STATE OF U.P. versus DEOMAN UPADHYAYA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 May 1960 | [1961] 1 S.C.R. 14 | 1960 INSC 107
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 May 1960
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR*, K. SUBBA RAO*, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1/1960
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1961] 1 S.C.R. 14
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 107
Text of the judgment
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961(1)]
19~0
STATE OF U. P.
Jo.toy 6.
v.
DEOMAN UPADHYAYA
(f;. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, K. SUDBA RAO,
M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Criminal Law -Evidence-Statement made to police officer leading to discot:e.,y--SlaJ.ute making stalcmcnt admissible u:lun made by
perso11 in custody and inadmissible when made fry persan not in
custody-Wlicthcr offends equality before t/ie law-" Persans in
custody " - "Person accused of an offeiu:e "-Connotation of-Circumstantial evidence-Indian Evidence Act, I872 (I of I872), s. 27
-Code of Criminal Procedure. I898 (Act 5 of I898), s. I62(2)Co11stitution of India, Art. I4.
The respondent was tried for the murder o! one Sukhdei
early on the morning o! June 19. 1958. The evidence against
him was entirely circumstantial and consisted o! the following
facts: (i) on the 18th evening there was an altercation between
the respondent and Sukhdei during which he slapped her and
threatened that he would smash her lace; (ii) on the 18th ewning the respondent borrowed a gandasa lrom one Mahesh; (iii)
before day break on the 19th he was seen going towards and
taking a bath in the village tank; (iv) the respondent absconded
immediately thcrPafter; (v) he was arrested on the 20th and on
21st he offered to hand over the gandasa which he said he had
thrown in the tank and thereafter he took the gandasaout o! the
tank, and (vi) the gandasa was found to be stained with human
hlood. The Sessions Judge accepted this evidence, found that
the irresistible conclusion was that the respondent had committed the murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal the
lltgh Court held that s. 27 o! the Indian Evidence Act offended
Art. 14 o! the Constitution and was void as it created an unjustifiable discrimination bet"'·ecn persons in custody whose statement leading to discovery was made admissible and persons not
in custody whose statement was not made admissible even if it
led to a discovery ; and consequently they held sub-s. (2) o!
s. 162 o! the Code o! Criminal Procedure in so !ar as it related
to s. 27 o! the Indian E\'ic!ence Act also to he void. As a result,
the High Couit ruled out the statement o! the respondent that
he had thrown the gm1dasa in the tank as inadmissible. They
further held that the story tbat the appellant had borrowed the
gandasa from Mahesh was unreliable. The rest o! the evidence
in the view o! the High Court was not sufficient to prove the
guilt o! the respondent and accordingly they acquitted him.
Held, (per S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur, Hidayatullah and
Shah, JJ-, Subba Rao, J .. dissenting), thats. 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act and sub-s. (2) of s. 162 o! the Code of Criminal
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
15
Procedure did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution and were
I960
not void.
Article 14 does not provide that all laws must be uniform State of U. P.
v.
and universally applicable; it merely forbids imwoper or inviDeoman
dious distinctions by conferring rights or privileges upon a class
Upad~yaya
of persons arbitrarily selected from out of a larger group who
are similarly circumstanced, and between whom and others not
so favoured, no distinction reasonably justifying different treatment exists. Between persons in custody and persons not in
custody the legislature has made a real distinction by enacting
distinct rules regarding admissibility of statements confessional
or otherwise made by them.
In considering the constitutionality of a statute on the
ground whether it has given equal treatment to all persons similarly circumstanced it has to be remembered that the legislature
has to deal with practical prob.lems; the question is not to be
judged by merely enumerating other theoretically possible situations to which the statute might have been but has not applied.
A doctrinaire approach is to be avoided. Persons not in custody
making statements to the police leading to discovery of facts
were a possible but rare class. A person who approaches a
police officer investigating an offence and offers to give information leading to· the discovery of an incriminating fact must be
deemed to have surrendered himself to the police and to be in
custody within the meaning of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Att.
A law which makes provision for cases where the need is most
felt cannot be struck down becaus~ there are other instances to
which it might have been applied. The object of the legislation
being both to punish offenders proved to be guilty and to protect persons who may be compelled to make confessional statements, the provisions of s. 27 are reasonable as they make
information admissible on. the ground that the discovery of a
fact pursuant to the statement made by a. person in custody is a
guarantee of the truth' of that statement.
Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy, (1921) I.L.R.
49 Cal. 167 and Santokhi Belaar v. King Emperor,. (1933) I.L.R.
12 Pat. 241, referred to.
·
West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, (1937) 300 U.S. 379: Sr L. Ed. 703, Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., (1926) i70 U.S. 402:
70 L. Ed. 654 and Miller v. Wilson, (r9r5) 236 U.S. 373: 59
L. Ed. 628, relied on.
The expression "a person accused of any offence" in s. 27
is merely descriptive of the persons against whom evidence is
sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. It is not necessary
that the person should have been accused of an offence at the
time when he made the statement leading to the discovery of a
fact.
The statement made by the respondent that he will recover
16
v.
J)eomati
li padhyara
SUPREME coeRT REPORTS
(1961(1)]
the gandasa which he has thrown in the tank is admissible in
evidence.and may be used against him. This statement together
with the other facts proved; even if the fact of the respondent
borrowing gandasa from Mahesh were excluded, established a
chain which .<ias consistent only with his guilt and inconsistent
with his innocence.
Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor, (1939) L. R. 66 I.A. 66,
applied.
Per Subba Rao, ].-Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act
was void as it violated Art. 14 of the Constitution. The classification of accused persons for the purpose of making their confessions admissible into those in custody and those not in
custody was not based upon any intelligible differentia nor was
it reasonable. It was a pure surmise that the legislature may
have thought that the confession of an accused in custody leading to a recovery was a substitute for an extra-judicial..confes·
sion that he might have made if he was not in custody. It was
not correct that the number of accused not in custody making
statements or confessions leading to a discovery was not appreciable and that they need .not be provided for. Till the year
1872 the legislature treated accused in custody and those not in
custody in a similar manner but in that year by an accidental
omission of the word "or" it made a distinction between them
It was, therefore, not right to speculate and hold that the
legislature consciously excluded from the operation of s. 27
accused not in custody on the ground that they were few in
number. Besides, the authorities did not justify classification
on the basis of numbers or enable the legislature to include the
many and exclude the few from the operation of law without
there being an intelligible differentia between them. The
taking into custody did not amount to the giving of the statutory or implied caution and did not provide any intelligible
differentia for the classification.
·
In re Mottai Tlievar, A.LR. 1952 Mad. 586, Durlav Namasudra v. King Emperor, (1932) LL.R. 59 Cal. 1040, Dconandan
Dusadh v. King Emperor, (1928) l.L.R. 7 Pat. 411, Santokhi.
Beldar v. King Emperor, (1933) I.L.R. 12 Pat. 241, Bharosa
Ramdayal v. Emperor, A.LR. 1941 Nag. 86 and ]alla v. Emperor, A.LR. 1931 Lah. 278, referred to.
Sakhawal Ali v. The Stale of Orissa, (1955] l S.C.R. 1004,
distinguished.
Joh" A. Walson v. Stale of Maryland, (1910) 218 U.S. 173:
54 L. Ed. 987, Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Harry 0. Blagg,
(1915) 235 U.S. 571 : 59 L. Ed. 364, St. Louis, Iron M"!mtain &
Southern Railway Co. v. State of Arkansas, (1916) 240 C. S. 518:
6o L. Ed. 776, Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., (192G) 270 U.S. 402:
70 L. Ed. 654 and West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, (1937)
300 U. S. 379 : 81 L. Ed. 703, considered.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Per Hidayatullah, ].-There was always a clear distinction between a person not accused of an offence nor in the
custody of a police officer and one who was. Section 27 has State of U, P.
v,
been bodily taken from th~ English law. In both the laws there
Deoman
was greater solicitude for a person who made a statement when
Upadhyaya
the danger in which he stood ,had not been brought home to
him than for one who knew of the danger. In English law, the
caution gave him the warning, and in India the fact of his being
in custody took the place of the caution. The law thus classified accused persons into two: (i) those who had the danger
brought home to them by detention on a charge and (ii} those
who were free. The protection given to these two classes was
·different. The law was concerned with seeing !airplay, and this
was achieved by insisting that an unguarded statement was not
admissible. The need for the caution was there, and this caution
was forcefully brought home to an accused when he was in
police custody. There was ample protection to the accused in
custody as only that portion of his statement was made admissible which resulted in the discovery of a material fact otherwise unknown to the police.
Case law discussed.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 1 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 11, 1959, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 325/1959.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
G. C. Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for the appellant.
H.J. Umrigar, 0. P. Rana and D. Goburdhan, for
the respondent.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. ·N.
Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L.
Iyengar and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener (The Attorney-General for India).
1960. May 6. The Judgment of S. K. Das, J. L.
Kapur and J.C. Shah, JJ., was delivered by Shah, J.
K. Subba Rao, J., and M. Hidayatullah, J., delivered
separate Judgments.
•
SHAH J.-The Civil and Sessions Judge, Gyanpur,
convicted Deoman Upadhyaya-respondent to this
appeal-of intentionally causing the death of one
Sukhdei in the early hours of June 19, 191$8, at
3
Shah J .
'
18
Stall of l.i. l'.
v.
De om an
Upodhyay•
Shah J.
'
'
. I
I
SUPRE:\1E COUHT REPORTS
[1961(1)]
village Anandadib, District V ara.nasi, and sentenced
him to death subject to confirmation by the High
Court. The order of conviction and sentence was set
a.side by the High Court of Judicature at Alla.ha.bad.
Against tba.t order of acquittal, the State of Uttar
Pradesh has appealed to this court with a. certificate
granted by the High Court.
Deoma.n wa.s married to one Dulari. Dula.ri's
pa.rent,s ha.d died in her infancy and she wa.s brought
up by Sukbd!li, her cousin. Sukhdoi gifted certain
a.gricultura.l la.nds inherited by her from her father to
Dula.ri. The lauds gifted to Dulari and the Janel~ of
Sukhdei were cultiv11.tcd by l\Jaha.bir, uncle of Deoma.n. Mahabir and Deoma.n entered imo ncgotia.tions
for the sale of some of these lands situated at v ilia.go
Ana.nda.dih, but Sukhdei refused to agree to the
proposed sale. According to the case of the prosecution, in the evening of ,June 18, lli58, there was a.n
altercation between Deuman and Sukhdci. Deuman
slapped Sukhdei on her face a.nd threatened that he
would smash her face. Early in the morning of
June 19, Deoman ma.do a murderous assault wit.h a
gandasa (which wo.s borrowed by him from one
Ma.hesh) upon Sukhdei who was sleeping in the courtyard near her house a.nd killed her on the spot and
thereafter, he threw the gandasa into the village tank,
washed himself and absconded from the village. He
was arrested in the afternoon of the 20th near the
village Ma.napur. On June 21, he offered to hand
over the ganda8a which he said, he had thrown in the
village ta.nk, and in the presence of the investigating
officer a.nd certain witne8808, he waded into the ta.nk
and took out a ganda8a, which, on examination by
the Serologist, was found to be stained with human
blood.
Deoma.n was tried for the murder of Sukbdoi before
the Court of :Session o.t Gyanpur. The trial Judge, on
a consideration of th11 evidence led by the prosecution,
held the following facts proved : (a) In the evening of June 18, 1958, there was a.n
altercation between l::lukbdei and Deoma.n over the
proposed transfer of lands in village Ananda.dih a.nu
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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and in the course of the altercation, Deoman slapped
Sukhdei and threatened her that he would smash her State of U. P.
"mouth" (face).
v.
(b) In the evening of .June 18, 1958, Deoman
Upadhyaya
borrowed a gandasa (Ex. l) from one Mahesh.
(c) Before day-break on June 19, 1958, Deoman
Shah ].
was seen by a witness for the prosecut.ion hurrying
towards the tank and shortly thereafter he was seen
by another witness taking his bath in the tank.
(d) Deoman absconded immediately thereafter
and was not to be found at Anandadih on J nne 19,
1958.
