s. 76 was held to be a tax
and not a fee.
In the second case of Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa (1), a similar imposition
by the Orissa Legislature came up for consideration.
After referring to the earlier case, it was pointed out
that-"
"two elements are thus essential in order that a
payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place,
it must be levied in consideration of certain services
which the individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly. But this by itself is not enough to make
the imposition a fee, if the payments demanded for
rendering of such services are not set apart or specifically appropriated for that purpose but are merged in
the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes."
The Orissa imposition was held to be a fee because
the collections made were not nierged in the general
public revenue and were meant for the purpose of
meeting the expenses of the Commissioner and his
office which was the machinery set up for due administration of the affairs of the religious institution.
They went to constitute a fund which was contemplated by s. 50 of the Orissa Act and this fund was specifically set apart for rendering services involved in
carrying out the provisions of the Act.
The third case, namely, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi
'96°
.
.
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 1046.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
v. The State of Bombay (1 ) came from Bombay. Sec. 58
196o
of the Bombay Act, No. XXIX of 1950, provided for
. .
an imposition in prop?r~ion t? _the gross ~nnual in- Ra!;:~~;;;-co.,
come of the trust. This 1mpos1t10n was levied for the Ltd . .i Others
purpose of due administration of the trust property
v.
and for defraying the expenses incurred in connection The State of
with the same. After referring to the two earlier O•issa & Others
cases, the Court went on to say that-Wanchoo ].
"tax is a common burden and the only return
which the taxpayer gets is participation in the common benefits of the State. Fees, on the other hand,
are payments primarily in the public interest, but for
some special· service rendered or some special work
done for the benefit of those from whom the payments
are demanded. Thus in fees there is always an element of quid pro quo which is absent in· a tax ........ .
But in order that the collections made by the Government can rank as fees, there must be co-relation between the levy imposed and the expenses incurred by
the State for the purpose of rendering such services."
It was then pointed out that the contributions, which
were collected under s. 58, were to be credited in the
Public Trusts Administration Fund as constituted
under s. 57. This fund was to be applied exclusively
for the payment of charges for expenses incidental to
the regulation of public trusts and for carrying into
effect the provisions of the Act. The imposition therefore was in that case held to be a fee.
These decisions clearly bring out the difference between a tax and a fee and generally speaking there is
always an element of quid pro quo in a fee and the
amount raised through a fee is co-related to the expenses necessary for rendering the services which are
the basis of quid pro quo. Further, the amount collected as a fee· does not go to augment the general
revenues of the State and many a time a special fund
is cr~ated in which fees are credited-though this is
not absolutely necessary. But as I read these decisions, they cannot be held to lay down that what is
in pith and substance a tax can become a fee merely
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 1~55.
13
574
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
because a fund is created in which collections are cre. .
dited and some services may be rendered to the perTh H
e 1 ngir·
'
1/ampur
Coal Co. sons f rom w h om co JJ ectwns
are ma d e. If t h a t were
Ltd. o;. Others ·so, it will be possible to convert many taxes not otherv.
wise leviable into fees by the device of creating a
The Sta" of
special fund and attaching some service to be renderOrissa &- Othm ed through that fund to the persons from whom colWanchoo J.
lections are made. I am therefore of opinion that one
must first look at the pith and substance of the levy,
and if in its pith and substance it is not essentially
difforent from a tax it cannot be converted into a fee
by creating a special fund in which the collections are
credited and attaching some services to be rendered
through that fund.
Let me then look at the pith and substance of the
cess, which has been imposed in this case. The cess
consists of a levy not exceeding five per centum of
the value of the minerals at the pit's mouth on a!l
extracted minerals. Prima facie such a levy is nothing
more nor less than a duty of excise. Item 84 of List
I gives power to levy duties of excise exclusively to
the Union and is in these terms:"Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods
manufactured or produced in India except(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs
and narcotics, but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included
in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry."
