RAJA NARAYANLAL BANSILAL versus MANECK PHJHOZ MISTHY AND ANOTHER.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 31 August 1960 | [1961] 1 S.C.R. 417 | 1960 INSC 135
Key facts
- Decided
- 31 August 1960
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 268/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1961] 1 S.C.R. 417
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 135
Text of the judgment
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
RAJA NARAYANLAL BANSILAL
v.
MANECK PHJHOZ MISTHY AND ANOTHER.
c..J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. \;VANCHOO, K. C. DAs GUPTA and
J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
(B. P. SINHA,
Company-Investigation into affairs of-Inspector appoi11tcd
11nder olcf Act, if can exercise po<ecrs"under ·new Act-Constitution-Testimonial compulsion-Trhether provisions for production of documents and evidence offend guarantee-Equal protection of the lm<'-If provisions for investigation and production of evidence offend
g·uarantcr-Indian Companies Act, r913 (VII of I9IJ), s. I JS-Indian Companies Act, I956 (I of I95fi), ss. 235, 239, 240, 645 and
646, Constitution.of India, Arn. I4 and 20(3).
On November 15, 1954, the Registrar wrote to the company
of which the appellant was the Managing Agent under s. 137,
Indian Companies Act, -1913, that it had been represented to him
that the business of the company was carried on in fraud and
called upon it to furnish certain information. On April 15, 1955,
the Registrar made report to the Central Government under
s. 137(5) to the effect that in his opinion the affairs of the company
a
were carrie<l on in fraud of co11ntrihutories and they disclosed an
unsatisfactorv state of affairs and that a case had been n1ade out
for an investigation under .s. 138.
Thereupon, the Central
Government, on November I, 195j, appointed an Inspector to
investigate the affairs of the company and to report thereon.
The Inspector \Vas authorised under s. 140 to examine any person
on oath, and he wrote to the appellant that he would examine
him on oath in relation to the business of the company. On
April 1, 1956, the Indian Companies Act, 1913, was repealed. by
the Indian Companies Act, 1956, which conferred wider and more
drastic powers o( investigation. On July 26, 1956, .the Central
Government accorded apprornl under s. 239(2) of the new Act to
the Inspector exercising his powers of investigating into ancl
reporting on the affairs of the company. In May 1957 the Inspector served notices upon the appellant calling upon him to
attend his office on the date and the time specified for the purpose of being examined on oath and to produce certain account
books and papers relating to the company. The appellant challenged the investigation and contended: (i) that since the
Inspector was appointed under the old Act he had no jurisdiction
to exercise the po\vers referable to the provisions of the new Act,
(ii) that s. 240 of the new Act which provided !or the production
of documents and evidence at such investigations offended Art.
20(3) of the Constitution, and (iii) that s. 239.of the new Act
which conferred po\vers on inspectors for investigation antis. 240
offended Art. 14 of the Constitution.
1960
,-l11g11st 3r.
SUPRE:\IE COt;RT REPORTS
418
[ J!)(\J]
Held, that the Inspector appointed under s. 138(4) of the old
Act must be deemed tn ha,·e been appointed under s. 235 of the
Uaja .\'aruya11lal nt\V Act and had authority and pov;er to issue notices under
Ra,,<ilal
s. 240 of the new Act. Section 645 of the new Act provided that
"·
the appointment of an Inspector under the old Act shall, on repeal
ff/a,,rck Pliiiv:: of the old :\ct and cin coming into force of the nc\v ,\ct, have
1\fistry (... Anvtlur effect as if it was n1a<le under the nc\v Act. Section 646 '''hich
provided that not.hi:1g in the new Act shall affect the O]'eration of
s. 138 of the old Act as respects inspectors was not an exception
or proviso to s. 645 <ind the l\\'O se:ctions being saving sections
had to be read as independent of and in atldition to, and not as
exceptions to, each other.
1960
Hdd, further thats. 240 of Indian Companies Act, HJ56, did
not offend Art. 20(3) of .the Constitution. For invoking the constitutional right again5t testimunial compulsion guaranteed
un.ler Art. 20(.1) there must !Jc at the relevant stage a formal
accusation against the party pleading the guarantee relating to
the commission of an offence which rnay result in a prosecution.
The enquiry undertaken under s. 240 by the Inspector was in
substance an enquiry into the affairs of the company; at this
stage there \Vas no accusation, formal or other\l.·ise, against any
specified individual. The mere fact that a prosecution may utlimately l>e launched against the alleged offenders would not
fl~trospecti\'ely cliangc the complexion or character of tlu~
proceedings held by the Inspector when he makes the im·estiga-
tion.
Maqbool lltissaii; v. The Sta"' of liomlay, [1953] !'.C.K 730,
S. A. Vc11k<1laraman '" The l..'nio11 of India, [1954] S.C.R. u50,
~f. P. Sliar1110 v. 3olid1 Cha11<ira, District Magistrale, /Je/hi, [1954]
S.C.K 1077, Thomas Dana'" S/af,; of Punjab, [1959] Supp. l
S.C.I{. 274 anu ,\fohammcd Dastagir '" Fhe Slate of Madras, [ 1960]
3 S.C.R. u6, relied on.
Jldd, further that ss. 239 and 240 of the fndian Companies
Act, 1951>, <lid not violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. Thes" sections dPnied the company and persons in charge of the man;1ge1nent of such co1npanir~s the ordinary protection afforde<l to \Vitnesses under s. 132 of the Evidence Act and under s. 161(1) and (2)
of the Criminaf Procedure Code. As they were entrusted with
the financial interests of a large number of citiz~ns it \vas li:>gitirnate to treat such cornpanies ancl their rnanagers as a class hy
themsel\'es and to provide for necessary safeguards and checks
against abuse of p0\\·1~r by the managers. The basis of the
classitiratinn is founc'.ed rJn 311 inteJligibJc differentia \Vhich has.
a rational relation to the object sought to be achicvell.
Sltri Ram /(ris/11111 Da!mia v. ju.1tirr Toidol/;ar, [1959] S.C.R.
297, applied.
CIYII.
APPELi.A TE
No. 268 of 1959.
JURISDICTION :
Civ ii
A ppea.l
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
z960
Appeal froru the judgment and decree dated September 3, 1958, of the former Bombay High Court in R a1a. Narayan 1a1
AppeaI IN O. 28 / 1958 •
1
Bansilal
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Ganpat Rai and I. N. M kv. .
,ff c
II
anec Phiroz
Sh roJJ,
!Of the appe ant.
Mistry & Another
JJf. C. Setalvad, Attorney.General for India, B. Sen
and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.
1960. August 31. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-The appellant Raja Nara- Gajendragadkar ].
yanlal Bansilal of Bombay is the Managing Agent of
a Limited Company named the Harinagar Sugar Mills
Limited. By virtue of the power conferred on him
by s. 137 of the Indian Compl~nies Act, 1913 (VII of
1913), the Registrar wrote to the mills on November
15, 1954, that it had been represented to him under
s. 137(6) that the business of the company was carried
on in fraud, and so he called upon the company to
furnish the information which he required as set out
in a part of his letter (Ex. A). On April 15, 1955, the
Begistrar made a. report (Ex. AA) to the Central
Government under s. 137(5) of the said Act. This report showed that according to the Registrar the affairs
of the company were carried on in fraud of contributories and they disclosed an unsatisfactory state of
affairs. The report pointed out that the appellant
was the Managing Agent of the company as well as
its promoter, and that it was suspected that under a
fictitious name of Bansilal Uchant Account the company was advancing money to the several firms owned by the appellant which were ostensibly purchased
from the company's funds. The report further stated
that between the years ending in September, 1942 and
1951 about Rs. 19,200 were paid for Harpur Farm
and Rs. 39,300 for Bhavanipur Farm, and accounts
disclosed that the Uchant Account was chiefly operated upon for purchasing E:mch lands out of the funds of
the company though the purchase in fact was for and
on behalf of the appellant. The Registrar also added
that he had reason to believe that the Managing
5-1
420
60
Sl:PRE:IIE COCRT REPORTS
[1061]
Agent was utilising the property of the company in
Raia .~-,,-;;,,.,,,,;,. 1 some cases for his pers011al gain, and concluded that,
· n.,.,;z.1
in his opinion, a case had liecn ma.de out for an invcs"·
tig<ition under s. 138.