(e) Tha.t on June 21, 1958, Deoman, in the presence of the investigating officer and two witnesses,
offered to hand over the gandasa which he said he
had thrown into a tank, and thereafter he led the
officer and the witnesses to the tank at Anandadih and
in their presence waded into the tank and fetched the
yandasa (Ex. 1) out of the water. This gandasa was
found hy the Chemical Examiner and Serologist to
be stained with human blood.
In the view of the Sessions Judge, on the facts
found, the ' only irresistible conclusion ' was that
Deoman had committed the murder of Sukhdei early
in the morning of June 19, 1958, at Anandadih. He
observed, "The conduct of the accused (Deoman) as.
appearing from the movements disclosed by him,
when taken in conjnction with the recovery at his
instance of the gandasa stained with human blood,
which gandasa had been borrowed only in the evening
preceding the brutal hacking of Sukhdei, lea ~es no
room for doubt that Deoman and no other person was
responsible for this calculated and cold-blooded murder". At the hearing of the reference made hy the
court of Session for confirmation of sentence and the.
appeal filed by Deoman before the High Court at
Allahabad, it was contended that the evidence that
Deoman made a statement before the police and two
witnesses on June 21, 1958, that he had thrown the
gandasa into the tank a.nd that he would take it out
and hand it over, /was inadmissible in evidence,
because s. 27 of t.he Indian Evidence Act which
20
State of U. P.
,..
De om an
Upadhyaya
Shah ].
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SUPREME COCRT HEPORTS
[1961(1)]
rendered suoh a. statement a.dmissiblo, discriminated
between persons in custody a.nd persons not in custody
and wa.s therefore void a.s violative of Art. 14 of tho
Constitution. The Division Bench hearing tho appeal
referred the following two questions for opinion of a.
Full Bench of tho court ;1. Whether. s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is
void because it offends against the provisions of Art.
14 of the Constitution ? a.nd
2. Whether sub-s. (2) of s. 162 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in so fa.r a.s it relates to s. 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act is void ?
The reference wa.s heard by lit C. Desai, B. Mukhorjee a.nd A. P. Srivastava, JJ. Mukherjee, J., a.nd
Sriva.sta.va, J., opined on the first question, tha.t" s. 27
of the lndia.n Evidence Act creates an unjustifiable
discrimination between " persons in custody" a.nd
"persons out of custody ", a.nd in tha.t it offends
a.gs.inst Art. 14 of the Constitution a.nd is unonforcoa.ble in its present form ", and on the second question,
they held tha.t sub-s. (2) of s. 162 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure " in so fa.r a.s it relates to s. 27
of the Indian Evidence Act is void".
Desai, J.,
answered the two questions in the nega.tive.
The reference for confirmation of the doa.th sentence
a.nd the a.ppea.l filed by Deoma.n were then heared by
another Division Bench. In the light of the opinion
of the Full Bench, the learned Judges excluded from
consideration the statement ma.de by Deoman in the
presence of the police officer a.nd the witnesses offering to point out the gandasa which he ha.cl thrown in
the village ta.nk. They held that the story that Deo.
man ha.cl borrowed a. gandasa in tho evening of .June
18, 1958, from Mahesh wa.s unreliable. They accepted the conclusions of the Sessions Judge on points
(a.), (c) a.nd (d) a.nd also on point (e) in so far a.s it
related to the production by Deoma.n in the presence of the police officer and search witnesses of the
gandasa after wading into the tank, but a.s in their
view, the evidence was insufficient to prove the guilt
of Deoman beyond reasonable doubt, they acquitted
him of the offence of murder. At the instance of the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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State of Uttar Pradesh, the High Court granted a certificate that " having regard to the general importance· State of l..[. P.
of the question as to the constitutional validity of
v.
s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act", the case was fit
Deoman
Upadhyaya
for appeal to this court.
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of a
Shah ].
group of sections relating to the relevancy of certain
forms of admissions made by. persons accused of offences. Sections 24 to 30 of the Act deal with ad mis·
sibility of confessions, i.e., of statements made by a
person stating or suggesting that he has committed a crime. By s. 24, in a criminal proceeding
against a person, a confession made by him is inadmissible if it appears to the court to have been
caused by inducement, threat or promise having
reference to the charge and proceeding from a person
in authority. By s. 25, there is an absolute ban
against proof at the trial of a person accused of an
offence, of a confession made to a police officer. The
ban which is partial under s. 24 and complete under
s. 25 apy,Jies equally whether or not the person against
whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial
was at the time of making the confession in custody.
For the ban to be effective the person need not have
~een accused of an offence when he made the confession. The expression, " accused person " in s. 24 and
the expression " a person accused of any offence "
have the same connotation, and describe the person
against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. As observed in Pakala Narayan
Swamy v. Emperor (1), by the JudicialCommittee of
the Privy Council," s. 25 covers a confession made to
a police officer before any investigation has begun or
otherwise not. in the course of an investigation". The
adjectival clause "accused of any offence" is therefore descriptive of the person against whom a confessional statement made by him is declared not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person
at the time of 'making the statement for the applicability of the ban. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence
Act by its first paragraph provides " No confession
(1) (1939) L.R. 66 I.A. 66.
22
SCPHEME COCRT llEPORTS [1961(1))
1960
ma.de h.v any person whilst he is in the custody of a.
.
polire ollic•.,r, unleRR it be ma.de in the immediate proState of i;. P.
senco
of a. Magistrate, shall be proved as a.go.inst a. perv.
son accused ·Of any offen co." By this section, a. conDrun1ati
Upadhyaya
fession ma.de by a. person who is in custody is declared
not prova.bln unle•• it is made in the immediate preShah ].
sonce of a Magistrate. Whereas s. 25 prohibits proof
of a. confession ma.do by a pers.011 to a police officer
whether or not at th.., time of ma.king the confession,
ho wa.s in custody, s. 26 prohibitR proof of a confession by a pPrsou in cust-Ody ma.do to any person unless
the co11fcssio11 is ma.de in tho immediate presence of a
:l-1a.gistratc. s.. c1ion 27 which is in form of a proviso
state•" Provided that, when any fact is d<'posed to a.s
discovered in consequence of information received
from a. person accused of any offence, in the custody
.of a police officPr, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may b~ proved."
The expression, "accusod of any offence" ins. 27, as
ins. 25, is .. lsode;criptive of the person concerned, i.e.,
against a person wbo is accused of an offence, s. 27
renders provable certain statements made by him
whilf' he was in the custody of a. police officer. Section 27 i:; fouuded ou the principle that even though
the evidence relaf.ing to confession1tl or oLher statement a made by a. persou, whilst ho is in the c11study
of a poliee officer, is tainted.and therefore inadmissible,
if the trut.h of the informa.t.iou given by him is assured
by the di~covery .,fa. fac:t, it. m11.y be presumed to be
untainted n.nd is therofore declared prova.blo in so far
as .it disl inctly relates to the fact thereby discovered.
En>n though s. 27 is in the form of n. proviso to s. 26,
the two seetions do not nrcess:uilY deal with the evidence of the same d1ara.cter. The ban imposed bys. 26
is against the proof of confessional statements. Section 27 is cuacerncd with the proof of information
whether it amounts to a confession or not., which
leads lo discovery of facts. By s. 27, even if a fact is
deposed to as discovered in consequence of information receiVPd, only that much Of tbe information is
a.dmis8ible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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By s. 26, a confession made in the presence of a Magistrate is made provable in its entirety.
Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also
enacts a rule of evidence. This section in so far as it
is material for purposes of this case, prohibits, but not
so as to affect the admissibility of information to the
ext.ent permissible under s. 27 of the Evidence Act,
use of statements by any person to a police officer in
the course of an inve•tigation under Ch. XIV of the
Code, in any enquiry or trial in which such person is
charged for any offence, under invest.igation at the
time when the statement was made.
On an analysis' of ss. 24 to 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act, and s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
following materia.l propositions emerge:(a) Whether a person is in custody or outside, a
confession made by him to a police officer or the making of .which is procured by inducement, t.hreat, or
promise having reference to the charge against him
and proceeding from a person in authority, is not pro:
vable against him in any proceeding in which he is
charged with the commission of an offence.
(li~ A confession made by a person whilst he is in
the custody of a police officer to a person other than
a police officer is not provable in a proceeding in which
he is charged with the commission of an offence unless
it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
(c) That part of the information given by a person whilst in police custody whether the information
is confessional or otherwise, which distinctly relates to
the fact thereby discovered but no more, is provable
in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence.
(d) A statement whether it amounts to a confession or not made by a person when be is not in custody, to another person such latter person not being a
police officer may be proved if it is otherwise relevant.
(e). A statement made by a person to a police
officer in the course of an investigation of an offence
under· Cb. XIV of the, Code of Criminal Procedure,
cannot except to the ext.ent permitted by s. 27 of the
State of U. !'.
v.
Deoinan
TJpadhyaya
Shah ].
•
24
State of U. P.
\'.
Deoman
Upadhyaya
Shah }.
•
SUPREME COURT ltEPOH.TS
(1961(1)]
Indian Evidence Act, be used for any purpose a.t a.ny
enquiry or trial in respect of a.ny offence under investigation at the time when the statement wa.s ma.de in
which he is concerned as a. person accused of a.n
offence.
A confession made by a. person not in custody is
therefore a.dmissiblc in evidence aga.iust him in a crimina.1 proceeding unloss it. is procured in the manner
described in s. 24, or is made to a police officer. A
statement made by a. person, if it is not confessional,
is provable iu all proceedings unless it is made to a.
police officer in the course of an investigation, and the
proceeding in which it is sought to be proved is one for
the trial of that person for the offence under in vestigatiou when he ma.de that statement. Whereas information given by a. person in custody is to the extent
to which it distinctly relates to a fact thereby discovered is made provable, by s. 162 of tl:ie Code of Criminal Procedure, such information given by a person
not in custody to a. police officer in the course of the
investigation of an offonce is not provable. This distinction ma.y appear to be somewhat paradoxical.
Sections 25 a.nd 26 wero enacted not because the law
presumed the statements to be untrue, but having
regard to the tainted nature of the source of the evidence, prohibited them from being received in evidence.
It is manifest tha.t the class of persons who needed
protection most where those in the custody of the
police a.nd persons not in the custody of police did not
neod the same degree of protection. But by the combined operation of s. 27 of the Evidence Act a.nd s. 162
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the a.dmissibilty
in evidence against a person in a. criminal proceeding
of a. statemeut ma.de to a. police officer lea.ding to the
discovery of a. fact depends for its determination on
the question whether he wa.s in custody a.t the time
of ma.king the statement. It is provable if he wa.s
in custody a.t the time when he made it, otherwise it
is not.
Are persons in custody, by this distinction depri vcd
of" equality before the la.w, or the equal protection
of the laws" within the meaning of Art. 14 of the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
Constitution ? By the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution, it is not
predicated that all laws must be uniform and universally applicable; the guarantee merely forbids improper or invidious distinctions by conferring rights or
privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected
from out of a larger group who are similarly circurns.
tanced, and between whom and others not so favoured, no distinction reasonably justifying different
treatment exists: it does not give a guarantee of the
same or similar treatment to all persons without reference to the relevant differences. The State has a
wide discretion in the selection of classes amongst
persons, things or transactions for purposes of legislation. Between persons in. custody and persons not in
custody, distinction has evidently been made by the
Evidence .\ct in some matters and they are differently treated. Persons who were, at the time when
the statements sought to be proved were made, in
custody have been given in some matters greater protection com pared to persons not in custody. Confessional or other statements made by persons not in
custody may be admitted in evidence, unless such
statements fall within ss. 24 and 25 whereas all confessional sta.tements made by persons in custody
except those in the presence of a Magistrate are not
provable. This distinction between persons. in custody and persons not in custody, in the context of
admissibility of statements made by them concerning
the offence' charged cannot be called arbitrary, artificial or evasive : the legislature has made a real distinction between these two classes, and has enacted
distinct rules about admissibility of statements confessional or otherwise made by them.