This item gives power to Parliament to impose duties
•
of excise on all goods manufactured or produced in
India with certain exceptions mentioned therein.
Taking this particular case, coal is produced from the
mine and would clearly be covered by the words
"other goods produced in India" and a duty of excise
can be levied on it. 'Vhat then exactly is meant by
a duty of excise ? Reference in this connection may
be made to Governor-General in Council v. Province of
Madras (1). In that case the point arose whether the
sales-tax imposed by the Madras Legislature was a
duty of excise. The Privy Council pointed out thati96o
(•) (•9i5) L.R. 72 I.A. 91.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
"in a Federal constitution in which there is a
I96o
division of legislative powers between Central and Th H" .
Provincial legislatures, it appears to be inevitable that Ramp:, ~';!;'~ 0 .
controversy should arise whether one or other legisla- Ltd. & Others '
ture is not exceeding its own, and encroaching on the
v.
other's, constitutional legislative power, and in such The State 01
a controversy it is a principle, which their Lordships Orissa & Others
do not hesitate to apply in the present case, that it is Wanchoo J.
not the name of the tax but its real nature, its 'pith
and substance' as it has sometimes been said, which
must determine into ~hat category it falls."
The Privy Council went on to consider what a duty
of excise was and said that"it is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer
or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced. It is a tax on goods not on sales or
the proceeds of sale of goods. Though sometimes a
duty of excise may be imposed on first sales, a duty
of excise and a tax on the sale of goods were separate
and distinct imposts and in law do not overlap."
The Privy Council approved of the decisions of the
Federal Court in re The Central Provinces and Berar
Sales of ]Jf otor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act,
19.38 (1) and The Province of Madras v. Messrs. Boddu
Paidanna and Sons (2 ). It seems to have been urged
that because in some cases a duty of excise may be
levied on the occasion of the first sale and a sales tax
may also be levied on the same occasion, there is
really no difference between the two. I.t is however
clear that a duty of excise is primarily a tax on goods
manufactured or produced; it is not a tax on the sale
of goods, though the taxing authority may as a matter of concession to the producer not charge the tax
immediately the goods are produced and may postpone it, to make it easy for the producer to pay thfl
tax, till the first sale is made by him; nevertheless
the charge is still on the goods and is therefore a duty
of excise. On the other hand, a sales tax can only be
levied when a sale is made and there is nothing to
prevent its levy on the first sale. The two concepts
(I) (1939) F.C.R. 18.
(2) (1948) F.C.R. go.
576
'9 60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
are however different and, as the Privy Council point-
Th• mng;,_
ed ou~, sal~s tax and a _duty of excise are separate
Rampur Coal co., and d1stmct imposts and m law do not overlap. The
Ltd. & Others pith and substance of a duty of excise is that it is priv.
marily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer
The State 0 !
in respect of the commodity manufactured or proOrissa &- Others duced.
8:
Wanchoo ].
Let me therefore see what the Orissa Legislature
has done in the present case. It has levied a cess at
a rate not exceeding five per centum on the value of
minerals at the pit's mouth on all extracted minerals. All the extracted minerals are nothing other
than goods produced and the cess is levied on the
goods produced at a rate not ~xceeding five per centum
of the value at the pit's mouth. The cess therefore
in the present case cannot be anything other than a
duty of excise. The pith and substance of the cess in
this case falls fairly and squarely within entry 84 of
List I and is therefore a duty of excise, which cannot
be levied by the Orissa State Legislature. I may in
this connection refer to the cesses levied by the Central Legislature and Parliament by Act XXXII of
1947 and by the Act No. LXV of 1951. Sec. 3 of Act
XXXII of 1947 lays down that there shall be levied
and collected as a cess for the purposes of that Act
a duty of excise on all coal and coke despatched from
collieries at such rate not less than four annas and not
more than eight annas per ton as may from time to
time be fixed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette. This is obviously a tax on
the goods produced, the basis of the tax being so much
per ton. Again sec. 9 of Act LXV of 1951 lays down
that there may be levied and collected as a cess for
the purposes of that Act on all goods manufactured
or produced 'in any such scheduled industry as may
be specified in this behalf by the Central Government by notified order a duty of excise at a rate not
exceeding two annas per centum of the value of the
goods. This again is clearly a tax on goods produced
or manufactured and is in the nature of a duty of excise, the basis of the tax being so much of the value
of the goods. If these two taxes are duties of excise,
. 2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
577
I fail to see any difference in pith and substance
i96o
between these two taxes and the cess levied under the The HingirAct.