Mai"'k Phi•w
On receiving this report, on ~ovembcr l, 1955, the
M"''·'· "'- 11 ''"'"" Centrnl Government passed an order under s. 138(4)
Gajrnd"''"d""' 1 _of t.he said Act (Ex. B) appointi11g the first respondent
·
t.faneck P. Mistry, who is a Chartered Accountant., as
an inspector to investigate the affairs of the company
from the date of its incorporation. The said inspector was asked to point out all irregularities and contraventions of the provisions of tho said Act or any
other law, and make a full report as indicated in a
communication which was separately sent to him.
This separate communic<!.t.ion (Ex. llBJ prescribes thti
mode of enquiry whieh should be adopted by inspectors. It requires th:~t while i11vestigating the affairs
of companies the inspectors should liear in mind that
for a successful prosecution the evidence in support
of •L charge must be clear, tangible and cogent, and
that their reports should specify with reference to t.he
evidence collected during the investigations the points
specified under paragraph 2(a) to (e). ln the course
of their inHstig1~tion the inspectors are asked LO
make use of the powers availablo to them under s. 140
of the said Act including the right to examine a person on oath. The investigation should be conducted
in. private and the inspect-0rs a.re not Plltitled to make
public the information received by them during the
course of thejnvestigation.
Pursuant· to the powers conferred on him by the
said order n•spondent 1 wroto to the appellant inti·
mating to him that he would examine him on oath in
relation to the business of the company under s. 140(2)
of the said Act (Ex. C). Meanwhile on April I, 1956,
the Companies Act of 1913 (Vll of 1913) was repealed
by the Companies Act of 1956 (I of 1956). For the
sake of convcnienee we would hereafter refer to the
repealed ~\ct as tho old Act and the Act which came
imo force ou April 1, 1956, as the new Act. On July
26, 1956, the Contra! Government purported to exorcise its power undor s. 239(2) of the new Act and
'9
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
accorded approval to respondent 1 exercising his
1960
powers of investigating into, and reporting on, the• . affairs of the appellant including his personal books RaJa Narn y anlal
, f
Bansi 1a1
of accounts as well as the a ff airs o the three concerns
v,
specified in the order. These three concerns are M/s. Man.ch Phiroz
Narayanlal Bansilal, who are the Managing Agents Mistry & Another
of Harinagar Sugar Mills, the Shangrila Food Pro- . ·-·
ducts Limited and Harinagar Cane Farm. It appears Ga1endragadkar ].
that the appellant is the proprietor of the firm of
·
N arayanlal Bansilal. After this order wa.s passed
respondent 1 served upon the appellant tho four impugned notices (Ex. E collectively) on May 9, 1957,
May 16, 1957, May. 29, 1957 and June 29, 1957, respectively. These notices are substantially identical in
terms, and so it would be sufficient for our purpose to
set out the purport of one of them. The first notice
called upon the appellant to attend the office of respondent 1 on the date and at the time specified for the
purpose of being examined on oath in relation to the
affairs of the company, and to ·produce before respondent 1 all the books of accounts and papers relating to
the sajd company as mentfo'ned in the notice. The
appellant was further .told that in default of compliance with the requisition. aforesaid necess!Lry legal
steps would be taken without further reference to
him. The notice contains a list of twelve items describing the several documents which the appellant
was required to produce before respondent 1.
After these notices were serv.ed on the appellant he
filed a petition (N"o. 201 of 1957) in the Bombay High
Court and prayed that the High Court should issue
a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate direction,
order or writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution calling upon respondent 1 to produce the records of the
case relating to the notices in question and to set aside
the said notices, the proposed examination of the
appellant and the interim report made by him. It
fu!'ther prayed for a writ of prohibition or any other
appropriate direction, order or writ restraining respondent 1 from making any investigation under the said
notices and from exercising any powers of in vestigation under s. 239 and/or s. 240 of the new Act and/or
422
SGPREJJE COL"RT REPORTS
[I!J6l]
from investigating into the affairs of any persons or
petitioner
He fi rst
8 11 1 1
v
alleged that since respondent l had been appointed
Ma11eck l'M•o• under the old Act he had no jurisdiction to exercise
Mist'Y & A 11 oth" powers referable to the relevant provisions of the new
. Act. This ground assumed t·hat the sn.id relevant
Ga;rndo-agadq"' J.
. .
. 1s
. urge d
prov1s10ns
of t he new 1\ ct arc va l1.d , b ut 1t
that the powers rcferablo to the said provisions are
not available to respondent I since he was appointed
under the old Act. The other ground on II' hich the
lrrits wer11 claimed challenges tho vircs of ss. 23!J and
240 of the new Act. This challenge assumed an allernat.ive form. It is argued thats. 240 offends against
the constitutional guarantee provided by Art. 20(3) of
the Constitution and it is also urged that certain portions of ss. 239 and 240 offend against another constitutional guarantee prnvided by Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is thus on these three contentions that the
petitioner claimed appropriate writs by his petition
bt'fore the Bombay High Court. These pleas wern
resisted by the Union of India which had been joined
to the proceedings as respondent 2. '.\Ir. ,Justice K. T.
Desai, who heard the petition, rejected the contentions raised by the petitioner, and held that no case
had been made out for the issue of any writ. This
decision was challenged by the appellant beforo
the Court of Appeal in the Bombay High Court; the
Court of Appeal agreed with the view taken by
DPsai, J., and dismissed the appeal. Thereupon the
1ippella.nt applied for and obtained a certificate from
the High Court, and it is with the said certilicato that
he has come to this Court by his present appeal. On
his behalf :\Ir. Viswanatha Sastri has raised the same
three point.s for our decision.
Lot us first examine the question whether or not the
first respondent has jurisdiction t-0 exercise the powers
under the relevant provisions of the new Act. It is
common ground that ff respondent 1's powers to hold
the investigation in question are to be found in the
relevant provisions of the old Act and not those of the
.new Act tbe impugned notices issued by him would be
1 96o
-:-C'onr.crns specified in the petition. Tho
Raia .\ araya" 1a1 l .
• mam
· 1y on two groun ds.
• ,, •
c am1e d t hese writs
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
60
without authority and jurisdiction. In dealing with
'9
this question it is necessary to examine the broad fea. Raja Narayanlal
tures of the relevant sections of the two Acts.
