THE COMMISSIONER 0]' INCOME TAX, BOMBAY CITY I, BOMBAY versus M/S. NARSEE NAGSEE AND CO., BOMBAY.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 May 1960 | [1960] 3 S.C.R. 988 | 1960 INSC 110
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 May 1960
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 319/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 3 S.C.R. 988
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 110
Text of the judgment
988
Jai i<aur
v.
Sher Singh
Das Gttpta J.
Ig60
May 6.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
dJ.ughters in posses~ion, would not become full
owners under s. 14. We do not think it would be
proper to consider these questions in the present suit
in this haphazard manner when on the all-important
question of possession, the appellants themselves do
not wish to say whether the mother was in possession
actually or constructively, whether the danghters'
possession was merely permissive, or whether the
daughters were in independent possession, on their
own behalf. These and other questions of fact, and
the questions of law that have to be considered in
deciding a claim by tho first appellant or the other
two appellants under s. 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act, should properly be considered in any suit that
they may bring in future, if so advised. We express
no opinion on any of these questions.
For the reasons which have been mentioned earlier,
we hold that the High Court rightly decreed the snit
in favonr of the plaintiffs in respect of the nonancestral property also, and dismiss the appeal. In
the circumstances of the case, we order that the parties
will bear their own costs throughout.
Appeal dismissed.
••
-
THE COMMISSIONER 0]' INCOME TAX,
BOMBAY CITY I, BOMBAY
v.
M/S. NARSEE NAGSEE AND CO., BOMBAY.
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HrnAYATUI,LAH, JJ.)
Business Profits Tax-Limitation for assessment-Notice under
Business Profits Tax Act issued beyond four years-Validity,, Profits escaping assessm-ent ", meaning of-Excess JYrofits Tax Act,
1940 (15 of 1940), ss.13, 15-Indian Income-tax Act,1922 (II of 1922),
ss. 22(2), 34(1)-Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax Amendment
Act, 1947 (22 of 1947)-Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 (21 of 1947),
SS. II(I), 14.
The assessee firm which was doing business in Bombay \vas
served with a notice on January 21, 1953, by the Income-tax
Officer under s. n(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947· in
respect of the chargeable accounting period from November 13,
1947, to October 31, 1948, calling upon it to submit its return. It
filed the return under protest stating that the notice was barred
under s. 14 of the Act as it was served beyond the period of four
-
,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l
..
989
years. The question was whether in s. I I of the Act a limitation
1960
corresponding to the limitation contained in s. 14 must be necessarily read and whether in a case where the profits were not Commissioner of
brought to assessment because notice under s. I I was not issued Income Ta"
in time, they must be deemed to have escaped assessment and
v.
action could only be taken under s. 14 within the time specified N""" N,,gsee
therein ;
&- Co.
Held (per S. K. Das and Kapur, J]., Hidayatullah, J.,
dissenting), (r) that the words "profits escaping assessment" in
s. 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947, apply equally to
cases where a notice was received by the assessee but resulted in
no assessment, under-assessment or excessive relief, and to cases
where due to any reason no notice was issued to the assessee and
therefore there was no assessment of his income ;
(2) that ss. II and 14 of the Act have to be read together and
·that a notice under s. I I cannot be issued against an assessee
beyond the period of four years indicated in s. I4·
Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1959] Supp. I
S.C.R. IO and Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. Stqt,e of
Bihar, [1960) r S.C.R. 332, relied on.
Gokuldas Ratanji Mandavia v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
[1959] A.C. rr4, distinguished.
Per Hidayatullah, ].-Section I I of the Business Profits Tax
Act, 1947, is confined to cases where there has been no prior
assessment, while s. I4 is applicable to cases where after an
assessment there is discovery that profits have escaped assessment due to one reason or another.
The use of the words
" escaped assessment " in the context of the Act has reference
only to those cases where profits of a business were brought to
process once but for some reason some profits escaped assessment
or were µnder-assessed or received excessive relief. For the
subsequent and re-openert assessment there is a limit of four
years, but for the assessment for the first time there is no limit.
C1vu, APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 319 of 1958.
Appeal from the judgment, and order dated
September 5, 1956, of the Bombity High Court in
Income-tax Reference No. 31 of 1956.
Ii. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicilor-General of India,
K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant.
N. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley, J. B. Da<lachanji
and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondents.
N. A. Palkhivala, S. S. Shukla and Mrs. Eluri
U dayaratnam, for the intervener {The Punjab National
Bank Ltd.)
