K. M. NANAVATI versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 September 1960 | [1961] 1 S.C.R. 497 | 1960 INSC 142
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 September 1960
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, J.L. KAPUR, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 320/1960
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1961] 1 S.C.R. 497
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 142
Text of the judgment
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
K. M. NANAVATI
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KA~Ult, P. B. GAJENDltAGADKAlt, K. SuBBA RAO and- IC N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Sentence, suspension of-Order by Governor during pendency of
appeal in the Supreme Cotirt-If constitutionally valid-Governor's
power of clemency-Court's power of granting bail or suspending
sentence-Harmonious exercise of two powers-The Constitution of
India, Arts. I6I, I42-Suprcme Court Rules, Order XXI, r. 5.
The petitioner was Seco.nd in Command of l. N. S. Mysore
which came.to Bombay in the beginning of March, 1959· Soon
thereafter he was arrested on a charge of murder under s. 302
of ·the Indian Peria] Code and was placed, and continued to
remain, in naval custody all along during his trial. In due
course he was placed on trial by a jury before the Sessions
Judge, Greater Bombay, in which the jury returned a verdict of
not guilty by a majority; but the Sessions Judge disagreeing
with the verdict of the jury made a reference to the High Court
which convicted the petitioner under s. 302 of the Indian Penal
Code and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. On the same
day when the High Court pronounced its judgment the Governor o(Bombay passed an order under Art. '161 of the Constitution of India suspending the sentence passed by the High Court
of Bombay on the petitioner until the appeal intended to be
filed by him in the Supreme Court against his conviction and
sentence was disposed of and subject meanwhile to the condition
that he shall be detained in the Naval Jail custody. A warrant
for the arrest of the petitioner which was issued in pursuance of
the judgment of the High Court was returned unserved with the
report thaf it could not be served in vie1v of the order of the
Governor suspending the sentence passed upon the petitioner.
In course of the hearing of an application for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court filed by the petitioner in the High
Court the matter of the unexecuted warrant was placed before
it and a Special Bench of'.the High Court after examining the
validity of the action taken by the Governor came to the c011clusion that the order passed by the Governor was not invalid,
that the order for detention of the petitioner in naval custody
was not unconstitutional and that the sentence passl'd on the
petitioner having been suspended the provisions of 0. XXI, r. 5,
of the Supreme Court Rules rlid not apply and it was not
n.ecessary for the petitioner to surrender to his sentence.
Thereafter· the petitioner filed an application for special
leave in the Supreme Court and also another application praying for exemption from· compliance with the aforesaid rule and
Sf!pteniber 5.
498
SUPHEME COURT HEPORTS
[ 1961]
for the hearing of his application {or special leave without
surrendering to his sentence. His pica at first was that as he
I<. M. /tw""""':ati was not a free man it was not possible for him to comply with
v.
the requirements of 0. XX!, r. 5, of the Supreme Court Rules;
The State of but he subsequently amended it to the effect that the aforesaid
Bombay
Rule did not apply to his case in view of the Governor's order.
On a reference of this matter by a Division Bench of this Court
to the Constitution Bench for hearing.
Held, that the Governor had no power to grant the suspension of sentence for the period during which the matter was
sub-judice in this Court. The Governor's qrder suspending the
sentence could only operate untir the matter brcame sub-ju<lice
in this Court on the filing of the petition for special leave to
appeal whereupon this Court being in seisin of the matter would
consider whether 0. XX!, r. 5 should be applied or the petitio-.
ner should be exempted from the operation thereof as prayed
for. It would then be for tliis Court to pass such orders as it
thought fit as to whether bail should be granted to the petitioner or he should surrender to his sentence or to pass such other
order as the court deemed lit in the circumstances of the case.
On the principle of harmonious construction and to a\'oid a
possible conflict between the powers given under Art. 161 to the
Governor and under Art. 142 to the Supreme Court, both of
which are absolute and unfettered in their respective fields of
operation, it mu;t be held that Art. 161 does not deal wjth the
suspension of sentence during the time that Art. 142 is in operation and the matter is sub-judice in the Supreme Court.
Per KAPVK .J. (dissmti11g)-The language of Art. 161 is of
the widest amplitude. It is plenary and an act of grace and
clemency and may be :termed as bt·nign prerogative of mercy.
The power of pardon is absolute and exercisable at any time.
Rules framed under Art. 145 are subordinate legislation and
cannot override the provisions of Art. 161 of the Constitution
itself. While the Governor's power to grant pardon is a power
specially conferred upon him as was vested in the British
\;overnor in British days, the power given lo the Court under
Art. 142(1) is a general power exercisable for doing complete
justice in any cause or matter, and if they deal with the same
matter then Art. 161 must prevail over Art. 142(1). The two
·pOY•crs may have the same ~ffecl but they operate in distinct
fields on different principles taking wholly irreconcilable factors
into consideration.
The action taken by the executive being the exercise of
overriding power is not subject to judicial review.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution that the amplitude of executive power should be
restricted as to become suspended for the period of pendency of
an appeal in the SupremeCourt.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICT.lON: Criminal Misc.
Petn. No. 320/60.
K. M. Nanal!ati
Application for exemption from c01npliance with
v.
the requirements of Rule 5 of Order XXI, Supreme Th• Stat• of
Court Rules, 1950 (e.s amended).
Bombay
1960. July 18, 19, 20, 21, 22.
S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath
and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner.
H. M . . Seervai, Advocate-General for the State of
Bombay, Atul Setalved and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.
[Sinha C. J.-Do you dispute the power of the
· Court to make this rule ? ]
..
H. M. Seervai :-No, My Lord. The Court imposes
a penalty in its judicial capacity; the Executive
remits the penalty in its executive capacity. There is
no clash between the two powers. The powers of the
Executive do not collide with the powers of the
judiciary. The prerogative of the King or the Pre.
sident can never be in conflict with the judiciary,
executive or legislature. Prerogatives come to aid the
process of justice. Power of pardon is plenary in
nature and unfettered. It could be exercis1Jd at any
·time after the commission of the offence, before indictment, during the trial and after the trio.I.
[Sinha C. J ..".""'lir·not that power of pe.rdoII--exercised
before the trial ?]
·
Pe.rd.on is given after the offence is proved. In the
United States the question is never asked whether the·
President has invaded the power of the judiciary.
[Sinha C. J.-So far as India is concerned take a
case like this : A man is convicted for murder and
sentenced to imprisonment for life. But subsequently
it is found that the deceased died a. natural death or
the deceased appeared alive afterwards. What will
happen ?]
A pardon will be granted (s. 401). The President is
entitled to pardon a person convicted for an offence
punishable with death, United Statea v. Wilson, 8
L. Ed. 640 e.t 644, Ex parte W eUa, 15 L. Ed. 421, 423.
500
v.
Tiu State of
/Jomliay
SUPREJ!E COUltT REPOHTS
[l!J61]
A free and uucouditiona.I pardon has the effect of
obli•,era.ting the crime. Section 426(1) empowers the
Court to suspend the sentence or graut bail. The Executive, Judiciary and Legislature, paralysing ea.ch
other novor hi•ppens. United States v. Klein, 20 L. Ed.
519, Ex Parte Grossman, 69 L. Ed. 527.
[SuBBA RAO J .-Your argument assumes that if
the Governor's order wa.s valid th1~11 the Supremo
Court Rule would not come in. It ma.v not be ueccssarily so because in the present case there was a. conviction and sentenco a.nd the accused has no right of
appeal. The accused invited the order of the Governor.
Entertaiument of the appeal by special lea.vo is in the
discretion of the Supreme Court. Unless them are
adequate reasons fur the Govemor tu ma.ke this order,
why should WU use our discretion to give exemption to
the accused frotn tho rules of the Court ?]
The sentence having been suspended there is nu
sentence and therefore this Court need not insist on
his surrender.
[Sul!BA RAO J.-The provisions, of Art. 161 did
not say that the pow(·r undN it could he exercised
notwithstanding other provisions of the Constitution.
\Vas it, tberefore, not neeeHsary to hormuuioe this
power with other constitutional provi,ion8 8tH:h aH
Art. 142 ?]
[KAPUR J.-ln India have the l'cmrtR puwt·r lo
suspend a sent-0nce?]
Yes, in a limited way as j.ll'Ovided ins. 426.
[KAPUR J.-If the sentence is suspended, there is
no sentence.]
);o, there i8 nu sentence to surrender to. The cxccu.
tiun of seutcnc(: is au executive power. Thn function
of the Court ends with tht> j.1assing uf the sentence. Tu
carry the sentence into execution is an exPcutive ur<ler.
United States v. Benz, 75 L. Ed. 354, 358.
In India we start withs. 401 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898, and s. 2\J5 Government of India Act,
1935.
_ Pardo11 is a part of the Constitutional ~ehornc,
Balmukand v. King Emperor, L. R. 42 I. A. 133.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
Exercise of prerogatives is in the jurisdiction of the
Executive and not the judiciary; Lala Jairam Das v. I{. M. Nana.vati
King Emperor, L. R. 72 I. A. 120. The powers are in
v.
aid of justice.
The Slate of
Bonibay
[SUBBA RAO J.-Your argument is that one acts in
the judicial fif'ld, while the other acts in the execnt.ive
field and hence there is no conflict. But whatever the
nature of the power, the Governor in exercising· that
power is encroaching on the field occupied by the
Supreme· Court. Under the Constitution the Supreme
Court can entertain appeals and pass the necessary
orders and perhaps, under the rules suspend or stay
execution of a sentence. On the other hand the
Governor under Art. 161 has powers to suspend the
sentence. I am suggesting that where there is a conflict of jurisdiction between the .Judiciary and the·
Executive is it not reasonable to bring harmony between these two? What is wrong in confining the
power of the Governor to cases where there is no
appeal pending before the Supreme Court.? Can the
executive interfere -with the jndiciary in the midst of
a case.?']
Yes, in its administrative capacity it can ask the
Advocate-General to eh ter a nolle prosequi and terminate the trial. This a statutory power. Babu [,,al
Chokhani v. Emperor, [1937] 1 Cal. 464. Court refused
bail but the executive suspended the sentence.
The State of Bihar v. M. Homi, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 78.
Rule 5, Order XXI, of the Supreme Court Rules
represents a well.settled practice of all courts .but it
cannot affect the power of pardon or the exercise of
prerogatives which is unfettered. The Buie postulates
that there is a sentence to.surrender to. Under Arts.
72, 161 the President's prerogative is not made subject
to apy parliamentary legislation. There is no limit to
Art.. 72 or Art. 161 in the Constitution express or
implied, Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque,
[1955] 1 S. C. R. 1104. The powers of the Court and
the Executive are distinct and separate. The Executive comes in after the Court has-performed its fimction.
502
K. M. ~·••avati
v.
Th• State o/
Bombar
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
[KAPUR J.-You are talking about Sllspension of
the imntencf' but. can the Supreme Collrt suspend the
sentence? We can grant bail but can we suspend the
sentence?
Yes, the Supreme Court has the power to st.a.y the
execution of sentence.]
[KAPUR .J.-Is the condition imposed upon Commander Nana.vs.ti illegal?]
No, nobody has said so.
The Court can say judicially that justice requires
that a convicted person should remain in jail bl!t the
President can say on considerations of mercy that he
should be set at libert.y, King v. S.S. Singh, l.L.R.
32 Pat. 243. Power of preroga tivtt is far wider than
the judicial powers of the Court. The exprnssion "at
any time" in s. 401, Code of Criminal Procedure, recognises this principle.
[GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-Ca.n the naval authorities
keep the petitioner in nave.I custody? Is it legal ?]
The naval authorities made no such request. The
Governor ordered him to be kept in 1.1a.va.l custody
and th~ no.val authorities did not object. There is
nothing illegal a.bout it. It was perfectly lega.1. The
validity of the Governor's order has not been referred
to 'this constitutional bench of the Court. There is a.
distinction between illegal e.nd unlawful. Illege.1 is
that which the law directly forbids; unlawful is that
which the law does not recognisl'.
[SINHA C. J.-What is unlawful may become lawful by consent but wha.t is illega.1 cannot become legal
even by consent.]
The Governor's order should not be held to be
illegal without a.ny complaint to that effect from the
parties concerned aud in their absence. When the
na.vy accepted the Governor's order it could be presumed that there was a usage, s. 3(3)(12), Navy Act.
There is no section in the Navy Act which prohibits
such custody.
[GAJENDBAGADKAR J.-Is this the position DOW
that the Provost Marsha.II is keeping the petitioner in
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
50~
r~6o
his custody without any express provision of the Navy
Act?]
1<. M. N anavati
Section 14 of the Navy Act. There is .a i;lifference
v.
between a private person and a baval officer being Th• 51•1• of
Bombay
detained in naval custody. Commander Nanavati
is still in naval service. He cannot leave the naval
service.
[SUBBA RAO J.-There are t\Vo ways of reconciling
the powers of the Governor under Art. 161 and those
of the Supreme Court under Arts. 142; 144, 145. One
way was to say that the Supreme Court had no power
when the Executive exercised its powers. The other
way was to say that while both had powers, so far as
pardon and remission were concerned the Executive
had the exclusive power, but as far a.s suspension was
concerned, when proceedings were pending in the
Supreme Court the Executive could not make an order
impinging upon the Supreme Court's power.]
But in the interest of jnstice the Supreme Court
can pass. any suitable order. The power of the Supreme Court under Art. 141 is a power generally exercisable in all cases but the Governor's'· power is a
special power. If there is a conflict between a General
power. and a special power the. special powe~7 sJ10uld
p~eva1l although I don't admit that th~. !S a con.
wt.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor.General of India,
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Punjab and
T. M. Sen, for the Attorney.General of India. There
is no conflict at all. The power of the Supreme Court
is a judicial power ; the power of the Governor-is an
executive power. They cannot collide at au:--The
Su~eme Court can certainly exercise its power but
let it not disregard the power of the executive. Let
both the powers be harmonised.
0. B. Agarwala (Amicus Curiae)7 The Supreme
Court is a Court of record under Art 129 and has the
constitutional privilege of prescribing its procedure
under which it will exercise its discretion ve.sted in it
under the Constitution. By Art: 145 the Supreme
fl
65
504
°
'9 6
SUPHEl\lE COUHT REPORTS
[I 961]
Court has the constitutional power to lay d9wn rules
imposing conditions
under which alone it would enterK. M. ;\°(1,,n;·a/1
I
v.
tain a. special eave petition.
The s:"'' of
The ma.teria.1 rule is made under the constitutional
Bombay
right given to the Supreme Court a.s a Court of Record
a.nd not under a. la.w made under Art. 245. Subordinate legislation presupposes a. rule ma.de under la.ws
enacted under Art. 245. I ts analogy cannot be
applied to rules under Art. 145. The fa.ct tha.t the rules
ma.de by the Supreme Court under Art. 145 require
the approval of the President cannot convert the
rules into a law made under Art. 245.
The rule in question made by the Supreme Court
requires that the special leave petition is subject to
the condition tha.t the petitioner surrenders to the
authority of the Supreme Court, and by passing the
order in question the Governor has deprived the
Supreme Court of its authority over the custody of the
accused pending the special leave !Jetition. Artkle
161 read with Art. 154 shows tha.t the Governor even
while exercising his constitutional powers ca.1111ot
affect, modify or override the powers of the Supreme
Court or the procedure prescribed by it.
After a special leave petition is ma.de to it or when
the appeal is admitted, the Supreme Court ha.s ample
jurisdiction to give relief by way of suspension of
sentence under Art. I 41 a.nd the rules. Power of suspension of sentence is not exercisable by the Executive
when relief ca.n be granted by the trial Court or a.
competent Court of appeal.
The a.ppropria.t1> construction of the rule would
indicate that the Governor's powers under Art. 161
operate only up to the stage when an application for
special leave is ma.de under Art. 136 and cartnot
interfere with the authority of the Supreme Court
thereafter.
