DIRECTOR OF RATIONING AND DISTRIBUTION versus THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 August 1960 | [1961] 1 S.C.R. 158 | 1960 INSC 123
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 August 1960
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM*, A.K. SARKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 158/1956
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1961] 1 S.C.R. 158
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 123
Text of the judgment
158
Augu~r
16.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
DIRECTOR OF RATIONING AND
DISTRIBUTION
v.
THE COHPORATION OF CALCUTTA
.\ND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM,·A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
Statute, interpretation of-State, if bound by stat11te--Pri1iciplcs applicable--" l'ason", if incl11dcs State-Calcutta Municipal
Act, 1923 (Brn. II l of 1923), s. 386(1)(a)-Constit11tion of India,
Art. 372.
The appellant was using certain premises in Calcutta fo
storing rice flour, etc. \vithout taking ~ut any license undc.
s. 386(1)(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. The respon·
dent f1Jccl a complaint against the appellant for a contravention
of s. 306(1)(a). The trial ~lagistratc acquitted the appellant
holding that the provisions of s. 386(1)(a), neither in terms nor by
necessary implication bound the Government whom the appellant represented. In revision, the High Court held that the
Government was bound by a statute unless the legislature
excluded it expressly or by necessary implication. The High
Court d•clined to follow the decision o! the Privy Council in
L. R 73 I. A. 271 that the general principle applicable in England applied to Indian legislation also.
H cld, that the State was not bound by the pro,·isions of
s. 386(1)(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, and that the
appellant was not liable to be prosecuted for a contravention of
this section.
!'er Sinha, C. J., Imam and Shah, JJ.-The law applicable to
India before the Constitution was as authoritatively laid down
by the Privy Council in L. R. 73 I. A. 271. The Constitution has
not made any change in the legal position. On the other hand
it has clearly indicated that the laws in force before January 26,
1950, shall continue to have validity even in the new set-up
except in so far as they were in conflict with the express provisions of the Constitution. The rule of interpretation of statutes
that the State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided
in express terms or by necessary implication, is still good law.
Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Bombay, (1946) L.R. 73 I. A. 271, applied.
Bell v. The Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras,
(1901) l.L.R 25 Mad. 457, disapproved.
The Corporation of Caler.Ila v. Sub-Postmaster, Dharmatala
Post Office, (1948) 54 C. W. N. 429, United States of A""'rica v.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COUitT REPORTS
159
United Mine Workers of America, (1947) gr L. Ed. 884, United
States of America v. Reginald P. Wittek, (1949) 93 L. Ed. 1406,
Less Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corporation, (1949)
93 L. Ed. 1628 and Roberts v. Abern, (1904) l C. L. R. 406, referr-
D·ireclor of
Rulionning &
Distribution
ed to.
v.
There is nothing in the Act to inclica te that the State was
bound by it by necessary implication, nor is there anything in it The Corporation
of Calcutta
to show that ifs. 386 were not held to apply to the State the law
0- Others
would lose it efficacy or that its working would be hampered in
any way.
Per Sarkar, J.-The rule that the crown is not bound by
the provisions of any statute unless it is directly or by necessary
implication referred to is really a rule of construction of statutes
and is not dependent on royal prerogatives. It has been applied
by courts in India all along before the Constitution and there is
no reason why it should not be applied to the interpretation of
statutes after the Constitution.
Attorney General v. Donaldson, (1842) ro M. & W. II7, Coomber
v. Justices of Berks, (1883) g App. Cas. 61, Roberts v. Ahern, (1904)
1 C.L.R. 406, United States v. United Mine Workers of America,
(1947) 91 L. Ed. 884, United Statesv. The State of California, (1936)
So L. Ed. 567, Bell v. The Municipal Commissioners for the City of
Madras, (1901) I. L. R. 25 Mad. 457, Mersey Docks v. Cameron,
(1865) II H. L. C. 443 and Coomber v. Justice of Berks, (1884) 9
App. Cas. 61, Greig v. University of Edinburgh, (1868) L. R. l
H. L. (Sc.) 348 and Cooper v. Hawkins, [1904] 2 K. B. 164, referred to.
Section 386(1)(a) does not bind the Government by necessary implication ; the fact that certain provision• of the Act
expressly exempt the Government does not raise the necessary
implication. Nor would the purposes 9f the Act be defeated if
the Government were not bound by it.
Hornsey Urban Council v. Hennel, [1902] 2 K. B. 7.l and
Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation, Bombay, (1946) L.R.
73 I. A. 271, relied on.
Per Wanchoo, ].-The rule of construction which is based on
the royal prerogative as known to the common law of England
cannot be applied to India now when there is no crown in India
and when the Common law of England is not applicable. The
proper rule of construction which should be applied now is that
the state is bound by a statute unless it is exempted expressly
or by necessasy implication.
Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Bombay, (1946) L. R. 73 I. A. 271, not applied.
United States of America v. United Mine Workers of America,
Etc., (1947) 91 L. Ed. 384, United States of America v. Reginald P.
Wittek, (1949) 93 L. Ed. r406, Jess Larson v. Domestic and Foreign
160
1960
Director nf
Ratir111i"C (.-..
Di .~r, ibu 1io11
v.
SUPRE;\IE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Commerce Corporatio11, (1949) 93 L. Ed. 1628, H. Snowdm Marshall v. People of the Stale of New York, (1920) 65 L. Ed. 315 and
G11aranty Trust Company of New York v. United States of Amc·rica,
(1938) 82 L. Eel. 1224._ referred to.
The Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, docs not specifically
exempt the State from its provisions. As the State c3nnot be
Tht Corpvratioti sentenced to imprisop.ment it is exen1pt i>y necessary implication
of Calculla
from all penal provisions provirling for sentences of imprison&..- 01/u:r:>
ment or death. Further, where a statute provides for a fine and
the fine goes to the State, the State is exempted from the provisions by necessary implication as it could never be the intention
that such a prosecution should be launched. The prosecution in
the present case is under s. 488 which provides for a fine for a
breach oJ s. 386, and the fine when imposed and realised goes to
the State. Consequently, the State is exempt from the penal
provisions of s. 488 of the Act by necessary implication.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Crimin&!
Appeal No. 158 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated February 9, 1955, of the Calcutta High
Court in Criminal Revision No. 282 of 1954, ari8ing
out of the judgment and order datfld December 15,
1953, of the Second Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta,
in Case No. 2629C of 1952.
1960. Feb. 8, 9, 10. S. M. Bose, Advocate-General
for the State of West Bengal, A.G. Mitra, B. Sen, P. K.
Bose and D. Gupta, for the appellant.. Threo questions
arise for determination in thi9 appeal: (1) whether
State is a "person" within the meaning of s. 386 of
the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, (2) doos the Constit.ution make any change in tho principal of prerogative
as part of the common law and (3) does Art. 372 of
the Constitution keep tho existing law intact, i.e., the
law as declared in L. R. 73 I. A. 271 to the effect that
the Crown i8 not bound by any statute unless it is
expressly named or unless it oan be held to be included by neceBBary implication.
The word " person " has been held not to include
the State. [A.LR. 1954 Punj. 49; A.LR. 57 Punj.
150; A.LR. 53 Nag. 35; A.LR. 1955 Nag. 177; I.L.R.
1953 l Cal. 355; 62 C. W .N. 561. 33 Pat. 603 takes
the contrary view.] If the word "person" included
the State, Art. 300 of the Constitution would not be
1 S.C.R.
i
l\
J
'
J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Hll
I960
necessary. How far the Crown is bound by a Statute
not specifically naming it is laid down by the Privy
Director of
Council in L.R. 73 I.A. 271. The dceision of the l?atio11ing C::~
Madras High Court taking a contrary view in LL.it. Distribution
25 Mad. 457 was not cited before the Privy Council
v.
and is based upon t,he wrong assumption that common Tlie Corporatian
law changed with the change of legi8l>1tion. '!'he vf Calcutta
& Others
coming into force of the Constitution does not alter the.
law as laid down in L.K 73 I.A. 271, I.L.R. 1958
Mad. 801 and I.L.R. 58 Born. 635. Article 372 of the
Constitution includes the common law of the land and
continues the same after the coming into force of the
Constit,ution. [I.L.R. 1956 Cal. 26, I.L.R. 1955 Born.
654]. This common law doctrine of the immunity of
.the Crowu from St.atutes not specifically naming it or
referring to it by necessary implication is ·applicable
in United States also. [52 L. Ed. 82; 65 L. Etl. 315; 82
L. Ed. 1224].
M. G. Setalvad, Attorney.General for India, R. Gana.
pathy Iyer, R.H. Dhebar and T.1"1. Sen, for intervener
.No. 1. The question is whether the ancient rule of
English common law declared to be applicable to India
by the Privy Council is applicable to the construction
of s. 386 and it has to be examined as to what was
the position before and after the Constitution. The
High Court has decided that even before the Con8titution the principle did not apply in spite of the Privy
Council decision. The statute of 1923 must be construed in accordance with the rule of interpretation
prevailing in 1923. The makers of statute in 1923 did
not intend to include State in the word" person".