128
990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960. May 6. The Judgment of S. K. Das and
J.L.
Kapur,
,JJ"., was delivered by Kapur, J. HidayaCommissioner of
tullah, J., delivered a separate Judgment.
Income lax
v.
KAPUR, J.-This is an appeal against the judgNar~ee ]\iogsee
ment
and order of the High Court of Bombay passed
&Co.
in Income Tax Reference No. 31of1956. The -appellant is the Commissioner of Income-tax and the
J\apur ].
respondent is a firm carrying on business in Bombay
and the question for decision arises under the Business Profits Tax Act (Act 21 of 1947), hereinafter
referred to as the Act.
The assessment relates to the year of assessment
1949-50 and the chargeable accounting period was
from November 13, 1947, to October 31, 1948. On
January 12, 1953, the Income-tax Officer issued a
notice on the respondent under s. 11(1) of the Act
in respect of the above-mentioned chargeable accounting period which was served on the respondent on
.January 21, 1953. The respondent filed a return
under protest. The assessment was completed by
the Income-tax Officer on November 30, 1953.
Against this order the respondent took an appeal
to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the
ground that the respondent was not liable to Business Profits Tax because it was beyond the period
of four years limitation under s. 14 of the Act. This
plea was upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Income-tax Officer then appealed to the ,
Appellate Tribunal and it confirmed the order of
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. At the instance of the appellant a case was stated to the High
Court of Bombay on the following two questions of
law:,
(1) "Whether the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to assess the assessee firm under the Business
Profits Tax Act by issue of a notice under Section
11 (1) of the Business Profits Tax Act on 12-1-1953
in respect of the chargeable accounting period
13-11-1947 to 31-10-1948 without having recourse to
Section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act ?
(2) If the answer to Question No. 1 is in the
negative whether the B. P. T. assessment could be
considered to have been validly made ? "
r960
,l
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-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
991
The High Court modified the first question by
deleting the words "without having recourse to Section Comniissioner of
14 of the Business Profits Tax Act" and answered Income Ta-t""
v.
both the questions in the negative. The Income-tax
iVarsee
Nagsee
Appellate Tribunal had held that as under s. 14 of
& c~.
the Act the period of limitation commenced from the
end of the chargeable accounting period in question
Kapur .f•
the notice under s. 11 (1) had to be issued before that
period. The High Court did not accept this view.
It held that both ss. 11 and 14 had to be read together and the mention of four years in s. 14 was an
important indication of the period of limitation in
regard to the issue of notice under s. 11 also and
further if profits which escaped assessment, as in the
present case, could only be taxed within four years
of the end of the chargeable accounting period
because of s. 14 of the Act, then inferentially the
escape of assessment must be at sometime anterior
to the period mentioned in s. 14 and as on the facts
of the present case the notice had been issued four
years after the close of the chargeable accounting
period the notice under s. 11 was not valid. .Against
this order the appellant has come in appeal to this
Court on a certificate of the High Court.
It is submitted by the appellant that though ss. 11
and 14 may have to be read together, they apply
to different sets of circumstances ; s. 11 applies to a
case where the Income-tax Officer requires any
person whom he believes to be engaged in any
business to which the Act applies or to have been so
engaged during any chargeable accounting period
and calls upon him to furnish a return with respect
to such chargeable accounting period; and s. 14
applies to a case where, in -consequence of definite
information possessed by him, the Income-tax Officer
discovers in regard to any chargeable accounting
period that the profits of any business have escaped
assessment. In other words, s. 11 applies to original
assessments after the first notice calling upon an
assessee to make a return in regard to the profits of
any chargeable accounting period and s. 14 applies
where such notice was issued, and it either ended in
no assessment at all or there was under-assessment,
992
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
etc. According to the argument of the appellant,
. .
therefore, there is no period oflimitation prescribed by
er,:;::;;~··;:;~•! the Act for the first notice to furnish a return in
v.
regard to any chargeable accounting period but if
Narsee Nagsee such notice was given and a return was made and
c;. Co.
for any reason whatsoever the profits were not
assessed or were under-assessed, etc., Lhen s. 14 comes
Kapur j.
into operation and notice has to be served within
four years of the end of the chargeable accounting
period in question.
The provisions of the Act which arise for consideration are ss. 2, 4, 5, 11 and 14. Section 2 is the
definition section ; s. 4 the charging section and s. 5
deals with the applicability of the Act. Section 11
provides for the " Issue of notice for assessment "
and s. 14 is headed "profits escaping assessment".