As~uruing. without admitting, that the Governor
could interfere with t.he authority and jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court ho could du so only if a valid order
wa.s made under Art. 161. The order !lllder consideration being subject to a.n illegal condiLion is an illegal
order. Even if, the condition i~ not illega.1 it has been
)
""
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
operated only by the petitioner's voluntary consent
with the object of not complying with the rule of the K. M. Nanavati
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court will decline to
v.
exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner who The Stat~ of
Bonibay
by his voluntary act put himself out of its jurisdic.
tion.
Under Art. 144 the Governor's authority is bound to
aid the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It is
open to the petitioner to approach the Government to
modify the Governor's order to enable him to comply
with the procedure of the Supreme Court.
[KAPUR J.-Has the Court power to suspend a
sentence ? Has any court ever done so ? Has any
court ever ordered that the sentence will take effect
.after a certain period of time ?]
The appellate Court has the power to suspend the
sentence under Art. 142.
[SINHA C. J.-The Executive can intervene at any
time during the trial.]
Yes, in the case of pardon, The State of Bombay v.
The United Motors (India) Ltd., [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
[SINHA C. J.-The argument of the petitioner is
that there is no sentence in operation and therefore
there is nothing to surrender to.]
There is apparently a conflict. The Court says the
petitioner must surrender to his sentence. The Executive says that he need not surrender and will remairi
in some other custody. The Governor has extended
the period of suspension till the decision of the petitioner's appeal in this Court. There is clash with the
rule of this Court.
[SINHA C. J.-If the Supreme Court refused bail
can the cxecuti ve suspend the sentence ?]
No, it.cannot, in cases of suspension there is apparently a conflict. There is a. distinction between pardon
and suspension. Suspension stands on a different
footing. Pardon can be granted at any stage but
suspension of sentence can be made only after tho
sentence is inflicted.
H. ilJ.. Seervai in reply. Nothing in Arts. 142, 145
and ss. 411, 426, Code of Criminal Procedure, will
506
SUPTIE'.IIE cor.;JtT REPORTS
[1961]
supersede the powers of the Go\·e1·nor to grant reprieve, etc. The Code pf Criminal Procedure gives
1
I<. ·' · ~\'"""'·a1i tbe pown of suspension, of bail, etc.
The State nj
[KAPUR J.-Did the Federal Court have power lo
suspend a. sentence.]
YeR, it had t.he power to grant bail or slay execution of sentence. The power of the Cu11rt to suspend
is not a.bsolute.
[Sr:>HA C. J .-The Executive is bound to eXLCUte
t.he orders of the Court.]
Y1•s, but if the Government, after the paRsing of
the Court's order, itHelf in i:s own jurisdiction passes
an order suspending the sentence the Executive in
that case has no authorit.y to execute the order of the
Court, United Stales v. Benz, i5 L. Ed. 354, Ila.Jes
Plea.s of the "Crnwn,-lfoprieves bt>fore or after the
judgment, p. 412, Ror;ers \'. Peck, 50 L. Ed. 256Reprieve being granted when a mutter wa.s before the
Court.
1960. September 5. The Judgment of Sinha, C .•J.,
Ga.jendraga.clka.r, Subba. Hao a.nd Wa.nehoo, ,J,J., was
delivered by Sinha. C. J. Kapur, ,J., delivered a
separate ,Judgment.
Srnh• c. }.
SINHA C. ,J.-This mattt•r has uec·11 pla.ce<l before•
the Constitution Bench in rather extrnordinary circumsta.ncPs, a.8 will prc"eut.ly :ippear. It involve8 the
question as to what is tho content of the power conferred on the Gornrnor of a. State under Art. 161 of
the Constitution; and whet.her the order of the
Governor of llombn.y da.tPd :\'larch 11, 1960, impinges
on thti judicial powPrs of this Court., with pn,rticiilar
mforence to its powerH uudt•r Art. 142 of the Constitution.
For the determina.tiou of tho constitutional issue
raised in this case, it i• 110t necessary to go into the
merits of the case against the petitioner. 1t is only
necessary to state tho following facts in order to
appreciate the factual backgrouud of the ordi<r of the
GovenH,r of Bombay aforesaid impugned in this co.se.
The petitioner was Second in Comma.nd of I. N. S.
Mysore, whioh ca.me lo Bombay in the beginning of
19 "'
•
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
March 1959. On April 27, 1959, the petitioner was
arrested in connection vith a charge of murder under K. jYf, 1'la11avati
s. 302 of the Indian Penll.l Code. He was produced
v.
before the Addit,ional Chief Presidency Magistrate, The State of
Bombay
Greater Bombay, in connection with that charge. on
April 28, 1959. The Magistrate remanded him to
Sinha C. J.
police custody on that day. On the following day
(April 29, 1959) the Magistrate received a letter from
the Flag Officer, Bombay, to the effect that he was
ready and willing to take the accused in naval custody
as defined in s. 3(12) of the Navy Act, 1957, in which
custody he would continue to be detained ·under the
orders of the Na val Provost Marshall in exercise of
his authority under s. 89(2) and (3) of the Navy .Act.
Thereupon the Magistrate made the order directing
that the accused should be detained in the Nav·al Jail
and Detention Quarters in Born bay. The Magislmte
has observed in his order that he had been moved
under the instructions of the Government of India.
The petitioner continued.to remain in naval custody
all along. In due course, he was placed on trial b<·fore
the Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay. The trial was
by a jury. The jury returned a verdict of 'not guilty'
by a majority of eight to one. The learned Sessions
Judge ma.de a reference to the High Court uHder
s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, disagreeing
with the verdict of the jury; The reference, bdng
Cr. Ref. No. 159 of 1959, was heard by a Division
. Bench of the Bombay High· Court. The High Court
accepted the reference and convicted the petitioner
under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
him to imprisonment for life, by its judgment and
order dated March 11, 1960. On the same dav, the
Governor of Bombay passed the following order":" In exercise of the powers conferred on me by
Article 161 of the Constitution of India, I, Shri Pra.
kasa, Governor of Bombay, am pleased hereby to
suspend the sentence passed by the High Court of
Bombay on Commander K. M. Nanavati in Sessions
Case No. 22 of IV th Sessions of 1.959 un ti! the appeal
intended to be filed by him in the Supreme Court
against his conviction anct'Sentence is disposed of and
508
ry6r,
,.,
SCPRE:\IE COCRT REPORTS
[1961)
subj<'ct m<;a.nwhile to the conditions that he shall
Lo detained in the Naval Jail Custody in I. N. S.
Kunjali ".
In pur8uance of the judgment of the High Court, a
writ iS!!ued to the Sessions Judge, Groater Bombay,
communicating the order of the High Court convicting and sentencing the petitioner as aforesaid. The
Sessions Judge issued a. warrant for t.he arrPst of tho
accused and sent it to th<> police officer in charge of
the Citv Sessions Court for Greater Bombay for execution.· :rhe warrant was returned unse~ved with
the report that the warrant could not be served in
view oft he order set out above passed by the Governor
of Bombay suspending the seutnnce up·Jn the petitioner. The Sessions Judge then returned the writ togethor with the uuexecuted warrant l'l the High
Court.
In the meantime an application for leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court was made soon after the judgm(•.nt was pronounced by •the High Court a.nd the
matter was fixed for hearing on :11arch 14, 1960. On
that day the matter of the unexecutrcl warrant was
pla,ced before the Division Bench_ which directed that,
in view of the unusual and u.nprecodented situation
ariaing out of the order of the Governor the matter
should be reforred to a. Jargor Bench. Notice was
accordingly issued to the State of Bombay and to the
accused person. A Special Bench of five Judges of
that Court heard the matter. The Special Bench
premitted two Advocates, Mr. Kotwa.l a.nd Mr. Pra.njpe, to appear on behalf of the Western India. Advoca.teo' Association. Similarly, Mr. Peerbhoy was also
permitted to appear along with Mr. Latifi on behalf
of the Bombay Bar Association. They were heard as
amfru.s cu.riae in view of the fact tha,t the Advocate
General for the State of Bombay and the counsel for
accused wore both sailing in the same boat, tha.L is to
88.)', both of them were appearing to support the order
made by the Governor. In view of tho great importance of the issues involved, the Court allowed those
Advocates to represent the other ·view point. The
Ad'.:ocale General of Bombay as also counsel for the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS
509
z960
accused made objections to the Court hearing the
Advocates aforesaid on the ground that they had no J(. }/f! lVa.navati
locus standi. The Advocate General of Bombay also
v.
Taised a preliminary objection to the hearing of the The State of
Bon1b<!Y
matter by the Special Bench on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction . to examine the validity of the
action taken by the Governor, because there was Sinha C. ].
no judicial proceeding then pending. The criminal
reference aforesaid, to which the State and the accused were parties, had already been disposed of and
none of those parties had raised any grievance or
objection to the order of the Governor impugned before
the Court. The Court overruled that objection in view
of the fact that the writ issued by the Court had been
returned unexecuted on grounds which could be examined- by the Court as to the validity of the reasons
for the return of the warrant unexecuted. The High
Court then examined the validity of the action taken
by the Governor and came to the conclusion that it
had the power to examine the extent of the Governor's
power under Art, 161 of the Constitution and whether
it had been validly exercised in the instant case.
After an elaborate examination of the questions raised
before it, the Special Bench came to the conclusion
that the order passed by the Governor was not invalid. It also held that the condition of the suspension of the order that the petitioner .be detained in
naval custody was also not unconstitutional, oven
though the accused could not have been detained in
Naval Jail under the provisions of the Navy Act,
after he had been convicted by the High Court. The
Court also held negativing the contention raised on
behalf of the Advocates appearing as amicus curiae,
that the order of the Governor did not affect the
power of the Supreme Court with particular reference
to r. 5 of 0. XXI of the Rules of the Supreme Court,
which will be set out in full hereinafter. The reason
for this conclusion, in the words of the High Court,
is:" As the sentence passed upon the accused has
been suspended, it is not necessary for the accused to
surrender to his sentence. Order XXI, r. 5, of the
510
SUPRE'.lfE COCRT HEPORTS
[19Gl]
Supreme Court Rules will not, therefore, ltpply in this
case."
/(. ,\f_ ,VaJ1avati
The High Court also overruled the plea of mala fides.
v.
In lhe result, tho High Court held that e.s the order
roe.de by the Governor had not been shown to be
unconstitutional or contrary to law, the warrant
5111/i(l c. J.
should not be reissued until the appeal to be filed in
the Supreme Court ha.cl been disposed of, unless the
order ma.de by the Govnnor stands cancelled or withdrawn before that event.
The petitioner filed his petition for specie.I leave in
this Court on April 20, 1960, and also mu.de e.n application on April 21, 1960, under 0. XLV, rr. 2 and 5 of the
Supreme Court Rules for exemption from compliance
with 0. XXI, r. 5, of those Rules. It was stated in the
petition that, soon after his arrest, the peritioner
throughout the trial before the Sessions Court and the .
hearing of the reference in the High Court, had been
in naval custody and continued to be in that custody,
that he had been throughout of good behaviour and
was ready and willing to obey any order of this Court.,
but that the petitioner " not being a free man it was
not possible for him to comply with the requirements
of r. 5 of 0. XXI of the Supreme Court Rules ...... ".
He, therefore, prayed that he may be exempted from
compliance with the aforesaid rule and that his pet.ition for specie.I leave tu appeal be posted for hearing
without his surrendering to his sentence. On April 25,
1960, the special leave petition e.hlllg with the application for exemption aforesaid was placed before a
Division Bench which pe.l!Sed the following order : ""This is a petition for special leave against the
order passed by the Bombay High Court on reforencP,
convicting the petitioner under s. 302 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentencing him to imprisonment for
life. Afoug with hiR petition for special leave a.n
application has been filed by the pet,itioner praying
that he may be exempted from surrendering under 0.
XXI, r. 5, of the Rules of this Court. His contention
in this e.ppliration is that he is ready and willing to
obey any order that this Court may pass but that as a
result of the order passed by the Governor of Bombay
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
1960
under Art. 161 of the Constitution he is not a free
man to do so and that is put forward by him as an K. A-1. Nanavati
important ground in support of his plea that he may
v.
be exempted from complying with the relevant rule of The State of
Bombay
this Court. This plea immediately raises an important
constitutional question about the scope and extent of
the powers conferred on the Governor under Art. 161 Sinha C. ].
of the Constitution and that is a constitutional matter
which has to be heard by a Constitution Bench of this
Court. We would accordingly direct that notice of
this application should be served on the Attorney.
General and the State of Bombay and the papers in
this application should be placed before the learned
Chief Justice to enable him to direct in due course, in
consultation with. the parties concerned, when this
applic~tion should be placed for hearing before the
Constitution. Bench ".
After the aforesaid order of this Court, it appears
that on July 6, the petitioner swore an affidavit in
Bombay to the effect that his application aforesaid for
exemption from compliance with the requirements of
r. 5 of 0. XXI of the Rules had been made under a
misapprehension of the legal position and that the
true position bad been indicated in the judgment of
the Special Bench of the Bombay High Court to the
effect that r .. 5 of 0. XXI of the Rules would not
apply to his case in view of the Governor's order
aforesaid and that, therefore, his special leave petition
be directed to be listed for admission. It is apparent
that this change in the petitioner's position as regards
the necessity for surrender is clearly an a1'terthought._
Certainly, it came after the Division Bench had directed the constitutional matter to be heard as a preliminary question.
That is how the matter has come before us. Before
we heard the learned Advocate General of Bombay,
and the learned Additional Solicitor-General on behalf
of the Union of India, we enquired of Shri J. B.
Dadachanji; Advocate for the petitioner, whether the
petitioner was prepared to get himself released from
the Governor's order in order to present himself in this
66
512
1y6v
fllJPREJ\IE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Court so that t.he hearing of his special leave petition
might proceed in the ordinary course,. but ho was not
/(, lv/. ,\'<111atati
in
a position to make a categorical answer and preferrv.
ed to have the constitutional question determined on
The State of
11aii;ba ;·
its merits. We had the assistance of l\fr. C. B. Aggarwaln, who very properly volunteered his services as
Si11'1a C. ].
amicus curiae to rnpresent the other ·view point. In
this Court also the sit'uation was the same as iu the
High Court, uamely, that unless there was an amicus
curiae to represent the opposite view point, the parties
represented before u~ were not contesting the validity
of the Governbr's order. Both here and in the High
Court, it was at the instance of the Court itself that
the matter has been placed for hearing on the preliminary question before dealing witb the meritR of the
petitioner's ci;,se.
The learned Advocate General of Bombay has argued with his usual vehemence and clarity of expression
that the power of pardon, including the lesser power
of remission and suspension of a sentence etc. is of a
plenary character and is unfettt>red; that it is to be
exercised not as a matter of course, but in special circumstances requiring the interventio11 of the Head of
the Executive; that tho pow!'r could be exercised at
any time aftrr the commission of an offence; that.. tLis
power being in tho nature of exercise of sovert>ign
power is vested in the Head of the State and has, in
some respects, been modified by statute; that the
power of pardon may be exercis!'d uncouditionally or
subject to certain conditions to be imposed by tho
authority exerciRing the power; that such conditions
should not b•3 iHegal or impossible of performance or
against public policy. 1t was further argu!'d that the
power of pardon is vested in the Head of tho State as
an index of sovereign authority irrespective of the
form of Govemment. Thus the President of the United States of America and Governors of States, besides,
in some cases Committees, ho.vo been vested with thoso
powers, which cannot be derogated from h)' a Legislature. So far as India is concerned, before the Constitution ca.me into effect such powers have been regulated by statu!A', of course, subject to the power of the
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
z960
Crown itself. After the Constitution, the power is
contained in Art. 72 in respect of the President, and K. M. Nanavali
Art. 161 in respect of the Governor of a State. Artiv.
cles 72 and 161 are without any words of limitation, The Stal• of
Bombay
unlike the power of the Slipreme Court contained in
Arts. 136, 142, 145 and other Articles of the Constitu- Sinha C, j.
tion. Hence, what was. once a prerogative of the·
Crown has now crystallized into the common law of
England and statute in India, for example, s. 401.· of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, or Arts. 72 and 161 of
the Constitution. He particularly emphasised tba,t
the two powers, namely, the power of the Executive j,o
grant pardon, iri its comprehensive sense, and of the
Judiciary are completely apart and separate and there
cannot be any question of a conflict between th<'m;
because they are essentially different, the one from :,h.,
other. The power of pardon is essentially an executiva
action. It is exercised in aid of justice and not in defi.
ance of it. With reference to the particular question,
now before us, namely, how far the exercise of the execulive power of pardon contained in those two Articles
of the. Constitution can be said to impinge on the
judicial functions of this Court, it was argued that
r. 5 of 0. XX! of the Rules of this Cour.t postulates
the existence of a sentence of imprisonment and, as in
. this case, as a result of the Governor's order, there is
no such selltence r.unning there could not be any question· of the one trespassing into the field of the .other.