There is nothing in the Evidence Act which precludes proof of information given by a person not in
custody, which relates to the facts thereby discovered;
it is by virtue of tlie ban imposed by s. 162 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, that a statement made
to a police officer in the course of the investigation of
an offence under Oh. XIV . by a person not in police
4
Stale of U. P.
v.
Deoman
Upadhyaya
Shah j.
26
.<:tatt of {i. !'.
v.
L)to,,1at1
Upadh)·aya
Shah }.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961(1)]
custody at t.he time it wa.s made even if it leads to
tho discovery of a. fact is not provable aga.inRt him at
the trial for tha.t offence. But the di~tinction which
it may he rememher.-d dneR not proceod on the sa.me
lines as under t.he Evidenco Act., arising in the ma.ttel'
of a.dmissibilit.y of sueh statements ma.de to the police
officer in the courBo of an investigation between persons in custody a.nd per8ons not in cu8tody, ha.s little
pra.ctioal significance. When a person not in onstrnly
a.pproa.ches a. police officer inrnstigating an offence
a.nd offers t-0 give information lea.ding to the discovery
of a. fact, having a bee.ring on the charge which
may be made against him he may appropriately be
deemed to have surrendered himself to the police.
Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
contemplate any formality before a. person can be s1lid
to be ta.ken in custody : sub~ission to the custody by
word or action by a person in sufficient. A person
directly giving to a. police officer by word of month
information which may be used a.s evidence against
him, ma.v be deemed to have submit.led himself to the
"custody " of the police officer within the meaning of
s. 27 of tho lndia.p. Evidence Act: Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh (1), Santokhi Beldar v. King
Emperor('). Exceptional oases may cert.a.inly be imagined in which a. person ma.y give information without presenting himself before a. police officer who is
in veHtigating an offence. For instance, he ma.y write
a. letter and give such information or may Rend a. telephonic or other message to the police officer. But in
considering whether a. statute is unconstitutional on
the ground that the law has given equal treatment to
all persons similarly circumstanced, it mn~t be remembt1red that the legislature has to deal with practical
problems; the quest.ion is not to be judged by merely
enumerating othur theoretically possible situations to
which the statute might have been but is not applied.
As has often been said in considering whether there
has been a. denial of the equal protection of the laws,
a doct.rina.ire approach is to be a.voided. A person
who has committed an offence, but who is not in
(1) (1921) l.L.R. 49 Cal. 167.
(2) (1933) !.L.R. 12 Pat. 241.
S.C.R.
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
custody, normally would not without surrendering
himself to the police give information voluntarily to a
police officer investigating the commission of that
offence leading to the discovery of material evidence
supporting a charge against him for the commission
of the' offence. The Parliament enacts laws to deal
with practical problems which are likely to arise in the
affairs of men. Theoretical possibility of an offender
not in custody because the police officer investigating
the offence has not been able to get at any evidence•
against him giving information to the police officer
without surrendering himself to the police, which may
lead to the discovery of an important fact by the
police, cannot be ruled out; but such an occurrence
would indeed be rare. Our attention has not been
rnvited to any case in which it was even alleged that
information leading to the discovery of a faot which
may be used in evidence against a person was given by
him to a police officer in the course of investigation
without such person having surrendered himself.
Cases like Deonandan Dasadh v. King Emperor (1),
Santokhi Beldar v. King Emperor (2 ), Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor('), In re Mottai Thevar('), In re
-- Peria Guruswami ('), Bharosa Ramdayal v. Emperor(')
and Jalla v. Emperor(') and others to which our
attention was invited are all cases in which t,he accused persons who made statements leading to discovery
of facts were either in the a.ctual , custody of police
officers or had ,surrendered themselves to the police at
the time of, or before making the statements attributed to them, and do not illustrate the existence of a
real and substantial class of persons not in custody
giving information to police officers .in the course of
investigation leading to discovery of facts which may
.
be used as evidence against those persons.
In that premise and considered in the background
that " persons in custody " and "persons not in custody " do not stand on the same footing nor require
(1) (19281 !LR 7 Pat. 411,
(2) (1933) LL.R 12 Pat. 241,
(3) (1932) l.L.R. 59 Cal. 1040.
(4) A.LR. 1952 Mad. 586.
(5) LLR 1942 Mad, 77,
(6) LLR 1940 Nag, 670.
(7) AJ.R 1931 I.ah. 278,
Stcife of U. P.·
upadhyttyti
Shah ].
28
v.
f)f~!tf/flll
l_ fadltyn)rt
.'>hali .f.
StiPitEME COCRT REPORTS
[l96I(l)]
identical protect.ion, is the more theoretical possibility nf some degree of inequality of the protection of
the laws relating to the admissibility of evidence between persons in custqdy and persons not in custody
by itself a ground of striking down a salutory provision of the law of evidenco ?
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. is adopted
from the last clauso of s. I of the 14th Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States of America, and
it may reasonably bn assumed that our Constituent
Assembly when it enshrined tho guarantee of eq11al
protection of the laws in our Constitution, was a.ware
of its content delimited by judicial interpretation in
the United St.ates of America.. In considering the
authorities of the superior courts in the United States,
we would not therefore be incorporating principles
foreign to our Constitution, or be proceeding upon the
slippery ground of apparent similarity of expressions
or concepts in an a.lien jurisprudence developed by a
society whose approach to similar problems on account
of historical or other reasons differs fr,>m ours. In
West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish (1 ), in <lea.ling
with the content of the guarantee of tho equal protection of the laws, Hughes, C. J., observed at
P- 400:" This court bas frequontly hold that the legislative authority, acting within its propn field, is not
bound to extend its ri>gulation to all cases which it
might possibly reach. The legislature "is free to
recognise degree of ha.rm a.nd it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is
deemed t-0 be clearest ''. If "the la.w presumably hits
the evil where it iH most folt, it is not to be overthrown. ho.cause there aro other instances to which it
might have been applied ''. There is no " doctrinaire
requirement" that the legislation should be couched
in all embracing terms''. '
Holmes, J., in Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co.('), in his
dissonting judgment observed :" A classification is not to be pronounced arbitrary
(1) (1937) 300 U.S. 379: 81 L. Ed. 703.
(2) (<926) 270 U.S. 402 : 70 L. Ed. 654.
.....
-,
S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
29
because it goes on practical grounds and attacks only
those objects that exhibit or foster an evil on a large
scale. It is not required to be mathematically precise and to embrace every case that theoretically is
capable of doing the same harm. "if ~he law presumably hits the evil, where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which
it might have been applied." Miller v. Wilson(1).
-McKenna, J., in Health and Milligan Mfg. Co. v.
Worst (2 ), observed :
"Classification must have relation to the purpose
of the legislature. But logical appropriateness of the
inclusion or exclusion of objects or persons is not required. A classification may not be merely arbitrary, but
necessarily there must be great freedom of discretion,
even though it. result in 'illadvised, unequal, and
oppressive· legislation'. ..... Exact wisdom and nice
adaption of remedies are not required by the 14th
Amendment, nor the crudeness nor the impolicy nor
even the injustice of state laws redressed by it."
Sections 25 and 26 are manifestly intended to hit at
an evil, viz., to guard against the danger of receiving
in evidence testimony from tafoted sources about
statements made by persons accused of offences. But
these sections' forin part of a statute which codifies the
law relating to the relevancy of evidence and prodf of
facts in judicial proceedings. The State is as much
concerned with punishing offenders who may be prayed guilty of committing offences as itis concerned with
protecting persons who may be compelled to give confessional statements. If s. 27 renders information
admissible on the ground that the discovery of a fact
' made by a person m
. custody
pursuant to a statement
is a guarantee of the truth of the statement made by
him, and t.he legislature has chosen to make on that
ground an exception to the rule prohibiting proof of
such statement, that rule is not to be deemed unconstitutional, because of the possibility of abnormal
instances to which the legislature might have, but has
not extended the rule. The principle of admitting
.
(1) (1915) 236 U.S. 373; 59 L. Ed. 628.
(2) (1907) 207 U.S. 338; 52 L. Ed. 236.
State of U. P.
v.
Deom.an
Upadhyaya
Shah j.
30
SttJlr '>f U P.
v.
/Jf'f)l)l(Jli
l;pridhyn.ra
Shnh j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961(1 )j
evidl'nco of statoments me.do by a person giving iniormation leading to the discovery of facts which may be
used in evidence l\gainst, him is manifostly reasonable.
The fact that the principle iH restricted to persons in
custody will not by itself be 11 ground for holding that
there is a.11 attempted hostile discrimination because
the rule of admissibility of evidence is not extended to
a. possibfo, but an uncommon or abnormal class of
cases.
Counsol for the defence contended that in any event
Deuman was not a.t the time when he made tho stat.cmrnt. attrihutod to him, accuHed of any offence and on
that. a.ccount also ape.rt from tho constitutional pica.,
the statement was not provable. This contention is
unsound. As we havo already ob81lrved, the expression "accused of any offence " is descript.ive of the
person against whom evidcnco rr.•lating to information
e.ll~ged t.o be given by him is made prove.hie by s. 27
of the Evidence Act. It docs nut. predicate 1~ formal
accusation against him at tht1 time of making tho
statement sought to be proved, as a. condition of its
applicability.
In that view, tho 11igh Court wati in error in holding thats. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 1rnd ;;. 162,
sub-s. (2), of the Code of Criminal Procedure in •o fo.r as
'that sect.ion relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act' are voicJ e.s offending Art. 14 of the Const.iLution.
The High Court acquitted Deoman 011 t.110 ground
that his statement which led to tho discovery of tho
gundasa is inadmissible. As we differ from t.hc High
Court on that guofition, we must proceed to review the
evidence in the light of that statement in so far as it
distinctly rPlates to thr. fact thernby discovored boing
ad m issi blc.
The evidence disclo~os th .. t Deuman arid his uncle,
Mahabir, were anxious to di8pose of tho property of
Sukhdoi and of Dule.ri 1rnd Sukhdei obstructed such
dispo8al. Jn the e\•ening of Juuc 18, 1958, there was
an altercation between Sukhdei and Denman over the
proposed disposal of t.ho property, in the presence of
witnesses, Shobhuath and MaheHh,-and Deome.11 sla.pped Sukhdei and threatened that he would " smash her
0
'
S.C.R.
-·
).
::r
-I
->·
)
'
-\
'
(
•
~
r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
31
mouth". In the morning of June 19, 1958, the dead
body of Sukhdei with severa.l incised injuries caused
by a gandasa was found lying in her court.yard.
Deoman was seen in the villa.ge on that day early in
the morning hurrying· towards the villagA tank and
'taking a bath', but thereafter he absconded from the
village and was not found till sometime in the afternoon of the 20th. In his examination by the court, he
has stated that he had left Anandadih early in the
morning of June 19, on business and that he was not
absconding, but there is no evidence in support of that
plea. The evidence discloses that in the presence of
witnesses, Shobhnath and Raj Bahadur Singh, Deoman
waded into the village tank and" fetched the gandasa"
which was lying hidden in the mud at the bottom of
the tank and that gandasa was found by the Serologist
on examination to be stained with human blood. Tbe
High Court has agreed with the findings of the Trial
Court on this evidence. The evidence that Deoman
had in the presence of the witnesses, Shobhnath and
Raj Bahadur Singh offered to point out the gandasa
which he said he had thrown into the tank was accepted by the Trial Court and the High Court has not
disagreed with that view of the Trial Court, though
it differed from the Trial Court as to its admissibility.
The evidence relating to the borrowing of the gandasa
from witness, l\fahesh, in the evening of June 18, 1958,
by Deoman has not been accepted by the High Court
and according to the settled practice of this Court,
that evidence may be discarded. It was urged that
Deoman would not have murdered Sukhdei, because
by murdering her, he stood to gain nothing as the properties which belonged to Sukhdei could not devolve
upon his wife Dulari in the normal -course of inheritance. But the quarrels between Deoman and Sukhdei
arose not because the former was claiming that Dulari
was heir presumptive to Sukhdei's estate, but because
8ukhdei resisted attempts on Deoman's part to dispose
-of the property belonging to her and to Dulari. The
evideuce that Deoman slapped Sukhdei and threatened
her that he would "smash her face" coupled with the
circumstances that on the morning of the murder of
State of U. f.J
v.
