TATA IRON AND STEEL CO., LIMITED, BOMBAY versus S. R. SARKAR AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 August 1960 | [1961] 1 S.C.R. 379 | 1960 INSC 134
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 August 1960
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, A.K. SARKAR, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 199/1959
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1961] 1 S.C.R. 379
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 134
Text of the judgment
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
379
TATA IRON AND STEEL CO., LIMITED,
BOMBAY
v.
S. R. SARKAR AND OTHERS.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. c. DAS GUPTA AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Sales Tax-Inter-State sales-Sale effected by transfer of
documents of title to goods during their movement from one State to
another-Appropriate State to tax such sale-Place where sale
effected-Central Sales Tax Act, I956 (74 of I956), ss. 2(a), 3, 4Constitution of India, Art. 286.
The petitioner, a limited company carrying on the business
of manufacturing and selling fron and steel goods, with its
factory at Jamshedpur in Bihar and its head Sales Office in
Calcutta in west Bengal, was served with a notice on August 12,
1959, by the Commercial Tax Officer of West Bengal directing it
to submit a statement of sales from Jamshedpur for the period
of assessment July l, 1957, to March 31, 1958, "the documents
relating to which were transferred in West Bengal or of any other
sales that may have taken place in West Bengal under s. 3(b) of
the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956." For the same period, i.e.,
July 1, 1957 to March 31, 1958, of assessment the petitioner had
on December 15, 1958, filed with the Sales Tax Officer, Jamshedpur, a return of inter-State sales made from Jamshedpur, in
which were included all sales in which movement of the goods
had taken place from the State of Bihar to destinations outside
the State, and had paid advance tax nnder the Central Sales Tax
Act, 1956. The petitioner contended before the Taxing Officer
of West Bengal, inter alia, that in so far as its inter-State sales
from Jamshedpur were concerned the situs of snch sales, as
determined nnder s. 4(2) of the Act, would always be in the State
of Bihar as the goods were in Bihar and that the State of West
Bengal could not tax a sale where goods were under the contract
of sale moved from Bihar to Bengal even though the documents
of title to the goods sold were transferred in Bengal, such sales
being taxable only by the State of Bihar. The Taxing Officer,
however, taxed all the sales effected by the company under
s. 3(b) on the view that the sales in which the documents of title
were handed over in Calcutta were taxable in the State of West
Bengal because (1) all the sales effected in favour of West Bengal
parties satisfied the conditions prescribed by s. 3(b), and (2) the
place where the documents were delivered by the company to
the purchaser was the place where the sale was effected.
Held, (per Sinha, C. J.,- Imam and Shah, JJ., Sarkar and
Das Gupta, JJ., dissenting): (1) that within cl. (b) of s. 3 of the
49
August ag.
380
SUPRK\IE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, are included sales in which property
in the goods pa.ssPs during the rnovernent of the goods from one
'fttftt Iron ls.
State to another by transfer of documents of title thereto clause
Strei Cn., l.td. (a) of s. 3 covers sales, other than those included in cl. (h). in
v.
which the movement of goods from one State to another is the
result of a covenant or inci<hnt of the contract of sale, and property in !:le goods passes in either State.
(2) that sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the Act defines what sales or
'
purchases shall be deemed to take place inside a State and,
thereby, locates the place wl1ere a sale is effected. The terms of
the sub-scctiori-heing quite general provide also for cases where
sales are effected in the course of inter-State trade or commerce
under s. 3 of the Act.
·
Cll that the Taxing authorities in West Bengal had to ascertain, before they could order payment of tax under the Central
Sales Tax Act, whether on t1e materials they were satisfied (a)
that the goods at the time of transfer of documents of title were
in movement from the State of Bihar to the State of West
Bengal, and (b) that the pJa.:e where the sale was effected was,
under s,4, cl. (2). withi1i the State of West Ilengal.
Per Sarkar and Das Gupta. Jj.--A sale contemplated by
s. 3(b) ul the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, is one where the transfer of property in the goods sold takes place hy the transfer of
documents of title to them during their movement from one
State to another and is effected within the State in which the
documents of title are transferred, that State is the "appropriate
State" in respect of such sale (2) The purpose of s. 4(2) of the
Act is to formulate principles .'or determining when a sale. takes
place "outside a State", and not to fix the place where a sale
under s. 3(b) can be said to have taken effect. The place of that
sale is fixed by cl. (ii) of the Explanation in s. 2(a).
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 199of1959.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, N. A. Palkhfrala, S. N.
Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.
Vohra, for the petitioner.
B. Sen, K. C. Mukherjee and P. K. Bose, for respondents X os. l and 2.
Lal Narriyan Sinha and S. P. Varma, for re~pondent
No. 3.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. H. Dhebar and T. JI. Sen for respondent
No. 4.
I s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1960. August 29.
delivered by
381
The judgment of the Court was
SHAH J.--By this petition for writs of certiorari
and mandamus, the Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd.,
hereinafter referred to as the company, challenges the
authority of the Commercial Tax Officer, t.yons Range,
Calcutta, to demand payment of Rs. 41,14,718·12 nP.
to the West Bengal Government as tax leviable under
the Central Sales Tax Act No. 74 of 1956 in· respect of
certain sales of steel goods.
The company has its registered office in Bombay, its
Head Sales office in Calcutta in the State of West
Bengal and its factories in Jamshedpur in the State
of Bihar. The company is registered as a "dealer"
under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, and is also registered
as a " dealer " in the State of West Bengal under the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. For the period of assessment July 1, 1957, to March 31, 1958, the company
submitted its return of taxable sales to the Commercial Tax Officer, Lyons Range, Calcutta, disclosing a
gross taxable turnover of Rs. 9,561-71 nP. in respect
of sales liable to Central sales tax in the State of
West Bengal. By his memorandum dated August 12,
1959, the Commercial Tax Officer directed the company to submit a statement of sales from Jamshedpur
for the period under assessment, "documents relating
to which were transferred in West Bengal or of any
other sales that may have taken place in West Bengal
under s. 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 ".
The company, by its letter dated September 30, 1959,
informed the Tax Officer that the requisition for production of statement of sales made from Jamshedpur
in the course of inter-State trade or commerce was
without jurisdiction. The company contended that
" all the sales from J amshed pur were of the type
mentioned in s. 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act and
at the same time, some of them also fell within the
category mentioned in s. 3(b) of the Act ", that even
if the sales were "of the type mentioned in s. 3(b) of
the Act, the appropriate State of the place where the
sales take place or are effected alone had jurisdiction
Tata Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Shah ].
382
Tata Iron lS·
Steel Co , Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Shah ].
SCPRE:IIF. COURT REPORTS
[1961]
to assess such sales to Central sales tax ", a1 d that in
respect of inter-Sta.to s.1les from Jamshedpur, the situs
of the sale was always the State of Biha.r as the goods
were in Bihar either at the time of the contract of
sale or at the time of appropriation to the contract.
By his order dated October 21, 1959, the Commercial
Tax Officer made a " best judgment assessment" on a
gross turnover of Rs. 9,00,09,56I·iJ nP. of interState sales and called upon tho company to pay
Rs. 41,14,718·12 nP. as tax under the Central Sales
Tax Act.
The company had, on December 15, 1958, filed with
the Sales Tax Officer, Jamshcdpur, a return of int€rState sales made from Jamshedpur for the period
July 1, 1957, to .March 31, 1958, and a return for the
same period for the sales made from Dhanbad with
the Sales Tax Officer, Dhanbad. Jn these returns,
the company included all sales in which movement of
the goods had taken place from tho State of llihar to
destinations outside that State. The total turnO\·or in
respect of such inter-Stat~ sales as shown in the return
exceeded Rs. 26 crores and the company pa.id as
required by the Biha.r Sales Tax Act Rs. 71 lakhs odd
as advance tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
By this petition the company impugns the validity of
the order of the Commercial Tax Officer and claims a
writ of certiorari quashing and setting aside the assessment order dat~d October 21, 1959, and a writ of
mandamus directing the Commercial Tax Officer t-0
refrain from ta.king steps in enforcement or implementa.t.ion of the order.
Counsel for the respondents contends that the petition under Art. 32 of tho Constitution is not ma.inta.ina.blo because no fundamental right of the company is
infringed by the order passed by the Commercial Tax
Officer and the remedy of the company, if it feels
aggrieved by the order, is to seek relief by resorting to
the ma.chi'!ery provided by the West Bengal Sales
Tax Act. Counsel relics in support of his contention
upon the judgments of this court in Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, Mohinilargarh (') and Laxmanappa
(1) (19l1) S.C.R. n7.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
z960
Hanumantappa Jamkhandi v. The Union of India and
1
another ( ). In Ramjilal's case('), this Court held that Tata Iron &.
the protection against imposition and collection of tax Steel Co., Ltd.
save by authority of law directly arises from Art. 265
v.