The decision of the Privy Council was the binding law
of the land unless there was . legislation abrogating it
or _taking away its effect.. Article 372 of the Constitution actually continues the law as laid down in L.R. 73
I.A. 271. This Article uses the expression "of the law
in force in India" ancl not the words "existing law ".
The same expression is used in s. 292 of the Government of India Act and was inte~preted in [1940] F.OA'.t-.
llO. There is nothing in the Co,nstitution which takes
away the applicabiliy of the rule. , There is noµiing in
.,
162
SUPHEllIE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
that rule or in it8 nat,ure repugnant to any provl8lon
of
our ConHtitution. The rule is illustrated in 152
Dirtltor vj
Rationrng {~
E.R. 406 and I C.L.R. 406. The rule is applicable to
Dist"""'""' all forms of Governments and is based on the ground
v.
of public policy and not merely on the ground of
The Corporatwn prerogative. [91 L. Ed. 884; 9:l L. Ed. 1628].
ofc,. Calc:ata
V • Ji.' • 1'• Cha n,. Advacate 0 enera l f or M a d ras anrl
Others
'I'. M. Sen, for interv1>ncr ~·o. 4. Supported the Advocate-General of Bengal.
H. ld. Seervai, Adrncate-General for Maharashtra and
R.H. Dhehar, for intervener ~o. 5. The word "person" should be gi\·en its normal meaning. It doe8 not
include the Crown or the State. It would not include
the State unless t.he sta.tuto would be meaningless
without such inclusion. [L.K 73 I.A. 271; l C.L.R.
406]. By "necessary implication" is meant that without the inclusion of the crown or tho Statti the bcneficient purposo of tho statut.e would be wholly frustrat.
ed. Tho consensus of j11dicial opinion in Bombay has
• been the same as expressed in L.R. 73 I.A. 27 l. The
rule has nothing to do with form• of Government. [93
L. Ed. 1406]. Indian decisions have uniformly taken
this view. [5 Born. H.C.R. 23; I.L.R. I Born. 7;
I.L.R. 14 Born. 213; 36 Born. L.R. 820; 37 Born.
L.R. 499; I.L.R. 2 All. 196]. l.L.R. 25 Mad. 457
accepts tho rnlc but says that it docs not apply to
taxation. This was a wrongful curtailment of the
prerogatiw. [Ha.lsbury, Vol. 7, p. 469, pa.ra. !J8]. The
judgments of the Privy Council delivered before January 26, l!J50, a.re binding on all courts in India. oxcept
the Supremo Court and they a.re binding till the
Supreme Court takes a differont view. [A.I.R. 1953
Cal. 524; A.LR. 1955 !'\ag. 293; 56 Born. L.R. 1084].
Government of India. Act, s. 212 provided tha.t the
judgmen.ts of the J<'cdera.I Court and of the Privy
Council shall be binding a.nd shall be followed.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab and
D. Gupta, for intervener No. 2. In pre.Constituiion
siatutes the word " person " could include " tho
Crown " but normally or ordinarily it would not so
include. In I.L.R. 1958 Punj. 201 it wa.s held that
"person " included the State of Punjab and the Union
i96u
•
1 S.C.R.
r'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
r960
of India. The rule laid down by the Privy Council is
equally applicable to a Republic. [25 L. Ed. 194; 65 Director of
L. Ed. 315; 24 L. Ed. 192 and 85 L. Ed. 1071]. In Rationing &
A.LR. 1956 Pat. 91 the State has becu held to be a Distribution
v.
person.
G. C. Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for intervener No. 3. The Corporatio1i
AdoptM the arguments of the Advocate-General of- of Calcutta
& Others
West Bengal and of the Attorney-General of India.
T. M. Sen, for intervener No. 6. Ado!ited the arguments of the Advocate-General, Bengal and the Attorney-General of India.
N. 0. Cha.tterjee, Siinil K. Basu aud Sukumar
Ghose, for respondents. Section 386 is directed towards
rnaintern;nce of healthy condition etc. and is a wholesome provision for safeguarding the health of the
people by providing for the control or storing houses
aud for the equality of the stores. The financial
aspect, i.e., the recovery of license foes or fine is inconcequential. The prerogative of immunity from
the statutes is only available when the State acts as
State and not when it descends to t.rade and business.
State is a person. Salmond, 11th Edition, p. 35,
defines person as an entity capable of rights and
duties. It has the power to hold and acquire property; it can sue and be sued [Article 300 of the
Constitution; 60 Punj. L. H. 546.]. The correct rule
of interpretation is thftt to exempt the ~tate from the
operation of a statute there must, be express exelusion
in favour of the State. [Friedman in 13 Modern Law
Review, 24]. The mere fact that the State cannot be
sent to jail, does not indicate that it is not a person.
A Corporation is a person. It is the stigma of the
conviction that matters and it is not a question of
hurting the State financially. [1944] 1 K. B. 146;
[1950] S.C.K 720. A Corporation can be prosecuted
even where mens rea or state of mind is concerned.
[Paton on ,Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, p. 279]. Sanctions of criminal law should be available against the
State for enforcing the law. [72 C. L. R. 409; Willis'
Constitution Law, p. 37]. State is a person. [78 L. Ed.
1307; l. L. }{, [1951] l All. 269]. When State engages
in trade or commerce, it must be treated in the same
164
SlJPRE~fE COURT
HEPOHTS
(1961]
way as ordinary citizens. [A. I. H. 1955 Nag. 177;
A. I. R. 1956 Pa.t. 91]. Sta.to is not a person only for
ni,tclor of
the
purposes of Art. 14.
Ratiot:u1g &
The doctrine of immunity of States from the operaJ)istribulron
v.
tion of its laws cannot be invoked in the present
The, Corporatio;ic constitutional set up.
The rule is based on royal
of Calcutta
prerogative. (1 C. L. R 406; Willis p. 54]. The rule
& Other~
springs from the prerogativ•J that the King can do no
wrong. [ [1920] 2 A. C. 508]. There is no one equivalent to the King now in India and therefore the
prerogative does not survive. Law is a scheme of
social control and the command of a superior. If the
State claims immunity, it mnAt be exempted by
express legislation. Iwmuuit.y cannot ho implied.
Thero has been progressi\•e restriction on I.he immunity of the State. [78 L. Ed. 1307; 90 L. Ed. :rn6].
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 457 lays down the correct law. After
tho coming into force of the Constitution, the High
Courts are not bound by the ju<lgmellt of th" Privy
Council. All powers arc derived from the Constitution and no immunities can be implied.
Even if any immunity can be implied, then it
cannot be invoked in respect of any trading or commercial activity. [5 Bom. H. C. R. Appendix 1 at
p. 13; 78 L. Ed. 1307; 90 L. Ed. 326]. The act iv it.v
carried on by the State in storing food grains etc., and
distributing them was trading activity and not exercise of Governmental function.
The State is bound by necessary implication by the
provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. Thero
a.re proviRions in the Act which expressly exempt tho
State from their operation. See s. 126.
S. M. Bose in reply.-Common law can be a.mended
by legislation. See s. 4, Hindu Succession Act (30 of
1956) and Hindu Adoptions and l\1aintena.ncc Act (78
of 1956). There is difference between Civil and Criminal liability. [72 C. L. R. 406, at 409, 424, 4'15]. The
Stat.e is not carrying on any trading activity but is
acting in the exerciso of esRential Governmmita.l functions. [ (1955] 1 S. C. R. 707]. Common law of England
was introduced in the Presidency towns by statutes.
See Ormond's Rules of Court; I. L. R'. 61 Ca.I. 841.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME CODRT REPORTS
165
H. M. Seervai, (with the permission of the Court).
It is a settled rule that if a word is not a term of art, Director of
you must take the ordinary meaning and not go to Rationing &
technical books. [74 C. L. R. l ; 90 L. Ed. 396; Hals- Distribution
v.
bury Vol. 7, p. 221 ].
The Corporation
S. M. Sikri, (with the permission of the Court) of Calcutta
referred to Holdsworth History of the English Law,
6- Others
Vol. 10, p. 354.
Our. adv. vult.
1960. August 16.-The Judgment, of Sinha, C. J.,
Imam and Shah, JJ., was delivered by Sinha, C. J.
Sarkar and Wanchoo, JJ., delivered separate judgments.
Sinha C. ].