Deoinan
Upadhyaya
Shah ].
32
Sf(Jft
of ti. P.
v.
D~oman
. Shah j.
SUPRE:\JE COlJHT REPORTS
(1961( I)]
Sukhdei, Deoman absconded from the village after
washing himself in :the village tank and after his
arrest made a statement in the presence of wit.nesse•
tha.t he had thrown the garuia.9a in t.he village tank
and produced the 8ame, establishes a strong chain of
circumstances leading to the irresistible inference that
Deoman killed Sukhdei early in tho morning of ,June
19, 1958. The learned trial Judge held on the evidence
that Deoma.n was proved to be the offender. That con.
clusion is, in our viow, not weakened because tho
evidence relating to the borrowing of the garulasa from
witness Mahesh in the evening of June I~, 1958, way
not be used against him. The High Court was of the
view that the mere fetching of the garulasa from it,s
hiding place did not establish that Deoma.11 himself
ha.d put it in the tank, and an inference could legitimately be raised that somebody else had placed it in
tho tank, or that Deuman had seen someone placing
that garuia.9a in the tank or that someone had told him
about the gandasa lying in the tank. But for reasons
already set out the information given by Deoman is
provable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact
thereby discovered: and. his statement that he had
thrown the garuia.9a in the tank is inform:ation which
cli8tinctly relates to the discovery of the garuiasa. Discovery from its place of hiding, at the instance of
Deoman of the gandasa sta.i11ed. with human blood in
the light of the admission b~ 'him that he had thrown
it in the tank in which it wasVound therefore acquires
Mignificance, and destroys the \hoories suggested by the
High Court.
The quarrel between Deowa.q a.n<l Sukhdei a.n'd the
threat uttered by him that he ~.ould smash Sukhdei's
" m?uth" (face) and his absconding immediately after
the death of Sukhdei by violence, lend very strong
support to tho case for the prosecution. The evidence,
it is true, is purely circumstantial but the facts proved
e8tablish a chain which is conMistent only with his
guilt and not with his innocence. In our opinion
therefore the Sessions J udgo wa.s right in his view that
Deoma.n had ca.used the death of Sukhdei by striking
her with the gandaaa produced before the court.
S.C.R.
,,
,
~'e/·
;.
-'·
1
.>
33
On the evidence of the medical officer who examin- ·
ed the dead body of Sukhdei; there can be no doubt State of U. P. ·
that the offence committed by accused Deoman is one
"·
of murder. The Trial Judge convicted the accused
Deoman
of the offence of murder and in our view, he was Upadhyaya
right in so doing. Counsel for Deoman has conte~d
Shah ].
ed that in any event, the sentence of death should
not be imposed upon )!is client. But the offence
appears to have been brutal, conceived and executed
with deliberation and not in a moment of passion,
upon a defenceless old woman who was the benefactress of his wife. The assault with a dangerous weapon was made only because the unfortunate victim
did not agree to the sale of property belonging to her
and to her foster child. Having carefully .considered
the circumstances in which the offence is proved to
have been committed, we do not think that any case
is made out for not restoring the order imposing the
death sentence. We accordingly set aside the order
passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the Court of Session.
It ~ay be observed that the sentence of death
cannot' be executed unless it is confirmed by the High
Court. The High Court has not confirmed the sentence, but in exercise of our powers under Art. 136 of
the Constitution, we may pass the same order of confirmation of sentence as the High Court is, by the
Code of Criminal Procedure, competent to pass. We
accordingly confirm the sentence of death.
SUBBA RAO J.-I have had the advantage of, perus.
ing the judgment of my learned brother, Shah, J. I
regret my inability to agree with his reasoning or conclusion in respect of the application of Art. 14 of the
Constitution to the facts of the case. The facts have
been fully stated in the judgment of my learned
brother and they need not be restated here.
Article 14 of the Constitution reads :
" The State shall not deny to any person equality
before the law or equal protection of the laws within
the territories of India."
5
]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
Subba Rao
J.
34
State of U. P.
v.
Dtontan
Upadhyaya
Subba J?ao j.
SUPREME COUHT REPORTS
[1961(1)]
Das, C. J., in Bashesliar Nath v. The Commissioner of
Income-tax(') explains the scope of the equality clause
in the following t~rms:
" The underlying object of this Article is undoubtedly to secure to a.II persons, citizens or non-citizens, the equality of status and of opportunity referred to in the glorious preamble of our Constitution. It
com bin es the English doctrine of the rule of law a.nd
the equal protection clause of tho 14th Amendment to
the American Fedora.I Constitution which enjoins tha.t
no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the la.ws ". There can,
therefore, be no doubt or dispute that this Article is
founded on a sound public policy recognised and valued in all civilised States ..................... The command
of the Article is directed to the State and the reality
of the obligation thus imposed on the State is the
measure of the fundamental right which every person
within the territory of India is to enjoy."
This subject has been so frequently and recently
before this Court as not to require an extensive consideration. The doctrine of equality may be briefly
stated a.s follows: All ~rsons a.re equal before the
•
law is fundamental of every civilised constitution.
Equality before law is a negative concept; equal pro- 1 --...... . . .
tection of laws is a positive one. The former declares
that every one is equal before law, that no one can
claim s~cia.l privileges and that all classes a.re equally
subjected to the ordinary law of the land; the latter
postulates a.n eq ua.l protection of a.II a.like in the same
situation and under like circumstances. No discrimination can be ma.de either in the privileges conferred
or in the liabilities imposed. But these propositions
conceived in the interests of the public, if logically
stretched too far, may not achieve the high purpose
behind them. In a. society of unequal ha.sic structure,
it is well nigh impossible to make laws suitable in
their application to a.II the persons alike. So, a. reasonable classification is not only permitted but is
necessary if society should progress. But such a.
classification cannot be arbitrary but must be based
..
(1) [1959) Supp. (•) S.C.R.
s•8.
S.C.R.
r
(
'
1r,.
~
'
,,
f
)
,,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
I960
upon differences pertinent to the subject in respect of
and the purpose for which it is made.
.
State of U. P.
Das, C. J., in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri
v._
Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1) culled out the rules of conDeoman
struction of the equality clause in the context of the Upadhyaya
principle of clas~ification from the various decisions of
this Court and those of the Supreme Court of the Subba Rao ].
United States of America and restated the settled law
in the form of the following propositions at pp. 297.
298:
"(a) that a law may be constitutional even though
it relates to a single indi:vidual if, on account of some
special circumstances or reasons applicable to him
and not applicable to others, that single individual
may be treated as a class by himself;
(b) that there is always a presumption in favour
of the constitutionality of an enact,ment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there
has been a clear transgression of the constitutional
,principles;
(c) that it must be presumed that the legislature
unders1;.ands and correctly appreciates the need of its
own people, that its laws are directed to problems
made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;
{d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees
of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases
where the need is deemed to be the clearest ;
(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of
constitutionality the court may take into considera.
tion matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume
every state of facts which can be conceived existing
at the time of legislation ; and
(f) that while good faith and knowledge of the
existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to
be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law ·
or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice
of the court on which the~classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always
(1) [1959] S.C.K 279.
36
SGPREME COURT REPORTS (1961(1)]
holding tha.t there must be some undisclosed and
Stale of U. P. unknown res.sons for subjecting certs.in individuals or
corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation."
v.
Deoman
In view of this clear statement of law, it would be
Upadhyaya
unnecessa.ry to cover the ground over again except to
a.dd the following caution administered by Brewer, J.,
Swbba Rao j.
in Gulf, Colorada and Santa Fe Rly. Co. v. Ellis('):
" While good faith a.nd a. knowledge of existing
conditions on the pa.rt of a. Legislature is to be presumed, yet to ca.rry that presumption to the extent of
a.lwa.ys holding tha.t there must be some undisclosed
a.nd unknown res.son for subjeoting certs.in individuals
or Corporations to hostile a.nd discriminating Legislation is to ma.ke the proteoting clauses of the 14th
Amendment a. mere rope of sand, in uo manner restraining sta.te action."
It will be seen from the said rules tha.t a. weighta.ge
is given to the Sta.te as a.gs.inst an individual and a.
hea.vy burden is thrown on the latter to establish his
funds.mental right. If the caution administered by
Brewer, J., in Gmf, Colorada and Santa Fe Rly. Co. v.
Ellis(') a.nd restated by Das, C. J., in Shri Ram
Krishna Dalmia's case(') were to be ignored, the burden
upon a. citizen would be a.n impossible one, the rules
intended to elucidate the doctrine of oqua.lity would
tend to exhaust the right itself, a.nd, in the words of
Brewer, J ., the said concept becomes " a. mere rope of
sand, in no manner restraining state action". While
the Court ma.y be justified to assume certain facts to
sustain a reasonable cla.BBifica.tion, it is not permissible
to rest its decision on some undisclosed and unknown
reasons; in that event, a. Court would not be enforcing
a. funds.mental right but would he finding out some
excuse. to support the infringement of that right.
It will be convenient at the outset to refer to the
relevant sections. Under s. 25 of the Evidence Act,
no confession ma.de to a police-officer shall be proved
a.s a.gs.inst a. person accused of a.n offence. Section 26
saye that no confession ma.de by any person while he
is in the custody of a. police-officer, unless it is ma.de in
the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be
(1) [1897] 165 U.S. 150; 41 L. Ed. 666.
(2) [1959] S.C.R. 279.
'.
S.C.R.
.....
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
37
proved as against such person. Section 27, which is
in the form of a proviso, enacts that "when any fact
is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence,
in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not,
as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered,
may be proved." Section 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure lays down that no statement made by any
person to a police-officer in the course of an investiga.
tion shall be used for any purpose at any inquiry or
trial in respect of any offence under investigation at
the time when such statement was made. Sub-s. (2)
of s. 162 of the said Code which was amended by s.. 2
.of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Second Amendment) Act, 1941 (Act XV of 1941), provides that the
said section shall not affect the provisions of s. 27
of the Indian Evidence Act.
· A combined effect of the said provisions relevant to
the present enquiry may be stated thus: (I) No confession made to a police.officer by an accused can be
proved against him ; (2) no statement made by any
person to a police-officer during investigation can be
used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial ; (3) a
confession made by any person while he is in the police
custody to whomsoever made, such as a fellow.prisoner,
a doctor or a visitor, can be proved a,gainst him if it is
made in the presence of a Magistrate; and (4) if a
person accused of an offence is in the custody of a
police.officer, any information given by him, whether
it is a statement or a confession, so much of it as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may
be proved.· Shortly stated, the section divided the
accused making confessions or statements before the
police into two groups: (i) accused not in custody of
the police, and (ii) accused who are in the custody of
the police. In the case of the former there is a general
bar against the admissibility of any oonfessious or
statements made by them from being used as evidence
against them; in the case of the latter, so much of
such statements or confessions as rel&tes distinctly to
the fact thereby discovered is made admissible,
State of TJ.· P.
.v .
Deoman
Upadhyaya
Subba Rao ].
38
State of U. P.
v.
Dtoman ·
Upadhyaya
Subbt:i Rao ].
SGPREME COL'RT REPORTS
[1961(1)]
Shorn of the verbiage, let us look at the result
brought about by the combined application of s. 27 of
the Evidence Act and s. 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. A and B stabbed C with knives and hid
them in ·a specified place. The evidence against both
of them is circumstantial. One of the pieces of circumstantial evidence is that both of them gave information to the police that each of them stabbed C with
a knife and hid it in the said place. They showed to
the police the place where they had hidden the knives
and brought them out and handed them over to the
police; and both the knives were stained with human
blood. Excluding this piece of evidence, other pieces
of circumstantial evidence do not form a. complete
chain. If it was excluded, both the accused would be
acquitted; if included, both of them would be convicted for murder. But A, when he gave the information
was in the custody of police, but B was not so. The
result is that on the same evidence A would be convicted for murder but B would be acquitted : one
would lose his life or liberty and the other would be
set free. This illustration establishes that prima f acie
the provisions of s. 27 of the Evidence Act accord
unequal and uneven treatment to persons under like
circumstances.