Rule 5 aforesaid.· of.•. this Court represents the · well.
settled practice of this Court, as ()f other Courts, that
.a person convicted and sentenced tq . a term of im prisonment should uot be permitted· to be fo: cqntempt of
the order of this Court, tha\ is to say, shoold:··not be
permitted to move the appellate court without":SUr,
!endering to the sentence. But the petitioner i~ nbt
m such contempt, because r. 5 did not apply to him.
The order of sentence ag~in,,t him having been suspu1.ded, he is not disobeying any rule or process of
th is Court or of the High Court. The power of the
Supreme Court to make rulec :s subject to two limita. tions, namely, (I) to any law made by Parliament_ and
(2) t.hu approval of the President. On the other hand,
0
514
1960
SUPltE:ME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Arts. 72 a.nd 161 enshrine tho plena.ry powers of the
sovereign
State to gra.nt pa.rdon etc., a.nd are not subK. M. /\ anauati
ject to any limitations. There could, therefore, be no
v.
TM State of
conflict between these two, and if there were any conRombaj•
flict a.t a.II, the limited powers of the Court must yield
to the unlimited powers of the Executive. As regards
Sinha C. ] .
the condition imposed by the Governor, subject. to
which the sentence pa.ssed against the petitioner ha.d
been suspended, the condition was not illegal, because
it did not offend against any peremptory or mandatory
provisions of law. It is not the same thing to say
that the condition was not authorised by law as to
say that the condition was illegal, in the sense that
it did what was forbidden by law. We were referred
to the various prnvisions of the Indian Navy Act (Act
LXII of 1957) to show that there were no provisions
which could be said to have been contravened by the
condition attached to the order of suspension by the
Governor. Furthermore, the naval custody in which
the petitioner continues ha.d been submitted to by tho
petitioner and what has been consented to cannot be
illegal, though it may not have been authorised by
law. Lastly, it was contended that the observation
of the High Court in the last paragraph of its judgment was entirely uncalled for, because once it is held,
· as wa.s held by tho High Court, that the Governor's
order wa.s not unconstitutional, it was not open to the
High Court to ma.ke observations which would suggest
that the Governor had exercised his power improperly. If the exercise of the power by the Governor
is not subject to any conditions, and is not justiciable,
it wa.s not within tho power of the High Court even
to suggest that the Governor should not have passed
the order in queBtion. The lea.med Additional Solicitor General adopted the able arguments of the Ad vocate General and added that, in terms, there was no
conflict between Arts. 142 and 161 of the Constitution.
Mr. C. B. Aggarwala, to whom the Court is obliged
for his able asAistancc to tho Court, argued that the
exercise of the rule ma.king power by the Supreme
Court is not a mere statutory power, but is a constitutional privilege; that the Supreme Court alone could
1
~:
l S.C.R.
"''
SUPREME 'COURT REPORTS
515
lay down rules and conditions in accordance with
which applications for special leave to appeal to the K. M. Nanavati
Court could be entertained ; that the material rule
v.
governing the present case was made under the cons- The State of
titutional power of the Supreme Court under Art. 145
Bombay
and that the Advocate-General was in error in describing it as subordinate legislation; that the fact that Sinha C. ].
the rules ·ma.de• by this Court under Art. 145 of the
Constitution require the approv!tl of the President
cannot convert them into rules made under a law
enacted in pursuance of power conferred, ·either by
Art. 123 or Art. 245 of the Constitution; that the
underlying idea behind r. 5 of 0. XXI of the Rules of
•
this Court is to see that the petitioner to this Court or
the appellant should remain under the directions of
the Court ; that the Governor by passing the order in
question has deprived the Supreme Court of its power
in respect of the custody of the convicted person; that
the power under Art. 161 has to be exercised within
the limits laid down by Art. 154 of the Constitution.
It was also argued that the petitioner could have got
his relief from this Court itself when he put in his
application for special leave and that in such a situation the Executive should not have intervened. In
other words, the contention was that, like the Courts
of Equity, which intervened in aid of ·justice when
law was of no avail to the litigant, the Executive also
should exercise their power only where the courts have
not been clothed with am pie power to grant adequate
relief in the particular circumstances governing the
case. It was further argued that on a true construction
of the provisions of the law and ·the Constitution, it
-would appear that the Governor's power extends only
up to a stage and no more, that is to say, the Governor
could suspend the operation of the sentence only until
the Supreme Court was moved by way of special leave
and then it was for the Court to grant or to refuse bail
to the petitioner. Once the Court has passed an ordei:_
in that respect, the Governor could not intervene so
as to interfere with the orders of the Court. Alternatively, it was argued that, even assuming that an
order of suspension in terms made by the Governor,
,..,
516
S"CPRE~lE COURT
nEPORTS
[1961)
could at a.II be passed during tho pondency of the
applicatiqn for leave to appeal to this Court, such an
K. At: Nanat·ati
ordor could be passed only by the President, a.nd not
v.
by the Governor. ln any view of the matter, it was
The ~tale aj
80111bay
further argued, the Governor could pass an order contemplated by Art. 161, but could not add a condition,
Si•ha C. j.
as he did in tho present case, which was an illegal
condition. It was further argued that the generality
of the expressions used in s. 401 of the Criminal Procedure Codo has to be cut down by the specific provisions of s. 426 of that Code. In other words, when
there is au _appeal pending or is intended to be preferred, during that limited prriod, the trial court
itself or the appellate court, has to exercise its judicial
function in the matter of granting bail etc.; and the
a.ppropria.t-0 Government is to stay its hands during
that time.
Before dealing with the ma.in question a.s to what is
the scope of the power conferred upon the Guvernor by
Art. 161 of the Constitution, it will bo convenient to
roview in a. genera.I way the law of pardon in the
background of which the controversy has to be
determined. Pardon is one of the many prerogatives
which have boon recognised since time immemorial as
being vested in the Hovoreign, wherever the sovereignty might lio. Whether the sovereign happened to
be a.n absolute monarch or a. popular republic or a.
constitutional king or qneen, sovereignty has always
hL>en associated with tho source of power-tho power
to appoint or diRmiss public servants,. tho power to
declaro war aud conclude peace, the power to legislate
and the power to adjudicate upon a.II kinds of disputes. Tho King, using the term in a most comprehensive sense, has been the symbol pf the sovereignty
oft.he State from whom oma.na.te all power, authority
and jurisdictionH. As kingship was supposed to ho
of divine origin, nn absolute king had no difficulty in
proclaiming and enforcing his divine right to goYern,
which includes the right to rule, to administer and to
dispense justice. It is a. historioa.l fa.ct that it was this
claim of divine right of kings that brought the Stuart
Kings of England in conflict with Parliament a.a the
•
(II
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
517
spokesman of the people. We know that as a result
of this struggle between the King, as embodiment of K. M. Nanavati
absolute power in all respects, and Parliament, as the
v.
champion of popular liberty, uJt.imately emerged the The State of
Bonibay
constitutional head of the Government in the person
of the King who, in theory, wields all the power, but,
in practice, laws are enacted by Parliament, the exe- Sinha C. ].
cutive power vests in members .of the Government,
collectively called th'e Cabinet, and judicial power is
vested in a Judiciary appointed by the Government in
the name of His Majesty. Thus, in theory, His
Majesty or Her Majesty continues to appoint the
Judges of the higest courts, the members of the
Government and· the public ;.;13rvants, who hold office
during the pleasure of the sovereign. As a result of
historical processes emerged a clear cut division of
governmental functions into executive, legislative and
judicial. Thus was established the " Rule of ·Law"
which has been t.he pride of Great Britain and which
was highlighted by Prof. Dicey. The Rule of Law,
in contradistinction to the rule of man, includes within its wide connotation the absence of arbitrary
power, submission to the ordinary law of the land,
and the equal protection of the laws. As a result of
the historical process aforesaid, the absolute and
arbitrary power of the monarch came to be canalised
into three distinct wings of the Government. There
has been a progressive increase in the power, authority
and jurisdiction of the three wings of the Government
and a corresponding diminution of absolute and arbitrary power of the King. It may, therefore, be said
that the prerogatives of the Crown in England, which
were wide and varied, have been progressively curtailed with a corresponding increase in the power,
authority and jurisdiction of the three wings of
Government, so much so that most of the prerogatives
of the Crown, though in theory they have continued
to be vested in it, are now exercised in his name by
the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary.
This dispersal of the Sovereign's absolute power
amongst the three wings of Government has now
.
518
SUPRE~fE COURT
REPORTS
[ 196 I]
become the norm of division of power; a.nd the preroga.tivo is no greater than what the la.wallows. In the
K. M. Non•v•li celebrated decision of the House of Lords in· the case
v.
The si. 1, of
of Attorney General v. De Keyser's Royal llotel, LimiBo>nb•y
ted (')which involved the right of the Crown by virtue
of its prerogative, to take possesHion of private pro. Sinha C. J.
perty for administrative purposes in connection with
the defence of the realm, it was held by the House of
Lords that the Crown was not eiltitled by virtue of its
prerogative or under any statute, to take possession of
prnperty belonging to a citizen for the purposes a.fore.
said, without paying compensation for use a.nd occupation.
It wa.s argued by Sir John Simon,'K. C., for the res.
pond en ts that:" The preroga.ti ve ha.s been defined by a learned
author as •the residue of discretionary or a~bitra.ry
authority which at a.ny given time is legally lt>ft in
the hands of the Crown'. lt is tho ultimate resource
of the executive, and when there exists a statutory
provision covering precisely the same ground there is
no longer any room for the exercise of the Roya.I Prerogative. lt ha.s been ta.ken a.way by necessary implication because the two rights cannot live together''.
(See p. 518 of the Report).
This argument on behalf of the respondents appears
to have been accepted by Lord Dunedin, who delivered the lea.ding opinion of the House in these terms :"The prerogative is defined by a. learned constitutionR.l writer as •the residue of discretionary or
arbitrary authority which at any given time is legally
left in the hands of the Crown '. Inasmuch as the
Crown is a. party to every Act of Parliament it is
logical enough to consider that when the Act deals
with something which before tho Act could be effected
by tho prerogative, and specially empowers the Crown
to do the same thing, but subject to conditions, the
Crown assents to that., and by that Act, to the prero.
gative being curtailed". (See p. 526 of the Heport).
This position has been recognised in Halsbury's Laws
(1) (t9>o] A.C. ,108.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
519
1960
of England, Volume 7, Third Edition, at p. 221, in
these words:·
K. M. N«,navati
"The prerogative is thus created and limited by
v.
the common law, and the Sovereign can claim no The siate of ·
Bombay
prerogatives except such as the law allows, nor such
as are contrary to Magna Carta, or any <'ther statute, .
Sink~. C. ].
or to the liberties of the subject.
The courts have jurisdiction, therefore, to inquire
into the existence or extent of any alleged prero".
.
ga t 1ve.............
. '
We have thus briefly set out the history of the
genesis and development of the Royal Prerogative of
Mercy because Mr. Seervai has strongly emphasised
that the Royal Prerogative of Mercy is wide· and
absolute, and can be exercised at any time. Very
elaborate arguments were addressed by him before us
on this aspect of the matter and several .English and
American decisions were cited. In so far as his argument was that the power to suspend the sentence is a
part of the larger power of granting pardon it may be
relevant to consider incidentally the scope and extent
of the' said larger power; but, as we shall presently
point out, the controversy raised by the present
petition lies within a very narrow compass; and so
concentration on the wide and absolute character of
the power to graqt pardon and over-emphasis on
judicial decisions which deal directly with the said
question would not be very helpful for our present.
purpo~e. In fact we apprehend that entering into an
elaborate discussion about the scope and effect of the
said larger power, in the light of relevant judicial
decisions, is likely to create confusion and to distract
attention from the essential features of the very
narrow point that falls to be considered in bhe present
case. That is why we do not propose to enter into a
discussion of the . said topic or to refer to the several
decisions cited under that topic.
Let us now turn to· the law on the subject as it
obtains in India since the Code of Criminal Procedure
was enacted ln 1898. Section 401 of the Code gives
power to the executive to suspend the execution of
67
520
SUPREME COCRT REPORTS
[ 1961 J
the sentfmce or remit the whole or e.ny pa.rt of thB
punishment without conditionH ·or upon e.ny conditions
K. M. Nana11ali
the person sentenced e.ccepts. Section 402 giveA
which
v.
Tise SttTtt of power to the executive without the consent of the perBombay
son sentenced to commute a. sentence of dee.th into
imprisonmert for life e.nd e.lso other sentences into
Sinha C. j.
sentences less rigorous in nature. In e.ddition the
Governor-Genera.I had been delege.ted the power to
exercise the prerogative power vesting in His Ma.jesty.
Sub-section (5) of s. 401 a.lso provides that nothing
contained in it sha.11 be deemed to interfere with the
right of His Ma.jesty, or the Governor.Genera.I when
such right is delegated to him, to gra.nt pa.rdons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment. This
position continued till the Constitution ca.me into force.
Two provisions were introduced in the Constitution to
cover the former roya.I prerogative relating to pardon,
e.nd they a.re Arts. 72 e.nd 161. Article 72 dee.ls with
the power of the President to grant pardons, reprieveA,
respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend,
remit or commute the sentence of a.ny person convicted of any offence. Article 161 gives simila.r power U>
the Governor of a. Sta.te with respect to offences a.gs.inst
a.ny la.w relating to a. matter to which the executive
power of the State extends. Sections 40 I a.nd 402 of
the Code ha.ve continued with necessary modifica.tions
to bring them into line with Arts. 72 and 161. It will
be seen, however, that Arts. 72 a.nd 161 not only dea.I
with pa.rdons and reprieves which were within the
roya.l preroga.t.ive but ha.ve also included what iA provided in ss. 401 e.nd 402 of the Code. Besides the
genera.I power, there is a.lso provision in ss. 337 a.nd
338 of the Code to tender pa.rdon to a.n e.ccomplice
under certs.in conditions.
.
In this ca.so we are primarily concerned with the
extent of the power of pardon vested in the State so
fa.r a.s the Governor is concerned by Art. 161 of 'the
Constitution. Article 161 is in these terms:"The Governor of a. Sta.te sha.11 ha.ve the power
to gra.nt pa.rdons, reprieves, reapites or remissions of
punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of a.ny person oonvioted of a.ny offence a.gs.inst
1960
.
1 S.C.B,.
<
SUPBEl\IE COURT REPORTS
-521
1ybo
any law relating to a matter to which tho executive
power of the State extends."
J{. ,11 • •\' aitavati
Though Art. 161 does not make any reference to
v,
Art. 72 of the Constitution, the power of the Governor
Bombay
of a State to grant pardon etc. to some extent overlaps
the same power of the President, particularly, in the
Siu/ta C. ].
case of a sentence of death. Articles 72 and 161 are
in very general terms. It is, therefore, argued that
.they are not subject to any limitations and the respective area of exercise of power under these two
Articles i8 indicated separately in respect of the President and of the Governor of a 8tate. It iH further
argued that the exercise of power under. these two
Articles is not fettered by the provisions of Arts., 142
and 145 bf the ·Constitution or by any other law.
Article 142(1) is in these terms:"The Supreme Court in the exercise of its juri~
diction may pass such decree or make such order as is
necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or
matter pending before it, and any decree ~o passed or
order so made shall be enforceable throughout the
territory of'India in such manner as may be prescribed.
by or under any law made by Parliament and, until
provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as
the President may by order prescribe."