SINHA C. J.-This appeal by special leave is
directed against the judgment and order of the High
Court at Calcutta dated February 9, 1955, whereby
that Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, set aside an
order of acquittal dated December 15, 19,53;~passed by
the Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta, in respect of the
prosecution launched by the Corporation of Calcutta,
responr,l'ent in this Court, against the appellant.
The relevant facts are these. On July 1, 1952, the
Corporation of Calcutta made an application for summons under s. 488 of Bengal Act III of 1923, which
was substituted by West Benga.! Act XXXIII of 1951,
against "the Director of Rationing and Distribution
representing the Food Department of the Government
of West Beng11! ". The offence complained of was" for
using or permitting to be nsed premises No. 259,
Chit.pm Road, Upper, for the purpose of storing rice
etc., under the provisions of the Bengal Rationing
Order, 1943, without a licence under s. 386 for the year,
1951,52, corresponding s. 437 of the C.M.C. Act, 1951 ".
Section 386(l)(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act is in
these terms:-·
"No person shall use or permit to be used any
premioes for any of the following purposes without or
otherwise than in couformitv with the t,erms of a
licence granted by the Corporation in this behalf,
namely, any .of the purposes specified in Schedule
XIX".
166
SUPHEl\lE COCRT ltEPORTS
[1!161]
Item 8 of the sai<l Schedule iR "storing, packing,
presRiug, cleansing, preparing or manufacturing, by
D1tt"Cf'JT nf
any process whate\·er, any of the following articles"
Unt1n111ng &
an<l the articles nwntione<! include rice, flour, etc.
/)I .I! YI Ii It f I ~J II
v.
The facts alleged by the prosecution w1•rc not denied
Tht Corporo/1011 on behalf of the Department, which was in tho posiof Calcutta
tion (>ft he a1)(!11scd, b.1t it was conten<le<l bv wiw of a
6· 0Jhtr5
preliminary objection that the pros~cuti~n w~s not
maintr.inablc in law. Aft.er hearing arg11m1mts for the
parties the leu.rned triu.I Ma~istrat,e passed an order
acquitting the accusc<l relying upon a dcci,ion of the
Calcutta High Court. in t.he case of The Corporation of
Calcutta v. Sub.Postmaster, Dhnrarnta/a Post Office('),
holding th.it the provision~ of s. 386 of the Act,
neither in tnms nor by necessary implication, bound
the Government. The respondent. rnovc<l the Calcutta
High Court in its re,•isinnal juriMlicLion iu Criminal
Revi8ion No. 282 of 1954, which waH lie;ir<l hy a Division Bench con8ist.ing of ,l. P. :\litter aud S. !\.Gu ha
Hay, JJ. Guha. Kay, J., who deliYcred the judgment
of the Court., Mitter, J., concurring, hdd th•tl the prnvious decision of tlw •arnc High Court, in 'J'hc Corporation
of Calcutta,.. Sub-Postmaster, Dharamtala Post Oj]ice (')
was clearly distinguishable. The distinction pointed
out w1ts that the preYious decision of the Court had
relied upon the docision of the .Judici;1! Cummittc" of
the Privy Council in l'rovince of Bombay v. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Born/Jay('), i11 a cr>se arising
before the coming into force of the Constitut.io11. As
the present case itrose after th·, advent of the Constitution, tho High Court did not feel bound by the aforesaid decision of the Privv Council and therefore
"xamined tho legal positi~n afresh. On such an examination, t.he High Court came to the conclusion
that the Indian Legislature in enacting !11ws acted on
the assumption that the Government would ho bound
unless excluded either expressly or by necessary
implication oftener than on the assumption that it
would not be bound, unless the Legislature so provided
expressly or by necessary implication. The High
Court took the view that the decision of the Division
(I) {1948) 54 C,\.\'.~. 429.
(z) (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. z71.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
167
Bench of the Madras High Court in Bell v. The Munici:pal Commissioners for the City of Madras (1 ) was more
Director of
in consonance with the law in lndia than the opposite Rationing
&
view expressed in the Privy Council judgment afore- Distribution
said. They definitely decided that the law of India,
v.
even before the coming into effect of the Constitution, The Corporation
and even at the time of the passing of the Government of Calcutta
& Others
of India Act, 1935, was that the Government was
bound by a Statute unless it was exempted either Sinha C. ].
expressly or by necessary implication. ln that view
of the matter, the High Court further observed that
the question whether the decision aforesaid of the
Privy Council was still good law under Art. 372 of the
Constitution did not arise and that, if it did, it was
inclined to the view that the law declared by the Privy
Council was not continued by any provision of law.
In effect, the High Court took the view that the State
. was bound by the Statute unless it was excluded from
its operation either expressly or by necessary implication. In that view of the matter, it held thats. 386
of the Act bound the appellant, set aside the order of
acquittyd and sent the case back to the learned Magistrate for disposal according to law. .The appellant
made an application for special leave to appeal from
the aforesa,id judgment and order of the High Court,
and obtained special leave in September 1955. It is
thus clear that this case had remained pending in this
Court for about five years. If this Court agreed with
the view expressed by the High Court, the case would
have to be triud on merits and the trial would begin
more than eight years after the institution of the petition of complaint, but, as will presently appear, this
prosecution was misconceived and therefore, in effect,
no one has been the worse for the long pendency of
the prosecution, which now must come to an end.
The short question for determination in this appeal
is whether any offence had been committed by the
appellant, as alleged against him. If he was bound by
the provisions of the Act to take out a licence on payment of the necessary fees, he must be held to have
contravened the provisions of that Statute. It has
(1) (1901) l.L.R. 25 Mad. 457·
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
b<>en contended:. by tho' learned Adv?ca.te-General of
Bengal, representing the appellant, that the deciRion
Dircc!or of
of
the Privy Council referred to above is 8till good law
Uaf1(ln1ng ~~
and that. thA contrary decision of the Divi~ion Bench
J)1Sfrii111/IV'I
v.
of tho :\fadras Hig!1 (;ourt (1) did not take the correct
The Corporalio11 view of the legal position.
The argument further is
of Calrullu
that
the
Privy
Council
deci;,iun
was certuiuly bindii1g
{-- Otho-.~
on the Cuurts in India at tho time it was rendered.
That \\'as the law of the le.nd a• declared by the
5111/ia C. }.
highest judicial authority. Has that judicial det.ermination Leen altered by tLe Constitution Y It has
been argued that the law in India, even after the
coming into effect of the Constitution, continues to Le
the same a• the law in England in respect of the
prerogatives of the Crown. The Act in que8tivu does
not make any express proviRion binding the Government and there was nothing in the Act to show to tho
contrary hy necessary implication. 'The Act. 0ould
opera.to with reasonable effic1\cy without being held to
be binding on tho Goverrncnt. It was further p·,intcd
out that the High Court hBd failed to take into consideration the fact that that High Court itself had
construed the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923, which
was replaced by the present Act of 1951, on the basis
of tho Privy Council decision not to have bound the
(;overnrnent. Tho Act of 1951 did not mako any
provision oxpressly a.Lmgating that view. Hence, it
is argued the High Court Bhoul<l have felt bound by
the previous decision of that very Court given on tho
basis of the Privy Council decision; and had erred in
taking tho opposite view. The argument further was
that the State is not a person within the meaning of
the penal Bection with reference to which the prosecu.
tion had Leen launched. The common law could uot
have been overridden impliedly by a course of legislation. The common law applies to India even after
the Constitution, not because there is tho King or the
Queen, but because it is the law in force. ln other
words, what was the prerogrative of the sovereign has
now become the law of tho land in respect of the sovereignty. of the State. Thus the law of England, which
(1) (1901) l.L.R. 25 Mad. 457·
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Hl!J
Ig6o
in its source was the prerogative of the Crown, was
the common law of the land and was adopted by the Director of
Constitution by Art. 372, subject to the reservatiuns Rationing ~.,...
contained therein. The Attorney-General for India as Distriliu!ion
v.
also the Advocates-General of Madras and Bombay
The Corporation
supported the contention ·raise<l on behalf of the of Calcutta
appellant.
(?" Others
.Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, who appeared on behalf of
the respondent, contended that. the State is a legal Sinha C. ].
person as recognised in Art. 300 of the Constitution
and was, therefore, capable of rights and obligations;
that unless there is an express exclusion of the State
by the Legislature, the Act would apply to all, including the State. He further contended that under the
Constitution there is no King and, therefore, there
cannot be any question of prerogative. Any exemption from the operation of the statute must be found
in express immunity under the law and cannot be
implied. He went to the length of contending that
a State's prerogative is inconsistent with the whole
Constitution. Whatever may have been the legal
position before the coming into effect of the Constitution, it has not countenanced the continuance of
any such prerogative as is contended for on behalf of
the appellant. Another line taken by Mr. Chatterjee is
that when the State embarks upon a business, it does
so not in its sovereign capacity, but as a legal person,
subject to the same rights and liabilities as any other
person. In effect, therefore, he contended that the
State is a person within the meaning of s. 386 of the
Act; that the doctrine of immunity of States from the
operation of its laws cannot be invoked after the
advent of the Constitution, and, alternatively, that
even if the immunity is available to the State as a
sovereign power, it is not available to the State when
it embarked upon a commercial undertaking and that,
in any case, the State was bound by the law by applying the rule of necessary implication from the provi·
sions of the Act.