Bansilal
We will begin with the old Act. Section 137 of the
·v.
old Act deals with investigation by the Registrar. Maneck Phiro•
Section 137(1) pr0vides that where the Registrar on M" 1'Y &- Another
perusal of any document which a company is required Gajendragadkar J.
to submit to him is of opinion that any information or
explanation is necessary in order that such document
may afford full particulars of the matter to which it
purports to relate he may, by a written order, call on
the company to furnish in writing the necessary infor.
mation or explanation within the time to be specified
in the order. Section 137(5) requires the Registrar to
make a report in writing to the Central Government
if no information is supplied to him within the speoi·
lied time, or if the information supplied to him appears
to him to disclose an unsatisfacto.ry state of affairs, or
does not disclose a full and fair statement of the relevant matters. Thus s. 137(1) to (5) deal with the
investigation which the Registrar is empowered to
make on a persual of the document submitted to him
by .a company under the provisions of this Act. Section 137(6) deals with a case where if it is represented
to the Registrar on materials placed before him by
any contributory or creditor that the business of a company is carried on in fraud or in fraud of its creditors
or in fraud of persons dealing with the company or
for a fraudulent purpose, he may, after following the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, call for information or explanation on matters to be specified in his
order within such time as he may fix, and when such
an order is passed the provisions of s. 137(2) to (5)
would be applicable. This sub-section provides that
if at the end of the investigation the Registrar is satisfied that the representation on which he took action
was frivolous or vexatious he shall disclose the iden.
tity of the informa.nt to the company. This provision
is obviously intended as a safeguard against frivolous
or vexatious representations in respect of the affairs
of any company. The provisions. of this section 8.fe
substantially similar to the provisions of s. 234 of thenew Act.
·
,124
'9""
SCPRE:\IE corRT REPORTS
[1961]
Section 138, which drals with inveatigation of
companies bv
• inHpcotorn, 1rnthori8rH the
1
n... ,. 1 ~ 1
_-cntra 1,overnme11t t•) appoint orrn or more compet'"
ent inspectors to investignte thn affair; of any com"'"'"'k l'h"o: pany and report thereon in ;uch manner <\S tho said
~fosrry <:- .4notlu'Governrucnt may direct. The 11ppointment of com. --d'
petent inspectors ca;n he made hy thn C'~nt.ral GovernG•1••draga ""' I
,
r
, ' ;i in
,
· nwnt rn
1our
e1asses o f cases as ~pec1l;cu
s. 138( I )
to (4). It would be relevant to refer to t-"·o of tlwse
cases. Under s. 138(1) a compet.cnt insp•:ctor r1t11 bo
appl)inted in tho o,ase of a hanking compn.11y havin~ a
sham capital on the application of memliern holding
not less than one-fifth of the shares issued, and under
s. 138(4) in the case of any company 011 a report hy
the Registrar under s. l:l7(5). This sectio11 substantially corresponds t•) s. 233 of the new Act.
The other sections of tho old Act to whiclo reference
must be marle r.re ss. 140, 141 · a11d 141 A. Secti•m 140( I) imposes upon n.11 persons who are or have
been officers of the company an obligation tu produce
before the inspectors all books and documents in their
custody or power relating to the company. Section 140(2) empowers the inspector to ex:i.mine on oath
any such person, meaning a person who is or hns heen
an officer of the company in relation to thP busiJJess of
the eompany and t.o administ€r an oath to him. Section 140(3) pro\' ides that if a peri;on refuses tu produce
a Look or a document or to answrr uny questio11 lw
sbfall be liable to a fine not. exceeding Hs. 50 ill respe0t of each offo11ce. Section 141 pruYides tha.t on
the conclusion of an invcstigntion the inspect.ors shall·
report their opinions to the Central Government, and
shall forward a copy ,,f their report to the registered
office of the company; and it also provides that ti
eopy of the said report. can be delivered at their requ.
est to tho applicants for the im·estigation. Thon wo
haves. 141A which deals with the institution oJf pro.
sec11t10ns. Section 14lA(l) provides that if from 1rn~·
report made under s. 138 it appears to the CPntral
GoYcrnment th11t any person has been guilty of any
offence in relation t•J the company for which he is criminally liable the Central Government shall refer the
. a.fTa.irs of
-:- -R a;a •\ ·11rn1·n11 1fl! .,
l ,..,
I
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
matter to the Advocate.General or the Public Prosecutor. Section 141A(2) lays down that if the law offi- Raja Narnyanlal
cer who is consulted under (I) considers that there is
Ba11silal
a case in which prosecution ought to be instituted he
v.
.
shall cause proceedings to be instituted accordingly. Maneck Phiroz
· b r1e
· f 1s
· t h e sc h eme of t he re1evan t prov1s10ns
· ·
Mistry & Another
Th at m
of the old Act.
Gajeadragadkar j.
We will now examine the scheme of the relevant
provisions of the 1iew Act. It has already .been noticed that ss. 234 and 235 of the new Act arc substantially similar to ss. 137 and 13.8 of the old Act. Section 239 of the new Act provides for the powers of the
inspectors to carry on investigation into the affairs of
related companies or of managing agent or associate.
'l'he sweep of the enquiry authorised by this section is
'very mnch wider than that under the corresponding
section of the old Act. Sub-section (1) of this section
authorises an inspector to investigate the affairs of a·
company and also the-affairs of any other body corpornte or person specified in els. (a) to (d) if he thinks
it necessary so to do. These clauses include several
cases of body corporate which may have any connec"ti<>n direct or indirect, immediate or remote, with the
dfairE of the company whose affairs are under invest igatiou. IL is unnecessary for our purpose in the
present appeal to enumerate the Raid cases serially or
exhaustively. It is conceded that the three other
persons who have been called "upon by respondent 1
to prodµce documents and give evidence fall within
the purview of s. 239. As a result of the 'provisions
of s. 239(1) the inspector has to report not only on the
affairs of the company under investigation but also on
the affairs of other bodies or persons who have been
compelled to give evidence and produce documents
during the couri;e of the enquiry. The only safeguard
provided against a possible abuse of these extensive
powers is that in the case of any body corporate or
person rderred to in els. (b)(ii), (b)(iii), (c) or (d) of subs. (1) the inspector shall not exercise his relevant
power without first having obtained the prior approval of the Central Government thereto.
Section 240 of the n·ew Act imposes an obligation
42ti
'9"°
SUPRE:\JE COURT REPO!t'l'S
[ l!J!il J
on the corporate bodies and persons in respect of
which or whum ill\·estigation is authorised bys. 239 to
H<omlal
produce all books and papers and to gi~·e all assistance
v.
in connection with the said investigation ; that is tho
Ala""" Phi>or result of s. 240(1). Section 240(2) empowers th0 insM"1'Y 6· A"°'"" pector t.o examine 011 oa.t.h any of the persons referred
c.,,,,d,:~:dka' J. to i1_l. sub-s. (I~ iu rela.tion to the. relevant matters as
spec1h8d. Sect10n 240;3) deals with a case where a
person refuses to comply with the obligation imposed
on him by s. 240(1) or (2); and it provides that in
such a case tho inspector may certify the refusal
under his hand to tho court, and tho court may thereupon <'nquiro into the case, hear witnesses who may
be produced against or on behalf of the alleged offender, consider any statement which may Le offered in
defence, and puni~h the offender as if he had been
guilty of contempt oft.he court. Section 240(4) deals
with a case where the inspector thinks it necp;·sary
fur the purpose of his investigation that a person
w horn ho has no power to examine on oath shoulrl ho
cxaminod, and it provides that in such a. case he may
apply to the court, and the court may, if it thinks
tit, order that person to attend and be examined on
oath before it on any m1ttt-0r relevant to the invest.igation. This sub-section provides for the procrdure
to be followed in examining such a witness. Section 240(.'i) lays down that notes of any examination
under sub-s. (2) or (4) ohall be ta.ken down in writing,
and shall be read over to or by, and signed by, the
persan examined, and may thereafter be used as
evidence against him. Having thus made elaborate
prol'isions for tho production of documents and
evidence in the course of the investigation by the
inspect-Or, s. 241 deals with the inspectors' report and
provides that inspectors may, and if su directed by the
Cemml Govemment sh.'\11, make interim reports to
that. Government, and on the conclusion of the investi"at1on shall make a final report to it. SecLion 241(2)
provide• for the supply of the copy of tho said mport to
the several parties concerned as specified in els. (a) to (e).