Sarkar
and is not secured by cl. 1 of Art. 31 ; and Art. 265
not being in Ch. III of the Constitution, its protection
Shah ].
is not a fundamental right which can be enforced by
an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It
was observed in Ramjilal's case(') that the right secured by Art. 265 may be enforced by adopting appropriate proceedings under the Act authorising levy of
tax but a petition founded on Art. 32 read with
Art. 31(1) was misconceived and must fail. That view
was reiterated in Laxmanappa's case (1). But it has
been held that a threat by the State to realize without
authority of law tax from a citizen by using ·coercive
machinery of an impugned Act is an infringement of
the fundamental right guaranteed to him under
Art. 19(l)(g) and gives to the aggrieved citizen a right
to seek relief by a petition under the Constitution (see
Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh and others('), The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and others(') and The
State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and
others('). In these cases, in appeals from orders
passed by the High Courts in petitions under Art. 226,
this Court held that an attempt to levy tax under a
statute which was ultra vires infringed the fundamental right of the citizens and recourse to the High
Court for protection of the fundamental right was not
prohibited because of the provisions contained in Art.
265. In the case before us, the vires of the Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956, are not challenged; but in
Kailash Nath and another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
and oth.ers (5) a petition challenging the levy of a tax
was entertained by this Court even though the Act
under the authority of which the tax was sought to be
recovered was not challenged as ultra vires. It is not
necessary for purposes of this case to decide whether
the principle of Kailash Nath's case (6 ) is inconsistent
(l) [1955] l S.C.R. 769
(3) [1954] S.C.R. uu.
(5) [1953] S.C.R. Io69.
(2) [1951] s.c.R. 127.
(4) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603.
(6) A.I.R. 1957 s. c. 790.
384
Tata Tron 0.
Co .. Lid.
v.
St~rl
Shah }.
SCPREi\l.E. COUHT REPORTS
[1961]
with the view expressed by this Court in Ramjilal's
case('). Evidently, ihe company has paid t.o the Sales
Tax Officer, Rihar, tax due under the Central Sales
Tax Act on its turnover including sales on which the
tax is sought to be le\·ied by the Commercial Tax
Officer, West Bengal. Under the Central Sales Tax
Act, there is a single liabilit.y to pay t.ax on inter.State
sales. The company having paid tht• tax tot.he Bihar
State for and on beho.lf of the Central Go\·ernment, the
threat to recover again sales tax on belrnlf of the
Central Government in respect of the same sales, i. e.,
sales which are included in the aP.sessment proceedingR
before the Bihar Sales Tax authoritieR prima facie
infringes the fundamontal right of the company to
hold its property and the company is entitled to
approach this Court under Art. 32 of the Co11stitution.
The preliminary objection raised by counsel for the
respondents must therefore fail.
To appreciate the arguments ad\•anced 011 the merits
of the claim made by the company, it is necessary to
set out tho rele\·ant legislative history and the course
of judicial decisions.
Cnder the Government of India Act, 1935, po11·er to
make laws in respect '.>f" taxes on sale of goods and
advertisements" waE conferred bys. 100(1) read with
entry 48 of List II in Schedule VII upon the Pro\'ineial Legislatures. This power was !'X~rciscd by all the
Provinces and by picking out one or more ingredients
constiluting a Rale, as determinative of the place
where the sale took place, they brought within the
taxing laws transactions substantially outside the
territorial limits of their authority. Statutes so enacted led to multiplo tax1itio11 of the same tra.nRa.c:tion by
several Provinces, each Province seeking to rely upon
some ingredient of the sale \\ ithin its jurisdiction as
establishing a territorial nexus.
This burden lay ho,al"ily upo11 the conRumer. The
Constituent Assembly was seriously exercioed over this
situation and tried to meet the problem by placi11g
restrictions upon the taxing power of the 8tates in
respect of sales and purchases having inter-State
elements. Article 2813 of the Constitution was one of
(1) [t951] S.C.R. 127.
.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
385
the Articles enacted for that purpose. That Article
before it was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Tata Iron &
Amendment) Act, 1956, stood as follows:
Sltel Co., Lid.
(l) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the
v.
Sarkar
imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods
where such sale or purchase takes placeShah ].
(a) outside the State; or
(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or
export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
Explanation :-For the purposes of sub-clause (.a), a
sale or purchase shall be deemed to .have taken place
in the State in which the goods have actually been
delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase
for the purpose of consumption in that State, relating
to sale of goods the property in the goods has by
reason of such sale or purchase passed in another
State.
(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law
otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or
autho1ise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerceProvided that the President may by order direct
that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which
was being lawfully levied by the Government of any
State immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution, shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this
clause, continue to be levied until the thity-first day
of March, 1951.
.
(3) No law made by the Legislature of a State
imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on
the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been
declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the
life of the community shall have effect unless it has
been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has received his assent.
As framed, the Article attempted to enunciate
restraints upon the legislative power of the States:
but the somewhat inartistic form in which the Article
and particularly the Explanation was couched, obscured instead of clarifying the meaning of the Constituent
'
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1961]
Assembly. The scope of Art.. 286 fell tCJ be determined
in The State of Bombay v. United Motors (India)
Tata Iron S.
Ltd.
(')in a.n appeal to this court in which the validity
Sl1tl Co., ltd.
of the provisions of the Bombay Sa.Jes Tax Act, 1952
v.
Sar/tor
was challenged. By the BombA.y Act; liability to pay
tax was imposed on sales of goods which had been
Sita~ ].
actually delivered in the State of Bombay as a. direct
result of sales for th" purpose of consumption in that
State even if property in the goods bad, by reason of
such sales, passed in another State. The High Court
of Born bay in a. petitiCJn under Art. 226 held that the
definition of ea.le in the Act included certain sales
which were by Art. 286 of the Constitution exempt
from liability to tax by the State and the tax imposed
was therefore wholly void. A majority of Judges
hearing a.n appeal from that judgment to this Court
held that Art. 286(l)(a) prohibited taxation CJf sales or
purchases involving inter-State ele"ments by a.11 St>i.tes
except the State in which the goods were actually
delivered for the purpose of consumption therein, and
· the effect of t.he Explanation thereto was to convert
inter-State transactions into intra-State transactions
and lo remove them from the operation of cl. 2. On this
view, the majority of the Judges held th>i.t the Bombay
Sales Tax Act did not contravene Art. 286. This
jnterpreta.tion of Art. 286 did not meet with the
approval of a larger Bench of this Court which heard
and decided the Bengal Immunity Co.'s case('). In
that case four out of the seven judges constituting the
Bench held that the operative provisions of the several
parts of Art. 286, namely cl. l(a), cl. l(b) and els. 2
and 3 were intended to deal with different topics and
one "could not be projecl{!d or read into another".
According to the minority view, Art. 286{l)(a.) located
the situs of the sales with a view to a.void multiple
taxation and for that purpose, it divided the sa.le8 into
two categories-" inside sales" and "outside sales",
and that Art. 286(2) applied to the sales in the course
of inter-State trade and the sales which fell within
the Explanation were intra-State sales. In M fa. Ram
Narain Sona L/.d. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales
(1) [1953) s.c.R 1o6g.
(3) [1955] l S.C.R. 6o3.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
387
Tax and others(') which was decided after the Bengal
Immunity Oo.'s case('), this Court held:
I960
Tata Iron 6'
"The bans imposed by Art. 286 of the Constitu- Steel C )., Ltd.
tion on the taxing powers of the States are indepenv
Sa· ar
dent and separate and each one of them has to be got
over before a State Legislature can impose tax on
.•"tiah
transactions of sale or purchase of goods. The Explanation to Art. 286(l)(a) determines by the legal fiction
created therein the. situs of the sale in the case of
transactions coming within that category and once it
is' determined by the application of the Explanation
that a transaction is outside the State, it follows as a
matter of course that the State, with reference to
which the transaction can thus be predicated to be
outside it, can never tax the transaction."
The Constitution was thereafter amended, Explanation 1 of Art. 286 was deleted and els. 2 and 3 thereto
were altered by the amendment. As amended, Art.
286 stands as follows :
Art 286 :-1. No law of a State shall impose, or
authorise the im-position of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods, where such sale or purchase takes
place(a) outside the State; or
(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or
export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
2. Parliament may by law formulate principles for
determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes
place in any of the ways mentioned in cl. 1.
3. Any law of a State shall, in so far as it imposes,
or authorises the impositio!l of,. a tax on the sale or
purchase of goods ·declared by Parliament by law to
be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, be subject to such restrictions and conditions
iri regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify.
Simultaneously, the Parliament was authorised by
the incorporation of item 92A in List I of the seventh
schedule, to legislate for levying tax on the sale or
purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such
T
(t) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 483:
50
(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603.
388
Tata Iron &
Slttl Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Shah ].
SU'PREME COlJRT REPORTS
[1961]
sale or purchaBc takes place in the course of inter.
State tra<le or rommerce, and by the amendm!'nt of
item 54 of List 11 oxdu<led that ncld of taxation from
the competence of the State LegislatureB. Art. 269,
cl. l(g), which was aho amended by cl. 3 to that Article read after the amendment as follows:
"Parliament may by law formulate principles for
determining when a sale or purchase of goo<ls takes
place in tho course of inter-State trade or commerce".
Tho effect of these diverse amendments made by
the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, was
to invest the Parliament with exclusive aut.hority to
enact laws imposing tax on sale or purchase of goods
where such sa.le or purchase takes place in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce, and the tax collected
by the States was to be assigned in the manner provided by cl. 2 of Art. 269 to the State within which the
tax was leviahle.