Rampur Coal Co.,
It is however urged that the method employed in Ltd. & Others
the Act for realising the cess is only a method of
v.
quantification of the fee and merely because of this The State 0!
· h an d su b stance of t h e impost
·
Orissa & Others
quant1'fication, th .e pit
does not change from a fee to a duty of excise. Refe- wanchoo 1.
rence in this connection was made to three cases of
quantification. In Sir Byramjee J eejeebhoy v. The
Province of Bombay (1), a question arose with respect
to a tax imposed on urban immovable property, whether it was a tax on lands and buildings. The challenge to the tax was on the ground that it was tax on
income or capital value within items 54 and 55 of
List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of
India Act and could not therefore be imposed by the
Bombay Legislature. It was held that the tax was a
tax on lands and buildings within the meaning of
item 42 of List II of the same Schedule and that the
basis of the tax, which w~s the annual value, would
not convert it into a tax on income or capital value.
The High Court considered the pith and substance of
the said Act and came to the conclusion that every
tax on annual value was not necessarily a tax on income and it was held that the mode of assessment of
a tax did not determine its character and one has to
look to the essential character of the tax to decide
whether it was a tax on income or on lands and buildings. Looking to the pith and substance of the tax it
was held in that case that it was a tax on lands and
buildings. That decision was in the circumstances of
that case right because the intention of the legislature
was not to tax the incoine of any one; the essential
character of the tax in that case was to tax the lands
and buildings and the annual value of the lands and
buildings was only taken as a mode of levying the
tax. In the present case, however, the very mode of
the levy of the cess is nothing other than the levy of
a duty of excise and therefore the principle of quantification for purposes of a fee cannot be extended to
(1) I.L.R. 1940 Bom. 58.
578
SUPREME COURT R-EPORTS
[1961]
such an extent as to convert what is in pith and sub.
stance a tax into a fee on that basis.
Th ' H ingirTh e nex t case t o wh"IO h reierence
,.
.
Rampur Coal Co
was ma d e is
Ltd. & Others ··Municipal Corporation, Ahmeilabad v. Patel Gordhandas
v.
Hargovandas (1 ). In that case the Ahmedabad Bon, State of rough Municipality had levied a rate on open lands and
Orissa & Others the basis of the levy was one per oentum of the capital
Wa•ehoo J.
value of the land. It was urged that this amounted
to a capital levy within entry 54 of List I; but the
court repelled that contention and held that the levy
was in pith and substance a tax on lands, which came
within entry 42 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to
the Government of India. Act. A distinction was
made between a tax on land which is levied on the
basis of its capital value and a tax which is on capital
treating it as an asset itself. This decision also, if I
may say so with respect, is correct, for the basic idea
was to tax lands and some method had to be found
for doing so and the method evolved, though it might
look like a capital levy, was in pith and substance not
so. But the theory of quantification which is the
basis of these two oases cannot be stretched so far as
to turn levies which are in pith and substance taxes
into fees, by the·process of attaching certain services
and creating a fund.