That takes us to s. 242 which deals with prosecution. Section 242(1) provides inter alia that if from
. ~R a1a ivar11ya11 1a1
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
any report made under s. 241 it appears to the
r96o
Central Government that any person has in relation R . ,-,11
.
f
cc
,,
h' h a;a1 nrayana
to the· company been gmlty o any ouence 1or w JC
Bansital
he is criminally liable, the Central Government may,
v.
after taking such legal advice as it thinks fit, prosecute Maneck Phiro:
such person for the offence, and it imposes on all officers Mistry <> Another
and agents of the company, except those prosecuted, G . d--dk
. t h e Central Govermrient a ll assrntance
.
, con- a;en rnga ar 1.
to give
m
nection with the prosecution which they are reasonably able to give. That broadly stated.is the position
with regard to the relevant provisions of the new Act.
Mr. Sastri has drawn our pointed attention to the
fact that the scope and nature of the enquiry authorised by the new Act are very much wider than under
the old Act, and he has characterised the relevant
powers conferred on the investigating inspectors as
draconian. He, therefore, contends that unless it is
established that these powers are available to the
inspector appointed under the relevant provisions of the
old Act the impugned notices must be set aside; and
his argument is that these powers are not available to
the inspector appointed under the old Act. The deci.
sion of this question will depend mainly on the construction of ss. 645 and 646 of the new Act.
Section 644 provides for the repeal of the enactments mentioned in Schedule XII; the old Act is one
of the enactments thus repealed. Ordinarily the effect
of the repeal of the old· Act would have been governed
by the provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act
(10 of 1897), but in the case of the new Act the aµplication of the said section is subject to· the provisions
of ss. 645 to 657 of the Act ; that is'\he effect of s. 658
which provides that the mention of particulars in
ss. 645 to 657 or in any other provisions of this Act
shall not prejudice the general application of s. 6 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897, with respect to the
effect of repeals. In other words, though s. 6 of the
General Clauses Act will generally apply, its application will be subject to the provisions contained in
ss. 64~ to 657; this position i~ not disputed.
It 1s now necessarv. to consider s. 645. It reads
thus:
·55
•
428
60
SUPRE~IE
COUHT REPORTS
[HJ61]
"~othing in this Act shall affect any order, rule,
regulation, appointment, conveyance, mortgage, deed,
document or agreement made, fee directed, resolution
v.
passed, dirrction given, proceeding ta.ken, instrument
Monrc• P"" 0 ' executed or issued, or thing done, under or in pursu~"'''Y 1~ Anotha a.nee of any previous companies law; but any such
c. 1,,.,1,.,.dkor ;. order, rule, regulation, appointment, conveyance,
·
mortgage, deed, document, agreement, fee, res(>lution,
direction, proceeding, instrument or thing shall, if in
force at the commencement of this Act, continue to I.Jo
in forct1, and so far as it could have been made, directed, passed, given, ta,ken, executed, issued or done
under or in pursuance of this Act, shall have effect as
if made, directed, passed, given, taken, executed,
issued or done under or in pursuance of this Act."
The effect of this section is clear. If an i11spector has
been a.ppointed under the relevant section of the old
Act, on repeal of the old Act and on coming into force
of the new Act, his appointment shall have effect a.s if
it wao made under or in pursuance of the new Act.
Indeed it is common ground that if s. 645 had stood
a.lone and had not been followed by s. 646 there would
have been no difficulty in holding that the inspector
appointed under the old Act could exercitie his powers
and authority under the relevant provisions of the
new Act, and the impugned notices would then be
perfectly \'a.lid. Incidentally we may rofor to the
'provisions of s. 652 in this connection. Under this
section any pernon appointed to any oflice under or by
virtue of any previous company law shall be deemed
to have been appointed to that office under this Act.
It is, however, urged that the authority of the
inspector which is in dispute is governed by s. 646.
This section provides :
" Nothing in this Act shall affect tbe operation of
section 138 of the Indian Companios Act, Hll3 (Vll of
1913), as respects inspectors, or as respects the continuation of an inspection begun by inspectors,
app•Jinted before the commenccmont of this Act ; and
tho provisions of this A.ct shall apply to or in relation
to a report of inspectors a.ppointod under the said
~cction 138 as thoy apply to or in relation to a report
'9
Raja Xarnyonlol
llansilal
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
of inspectors appointed under section 235 or 237 of
I96o
this Act.''
Ra1a N'arayanlal
The argument is that the expression "nothing in
;ansital
this Act" includes s. 645 and so s. 646 should be read
v.
as an exception or proviso to s. 645; and if that is so, Maneck P~ii-oz
all matters covered by s. 138 of the old Act must con- Mistry & Another
tirrne to be governed bv the said Act and not by any G . d--dk
•
We are una·ble to a1en raga ar 1.
of the provisions of the new Act.
accept this argument. In appreciating the effect of
the provisions of s. 646 it is necessary to bear ill mind
that it occurs in that part of the new Act which deals
with repeals.and savings. Sections 645 to 648 are the
saving sections, and ordinarily and in the absence of
any indication to the contrary these saving clauses
should be read as independent of, and in addition to,
and not as providing exceptions to, one another. It
is significant that whereas s. 646 provides for the continuance of the operation of s. 138 it does not make a
corresponding provision for the continuance of the
operation of s. 140 of the old Act which deals with the
powers of the inspector to call for books and to ex11mine parties. Besides, it may perhaps not be accurate
to suggest that having regard to the provisions of
s. 645, s. 646 is wholly redundant. It would be possible- to take the view that cases falling under s. 138(1)
of the old Act are intended to be covered by s. 646 as
they would not be covered by s. 645. In regard to
the case of a banking company coveted by s. 138(1)
s. 646 will come into operation and that may be one
of the reasons for which s. 646 was enacted. It may
be that the case of the banking company may also be
covered by s. 35 of the Banking Companies Act 10 of
1949, but since s. 138(1) applied to the said case until
the old Act was repealed the Legislature may have, as
a matter of caution, thought it necessary to provide
for the continuance of the operation of s. 138 by
enacting s. 646. However that may be, we feel no
difficulty in holding that s. 646 should not be construed as a proviso to s. 645 but as an additional saving
provision. The words used iri s. 645 are so clear, and
the .policy and object of enacting the said provision
are in our opinion so emphatically expressed, that it
430
SUPRK\fE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
would be unr<'asonable to hold thats. 646 was intendcd
t-0 provide for such a radical exception to s. 645.
R 0
10 1
"'
\\"J
. 1ature enacts a saving section as a
- "' •""
· n,..,,,
·
·
1erc
t he Lcg1s
101
"·
runlter of abundant caution the argument that the
Ma .. cck pi,,,,, eun.ctmcnt of the said Hect.ion was not wholly necesMi•1'.Y "- Ano11,., sary cannot be treatBd as decisive or even d'fective.
.
--Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was right in
G a~ettrlragadkar J
.
l
J •
,
·
· conung to tie cone us10n that the mspoctor appointed
under s. 138(4) of tl1e old Act mtrnt hy legal fiction,
which ·is aut.horised by s. 645, be deemed to have been
appointed un<lor s. 23.i of tho new Act, and if that is
so, respondent. I had R nt.bority and power to issue the
impugned notices under s. 240 of the new Act. The
challenge to the validity of the impugned notices on
tho ground that respondcnt I bad no authority to
issue the said notices must, the·refore, fail.
That takes us to the question as to whether the
relevant provisions of s. 240, which empower respondent I t-0 issue the relevant notices by which the
appellant was called upon to givo evidence and to
produce documents, offend against the fundamental
constitutional right guaranteed by Art. 20(3). It has
ooen strenuously urged before us that the mn,in object
of lhe present investigation is to diseo-rrr whether the
appellant has commit.ted any offences, and so by compelling him to give oddenco and produce documents
he is denied the constitutional protection against sC'!fincrimination.
Art.icle.20(3) provides that " no person accused of
any offence shall he compelled to be a witness against
himsolf". It may be assumed that the appellant is
being compelled to be witness againRt himself in the
prrnent proceedings; but even so the question which
a.rises for our decision is whcthor the appellant can be
said to be a person who is accused of any offence as
required by Art. 20(3). Mr. Sastri has contended that
the words " person accused of any offence" should not
rect·h·e a narrow or literal const.n1ction; they should
be liberally in!Npreted because the clause in which
they occur Pnshrines a fundamental constitutional
right R-nd the scope and reach of the said right should
not be unduly narrowed down. In support of this
i96o
.
\~.
0
1 S.C.R.
I
I
'
r
I'
l
I
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
431
general argument Mr. Sastri has naturally relied on
I96o
t?e hist?rical b~ckwo?nd .of the doctrine of protea- Roja ,,:-;,-:;,yon/al
t1on agamst self-nicr1mmat10n; and he has strongly
Bansilot
pressed into service the decisions of the Supreme
v.
Court of the United States of America dealing with Maneck Phfroz
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the Mistry & Another
United States. The said Amendment inter alia pro- . - d k
· any cri· Ga1endraga ar 1 .
v1'd es t h at " no person sh a II be compe IJed rn
minal case to be a witness against himself". It would
be noticed that in terms the Amendment refer to a
criminal case, and yet it has received a very broad
and liberal' interpretation at the h0,nds of the Supreme
Court of the United States of America. It has been
held that the said constitutional protection is not confined only to criminal cases but it extends even to
civil proceedings (Vide: McCarthy v. Arndstein(') ).
As observed by Mr. Justice Blatchford in Charles
Counselman v. Frank Hitchcock(') "it is impossible
that the meaning of the constitutional provision can
only be that a person shall not be compe!led to be a
witness against himself in a criminal prosecution
against himself. It would doubtless cover such cases
but it is not limited to them. The object was to
insure that a person should not be compelled, when
acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had
committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against
which it seeks to guard".
In support of his plea that a liberal interpretation
should be out on an article which enshrines a fundamental co11stitutional right Mr. Sastri bas also invited
our attention to the observation made by Mr. Justice
Bradley in Edward A. Boyd and George H. Boyd v.
United States('). Says Bradley, J., "illegitimate and
unconstitutional practices get their first footing in
that way, namely by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can·
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and
(1) (1924) 6n L. Ed. 158.
(2) (1892) 35 L. Ed. I!ro.
(3) (1886) 29 L. Ed. 746, 7 52.
432
R"J"
Sl'.PREJfE COlJRT REPORTS
[ 1961]
r96o
property should oo liberally construed ''. The learned
_;,;;.,"'"!a! judge has also _added that ,any compulsory dis-
/Jo.,,.1;,1
covery by extort mg thu party s oath, or compelling
the production of his private books and papers, to
,ir.,,,.,1. Plii•oz convict him of crime or to forfeit his prop0rty, is conMimy 0- A"'""'t.ra.ry to the principles of a free government, and is
. .
--dk
abhorrent to the instinct.a of an American. It may
0 1
'
c.;"1'"baga
·snit the purposes of despotic power; hut it cannot
abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and persona.I freedom". In regard to this eloquent statement
of the law it may, however, be permissible to state
that under the English Law the doctrine of protection
against self-incriminativn ha8 never been applied in
the departmC'nts of Company Law and Insolvency
Law. There is !lo doubt that undr,r s. 15 of the English Bankruptcy Act when a public examination of
a debtor is held he ia compelled to answer all questions as the court may put, or allow to be put to him,
and that the answers given have to be signed by him
and can be used against him in evidence (Vide: In
Re: Atherton(')); similar is"tht' position under s. 270
of the English Compani•)S· Act. However, the general
argument for the appellant is that in construing
A rt. 20(3) we may take some assiRta.nce from the
broad and libcra.I conAtr11ction which has been placed
on the apparent.Iy narrow and limited words used in
tho Fifth Amendmout to the ConHtitution of the United StalM of America.
Thus presented the argument is no doubt at.tractive,
and its validitv ancl effr-ctivene~s would have had to
be fully and carefully examined if the question raised
in the present appeal had been a. matter of first impression; hut the const.ruction of Art. 20 in genera.I and
Art.. 20(2) and (3) in particular has been the subjectmatterof some decisions of this Court, and naturally
it is in the light of the previous decisions that we have
({> dPal with the merits of the appdlant's case in tho
present appeal. In 1\faqbool Hus.ooin ,., 'l'he State of
Bombay (') this Court had occasion to consider the
scope and effect oft he constitutional guarantee provided by Art. 20(2). A person against whom proceedings
'"·
(1) 11912) 2 K.B. 251.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. 730.
I
,.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
433
had been taken by the Sea Customs Authorities under
z96.o
s. 167 of the Sea Customs Act and an order for confis. R . N
,
.
ti y a;aBansilal
aray...in1a1
cation
of. goods ha d been passe d was su bsequen
prosecuted before the Presidency Magistrate for an
v.
offence under s. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regula- Maneck Phiroz
tions Act in respect of the same act. It was urged on Mistry G> Another
his behalf that the proceedings taken against him
before the Sea Customs Authorities was a prosecution Gajendragadkar f.
and the order of confiscation passed in the said proceedings was a punishment, and so it was argued that
the constitutional guarantee afforded by Art. 20(2)
made his subsequent prosecution under s. 23 of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act invalid. This, plea
was rejected. In deitling with the merits of the plea
this Court had to consider the meaning of the words.
" prosecuted and punished " used in Art. 20(2). Article 20(2) provides that no person shall be prosecuted
and punished for the same offence more than once, and
the question raised was whether the proceedings before
the Sea Customs Authorities constituted prosecution,
and whether the order of confiscation was punishment
under A/rt. 20(2). In construing .Art. 20(2) this_Court
considered Art. 20 as a whole and examined the interrelation of the relevant terms used in the three clauses
of the said article. " The very Wording of Art. 20 ",
observed Bhagwati, J., "and the words used therein" convicted"," commission of the act charged as an
offence"," be subjected to a penalty", "commission
of the offence", "prosecuted and punished", "accused of any offence" would indicate that the proceedings therein contemplated are of the nature of criminal proceedings before a court of law or a judicial
tribunal and the prosecution in this context would
m~ai;i an initiation or starting of proceedings of a
cnmmal nature before a court of law or a judicial
tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed
in the statute which creates the offence and regulates
the.procedure''. Having thus construed Art. 20(2) in
the light of the relevant words used in the different
clauses of the said article, this Court naturally proceeded to enquire whether the Sea Customs Authorities
acted as a judicial tribunal in holding proc~dings
434
1 60
9
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
against the person.