In exercise of authority conferred upon the Parlia.
ment by Art. 286 and Art. 269, cl. 3, the Parliament
enacted the Central S11les Tax Act (74 of 1956). The
Act was enacted as the preamble recites:
"to formulate principles for determining when a
sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce or outside a State or in
the course of import into or export from India, to provide for the levy, collection and distribution of taxes
on sales of goods in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce and to declure certain goods to be of special
importance in inter-Sta.Le trade or commorco and
specify the restrictions and conditions to which State
laws impo8ing taxes on the sale or purchase of such
goods of special importance shall be subject".
By chapter 2 of the Act., ss. 3, 4 and 5, those principles were formulated and by chapter 3, detailed provisions were made for imposing liability to pay tax ou
inter-St,ate sales, for registration of dealers, fixing
rates of tax and for lovy and collection of tax and for
imposing penalties for breach of the provisions of the
Act relating to levy and collection of inter-State ·sales
tax. By s. 6, every dealer was made liable to pay tax
on all sales effected by him in the course of inter-State
·1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
389
trade or commerce. By sub-s. 2 of s. 8, the rates of
tax on sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce were directed to be calculated at the same rates
and in the same manner as would have been done if
the sale had in fact taken place inside the appropriate
State. By s. 9, the machinery for levy and collection
of tax was prescribed. The tax payable by any dealer
under the Act was to be levied and collected by the
appropriate State in the manner provided by sub-s. 2
which enacts that the authority for the time being
empowered to assess, collect and enforce payment of
any tax under the General Sales Tax Law of the
appropriate State shall on behalf of the _Government
of Ind.ia assess, collect and enforce payment of any
tax payable by any dealer under the Act in the same
manner as the tax on the sale or purchase of goods
under the General Sales Tax Law of the State is
assessed, paid and collected. It is manifest that by
s. 6 which is the charging section, liability to pay tax
on inter-State sales is imposed upon all sales effected
by any dealer in the course of inter-State trade or.
commerce. The liability to pay tax under the Central
Sales Tax Act arises as an inter.State sale. The tax
though collected by the State in which the sale takes
place is due to the Central Government and is payable at the rates prescribed in respect of intra.State
sales by the State in which it is collected.
Sale is defined ip s. 2(g) as meaning any transfer of
property in goods by one person to another for cash or
for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration and includes a transfer of goods on the hirepurchase or other system of payment by instalments,
but does not include a mortgage or hypothecation of
or a charge or pledge on goods. By s. 3, a sale or
purchase of goods is deemed to ta.ke place in the
course of inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or
purchase (a) occasions the movement of goods from
one State to another, or (b) is effected by transfer of
documents of title to the goods during their movement
from one State to another. A transaction of sale is
subject to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on the
completion of the sale, and a mere contract of sale· is
Tata Iron ~ ·
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Shah ].
390
Tata Tron 6Sf1el Co., I.Id
v.
sa,kar
Shah ].
S"CPRE'.\IE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
not. a sale within ihe definition of sale in s. 2(g). A
sale being by the definition, transfer of property,
becomes taxable under s. 3(a) if the movement of goods
from one State to another is under a. covenant or incident oft.he contract of 8alc, and the property in the
goods passes to t.he purchaser otherwise than by transfer of documents of title when the goods are in movement from one State to another. In respect of an
inter-State sale, the tax is leviable only once and that
indicates that the two clauses of s. 3 are mut.ua.lly
exclusive. A sale taxable a.s falling within cl. (a) of
s. 3, will be excluded from the purview of cl. (b) of s. 3 ;
otherwise certain sales may, be liable to tax under both
the clauses and two States may, in respect of a. single
sale, claim to levy the tax contrary to the plain
intend ment of ss. 6 and 9 of the Act.
The sale contemplated by cl. (b) is one which is
effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods
during their movement. from one State to another .
. Where the property in the goods has passed before t.he
movement has commenced, tho sa.lo will evidentlv not
fall within cl. (b); nor will the sale in which the. property in the goods passes after the movement from
one State to another has ceased be covered by the
clause. Accordingly a sale effected by transfer of .
documents of title after the commencement of movement and before its conclugion as defined by the two
terminii set out in Explanation (l) and no other sale
will he regarded a.s a.n inter-State sale under s. 3(b).
The definition (lf the expression "salo" um.loubtedly
includes transfer of goods on hire-purchase or other
systems of payment by instalments, but thereby, a.
more contra.ct of sale which does not result in transfor
of property occasioning movement of goods from one
State to another does not fall within tho terms of
s. 3(a.). That transact.ion alone in which there is
"transfer of goods " on the hire-purchase or other
systems of payment by instalments is included in the
definition of" sale". Tho question whether a. mere
contra.ct in which goods a.re delivered under a. hirepurcha.se agreement is a sale within the meaning of
s. 2, cl. (g) and therefore, covered by cl. (a.) of s. 3 does
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
not fall to be determined in this case : nor are we
called upon to express our opinion on the question Tai• Iron ,s.
whether the clause authorising imposition of sales tax 5 lee1 c o., LI'•·
on what may be merely a contract of sale is unconstiv.
SOrkar
tutional. We are in this case concerned to decide the
competing claims of the States of West Bengal and
Shah ].
Bihar to levy sales tax from the company in respect
of transactions of completed sales and not in respect
of any hire-purchase transactions.
Cases of this Court, viz., State of Travancore-Cochin
and others v. The Bombay Co., Ltd. (1) and State of
Travancore - Cochin and others v. Shanmugha Vilas
Cashew Nut Factory and others(') relied upon by counsel for the State of West Bengal have no bearing on
the interpretation of s. 3, els. (a) and (b). In those
cases, the meaning of the expressions, " in the course
of import and export " and "in the course of interState trade or commerce "-used in Art. 286 fell to be
determined. The Constitution does not define these
expressions. The Parliament has in the Central Sales
Tax Act, 1956, sought to define by s. 3 when a sale or
purchase of goods is said to take place in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce and by s. 4(1) to
define when a sale or purchase of goods is said to take ·
pla.qe outside a State and by s. 5, when a sale or purchase is said to take place in the course of import or
export. In interpreting these definition clauses, it
would be inappropriate to requisition in aid the observations ma,de in ascertaining the true nature and incidents without the .assistance of any definition clause
of " sales ontside the State " and " sales in the course
of import or export" and" sales in the course of intetS,tate trade or commerce" used in Art. 286.
In our view, therefore, within cl. (b) of s. 3 are
included sales in which property in the goods passes
during the movement of the goods from one State to
another by transfer of documents of title thereto:
cl. (a) of s. 3 covers sales, other than those included in-c::
cl. (b), in which .the movement of goods from one
State to another is the result of a covenant or incident
of the contract of sale, and property in the goods
passes in either State.
(1) [19.50] S.C.R. 1112.
(2) [195+] S.C.R. 53•
\
392
Fala !roil 6Stetl Co., I.Id.
v
Sarknr
Shah ].
SUPRE~IE
COl'HT REPORTS
[ 1961]
The question to which attention must then be
directed is, which out of the two or more States concerned with the goods sold under an inter State sa.le is
entitled to collect the tax under Act 74 of 19fi6. By
s. 9, the tax payable by any dealer under the Act is to
be levied and c·1llected in the "appropriate State".
The expression "appropriate State" was at the material time defined by s. 2(a) as follows:
"Appropriate Stato" means:(i) in relation to a dealer who has otH' or more
places of business situate in the same St ate, that
State;
(ii) in relation to a dealer who has one or moro
places of business situate in different States, every
such State with respect to the place or places of business situate within its territory;
Explanation:-" Placo of business" means,
(i) in the case of a sale of goods in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce falling within cl. (a) of
s. 3, the place fr:im which the goods have been moved
by rea.8on of such s:tle ;
(ii) in the case of any such sale falling within
cl. (b) of s. 3, the place where the sale is <'ffccted.
Thio definition mado the State in which tlw place
of business is situate, the appropriate State; and by
the Explanation, the expression "place of business"
wa.H dP.fined in relation to the two classes of sales in
s. 3 as snles in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. By the first part. oft ho definit.ion, in case of
sale of goods falling within cl. (a), the place from
which the goods have been moved is tho placo of business and by cl. 2, in the case of sales falling within
cl. (b) of s. 3, the place where the sale is effected is the
place of buoincBs. This evidently is a highly artificial
definition. By a fiction, the place from which goods
have been moved by reason of the sale falling within
cl. (a) of s. 3, that is, that place from which the goods
have been moved under the contract of sale for the
purpose of deliver.I' LO the purchaser in a not her State
was dedarwJ the place of business. By another fiction, the place where the sale is dfocted in inter-State
transactious falling within s. 3(b) was declared the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
· 393
place of business. In ascertaining the place of business as defined by the Explanation, for cases falling
within cl. (a) of s. 3, little practical difficulty arises.
But in cases of sales falling within cl. (b), the location
of the place where " the sale is effected " for ascertainment of the place of business within the meaning
of the Explanation raises difficult problems. As
observed by Das, Acting Chief Justice, in Bengal
Immunity Company's case (1 ) at p. 649:
" The situs of an intangible concept like a sale
can only be fixed notionally by the application of
artificial rules invented either by Judges as part of
the judge-made law of the land or by some legislative
authority. But so far as we know, no fixed rule of
universal application has yet been evolved for determining this for all purposes. There are many conflicting theories: One, which is more popular and
frequently put forward and is referred to and may
indeed be urged to have been adopted by the Constitution ............ favours the place where. the property
in the goods passes, another which is said to be the
American view ......... fixes upon the place where the
contract is concluded, a third which prevails in the
continental countries of Europe prefers the place
where the goods sold are actually delivered, a fourth
points to the place where ·the essential ingredients
which go to make up a sale are most densely
grouped".