Learned Additional Solicitor General tries to efface
this apparent vice in the sections by attempting to
forge a. reasonable basis to sustain the different treatment given to the two groups of accused. His argument may be summarized thus: Accused are put in
two· categories, namely, (1) accused in custody; and
(2) accused not in custody. There a.re intelligible
differentia. between these two categories which have
reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the legislature in enacting the said provisions.
The legislature has two objects, viz., (i) to make a vailable to the Court important evidence in the nature of
confessions w enable it .to ascertain the truth ; and (ii)
to protect the accused in the interest of justice against
coercive methods that may be adopted by the police.
The differences between the two categories relating .to
the ot;ects sought to be achieved are the following:
•,
S.C.R.
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
39
(a) while extra-judicial confessions in the case of an
accused not in custody are admissible in evidence,
they are excluded from evidence in the case of accused
in custody; (b) compared with the number of accused
in the custody of the police· who make confessions or
give information to them, the number of accused
not in custody giving such information or making confessi.ons would be insignificant; (c) in the case of confession to a police-officer by an accused not in custody, no caution is given to him before·the confession
is recorded, whereas in the case of an accused in custody, the factum of custody itself amounts to a caution to the accused and puts him on his guard ; and
(d) protection by the imposition of a condition for the
.admissibility of confessions is necessary in the case of
accused in custody; whereas no such protection for
accused not in custody is called for. Because of these
differences between the two categories, the argument
proceeds, the classification made by the legislature is
justified and takes the present case out of the operation of Art. 14 the Constitution.
I shall now analyse each of the alleged differences
between the two 1iategories of accused to ascertain
whether they afford a reasonable and factual basis for
the classification.
Re. (a): Whether the accused is in custody or not
in custody, the prosecution is not prevented from
collecting the. necessary evidence to bring home the
guilt to the accused. Indeed, as it often happens, if
the accused is not in custody and if he happens to be
an influential person there is a greater likelihood of
his retarding and obstructing the progress of investigation and the collection of evidence. Nor all the
extra-judicial confessions are excluded during the trial
after a person is put in custody. The extra-judicial
confession made by an accused before he is arrested
or after he is released on bail is certainly relevant
evidence to the case. Even after a person is ta.ken
into custody by a police-officer, nothing prevents that
person from ma.king a confession to a third-party and
the only limitation imposed by s. 26 of the Evidence
Act is that he shall make it only in the presence of &
State of U. P.
v.
Deoman
Upadhyaya
Subba Rao ].
40
Stale of U. P.
v.
Deoman
Upadhyaya
Subba Rao }.
SUPREME COURT REPbRTS
[1961(1)]
Magistrate. The confession ma.de before a Magistrate
after compliance with all the formalities prescribed
has certainly greater probative force than that ma.de
before outsiders. On the other hand, though extra.judicial confessions a.re relevant e~ ldence, they a.re
received by Courts with great oautnn. That a.pa.rt,
it is a. pure surmise that the legislature should have
thought that the confession of an accused in custody
to--a. police-officer with a condition attached would be
a substitute for an extra.- judicial confeBSion that he
might have ma.de if he was free. Broadly speaking,
therefore, there is no justification for the suggestion
that the prosecution is in a better position in the matter of establishing its case when the accused is out of
custody than .when he is in custody. Moreover, this
circumstance has not been relied upon by the State in
the High Court but is relied upon for the first time by
learned counsel during his arguments. In my view,
there is no pra.ctial difference at all in the matter of
collecting evidence between the two categories of persons and that the alleged difference cannot reasonably
sustain a. classification.
Re. (b): The second circumstance relied upon by the
learned counsel leads us to realms of fancy and imagination. It is said that the number of persons not in
custody making confessions to the police is insignificant compared with those in cust.ody and, therefore,
the legisla.t,ure may have loft that category out of
consideration. We are asked to draw from our experience and accept the said argument. No such basis
was suggested in the High Court. The constitutional
validity has to be tested on the facts existing at the
time the section or its predecessor was enacted but not
on the consequences flowing from its operation. When
a statement ma.de by accused not in the custody of
police is statutorily ma.de inadmissible in evidence,
how can it be expected that many such instances will
fa.II within the ken of Courts. If the ban be removed
for a short time it will be realized how many such
instances will be pouring in in the same way a.a oonfeBBions of admissible type have become the common
fea.ture of a.lmost every orimina.l case involving grave
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41
offence. That apart, it is also not correct to state
that such confessions are not brought to the notice of State of U. P.
Courts.
v.
In re Mottai Thevar (1 ) deals with a case. where the
Deoman
accused immediately after killing the deceased goes to Upadhyaya
the police station and makes a clear breast of the
offence. In Durlav Namasudra v. King Emperor (2 ) Subba Rao ].
the information received from an accused· not in the
cust.Gdy of a police-officer which led to the discovery
of the dead-body was sought to be put in evidence.
Before a division bench of the Patna High Court in
Deonandan Dusadh v. King Emperor(') the information given to the Sub-Inspector of Police by a husband who had fatally assaulted his wife which led
to the discovery of the corpse of the woman was
sought to be admitted in evidence. In Santokhi Beldar
v. King Emperor (') a full bench of the Patna High
Court was considering whether one of the pieces of
evidence which led to the discovery of blood-stained
knife and other articles by the Sub-Inspector of Police
at the instance of the accused was admissible against
the informant. A statement made by an accused to·
a responsible police-officer voluntarily confessing that
he had committe<;I an act of crime was considered by
a division bench of the Nagpur High Court iu Bharosa
Ramdayal v. Emperor ('). The Lahore High Court in
Jalla v. Emperor (5 ) had before it a statement made
by an accused to the police which led to the discovery of the dead-body. In re Perid Guruswamy and
Another (') is a decision of a division bench of the
Madras High Court wherein the question of admissibility of a confession made by a person to a policeofficer before he came into his custody was considered.
I have cited the cases not for considering the validity of the questions decided therein, namely, when a
person can be described as an accused and when he
can be considered to have come into the custody of
(1) A.l.R. 1952 Mad. 586.
(2) (1932).LL.R. 59 Cal. 1040.
(3) (1928) LL.R. 7 Pat. 4n.
(4) (1933) LL.R. 12 Pat. 241.
(5) A.LR. 1941 Nag. 86.
· (6) A.LR. 1931 Lab. 278.
(7) A.I.R. 1941 M~d. 765.
6
42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961(1))
the police, but only to controvert the argument that
such
confessions a.re in practice non-existent. I ha.vo
Slate of U. P.
given
only the representative decisions of various
v.
High Courts a.nd I am sure if a research is made furJ)tomat1
Upadhyaya
ther instances will be forthcoming.
Tho historical background of s. 27 also does not
Subta Rao j.
wa.rra.nt any assumption that the legislature thought
that cases of persons not in custody of a. police-officer
ma.king confessions before him would be very few ..a.nd,
therefore, need not be provided for. Sections 25, 26
a.nd 27 of the Indian Evidence Act correspond· to
ss. 148, 149 a.nd 150 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1861. Section 148 of the Code prohibited the use
a.s evidence of confessions or admissions of guilt ma.de
to a. police-officer. Section 149 provided :
"No confession or admission of guilt ma.de by
a.ny person while he is in the custody of a. police
officer unless it be made in the immediate presence of
a. Ma.gistra.te shall be used a.s evidence a.ga.inst such
person."
&ction 150 stated :
" When a.ny fact is deposed to by a. police officer
a.s discovered by him in consequence of information
received from a. person accused of a.ny offence, so
much of such information, whether it amounts to a.
confession or admission of guilt or not, a.s relates distinctly to the fact discovered by it, ma.y be received
in evidence."
Section 150 of the Code of 1861 wa.s a.mended by Act
VIII of 1869 a.nd the a.mended section read a.s
follows:
"Provided that when a.ny fact is deposed to in
evidence as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person a.caused of a.ny offence, or in
the custody of a. police officer, so much of such information, whether it a.mounts to a. confession or admission of guilt, or not, a.a relates distinctly to the
fa.ct thereby discovered, ma.y be received in evidence."
It would be seen from the foregoing sections that
there wa.s a.n absolute ba.r a.ga.inst the admissibility
of confessions or admissions ma.de by a.ny person
to a. police-officer a.nd that the sa.id ba.r wa.s pa.rtia.lly
-
S.C.R.
...;
'
/
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
43
lifted in a case where such information, whether it
amounted to a confession or admission of guilt,
related distinctly to the fact discovered. The proviso
introduced by Act VIII of 1869 was in pari materia
with the provisions of s. 27 of the Evidence Act with
the difference that in the earlier section the phrase
" a person accused of any offence " and the phrase
"in the custody of a police officer " were connected
by the disjunctive " or". The result was that no
discrimination was made between a person in custody
or out of custody making a confession to a policeofficer. Section 150 of the Code before amendment
also, though it was couched in different terms, was
similar in effect. It follows that, at any rate till the
year 1872, the intention of the legislature was to provide for all confessions made by persons to the police
whether in custody of the police or not. Can it be
said that in 1872 the legislature excluded confessions
or admissions made by a person not in custody to a
police.officer from the operation of s. 27 of the Evidence Act on the ground that such cases would be
rare ? Nothing has been placed before us to indicate
the reasons for the omission of the word "or " in s. 27
of the Evidence Act. If that be the intention of the
legislature, why did it enact s. 25 of the Evidence
Act imposing a general ban on the admissibility of all
confessions made by accused to a police-officer ? Section 27 alone would have served its purpose. On the
other hand, s. 25 in express terms· providEls for the
genus, i.e., accused in general, and s. 27 provides for
the species out of the genus, namely, accused who are
in custody. A general ban is imposed by one section
and it is lifted only in favour of a section of accused
of the same class. The omission appears to be rather
by accident than by design. In the circumstances it is
not right to speculate and hold that the legislature
consciously excluded from the operation of s. 27 of the
Act accused not in cnstody on the ground that they
were a few in number.
During the course of the arguments of the learned
counsel for the respondent, to the question put from
the Bench whether an accused who makes a confession
r960
State of U. P.
v.
.pea1nan
Subba Rao ].
44
SCPREi\fE COURT REPORTi'
[1961(1)]
of his guilt to a. police-officer would not by the a.ct
State of U. P. of confession submit himHelf to his custody, the learned counsel answered that the finding of the High Court
v.
was in his favour, namely, that. such a confession
Upadhy(lya
would not bring about that result. Learned Additiona.l
Solicitor-General in his reply pursued this line of
S11bba Nao J.
thought and contended that in that event a.II possible
cases of confession to a police-officer would be covered
by s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The governing
section is s. 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which reads:
"(I) In ma.king a.n arrest tho police-officer or
other person making the same shall actually touch or
confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless
there be a submission to the custody by word or
action.
·······························································" .
It has been held in some decisions that" when a person sti.tes that he has done certain acts which amount
to an offence, he accuses himself of committing tho
offence, and if he makes the statement to a policeofficer, as such, he submits to the custody of the officer
within the meaning of cl. (I) of this section, and is
then in the custody of a police-officer wit.hin the meaniug of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act". But other
cases took a. contrary view. It is not possible to state
as n. proposition of law what words or what kind of
action bring about submission to custody; that can
only be decided on the facts of each c1tse. It may
depend upon the nature of the information, the circumstances under, the. manner in, and the object for,
which it is made, the attitude of the police-officer concerned and such other facts. It is not, therefore,
possible to predicate that every confession of guilt or
statement made to a police-officer automatically brings
him into his custody. I find it very difficult to hold
that in fact that there would not be any appreciable
number of aconsed making confessions or statements
outside the custody of a police-officer. Giving full
credit to all the suggestions thrown out during the
argument, the hard core of the matter remains, namely, that the same class, i.e., accused ma.king confessions
-
J
S.C.R.
/
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.(5
to a police-officer, is divided into two groups-one may
be larger than the other-on the basis of a distinction State of U. P.
without difference.