(1961]
The scheme of the relevant pro-
visions of the Ac't was then examined, and it was
/1 . "
a;a ·'"'"Y"" 1a1 h Id h
· ' are not a judicial tribuBansilal
e t at the sa1"d aut hont10s
v.
nal with the result that the "adjudging increased
Maneck Phi•oz rate of duty nr penalty and confiscation" 1mder the
Mist•y & Anotlm provisions of the said act did not constitute a judg. J--d'
ment f or
Ga;en raga l'lar 1.
order of a court
tribunal necnsf or judicial
.
sary or the purpose o supportmg the plea of double
jeopardy. In the result tho oonclusion of this Court
was that when the Customs Authorities confiscated
the gold in question the proceedings taken did not
amount. to a prosecution of the party uor did the order
of confiscation constitute a punishment as contemplated by Art. 20(2).
This decision has been affirmed by this Court in the
case of S. A. Venkataraman v. 'l'he Union of India(').
In that case an enquiry had been made against
the appellant Venk1Ltaraman under the Public Sern111ts
(Inquiries) Act, 1850 (Act XXXVII of 1850). On
receiving the report of the enquiry commissioner opportunity was given to the appellant under Art. 311(2) to
show qause, and ultimately after consultation with the
Union Public Service Commission the appellant was
dismissed by an order p11.ssed by the President. The
order of dismissal was passed on September 17, 1953.
Soon thereafter on February 23, 1954, the polico submitted a charge-sheet against him charging him with
having committ{'d offences under ss. 161/165 of the
Indian Penal Code and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. The validity of the subsequent prosecution was challenged by the appellant on the ground
that it contravened the · constitutional guarantee
enshrined in Art. 20(2). The appellant's plea was,
howe,·er, rejected on the ground that the proceedings
taken against him before the commissioner under the
Inquiries Act did not a.mount to a prosecution.
The relevant provisions of the said a.ct were examined, and it was held that in an inquiry under the said
Act t.here is neither any question of investigating au
offenc:e in tho sense of an act or omission punishable
by any law for the time "being in force nor is there
(1) [1954J S.C.R. u50.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
435
any question of imposing punishment prescribed by
r96o
the law which makes that act or omission an offence. R . N - 1 1
. J ., as het.h en was, who d el'1vered t he JU
, d g- a1aBans.ilal
arayan a
Mukh erJea,
meut of the Court, has referred to the earlier decision
v.
in the case of Maqbool Hussain (1), and has observed Maneck Phiroz
that " the effect of the said decision was that the pro- Mistry & Another
ceedings in connection with the prosecution and G . d-dk
· hment of a person must be m
· t he nature of a a;en raga ar 1 .
pums
criminal proceeding before a court of law or a judicial
tribunal, and not before a tribunal which entertains a
departmental or an administrative enquiry even though
set up by a statute but which is not required by law to
try a matter judicially and on legal evidence". Thus
these two decisions can be said to have considered
incidentally the general scope of Art. 20 though both
of them were concerned directly with the construction
and application of Art. 20(2) alone.
Article 20(3) was considered by the Full Court in
M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate,
Delhi (2 ). The question about the scope and effect of
Art. 20(3) was raised in that .case by a petition filed
under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It appears that the
Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies, Delhi State,
lodged information with the Inspector.General, Delhi
Special Police E>tablishment, against the petitioners
alleging that they had committed several offences
punishable under the Indian Penal Code. The lodging
of.this information was preceded by an investigation
into the affairs of the petitioners' company which had
been ordered by the Central Government under s. 138
of the old Act, and the report received at the end of
the said investigation indicated that a well-planned
and organised attempt had been made by the petitioners to misappropriate and embezzle the funds of
the company by adopting several ingenious methods.
On receipt of the said First Information Report the
District Magistrate ordered investigation into the
offences and issued warrants for simultaneous searches
at as many as thirtyfour places. By .their petitions
the petitioners contended that the search warrants
(1) [1953) S.C.R. 730.
56
(2) [1954) S.C.R. 1077.
436
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
wl're illegal and they prayed that the same may be
quashed as being in violation of Art. 20(3). The plea
Ra1a
· d by t he put1t10ners
··
·
1y rciecte
·
d
· B.\ arayanlal
.
t h us rarne
was u1t1mate
11
••:'.' •
on the ground that the impugned searches did not
Manech Phiro: violate the S•~id constitutional guarantee. JagannadhaMistry 6- Arwthudas, ,T., who spoke for the Court, observed that" since
article 20(3) provides for a constitutional guarantee
Ga1endrag,ulkar J. against testimonial compulsion its words should he
liberally construed, and that there was no reason to
confine the content of the said guarantee to its barely
literal import". He, therefore, held that the phrase
"to be a witness" means 11othing more than to furnish
evidence, and such evidence can be furnished through
the lips or by production of a thing or of a document
or in other modes. He also pointed out that the phrase
was "to be a witness" and not "to appear as a
·witness" and so the protecti6n aff()rded was not mert>ly
in respect of test.imonial compulsion in the court room
but may well extend to compel testimony previously
obtained from him. The conclusion of the Court on
this part of the construction was t bus stated. The
constitutional guarantee "is available t-0 a person
against whom a formal accusation relating to the com·
mission of an offence has been levelled which in the
normal course may result in prosecution ; whether it is
available to other persons in other situations does not
call for a decision in this case". Since the First Information Heport hacl been recorded against the petitioners in that case it followed that the first test that
a formal accusation relating to the commission of an
offence must have been levelled was satisfied. The
question which was then considered was whether there
was any ha.sis in the Indian Law for the assumption
that a. search or seizure of a. thing or document is in
itself to be treated as compelled production of the
same; and it was held that there would be no ju8tification for treating tho said search or seizure a.s compelled
production; that is why the challenge to the validity
of the search warrants issued against the petitioners
was repelled. The effect of this decision thus appears
to be that one of the essential conditions for invoking
the constitutional guarantee enshrim·d in Art. 20(3)
1960
-,-
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
437
1
is that a formal accusation relating to the commission
96°
·
of an offence, which would normally lead
to
his
proR . N. · h
a;a arayan 1a1
secution, must have been levelled agamst t e party
Bansilal
who is being compelled to give evidence against himv,
self; and this conclusion, in ·our opinion, is fully con- Man"k Phfroz
sistent with the two other decisions of this Court to Mistry &- Another
which we have already' referred.
. a
dk
. .
f th• Ga1en
raga ar 1 .
There are two oth er su bsequent d ec1s10ns o
1s
Court to which reference may be made. In Thomas
Dana v. State of Punjab (1), according to the majority
decision" prosecution " in Art. 20(2) means a proceeding either by way of indictment or information in a
criminal court in order to put an offender upon his
trial. It would be noticed that this conclusion is
wholly consistent with the view taken by this Court
in the case of M aqbool Hussain (') and S. A. Venkataraman ('). In Mohammed Dastagir v. The State of
Madras(') this Court had to consider Art. 20(3). The
appellant in that case had gone to the bungalow of the
Deputy Superintendent of Police to offer him a bribe
which was covered in a closed envelope with a reqmst
that he might drop the action registered against him.