In this case it is manifest that it is the Government
of West Bengal which is sought to be prosecuted
••
170
SCPRE;\IE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
through one of its officers. The prosecution is not
against a named person, but a.gs.inst tho Direct.or of a.
Direc.!or of
named Department of the Government. The person
Ratic:ntnJ: Cwho was tht' Direct,,r of the Depa.rt.men!. at the releVistril;"t:o11
v.
vant date, that is to say, in the year 1951-52 may not
The Co,·poration be the same person who a.1rnwerec..l that description on
of Calt:;itta
the date the prosecution was launched. In essence,
&- Othrrs
therefore, it is the Government of West Bengal which
has t-0 answer the charge levelled by the respondent,
Sinha C. J.
the Corporation of Cu.lcutta. Whether a prosecution
against such an indeterminate person would or wo.ild
not lie is t> matter which has not been rnised 11,nd,
therefore, need not ho discussed. The question most
canvassed before us in whether the penal section invoked in this case applies to Government. It has
hcen contended, and in our opinion rightly, that the
provisions of the penal section neither by express
terms nor by necessary implication arc meant to be
A.pplied to Government. The decision of the J i;dicial
Committee of tho Privy Council('), if it is good law
even now, completely covers this case, but the decision of the High Court, now under examination, has
ta.ken the vi"w that the earlier decision of the Division
Bench of the J.\Iadras High Court(') ha8 laid down
the correct law, and not the Privy Council decision.
We have, therefore, to decide which of the two decisions has ta.k•m the correct view of tlrn legal position
as it obtained on the day the prosecution was
launched.
It is well-established that the common law of England is that the King's prerogative is illustrated by
the rule that the Sovereign is not neces8arily bound
by a statutory law which binds the subject. This iH
further enforced by the rule that the King is not bound
by a statute unless be is expressely na.m~d or unless he
is bound by necessary implication or unless the
statute, being for the public good, it would be absurd
to exclude the King from it. Bla.ckst-One (Commentaries, Vol. I, 261-262) accurately summed up the
legal position as follows : "The king is not ·bound by a.ny act of Parliament, unless he be named therein by special a.nd
\1) (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. z71.
(1) [1901] °I.L.R. 25 Mad. 457,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
171
pa.rticular words. The moRt general words that can
be devised ...... affoct not him in the least, if they may
Director of
tend Lo restrain or diminish any of his rights or inte- Rationing &
rests. For it. would be of most mischievous consequ- Distrib:tfion
ence to the public, if the strength of the executive
v.
power were liable to be curtailed without its own The Corpo1'afion
express consent by constructions and implications of of Calcutta
& Others
the subject. Yet, when an act, of Parliament is expressly n111de for the preservation of public rights and the Sinha C. ].
suppression of public wrongs, and does not interfere
with the established rights of the crown, it is ·said to
be binding as well upon the king as upon the subject;
and, likewise, the king may take the benefit of a.ny
particuhr 11.ct., though he be not specially named."
((~noted at p. 355 of Holdsworth, A History of English
Law, Vol. X).
The King's prerogat.ive is thus ere:1tod and limited by
common law and the sovereign can claim no prerogati''''> except such as the law alluws. (See Halsbury'~
L<tws of Enghnd, Vol. 7, Third Edition, para. 464, at
p. 221).
The prerogative of the Crown in respect of property
is thus stated in the same volume of Halsbury's Laws
of England, para. 980, at p. 465 :" The Crown not being bound by any statute
whereby any prerogative right, title, or interest belonging to it may be divested or abridged, unless expressly
named or bound by clear implication, property owned,
and occupied by the Crown is exempt from taxation
nnlcss rendered liable either by express words or
necessary implication. Moreover, an express exemption of particular classes of Crown property in a
statute is not in itself sufficient to raise the implication
that such property only is exempt, and that other
property not falling within the exception is bound,
such clauses being inserted merely ex majore cautela."
. That was the law applicable to India also, as authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council in the case
referred to above. That decision was rightly followed
by the. Calcutta High Court as stated above. That
would be the legal position until the advent of the
Constitution.
li2
SCPRK\!E COURT REPOHTS
(Hl61]
The question naturally arises: ivhether the Constitution
has made any change in that position ? Thera
f.1£,r.c.!oY of
aro no words in the Constitution which can be cit,ed in
Uat><..·11:11J? .;,.
support of the proposition that the position has changDis1ri/,11t11J1
v.
ed after the republican form of Go\'ernment has been
Tlit Ccitf'Jt(lflOll ndumbrat~d by· our Constitution,
It was argued on
of Calcutta
behalf of the respondent that the existence of such a
(,,. Orlicr5
prerogative is negatived by tho·very form of our new
set
up, that is to say, it was contended that the repuSit1h:i C. ].
blican form of Government is wholly inconsist,ent with
the existence of such a prerogative, In our opinion,
there is no warrant for such a contention, The immunity of Goverumont f1:om tho operation of certain
statutes, and particularly statutes creating offences, is
based upon the fundamental concept that tho Govern,
rnent or its officers can.not he a p:irty to committing a.
crime-analogous to the • preroga.t ive of perfect.ion '
that the King can do no wrong,. Whatever may have
been the historical roe.son of the rule, it has been
adopted in our country on grounds of public policy as
a rule of intorpretat-ion of statutes, That. this rule is
not peculiar or confined to a monarchical form of
Government is illustrated by the decision of the
Supreme Court of U, S. A, in the case of United State.s
of America v, United Mine Workers of America (1),
where it is la.id down that restrictions on the issue of
injunctions in la.hour disputes contained in certain
statutes do not apply to the United States Government as &n employer or t-0 relations between the
Government and its employees and that statutes in
general terms imposing certain restrictions or divesting certain privileges will not be applied to the
sovereign without express words to that effect, Similarly, in the case of United States of America v. Reginald P, Wittek('), the question aroso whether the
District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act applied to
government-owned defence housing or to governmentowned low-rent housing in tho Dist-rict., and it was ruled
by the Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the
Munieipa.1 Court of Appoals, that the statute in question did not apply to the United States Government
(1) (19i7) 330 U.S. l58: 91 L. Ed. SB+.
(2) (1949) 337 U.S. 346; 93 L. Ed. r4o6.
1 S.C.R.
I
l
SUPREME COv_RT ftEPORTS. -
173
which was not a. "landlord " within the meaning of
r960
the Act. The decision was based bn the· rule that a
·
· restr1ct1t>ns
· ·
d oes · 11ot impo.se
·
Director of
genera1 statute imposmg
.....
Ralioni~ig &
them upon the Government itself· without a clear D!et_rib,.eionexpression or implication to that effect.• Another
y.
illustration of the rule· is to be found in the case of Tho Corporation
Jess Larson v. Domestic and Fo?eig'f!' 'Commerce Oor-· 0 ! Calcutta
poration ('). In tha.t case a suit by a citizeQ, in effect,
& Others
against the Govern'ment (War Assets Administration) Sin/:--;;. 1 _
for an injunction was dismissed by the D.i!itrict Court
on the_ground that the Court dia not ~ave jurisdiction,
because the suit was one against .the United States.•
The Supreme Com:t, by majority, -held that the suit as
against the United States must fail on the ground that
according to the laws of the country the sovereign
enjoyed an immuqity which was not enjoyed .b)':. the
citizens. The case of Roberts v. Ahern(•) is another
illnstratfon of the same rule. It was held by the High
Court of Australia in that case that the Executive
Government of the Commonwealth or of a State is not
-bound by a statute unless the intention that it shall
be so bound is apparent.
On the other hand, Art. 372 of the:Qonstitution has
specifically provided that subject to the Other provisiCl.ll.S of the Cdnst.itution all the la.ws in force in this
country immediately before the commencement of the
Constitution shall continue in force until altered or
repealed or ii.mended by a competent Ligislature or by
other competent authority. The expression "law in
-force" has been used in a very comprehensive s'ense as
would appear from the provisions of sub-els. (a) and (b)
of cl, (3) of Art. 13 of-the Constitution .. If we, compare
theprovisions of A'rt. 366(10) which defines "existing
Jaw " which has reference to Jaw made· by a legislati've
agency in contradistinction to "Jaws in force" which
include!! not only statutory law, but also custom or
usage having the force of law, it must be interpreted as
including thl3 common law of Englljond which was
adopted as the law of this country befoi;e the Constitution came into force. It is thqs clear that far from
(1) (1949) 337 U.S. 682 : 93 L. Ed. 1628.