Ex facie, cl. 2 of the Explanation to J>. 2(a) does not
seek to locate the place where the sale is effected in
cases falling within cl. (b) of s. 3 at the place where
the transfer of documents of title to the goods was
effected. Parliament has classified the sales " in the
course of inter-State trade or commerce" in els. (a)
and (b) of s. 3 and by the first clause of the Explanation to s. 2(a), in cases of sales falling within s. 3(a)
the place of business is the place from which movement has commenced and in the case of sales falling
within s. 3(b), it is the place where the sale is effected.
But there is in the Explanation no material for ascertaining the place where the sale is effected.
(t) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 603.
Tata Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Shah ].
394
Tata ]r0'1 6Steel Co .. Ltd.
v.
.~:iarAar
Shah j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
There wa.s a sh<i.rp conflict of opinion as to the true
meaning of Art. 286, els. l(a) and (b) and the Explanation as they st.ood before the amendment by the
Constitution (Sixth Arnendme.nt) Act, 1956. In the
United Motors' cas.i (') it was opined by a majority of
tho judges of this Court that Art. 286(l)(a) prohibited
taxation of sales or purchases involving inter.State
elements by a.ll States except the State in which the
goods were delivered for the purpose of cons um pt ion
therein, a.nd the latter State wa.s left frro to ta.x such
sales or purchase> a.nd that power was not derived
from the ExplH.nation to Art. 286(1) but under Art.
246(3) read with entry 54 in List II. Mr. Justice Bose
who disagreed with the majority held that the basic
idea underlying Art. 286 was to prohibit taxH.tion in
the course of inter-State trade and commerce until the
ban under cl. 2 of the said Article was lifted by
Parliament and always in the case of imports nnd exports, and when the ba.n wa.s lift~d. the Explaua.tion
to ol. l of Art. 286 came into play to determine the
situs of the sale, the explanation not governing cl. 2
a.s it a.ppl\ed to transactions which in truth and in
fact took place in the course of inter-State t re.de a.nd
commerce. Mr. Justice Bhagwati who a.greed with
tht• conclusion of the majority a.s to the vires of the
impugned Act, opined that the Explanation to Art.
286(1) did not take a.way the right which the Sta.to in
which the property in the goods passed had to tax the
sale or purchase, but only deemed such purchase or
sale by a legal fiction to have ta.ken place in the State
in which the delivery of the goods had been made for
consumption so as to enable the latter State also to
tax tho sale or purchase in quest.ion. In 'l'he Bengal
Immunity Go.'s case('), Das, Acting Chief Justice, in
delivering the judgment of the majority observed that
the several parts of Art. 286, viz., els. l(a), l(b), (2)
and (3) were intended to deal with different topics;
that the Explanation to cl. l{a) to Art. 286 should not
lt1gitima.tely be extended to cl. (b) either as an exception or as a proviso theret-0 or read as curtailing or
limiting the ambit of cl. 2; that Art. 286(1Xa) fixed
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 100g.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. 395
the situs of the sales with a view to avoid multiple
taxation and for that purpose classified the sales into Tata Iron &>
two categories, inside sales and outside sales and Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
enacted that the State cannot tax outside sales and
Sarkar
the purpose of the Explanation which declared a sale
in the course of inter-State trade must be deemed to
Shah ].
have taken place inside the State in which the goods
are deliver~d for consumption was clearly to take it
out of the inter-State trade and impress it with the
character of an intra-State .sale. This view was
follow~d in M/s. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant
Commissioner of Sales Tax & others (1 ).
Evidently, by the interpretation placed by this
Court on the scope and meaning of Art. 286 as originally enacted, Parliament was faced with a difficult
problerii. The Parliament had to examine the problem of taxing inter-State trade and commerce in the ·
light of three principal factors, namely, (1) the constitutfonal freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse
guaranteed by Art. 301, (2) the inadvisability of
.allowing the States unrestricted freedom to levy or
impose taxes on sales or purchases of goods with interState content, and (3) the necessity to impose restrictions on multiple taxation of the same sale by different
States. The Parliament deleted the Explanation to
cl. 1 of Art. 286 which had given rise to this serious
conflict of views and recast els. 2 and 3. By cL 2 as
amended, the Parliament was authorised to formulate
principles for determining when a sale or pnrchase of
goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in
cl. 1 ; and by the addition of item 92A in List I of the
seventh schedule, the Central Government alone could
tax sales or purchases of goods which take place in
the course of inter-State trade or commerce. By incorporating cl. 3 to Art. 269, the Parliament assumed
to itself the power to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place
in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. It is
after this .amendment was made that the Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956, was enacted with a view to provide for collectio1l of a tax on sales or purchases in
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 483.
51
396
Tata lro11 ,-;..
Strei C()., Lr-I.
"·
Sa1har
SJ:ah .f.
SCPRK\TE COCRT REPORTS
(1961 J
the course of int.er.State trado or commerce. Tho
Par!i:urnmt had to define sales in the course of inter.
Stale trade or commc-.rc<',.Ralcs in the course of import
or export, and intra-Sl!•tc sales. The Parliament set
out by s. 3 to define sales of goods which ca.n be SH.id
to take place in th~ course of inter-State trado or
commerce, by R. 4(1) t.o define wlwn a sa.le is said to
tBke place outside a Stttte, and by s. ii when a.
sa.le is said to take place in the course of import and
in the course of export. By s. 9, authority to tax was
conferred upon the appropriate State, and that expression was defined hv s. 2 as the State where the dealer
had hi~ placo o( business, and in respect of salt's
which fall within cl. (h) of s. 3, the: place of business
of the dt>aler was dedared to be the place where the
salo i~ ptfected. B1· f;, 3, it was intended to define the
class of sales whicli' s:iall b(I deemed to bo sales in the
course of intcr-Stato trade or commerct>, but the conditions which go to make such transaction~. sales in
the course of inter-State trade or commerce as sot. out
by els. (a.) and (b) were not intended to locate the
place where the salt> takes placo.
Th1i legal position as to taxability of sales in the
cours·~ of inter-State t.ra.de or commrrce was unsatisfactory and the Parliv.ment radically amended Art. ~86
and the a.Hied Articles. It also enacted a Hpecial Act
authorising levy and collection of Cent.ral Sales Ta.x
with a. viow to prevent. rivalry a.nrl competition between
different 8t.i<tcs. Is it then to be assumed that the
Parliament still left the law in so far as it related to a
class of sales covered by the description of sa.lcs in the
course of intor-State trade or commerce in the same
unsatiAfactory condition without enacting whore the
sales in cases falling within cl. (b) of s. 3 wore cffccwd?
Before proceeding to answer that <Jliery, attention
may be directed to s. 4 of Act 74 of H.156. It is as
follows :
"(I) Subject to the provisions contained ins. 3
when a sa.lo or purchaso of goods is detnmim.'C! in
accordance with sub-s. (2) to !.a.kc place inside a State,
such Mle or purchase sh1tll be deemed to have taken
pla.oe out.qide a.II other States.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOltTS
397
(2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to
take place inside a State if the goods are within the
State(a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at
the time the contract of sale is made ; and
(b) in the case of unascertained or future goods,
at the time of their ·appropriation to the contract of
sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of
the other party is prior or subsequent to such appropriation.
Explanation :-Where there is a single contract of
sale or purchase of goods situated at more places than
one, the provisions of this sub.section shall apply as
if there were separate contracts in respect of the goods
at each of such places."
Sub-section 2 defines what sales or purc.hases shall
be deemed to take place inside a State. The terms of
sub-s. 2 are quite general, and the Parliament has
thereby attempted to locate the place where a sale
takes place. The clause does not deal with the conditions which" effect" a sale: nor is there any warrant
for the view that sub-s. 2 of s. 4 only seeks to locate
the place of sale which are not in the course of interState trade or commerce. By enacting ch. II, the
Parliament sought as evidenced by the title of the chapter to exercise its power under Art. 269(3) and 286(2).
By s. 3, the Parliament formulated principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place
in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and in
so doing, it exercised authority conferred upon it by
Art. 269(3). In enacting s. 4, cl. (1), the Parliament
sought to formulate principles for determining when
a sale takes place outside a State and in enacting that
section, it legislated in exercise of authority under
Art. 286(2) read with cl. l(a) of that Article; and in
enacting s. 5, sub-ss. 1 and 2, it exercised authority
under Art. 286(2) read with cl. l(b) of the Article to
formulate principles for determining the sale which
takes place in th6 cou.rse of import or export. The
Parliament by sub-s. 2 of s. 4 attempted to define when
a sale shall be deemed to take place inside a State,
and by sub-s. 1 of s. 4 provided that when a sale or
Tata Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Shah ].
398
Tata lrn11 6Strtl Co., Ltd
v.
Sar!:ar
Shah ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1961]
purchase of goods was determined in accordance with
sub-s. 2 to take place insidn a State, such sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place outside all
other States. But sub-s. I having been made subject
to the provisions contained in s. 3, it is evident that
only those sales which were not in the course of interState trade or commeree should be determined under
sub-s. I of s. 4 as having taken place outside a State.