It will be seen that it consists of two parts. The
first part gives power to this Court in the exercise of
its jurisdiction to pass such decree or make ,such order
as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause
or matter pending before it. The second part deals
with the enforcement of the order passed by this
Court. Article 145 gives power to this Court with
the apvroval of the President to make rules for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the
Court. It is obvious that the rules made .under
Art. 145 are in aid of the power given to this Court
under Art. 142 to pass such decree or make such order
as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause
or matter pending before it. Rule 5 of 0. XXI of the
]:{ules of this Court was framed under Art. 145 and is
in these terms:" Where the petitioner has been sentenced to a
522
v.
Tlie Statt of
llomf)(~ y
SCPH.ElllE COUHT REPORTS
[19Gl]
term of impris<rnment, tho petition shall sltt.te whether
the petitioner has surrendered. Unless the Court
otherwise orders, t.he petition shall not be posted for
hearing unt.il the petitioner has surrendered to his
sentence."
This rule waR, in term", introduct•d into the Supreme
Court llules last year and it only crystallized the preexisting practicti of this Court, which is also the practice in the High Courts. That practice is based on
the very sound principle which was recognised long
ago by tho Full Bench of the High Court of .Judicature, !'\orth \Vt,stern Provinces, in 1870, iu the case
of The Queen v. Bisheshar Pershad ('). In that caso no
ordPr of conviction had been passed. Only a warrant
had been issued against the accused and as the warrant had been returned unserved a proclamation had
been issued and attachment of the property of tho
accused had been ordered, with a view to compelling
him t.o surrender. The validity of the warrnnL had been
elmllt·nged before the High ·court. The High Court
refused to entntain his petition until he had sunendered because he was deemed to he in contempt. of a
lawfully constituted authority. Tbe accused person
iu pursuance of t.he order of t.he High Court surrendered and after he bad surrendered, the mattt>r was
dealt with by tJw High Court on its merits. But as
observed aho\'C the Rules framed uuder Art.. 145 are
011ly in aid of the powers of this Court under Art. 142
and the main question that fallR for considt>ration is,
whethtlr the order of suspension passed by the Governor under Art. Hi! could operate when this Court had
be!'ll mon•d for granting Hpecial leaYe to appP-al from
the judgment and order of the High Court. A; soon as
the µctitioner put in a petition for spt>cia.l leave to
appeal t.he mattt>r became sub judice i11 this Court. This
Court under its Rules could insist upon the petitioner
surrendering tc• his sentence as a condition precedent
to his being heard by this Court, though this Court
could dispense with and in a proper case could exempt
him from the operation of that rule. It ioi not disputed that this Court has the power to stay the execution of the sentence and to grant bail pending tho
(1) Vol. :z, :t-i.\.\'.P. High Court Heports, p. 441.
..
1 S.C.R.
SUPREi\IE COUHT HEPOHTS
523
disposal of the application for special leave to appeal.
Rule 28 of 0. XXI of the Hules does not cover that ](. 111. ,Va11avati
period, but even so the power of the Court under
v.
Art. 142 of the Constitution to make such order as is The State of
Bonibay
necessary for doing complete justice in this case was
not disputed and it would be open to this Court even
while an application for special leave is pending to Sinha C. j.
grant bail under the powots it has under Art.. 142 to
pass any order in any matter which is necessary for
doing complete justice.
But it has been argued that, even as the terms of
Art. 161 are without auy limitation, the provisions of
s. 401 of tbe Code of Criminal Procedure are also in
simllarly wide terms, and do not admit of any limita.
tions or fetters on the power of the Governor ; the
Governor could, therefore, suspend the execution of
the sentence passed by the High Court even during
the period that the matter was pending in this Court.
In other words, the same power of dealing with the
matter of suspension of sentence is vested both in this
Court as also in the Governor.
This immediately raises the question of the extent
of the power under s. 401 of the Code with respect to
suspension as compared with the powers of the Court
. under s. 426, which enables the Court pending appeal
to suspend the sentence or lo release the appellant ou
bail. It will be seen from the language of s. 426 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure c.lealing with the power
of the appellate court that, for reasons to be recorded
in writing, the court may order that the execution of
. the senteuce be suspended or that if the accused is in
confinement he mav be released on bail or on his own
bond. Section 40( occurs in Chapter XXIX, headed
"Of suspensions, remissions and commutatious of
sentences". This Chapter, therefore, docs not deal
with all the powers vested in the Governor under Art.
161 of the Constitution, but only with some of them.
Section 426 is in Chapter XXXI, headed as "Uf
appeal, reference and revision". Section 426, therefore, deals specifically with a situation in which an
a.ppeal is pending and the appellate court has seisin
of the case and is thus entitled to pass such orders as
•
524
SUPREME COURT REPOH,TS
[1961]
it thinks fit and proper to suspend a sentence. It will
thus be seen that whereas Chapter XXIX, in which
[(. 111. 1Vanavati
s. 401 occurs, deals with a situation in which penv.
d
ency of an appeal is not en visaged, s. 426 deals with
The State of
Bombay
a situation in which pendency of an appeal is postulat.
ed. In other words, Chapter XXIX deals with persons
Sinha C. ].
sentenced to punishment for an offence simpliciter in
general terms, whereas s. 426 deals with a special case
and therefore must be out of the operation of s. 401.
But it has been vehemently argued by the learned
Advocate General that the words "at any time"
indicate that the power conferred by s. 401 may ·be
exercised without any limitation of time. In the context of s. 401 "any time" can only mean after con.
vict.ion. It cannot mean before conviction, because
there cannot be any sentence before conviction. The
question then is : " Does it cover the entire period
after the order of conviction and sentence even when
an appeal is pending in the appellate court and s. 426
can be availed of by the appellant?"
It will be seen that s. 426 is as unfettered by other
provisions of the Code as s. 40 l with this difference
that powers under s. 426 cau only be exercised by an
appellate court pending 11n appeal. When both the
prnvisions are thus unfettered, they have to be
harmonised so that there may be no conflict between
them. They can be harmonised without-any difficulty,
ifs. 426 is held to deal with a special case restricted
to the period while the appeal is pending before an
appellate court whilc s. 401 deals with the remainder
of the period after conviction. We see no difficulty in
adopting this interpretation nor is there any diminution of powers conferred on the executive bys. 401 by
this interpretation. The words "at any time "
emphasise that the power under s. 401 can be exercised without limit of time, but they do not necessarily
lead to the inference that this power can also be
exercised while the conrt is seized of the same matter
under s. 426.
Turning now to Arts. 142 and 161, the argument of
Mr. Seervai is that though this Court has the power to
suspend sentence or grant bail pending hea1)ug of the
1960
.,
t
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
525
special lea \'e petition, that would not affect the power
of the executive to grant a pardon, using the term in ](. J\1. l\'anavali
its comprehensive sense, as indicated above. Reference
v.
was in this connection made to Balmukand and others The State of
Bombay
v. The King Emperor (1 ). That was a case where a
convicted person had moved His Majesty in Council
for special leave to appeal and the question arose as Sinha C. } .
to the power of the executive to suspend the sentence.
In that connection Lord Haldane, L. C., made the·
following observations :"With regard to staying execution of the sentence
of death, their Lordships are unable to interfere. As
they have ofteri said, this Board is not a Court of
Criminal Appeal. The tendering of advice to His
Majesty as to the exercise of his prerogative of pardon
is a matter for the Executive Government and is outside their Lordships' province. It is, of course, open
to the petitioners' advisers to notify the·· Government
of India that an appeal to .this Board is pending. The
Government of India will no doubt give due weight to
the fact and consider the circumstances. But their
Lordships do not think it right to express any
opinion as to whether the sentence ought to be suspended".
These observations were made because the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, unlike the Supreme
Court, was not a Court of criminal appeal and therefore the question of suspending the operation of the
sentence of death was not within their judicial
purview. The granting of special leave by the Privy
Council was an example of the residuary power of the
Sovereign to exercise his judicial functions b_v way of
his prerogative and therefore the petitioner was left
free in that case to approach. the Gover!rment of India,
as the delegate. of the Sovereign, to exercise the prerogative power in view of the circumstance that an
appeal to the Privy Council was intended. The footnote to the Report also contains the following:
" The petitioners were reprieved by the Government of India pending the hearing of the petition for
leave to appeal". (see p.134).
(1) (1915) 42 LA. 133.
521i
"·
Sinha C. _/.
'
8Cl'HEME C:OUHT HEPOHTS
(Hl61]
It is noteworthy that the reprieve granted in that case
covered only the period until the grant or refusal of
the petition for leave to a.ppca.l and did not go
further so as to eover the period of pendency of the
appeal to the Privy Council, unlike t.hc order now
impugned in this case. The power which was vested
in the Crown to grant special leave to appeal to convicted persons from India has now been conferred on
this Court under Art. 136. The power under Art. 136
can be exercised in respect of " any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or
matter passed or ma.de by any court or tribunal in
the territory of India''. This wide and comprehensive power in respect of any ,.determination by
any court or tribunal must carry with it t.be power to
pass orders incidental or ancillary to the exercise of
that power. Hence thu wide powers given to this
Court under Art. 142 "to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter
pending before it". As already indicated, ,the power
of this Court to pass an order of suspension of sentence or to grant bail pending the disposal of the application for special leave to appeal has not been disputtid and could not have been disputed keeping in
view the vory wide terms in which Art. 142 is worded.
When Ml application for special leave to appeal from
a judgment and order of conviction and sentence
passed by a High Court is rnadr, this Court has been
il!suing orders of interim bail pending the hearing and
disposal of the application for special leave as also
during the pendency of the appeal to this Court after
special leave has been granted. So if i\lr. Seervai's
argument. is correct that the pende.ncy of a special
leave application iu this Court makes no difference to
the exercise of the power by the executive under
Art. 161, then both the judiciary and the executive
have to function in the same tield at the same time.
lllr. Seerva.i however contended that there could never
ho a conflict hetwecn the exercise of the power by the
Governor 4nder Art. 161 and by this Court under
Art. 142 becauHe the power under Art. 161 is executive
power and tl l power under Art. 142 is judicial power
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
...
.
527
and the two do not act in the same field. That in our
r96o
opinion is over-simplification of the matter. It is true
. exercise
. d b y th e exe- K. M. Nanavati
th a t th e power un d er Ar t . 161 1s
cutive while the power under· Art. 142 is that of the The ;;ate of
judiciary; but merely because one power is executive
Bombay
and the othe~ is judicial, it does not follow that they
can never be exercised in the same field. The field in Sinha c. J.
which the power is exercised does not depend upon
the authority exercising the power but upon the subject-matter. What is the power which is being exercised in this case ? The power is being exercised by
the executive to suspend the sentence; that power
can be exercised by this Court under Art. 142. The
field in which the power is being exercised is also the
same, namely, the suspension of the sentence passed
upon a convicted person. It is significant that the
Governor's power has been exercised in the present
case by reference to the appeal which the petitioner
intended to file in this Court. There can therefore be
no doubt that the judicial power under Art. 142 and
the Executive power under Art. 161 can within certain narrow limits be exercised in the same field. The
question that immediately arises is one of harmonious
construction of two provisions of the Constitution, as
one is not made subject to the other by specific words
in the Constitution itself. As already pointed out,
Art. 161 contains no words of limitation; in the same
way, Art. 142 contains no words of limitation and in
the fields cover.ed by them they are unfettered. But
if there is any field which is common to both, the
principle of harmonious construction will have to be
adopted in order. to avoid conflict between "the two
powers. It will be seen that the ambit of Art. 161 is
very much wider and it is only in a very narrow field
that the power contained in Art. 161 is also contained
in Art. 142, namely, the power of suspension of sentence during the period when the matter is sub-judice
in this Court. Therefore on the principle of harmonious construction and to avoid a conflict between the
two powers it must be held that Art. 161 does not deal
with the suspension of sentence during the time that
68
•
..
'
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Art. 142 is in operation and the matter is sub-judice
K M-;; . in this Court.
·
· anavati
In this connection it is well to contrast the languThe s;~,, of
age of s. 209(3) a.nd s. 295(2) of the Government of
Bombay
India Act, 1935. Section 209(3) gave power to the
Federal Court to order a stay of execution in any case
Sinha c. f.
under appeal to the Court, pending the hearing of the
appeal. Section 295(2) provided that nothing in this
Act shall derogate from the right of His Majesty, or of
the Governor General if any such right is delegated to
him by His Majesty, to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishments. It may have been
possible to argue on the language of s. 295(2) that the
prerogative exercised by His Majesty transcended the
power of the Federal Court under s. 209(3); but when
we compare the language of Arts. 72 and 161 with
the language of s. 295(2) of the Government of India
Act, we find no words like " Nothing in this Constitution" or "Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Constitution " in them. Such words have been
used in many articles of the Constitution: (See for
example, Art. 262(2) which provides specifically for
taking away by Parliament by law the power of this
Court in disputes relating to water and begins with
words" Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution "). The absence therefore of any such qualifying
words in Art. 161 makes the power of this Court under
Art. 142 of the same wide amplitude within its sphere
as the power conferred on the Governor under Art. 161.
Therefore if there is any field where the two powers
can be exercised simultaneously the principle of harmonious construction bas to be resorted to in order
that there may not be any conflict between them. On
that principle the power under Art. 142 which operates in a very small part of the field in which the
power under Art. 161 operates, namely, the suspension
and execution of sentence during the period when any
matter is sub-judice in this Court, must be held not
to be included in the wider power conferred under
Art. 161.
In this connection Mr. Seervai drew our attention
to the power of nolle prosequi. It may be mentioned
r96o
•
a
.
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f
----'-
529
that that power is not analogous to the power of pardon though its exercise may result in a case in a court
coming to an end. Simirar powers are contained in K. M. v.Nanavati
ss. 333 and 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Stale of
The fact that the Advocate General in the one case
Bonibay
and the Public Prosecutor in the other can bring a prosecution to an end has in our opinion no bearing on the Sinha C. ].
question raised in the present case. In any case action
under s. 333 of the Code results in a discharge only
and may leave it open, for example, to a private party
to bring a complaint in the . proper court unless the
presiding judge directs that the discharge shall
· amount to an acquittal. Under s. 494 the withdrawal of a case can only take place with the consent of
the Court. In any case these proceedings being not
in the nature of pardon or suspension or remission or
commutation of sentence have no bearing on the
question before us.
_
In the present case, the question is limited to the
exercise by the Governor of his powers under Art. 161
of the Constitution suspending the sentence during
the pendency of the special leave petition and the
appeal to this Court; and the controversy has narrowed down to whether for the period when this Court is
in seizin of the case the Governor could pass the impugned order, having the effect of suspending the sentence during that period. There can be no doubt that
it is open to the Govemor to grant a full pardon at
any time even during the pendency of the case in this
Court in exercise of what is ordinarily called" mercy
jurisdiction ''. Such a pardon after the accused person
has been convicted by the Court has the effect of
completely absolving him from all punishment or disqualification attaching to a conviction for a criminal
offence. That power is essentially vested in the head
of the Executive, because the judiciary has no such
'mercy jurisdiction '. But the suspension of tho sentence for the period when this Court is in seizin of the
case could have been granted by this Court itself. If
in respect of the same period the Governor also has
power to suspend the sentence, it would mean that
both the judiciary and the executive would be
530
SUPREME COURT REPO~TS
[1961]
functioning in the samt1 field at the same time lee.ding
to the possibility of conflict of jurisdiction. Such a collK. M. Natiavali
flict was not and could not have been intended by the
v.
makers of the Constitution. But it was contended by
Tica Statr of
Boniba_y~
Mr. Seervai that the words of the Constitution, namely,
Art. 161 do not warrant the conclusion that the power
Sinlta C. ] .
was in any way limited or fettered. In our opinion
there is a fallacy in the argument in so far as it postu.