(2) (1904) 1 C.L.R. 406.
174
-SUPREM}l: COUR.T REPORTS
[1961]
the Con.stitution ma~ing'.'any change in the legal position, it has· clearly ..indicated that the Ia.ws in force
Director .of
continue
to have validity, even in the new set up,
Rationing 6except in so far as they cor:µe in confifot with the
Distribulion
express provisions·of the Qonstitntion. No such proviv:
T_he Corporation sion has been broqg1;it to our 'notice.
That being so,
of Calcutta
we arc definitely of the opinion that 'the r,ule of inter-.
6- Others
pre1:ation. :9£:stattitei;) ~hat the.State is'not bonncfby a
'statute,
unless.it.is so provided iri express t~rms or by
Si.nhfl- C. J.
neces.~ary.Jmplication, is still good law.
.
But Mr. Chatt'2,rjee further contended; alternatively,
thae even if it were held that the Government as a
spvereign ·pow~r inay,have. the. ~enefit·of the immlrnity
claimed, it is not !llltitled .to that immuniiy when it
embarks upon a business and, in that. cap;i.oity,
becomes su\Jject to the penal provisions of the statute
equally with other citizens. This" question wa.s not
raisl'd below and has not been gone i'llto by the High
Court, nor is it clear on 1.he record, as it.stands, that
the Food Department of .the Government of West
llenga.J, which undertook rationing and distribution of
food on a rational basis had -embarked upon any trade
or business. In the a'bsence of any 'indic111ion to the
contrary, apparently this Department of the GovornmeJlt was djscharging the elementary duty of a
sqvrreign to ensure proper and equitable distribution
of aui.llable. fpod-stuffs with a v.iew to maintaining
pca9e and good Governmen~. Therefore, the alternative argument suggested J.,y Mr. Chatterjee has no
fouudation in fact.
1t only remains to consider the .other alternative
argument that even if the Seate has· not been bound
by the pe1)al seotion in the statute in question in
express terms, it must be deemed to be bound by it by
necessary implicatiou. But no specific provisions of
the statute in questiop h;i.ve been brought to our n6tice
which. could lend any support to this alternative argument. It has not been shown to us that if the section
which was sought to be applied against the Government were held not expressly to apply to Government,
the law will lose any qf its efficacy., or that its working
will be hampered in auy way. It must, thorefore, be
,
11 S.C.R.
SUPitEME COURT REPORT&
17q
held that there is. no substance irt this contention .
'
eithei:.
·
~
DireCtor of
The appeal· is accordingly allowea, the judgment Rationing &
under appeal set aside and the acq'uitta) of· the appel- Distribution
• ·
- ·-- • ·
"lant confirmed.
v.
r
SARKAR J.-The appellant ·is an. officer of the
Government.oJ West Bengal. He was..prosec:uted before
a Municipal Magi~ti;ate of Calcutt.a for storing rice in
certain .premises :withdu t obtaining a licence for that.
purpose fro!I) the respondiint, the Corporation of Calcutta, ,o.s required by. s. 386 of the Calcutta Municipal
AQt, 1923. ·That was an Act passed by the legislature' of
the formi:r"Proy11lpe of Bengal and may, for ..the pres\)nt
purpose, be ta.ken to have been passed by the legislature 9f the State of West Bengal. In storing the
rice the appellapt. had acted in his official capacity
and for carrying out the West Bengal Government's
rationing scheme. •
.
The Magistrate acquitted the appellant holding thl).t
the Act did not bind the -Government as it .was neither
expressly" nor. by necessary implication made bou.nd,.
and so, the appellant who had been prosecuted as
reptesentin~the Go,Yernment. would not be liable for
non-compliance with its provisions. On revision the
High Court at Calcutta held that the English rule that
a statute did not bind the Crown unless expressly. or
by necessary implication made bound, did not, apply
to Indian statutes and so the Government·would be
liable for breach of the provisions of the· Calcutta
Municipal Act. In this view of the matter, the High
Court set aside the order of acquittal and sent the
case·back to .the Magistrate for disposal on the merits.
This appeal has been taken from the order of the
High .Court with special leave granted by this Court.
The main question is whether the English rule that
" The Crown is not bound by the provisions of any
statute unless it is directly or by necessary implication
referred to " applies to India. It is said that· the ~ule
is based oq the English law of Crown prerogativps
and has no application. to India since, the promulgation of ou\. Constitution as we have now a republican
I
The Corporation
,of Calcutta
& Others
Sarkar
J.
176
'
SJJPREME COURT REPORTS·
[1961]
{960
form of gqvernment where no questjon of royal preroIt is pointed out that the prosecuRationing &
tion wits in this ca.se started since. the Constitution
D{ft.ibutio11
came into force and whatever ma.y ha.ve been t.he
v.
position
earlie10 the Government ca.n no longer take
The , Corporation
shelter.
under
the '.English rule.
, .
of Calcutta
I
think
the
rule
applies
to.
India
even
after
tlie
&- Others
·co,n'Btitution. It ·seems ·to me tha.t the,rule as applied
Sark~r ].
in mocfern times, is really a. rule of construction of
statutes a.nd is not dependent on royal prerogatkes.
This is tlie' view that appears to ha.ve been taken in
all recent authorities, to some of which I wish now to
refer.
I11 Craies' on Statutes (5th Ed.) it is Stll.ted at· p. 392
that" The r,ule is analogous, if not equivalent, to' the
rule already stated· that the eommon law is not presumed to be altered by statute". The rule, therefore,
is based on the presumed intentfon of the legislature
aud is, hence, a. rule of construction of statutes. Then
I find it stated in Attorney-General v. Donaldson (1)
that " It is a well established rule, generally speaking,
in the construotion1 •Of Acts of Parliament, that the
King is not included' unless £here a.re words to that
effect; for it is inferred prim.a faci~ that the law ma.de
by the Crown with the assent of the Lords and
Commons, is ma.de for subjects and not for the Qrown".
Again in 00,omber v. Justices of Berks(•) it was said.in·
referance to ·this rule, "In Rex v. Cook, 3 T.R. 519,
the general principle as to the construction of statutes
imposing charges as conta.i.ning·a.n exemption of the
Crown was laid·down ". In the Austra.lia.n case· of
Roberts v. Ahern;('), it was said, "'Dhis rule ha.a commonly been- based on the Royal prerogative. Perhaps,
however, having regard to modern developments of
constitutional la\y, a more satisfactory basis is to be
_found in the words of Alderson, B.'' The Wfpfs
refe\-red to are what I have already set out ~:ofi1
Attorney-General v. Donald,son (1 )'.
·
In America too this rule has been applied as" a rule
Dfrector of
~ga.th'.e_s can a.rise.
.
.
(I) (1842) 10 i.\!. & \V. 117, 123; rsz E.R. 4q6;
'(2) (1883) g App. Cas. 61, 65.
(3) (1904) • C.L.R. 406, 417.
.
1I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
177
of construction though there 'is no King there but th~
government is of the republican form. So in United
Director of
States v. United Mine Workers of America(') it 'wag Rationing
c.,,.
observed, "There is an old and well-known rule that Distribution
statutes ·which in general terms divest pre-existing
v.
tights or privileges will not he applied to the sovereign The Corporation
without express words , to that effect. It bas been of Calcutla
&;.. Othe1·s
stated, in cases in which there were extraneous and
affirmative reasons for believing that the sovereign
Sarl1ar ].
should also be deemed subject to a re~trictive statute,
that this rule was a rule of construction only ". Again
in reference to the same rule it was said in United
States v. State of California('). "The presmnption is an a.id to consistent construction of statutes of
the enacting sovereign whe'n their purpose is in •
doubt".
In our country also in Bell v. The Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras('), a, case on which
much reliance has been placed by the respondent, it
was said after referring to various English cases deal- '
ing with the rule, "This emphatic statement of the
rule being founded upon, general principles of construction is undoubtedly applicable as "inuch to Indian
enactments as t~ Colonial or Imperia.l Statutes". It
was also said a.t the same page, "The rule of construction above adverted to cannot itself be regarded as a
prerogative Of the Crown".
Then I find that in England the rule protects from
the operation of a statute not only what may strictly
be called Crown prerogatives, or whatever is nowadays left of them, but all the Crown's rights, title and
interest: see _Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Ed.)
Vol. VII, p. 465. In volume XXXI of the Second
Edition of the same treatise it is stated with reference
to t)ie rule that, "The Crown for this purpose means
not only the King personally, but also the 'officers of
State a.n\i servants of the Crown when acting within
the scope of their authority on behalf of the Crown in
the discharge of executive duties". In' Mersey Docks
(I) (1947) 330 u. s. 258, 272; 91 L: Ed. 884,-902.