The third case is Ralla Ram v. The Province of East
Punjab (2). That was a case of a tax on lands and
buildings and annual value was the basis on which
the tax was levied. The Federal Court rightly pointed
out that the pith and substance of the levy had to be
seen and on that view it was not income-tax but a tax
on lands and buildings and the method adopted was
merely a method of quantifi9ation. The Federal Court
also pointed out that "where there is an apparent conflict between an Act of the Federal Legislature and an
Act of the Provincial Legislature, we must try to
ascertain _the pitli and substance or the ·true nature
and character of the conflicting provisions and that
before an Act is declared ultra vires, there should be
an attempt to reconcile the two conflicting jurisdictions, and, only if such a reconciliation should prove
z96o
.
.
(1) I.L.R. 1954 Bom. 41.
(•) (1948) F.C.R. •07·
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
impossible, the impugned Act should be declared in.r960 .
valid." It may also be pointed out that in all these Th w .
three cases, one source of income of an individual or
i;:;;~o.
one •item out of the total capital of an individual was Ltd. & Others '
the basis of calculation while income-tax or capital levy
v.
is .generally on the total income or the total capital of The Staie uf
a person. That aspect must have gone into the deci- Orissa & Oth,rs
sion that the method employed was merely a mode Wanchoo J.
for imposing a tax on lands and buildings. In the
present case, however, I see no difference between the
method of imposing a duty of excise _and the method
employed in the Act for imposing a cess-a matter
which will be clear from the cesses imposed under the
two Central Acts already referred to (No. XXXII of
1947 and No. LXV of 1951). It is not as if there could
be no method of imposing a fee properly so called in
this case except the one employed. Two methods
readily suggest themselves. A lump sum annual fee
could be levied on each mine even on a graded scale
depending on the size of the mine as evidenced by its
share capital. Or a similar graded fee could be levied
on each mine depending on its size de<.;ermined by the
. number of men employed therein. Where therefore
the result of quantification is to bring a particular
impost entirely within the ambit of a tax it would not
be right to say that such an impost is still a fee, because certain services have to be rendered and a fund
has been created in whfoh collections of the impost
are credited. If this were p~rmissible many taxes not
otherwise leviable would be converted irito fees.by the
simple device of creating a special fund and attaching
certain services to be rendered from the amount in
that fund. That would in my opinion be a colourable
exercise of the power of legislation, as explained in
K. 0. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa (1).
Let me illustrate how taxes can be turned into fees
on the so-called basis of quantification with the .help
of the device of creating a fund an~ attaching certain
services to be rendered . out of monies in the fund.
Take the case of income-tax under item 82 of List I
of the Seventh Schedule, which is exclusively reserved
Ramp:,
(1) [19,54] S.C.R. 1,
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
for the Union. Suppose that some State Legislature
wants to impose a tax on income other than agriculRamp:, •;;;;~•. tural income in the garb of fees. All that it has to do
Ltd. & othm ·is then to create a special fund out of the amounts
v.
collected and to attach rendering of certain services
The State of to the fund. All that would be necessary would be to
Odssa & Othm define the services to be rendered so widely that the
wanchoo f.
amount required for the purpose would be practically
limitless. In that case there would be no difficulty in
levying any amount of tax on income, for the amount
collected would always be insufficient for the large
number of services to be rendered. What has to be
done is to find out a number of items in Lists II and
III of the Seventh Schedule in respect of which fees
can be levied by the State Legislature. These fees
can be le~ied on a total basis for a large number of
services under various entries of Lists II and III. A
fund can be created, say, for rendering services of
various kinds to residents of one district. In order to
meet the expenses of rendering such services, suppose,
the legislature imposes a tax on every one in the district at 10 per centum of the net total income (other
than agricultural income); the amount so collected is
put in a separate fund and ear-marked for such special
services to be rendered to the residents of that district.