!ates what has to be established, namely, that CT10
Governor's power we.8 absolute and not, fettered in any
we.y. So long as the judiciary has the power to pass-a
particular order in a pending case to that extent the
power of the Executive is limited in view of the woras
either of 88. 401 and 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Arts. 142 and 161 0£ the Constitution. If
that is the correct intepretation to be put on these provisions in order to harmonise them it would follow
that what is covored in Art. 142 is not covered _by
Art. 161 and similarly what is covered by s. 426 is not
covered by s. 401. On that interpretation :\fr. Seerv!Li
would be right in his contention that there is no con:
fliet between the prerogative power of .the sovereign
state to grant pardon and the power of tho courts to
dee.I with a ponding case judicially.
· ··
In this connection it may be relevant to deal with
· another argument urged by Mr. Seervai in respect of
the rule framed bv this Court under 0. 21, r. 5. He
contended that Art. 145 under which rules have been
framed by this Court is in terms subject to the provisions of any law me.de by Parliament, and he also
emphasised the fact that before the rules can com·e
into force they have to obtain the approval of the
President. In other words, the argument is that the
rule-making vower of this Court is no more than subordinate legislation, and so if there is a conflict between 0. 21, r. 5 and Art. 161 the rule must yield t-0
the powers conferred on the Governor by Art. 161.
This argument overlooks the fact that in substance
and effect the conflict is not between the said rule and
Art. 161 but between tho wide powers conferred on
this Court by Art. 142 and similar wide powers conferred on the Governor undor Art. 161. It would,
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
531
therefore, be fallacious to suggest that compliance
with the rule would become unnecessary because a K. M. Nanavati
higher power under Art. 161 has been exercised by
v.
the Governor, and so in ~he fac~L the· order, passed The State of
Bombay
by the Governor there 1s no longe_r _l!-ny need to comply with the rule. We have already referred to the
genesis of this rule and _w.!e.-have pointed out that Sinha c. J;
though the rule may have been framed under Art. 145
the source of the power of this Court to grant bail or
to suspend sentence pending hearing of any criminal
matter before it is not the saidrule nor Art. 145 but
Art. 142; that being so, what Fe have to dec_ide in
the present case is whether having regard to the
width 'and amplitude of the powers conferred on this
Court and the Governor by Arts. 142lrnd 161 respectively it would not be reasonable and J~.~per to harmonise the said two articles in such a way as to avoid
any conflict between the said two powers. In the
decision of this question the legal chara~r of the
rules that may be framed under Art. 145 cannot have
any niaterial bearing.
In this connection it would be relevant to consider
what would be the logical consequence if Mr. Seervai's
argument is accepted. . In the present case the.
Governor's order has been passed even before the
petitioner's application for special leave came to be
heard by this Court ; indeed it was passed before the
said application was filed and the reason forpassing
the order is stated to be that tho petitioner intended
to file an appeal before this Court. Let us, however,
take a case wliere an application for special leave has
been filed in this Court, and. on a motion made by the
petitioner the Court has directed him to be released
on bail .on executing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000
and on furnishing two sureties of like amount.
According to Mr. Seervai, even if such an order is
passed by this Court in a criminal mittter pending
before it, it would be open to the .Petitioner to move
the Governor for suspension ·of 41§._.sentence pending
the hearing of his application and ·appeal before this
Court and the Governor may, in a proper case, unconditionally suspend the sentence. In other words, Mr.
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Seervai frankly conceded that, even in a pending
K
•
. criminal matter before this Court, an order passed by
· M. ~anavati this Court may in effect be set aside by the Governor
The State of by ordering an unconditional suspension of the sen.
Bombay
tence imposed on the petitioner concerned. This
illustration clearly brings out the nature of the controSinha c. J.
versy which we are called upon to decide in this case.
If Mr. Seervai's argument is accepted it would inevitably mean that by exercising his power under Art.
161 the Governor can effectively interfere with an
order passed in the same matter by this Court in
exercise of its powers under Art. 142. It is obvious
that the field on which both the powers are operating
is exactly the same. Should the sentence passed
against an accused person be suspended during the
hearing of an appeal on the ground that a.n appeal is
pending? That is the question raised both before
this Court and before the Governor. In such a case
it would be idle to suggest that the field on which the
power of the Governor under Art. 161 can be exercised
is different from the field on which the power of this
Court can be exercised under Art. 1'12. The fact that
the powers invoked are different in character, one
judicial and the other executive, would not change
the nature of the field or affect its identity. We have
given our anxious consideration to the problem raised
for our decision in the present case and we feel no
·hesitation in taking the view that any possible con.
flict in exercise of the said two powers can be reasonably and properly a voided by adopting a harmonious
rule of construction. :Avoidance of such a possible
conflict will incidentally prevent any invasion of the
rule of law wbi ch is the very foundation of our Constitution.
It has been strenuously urged before us that the
power of granting pardon is wide and absolute and
can be exercised at any time, that is to say, it can be
exercised even in. respect of criminal matters which
are sub judice; and the argument is that the power to
suspend sentence is part of the larger power to grant
pardon, and is similar in character and can be similarly exercised. This argument is fallacious; it ignores
r96o
•
l
-
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REP.ORTS
~
533
the essential difference between the general power to
grant pardon etc., and the power to suspend sentence K. M. J:.l anavati
in criminal matters pending before this Court. The
v.
first is an exclusively executive power vesting in the The State of
.Bonibay
Governor under Art. 161; it does not vest in this
Court; and so the field covered by it is exclusively
subject to the exercise of the said executive power; Sinha C. ].
and so there can be no question of any conflict in
such a case; conflict of powers obviously postulates
the existence of the same or similar power in two
authorities; on the other hand, the latter power vests
both in this Court and the Governor, and so the field
covered by the said power entrusted to this Court
under Art. 142 can also be covered by the executive
power of the Governor under Art. 161, and that raises
the problem of a possible conflict between the two
powers. That is why we have observed earlier that
concentration or even undue emphasis on the charac.
ter and sweep of the larger power to grant pardon is
likely to distract attention from the essential features
of the power to suspend sentence with which alone
we are concerned in the present proceedings.
As a result of these considerations we have come to
the conclusion that the order of the Governor granting suspension of the sentence could only operate
until the matter became sub judice in this Court on
the filing of the petition for.special leave to appeal.
After the filing of such a petition this Court was seized
of the case which would be dealt with by it in accord.
ance with law. It would then be for this Court, when
moved in that behalf, either to apply r. 5 of 0. XXI
or to exempt the petitioner from the operation of that
rule. It would be for this Court to pass such orders
as it thought fit as to whether the petitioner should
be granted bail or should surrender to his sentence or
to pass such other or further orders as this Court
might deem fit in all the circumstances of the case. It
follows from what has been said that the Governor
had no power to grant the suspension of sentence for
the period during which the matter was sub judice in
this Court.
A great deal of argument was addressed to us as to
I·
534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1961]
whether the condition imposed by the Governor in his
t. order impugned in this case was or was not legal. In
I( M -N
. . anavaih. .
v.
t e view we h ave ta ken ofhG
t c ovcruor ' s power, so
Th• Stat• of far as the relevant period is concerned, namely, after
Bo.Way
the ease became sub judice in this Court, it is not
necessary to pronounce upon that aspect of the con.
Sinha c. f.
troversy.
In the result. the application dated April 21, 1960,
as amended by the affidavit of July 6, 1960, praying
that the special leave petition be listed for hearing
without requiring the petitioner to surrender in view
of the order of the Governor foils and is dismissed.
r96o
Kapur
•.
f,
KAPUR J ....:..I havo had the advantage of reading
the Order proposed by my Lord the Chief ,Justice,
but I regret I am unable t-0 agree with it and I proceed to give my reasons:
In this petition which is brought for exemption
from surrender to the sentence imposed on the p~Litio
ner a question of great constitutional importance
arises. The petitioner submits that his seutence
having been Huspended by the order of the Governor
of the erst.while State of Bombay, the rule made by
this Court as to surrender which is a condition precedent to the hearing of a petition for leave to appeal
against the judgment of the High Court is inapplicable to him and that it is a fit case in which he should
be exempted from the operation of tho rule. Tho
facts which have given rise to this petition are set out
in.the order of my Lord the Chief Justice and need
not be repeated here .
. The decision of this petition depends upon the
nature, effec:t, extent and operation of the powers conferred by arts. 142(1), 145 and 161 of the Constitution;
how they are to be construed and how and to what
extent, if any, they are in conflict or in accord with
each other. It will be necessary to delve into the
history of the preroga.tivo of pardons in England and
America and see how far the law la.id down by courts
of those countries and the practice there followed is
helpful in disoovoring the true intent and purpose of
these articles of the Constitution.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
535
r960
Under the Indian Constitution the power to grant
. pardons is vested in the President and the Governors K. M. Nanavati
of States. Article 72 deals with the former and art.
v.
161 with the latter. Article 72 which is in Part V, The State of
Bombay
Chapter I, dealing with the Union Executive provides:Kapur ].
Art. 72. (1) "The President shall have the power
to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remission of
punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the .
sentence of any person convicted of any offence.
(a) .......................•..........................•.......•....
(b) in all cases where the punishme1,t or sentence
is for an offence against any law relating to, a matter
to which the executive power of the Union extends;
(c) in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of
death.
(2) .....................•..•............•......•....••...•••••....
(3) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall
affect the power to suspend, remit or commute a
sentence of death exercisable by the Governor of a
State under any law for the time being in force:'.
Article 161 which is in Part VI is as follows:"The Governor of a State shall have the power
to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of
punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the
sentence of any person convicted of any offence
<Lgainst any law relating to a matter to which the
executive power of the State extends".
· Article 142( 1) is as under :" The Supreme Court in the exe.rcise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree· or make such order as is
neeessary for doing complete justice in any cause or
matter pending before it ".
Both articles 72 ·and 161 give the widest power to
the President or the Governor of a State as the case
may be and there are no words of limitation indicated
in either of the two articles. It was argued that under
arts. 142 and 145(1) of the Constitution certain powers
are conferred on the Supreme Court and if the articles
conferring powers on the President and the Governors
are read along with the power given to the Supreme
6g
536
SDPRE:.\1E COtJRT REPORTS
[1961]
Court they create a. conflict a.nd therefore to give a.
four articles it is
K . M . .,anacat1
v.
necessary to cut down t I10 amp 1·1tu do o f t ho powers
n, s1a1, of conferred by arts. 72 and 161 of the Constitution. In
Bombay
regard to suspension of sentences it will be fruitful to
tra.ce the legislative hi~tory of the rC'lc\;'.'e.nt powers
Kap•• J.
of the executive and the judiciary which a.rise for
construction.
In tho Criminal Procedure Code of 1861 (Act XX V
of 1861) the power of the executive wa.s confined to
remission of punishments and wa.s contained in s. 54
which wa.s as under:S. 54. " When any person has been sentenced to
punishment for an offonco, the Govero.or Genera.I of
India in Council, or the local Government, may, a.t
any time, without conditions; or upon any condition
which such person shall accept, remit the whole or
a.ny pa.rt of the punishment to which he shall have
been sentence'd ".
This section was in Chapter III dealing with "Preliminary Rules" which included among ot.her things
. passing of sentences, the place of confinement of persons convicted and the power of remission of sentences
by the Governor General. In Chapter XXX dealing
with appeals bys. 421 the appellate court was given
the power to suspend sentences ponding appeals a.nd
~elea.se which was in the following terms:S. 421. "In any case in which a.n appeal is
allowed, the Appellate Court ma.y, pending the a.ppea.l,
order tha.t t.he sentence be suspended, and if the
a.ppella.nt be in confinement for an offence which is
bailable, may order that he be released on bail ". '
Then ca.me the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872,
Act X of 1872. In Chapter XXIII dealing with execution of sentences the power of the executive to remit
punishment was contained in s. 322 which read a.s
under:S. 322. "When any person has been sentenced
to punishment for an offence, the Governor General
of India. in Council, or the Local Government, ma.y
at any time, without conditions, or upon a.ny conditions which the person sentenced accepts, remit the
i96o
-;:-
. harmonious interpretation to a.II the
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
1960
whole or any part of the punishment to which he has
been sentenced ............................... ".
]{, M. Nanavati
And the power of suspension of sentence pending
v.
appeals and release and bail was contained in s. 281, The Sitile of
Bonibay
a section in Chapter XX dealing with appeals which
was in the following terms :J(aptir ].
S. 281. "In any case in which an appeal is
allowed, the Appellate Court may, pending the
appeal, order that the sentence be suspended, and, if
the appellant be in confinement for an offence which
is bailable, may order that he be released on bail.
The period during which the sentence is suspended shall be omitted in reckoning the completion of the
punishment".
The Criminal Procedure Code was re-enacted in
1882 being Act X of 1882. The pow~r to suspend or
remit sentences was contained in a separate chapter,
viz., Chapter XXlX headed "Suspensions, Remissions and Commutations of Sentences". The relevant
provision was s. 401 :S. 40L "When any person has been sentenced
to punishment for an offence, the Governor General
in Council, or the Local Government, may at any
time, without conditions, or upon any conditions
which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the
execution of his sentence, or remit the whole or any
part of the punishment to which be has been
sentenced.
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to
interfere wit.h the right of Her MajestY' to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment".
The power of the appellate courts as to suspension of
sentences pending appeals was given in s. 426 which
was in Chapter XXXI dealing with appeals and that
section was as follows :" 426. Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, ·for reasons to be
recorded by it in writing order that the execution of
the sentence or order appealed against be suspended
538
SUPREllfF; COGRT REPORTS
[1961]
and, if he is in confinement, th.at he be released on
ha.ii or on his own bond.
K. Al. :\'anatiati
The power conferred by this section on an Appelv.
late Court may be exercised also by the High Court in
The State of
Boml::ay
the case of any appeal by a. convicted person to a.
Court subordinate thereto.
Kapur ].
When the appellant is ultimately sentenced t-0
imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation, the
time during which ho is so released shall be excluded
in computing the term for which he is so sentenced".
A new Criminal Procedure Code was enacted in 1898,
a. portion of which was subsequently amended. The
section dealing with powers of suspension or remission
of sentence is 401 which reads as under :" 401. (1) When any person has been sentenced
to punishment for an offence, the Governor General
in Council or the local Government may at any_ time
without conditions or upon any conditions which the
person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of
his sentence or remit the whole or any pa.rt of the
punishment to which he has been sentenced ...........,,.
..................................................................... .
The original sub-section (5) of this section was:
"(5) Nothing herein contained shall be deemed
to interfere with the right of His Majesty or of the
Central Government when such right is delegated to it
to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of
punishment".
And this sub-section was repealed by the Adaptation
of Laws Order, 1950. The words Governor Genera.I
in Council or the Local Government were suitably
a.mended with the various constitutional changes. ·
The corresponding section of appellate courts is
contained ins. 426 which is in Chapter X XXI dealing with appeals etc. The relevant portions of this
section when quoted a.re as under :" 426. (l) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be
recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of
the sentence or order appealed against be suspended
and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released
on bail or on his own bond.
I
J
I
I
1
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
..................................................................
.... ................... ............ ............................. ...
J{. ft!. N ana11ati
(2) (B) Where a High Court is satisfied that a
v.
convicted person has been granted special leave The State of
BombaJ!
to appeal to the Supreme Court against any sentence
which the High Court has imposed or maintained, the
f(apur ].
High Court may, if it so thinks fit, order that pending
the appeal the sentence or order appealed against be
suspended, and also,. if such person is in confinement,
that he be released on bail". (This sub-section was
added later).
It may be mentioned that in the Code of 1861 the
power given to the Governor General was to remit
punishment to which an accused person was sentenced and the power of the appellate court was to suspend
the sentence pending appeal in non-bailable offences
and to release on bail in bailable cases. In the Code
of 1872 also the power of the Governor General and of
the local Government was one of remission of punishment and the power of the appellate court was of suspension of sentences pending the appeal. In s. 401 of
the Act of 1882 the legislature chose to use the words
"suspension of the execution_ of a sentence or remit
the whole or any part of punishment". The power·
was discretionary and there is nothing to indicate
that this power was in any way limited. But the
power given to the appellate court was differently
worded from what was in the previous Codes in that
now it was necessary for the Courts to record reasons
emphasising that .the two powers-the one exercised
by the executive and the other exercised by the judiciary-were two separate powers, no doubt, operating
for the same purpose but exercised on different considerations and in dilferent circumstances. Of course
this does not mean that the courts did not exercise
thefr power judicially previous to the Act of 1882.