(2) (I936) 297 U, S. I75, I86; 8o, L. Ji:d, 567, 574·
(3) (I90I) l.L.R•.25 Mad, -157• 485.
2)
-
,
..
~
178
Sl!PREME COURT REPORTS
[196i]
v. Cameron (1), Lord Cranwort.h after referring to the
various iruJtanccs where the rule had been applied to
Director of
exe.mpt.
buildings occupied for purposes of the governRationi'ttg &
ment
from
mtes and other· impositio~s. said, "These
Distribution
v.
decisions _l)owcver have all gone on the ground more
The Corporatio11 or less 8onm1, that.these might all be tre;tted as buildof Calcutta
ings occupied by the servants. of the· Crown, and for
&- Others
the Crown, extending in some in~tances the shield of
the
Crown to what mig'ht' more fitly be described as the
Sarkar .] .
pi1blic"government of the country". Again- in-Coomber
v: .Tustir.es of Berks('), Lord Blackburn after referring
to certain observations Of Lord Westbury in tpe-Mersey
Docks case(') s11id, "He there says -that the public
purpose8 to make an exemption "must be such as itre
rcrj11ired and created by the government of the c9untry, and are, therefore, to be deemed part of the use
and service of the Crown;" and in Greig v. University
of Edinburgh(') he more clearly shews what was his
view l.iy using this language, "property occupied by tbe
servants of the Crown, and (according to the theory of
the Constitution) property occupied for the purposes of
the administration of the government of the country,
beqome ex.empt from.. liability to the poor-rate'--'."
In this case it was held that lands with buildings
constructed thereon and used by c·ounty justices, and
for police purposes were not lial;ile to income· tax._ In
Cooper v. Hawkins(') it was held that an engine-dtiver
11rriployed by the Cro,wn who drove a steam-locomotive
on Crown service at a speed exceeding the limit specified by regulations made under a statute, was. not liable
as in the absence~of express words, the statute did not
bind the Crown.. Lastly, I refer to ROberts v. Ahern(')
where a 'person- acting under' the otders of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia had been
prosecuted for .having carted away nigh:tsoil from a
.Post Offipe without a licence from, and without having
given any security to, the· local authority, as was
required by an enactment of the State of Victorta. It
was held that. he was not liable to prosecution because,
(l) (1865) 11H.L:C.443, 508; II E.R. 1405.
(2) (1883) 9 App. Cas. 61. 65.
(4) (1904] 2 K.B. 164.
(3) (1868) L.R. 1 H.L. (Sc.) 348.
(5) (1904) I C.L.R. 4o6, 417.
(
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
179
" The modern sense of the rule, at any rate, is that the
1960
Executive Government of the State is not bound
by
,
Director of
Statutes unless. that intention is apparent: ' p. 418, Rationing e;,
It was also said that " The doctrine is well settled in Disfribution
this sense in the United States of America:,,. (p. 418).
v.
It is unnecessary to multiply instances where acts of The Corporation
the executive government have received the protection o~c0a1chutta .
.
~•m
ofh
t e rue.
1
All this would ·seem to put it· beyond doubt, that
Sarkar J.
whatever its origin, the rule has long been. regarded
only as a rule of constr4ction. It has been widely
used to exempt executive governments from !be Opflration of statutes quite apart from protecting preroga.
tive rights of the British Crown stric.tly so called. It
has been -held reasonable to presume that the legislature intended that ell.eCUtive governments ate not to
be bound by statutes unless made bound expressly or
-by n.ecessary implication. It would be equally reasonable to do so in our country even under the present
set up for the presumption has all along been raised in
the past and especially as the applicablity of the rule
can no longer be made to depend on the prevailing
form of government. In countries with a republican
form of government, the Sovereign would be the State,
and its acts, which.can only be the acts of its executive limb would be, under the rule exempt from the ·
operation of its statutes. Whether the royal prerogative as understood in England, exists Ill the present
day India is not a question that can arise iu applying
what .is a pure rule of construction of statutes.
Further it is quite clear that the rule has been
applied by courts in India in the constructio·n of Indian
statutes all 'along at any rate upto the promulgation
of our Constitution, except in the solitary instance of
.Bell's case(') earlier referred to .. It would therefore be
right to hold· that the legislatures in our country have
proceeded on the basis . that the- rule would govern
the enactments passed by them. ··That being so and
remembering that the rule is one of constr)lction, there
would be no reason to deny its application to Indian
statutes after>tbe Constitution .. The new republican
(1) (1901) l.L.R. 25 Mad . .j57.
180
SlJPRK'.\IE COURT REPORTS
[19GI]
form of government adopted by us would not warrant
a drparture from the long estu.blished rule of conDir·tcf(:r (>/
struction.
Hn/H,llP?f: (":"·
It was then s'1.irl that the course of legislation in India
Jh st ri 1,u 11010
v.
would indicate that it was not. intended even before
The Corron1t10;1 the C-0nstitution that the rule would apply to Indian
of Calcutta
statutes. Thio contention was based on Bell's case (1).
6 ()/JitYS
That case seem& to me t-0 have proceeded on a. basis
not very Rotrnd. On an examination of certain Indian
Sa~Har J.
statutes it was said, "It is noteworthy that as a
general rule government is specially excluded whenever the Legislature considered that certain provisions
of an enactment should not bind the Government".
From this the conclusion was drawn that "According
to the uniform course of Indian legislation, statutes
imposing dut.ies or taxes bind Govnnment as much as
its subjects, unless the very nature of the duty or tax
is such as to bo inapplicable to the Government". It
seems t-O me that this decision overlooks the uniform
course of decisions of Indian Courts applying the rule
in the construction of Indian statutes. The legislature
must bo deemed to have known of these decisions and
if they wanted to depart from their effect they would
have passed a statute bringing about the desired
re•ult. :!'\o such statute was ever passed. It is wellknown that in these oiroumstances the legislatures
must. be taken to have proceeded on the basis that the
decisions were correct and the rule was to be applied to
the ste.tutes passed by them. The.t being so, an examination of the course of lndie.n legislation would be irrelevant. The ca.sea where the Government we.s expressly
excluded must be ta.ken to be instances of exemptions
ex majori cautila: see HornBey Urban Council v. Hennel('). Furthermore, it seems to me that a comparison of the number of statutes where the Government
had been specially excluded from their or'lre.tion with
the number where the statutes are silent on the
subject, is, e.t best, a very unsafe guide for deciding
whether the rule should be applied to Indian enactments. I therefore dissent from the view expressed
in Bell's case('), that the rule does not apply in India.
(•) (1901) l.L.R. •5 Mad. 457·
(2) [19<n] • K.B 73-
• S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
181
Now it seems to me that in storing the rice in the
pres11nt case, the Gover,nment of West Bengal was Director of
performing one of its governmental functions. It Rationing 6was storing rice for purposes of rationing, that is, Distribution
v.
making food-stuff availablf! to citizens in time of scarcity. That such activity is a part of the government's The Corporation
Calcutla
duty is unquestionable. The act for which the appel- of
-& Others
lant was prosecuted was, therefore, ·an act of the
West Bengal Government done in discharge of its Sarkar ].
ordinary duties as the government and the rule would
·prevent the Act from applying to· make -the Govern_.
ment liable for a breach of it.
Then it is said that the Act binds the Government
by necessary implication. In support of this argument
we were referrsd to certain provisions of the Act which
expressly exempted the Government from their operation. I am unable to agree that this raises the necessary implication. It has been said in Halsbury 's
Laws of England (2nd Ed.) Vol. X:.l(XI at p. 523 that
".A general prerogative of the Crown is not deemed to.
have been abandoned by implication by reason of the
specific exemption in a statute of any class of the
servants of the Crown from acting in compliance with
the preroga,tive,. nor by reason of the fact that the
. Crown has .foregone or curtailed its rights in some
other direction in another part of the statute" ; see
also· Hornaey Urban Oouncil case(') earlier referred to.
These observations would show the unsoundness of
the contention raised by .the respondent.
Lastly, it is said that the purpose of the Act was to
prevent adulteration of food-stuffs and this object
would be wholly-defeated unless the Government was
bound by it. It is not in ~ispute that if -this were so,
that might be a ground for holding that the Act bound
the Government. On this aspect of the case reference
may be made to· Province of Bombay v. Municipal
Oorporation of Bombay (9). I am however unable to
hold: that the purpose of the Act would be wholly or
at all defeated if the Goverl)n'.ient were not bound by
it. · It seems to me that s. 386 of the Act, the breach
of which is complained in this case, is concerned with
(1) (1902] 2 K.B. 73.
(2) (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 271.