We are unable to hold that any weight can be attached to the argument that if it was the object of the
Legislature by enacting su b-s. (2) of s. 4 to explain the
expression, " where the salo is effected " as used in
cl. (ii) of the Explanation to s. 2(1.1), the Legislature
would have expressly fltated so. Nor are we able to
agree with the contenti·)n that s. 4 only seeks to define
"out;iide sales" and is not. intended to locate the place
where a sale is effect(ld. The argument that by the
application of s. 4, sub-s. 2, in cases where the goods
sold are unasccrtained or future goods, there will be
diffieulty in ascertaining the place where the sale ,is
effected, has also no force. In any event, s. 4(:.!) may
not be denied its foll operation, merely because
difficulty may be encountered in some cases in ascertaining the place wh·3re it is effected by the application of the rnles set out therein.
The Commercial Tax Officer has observed in his
order that:
"In this case, it should be remembered that section 3(b) refers to transfer of documents and not only
to transfer of documents by endorsement. Thus, even
if the documents are in the name of the buyer as consignee but these are physically transferred to the buyer
in Wrst Bengal then that sale is taxable in \\'est
Bengl\l. In cl\se of goods consigned to " Self " there
is no question that deli1·ery to the railways cannot be
constituted as delivery to tbe buyer".
But under the Sa.le of Goods Act, if a document of
title to goods is used in the ordinary course of business
as proof of the possession or control of guocls, endorsement or delivery thereof according tu mercantile
practice will amount to delivery oft.he goods thereby
represented. The transfer of documents contemplated
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
by s. 3(b) is therefore such transfer as in law amounts
to delivery of the goods. Transfer of documents either
by endorsement or delivery does complete transfer of
title, but in the absence of an indication to that
effect in the statute, the place where the documents
are transferred is not the place of sale. If the view
which appealed to the. Commercial Tax Officer is
accepted, there is a possibility of large scale evasion of
tax. For instance, the documents may be handed
over outside Iudia. If documents of title to goods are
handed over by the vendor either directly or through
his agent to the purchaser or his agent outside India,
on the view taken by the Commercial Tax Officer, even
though the sale has taken place in India and the goods
are in India, the sale would not be taxable. This
result could not have been contemplated by the Legislature. We are therefore unable to agree with the
view taken by the Commercial Tax Officer.
It was urged by counsel for the State of Bihar that
iron and steel are commodities of which the storage,
sale and purchase are controlled by the Iron and Steel
(Control) Order, 1956, and all the sales which are made
subject to tax under the impugned order are those
covered by s. 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. In
para. 3 of the petition, the company has set out the
practice w.hich is followed in supplying steel pursuant
to the orders passed by the Controller. It is stated
that an intending purchaser has to obtain a permit
from the Iron and Steel Ccintroller of the region where
he carries on business and the permit is sent by the
Provincial Controller to the Controller at Calcutta.
The latter Officer plans the indent on the company
and sends it to the Head Sales Office at Calcutta for
compliance, and the planning of the indent in effect is
a directive by ~he Controller to supply steel to the
intending purchaser subject to the company's terms
and conditions. In paras. 4, 5 and 6 of the petition,
the specimen forms of quotation letters and the practice followed in supplying goods to the Government
and Railways, to the·" engineering firms and the
bazaar parties" are set out, In the light of els. 4, 5,
10 and 15 of the Iron and Steel (Control) Order, it was
Tata Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Shah ].
400
Ta.ta lrnu <"'>-
Stc1; Co., Lttf.
v.
Sarkar
St:l'HE:'.IIE COURT RRPORTS
[ 1961]
urged that a.II tho sales effected by the company under
the direction of the C'ontrnllor fall within s. 3, cl. (a).
But we do not think it necessary to express any
opinion 011 this argument at t.his stag1>, without a more
complete pict.urc of the modus operandi f.,IJowed.
The Commercial Tax Officer has taxed all the sales
effoc1.ccl by the company under s. 3, cl. (b), 011 the view
t.hat sales in which the documontR of title \\'ere handed
over in Calcutta were taxable in the 8tatc of \Yest
Bengal. The assessment is ma.de on twu 1ts.•;umptions,
(!)that all the sales effected in favour of West Bengal
parties satisfied thn conditions prescribed by s. 3(b},
and (2) that the place whE·re the documents are delivered by the company through its Head Sales Offic(J
to the purchaser is tho place where the sale jg effocted.
Neither of thrse assumptions is correct. The Commercial Tax Officor had, in our judgmPnt, tn ascertain
before he could order payment of tax under the
Central Sales Tax Aet, whether on the materials he
was satisfied, (a) that the goods at. the time of tmnsfer
of documents of title wcro in movement from the
State nf Bihar to the State of West Bengal, (b) that
the pla.cc where t.he sale was effected was 111:der s. 4,
cl. (2.1, within the State of West Bengal. Thi• Commercial Tax Officer has, in our view, failed to
apply the correct tests and has made ass11mptions
which are not watTant.c•d and on a true interpretation
of the prnvisions of the Central Sales 'l'<ix Act,
t.ho order of assessment di.,doscs a.n Prror apparent 011 its f,v:e and a writ of certiorari must issue
quashing tho assessment. It will be for the Commercial Tax Officer of WeAt Bengal to re-assess the compa11y iu respect of tr;rnsactious of sale which aro
properly taxable within the State uf West Bengal by
the application of the test which we have already
set out.
On this view, th<i ru]., is made absolute and it is
directed that a writ of certiorari will issue quashing
the order of assessment ma.de by tho Comml'rcial Tax
Officer, Lyons ]{auge, Calcutta, \Vt>st Bengal. The
company will be entitled to its costs of this petition.
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
SARKAR J.-The petitioner. was assessed to sales
tax on some of its sales by the Government of West Tata Iron &
Bengal under the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Steel Co., Ltd.
Act, 1956. It contends that the Government of West
v.
Sarkar
Bengal had no power to assess tax on those sales, for,
--·,
under the Act, they could be brol,lght to tax only by
Sarkar ].
the Government of Bihar. It has filed this petition
under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ to quash
the order of assessment made by the Government of
West Bengal on the ground that it violates the petitioner's rights under sub-els. (f) & (g) of cl. (1) of
Art. 19 to hold property and carry on business.
The petitioner is a limited company carryin·g on a
business of manufacturing and selling iron and steel
goods. It has its factory at Jamshedpur in Bihar
and its head sales office in Calcutta in West Bengal.
On August 12, 1959, the Taxing Officer of the
Government of West 'Bengal served a notice on the
petitioner to produce " a statement of sales from
Jamshedpur ..................... the documents relating to
which; were transferred in West Bengal or of any
other sales that have taken.place under s. 3 (b) of the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 ". The petitioner refused
to submit the return for reasons which we shall state
later and took the stand that the tax on the sales was
assessable by the Government of Bihar and not by the
Government of West Bengal.. The Taxing Officer of the
Government of West Bengal did not accept the contention of the petitioner and in the absence of a return
by it, made a best judgment assessment on October 21, 1959, assessing the petitioner to a tax of
Rs. 41,14, 718-12 nP. The petitioner seeks to have
this order quashed. ·
The respondents to this petition are the Government
of West Bengal, its officer who made the assessment,
the Government of Bihar and the Union of India. No
relief is however claimed against the last two respondents.
The questions raised by this petition depend on the
ccnstruction of certain provisions of the Central Sa.Jes
Tax Act, 1956. The Act was amended with effect from
October 1, 1958 •.. This ca.se however b&s to be decided
402
Tata Iron &.
Stet/ Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Sarkar ].
SUPRE:IIE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
on the Act a.s it stood prior to the amendment, for the
period covered by tho impugned order of assessment
wa.s from July I, 1957 to :\larch 31, 1958. It may be
stated here tha.t the validity of the Act bas not been
challenged by the petitioner.
A preliminary objection to thiR petition is ta.ken on
behalf of the Government of West Bengal. It is sa.id
that a.s the legality of the Act is not challenged, the ·
imposition of the ta.x doefl nut result in a.ny violation
of the funda.menta.l right guaranteed by Art. 31(1) of
the Constitution and this petition based on such alleged violation is, therefore, not competent. Such a. view
was indeed ta.ken by tl:.is Court in Ramji Lal v. Income.tax Officer, Mohindargarh ('). This case was
followed in Laxmanappa J/anumantappa Jamkhandi
v. Union of India('). The present case however does
not complain of a. violation of any fundamental right
under Art. 31. Tho fundamental right the infringement of which is alleged by the assessment order, is
the right to hold property <tnd carry on businef:s under
Art. 19 (l)(f) a.nd (g). In Kailash Nath v. The State
of" U. P. ('),this Court held t.hat an illegal levy of sales
tax on a trader under an Act the legality of which
was not challenged violates his fundamental rights
under 'Art. l9(l)(g) a.nd a. petition under Art. 32
with respect to such violation lies. Tho earlier case
of Ramji Lal v. Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh (')
does not appear to have been considered. lt is contended that the decision in Kai/ash Nath's case(')
requires reconsideration. We do not think however
that the present is a fit ~ase to go into the question
whether tho two cases a.re not roconcila.ble and to
decide the preliminary question raised. Tho point
was taken at a late Htage of the proceedings after
much costs had been incurred. The question a.rising
on this petition is further of general importance, a.
decision of which is desirable in the interest of a.II
concerned. As there is at lea.st one case supporting
the competence of tho petition, we think it fit to decide
this petition on its merits, on the footing that it is
competent.