In the Act of 1898 also-, which is still the law, the
same power of suspension of the execution of sentences
or remission of punishments is mentioned in s. 401
and in s. 426 giving the powers of the appellate courts
the words "for reasons to be recorded in writing " are
repeated showing that the legislature wanted to make
540
srPRE)IE COl'.RT REPORTS
[1961)
it clear ahont the essential differenco in th~ nature of
the exercise of tbA power cc•nferrf'd on the executive
}(. Jf _ ,\· rU!IHati
1>11d on the jn<liciary. The words" at any time" in
v.
s.
401 are very wide and show tho plenary nature of
1 ht State of
[1-;,n~ay
the power.
In tho Government of India Acts pre\'ious to the
Act of I 935 nothing was said about the power of the
.Crown or tho power of tho Governor (;pneral aA a
dPlegate of the Crown, and it cannot be said that the
Indian lrgislature, whate1·er its powers, could affect
the King's prerogative and therefore any provision in
the Criminal Procedure Corle was wholly irnpuissant
as to tho King's prerogative of pardons. See Henrietta Muir Edwards v. Attorney General of Canada(').
Provisions such ass. 401(5) are by way of abundant
caution.
Section 295 of the Constitution Act of 1935 was a
special provision as to thn power of the executive to
suspend, remit· or commute a scmtence of death. Subsection (1) of that section pro\'ided that the power of
the Go,·eruor General in his discretion were the same
as we.re vested in the Governor G<~neral in Council
imrnP<liate!y before the commencement of Part Ill of
that Act hut save as that no aut.hority in India outside a provi11ce had any power to suspend, remit or
commute the sentence of any pernon convicted in a
province. Sub.section (2) was a saving clause and it
provided:S. 295. (2) "Xothing in this Act shall derogate
from tlw right of His Majesty, or of tho Governor
General, if 11ny such righL is delegated to him by His
~fajesty, to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment.."
Thus the power of the King or bf the Governor General as a delegate to grant suspension remission or commutations remained unaffected by the introduction of a
federal system with division of subjects betw1>en the
('.,entre and the Provinces. This section was in the
pa~t dealing with the provisions as to certain legal
matters. Thus under the Government of India Act
the Governor General in his discretion had the nower
(1) [1930] A.C. u4, 136.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
r96o
to remit etc. sentences of death and Governors of
provinces had the power in regard to all sentences !{. M. ~Yariavali
passed in a province but the power of the King and
v.
of the Governor General as a delegate remained un- The Staf9 of
Bonibay
. affected by the first sub-section of the section. Thus upto the coming into force of the Constitution the exercise
Kapur ].
of the King's prerogative remained unaffected, was
plenary, unfettered arld exercisable as hitherto.
Historically in England the King as the autocratic head of the Government always had the power to
pardon.
.
This was a part ...of that special pre-eminence
which the King hath over and 'above all other persons
and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in
right of his royal dignity". Bl. Comm. (i). 239.
A pa'rdon is said by Lord Coke to be a " work of
mercy; whereby the King, either before attainder,
sentence or conviction or after forgiveth flll.Y crime,
offence, punishment, execution, right, title,· debt or
duty, temporal or ecclesiastical". 3 Inst. 23:~.
The common law is thus stated in Hale's Picas of
the Crown, Vol. 2, Chapter 58, page 412:
"Reprieves or stays of judgment or execution
are of three kinds, viz. :
1. Ex mandate regis.
2. · Ex arbitrio judicis. Sometimes the judge
reprieves before judgment, as where he is not satisfied
with the verdict, or the evi_dence is uncertain, or the
indictment insufficient or doubtful whether within
clergy; and sometimes after judgment, if it be a small
felony, the out of clergy, or in order to a pardon or
transportation. Prompt. Just 22b, and these arbitrary
reprieves 1:nay be granted or taken off by the justices
of gaol delivery, also their sessions be adjourned or
finished, and this by reason of common usage, 2 Dyer,
205a, 73 Eng. Reprint, 452.
3. Ex necessitate legis. Which is in case of pregnancy, where a woman is convict of felony or treason";
Blackstone thus expresses this prerogative:
"The only other remaining ways of avoiding the
execution ·of the judgment are by a reprieve or a
pardon; whereof the former is temporary only, the
.latter permanent.
542
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1. A reprieve (from reprendre, to take ha.ck) is
the
withdrawing
of a. ~entence for a.n interval of time;
!(. !if. ,\'a'1at•ati
whereby the executiou is suspended. This may be,
v.
The .5tatt of
first ex a.rbitrio judicis; either before or after judg/J'linbay
ment; as where tho judge is not satisfied with the
verdict, or the evidence is suspicious, or tho indictKapHr ].
ment is insufficient, or he is doubtful whether the
offence be within clergy or sometime if it bo a. sma.11
felony, or a.ny favourable circumstances a.ppea.r in the
criminal's character,· in order to give room to apply
to the Crown for either a.n absolute or cond itiona.l
pardon. These arbitrary reprieves ma.y be granted
or ta.ken off by the justices of gaol delivery, although
their session be finished, a.nd their commission expired; but this rather by common usage, than of 'strict
right.
Reprieve ma.y also be ex necessitate legis; a.s,
where a. woman is ca.pita.Hy convicted a.nd plcitng her
pregnancy; though this is no ca.use to stay the judgment, yet it is to respite the execution till ~he be
delivered. This is a. mercy dictated by the la.w of
nature in favourem prolis ". Bk. 4, cha.pt. 31, pp. 394,
395.
After imposition of the sentence execution of the sentence may be suspended for a. time which is known a.s
respite and ma.y be granted by the king or by the
Court. Orfield's Criminal Procedure from Arrest to
A ppea.I, p. 529.
As the pos.qessions of the kings of England expanded and several uew colonies came under their sway
the power of pardon which the kings exercised ca.me
to be exercis!·d by their representatives in the colonies
and in America. from them it went to the State
Governors and to the President for fedora.I offences.
The same process was followed in this country a.s the
various ena.ctment.9 a.nd provisions set out a.hove
show. It may be repetitive but it cannot be sufficiently emphasised that both the power of pardon and
the power of reprieve which is a. part of the all comprehensive power of pardon are executive acts and
ca.n be exercised at any time and in any circumstances
untrammelled and without control and in absolute
'
•
,_
1 S.C.R.
..
'
~
i
~.\
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
543
r960
freedom except that prescribed by the Constitution ;
Craies on Statute La11', page 483.
K. M. Nanavati
In the Constitution the power of the President is
v.
the same as it was in s. 295 of the Constitution Act The State of
Bombay
of 1935 and is unaffected in °regard to sentence of
death by the power conferred under art. 161. The
power of the Governor c9ntained in art. 161 also is of Kapitr ].
the widest amplitude as the words of the article which
have been quoted above would show. In construing a
constituent or an organic Statute such as the Constitution that interpretation must be attached which
is most beneficial to the ·widest amplitude of its
powers; British Coal Corporation v. King (1). The
Judicial Committee in Henrietta Muir Edwards v.
Attorney General of Canada (') said :-.
"Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the'
duty of this Board-it is certainly not their desire-I
to cut down the provisions of the Act by a narrow,
and technical construction, ........................ ".
In America the exercise of the power of pardon has
been held to be governed by the same principles as
are applicable to the exercise of the King's power of,
mercy under the English Constitution. In U nited'I
States v. Wilson(') Marshall, 0. J., referring to the
exercise of this power said :
'
" As this power had been exercised from time
immemorial by the executive of that nation whose
language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours. bears a close resemblance ; we adopt their
principles respecting the operation and effect of a
pardon, and look into their books for the rules pres-,
cribing the manner in which it is to be nsed by the
person who would avail himself of it".
Wayne, J., in Ex parte Wells (') said :
"We still think so, and that the language in tht;
Cons_titution, conferring the power .to grant reprieve~
and pardons, must be construed with reference to its
meaning at the time of its adoption. At the time of
our separation from Great Britain, that power had
1
..'
1
(1) [1935] A.G. 500.
(3) 8 L. Ed. 640, 643, 644.
70
(2) [1930] A.G. 124, 136.
(4) 15 L. Ed. 421, 424.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
544
[1961]
been exercised by the King, as the Chief Exocutive.
Prior to the Revolution, the Colonies, being in effect
K. A1. 1Vr111at·ati
under the laws of England, were accustomed to the
v.
exercise
of it in the variouH forms, as thP-y may he
The -'tt1t! n,'
/Jnmbfly
found in the English books. They were of course to
be applied as occasionH occurred, and they constitued
K11pur /.
a part of the jurisprudence of Anglo-America.. At
that time of the adoption of the Constitution, American statesmen were conversant with the pr11rogativcs
exercised by the Crown. Hence when the words t.o
grant pardons were used in the Constit.ntion, they
convey to the mind tho authority as exorcised by the
English Crown, or its representatives in the Colonies.
At that time both Englishmen anrl Americans attached the same meaning t.o tho words" pardon". In the
convention which framer! the ConsWution, no effort
was made to define or change its meaning, although
it was limited in cases of impeachment.
We must then givo the word the same meaning
as prevailed here and in England at the time it found
a place in the Con&t.it.ution. This is in conformity
with the principles laid down by this court in Cathcart
v. RobiM<m, 5 Pot. 264, 280; and in Flavell's case, 8
Watts & Serg. 197; Attorney General's brief".
In Ex parte Grossman(') Taft, C. J., said:-
"
............... The language of the Constitution cannot
he interpretetl safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they ·were when
the inRtrumont was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention, who submitted it
to the ratification of the Convention of the thirteon
states, were born and brought up in the atmoRphere
of tho common law, anti thought and spoke in its
vocabulary. They were familiar with othor forms of
government recent anrl ancient, and indicated in their
discussions earnest study and consideration of many
of them, but when they came to put thtiir concluRions
into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft,
thuy expressed them in terms of tho common law,
(t) 69 L. Ed 5>7. 530, 53'- 535.
."
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
. confident that they could be shortly and earnestly
understood ".
/(. M. N tOtt:Jvali
According to the American as also Indian Cons.t itu.
v.
tion the power as given to the President is not· to re- The Slate of
Bombay
prieve and pardon but that he shall have power to
grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the Kapur ].
United States except in oases of impeachment.
Wayne, J., in Ex parte Wells (1) at -page 425 has ex- ·
plained the difference between the -meaning of these
two expressions. " The· first conveys only the idea of
an absolute power as to the purpose or object for which
it is given. The. real language of the constitution is
general, that is, common to the class of pardons
known in the law as such whatever they may be by
their denomination. We have shown that conditional
pardon is one of them. A' single remark from the
power to grant .reprieves will illustrate the point.
That is not only to be u.sed to delay a judicial sentence
when the President shall think·the merits of the case
or some cause connected with the offender may requi~e it., but it also extends to cases ex neUBiitate legis
..................... Though the reprieve -in either case
produces delay in the execution of a sentence ", the
reprieves in the two cases are different in their legal
character and different as to the ca.uses which may
induce the exercise of the power to reprieve.
In India also the makers of the Constitution were
familiar with English institutions and the powers of
English Kings and the exercise of their power both
by the Governor General and the Governo.ts of British
India. and ·of its provinces. It will be legitimate to draw
on ~nglish la~ for guidance in the construction of the
. articles dealing with the power of the President and .
of the Governor in regard to pardons including the
other forms of clemency comprised in the two artfoles.
It will not be inappropriate to say that the framers of
the Indian Constitution were not only familiar and
trained in British Jurisprudence but were familiar
with the American Constitution a.nd they were drafting their Constitution in English language and therefore to draw upon the American parallel would be
wholly legitimate.
(1} 15 L. Ed. 421, 425.
546
SUPRE;\1E COCRT REPORTS
[1961]
The history of the prerogative of pardons and rep·
shows tha.t the power of the executive in the
rieves
/(. J.1 . .;\·anat·ati
ma.ttor
of pardons and reprieves and ot.her forms of
v.
pardons irrespective of the name used is of the widest
Tise State of
Bombay
amplitude and is plenary in nature and can be exercised at a.nv t.imo a.fter the commission of the offonce.
Kaf>ur ].
The power 'of tho oxecuti ve is an a.ct of grace and clemency. It is a sovereign or governmental power
which in a. monarchy is inherent in the King and in a.
Republic in the Sta.te or the people and which may, by
the Constitution, bo conferred on an officer or a department. It is a.n execut.ive power of the Governor and
it is the sa.me a.s was exercised by the colonial Governors in America. 67 C. J. S. 565.
Wayne, J., in the. matter of Ex parte Wells(') has
described it as a.n a.ct of mercy and a.n a.ct of clemency
applicable t-0 pardons of every kind and form. Field, ,J.,
in Ex parte Garland(') termed it the benign prProgative of mercy. It is tho power for a.voiding the exe·
eution of the judgment by reprieve or pardon whereof
the former is temporary and the la.tter permanent.
According to Willoughby's Constit.ution of America.,
Vol. IIJ,p. 1492:" The power to pardon includes the right to remit
pa.rt of the penalty a.s well a.s the whole a.nd in either
ca.se it ma.y be ma.do conditional. The power may be
exercised at a.ny time a.fter the offence is committed,
that is, either before, during, or after legal proceedings for punishment". Ex pa rte Garland 4 Wa.II. 333.
Reprieve whereby the execution is suspended is
merely the p.ostponement of the execution for a definite
time and it does not and cannot defe,it the ultimate
execution of the judgment but merely delays it. It is
extended to a. prisoner in order to afford him an opportunity t-0 procure some amelioration of the sentence
which has been imposed upon him. But power to reprieve is an executive act and the sole judge of tho
sufficiency of facls a.nd of the propriety of the action is
the Governor. No other department in America has
control over his actions. The pardoning power is in
derogation of the law and the power of pardoning
(1) 15 L. Ed. 421, 424·
(2) 18 L. Ed. 366, 370 <i 371.
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
547
when conferred on the head of the executive is &n
x960
executive power and function. The pardon may be
- ..
.
·
I
d
h
t
f
d
•t•
1
d
·
K
.
M
.
Nana11at1
con d itlona. ~n t e gran o a. con 1 10na par on is
v.
not illegal.
Thi s1a11 of
It has been held that the power of pardon is not
Bombay
subject to le-gislative control ; Ex parte Garland (1); nor
is it open to the legislature to change the effect of
Kapu, J.
pardon; United States v. Klein (2 ). The executive may
grant pardon for good reasons or bad. or for any reasons at all; its a.ct is final and irrevocable. The Courts
have no concern with the reasons which actuated the
executive. This power ts beyond the control of the
judiciary; 39 Am. Jur. 545, ss. 43; Horwitz v. Con- .
nor (8) .
\
.
·
· Thus in England the exercise of the power by the
King is·the exercise of the power of mercy. The power
is plenary in nature and unfettered and as far as constitutional powers are concerned .it can be exercised at
any time after the commission of the offence. In
America the power of the executive under the Federal
or State Constitution is the same in its nature a.s that
exercised by the representative of the English Crown in
America in colonial times. 67 C. J. S. 565. It pas
been said that executive clemency exists to afford
relief from undue harshness or individual mistake in
the operation or enforcement of the criminal law. It
is essential in popular Governments as well as in monarchies to vest in .some other party than courts the
power to amelior.a te or a.void particular criminal judgments and the exercise of this power is the exercise by
the highest executive of his full discretion and with
the confidence that lie will not abuse it.
In Ex parte Garland (1), it was held that the President's pardon was not subject to legislative control,
said Field, J ., "the law thus conferred is unlimited
...... .. .... .. .. ......... ........ It extends to every offence
known to the law and may be exercised a.t a.ny time
a.ftor its commission . ................... .. . .... ... The power
of the President is not subject to legislative control.