182
SUPRE:\fE COuRT REPORTS
[1961]
the use of premisos and not with the prevention of
adulteration
of food-stuffs as was contended for the
Dirtcfor of
respondent. The provi8ions with regard to adulteraRatio"•-ig &
D1strili11tion
tion of food-stutfa are contained in a different part of
v.
the statute. There is nothing to Hhow that the puri' ise Corporation
pose
of the Act would wholly be defeated if some
of Calcutta
premises
were used contrary to tho terms of the Act.
&- Other.<
I would for these reasons hold that the Act did not
Sarkar J
bind the Government a.nd the prosecution of the
appellant for an act done in the discharge of his duties
as an officer of the Government cannot he maintained.
This appeal should therefore be allowed and the order
of tho High Court set aside and that of the .'.llagistra.te
restored.
WA!\CllOO .J.-L h<1.vo had the a.ct vantage of reading
tho judgments prepared by my Lord the Chief Justice
and my brother ~arka.r J. I agree with their conclusion but my reasons are different.· 1 therefore proceed
t<i state my reasons for coming to the same concluBion.
The facts have already been stated in the judgment
of my Lord the Chief Justice and l will not therefore
repeat them. Sufllce it to say that the Corporation of
Calcutta initiated this prosecution, in substanc~, of the
~tatn of West Bengal through its Director .of lla.tion.
ing and Distribution under s. 488 oft.he Calcutta. :\lnni.
cipal Act, No. III of l!l23, (now equivalent to 8. 537
of the Calcutta Municipal Act, ~o. XXXIll of 1951),
for nsing or permitting to be nscd certain premises for
the purpose of 8toring rice, elc. under the proviHions of
the Bengal Rationing Order, 1943, without a licence
under s. 386 of Act Ill· of 1923, (now equivalent to
s. 437 of Act XXXILI of Hl51). The State did not
clenY the facts; but it wa.s cont.ended on its.behalf that
the· prosecution was not maintainable in law. The
Magistrate held that the provisions of s. 386 of the
1923 Act did not apply w the Sta.to either expressly
01· by. necessary implication and therefore passed an
order of a.cquitt&I. The Corporation took the matter in
revision to the High Court, which distinguished an
.,arJier decioion of tho High Court relied upon by the
!\la.gistrate and, held that after India. became a
•
• 1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
183
democratic republic from Jan nary 26, 1950, the High
Court was not bound by the decision of the Privy
Director of
Council in a similar matter reported in Province of Bom.
Rationing &
bay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay (1 i Distribution
and that the rule of construction based on the royal
v.
prerogative that the Crown was not bound by a statutE The CorpOration
unless it was expressly named therein or at any rnte of Calcutt~
& Others ·
could be held to be bound by necesary impl,ication,
did ·not apply in India after Janua_ry 26, 1950, and WanchoO ].
that the true rule of construction on which the Indian
legislatures acted was that the State would be bound
unless excluded either expressly or by necessary·
implication. The High Court th_erefore held thats. 488
of the Act of 1923 read with s. 386 bound the State
and set aside the order of acquittal and sent the case
back to the Magistrate for disposal according to lR.w.
The most important question thus is, whether the rule
of construction derived from the royal prerogative in
England can still be said to· apply in India after
January 26, 1950. If this rule ·of construction based
on the royal prerogative does not apply, it would necessarily follow that the ordinary rule of construction,
namely, that the State WO!Jld also be bound by the law
like anybody else unless it is expressly excluded or
excluded by necessary implication, would apply. Now
the rule of construction baaed on the royal prerogative
is a survival from the mediaeval theory of divine right
of Kings and the conception that the sovereign was
absolutely. perfect, with the result that the common
law of England evolved the maxim that " the King
can . do no wrong ''... In course of time however the .
royal prerogative in England was held to have been
. created and limited by .the oommon la.,v and the
· sovereign could claim no prerogatives, except such
as the law allowed nor such as were contrary· to
Magna Carta or any other statute ·~r to the liberties of
the subject. The courts also had jurisdiction to inquire
· into the existence or extent of any alleged prerogativP.
If any prerogative was disputed, they had to. decide
the question whether or not it existed in the same way
as they decided any other question of law. If a
(1) (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 271.
184
SGPRE:lfE COURT REPORTS
[ 1961]
prerogative was clearly established, they could take the
same
judicial notice of it as they took of any other rule
Dirtclor of
of
law:
(see Halsbury's Laws ofEngli~nd, 3rd Edition,
Ra120111nc 6Vol.
7,
p.
221,para.. 464).
Distnbutio11
v.
The question of royal prerogative wa.q 1.Iso consider.
The Corpo1·dtion ed in AUorney-General v. De Keyser's iloyal Hotel Limiof Calculta
ted('). It was held therein that oven where there was
& Otltets
prerogative it could be curtailed by a. statute, if the
statute
dee.It with something which before it could he
WaJtchoo J.
affected by the prerogative, inasmuch a.s the Crown
was a party to every . Act of Parliament. Thus in
modern times, the royal prerogative is the residue of
discretionary or arbitrary authority which a.t any
time is lega.Ily left in the hands of the Crown and is
recognisod under the common law of England. Two
things are clear from this modern conception of royal
prerogative, namely, (I) that there must be a. Crown or
King to whom the royal prerogative attaches, and (2)
that the prerogative must be pa.rt of the common law
of England. Both these conditions existed when the
Privy Council decision in Province of Bombay v.
Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay (') was
given in October 1946; the King was still there and
the Privy Council held that the English common law
rule of construction applied to Indian legislation as
much a.s to English statutes. I may mention however
that. in England also the .rule has come in for criticism
by writers of books on law. Glanville L. Willia.ms
in his treatise on "Crown Proceedings" says at p. 53:
"The rule originated in the .Middle Ages, when it
perhaps had some justification. Its survive.I, however, is due to little but the vis inertiae."
Age.in at 54, the author says" With the great extension in the activities of the
State a.nd the number of servants employed by it, and
with tho modern idea, expressed in the Crown Proceedings Act," (compare in this connection Art. 300 of our
Constitution), " that the State should be accountable
in wide measure to the law, the presumption should
be that a statute binds the Crown rather than it does
not."
1960
(1) [1920) A.C. 5o8.
(2) (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 271.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"
.
185
After January 26, 1950, when our country became a
democratic republic and the J;(ing ceased to exist, it is DirectoY of
rather otiose to talk of the royal prerogative. It is Rationing &also well to remember that the English common law Distribution
v.
as such never applied to India, except in the territories
covered by the original side of the three _Chartered The Corporation
High Courts, namely, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, ·of& Calcutta
Others •
(see Kahirodebir.ari ])atta v. Mangobinda Panda(') )
though sometimes rules of English cqmmon law were Wanchoo ].
applied by Indian courts on grounds of justice, equity
and good conscience. It seems to me therefore that
to apply to Indian statutes a construction. based on
the royal prerogative as kDown to the common law of
England now when there is no Crown _in this country
and when the common law of England was generally
not even applicable, (except in a very small part),
would be doing violence to the ordinary principle of
construction of statutes, namely, that· only those a:re
not bound by a statute . who are either expressly
exempted or must be held to be exempt by necessary
implication.
In our country the Rule of Law prevails and our
Constitution has guaranteed it by the provi_sions. contained in Pt. III thereof as well as by other.provisions
in other Par.ts: (see Virendra Singh and others v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh(') ). It is to my mind inherent
in the conception of the Rule of Law that the State,
no less than its citizens and others; is. bound by the
laws of the land. When the King as the embodiment
of all power-executive, legislative and judicial-has
disappeared and in our republic.an Constitution, ·
sovereign power has been distributed among various
organs created thereby, it seems to me that there is
neither justification nor necessity ·for continuing the
rule of construction based on the royal prerogative.
It is said that though the King has gone, sovereignty
still exists and therefore what was the prerogative of.
the King has become the prerogative of the sovereign.
There is to my mind a misconception here. It is true
that sovereignty must exist under our C?nstitution;'
(1) (1934) I.L.R. 61 'Cal. 841, 857._
"+
(2) [1955] 1 S,C.R. +'5·
186
SCPRlDIE COlJRT REPORTS
Ll961J
but there is no sovereign a.a such now. In England,
however, tho King is synonymous with the sovereign
Dirtc/Dr of
and
so arose the royal prerogative. But in our counRationing 6try
it
would be impossible now to point to one person
Distribulirn1
v.
or institution and to say that he or it is the sovereign
The Ca.po.atio" under the Constitution. A further question may arise,
•! Cal<utta
if one is in search of a sovereigu now, wbctber the
6- Others
Stat~ Government with which one is concerned here
is sovereign in the samo sense a.a the English King
(though it may have plenary powers under the limits
set under our Constitution). This to my mind is
another reason w by there bein~ no King or sovereign
as such now in our country, the rule of construction
based on th1J royal prerogative can no longer be
invoked.