Can it be said that such a levy is a fee justified under
various entries of Lists II and III, and not a tax on
income, on the ground that this is merely a mode of
quantification? As an instance, take, item 6 of List II,
"Public health and sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries"; item 9, "Relief of the disabled and unemploy.
able"; item 11, Education; item 12, Libraries, museums
and similar institutions"; item 13, communications,
that is to say, roads, bridges a.nd other means of communications; item 17, "Water, that is to say, water
supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, water storage and water power"; and item 25,
"Gas and gas-works"; item 23 of List III, "Social
security and social insurance, employment and unemployment"; item 24, "Welfare of labour including
conditions of work, provident funds, employers' liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age
1 60
9
Th H'
.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
\
•
581
\
pensions and maternity benefits"; item 25, "Vocational
'9 60
and technical training of labour"; and item 38, "Elec- 1., H' .
. . " . A ssume t hat a f un d IS
. created .1.or
.!'
· Rampur
,.. Coal
ingirtr1c1ty
ren dermg
co.,
these services to the residents of a district. The State Ltd. s. Others
Legislature is entitled to impose fees for rendering
v.
these services to the residents of the district; the costs 1 he State 01
of these services would obviously be limitless and · in Orissa & Others
order to meet these costs, the State legislature levies a Wanchoo 1.
consolidated fee for all these purposes at 10 per centum of the total net income on the residents of the
district (excluding his agricultural income) as a measure of quantification of the fee. Can it be said in the
circumstances that such a levy would not be incometax, simply because a fund is created to be used in the
district where collections are made and these services
have to be rendered out of the fund so created to the
residents of that district and to no others? The answer can only be one,· viz., that the nature of the impost is to be seen in its pith and substance; and if in
pith and substance it is income-tax within item 82 of
List 1 of the Seventh Schedule it will still remain
income-tax in spite of the creation of a fund and the
attaching of certain services to the monies in that
fund to be rendered in a particular area. Such an
impost can never be justified as a consolidated fee on
the ground that it is merely a method of quantification .
Compare what has been done in this case. Sec. 3
of the Act which refers to the services to be rendered
mentions communications, that is, roads, bridges and
other means of communication (barring those given
in List I), water-supply and electricity, for the better
development of the area. These three items themselves would mean expenditure of such large amounts·
that anything could be charged as a fee to meet the
costs, particularly in an undeveloped State like Orissa.
Further, the section goes on to mention provision for
the welfare of residents or workers in any such area,
which would include such things as social security and
social insurance, provident-funds, employer's liability,
workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits and may be even employment and unemployment. Again large funds would
7i
582
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
be required for these purposes. Therefore, the services enumerated ins. 3 being so large a~d requiring
Rampu' coal co .. such large sums, any amount can be levied as a fee
Ltd. & Othm and in the name of quantification any tax, even
v.
though it may be in List I, can be imposed; and that
The State 01 is exactly what has been done, namely, what is really
Odssa'"' Othm a duty of excise has been imposed as a fee for these
wan,hoo J.
purposes which fall under items 13 and 17 of List II
and 23, 24 and 38 of List III. There can be no doubt
in the circumstances that the levy of a cess as a
fee in this case is a colourable piece of legislation. I
do not say that the Orissa State Legislature did this
deliberately. The motive of the legislature in such
cases is irrelevant and it is the effect of the legislation
that has to be seen. Looking at that, the cess in this
case is in pith and substance nothing other than a
duty of excise under item 84 of List I and therefore
the State legislature was incompetent to levy it as a
fee.
The next contention on behalf of the State of Orissa
is that if the cess is not justified as a fee, it is a tax
under item 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.
Item 50 provides for taxes on mineral rights subject
to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development. This raises a question
as to what are taxes on mineral rights. Obviously,
taxes on mineral rights must be different from taxes
on goods produced in the nature of duties of excise.
If taxes on mineral rights also include taxes on
minerals produced, there would be no difference
between taxes on mineral rights and duties of excise
under item 84 of List I. A comparison of Lists I
and II of the Seventh Schedule shows that the
same tax is not put in both the Lists. Therefore,
taxes on mineral rights must be different from duties
of excise which are taxes on minerals produced.