(1) (1951] S.C.R. 127.
(2) [19,5] 1 S.C.R. 76<}.
(3) A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 790.
•
I..
1 S.C.R.
•'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
Now, the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, is an Act of
the Union Legislature. It authorises the levy of a Tata Iron t$tax on sales made in the course of inter-State trade. Steel Co., Ltd.
It is only with such sales that the present case is
v.
Sarkar
concerned .. Sales in the course of inter-State trade
are defined in s. 3 of the Act and this section will be
Sarkar ].
set out later. Section 6 of the Act provides that
every dealer shall be liable to pay tax under the Act
on a.II sales made by him in the course of inter-State
trade. That the petitioner is a dealer is not in dispute.
Section 9(1) provides that the tax payable by any
dealer under the Act shall be levied and collected in
the" appropriate State" by the Government of India.
Section 9(2) provides that the authorities empowered
to assess and collect tax under the general sales tax
law of the "appropriate State" shall on behalf of the
Government of India, assess and collect the tax payable under the Act and for such purpose, exercise all
powers under its general sales tax law. Under the
provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. Q, the State collecting the
tax be6omes entitled to retain it substantially. It is
therefore clear that the tax is payable to the Union
and is collected by a. State for the Union.
The contention of the petitioner before the taxing
officer of the Government of West Bengal may be
reproduced in its own words :
"We contend that all our sales from Jamshedpur
are of the type mentioned in Section 3(a) of the Central
Sales Tax Act and at the same time some of them also
fall within the category mentioned in Section 3(b) of
the Act. Even if the sales are of the type mentioned
in Section 3(b) of the Act, the Appropriate State of
the place where the sales take place or are effected,
has jurisdiction to assess such sales to Central Sales
Tax. Section 4(2) lays down the principles for ascertaining where the sale takes place, or in other words,
the situs of the sale. This section creates a legal
fiction for ascertaining the situs of the sale.
· So far as our inter-State sales from J amshedpur
are concerned the situs of such sales will always be in
the State of Bihar as the goods will be in Bihar either
,.
404
19fin
1'ata lro11 {.,..
_c..·1rrl Co., Ltd
v.
Satkar
Sar~ar
].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
at the time of contract of sale (ascertained goods) or
at t.he time <1f thPir appropriation to the contract
(unascertainerl goods). \Vo have accordingly filed our
returns of sales made in the course of inter-State trado
or commerce from Jamshedpur with the Bihar Sales
tax Authorities under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956,
and have paicl to them the Tax on the basis of these
ret.urns ".
The Taxing Officer of the Government of West
Bengal did not accept ,_he petitioner's contention. He
held:
" l n the casft of s;Lle 11/s 3(b) no property in the
goods passes unless the documents of title to goods
are in the hands of the buyer. ln such a caso the
" Appropriate State" to levy the tax should be that
State in which the sale has be~n effected; or, in other
words, that State in which the documents of title to
goods have been transferred to tlie buyer .
..................................................................
In the above circumstances, it is clear that West
Bengal is the "Appropriate State" to levy tax on
intPr-St.ate sales of the dealer effected by transfer of
documents of title to goods in West Bengal. In this
case, it should be remembered that section 3(b) refers
to transfer of documents and not only to transfer of
documents by endorsement. Thus, even if the documents are in the name of the buyer as consignee but
these are physically transforred to the buyer in West
Bengal then that sale iH taxable in West Bengal. In
case of goods consigned to" Self" there is no question
that delivery t-0 the railways cannot be constituted as
delivery to the buyer".
He also held that ;
"The dealer has said that section 4(2) lays down
the principles for ascert.aining where the sale in tho
course of inter-State trade takes place. In other
words, the "Appropriate State" (to levy the tax on
the sales) u/s 9 of the Central Act (prior to its amendment with effect from 1-10-58) should be determined
by section 4(2). In my opinion, this is an incorrect
reading of the law. E1\ch of section 3 and section 4
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
deals with quite independent sphere of commercial
transactions ".
Finally, he made the best judgment assessment, earlier
mentioned, remarking that:
"The dealer has himself admit.ted that he has some
sales u/s 3(b). From my experience of examining the
books of accounts of the dealer for some earlier years
I am of the opinion that a very substantial portion of
the total sales are effected by transfer of documents
in West Bengal. The dealer has refused to comply
with my direction to submit a statement of such sales.
I have, therefore, to make an estimate.
On examining the records of the dealer under the
State law and keeping in view the fact that there had
been considerable expansion of sales of iron and steel
in recent years I estimate the turnover during the
period of assessment to be Rs. 9 crores; i.e., an average of Rs. l crore per month ''.
Now in this case the petitioner's complaint is not
that there should not have been a best judgment
assessment. It does not say that that assessment is arbitrary or, for any other reason, unfair. Its pofot is
that the Government of West Bengal could not tax a
sale where goods were· under the contract of sale
moved from Bihar to Bengal even though the documents of title to the goods sold were transferred in
Bengal, such sales being taxable only by the Government of Bihar.
It is clear from what we have said that the Government of West Bengal purported to tax sales under
s. 3(b); it taxed sales where during their movement
from Bihar to Bengal, the property in the goods sold
passed, by a transfer in West Bengal of the documents
of title to them. Two questions arise, namely, what
is a sale under s. 3(b) and which is the" appropriate
State " to tax such sales ?
\,Ye take up the first question now. In order to
decide it, we have to considers. 3 as a whole. The
section, so far as material, is in these terms:
Section 3 :-A sale or purchase of goods shall be
deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade
or commerce if the sale or purchase-
Tata Iro>i 6'
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Sarkar ].
406
TattJ Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sar ACir
Sarkar ].
SCPREME COCRT REPORTS
[l96IJ
(a) occasions the movement of goods from one
State to another; or
(b) is effected by a transfer of documents of title
to the goods during t.heir movement from one State
to another.
The first thing that strikes us is that the section
has to be so construed that the two clauses in it are
made mutually exelu~ive. It seems clear that it was
not contemplated that a sale can fall with'n both tho
clauses. If that were not so, there might be two
" appropriate States" in respect of it, one being the
State from which the goods were moved by reason of
the sale and the other being another State within
which the sale was effected by the transfer of docu·
men ts of title during the movement of the goods sold
from one State to another. In such a case, each of
the two" appropriate States" would be entitled to
collect tho tax with the result that the same sale
would be taxed twice over. The learned counsel for
the State of Bihar was inclined to contend, no doubt
as an alternative argument, that that could be dona.
We do not think that the Act intended such a result.
We proceed now to state our reasons for this view.
The Act imposes tax on sales in the course of intcrState trade. It is an Act of the Union legislature.
Under the Constitution the State legislatures have no
power to tax such sales and only the Union Legislature can do so. It is well-recognised that the power
to, tax sales made in the course of inter-State trade
has been denied to the State Legislatures with the
object of preventing multiple taxation of the same
sale by different StMes resulting in hardship to the
ultimate consumer: see St,ate of Bombay v. United
Motors (India) Ltd.(') and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd .
. v. The State of Bihar ('). Since these cases were decided, tho Constitution has no doubt been amended, but
the observations made in them still apply. This
being so, the Aot could not have intended to tax the
same sale twice.
But apart from this consideration of a somewhat
general nature, the provisions of the Act plainly make
.(t) (19'3] S.C.R. 1Cl09.
(2) [ 1955] • S.C.R. bo3,
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
it impossible to levy two taxes on the same. sale.
Under s. 8(1), the tax is a certain percentage of the
dealer's " turnover". Section 2(j) defines "turnover "
as meaning the aggregate of the sale .prices in respe~t
of the dealer's sales. So the tax is a percentage of
the sale price and as each sale produces one price, it
follows that it can be taxed only once. Again, s. 9 by
providing that the tax shall be collected in the "appropriate State" by the Government of India, plainly
indicates that there is one tax payable to the Government of India which is collected by one State only.
Section 3 by the use of the word "or" between els. (a)
and (b) in it also suggests that the clauses are exclusive of each other.
One sale then cannot be taxed twice. A sale cannot
fall under both cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 3, for then it
would be liable to tax twice. Clauses (a) and (b) are
hence mutually exclusive. Keeping this basic consideration in mind, we proceed to construe s. 3.
We take cl. (a) of s. 3 first. That clause contemplates a sale which occasions the movement of goods
from one State to another. The words ' sale occasions
the movement' should create no difficulty. It is
apparent from the explanation in s. 2(a) which will be
set out later, that they mean •moved by reason of the
sale'. The question then arises, when does a sale
occasion the movement of goods sold ? It seems clear
to us that a saie can occasion the movement of the
goods sold only when the terms of the sale provide
that the goods would be moved ; in other words, a sale
. occasions a movement of goods when the contract of
sale so provides.