Congress can neither limit the effect not exclude from
its effect ariy class of offenders. The benign prerogative,
(1) 18 L . Ed, 366, 370 cl 371,
(3) 6 C. L. R. 1497,
(:i) 2.0 L . Ed. 51~'.
'
548
SCPRE:ME COl:RT REPORTS
(1961]
of mercy resposed in him cannot bo fettered by
a.ny legislative restriction .............................. ". In
K. M. .'!\' anavat i
Ex parte Grossman(') it was held that there was no
\'.
difference
between the power of the President a.nd
Thi Slate of
Bornbay
that of the king in regard to pardon and a.t page 535
it was observed by Ta.ft, C. J. :Kapur ].
"Executive clemency exists to afford relief from
undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation
or enforcement of the criminal law. The administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily a.lwa.ys
wise or certainly considerate of circumstances which
ma.y properly mitigate guilt. ·To afford a. remedy, it
ha.s always been thought essential in popular governments, a.s well as in monarchies to vest in some other
authority than the court power to a.meliorate or avoid
particular criminal judgment. It is a. check intrusted
to the Executive for special cases".
That case also la.id down that the exercise of the executive power to the uxtent of dostroying the deterrent
effect of judici1~l punishment would be to pervert it
but whosoever is to make the power useful must have
full discretion to exercise it and that discretion is vested in the highest officer in the nation.
In Biddle v. Vuco Perovich('), Holmes, J., in dealing
with pardons said:" Pardon is not a. private a.ct of grace from a.n
iudividual happening to possess power. It is a. pa.rt
of the constitutional scheme. When granted it is the
determina.tiou of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than
what the judgment fixed"
and in Sorrells v. United States(') the observation of
Holmes, J., were followed a.ud it was held the clemency
is the function of the executive and it is the function
of the courts to construe the Statute and not to defeat
it as construed.
A review of these American cases shows that the
courts there have accepted that the English principles
respecting the extent, operation and effect of pardons
a.nd reprieves apply in America.; that the power which
(1) 65 L. Ed. s•7· 530, 532, 535·
(2) 71 L. Ed. 1161, u63.
13) 77 L. Ed. 413 at p. 4"·
(
r
I
t
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
549
was exercised by the king and by delegation by the
colonial Governors is now exercised by the highest K. M. Nanavati
executive in the land and that a pardon which includes
v.
a reprieve and a respite may variously be described The State of
as an act of clemency, an act of mercy, an act of grace,
Bombay
an exercise of the sovereign or governmental power or
Kapur ].
the determination of the ultimate authority. Therefore the principles which govern the exercise of this ,
executive power are quite different from those which
govern the exercise of the power of the courts. It may
also be pointed out that the American courts have
frowned upon any interference by the courts or by
the legislature with the extent and effect of the prerogative of the people vested in the President in the
exercise of his power of benign mercy. It was so held
iu Ex parte Garland (') and United States v. Klein(').
In the former case the President had given a pardon
to rebels who liad taken part in the civil war against
the forces of the federation and the legislature had
reversed that pardon and it was held that pardon was
not subject to legislative control and in the latter
which' was a conditional pardon the power of the legislature was held not to be exercisable.
The power of the executive can be exercised at any
time. This is so in England, in America and in India.
"The King", said Lord Coke, "can forgive any crime,
offence, punishment or execution either before attainder, sentence or conviction or after~· ; 3 Insti. 233;
Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown bk. 2, Chapt. 37. ·In the
Indian Statute the words "any time" are expressly
used in s. 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code and in
England it is an accepted practice that the Crown
can pardon before or after conviction or before trial.
As far as the power of pardon before trial is concerned it can be exercised by entering nolle prosequi which
is also the law in India. Undet s. 333 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure the Advocate General can, in cases
tried before the High Court, enter a nolle prosequi and
this power is absolute and not subject to the control
of the court. This section makes it clear that befo.re a
verdict is given the Advocate-General may inform the
(t) 18 L. Ed. 366, 370& 371.
(2) 20L. Ed. ''9·
550
SUPRE:ME COl'.RT REPORTS
[1961]
court on behalf of the Government that he will not
further prosecute tho defendant upon the charge and
.. M. Nanav1iti
he· shall be discharged but this discharge doos not
v.
Tiu State of a.mount to acquittal unless the Judge otherwise directs.
Bombay
We a.re informed that in tho city of Bombay the
power of the Ad voca.te. Genera.I extends to cases tried
Kapu• ].
by the court of Ses8ion. There i8 no chance of private
complainant being able to restart the proceedings
because the Crown can always take over any criminal
proceeding and then enter a. noUe prosequi. Similarly
the power is gi>en in regard to other courts of original
jurisdict.ion to the Public Prosecutor under s. 494,
Criminal Procedure Code, but that power is not a.s
absolute as it is in thu case of s. 333 because it is
subject to the consent of the Court.
In the absence of constitutional restrictions the
power of pardon and reprieve whether conditional or
unconditional may be exercised at any time aftrr the
commission of the offence either before legal proceedings a.re ta.ken or during their pendency or a.flPr an
appeal is filed and while tho ca.so is pending iu the
appellate court. It was so held in Ex parte Grossman
(') ; Ex parte Garland(') and so stated in 67 C. J. S. 572.
In the absence of a. limitation imposed by law there is
no limit to the period of roprievo and successive reprieves where a period is prescribed arc not illegal : 67
c. J. s. p. 582. '
A case where the power of reprieve was exercised
and operated during the pendency of the appellate
proceedings is Rogers v. Peck ('). There one .Mary
Mabel Rogers was granted reprieve to permit her to
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from
the order of the District Court denying habe,as corpus.
She was con victe<l of murder at the December term
1903 and was confined in solitary confinement until
J<'ebrua.ry 3, 1905, on which day she was to suffer the
penalty of death. On February I, 1905, the Governor
reprieved the execution of sentence until June 2, 1905.
On April 29, 1905, she presented a. petition ror a. new
trial to the Supreme Court of the State. The petition
was admitted on May 5, 1905, and fixed for hearing on
(1) 6g L. Ed. 527, 530, 53s, 535.
(>) 18 L. Ed. 366, 370 .t 371.
(3) 50 L • .Ed. 256.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
551
May 10, 1905, but was dismissed on May 30, 1905, and
a new trial was refused. On June 1, 1905, the execu- K. .AI, N anavati
tion of the, sentence was further reprieved by the
v.
Governor until June 23, 1905. Thereupon she filed The State of
Bombay
her petition in the Federal Court for a writ of habeas
corpus which was dismissed: On that date the Goverf(apu' ].
nor further repdeved the execution of the sentence
until December 8, 1905. The appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States was admitted on June 22,
1905, but the appeal was finally dismissed on Novemqer 27, 1905. One of the grounds of appeal in tho
Supreme Court was that the Governor, by giving the
reprieve, issued his order requiring the execution while
proceedings \Vere pending in the court of the United
States for her relief on habeas corpus and therefore the
order was null and void and another ground was the
failure of the Supreme Court of the State to grant a
stay and fixing a date"for execution. Both the grounds
were overruled and it was held that the reprieve was
to allow the cause to be heard on appeal in the
Supreme. Court and that the order of the Governor was
not against due process clause and when the Governor
had given a reprieve beyond the hearing in the State
Supreme Court there was no occasion for the court to
act in the matter. This case shows that the power of
reprieve is exercisable even during, the period that
proceedings are pending in an appellate court.
The argument in opposition to the submissions of
the learned Advocate-General was that although the
power of the executive to grant pardon or reprie¥e or
suspension of sentence was absolute and could be
exercised at any time yet there was a sta~utory as
well as a constitutional limitation on the exercise of
.tl:fl:s power which excluded the power of the executive
for the period when the case of a defendant had been
brought before the Supreme Court or before any other
appellate court as the case may be. For the latter
reference ·was ruade to s. 426 of the Criminal Prodedure ()ode which gives the power to appellate courts
to suspend a sentence pending an appeal for reasons
to be recorded in writing and as to. the former arts.
71~
552
su·PREME COUET REPORTS
[1961]
z960
142 and 145' of the Constitution were referred to.
K. M. Nanavali Article 142 confers on the Supreme Court the power
to do complete justice in any cause or matter pending
.v.
Tha Stala of
before it and art. li5 gives to the Supreme Court
. B01J'bay
power to make ru)es with the approval of the President
but subject to any law which the Parliament
Kapu,. j.
may pass.· Under art. 145 which is the rule making
power of this court, the court has made two rules
which are relevant for the purpose of this appeal and
they are Order 21, Rule 5 and Order 21, Rule 28 and
when quoted they are as. follows :0. 21, R. 5 "When the petitioner has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the petition shall state
whether the petitioner has surrendered. Unless the
Court otherwise orders, the petition shall not be posted
for hearing until the petitioner has surrendered to his
sentence ".
0. 21, R. 28 "Pending the disposal of any appeal
under these Rules the Court may order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be stayed
on such terms as the Court may think fit ".
Rule 5 is a salutory rule in that the conrt will not
hear a case in which the party is in contempt of the
order of the subordinate court but that rule is in
express words subject to the discretion given to this
court under art. 136 which stat.es:"Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter the
Supreme Court may, in'· its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal. ........ ".
Rules made under art. 145 are subordinate legislation
because they are subj(lct te any law made by Parliam,ent and can be changed by the court with the
approval of the President. The change of an article,
on the other hand, is to be in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and therefore merely
because this Court has also the power under the rules.
to grant &uspension of a sentence and it has m!J.de
rules t]J.at it will not entertain any petition for leave 1
to appe.al unless the petitioner surrenders himself to .\
the sentence cannot override the provisions of art. ,
161·; because if there is irresolvable conflict between
/
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
553
r960
the article and the rules then the rules must give way,
being subordinate legislation.
K. M. Nanavati
It was argued that the power of the Court under
v.
articles 142 & 145 and of the Governor under art. 161 Tlie State of
Bo1nbay
are mutually inconsistent and therefore the power of
the Governor does not extend to the period the appeal
is pending in this Court because law does not contemKapur f.
plate that two authorities, i.e., executive and judicial
should operate in the same field and that it is necessary
that this Court should put a harmonious construction
on them. Article 142 of the Constitution, it was contended, is couched in language of the widest amplitude
and comprises powers of suspension of sentences etc.
The argument that the power of the executive to
suspend the sentence under art. 161 and of the
judiciary to suspend the sentence under art. 142 and
art. 145 are in conflict ignores the nature of the two
powers. No doubt the effect of both is the same but
they do not operate in the same field; the two authorities do not act on the same principles and in exercising their powers they do not take the same matters
into consideration. The executive exercises the power
in derogation of the judicial power. The executive
power to pardon in,cluding reprieve, suspend or respite
a sentence is the i>xercise of a sovereigti or governmental power which is inhe.rent in the State power.
It is a power of clemency, of mercy, of grace "benign
prerogative " of the highest officer of the State and
may be based on policy. It is to be exercised on tho
ground that public good will be as well or better promoted by suspension as by the execution but it is not
judicial process. The exercise of this power lies in the
absolute and uncontrolled discretion of the authority_
in whom it is vested.
The power of the courts to suspend sentences is to
be exercised on judicial considerations. At Common
Law, it was held in Ex parte U. S. (') courts possessed
and asserted the right to exert judicial discretion in
the enforcement of the law to temporarily suspend
either the imposition of sente.nce or its executi0n when
imposed to the end that pardon might be procured or
(1) 61 L. Ed. 129 at p. 14I.
554
St:PRE:ME COCRT HEPORTS
[ 1961]
1r;60
that the violation of law in other respects might be
prevented. It was also held that a Federal District
h' . .\/, .\'a11a1:ati
Court
exceeds its power by ordering that execution of
v.
a sentence imposr<i by it upon a. pie"' of guilt.y be
1 ht Sta.'e of
!Jon;l;ay
suspended indefinitely during good behaviour upon
considerations .wholly 1•xtraneous to the legality of the
conviction: Ex parte U.S.(').
J\larshall, C. J., in U. S. v. George Wilson(') stated
as follows:" ..................... It is a comtitucnt part of the
judicial system that the judge sees only with judicial eyes, and knows nothing respecting any particular case, of which be is not informed judicially".
In Ex parte Grossman('), it was said that administration of justice by th·~ courts is not necessarily or
always wise or considerate of circumstances which
may mitigatJ a guilt and in order to n·medy this it
waR thought necessary to vest t.his in sc;me other
authority than the court to a.meliorate or n.void particular criminal judgmer: t~. The 1·xcrciso of this power
has the effect of d!'stroying the deterrent elfrct of judicial punishment. The extent of the two powers,
judicial and executive and the difference between tho
two bas been pointed out in United States v. Benz(')
in which it was held that no usurpation of the pardoning power of the executive is involved in the action
of a. court in reducing punishment after the prisoner
had served a part of tho imprisonment originally impo8ed. At page 358 tho distinction was stated as
follows:" The judicial power and the executive power
over sentences are readily distinguishable. To render
judgment. is a judicial function. To carry the judgment into effect is au executive function. To cut
short a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise
of executive power which abridges the enforcement of
the judgment, but does not alter it qua. judgment.
To reduce a. sentence hy amendment. alters the terms
of the judgment itself and is a judicial act as much as
the imposition of the Rentcnco in the first instance".
(1) 61 I..Ed.129atp.141.
(3) <x; L. Ed. y27, 530, 532, 535·
(2) b L. Ed. 640, 643. 6H.
(4) 75 L. Ed. 354·
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
555
1960
According to Willis "Courts may exercise the power
of suspending sentence although this, like the pardon- K. Af . •\ranavati
ing. power, partakes of the nature of an executive
v.
function ; which shows that giving of suspensions of The Stale of
Botnbay
sentences is an exercise of executive power; Willis'
Constitutional Law, p. 151.. Clemency is the function
Kapur ].
of the executive and it is the function of the courts to
construe a Statute and nnt to defeat it as construed.
The judicial power therefore is exercisable on judicial considerations. The courts would approach
every question in regard to suspension with a judicial
eye. They are unable to look to anything which is
outside . the record or the facts which are proved
before them. It is not their sphere to take into consideration anything which is not strictly judicial. A
court knows nothing of a case except what is brought
before it in accordance with the laws of procedure and
evidence and consequently this is a. power distinct
from the power of the executive which may act,
taking into consideration extra-judicial matters even
on the ground that suspension, remission and commutation may be more for public good and welfare than
no interference. These are all matters of public policy
and matters which are not judicial and are within the
power of the executive and therefore it cannot be said
that the two powers operate in the same field. No
doubt they may have the same effect but they-operate
in distinct fields, on differrnt principles taking wholly
irreconcilable factors into consideration.
Taking the case of pardon· it is important lo note
that pardon is granted for reasons other than innocence. A pardon, it has been said, "affirms the
verdict and disaffirms it not". (28 Harvard Law
Review at p. 647 by Samuel Williston).
Commutation of sentences is a power which is.exercisable by the executive to ameliorate the rigours of
the punishment by courts when death sentences are
imposed. It was not contended that the power of
commutation is not available to the executive after
the sentence is passed and before an appeal is filed or
pending the appellate proceedings. It has the same
effect as reduction of a sentence by a court from
556
v.
1 lie Stale of
Bon1bay
J.;apHr
J.
SCPHE~lE COlJHT REPORTS
[1961]
death to one of imprisonment for life or trnnsportation for life as it used t-0 be. In England and in
Amcril'a it is exercised on the condition of acceptance
by the convict but no such limitation is imposed on
the power of the executive under the Indian law. But
whereas .the con rt will take into consideration only
the circumstances which would justify the exercise of
judicial power it is open to the executive to act on
other grounds and the act of the executive is not subject to review by the courts, the executive being the
sole judge Qf sufficinncy of facts and of the propriety
of the action and no other branch has any control
over executive action.