Y.
Let me now consider whether there is any textual
Deonian
or decided authority in support of the contention that Upadhyaya
the legislature can exclude from the operation of s. 27
accused not in custody 011 the ground that they are a Subba Rao J.
few in number.
In support of this contention learned counsel for the
appellant cited a decision of this Court and some decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of
America. The decision of this Court relied upon is
that in Sakhawat Ali v. The State of Orissa (1). -In that
case, Bhagwati, J., observed at p. 1010 thus:
"The simple answer to this contention is that
legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular
object or purpose need not be all embracing. It is for
the Legislature to determine what categories it would
embrace within the scope of legislation and merely
because certain categories which would stand on the
same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not render legislation which has
been enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14
of the Constitution."
These observations, though ·at first sight appear to
support the appellant, if understood in the context of
tho facts and the points decided in that case, would
not in any way help him. By the provisions of
s. 16(l){x) of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, a paid
legal practitioner on behalf of or against the Municipality is disqualified for election to a seat in such
Municipality. One of t.he questions raised was that
the said section violates the fundamental right of the
appellant under Art. 14 of the Constitution. The
basis of that argument was that the classification
made between legal practitioners who are employed on
payment on behalf of the Municipality or who act
against the Municipality and those legal practitioners
who are not so employed was not reasonable. Bhagwati, J., speaking for the_ Court, stated the well-settled
(1) [1955] l S.C.R. rno4.
46
SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
[1961(1)]
pl'inciples of classification and gave roasons ju8tifying
Stutt of U. I'. the classification in the context of the object sought to
be achieved thereby. But it was further argued in
v.
Dtoman
that case that the legislature should have also dislJpadhya)'a
qualified other persons, like clientl!, a.s even in their
case there would. be conflict between interest and duty.
Subba Rao ].
Repelling that contention the learned Judge ma.de the
aforesaid observations. Tho said observations could
only mean that, if there was intelligible differentia.
between the species carved out of the genus for the
purpose of legislation, in the context of the object
sought to be achieved, the mere fact that the legislation could ha vc been extended to some other persons
would not make the legislation constitutionally void.
On the other hand, if the passage be construed in the
manner suggested by learned counsel for the a ppellant, it would be destructive of not only the principle
of classification but also of the doctrine of equality.
:Nor do the American decisions lay down any such
wide proposition. In John A. Watson v. State of Maryland (1 ) tho constitutional validity of Maryland Code
of 1904 which made it a misdemeanor for any doctor
to practise medicine without registration, was challenged. The said Code exempted from its operation
physicians who were then practising in that State and
had so practised prior to January 1, 1898, and could
prove that within one year of the said date they had
treated at lea.st twelve persons in their professional
capacity. The Supreme Court of America affirmed
the validity of the provision. Tho reason for the
classification is stated at p. 989 thus:
" Dea.ling, as its followers do, with the lives and
health of the people, and requiring for its succeSBful
practice general education and technical skill, as well
as good character, it is obviously one of those vocations where the power of the state may be; exerted to
see that only properly qualified persons shall undertake its responsible and difficult duties."
Then the learned Judge proceeded to state :
"Such exceptions proceeds upon the theory that
those who have acceptably followed the profession in
(1) (1910) 218 U.S. 173; 51 L. Ed. 987.
..
S.C.R.
-
''
J
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
47
the community for a period of years may be assumed
to have the qualifications which others are required to
manifest as a result of an examination before a board
of medical experts."
The classification is, therefore, not sustained upon
any mathematical calculation but upon the circumstance that the groups excluded were experienced
doctors whereas those included were not. In Jeffrey
Manufacturing Company v. Harry 0. Blagg(') the
Supreme Court of America justified a classification
under Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act which made
a distinction between employers of shops with five or
more employees and employers of shops ,having a
lesser number of employees. Employers of the former
class had to pay certain premiums for the purpose of
establishing a fund to provide for compensation payable under the said Act. If an employer did not pay
the premium, he would be deprived of certain defences
in a suit filed by his employee for compensation. It
was contended that this discrimination offended the
provisions of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution. Day, J., sustained the classification on the
ground that the negligence of a fellow servant is more
likely to be a cause of injury in the large establishments, employing many in their service, than in
smaller ones. It was also conceded that the State
legislature was not guilty of arbitrary classification.
It is, therefore, manifest that the-classification was not
based upon numerical strength but on the circunistance that the negligence ofa fellow servant is more
likely , to happen in the case of larger establishments.
The passage at p. 369 must be understood in the light
of the facts and the concession made in that case.
The passage runs thus:
" .................. having regard to local conditions,
of which they (State legislature) must be presumed to
have better knowledge than we can have, such regulation covered practically the whole field which
needed it, and embraced all the establishments of the
state of any size, and that those so small as to employ
only four or less might be regarded as a negligible
(1) (1915) 235 U.S. 571 : 59 L. Ed. 36~.
State of U. P.
v.
Deo1nan
Upadhyaya
Subba Rao ].
48
St<1tc of U. P.
v.
/)to,,1an
U p1ldh)'aya
S1tbba Rao ].
SVPRE}IE COURT REPORTS [1961(1)]
quantity, and need not be assessed to make up tho
guaranty fund, or covered by the methods of compensation which a.re provided by this legislation."
The passage presupposes the existence of a claHsification and cannot, in my view, support the itrgument
that a.n arbitra.rv classification shall be sustained on
the·ground that'i.he ].-,gislat.11re in its wiHdom covPred
the field where the protection, in its view, was needed.
Nor the observations of Mc Kenna., ,T., in St. Louis,
Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. State
of Arkansas(') advance the case of the appellant.
The lea.med Judge says at p. 779 ihus:
"We have recognized the impossibility of legislation being a.11-compreherrnive, and that there m11.y bo
practical groupings of object~ which will as a whole
fairly present a class of itself, .ilthough there may bo
exceptions in which the evil aimed at is deemed not
so flagrant."
In that case the State legislature mado an exemption
in favour of railways les.~ than 100 miles in length
from the operation of the Hta.tute forbidding railway
companies with yards or terminals in cities of the
state to conduct switching operations across public
crossings in cities of the first or 8econd class with a
switching crew of less than one engineer, a fireman, a.
foreman, and throe helpers. !llcKenna, J., sustained
its constitutional validity holding that tho classification was not arbitrary. The observations cited <lo
not in any way detract from the well-established
doctrine of ela.ssilica.tion, but only lay down that tho
validity of a ela.ssifica.tion must be judged not on
abstract theories but on practical considero.tions.
Where the legislature prohibited the use of shoddy,
new or old, even when sterilized, in the manufacture
of eomforta.bles for beds, the St1preme Court of
America held in Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co.(') that
the prohibition was not reasonable. It was held that
constitutional guaranties may not be ma.de to yield to
mere convenience. Holmes, ,J., in his di~scnting judgment observed at p. 659 th us :
(1) (1916) '4o t:. S. 518; 6o L. Ed. 776.
(2) (1916) 270 U.S. 402; 70 L. Ed. 654.
'
i S.C.R.
·'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
49
"A classification is not to be pronounced arbitrary because it goes on practical grounds and attacks
only those objects that exhibit or foster an evil on a
large scale. It is not required to be mathematically
precise and to embrace every case that theoretically
is capable of doing the same harm."
Even this dissenting opinion says nothing more than
that, in ascertaining the reasonableness of a classification, it shall be tested on practical grounds and not
on theoretical considerations. In West Coast Hotel
Company v. Parrish (1 ) a state statute authorized the
fixing of reasonable minimum wages for women and
minors by state authority, but did not extend it to
men. In that context, Hughes, C. J., observed at
·p. 713 thus: ·
" This Court has frequently held that the legislative authority, acting within its proper field, is not
bound to extend its regulation to all oases which it
might possibly reach."
These observations assume a valid classification and
on that basis state that a legislation is not bound to
cover all which it might possibly reach .
.A neat summary of the American law on the subject is given in "The Constitution of the United States
of America", prepared by the Legislative Reference
Service, Library of Congress (1952 Edn.) at p. 1146
thus:
"The legislature is free to recognize degrees of
harm; a law which hits the evil where it is most felt
will not be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. The
State may do what it can to prevent what is deemed
an evil and stop short · of those cases in which the
he.rm to the few concerned is thought less important
than the harm to the public the.t would ensue if the
rules laid down were made me.thematically exact.
Exceptions of specified classes will not render the. law
unconstitutional unless there is no fair reason for the
law that would not equally require its extension to the
excepted classes."
(1) (1937~300 U.S. 37.9; 81 L. Ed. 703.
7
r960
State of ·u. P.
v.
Deoman
Upadhyaya
Subba Rao ].
50
SUP!lEME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
These observations do not cut a.cross the doctrine of
classification,
but only afford a. practical basis to susState of U. P.
it.
The
prevalence of a.n evil in one field loudly
tain
v.
calling
for
urgent
mitigation may distinguish it from
Deon1an
Upadhyaya
other field· where the evil is incipient. So too, the
deleterious effect of a. la.w on the public, if it is extendSubba Rao ].
ed to the excluded group, marks it off from the included group. Different combination of facts with otherwise apparently indentical groups ma.y so accentuate
the difference a.s to sustain a. cla.ssifica.tion. But if the
argument of the learned counsel, namely, that the
legislature can in its discretion exclude some and
include others from the operation of the Act in spite of
their identical characteristics on the ground only of
numbers be accepted, it will be destructive of the
doctrine of equality itself.
Therefore, the said and similar decisions do not
justify classification on the be.sis of numbers or enable
the legislature to include the many in and exclude the
few from the operation of law without there being a.n
· intelligible differentia. between them. Nor do they
support the broad contention that a. legislature in its
absolute discretion may exclude some instances of
identica.~ characteristics from an Act on alleged practical considerations. Even to exclude one a.rbitra.rily
out of a. class is to offend age.inst Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Let us now apply the said principles to the facts. of
the present case. Assuming for a. moment that the
ratio between the accused in the context of confessions
i~ 1000 in custody and 5 out of custody, how could
that be conceivably a.n intelligible ground for cla.ssifica.tion ? Assuming a.gain that the legislature thoughtsuch a.n exemption is unwarranted-that such cases
would not a.rise a.t all and need not be provided for,
could that be a. reasonable assumption having regard
to the historical background of s. 27 of the Evidence
Act a.nd factual existence of such instances disclosed
by decisions cited supra.? As I have already sta.tod
that such a.n exemption is a.n unwarranted flight .i~to
the realms of imagination in the teeth of e:.:pressed
·caution administered by Das, C. J., in Shri Ram
1 S.C.R.
{
.
1'.
f
I
1'
-1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
Krishna Dalmia's Cast (1) and by Brewer, J., in Gulf,
Colorada and Santa Fe Rly. Co. v. Ellis(').
Re. (c): Nor can I find any intelligible differentia in
the caution alleged to be implied by accused being
taken into cnstody. The argument is that under s. 163
of the Code of Criminal Procedure " no police-officer
or other person shall prevent, by any caution or otherwise, any person from making, in the course of any
investigation under this Chapter any statement which
ho may be disposed to make of his own free will,"
and as an accused is allowed to make any statement
he chooses without his being placed on guard by timely
caution, no statement made by him is permitted to be
proved; whereas by the accused being taken into
custody, the argument proceeds, by the said act itself
the accused gets sufficient warning that his statement
may be used in evidence and that this difference
affords a sufficient basis for the classification. I am
not satisfied that taking into custody amounts to a
statutory or implied caution. If that be the Qasis for
the distinction, there is no justification that an accused
once taken into custody but later released on bail
should not be brought in within the meaning of s. 27
of the Indian Evidence Act.
Re. (d): The fourth item of differentia furnishes an
ironical commentary on the argument advanced. The
contention is that an accused in custody needs protection in the matter of his confession and therefore a
condition is imposed before the confession is made
admissible. There is an obvious fallacy underlying
this argument. The classification is made between
accused not in custody making a confession a.nd
accused in custody making a confession to a police.
officer : the former is inadmissible and the latter is
admissible subject to a condition. The point raised is
why should there be this discrimination between these
two categories of accused ? It is no answer to this
question to point out that in the case of an accused in
custody a condition has been imposed on the admissibility of his confession. The condition imposed may
be to some extent affording a guarantee for the truth
(I) (I959l S.C.R. 279.