We turn now to the sale contemplated by cl. (b) of
s. 3. That is a sale effected by a tr\\nsfer of documents
of title to the goods during their movement from one
State to another. What then is a sale effected by a
transfer of documents of title? In our view, it can
only be a sale where the property in the goods sold is
.passed by a transfer of documents of title. It is well
known that in many cases of sale, property in the
goods sold is transferred by a transfer of documents
of title to them. It has been said that a sale has several
Tata Iron 6Steel Co., Lta.
v.
Sarkar
Sarkar ].
408
I
1960
Tata Iron 6Sltel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Sarkar
J.
SUPRE:\IE COCRT REPORTS
[ 1961]
elements, namely, agreement to soil, transfer of prop1Jrty in tho goods sold, payment of price, delivery of
the goods and so forth: see St.ate of Bombay ,., United
.Motors (India) Ltd.('). It seems to us to be inappropriate to talk of any of these elements of sale being
effected by a f.ransfer of documents of title, other than
the element of tra.nsfor of property. Thus, fur example, the contra.ct of sale cannot be pffected by the
transfer of documents of title, neither the paym~nt of
prfoe. A transfer of docum~nts of title m"y perhaps
effect a delivery of the goods if tho parties HO ag1:ee.
But. it seems to us that in defining a. sale in the course
of inter.State trarfo in a statute purporting to tax a.
sale, that is a transaction in which property in the
goods passed, tho legislature was not thinking only of
delivery of goods. It does not appear lo us to br, a.
reasonable construction of the words 'sale is cffecterl '
to hold that they mean delivrry of tlie thing sold.
Therefore, we thi1Jk that cl. (b) refers only to sales
where transfer of property in the goods sold takes
place by the transfer of documents of title t.o them
during their movement from one State to another.
We have then come to this that cl. (a) of s. 3 contemplates a sale where the cont.re.ct of sale occasions
the movement of the goods sold and cl. (b), a 1;ale
where transfor of property inf.ho goods sold is r·ffec:ted
by a. transfer of documents of title to them. Of course,
in the first case, the movement of tlw goods must be
from one State to another a11d in tho second, the docu- ·
ments of title must be transferred during such movement.
Now it will be apparent that if this was the foll
co11strucf.ion of the two clause~, then they would often
overlap. This, as earlier stated, was not intended.
We have to narrow down tho construction so as to
make the clauses mutually exclusive. There may he
sales under the terms of which the goods havo to be
moved from one State to another. All such Rales would
come within cl. (a). But it may so happen that in
some of these sales, the property in the goods passes
by a. transfer of documPnt of title to them during their
(1) (1953] S.C.R. 1c(,g.
-
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
409
1960
movement. Such sales would fall within cl. (b) also.
To avoid this result we have to exclude from cl. (a) Tata Iron &
such of the sales coming under it in which the pro- Steel Co., Ltd.
perty in the goods passes by a transfer of documents
v.
of title to them during their movement. In other·
Sarkar
words, where a sale comes under both the clauses, it
Sarkar ].
has to be held to fall under cl. (b).
\Ve, therefore, think that the two clauses should be
construed in the following way : Clause (a) contemplates a sale where· under the contract of sale the
goods sold are moved from one State to another, provided however that such a sale will not come under
cl. (a) but foll under cl. (b) if the property in the goods
sold is passed by a transfer of the documents of title
to them during their movement from one State to
another. Clause (b), on the other hand, contemplates
a sale where the property in the goods sold is passed
by a transfer of documents of title to them during their
movement from one State to another.
The next question is which State can collect the tax
on a sale falling under cl. (b) of s. 3, construing that
clause in the sense that we have done earlier. In other
words, the question in this case is: Would West
Bengal be the" appropriate State·" to tax a sale where
the property in the goods sold passed from the seller
to the buyer by a transfer in Wes~ Bengal of the documents of title to them during their movement from
Bihar to West Bengal ? Again, to put it shortly, in
the case of sale under cl. (b) of s. 3, is the State where
the transfer of documents of title takes place, the
"appropriate State" to tax the sale? The West
Bengal Government thought it was. We think that
this is the correct view to take.
Now the" appropriate State" which alone can under
s. 9 levy and collect the tax under the Act has been
defined in s. 2(a) which is in these terms:
Section 2.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,(a) "appropriate State" means(i) in relation to a. dealer who has one or more
places of business situate in the same State, that
Sta.te;
410
Tafa Iron 6Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Sarkar f.
SCPRE:\TE COURT REPORTS
(1961]
(ii) in relation to a dealer who has one or more
places of business situate in different Statt>s, every such
State with respect to the place or places of business
siwato within its territory;
Explanation.-" Place of business" meanR(i) in the case of a sale of goods in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce falling within .clause (a)
of section 3, the place from whioh the goods have been
moved by reason of such sale, .
(ii) in the case of any such sale falling within
clause (b) of s. 3, the place where the sale is effected ;.
So the" appropriate State" iR that within whose
territories t.ho dealer bas bis place of business. The
pince of business has however to be decided in each
case by reference to the kind of ~ale. The effect of
a. 2(a) appears to be this: If the sale is of the kind
mentioned in cl. (a) of s. 3, the "appropriate State" is
that from which the goo<ls have been moved by reason
of the contract of sale, while if the sale is of the kind
mentioned in cl. (b) of s. 3, the "appropriate State" is
that" where the sale is effoctod ".
We aro in this case concerned only with sales under
cl. (b) of s. 3, and the "appropriate State" in respect
of such a sale has to be decided from cl. (ii) of the
Explanation ins. 2(a). Under that clause the" appropriate State" in respect of such a sale is the 8tate
"where the sale is effected". The question is, does
this definition by itself give sufficient guidance to
ascertain the" appropriate St.ate"?
Tho learned counsel for the State of Bihar contends
that the words "where the sale is effected" do not
indicate any place of ~a.lo and are not intended to
indicate the" appropriate State". The" appropriate
State", according to him, has to be decided by resort
to s. 4(2) which was intended to be explanatory of
Explanation (ii) iu s. 2(a). We will consider s. 4(2) a
little later. But before we do that, let us examine the
argument that the words "where the sale is effected"
in cl. (ii) of the explanation in s. 2(a) do not indicate
any pla.ce or the" appropriate State".
The learned counsel gave several reasons why the
words "where the sale is effected" in cl. (ii) of the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
Explanation in s. 2(a) cannot indicate any place.
First, he referred to certain observations in State of Tata Iron &
Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd.{') indicating Steel Co., L_td.
v.
that it was difficut to localise, that is, to fix the place
Sarkar
where, a sale in the course of inter-State trade takes
place. He also said that transfer of property is the
Sarkar J.
creation of a jural relation and it is not possible to say
where a jural rPlation is created. Lastly, he referred
to the observations of Lord Lore burn, L. C., in Badische
Anilin Und Soda Fabrik v. Hickson(') that, ''if you
must decide in what country an appropriation of goods
by consent takes place, it takes place not where the
consent is given, but where the goods are at the time
situate ". Therefore he contended that the words
"where the sale is effected" do not point to any particular place of sale. . '
In our opinion, these reasons have no application to
a case, where a statute fixes the place of sale. The
difficulty in the cases mentioned above was not that
there was no place of sale at all, sale being a jnral concept, but which of the several places in which a sale
coulrl be said to have taken place, was the correct one
to select. No such difficulty arises where the statute
fixes the place of sale. That is what the Act before us
admittedly purports to do, in one view by cl. (ii) of the
Explanation in s. 2(a) and in the other view by s. 4(2).
Clause (ii) of that Explanatfon says in effect that in
the case of any sale falling within cL (b) of s. 3 the
appropriate State shall be the State where the sale is
effected. Now, a sale under s. 3(b) is a sale " effected "
by a transfer of documents of title. The "effect" is
the sale; the mode in which the" effect"· is produced
is by the "transfer of documents of title". As soon as
this mode has 'Completed itself the "effect " has been
produced. It is simple syllogism that the place where
the mode is completed, that is, the transfer of docu- ·
ments of title takes place, is the place where the effect
is produced, that is, the sale is effected. The act constituting the mode of effecting the sale being prescribed,
the sale must be taken to have been effected where
(t) [1953]
53
s.cx 1069
(2) [19o6] A.C. 419, 4"·
412
Tata Iron 6'
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarha-r
Sarkar j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
that act is performed. Clause (ii) of the Explanation
in s. 2(a), therefore, itself fixes the place of sale and no
question of any difficulty in fixing it arises. In our
view, a sale contemplated by s. 3(b) is effected within
the State in which the documents of title to the goods
sold are transferred resulting in a transfer of the property in them; that State is the "appropriate State"
in respect of such sale.
In this view of the matter no question of resorting
to s. 4(2) for fixing the place where a sale under s. 3(b)
is effected, arises. The place of that sale is fixed by
cl. (ii) of the explanation in s. 2(a) itself.
It also appears to us to be absolutely clear that the
purpose of s. 4(2) was not to fix the place where a sale
under s. 3(b) can be said to have taken effect. That
section is in these terms :
Section 4. When is a sale or purchase of goods said
to take place outside a State.(1) Subject to the provisions contained in section
3, when a sale or purchase-of goods is determined in
accordance with sub-section (2) to take place inside a
State, such sale or purchase shall be deemed to have
taken place outside all other States.
(2) A sale·or purchase of goods shall be deemed to
take place inside a Sta~e if the goods are within the
State(a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at
the time the contract of sale is made ; and
(b) in the case of unascertained or future goods,
at the time of their appropriation to the contract of
sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of
the other party is prior or subsequent to such appropriation.