As to suspension of sentlince again in 8. 426 of the
Criminal Procedure Code it is expressly stated that an
appellate court can suspend the 'Jentence (or reasons
to be stated; no such limitation is impo&_ed on the
executive under s. 401 of the Code. The language of
the two sections themselves shows the field in which
the two powers :iperatc although the elfoct may be the
same. It is relevant to consider in this connection
the grounds on which a court acts in regard to offences pu11ishablc with death or imprisonment. for life
(s. 497 of Cr. P. C.) but 110 such restrictions impede
exe(;utive action. SimilR.rly when the Supreme Court
acts under art. 142 it acts judicially and takes only
those facts into consideration which are sufficieut in
tho judicial sonKe to justify the exercise of its vower;
so would be tbe ease when the power is exercised
under the rules framed by the court. Thus it appPars
tbat the power of the executive and of the judiciary
to exercise the power under arts. 161 and 142 or under
ss. 401 and 426 are different in nature and aro exercised on different considerations and even may have
different effect.
Executive power exercised in regard to sentences
passed by courts is in its vny nature the exrrcise of
constitutional authorit.y which negatives the orders of
the court. Every time it is exercised it conflicts with
some order of the court whether it is a case of pardon
or commutation of sentence or a reprieve or suspension or respite. It is an interference with some action
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
557
r960
of the court which makes the power of the executive
to that extent overriding. It is for this reason that it K. M. Nanavati
has been said in American judgments, e. g., Ex p~rte
v.
Grossman (1) that although the Constitution has made The State of
Bombay
the judiciary as independent of other branches as is
practicable it is, as often remarked, the weakest of the
three. It must look for a continuity of necessary cooperation in the possible reluctance of either of the
other branches to the force of public opinion. The
action of the executive in interfering with sentences
passed by courts is a matter which is not within the
amplitude of the judicial power of the courts and
whenever any action is taken by the executive, unless
it is illegal, it is not justiciable nor subject to legislative control.
The power that this court exercises under Order 21,
Rule 5 must also depend upon the decision of the
question whether art. 145 can be used in derogation of
the power given to the Governors under art. 161. As
has been stated above, ·being subordinate legislation,
it must in reality be subordinate to the provisions of
the Constitution which is obvious from the fact that
any revision of the articles of the Constitution will
require the procedure laid down in the Constitution
for its amendment whereas the rules made under the
Constitution can be changed by the court itself with
the approval of the President or by a Parliamentary
enactment.
The language of art. 161 is of the widest amplitude
and applies to the various forms of clemency mentioned therein. It' is not denied that the power of
pardon is not affected by art. 142 and this power
includes the power to reprieve. It would be an undue
construction of the exercise of the power of pardon to
take out from its purview that portion of it which is
termed reprieve or stay of execution or suspension
and respite of sentence which differs from suspension
of sentences only in terminology. The construction
suggested would be illogical because the plenitude of
t~e language would remain unaffected before the petition for leave to appeal is filed and after the decision
(1) 69L. Ed. 527. 530, 532o 535·
•
u:iS
v.
The St~le of
Bombay
l(ap14r }.
SGPREJIE COt.:RT HEPORTS
[1961]
of the appeal but the power would remain suspended during the pendcncy of the appeal proceedings
c,·en though the poil·er of pardon and of commutation remains intact and the suggested restriction is
not borne out by the language of the article. And
this construction is opposed to dHcisio11R of courts of
America where tho power is similar as in India. Even
on the analogy of the Privy Council case Balmukand
v. King Emperor(') where reprieve was granted pending the hearing of the special leave petition, i.e., u pto
tho date the petition was taken up, heard and decided
and therefore uptil that date the reprieve was necessary and proper. In Rogers v. Peck(') reprievo was
granted for a period of time extending beyond the
hcarirg of the appeal proceedings.
If the argument as to want of tho power of suspension during the period of pendency of an appeal is
sustainable then tho power to commute must equally
be so affected because what is commutatio11 when
exerc\sed by the executive iS' called reduction of
sentence when ordered by the court. The two are
neither different in nature nor in effect.
Reference was made to s. 295 of the Government of
India Act of 1935 whereby the prerogative of the
King and of the Governor General as his delegate
was specifically saved. Reference was also made to
s. 209(3) of that Act which gave to the Federal Court
the power of stay in any case; the argument being
th.i.t the prerogative power of the Kiug and his delegate the Governor General would not be unlimited
but for its being expressly saved by s. 295(2). A close
examination of these provisions and the application
of rules of interpretation do not support the soundness of this argument.
Sectiou 2011(3) is in Pa.rt IX The J udica.ture a.nd
Chapter I the Federal Court. It gave power to thii
Federal Court to stay executions in any case under
appeal as follows:
S. 209(3) "The Federal Court may, subject to
such terms or conditions as it may think fit to impose,
order a. stay of execution in any case under appeal to
(1) •12 I.A 133
(2) 50 L. Ed. 256.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
559
r960
the Court, pending the hearing ·of the appeal, and
execution shall be stayed accordingly".
J(. Jl.1. N anavati
Section 295 is in Part XII Miscellaneous and under
v.
sub.head Provisions as to legal matters. Section 295 The State of
Bonibay
provided:.
S. 295(1) "Where any person has been sentenced
to death in a Province, the Governor General in his Kapur ].
discretion shall have all such powers of suspension,
remission or commutation of sentence as were vested
in the Governor General in Council immediately before
the commencement of Part III of this Act, but save
as aforesaid no authority in India outside a Province
shall have any power to suspend, remit or commute
the sentence of any person convicted in the Province:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section· affects
any power of any officer of His Majesty's forces to
suspend, remit or commute a sentence passed by a
court martial.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall derogate from the
right of His Majesty, or of the Governor General, if
any such right is delegated to him by His Majesty, to
grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of
punishment".
Stay of execution is a term appropriate to civil
proceedings as 0. 21, rr. 26 & 29 and 0. 41, r. 5 of the
Code of Civil Procedure would show but even if it
applied to criminal proceedings it would be of little
assistance in understanding the meaning of art. 142(1)
in any different manner from what has been said
above. But s. 295(2) is pressed into service to show
that wherever the power of the executive is intended
to be overriding it is specifically so stated. So construed the power exercisable by the Governor General
in his discretion and of the Governor will be of lesser
amplitude and subject to the limitation of s. 209(3),
whereas the power of the King or the Governor
General acting under s. 295(2) will not be so which is
seemingly incongruous. Besides the words " nothing
in this Act shall derogate" in s. 295(2) onfy emphasise
the constitutional position of the King's prerogative
and of his delegate and· was more in the nature of
72
j
I
560
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
ex abundanti cautela' because under constitutional
" Roy n'est lie par ascun statme, Bi il ne soil
practice
. K. J.1 .•va,1at·ati
expressement nosme" is a principle which has been
v.
The .'·:rate of
accepted in this court qua. the Union or the States.
Ro"'baJ•
" Where tho King has !lny prerogative, estate, right,
title or interest. he shall not be barred of them by the
Kap"' J.
genera.I words of an Act if be not named therein ";
Broom's Maxims, p. 39 (1939 ed.); Province of Bombay
v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay('),
where it was hold that Crown is not bound unless
expressly named or is bound by "necessary implication".
If the argument of limitation of the King's prerogative because of these saving words is sound then it
means in the Constitut.ion Act the British Parliament
did contemplate a.nd provide that tho power of the
King or of the Governor Genera.I as his delegate as to
suspensions, remissiom or commutation would be
overriding and oxercisable in spite of the pendency of
a.n appeal in the Federal C'.-0urt.
There a.re seven reasons for denying tho argument
of conflict between arts. 142 a.nd 161 :(I) As ha.s been discussed above, the two articles
operate in two distinct fields where different considerations for ta.king action apply. That is how the two
articles a.re reconcilable i..nd should be reconciled.
This interpretation accords with the rule of statutory
co-existence stated in text books on Interpretation of
Statutes, which is a.s follows:"It is sometimes found that the conflict of two
Statutes is apparent only, a.s their objects are different a.nd the language of ea.ch is restricted to its own
object or subject. When their language is so confin. ed, they run in parallel lines without meeting".
(Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (1953 Ed.),
p. 170).
(2) The pr<'per rule of construction of: Statutes was
la.id down in Warburton v. Loveland('):
"No rulo of construction ca.n require that when
the words of a. Statute convey a. clear meaning ........ .
it shall be necessary to introduce another pa.rt of thtt
(1) 7S I.A. 271.
,.
i
N
(•) ' l!.R. 499, 410.
•
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
561
1 60
Statute, which speaks with less perspicuity, and of
9
which thp .w?~ds ma:\'. h? ~apa.ble of such construction K. M. Nanauali
as by poss1b1hty to d1mm1sh the efficacy of the other
·•.
provisions of the Act ".
The State of
This rule was accepted in regard to the interpretation
Bombayj
of ss. 89, 92 and 93 of the Australian Constitution in
Kapur ].
the State of Tasmania v. Commonwealth of Australia(') :
"Applying those expressions to these sections I
should say they amount to this; Seeing that sec. 89
has an absolutely clear meaning, the rules of constru.
ction do not require us to introduce another part of
the Statute which speaks with less perspicuity, and to
apply that part to the construction of sec. 89. That
would have the effect of diminishing the clearness of
sec. 89 and appears to me to be an absolute inversion
of the rule which is applicable in such a case".
In the instant case the words of art. 161 are clear and
unambiguous. It is an unsound construction to put
a fetter ·On the plenitude of the powers given in that
article' by reading an earlier article which deals with
the powers of a different department of Government
and uses language " which speaks with less perspicuity".
(3) Moreover it is a relevant consideration in the
matter of interpretation that the two articles are
in two different parts. There is ample authority
for the view that one is entitled to have regard to
the indicia afforded by the arrangement of sections
and from other indications ; Dormer v. New Castle.
upon-Tyne Corporation(') per Slesser, L .. J. The
arrangement of sections into parts and their headings
are substantive parts of the Act and as is pointed out
by Craies on Statute La.w (5th Ed.), p. 165, "they are
gradually winning recognition as a kind of preamble
to the enactments which they precede limiting or
explaining their operation". They may be looked to
as a better key to construction than a mere prea.mble.
Ibid p. 195.
(I) I C.L.R. 329, 357·
(2) [1940] 2 K.B. 204. 217 (C.A.).
562
St:PRE:llE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
In Inglis v. Robertson(') which turned on the
meaning
of the Factors Act, Lord Herschell se.id :K. M. /\'a11aval1
"These headings are not in my opinion mere
v.
Tlie Stal~ of
marginal notes but the sections in t.he group to which
Bombay
they belong must be rea<l in conuection with them
and
interpreted in the.light of them".
Kapur ].
Viscount Simon, L. C., said in Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (') :".Moreover, ~ec. 154 contemplates-or, at any
rate, provides for-the diRsolution of the tre.nsforor
company when the transfer of its undertaking has been
made, e.nd there appears to he no means of calling
be.ck to life the company so dissolved for sec. 294
occurs in Pe.rt V of the Companies Act, 1929, dealing with winding up, whoroe.s sec. 154 is found in
Pe.rt IV''.
These cases place accent on the principle the.t tho
articles 142(1) and 161 dee.I with different subjects
showing operation in separate fields and were not
intended to overlap so as to be restrictive of each
other.
(4) The le.ngue.ge of art. 161 is general, i.e., the
power extends equally to all class of pardons known
to the law whatever the nomenclature used ; Ex parte
Wells (8 ) and therefore if the power to pardon is absolute and exercisable at e.ny time on principles which
are quite different from the principles on which
judicial power is exercised then restrictions on the
exercise of the lesser power of suspension for a period
during which the appeal is pending in this court
would be e.n unjustifiable limitation on the power of
the executive. It could not have been tho intention of
the framers that the amplitude of oxecutivo power
should be restricted as to become suspended for the
period of pendoncy of an appeal in the Supreme
Court.
(5) If this interpretation is adopted it would lce.d
to this rather incongruous result that if the appeal is
pending in e. Court of Session or the High Court the
power of the executive will he abundant, overriding
(1) [1898] A.C. 616, 630.
(2) [1940] A.c: 1114.
(3) 13 L. Ed. 421, 424.
,.
~
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
563
and operative during the pendency of appeals but
will be restrictive when appeal is brought in the Sup- K. M. Nanavati
reme Court.
v.
(6) Article 161 is a later provision and when it was The State of
Bombay
adopted the Constitution makers had already adopted
art. 72 and arts. 142(1) and 145. It does not seem
reasonable that by so juxtaposing the articles it was Kapur J,
the intention of the framers to constrict the power of
the· executive. The rules of interpretation on this
point have thus been stated:.
(a) It is presumed that the legislature does not
deprive the State of its prerogative powers unless it
expresses its intention to do so in express terms or by
necessary implication. Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay('); Director
of Rationing & Distribution v. Corporation of Calcutta (2 ).
•
(b) It seems impossible to suppose that so material
a change in the constitutional powers of the Governor
was ig,tended to be effected by a side wind.
(c) The law will not allow alteration of a Statute by
construction when the words may be capable of proper operation without it; Kutner v. Philips(').
(d) It cannot be assumed that the Constitution
has given with one hand what it has taken away
with another; Dormer v. New Castle-upon-Tyne
Corporation (').
(e) If two sections are repugnant, the known rule is
that the last must prevail: Wood v. Riley (5 ), per
Keating, J.
_
(7) The power given to the Governor in tegard to
pardons is a specific power specially conferred as· was
vested in the colonial and British Governors in Indian
provinces during Bri"tish days. The power give~ to
the court under Art. 142(1) is a general power exercisable for doing complete justice in any cause or
matter. If they, i.e., arts. 161 and 142(1) deal with
\1) 73 I.A. 271.
(2) Criminal Appeal No. 158 of 1956.
(3) (1891] 2 Q.B. 267, 272.
(4) [1940] 2 K. B. 204. 217 (C.A.).
(5) (1867·8) 3 C.P. 26.
.
564
SVPHEME COUHT HEPORTS
(1961]
the same subject matter a.s is contended then a.rt. 161
/(. Al. ,l\'atiatilzti must prevail over art. 142(1) which is in accord with
the constitutional position as above discussed.
v.
The Statt of
In the circumstances of this case I would grant
Bombay
tho petitioner r.•xemption prayed for and proceed to
hear tbe special leavP. petition on merits.
Kapur J.
BY COURT: In view of t.hc majority ,Judgment,
the petition is dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
THE UPPER GA:\GES St;CAH .MILLS LTD.
v.
KHALIL-UL-RAHlllA:\ A.:\'D OTHEHS.
(B. P. SrnHA, C. J., B. P. GA.JENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUP'l'A aud
J. c. SHAH, ,JJ.)
Tenancy-Adhivasi ri!;ht, acq,,isitioiz of-I'os.~,,ssion cnntin11cd
under stay orders of court.~- - tl"hcthcr such poss,·ssion is on bcluilf of
courts-- l'crson recorded in posscssicn as thckadar- ti' /ict11rr an
occ11pant in his 01en 1'igl:t-U. 11 • Z111nindari Alo!iti"ori and J.a11d
Reforms Act, i950, (U. }'. I of z950). s. 20(b).
The landlord granted a theka to the ccmp;rny for 10 years
ending \\'ith 1350 F which \\JS rc11e\ve<l up to 1355 F (june
1948).
On the company·; refusal to vacate on the cxpi1y 01 the
theka the l~ndlord lilcd a suit for cjcctment under the LT. P.
Tenancy Act, l9J9· The suit was resisted by the company on
the ground that it has beco1nc a hereditary tenant undC'r s. 29
of that 1\ct. The suit \vas decreed on l\ovcmher 3, 1948, an<l
an appeal and a second appeal a~ainst the dccrl'e al~o f<l.ilc<l, hut
the curnµany rcmain<:d in possession of the land on account of
stay orJe1s granted by the appellate courts. In execution t'he
lamllord obtained formal possesoion on Octohcr 13, 1950, but the
company resisted actual ejectment. On July 1, 1953, the company instituted proceedings to recover actual possession of the
land under s. 2J2 of the U. P. Zaminclari Abolition and Land
Reforn1s Act, 1950, clairning to have become an Adhivasi under
s. 20 thereof. Seclion 20 provi1led that every person who was
recorded as occupant.of any lanri in the K/Iasra or Khataimi of
1356 F shall be called an adhivasi of the land and shall be
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