The difference can be understood if one sees that
before minerals are extracted and become liable to
duties of excise somebody has got to work the mines. The usual method of working them is for tqe
owner of the mine to grant mining leases to those w40
have got the capital to work the mines. There should
'9
ne Hingir-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
583
1 60
therefore be no difficulty in holding that taxes on
9
mineral rights are taxes on the
right
to
extract
mineTh H' .
.
l
ll
d
e ingir·
rals and not taxes on the mmera s actua y extracte . Rampur coal co.,
Thus tax on mineral rights would be confined, for Ltd. & Others
example, to taxes on leases of mineral rights and on
v.
premium or royalty for that. Taxes on such premium n. State 01
and royalty would be taxes on mineral rights while Orissa & Others
taxes on the minerals actually extracted would be Wanchoo J.
duties of excise. It is said that there may be cases
where the owner himself extracts minerals and does
not give any right of extraction to somebody else and
that in such cases in the absence of mining leases or
sub-leases there would be no way of levying tax
on mineral rights. It is enough to say that these
cases also, rare though they are, present no difficulty. Take the case of taxes on annual value of
buildings. Where there is a lease of the building, the
annual value is determined by the lease-money; but
there are many cases where owners themselves live in
buildings. In such cases also taxes on buildings are
levied on the annual value worked out according to
certain rules. There would be no difficulty where an
owner himself works the mine to value the mineral
rights on the same principles on which leases of mine.ral rights are made and then to tax the royalty which,
for example, the owner might have got if instead
of working the mine himself he had leased it out
to somebody else. There can be no doubt therefore that taxes on mineral rights are taxes of this
nature and not taxes on minerals -actually produced. Therefore the present cess is not a tax on
mineral rights; it is a tax on the minerals actually
produced and can be no different in pith and substance from a tax on goods produced which comes under
Item 84 of List I, as duty of excise. The present levy
therefore under s. 4 of the Act cannot be justified as
a tax on mineral rights.
In the view I have taken, it is not necessary to consider the other point, raised on behalf of the petitioners, namely, that even if it is a fee, in view of the
two Central Acts (mentioned earlier) the Orissa. Legislature was not competent to pass the Act. I would
584
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
60
'9
therefore allow the petition, and declare that the
n. Hingir- Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952, is
Rampu• coal co., beyond the constitutional competence of the Orissa.
Legislature to pass it. The whole Act must be struck
down because there will be very little left in the Act
Th• Stat• 01 ifs. 4 falls as it must. The legislature would never
Orissa ©- Otlurs
have passed the Act without s. 4.
Wanchoo J.
BY COURT. In accordance with the majority Judgment of the Court, the Writ Petition is dismissed with
costs.
Lid. & Othm
v.
r960
KANTILAL MANILAL AND ORS.
v.
November aa.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
BOMBAY
(J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SH;\H, JJ.)
'•
Income-tax-Distribution of new shares at half the market
value-If amounts to distribution of dividend-Assessment-Reopening of-The Indian Income-tax Act, r9a2 (II of r9zz), ss. a(6A)
(a), 66(r).
The appellants were shareholders of a company known as
Navjivan Mills ltd. which held a large number of shares of the
Bank of India. The Bank with the object of increasing their
share capital offered some more shares to the Mills for a price
including premium which was about half the market value. The
Mills purchased a small number of the shares so offered with
their own funds and distributed their right to acquire the
remaining shares to their shareholders in the proportion of two
shares of the Bank for one share held by them. The assessment
of the appellant was reopened by the Income Tax Officer under
s. 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act on the footing that the release
of the right to the shares of the Bank of India amounted to
distribution of dividend. Appeals against the order of the
Income Tax Officer having failed, the High Court at the instance
of the appellants framed the following question:"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the
diskibution of the right to apply for the shares of the Bank of
India by Navjivan Mills Ltd. in favour of the assessees amounted to a distribution of "dividend"?
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