Reliance wa.s placed in this connect.ion on certain
cases from AuHtralia and Canada and also from the
United States of America. So far as Australia and
Canada are concerned, the cases are not of much help
for the Crown exists there still. Besides in Canada
and in most of the provinces of Canada and in New
Zealand provisions have been specifically introduced
in the Interpretation Acts laying down that no provision or enactment in any Act shall affect, in any manner whatsoever, the rights of His Majesty, bis heirs or
successors, unless it is expressly stated therein that
His Majesty shall be bound thereby: (sec Street on
" Governmental Liability ", at p. 152).
In the United States also, it is doubtful if the royal·
prerogative as such is relied on as the basis of certain
principles which are in force there. In United StateB
of America v. United Mine Workers of America, Etc.('),
the Supreme Court did say that there was an old and
well-known rule that statutes which in general terms
divested pre-existing rights and privileges would not
be applied to the sovereign without express words to
that effect. But there was no discussiou of the royal
prerogative as such in the judgment and the rule was
ca.lied a well-established rule of construction only.
Besides the Court went on to consider the words of the
statutes under consideration and held that on a proper
construction of them the United Stat~s was not bound.
\1) (1947) 330 U.S. 258: 91 L. Ed. 88.t·
l .S.C.R,
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
187
In United &ates of America v. Reginald P. Wittek('),
the St!-preme Court did say that a general statute Director of
imposing restrictions does not impose them upon the Rationing &government itself without a clear expression or Distribution
implication to that effect; but this decision was based
V.
•
mainly on the terms of the St!!-te statute there l!-nder The Corporahot.
consideration . and the surr_ounding circumstances and of& (alcutta
Others
legislative history of the statute concerned. Another
case in the same volume is Jess Larson v. Domestic Wanchoo ].
and Foreign Commerce Corporation (') at p.' 1628, where
a suit was brought against an officer of the United '
States and it was· held that it was in substance a suit
against the sovereign government over which the
court in the absence. of consent had no jurisdiction.
There is no discussion in this case of the royal preroga-.
tive having continued in the United States and the
decision seems to have turned on some law of that
country which provides that a suit against the Govern. ment could not be tried in a court in the absence of
consent. . As against these decisions I may refer to
H. Snowden Marshall v. People of the State of New
York (') to show that royal preorgative ·as such. is
losing ground in the United States, if nothing more.
When dealing with the priority of a State over the
unsecured creditors in payment of debts 'out of the
assets of the debtor, the Supreme Court held that
whether the priority wa.s a prerogative right or merely
a right of administration was a matter of local law and
the decision of the -highest court of the State as to the
existence of the right and its incidents would be
accepted by tl:i:e Ftideral Supreme Court as conclusive.
Again in Guaranty Trust Company of New York v.
United States.of America('), the Supreme Court held
.that the immunity of the sovereign from the operation
of statutes. of1imitation, although originally a matter
of royal prerogative, was now based upon the public
policy of protecting the citizens of the State from the
loss of their public rights and revenues through the
I
(1) (1949) 337 U.S. 346: 93 L. Ed. 14b6.
(2) (1949) 337 U.S. 682; 93 L. Ed. 1628.
(3) (1920) 254 U.S. 38o: 65 L. Ed. 315.
(4) (1938) 304 U.S. 126: 82 L. Ed. 1'24·
188o
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ !!161]
negligence of the officers of the State, showing that
some
of those immunities which in England were
Director of
claimed as royal prerogatives, though preserved in the
Ratio111ng &Di-~trif;ution
United States, were so preserved for other reasons.
v.
Besides it must not be forgotten that though tbe Crown
The Corporation
no longer remained in the United Stat~s after the
of Calculla
attainment
of independence the American colonies out
6- Others
of which the United States arose were colonised by
Wanclsoo ].
English settlors who carried the common law of
England with them to America with the result that
the first Constitution of some of the States (like New
York) after independence provided that the common
law of England which together with the statutes constituted the law of the colony before independence
Rhould be and continue to be the law of the State
subject t-0 such alterations as its legislature might
thereafter make: (see H. Snowden Marshall v. Peopl.e
of the State of New York('), at p. 317). That may
account for the United States recognising some of
those prerogative rights which were in force in
England; though even so, the basis for such recognition is now more the law or public policy than any
royal prerogative as such. The position in our country
was somewhat different. We had the King but the
common law of England did not, as already indicated,
apply as a rule in this country. Now that the King
has also gone, there BOO!llS to oo no reason for continuing the royal prerogatives after January 26, 1950.
Further it appears to me that the royal p(erogative
where it deals with substantive rights of the Crown
as against its subjects, .as, for example, the priority of
Crown debts over debts of the same nature owing to the
subject, stands on a different footing from the royal
prerogative put forward in the present case, which ill
really no more thar. a. rule of construction of statutes
paBBed by Parliament. Where, for example, a. royal
prerogative dealing with a substantive right has 00en
accepted by the Courts in India. as applioa.ble here
also, it becomes a law in force which will continue in
force under Art. 372(1) of the Constitution. But
(1) (1930) 254 U.S. 38<>: 65 L. l!d. 313.
i · S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
189
where the royal prerogative is merely a rule of c9n.
struction of statutes based on the existence of the Directoy of
Crowl'.\ in England and for historical reasons, I fail ~o Rationing&.
see why in a democratic republic, the courts should Distribution.
v.
not follow the ordinary principle of construction that
no one is exempt from the operation of a statute The Corporation
unless the statute expressly grants the exemption or of& Calcutta
Others
the exemption arises ·by necessary implication. On
the whole 'therefore I am. of opinion that the proper Wanchoo j;
rule of construction which should now be applied, at
any rate after January 26, 1950, is that. the State in
India whether in the Centre or in the States is bound
by the law qnless there is an express exemption in
favour of the State or an exemption can. be inferred
by necessary implication. The view taken by the
Calcutta. High Court in this connection should lie
accepted and the view expressed by the Privy Council
in Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of
the City of Bombay (1) should no longer be accepted as
the rule for construction of statutes pas~ed by Indian
legislatures.
Let m·e then com~ to the question wbether on the
view I have taken of the rule of construction, the
prosecution in this case can be allowed to continue.
There is nothing in the Act of 1923 or in the Act of
1951 exempting the State specifically from any of the
provisions of the Calcutt!/' Municipal Act. In this
case the State is being prosecuted under s. 488 (or
s. 537 now) and that section provides for fine for
breach of s. 386 (or s. ~7 now). The provision,is a
penal provision and immediately a question arises
whether the State as such, l!>part from its individual
officers as natural. persons, is liable to prosecution__
under the criminal law or has to· be exempted froin
the operation of the provisions of criminal statutes by
necessary implication. A criminal proceeding general.
ly ends with punishment which may bejmprisonment,
or fine, or both. Now it does ncrt require .any elaborate
reason to realise that the Sta.te as such cannot be
sentenced to imprisonment because there is no way of
(1) (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. a71.
HJO
Sl:PREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
1960
keeping it in prison; therefore, by necessary implication,
the Sta.t,e is exempt from all penal statutes and
Director nj
Raiio .. ing 6
provisions providing for sentences of imprisonment or
Disfrib1.i10"
death. Then come those penal provisions which
v.
impose fines, like the present. case, and the question is
The Corpor•ho• whether in such a case also the State must be deemed
0
! Co1<ut1a
by necessary implication to be exempt from the penal
6
provision. Generally speaking fines when inflicted by
Others
courts
are realised by the State and go to th£> coffers
WaNchoo ].
of the State. In effect, therefore if the Sta.to as such
is to be prosecuted under a penal statute imposing
fine the result is that the Court will sentence the State
to fino which will go t-0 the State itself. It is obdous
that if such is the result of a prosecution, namely
that the accuHcd gets the fine, the intention could
never be that such a prosecution should bo launched.
Therefore where tho penalty is fine and the fine goes
to the State, it must be held that by necessary implication the law does not intend the State to be prosecuted for such an offence. In the present case I
find that under s. 81 of the Act of 1923 (or the corresponding s. 115 of the Act of 1951) the fines impose.cl
by the Magistrate will not go to the Corporation but
in the usual way to the State. under the: circumstances whatever ether methods may be possible for
enforcing the provisions of s. 386 (or s. 437 now)
against the State it cannot be intended to be enforced
by prosecution resulting in fine which would gc to the
St.ate itself. In these circumstances it must be held
t!>at. b,\' neces.'11\ry implication tho State is exempt
from the penal provisions contained in s. 4S& (uow
s. 537). I would therefore allow the appeal, set a.side
the judgment of the High Court 'and restore the order
of acquittal by the Magistrate.
Appeal allcwed.
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