(2) [18g7] 165 U.S. 150; 41 Ed. 666.
State of U. P.
v.
Deoman
Upadhyaya
Subba Rao ].
52
ISUPRE:\1E COL'RT REPORTS
[1961]
of the statement, but it does not efface the clear distinction ma.de between the samo class of confessions.
State of U. P.
The
vice lies not in the condition imposed, but in tho
v.
Deo,nan
distinction ma.de between these two in the matter of·
Upadhyaya
admissibility of a confession. The distinction can be
wiped out only when confessions made by all accused
Subba Rao J.
a.re ma.de admissible subject to the protective condition imposed.
Not only the alleged differontia aro not intelligible
or germane to the object sought to be achieved, the
basis for the distinction is also extremely arbitrary.
There is no acceptable reason why a. confession ma.de
by an accused in custody to a. police-officer is to be
admitted when that made by a.n accused not in custody ha.a to be rejected. The condition imposed in the
case of the former may, to some extent, soften the
rigour of the rule, but it is irrelevant in considering
the question of reasonableness of the classification.
Rankin, J., in Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor(') in a
strongly worded passage criticised the anomaly under.lying s. 27 thus at p. 1045:
" ............ in a case like the present where the
confession was made to the police, if the man was at
liberty a.t the time he was speaking, what he said
should not be .admitted in evidence even though something was discovered as a result of it .................. .It
cannot be admitted in evidence, because the man
was not in custody, which of course is thoroughly
absurd. There might be reason in saying that, if a.
man is in custody, what' he may have said cannot be
admitted; but there can be none a.t all in saying that
it is inadmissible in evidence against him because he.
is not in custody."
In the present case, the self-same paradox is sought
to be supported a.s affording a. reasonable basis for the
classification.
The only solution is for the legislature to amend
the section suitably and not for this Court to discover
some imaginary ground and sustain the classification.
I, therefore, hold that s. 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act is void a.s violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
(1) (1932) 59 Cal. 1040.
.-
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
53
If so, the question is whether there is any scope for
J
'
z960
interference with the finding of the High Court. The State of U. J':
High Court considered the entire evidence and found
v ..
the following circumstances to have been proved in
Deoman
Upadhyaya
the case:
(a) "that in the evening of June 18, 1958, there
was an altercation between Sukhdei and Deoman, Subba Rao ].
accused, over the proposed transfer of property in
Anandadih, in the presence of Shobh Nath (P. W. 5)
and Mahesh (P. W. 7), and that in the course of this
altercation Deoman slapped her and threatened that
he would smash her mouth";
(b) "that at about dawn on June 19, 1958, the
accused was seen by Khusai (P. W. 8) hurrying 'towards a tank, and shortly afterwards was seen by
Mata Dihal (P. W. 11) actually bathing in that tank,
before it was fully light";
(c) "that the accused absconded immediately
afterwards and was not to be found at Anandadih on
June 19, 1958 "; and
(d) "that on June 21, 1958, the accused in the
presence of the investigating officer (P. W. 14), Shobh
Nath (P. W. 5) and Raj Bahadur Singh (P. W. 6)
stated that he could hand over the "gandasa" which
he had thrown into a tank ; that he was then taken
to that tank and in the presence of the same witnesses waded in and fetched the " gandasa " Ex. 1 out o~
the water; and that this" gandasa " was found by thli I ·
Chemical Examiner and Serologist to be stained with
human blood".
The High Court held that the said circumstances are
by no means sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. On t)lat
finding, the High Court gave the benefit of doubt to
the accused and acquitted him of the qlfence. The
finding is purely one of fact and there are no e;:ceptional circumstances in the case to' disturb the same.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismi~sed.
HIDAYATULLAH J.-The facts of the case have Hidayatullah ].
been stated in full by Shah, J., in the judgment which
he has delivered, and which I had the advantage of
54
SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS
reading. I have also had the advantage of reading
the judgment of Subba Rao, J. I respectfully agree
Stale of U. P.
generally
with the conclusions and the reasons, therev.
for,
of
Shah,
J. I wish, however, to make a few
Deoma"
Upadhyaya
observations.
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is in the
Hidayotullttl1 ].
Chapter on admissions, and forms ·part of a group of
sections which are numbered 24 to 30, and these sections deal with confessions of persons accused of a.n
offence. They have to be read with ss. 46 and 161164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Section 24 makes a confession irrelevant if the
making of it appears to the Court to have been caused
by inducement, threat or promise having reference to
the charge against the accused person, from a person
in authority and by which the accused person hopes
that he would gain some advanta,ge or avoid some
evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. Section 25 makes a confession to a
police officer inadmissible against a person accused of
any offence. Section 26 says that no confession made
by a person whilst he is in the custody of a police
. officer she.II be proved unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 27 then provides:
" Provided that, when any fa.ct is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody
of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates
distinctly to the fa.ct thereby discovered, may be
proved."
Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers a police officer of stated rank to examine
orally a.ny person supposed to be acquainted with the
facts a.nd circumstances of the case. Such person is
bound to answer all questions relating to the case but
not questions which would have a tendency to expose
him to a. criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.
The police officer may mako a written record of tho
statement. Section 163 of the Code then lava down
the rule that no police officer or other p;rson in
1 S.C.R.
)
j
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
55
J'960
authority shall offer or make, or cause to be offered
or made, any inducement, threat or promise as is State of U. P.
mentioned in the Indian Evidence Ac~, s . 24 and
v.
further that no police officer or other person shall preDeoman
vent, by any caution or otherwise, any person from Vpadh'yaya
making in the course of any investigation any statement which he may be disposed to make of his own Hidayatullak ].
free will. Section 162 of the Code then makes statements reduced into writing inadmissible for any purpose except those indicated, but leaves the door open
for the operation of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Section 164 confers the power to record confessions, on
Magistrates of stated rank during investigation or at
any time afterwards before the commencement of the
enquiry or trial. Such confessions are to be recorded
after due caution to the person making the confession
and only if there is reason to believe that they are
voluntary. Section 46 of the Code provides· that in
making an arrest the police officer or other person
making the same shall actually touch or confine the
·body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a
submission to the custody by word or action.
.· Whet'i an offence is committed and investigation
starts, the police have two objects in view. The first
is the collection of information, and the second is the
finding of the offender. In this process, the police
question a number of persons, some of whom may be
only witnesses and some who may later figure as the
person or persons charged. While questioning such
persons, the police may not caution them and the
police must leave the persons free to make whatever
statements they wish to make. There are ''two checks
at this stage. What the witnesses or the suspects say
is not be used at the trial, and a person cannot be compelled to answer a question, which answer may incriminate him. It is to be noticed that at that stage
though the police may have suspicion against the
offender, there is no difference between him and other
witnesses, who are questioned. Those who turn out to
be witnesses and not accused are expected to give
evidence at the trial and their former statements are
not. evidence, In so far as those ultimately charged
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
a.re concerned, they cannot be witnesses, save exceptionally, and their statements a.re barred under s. 162
Sl14lt of U. P.
of
the Code and their confessions, under s. 24 of the
v.
Denman
lndia.n Evidence Act. Their confoss!ons are only releUpadltya}'"
vant and admissible, if they a.re recorded a.a laid down
in
s. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a.ft.er due
Hidayatulluh J.
caution by the Ma.gistra.re and it is ma.de clear that
they a.re voluntary. These rules a.re hased upon the
maxim: Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum (no one should
be compelled to incriminate himself). In a.n address
to Police Constables on their duties, Hawkins, J.,
(later, Lord Brampton), observed:
" Neither Judge, magistrate nor juryman, can
interrogate a.n accused person ...... or require him to
answer the questions tending to incriminate himself.
Much less, then ought a. constable to do so, whose duty
as regards that person is simply to a.rrest and detain
him in Mfe custody."
·
In English law, the sta.tement of an accused person
can be tendered in evidence, provided he has been
cautioned and the exact words of the accused a.re
deposed to. Says Lord Brampton:
"There is, however, no objection to a. constable
listening to a.ny mere voluntary statement which a
prisoner desires to make, and repeating su~h statement in evidence, nor is there a.ny objection to his
repeating in evidence any conversation he may have
heard between the prisoner and any other person.
But he ought not, by anything he says or does, to invite or encourage an accused person to make any
statement, without first cautioning.him, that he is not
bound to say anything tending to crimina.te himself,
and that anything he says may be used against him.
Perhaps tbe best maxim with respect. to an accused
person is 'Keep your ears and eyes open, and your mouth
shut'".
See Sir Howard Vincent's "Police Code".
In Ibrahim v. Emperor('), Lord Sumner gave the
history of rules of common law relating to confessions,
· and pointed out that they were" as old as Lord Hale".
Lord Sumner observed that in Reg. v. Thomp.wn (')
(1) [1914] A.C. ~99·
(•) [18g3J 2 Q.B. u.
....
1 S.C.R.
/
,
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
57
I960
and earlier in The King v Jane W arrickshall (') it was
ruled (to quote from the second case):
State of u. P.
" A confession forced from the mind by the flatv.
tery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so
Deoman
questionable a shape, when it is to be considered as Upadhyaya
the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given
Hidaydtullah f.
to it."
Lord Sumner added :
"It is not that the law presumes such statements
to be untrue but from the danger of receiving such
evidence Judges have thought it better to reject it for
the due administration of justfoe: Reg. v. Baldry (2 ).
Accordingly when hope or fear were not in question,
such statements were long regularly admitted as relevant, though with some reluctance, and subject to
strong warnings as to their weight."
Even so, in the judgment referred to by Lord
Sumner, Parke, B., bewailed that the rule had been
carried too far out of "too much tenderness towards
prisoners in this matter", and observed:
" I confess that I cannot look at the decisions
without some shame, when I consider what objections
have prevailed to prevent the reception of confessions
in evidence ......... Justice and commonsense have too
frequently been sacrificed at the shrine of mercy."
Whatever the views of Parke, B., Lord Sumner
points out that" when Judges excluded such evidence,
it was rather explaineq by their observations on the
duties of policemen than justified by their reliance on
rules of law."
Lord Sumner has then traced the history of the law
in subsequent years. In 1905, Channel, J., in Reg v.
Knight and Thavre (') referred to the position of an
accused in custody thus :
"When he has taken any one into custody ....•. he
ought not to question the prisoner ...... ! am not aware
of any distinct rule of eviden.ce that, if such improper
questions ai'e asked, the answers to them are inadmissible, but there is clear authority for saying that the
(1) (1783) 1 Leach 263; 168 E.R. 234.
(2) (1852) 5 Cox'C.C•. 523.
(3)(1905) 20 Cox C.C. Jit.
'
8
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Judge a.t the trial may in his discretion refuse to allow
Stale of ll. P. the answers to be given in evidence."
v.
Five yea.rs later, the same learned Judge in Rex v.
Dton1an
Booth and Jones(') observed:
Upadhya)•a
"The moment you have decided. to charge him
HidayatlfllaA ]. and pra.ctica.lly got him int-0 custody, then, inasmuch
as a. Judge ca.rinot ask a. question or a. Magistrate, it
is ridiculous to suppose that a. policeman can. But
there is no a.ctua.l authority yet, that if a. policeman
does a.sk a. question it is inadmissible; what happens
is that the Judge says it is not advisable to press the
matter."
It is to be noticed that Lord Sumner noted the
difference of approach to the question by different
Judges, and observed that :
"Logically these objections a.II go to the weight
a.nd not to the admissibility of the evidence. What a
person ha. ving knowledge about the matter in issue
says of it is itself relevant to the issue a.s evidence
against him. That he ma.de the statement under circumstances of hope, fear, interest or otherwise strictly
goes only to its weight ...... Even the rule which excludes evidence of statements made by a. prisoner,
when they a.re induced by hope in authority, is a rule
of policy."