The police officer threw the envelope at the appellant
who took it up. While the appellant was still in ''the
bungalow he was asked by the police officer to produce
the envelope and he took out from bis pocket some
currency notes and placed them on the table without
the envelope. The notes were then seized by the police
officer and a rubber stamp of his office was placed on
them. On these facts it was urged that in relying
upon the evidence of compelled production of notes
the prosecution had violated the provisions of
Art. 20(3). In support of this contention the general
observations ma.de by this Court in the case of
M. P. Sharma('), were strongly pressed into service.
This Court, however, rejected the appellant's arguments and held that the prosecution did not suffer
from any infirmity. On the facts it was found that
thou,gh the offence had in fact been already committed
(1) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 274.
(2) (1953] S.C.R. 730.
(3) [1954] S.C.R. 1150.
(4) A.LR. 1960 S.C. 756.
(S) [1954] S.C.R. 1077.
438
SVPREME COVRT REPORTS
[ 1961]
i96o
by the appellant, he ha.d in fact not been accused of it
. ::-.
at the stage when the currency notes were produced
R a;a .-arayania1 b h"
. was a Iso }1eId t hat 1t
. cou Id not be said
. t }iat
Bansilal
y 1m ; 1t
v
he was compelled to produce the said currency notes,
Manuk l'hiro• because he might easily have refused to produce them,
Mistry 6- Another and so there was no occasion for him to invoke the
.
-
Ga;tndragadkar J.
constitutional protection against self-incrimination.
Wb at t hen 1s
• t be resu 1t of t hese d cc1s10ns?
· ·
Th ey
show that in determining the complexion and reach of
its respective sub-clauses the genera.I scheme of Art. 20
a.s a. whole must be considered, and the effect of the
inter-action of the relevant words used in them must
be properly'apprecia.ted. Thus considered the constitutional right guaranteed by Art. 20(2) against
double jeopardy ca.n be successfully invoked only
whf're the prior proceedings on which reliance is placed must be of a. criminal nature instituted or continued before a. court of law or a. judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute
which creates tho offence and regulates the procedure.
It would be noticed that the cba.ract.er of the said
proceedings as woll as the character of the forum
before which the proceedings are initiated or conducted ltre treated as decisive in the matter. Similarly,
for invoking the constitutional right against testimonial compulsion guaranteed under Art. 20 (3) it must
appear that 11 formal accusation has been made
against the party plea.ding the guarantee and that it
relates to the commission of an offence which in the
normal course may result in prosecution. Here a.gain
the nature of the accusation and its probable sequel or
consequence a.re regarded.as important.
Thus we go ha.ck to the question which we ha.v<•
already posed : . was the appellant · accused of any
offence at the time when the impugned notices were
served on him? Jn answering this question in the
light of the tests to which we have just referred ~t
will be necessary to determine the scope and nature of
the enquiry which the inspector undertakes under
s. 240; for, unless it is shown that an accusation of a.
crime can be made in such an enquiry, the a.ppella.l)t's
plea. under Art. 20(3) cannot succeed. Section 240
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
439
1 60
9
shows that the enquiry which the inspector undertakes iB in substance an enquiry
into
the
affairs
of
the
.
N.
. d Ra;a arayan1a1
company concerned. Certam documents are reqmre
Bansilal
to be furnished by a company to the Registrar under
v.
the provisions of the new Act. If, on examining the Maneck i'hiroz
said documents, the Registrar thinks it nece.ssary to Mistry & Another
call for information or explanation he is empowered
· to take the necessary action under s. 234(1). Similarly, Gajendragadkar J.
under s. 234(7) if it is represented to the Registrar on
materials placed before him by any contributory or
creditor or any other person interested that the busi,
ness of the company is carried on in the manner specified in the said sub-section the Registrar proceeds to
make the enquiry. Thus the scope of the enquiry contemplated by s. 234 is clear; wherever the Registrar
has reason to believe that the affairs of the company
are not properly carried on he is empowered to make
an enquiry into the said affairs. Similarly under
s. 235 inspectors are appointed to investigate the
affairs of any company and, report thereon. The
investigation carried on by the inspectors is no more
than the work of a fact-finding commission. It is
true that as a result of the investigation made by the
inspectors it may be discovered that the affairs of the
company disclose not only irregularities and malpractices but also commission of offences, and in such a
case the report would specify the relevant particulars
prescribed by the circular in that behalf. If, after
receiving the report, the Central Government is satisfied that any person is guilty of an offence for which
he is criminally liable, it may, after taking legal
advice, institute criminal proceedings against the
offending person under s. 242(1); but the fact that a
prosecution may ultimately be launched against the
alleged offender will not retrospectively change the
complexion or character of the proceedings held by
the inspector when he makes the investigation. Have
irregularities been committed in managing the affairs
of the company; if yes, what is the nature of the
irregularities? Do they amount to the commission of
an offence punishable urider the criminal law ? If
they do who is liable for the said offence? 'These and
440
SUPREME COL'RT REPORTS
[1961]
such other questions fa.II within the purview of the inspector's invoHtigation. The scheme· of the relevant
11
" 1 " 8 .;;,~;;n sections is that the investigation begins broadly with a.
v.
view to examine the management of the affairs of the
Maneck Phim company to find out whether any irregularities have
Mistry r~ Another been committed or not.
In such a case there is no
. daccusation,
either
formal
or otherwiRe, against any
G•J"' ragodkar f.
'fi
d
'
d'
'd
l
h
·
. spec1 e m 1v1 ua. ; t ere may be a. ger.era I a. ]] ega.t1on
that the affairs a.re irregularly, improperly or illegally
managed; but who would be responsible for the affairs
which a.re reported to be irregularly managed is a
matter which would be determined at the end of the
enquiry. At the commencement of the enquiry and
indeed throughout its proceedings there is no accused
person, no accuser and no accusation against anyone
that he has committed an offence. In our opinion a
general enquiry and investigation into the affairs of
the company thus contemplated cannot be regarded
as an investigation which starts with a.n accusation
contemplated in Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. In this
connection it ia necessary to remember that the relevant sections of the Act appear in Part VI which
generally deals with management and administration
of the companies.
It is well-known that the provisions of the Act are
modelled on the corresponding provisions of the
English Companies Act. It would, therefore, be use.
fol to refer to the observations made by the House of
Lords in describing the character of the enquiry held
under the corresponding provisions of the English Act
in tho case of Hearts of Oak Assurance Co. v. Attorney.
General('). In that case Lord Thankerton said "it
appears to me to be clear that the object of the examination is merely to -recover information as to the
company's affairs and that it is in no sense a. judicial
proceeding for the purpose of trial of an offence; it is
enough to point out ·that there a.re no parties before
the inspector, that he a.lone conducts the enquiry, and
that the power to examine on oath is confined to tho
officers, members, a.gents and servants of the company". We ought, however, to add that the 11\st
r96o
R .
t.-:-
•
(1) 1932 A.C. 392.
.