First, what the learned counsel for the petitioner and
the State of Bihar say is that s. 4(2) is really an
explanation to cl. (ii) of the. Explanation in s. 2(a);
cl. (ii) of the Explanation ins .. 2(a) does not say where
a sale is effected and the "place" is explained by subsec. (2) of s. 4. Now, sub-sec. (2) of s. 4 does not purport to be an explanation to clause (ii) oft.he explanation in s. 2(a); it does not refer to s. 2(a) at all. It
would be a strange mode of enacting a statute to have
•
•
1 S.C.R.
SOPREME COURT HEPORTS
413
an explanation to another explanation and that too in
another part of the statute dealing, as we shall pre- Tata Iron &
1lently show, with a different matter. Further sub-cl. Steel Co., Ltd,
(ii) of the Explanation in s. 2(a) specifies the place of
v.
Sarkar
lrnsiness and s. 4(2) specifies a State; so the latter
cannot be an explanation of the former.
Secondly s. 4(2) states when a sale shall be deemed, Sarkar .f.
to take place "inside a State". In order however to
say where a sale takes place in the course of intei:State trade it is inappropriate to talk of it as taking
place " inside a State ". A sale in the course of interState trade from its very uature, has nothing to do
with sales inside or outside a State. It contemplates
commercial activities which take place in more than
one State.
Thirdly, s. 4 is not really defining when a sale shall
ba deemed to take place inside a State. It is only
defining when a sale shall be deemed to take place
outside a State. It does so by saying that when a sale
is to be deemed to be inside any State under sub-sec.
(2), it shall be deemed to have taken place outside
all other States. Sub-section (2) provides when a sale
shall be deemed to take place inside a State only for
the purpose of showing that it shall then be deemed to
have then taken place outside all other States, and for
no other purpose. This is clear from the section itself
and is made further clear by the heading to the section. It seems to us that the heading is really a preamble to the sectitm giving a key to its interpretation
as was found to be the case in Martins v. Fowler (1 ).
Fourthly, s. 4 is expressly made subject to s. 3.
This can only mean that in case any conflict between
the two sections appears, s. 3 would prevail. Now
these two sections define two kinds of sale, namely, a
sale in the course of inter-State trade and a sale
taking place outside a State. If a sale happens to oome
under both definitions, it would have to be taken as a
sale in the course of inter-State trade for s. 4 has been
rnade subject to s. 3. That being so, it would be
impossible to hold thats. 4(2) indicates where a· sale
falling under s. 3(b) is to be held to have been effected.
Lastly it seems clear to us that s. 4 was enacted
(1) [1926] A. C. 746, 750.
414
11;60
Tata /'1>11 ,:....
Ster/ C0., /.td.
".
SCPREi\IE COC!tT REPORTS
[l!J61)
uncfor t.ho power conferred on the Parliament by Art.
286(2) to formulate principles for determining when a
sale takt'S place "out::;idc a State", the State ll'gislaturcs having been prevented by cl. (I) of that Article
from pa"Hing any law imposing tax on such a sale.
Thi~ iH clear from a consideration of ss. 3, 4 aud 5
which together constitute Chapter II uf the Act. Section 5 stales whrn a AalP is said to take placo in the
course of export or import. The puwer t-0 enact this
section is also derived from Art. 286(2). .Section 3
formulates the principles for determining when a sale
is said to take place in the course of inter-State trade
and it i8 enacted under thP power for that purpose
contained in Art. 269(3). The enactment~ in that
Chapter, as it8 hl'ading shows, \\ere for "formulation
of principles for determining when a sale or purchase
. of goods takes place in the course of inter.St ate tradt>,
or uutsiJ1, a State or in the course of export or import"
irnd werP made under Arts. 269(3) and 286(2), 11s
already stated. We think that it is legitimate to refer
to the h('ading of Chapter II for ascerta.iuing the
intention of the lPgislature on the principlee stateci by
tho .Judicial Committee in Toronto Cor7ioration v.
'J'(jronto Railu·uy (')in the~e words:
"This clause is the la~t of a fasciculus, of which
thP heading· is "Track, &c., and Hail ways", and, as
was held i11 Hananernmith Ry. Cu. v. Brand, such a
ht·adi11g is tu be regarded ~s giving the key to the
interpretation of the dauses ranged under it, unless
the wording is inconsistent with such interpretation".
The interpretation that we put on s. 4 in the light of
the heading, is clearly not incun~istent with the wording of tb11t section. It is admitted that s. 5 has no
connection with the other pro\'isionR iu the Act and is
clearly only laying down principles for d_ctermining
when a sale can be said to have taken place in the
course of import of goods into or export of goods out
of, rndia.. It would be kgitimato to hold that similarly s. 4 was enacted only for the purpose of formulating· principles for d~termining when a sale is said to
take place outside a Stale and nut for any other purpose. For all these reasons, we hold that sub-s. (2) of
(1) [1g.>7J A. C. 315, 324
'
.
·:-i
•
•
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
s. 4 was not enacted for determining whic_h is an
"appropriate State" to collect the tax in the case of a
sale falling under cl. (b) of s. 3.
It was argued on behalf of the Government of Bihar
that in any case the sales of the petitioner from Jamshedpur do not come under cl. (b) of s. 3 because all
such sales were made ,pursuant to the permit granted
under the provisions of Iron & Steel (Control) Order,
1956, issued under the Essential Supplies Act, 1955,
the directions in which permit the petitioner was
bound to carry out. - It appears that iron and steel
being controlled commodities, they could not under
the provisions of the Act and Order aforesaid, be sold
without the permission of the Iron &'Steel Controller.
It was contended that when on a cont,ract made pursuant to such permission, the petitioner loaded the
goods into the railway wagons at Jamshedpur, the
property in them passed under s. 23(1) of the Sale of
Goods Act to the purchaser, because, in view· of the
Iron & Steel (Control) Order, 1956, the goods became
_unconditionally appropriated to the contract by the
seller with the assent of the buyer. The case of Commissioner of Sales '/'ax, Bihar v. New India Sugar
Mills(') was cited as authority for this view. This case
was decided under a different Order. We do not propose to go into the question whether in any pa.rticular
sale property was transferred from the seller to the
buyer or how and when. -That point can be taken
·
before the appropriate taxing authorities.
It appears to.us that the Taxing Officer of the West
Bengal Government took the same view o~ s. 3(b) a.s
we have done. He said that in the case of a sale
under s. 3(b) " no property in the goods passes unless
the documents of title to the goods are in the hands of
the buyer". This, of course, means that in the case of
a sale under cl. (b) of s. 3 the property in the goods
.sold passes by the transfer of documents of title to
them. The Taxing Officer was further clearly contemplating the transfer of documents of title ta.king
place during the movement of the goods from
J amshedpur to places in West Bengal. So far, it seems
to us, his view is correct and unexceptionable. He
(r) 10 Sales Tax: Cases 74.
Tata Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Sarkar
Sarkar ].
-Uu
Te1t~1
fr,.i1 :,,
Sttd Co., /.t4
v.
Sarke1r _{
SVPRE:llE COl:HT HEPOHTS
(1961]
however proceeded to statP. that "<'\'ell if tho documents are in the na.me of the buyer as consignee but
these <>re physic1\lly trnusforred to the buyer in \VeRt
Bengal, then that sale is taxable in West Bengal''.
We think that. this was not a correct view to take.
Tho transfer of documents of title to the g0<Jds sold
can pass the property in them only if the parties agree
tlrnt I.hat would l>e t.he rcHult. Therefore, the: Taxing
O/lic••r of the \Vest 8eng1\I e.;ovcrnmcnt hiid further to
bear in mind the question whether the parties had
:..greed that. phy~ical delh·ery of the documents of title
to the goorls would pass thP propnrty in them. Ht'
dotis not seem to ha\'e done this. In the other case
also where the documents of title are transferred to the
buyer 1tfter endorsement, the same lest has to be kept
i11 mind, namely, that such transfer would pass the
1•roperly iu the goods only if the parties agreed that
tha.l would ha.pp•in. It., therefore, seoms lo us that tho
West Beng1d Go,·ernmeut's Taxing Officers order may
not ha.rn been completely in consonance with s. 3(b).
l u w> far as it purported to levy a tax on sales whero
the doc:uments of title aro already in the nam~ of the
lrnyer simply h•Jcauso such documents had been transforrcd in West. Bo)nga.1, it ma.y have g 1ne outside the
limits of s. 3(b). The order of a.ssessmont mado by tho
T1uing Officer of the Government of West Bengal in
this case is benee liable to be set aside.
We a('cordingly set aside the order made by the
Taxing Olficer of thn Government of West Bengal on
October 21, 1950, assessing the petitioner to a tax of
gs, 4l,14,718-l2nP. The Government of Wost Bengal
will be at liberty to proceed to assess the tax afresh in
terms of the interpretation put on s. 3 by us in this
judgment.
\Ye do not think it tit to ma.kc any ordor a.s to the
costs of this petition.
BY COURT: In view of the majority judgment of
the Court, the petition is allowed with costs, and it ic
directed that a writ of certiorari will issue quash in~.
the order of a8sessment made by the Commercial Ta>.
Oliicn, LyonH Hange, Calcutta.
Petition allowed.
0
,,
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