The Judicial Committee did not express any opinion
as to what the law should be. The state of English law
in 1861 when these rules bega.me a pa.rt of the Indian
la.w in a statutory form was thus that the police could
question any person including a. suspect. The statements of persons who turned out to be mere witnesses
were entirely inadmissible, they being supposed to say
what they could, on oath, in Court. Statements of
suspects after caution were admissible but not before
the caution was administered or they were ta.ken in
custody; but confessions were, as a rule, excluded if
they were ind need by hope, fea.r, threat, etc.
When the Indian law was enacted in 1861, it is
commonplace that the statute wa.s drafted in England. Two departures were made, a.nd they were ( l)
that no statement made to a. police officer by any
(1) (1910) 5 Cr. App. Rep. 177.
'··
I
lI
j
..
1 S.C.R.
' ,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
50
person w11.s provable 11.t the trial which inclucled the
accused person, and (2) that no caution was to be State of U. P.
given to a person making a statement.
v.
In so far as the accused was concerned, he was proDeoman
tected from his own folly in confessing to a charge Upadhyaya
both after and before his custody unless he respectively did so in the immediate presence of a Magis- Hidayatullah ].
trate, or his confession was recorded by a Magistrate.
In either event, the confession had to be voluntary and
free from taint of threat, promise, fear, etc. The law
was framed to protect 11. suspect against too much
garrulity before he knew that he was in danger w)lich
sense would dawn on him when arrested and yet left
the door open to voluntary statements which might
clear him if made but which might not be - made if a
caution was administered. Without the caution 11.n
innocent suspect is not in a position to know his
danger, while a person arrested knows his position
only too well, Without the caution, the line of distinction ceased, and the law very sensibly left out the
statements altogether. Thus, before arrest all suspects,
whether rightly suspected or wrongly, were on par.
Neither the statements of the one nor of the other
were provable, and there was no caution at all.
, The English law then was taken as a model for
accused in custody. Section 27 which is framed as an
exception has rightly been held as an exception to
ss. 24-26 and not only to e. 26. The words of the section were taken bodily from The King v. Lockhart (1 ),
where it was said : ·
"But it should seem that so much of the confeesion
as relates strictly to the fact discovere4 by it may be
given in evidence, for the reason of rejecting extorted
confessions is the apprehension that the prisoner may
have been thereby induced to say what is false; but
the fact discovered shews that so much of the confession as immediately relates to it is true."
That case follbwed immediately after Warrickshall's
case ('), and summarised the law laid down in the
earlier case. The accused in that case had made a
(1) (1785) I Loach 386: t6S E.R, •95 and footnoto to (1783) 1 Loach 263.
(•J (1783) 1 Loach z63: 168 Ii:. R. z34.
60
SVPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
confession which was not receivable, as it was due to
promiso of favour. As a result of the confession, the
Slate of li. P.
goods
stolen were found concealod in a mat.treBs. It
Y.
was contended that the evidence of the finding of the
J)toman
lipadliyaya
articles should not be admitted. K arcs, J ., with
Mr. Baron Eyre observed :
llidayatul/ah ].
" It is a mistaken notion, that the evidence of
confessions and facts which have been obtained from
prisoners by promises or t.hreats, is to be rejected from
a regard t-0 public faith ; no such rule ever prevailed.
The idea is novel in theory, and would ho as dangerous in practice as it is repugnant to the general principles of criminal law. Confessions are received in
evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a consideration whether they are or are not intitled to credit
...... This principle respecting confessions has no application whatever as to the admiBBion or rejection of
facts, whether the knowledge of them be obtained in
consequence of an extorted confession, or whether it
arises from any other source; for a fact, if it exists at
all, must exist invariably in the same manner, whether
the confession from which it is derived be in other respects true or false."
Another case is noted in the footnote in the English
Report Series. In February Session, 1784, Dorothy
Mosey was tried for shop-lifting and a confession had
been made by her and goods found in consequence of
it, as in the above case. Buller, .J., (present Mr. Baron
Perryn, who agreed), said :
"A prisoner was tried before me (Buller, J.) where
the evidence was just as it is here. I stopped all the
witnesses when they came to· the confession. The
prisoner was acquitted. There were two learned Judges
on the bench, who told me, that although what the
prisoner said was not evidence, yet that any facts
arising afterwards may be given in evidence, though
they were done in consequence of the. confession. This
point, though it did not affect the prisoner at the bar,
was stat~d to all the Judges; and the line drawn was,
that although confessions improperly obtained cannot
be received in evidence, yet that the acts done after-
.~ j.c.B. SUPREME COUBT REPORTS
/
61
wards may be given in evidence, though they were
'96°
done in consequence of the confession."
Stat( of U. P.
Where, however-, no fact was dis.covered, the statev.
ment was not held admissible. See Rex v. Richard
o.,.,,..
Griffin(') and Rex v. Francis Jone8 (').
upadhJ.aya
In Rex v. David Jenkins('), the prisoner was con.· . victed before Bayley, J., (present Park, J.), of stealing H<dayaJnllah J.
certain gowns and other articles. He was induced by
a promise from the prosecutor to confess his guilt, and
after that confession, he carried the officer to a particular house, but the property was not found. The
evidence of. the oonfession was not received; the evidence of his carrying the officer to the .house as abovementioned was. But Bayley, J ., referred the point for
consideration of the Judges. The Judges were of
opinion that,
"the evidence was not admissible and the conviction was .therefore wrong. The confession was excluded, being ma.de under the influence of a promise it
could not be relied upotl, and the acts of the prisoner,
under the same influence, not being confirmed by the
finding of the property, were open to the same objection. The influence which might produce a groundless confession might also produce a groundless conduct."
It would 1>ppee.r from this that s. 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act has been taken bodily from the English
law. In both the laws there is greater solicitude for a
person who makes a statement at a. stage when the
danger in which he stands has not been brought home
to him than for one who knows of the danger. In
English law, the caution gives him the necessary
warning, and in India the fact of his being in custody
takes the place of caution which is not to be given.
There is, thus, a clear distinction ma.de between a person not accused of an offence nor in the custody of a
police officer and one who is.
It remains t-0 point out that in 1912 the Judges of
the King's Bench Division framed rules for the guidance of the police. These rules, though they had no
(1) {1809) Russ, & Ry, 151 ; t68 ti:.R. 732.
(3) (1822) Rusi1, & Ry. 49;;; lOS E.R. 914.
(;;} (r8o9} RU88. & Ry. 152.
62
Sl7PRE:ME COCRT REPORTS
[1961]
force of law, laid down the procedure to be followed.
At first, four rules were framed, ,Put later, five more
Slate vj U. ·p.
were
added. They are reproduced in Halsbury's Lawe
'°.
of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 10, p. 470, para. 865. These
Dtoman
Upadhya_va
rules also clearly divide persona suspected of crime
into those who are in police custody and those who
lfidayatullah J.
a.re not. It is assumed that a person in the former
category knows his danger while the person in the
latter may not. The Jaw is tender towards the person
who may not know of his danger, because in hie case
there is Jess chance of fairpla.y than in the ca.se of one
who has been warned.
f.t is to be notioed tha.t in the Royal Commission on
Police Powers and Procedure (1928-29) CMD 3297,
nothing is ea.id to show that there is anything invidious in making statements leading to the discovery of
a relevant fact admissible in evidence, when such
statements a.re made by persona in custody. The
suggestions and recommendations of the Commission
are only designed to protect questioning of persons
not yet taken in custody or taken in custody on a
minor ohargo and the use ·of statements obtained in
those circumstances.
The law has thus ma.de a. classification of accused
persons into two: (1) those who have the danger
brought home to them by detention on a. charge; and
(2) these who a.re yet free. In the former category
a.re also those persons who surrender to the custody
by words or action. The protection given to these
two classes ie different. In the case of persons belonging to the second category tho law has ruled that
their statements are not admissible, and in the case of
the first category, only that portion of the statement
is e.dmissiblEi as is guaranteed by the discovery of a.
relevant fa.ct unknown before the statement to the
investigating authority. That statement may even
be confessional in nature, as when the person in custody says; "I pushed him down such and such mineshaft", and the body of the victim is found as a
result, and it can be proved that his death was due to
injuries received by a fa.ll down the mineshaft.
It is argued that there is denial of equal protection
-
'
1 S.C.R.
)
-j
·I
''
'
-.j
....
'·
-:\
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
63
z960
of the law, because if the statement were made before
custody began, it would be inadmissible. Of course, State of U. P.
the making of the statement as also the stage at which
v.
it is !llade, depends upon the person makiqg it. The . Deoman
Ia.w is concerned in seeing fairpla.y, and this is achiev- Upadhyaya
ed by insisting that a.n unguarded statement should
Hidayatullah ].
not be receivable. The need for caution is there, and
this caution is very forcefully brought home to an
accused, when he is accused of an offence and is in
the custody of the police. There is thus a classification which is reasonable as well as intelligible, and it
subserves a purpose recognised now for over two centuries. When such an old and time-worn rule is challenged by modern notions, the basis of the rule must
be found. When this is done, as I ha.ve attempted to
do, there is no doubt left that the rule is for advancement of justice with protection both to a suspect not
yet arrested a.nd to an accused in custody. There is
ample protection to a.n accused, because only that
portion of the statement is made admissible against
him which has resulted in the discovery of a material
fact otherwise unknown to the police. I do not, therefore, regard this as evidence .of unequal treatment.
Before leaving the subject, I may point out that
the recommendation of the Roya.I Commission was:
" (xlviii) A rigid instruction should be issued to
the Police that no questioning of a prisoner, or a
• person in custody ', about any crime or offence with
which be is, or may be charged, should be permitted.
This does not exclude qmistions 'to remove elementary
a.nd obvious ambiguities in voluntary statements,
under No. (7) of the Judges' Rules but the prohibition
should_ cover all persons who, although not in custody,
ha.ve been charged and are out on bail while awaiting
trial."
This is a matter for the legislature to consider.
In view of what I have said above and the reasons
given by Shah, J., I agree that the appeal be allowed,
as proposed by him.
BY COURT: In accordance with the opinion of
the majority the appeal is allowed. Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act and e. 162, eub-e. (2), of the Code
64
SUPREME COGRT REPORTS
[1961]
of Criminal Procedure in so fa.r a.a " tha.t section
relates
to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act" a.re
State of U. P.
intra vires a.nd do not offend Art. 14 of the Oon~titu
v.
Deomati
tion. Tho order of the High Court acquitting the
Upadhyaya
respondent is a.lso set a.side a.nd the order of the CourL
of
Sessions convicting the 11ccused (respondent) under
llidayatullah j.
s. 302 of the India.n Pena.I Codo and sentencing him
to <lea.th is restored.
Appeal allowed.
BHAGAT SIKGH
v.
July I.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(P. B. GAJENDBAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HIDAYA'rULLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA, a.nd
J.
SHAH, JJ.)
c.
Government Servant-Dismissal-Member of subordinate rank
of police forces-Police officer committing offence-Departmental
enquiry and dismissal-V a!idity-Dismissal from service without
fresh shew cause notice-Legality-Police Act, 186t (V of 186t),
ss. 29, 35-Government of India Act, 1935 (z5 <So :z6 Geo. 5, Ch. 42),
SS. 240(3), 243.
The appellant, who was employed in the Punjab Police, was
found while working as a Police Censor to have detained certain
letters illegally and later to have made use of copies and photographs of them for blackmail. lie was consequently revqted
to his substantive post of head constable on January 14, 1944·
Thereafter an enquiry was started against him by the Superintendent of Police and eventua!Jy he was dismissed frorn service on
January 25, 1944· His representations to higher authorities
having failed he instituted a suit challenging the legality of the
order of dismissal on the grounds, inter alia, (1) thats. 240(3) of
the Government of India Act, 1935. had not been complied with,
and (2) that as the appellant was alleged to have committed a
criminal offence the Superintendent of Police could not hold a
departmental enquiry in respect of sucli allegations in view of
ss. 29 and 35 of the Police Act, l!lbr.
Held : (1) thats. 243 of the Government of India Act, i935,
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