1 S.C.R.
;J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
441
observation is no longer true about the inspector's
r96o
powers under s. 240 of the new Act. In the same case R . N - 1 1
•
arayan a
Lord Macqu"11 an observe d t hat "the ob3eot
of t. he en- a;aBansizaz
quiry manifestly is that the Commissioner may either
v.
by himself directly or through the medium of a dele- Maneck Phiroz
gate obtain the information necessary to enable him Mistry & Another
to decide what action, if any, he should take. Thee . d - k
. 1 wor d s of th e sec t"10n are those wh"ic h em- a;en ragad ·ar 1 .
card ma
power the Commissioner or his inspector to examine
into and report on the affairs of the society ". Thus
it is clear that the examination of, or investigation .
into, the affairs of the company cannot be regarded as
a proceeding started against any individual after
framing an accusation against him. Besides it is quite
likely that in some cases investigation may disclose
that there are no irregularities, or if there are they do
not amount to the commission of any offence ; in such
cases there would obviously be no occasion for the
Central Government to institute .criminal proceedings
under s. 242(1). Therefore, in our opinion, the High
Court was right in holding that when the inspector
issued the impugned notices against the appellant
the appellant cannot be said to have been accused
of any offence; and so_ the first essential condition for
the application of Art. 20(3) is absent. We ought to
add that in the present case the same conclusion
would follow even if the clause " accused of any
offence " is interpreted more libera.lly than was done
in the case of M. P. Sharma('), because even if the
· expression "accused of any offence" is interpreted in
a very broad and liberal way it is clear that at the
relevant stage the appellant has not been, and in law
cannot be, accused of any offence. Thus the tests
about ·the character Qf the proceedings and the foruru
where the proceedings are initiated or intended to be
taken are also not satisfied; but, as we have already
indicated, such a broad and liberal interpretation of
the relevant expression does not appear to be consistent with the tenor and effect of the previous decisions
of this Court.
It is true that in his report the Registrar has ma.de
(1) [1934] S.C.R. 1077.
'
442
SUPHE:\I.E COURT REPORTS
[1961)
certain allPga.tions on whic~ ~Ir. Sastri has relied. He
/laia ,-:;,-;.,,.,, " 1 contends ~hat the st11te.m;-nts in the report do a.mount
1
• Ransilai
t-0 allegat1011s of comm1sswn of oflences b.i; the appel"·
la.nt. What the RPgistra.r has stated in his report in
Manech Phi.oz this particular case cannot be relevant or material in
M"''Y G- A'"''"" deciding the vires of the impugned section. Tho vires
_ d--· ,
of the section can be determined only by examining
Giljtll ,agadr.tu J. h
l
t e re evant scheme of the Act, nnd we h11.ve already
seen that such an examination d(){'s not assist the
appellant's contention that Art. 20(3) is contravened.
Besides, what the Hegistra.r has stated in his report
can hardly amount to an accusation against the
appellant; it is a report submitted by him t-0 the
Cer!trnl Government, and it is only intended to enable
tho Central GovcrnmPnt to decide whether it should
appoint a.n inspector. It is not as if the investigation
before tho inspector begius on the basis tha.t tho Hegistra.r is the complainant who has ma.de a.n a.ccu8ation
against the appellant, or that the function of the
investigation is to tiud out whether the sa.id accusation is proved or not.. As we have already seen an
enquiry under s. 240 may require a large number of
persons to give evidence or produce documcnll! but it
cannot be said that any accusation is ma.de against
any of the said persons. In fact three persons have
been served with similar notices in the present enquiry which shows that the inspector desires to obtain
rellwant e\•idenco from them as from the appellant.
How can it be said that an accusation has been ma.de
against the sa.id three persons, and that incidentally
holps to bring out the real character and scope of the
enquiry. Therefore we do not think that the statements made in the Registrar's report on which .\Ir.
Sastri relies can really assist us. in deciding the question of the vires of s. 240. It is also significant that
the a.ppella.ut has not challenged the va.hdity of the
impugned notices on any ground relatable to, or based
on, the sa.id report. The challenge is founded 011 tho
broad and genera.I ground that s. 240 offends against
Art. 20(3).
Wo may incidentally a.dd tha.t it was in support of
his argument based on the Registrar's report that
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1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
443
Mr. Sastri sought to rely on the decision of the Calr96o
· cutta High Court in Collector of Customs ~· Calc1;1tta Raja Narayan/al
Motor and Cycle Co. (1 ). In that case cer~am notwes
Bansilal
had been issued under s. 171A of the Sea Customs Act
v.
to certain persons to appear before the customs offici- Maneck Phiroz
a.ls and to produce certain documents. The High Mistry & Another
Court
. d-dk
. took the. view
h that "it
h appeared from
h the
. accu- G a;en
raga ar 1 .
sat10ns made m t e searc warrants at t e mstance
of the customs authorities and those made in one of
the notices by the customs authorities themselves,
that the accusations of criminal offences could not be
excluded " ; and so it was held that the requirements
of Art. 20(3) were satisfied and the protection under
the said article was available to the persons concerned.
In our opinion this decision does not assist the appellant. It proceeded on the finding that accusations of
criminal offences could be held in substance to have
been made against the persons concerned, and it dealt
with the other points of law on that assumption.
That being so, we think it unnecessary to discuss or
consider the said decision. Our conclusion, therefore,
is that s. 240 does not offend against Art. 20(3) of the
Constitution.
That still leaves the challenge to the vires of the
said section under Art. 14 of the Constitution, though
we ought to add that Mr. Sastri did not seriously
press his case under Art. 14, and we think rightly.
The argument under Art.· 14 proceeds on familiar
lines. It is urged that the ordinary protection afforded to witnesses under s. 132 of the Indian Evidence
Act as well as the protection ll.fforded to accused persons under s. 161(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure
Code, have been denied to the appellant in the investi- ·
gation which respondent 1 is carrying on in regard to
the affairs of his company, and that violates equality
before the law. The scope and effect of Art. 14 have
been considered by this Court frequently. It has been
repeatedly held that what Art. 14 prohibits is class
legislation; it does not, however, forbid reasonable
classification for the purpose of legislation. If the
classification on which legislation is based is founded
(t) A.l.R. 1958 Cal. 682.
57
444
SliPREME COCRT REPORTS
[l!l61)
on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes peror tbingH that arc grouped together from others
f t hegroup,and 1fthe
·
·
· has a rat10n·
•
"
.,,,
et
outo
dtffcrentta
8
1 1
v.
al relation to the object sought to be achieved, then the
Ah>1«ck Phnoz classification does not offend Art. 14 (Vide: Shri Ram
Mfr1ry & A>1othrr Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (1)).
Now in the
-.
light of this test how can it be said that the classifiGa;endragadka• ].
·
a
ds Art. 14 o f t he
cat10n
ma de by ss. 239 and 240 ouen
Constitution? A company is a creature of the statute.
There can be no doubt that one of the objects of tho
Companies Act is to throw open to all citizens the
privilege of carrying on business with limited liability.
Inevitably tho business of the company has to be
carried on through human agency, and that sometimes giYes rise to irregularities and malpractices in
th•l management of the affairs of the company. If
persons in charge of the management of companies
abuse thAir position and make personal profit at the
cost of the creditors, contribut.ories and others interested in the company, that raises a problem which is
very much different from the problem of ordinary
misappropriation or breach of trust. The interest of
the company is tho interest of several persons who
constitute tho company, and thus persons in managemtJnt of tho affairs of such companies can be classed by
themHelves as distinct from other individual citizens.
A citizen can and may protect his own interest, but
where the financial interest of a large number of citizens is loft in charge of persons who manago the affairs
of the companies it would be legitimate to treat such
com pauies and their managers as a class by themselves and to provide for necessary safoguards and
checks against a possible abuse of power vesting in
the managers. If the relevant provisions of tho Act
dealing with enquiries and investigations of the affairs
of the companies are considered from this.point of view
there would be no difficulty in holding that Art. 14 is
not violated either by s. 239 or s. 240 of the new Act..
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with
cost.s.
r96o
sons
. .-,/I a;a ""'"Y"" 1a1 I f
Appeal dismissed.
'"' r .. ,. .. ,., C: r. ~
.,,.,.
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