Section 2 (2) defines accounting period and s. 2( 4)
chargeable accounting period. Section 4 provides
that in respect of any business to which the Act
applies there shall be charged, levied and paid on
the amount of taxable profit during any chargeable
accounting period a tax equal to sixteen and two.
third per cent. of the t11xable profits, which in later
years was fixed at a lower figure by the Finance Acts
of 1948 and 1949. Under s. 5 the Act applies to
every business of which any part of the profits made
during the clrnrgeable accounting period is chargeable to income-tax under s. 4 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) or subcl. (c) of that sub-section. Sections 11(1) and 14 of
the Act may now be quoted:S. 11(1). "The Income-tax Officer may, for the
purposes of this Act, require any person whom he
believes to be enaged in any business to which this
Act applies, or to hav-e been so engaged during any
chargeable accounting period, or to be otherwise
liable to pay business profits tax, to furnish within
such period, not being less than forty-five days from
the date of the service of the notice, as may be specified in the notice, a return in the prescribed form
and verified in the prescribed manner setting
forth (along with such other particulars as may
be provided for in the notice) with respect to any
chargeable accounting period specified in the notice,
r
6960
/
3 S.C.R.
..
....__
....
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
993
the profits (taxable profits) of the business or the
r960
amount of deficiency, if any, available for relief
Commissioner of
under section 6 ".
Income Tax
S. 14. "If, in consequence of definite information
v.
which has come into his possession, the Income-tax Narsee Nugsee
&Co.
Officer discovers that profits of any chargeable
accounLiug period chargeable to business profits
Kapur ].
tax have escaped assessment, or have been underassessed, or have been the subject of excessiv~
relief, he may at any time within four years of
the end of the chargeable accounting period in
question serve on the person liable to such tax a
notice containing all or any of the requirements
which may be included in a notice under s. 11, and
may proceed to assess or reassess the amount of
such profits liable to business profits tax, and the
provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply
as if the notice were a notice issued under that
section".
These sections lead to the conclusion that every
business to which the Act applies is liable to the risk
of being assessed to Business Profits Tax and it is
well settled that income escapes assessment when the
process of assessment has not been initiated as also
in a case where it has resulted in no assessment after
completion of the process of assessment. In our
opinion, the High Court was right when it held that
ss. 11 and 14 of the Act have to be read together.
The Act and the Indian Income-tax Act are both
taxing statutes operating on the same source, i.e.,
profits of business which is similarly defined in the
two statutes. If the provisions relating to escaping
of assessment in the two statutes, i.e., in s. 14 of the
former and in s. 34(1) of the latter as it existed after
the amendment of 1939, employ the same language,
they must receive the same interpretation and not be
construed differently. Section 34(1) of the Indian
Income-tax Act as amended in 1939 provided:S. 34(1). "If in consequence of definite information
which has come into his possession the Income-tax
Officer discovers that income, profits or gains
chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment
in any year, or have been under-assessed, or have
994
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
been assessed at too low a rate, or have been the
snbject of excessive relief under this Act the IncomeComniissioner of
tax
Officer may, in any case in which he has reason
Income Tax
to believe, that the assessee has concealed the
v
particulars of his income or deliberately furnished
lVarsee Nagsee
&Cn.
inaccurate particulars thereof, at any time within
eight years, and in any other case at any time
Kapur f.
within four years of the end of that year, serve on
the person liable to pay tax on such income, profits
or gains, or, in the case of a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any
of the requirements which may be included in a
notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 and may
proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits
or gains and the provisions of this Act shall, so far
as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a
notice issued under that sub-section ".
The words "escaping income" in the Indian
Income-tax Act were interpreted as being applicable
to a case where a person received notice under s. 22(2)
of the Income-tax Act but the process ended in no
assessment as to a case where there was no assessment
at· all because no notice was issued under s. 22(2) of
the Income-tax Act ; in other words, it includes cases
where the process of assessment did not commence
because no notice was given under s. 22(2) of the
Income-tax Act due to inadvertence, oversight, negligence or any other cause as to cases where such notice
proved abortive or ineffective. Both are cases of
escaped assessment: Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay v. Pirojbai N. Contractor (1 ). In this Court
these words were considered and interpreted in Kamal
Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax (2 ). They were
interpreted to comprise a case of no notice being given
for the assessment and notice being given and resulting in no assessment. Gajendragadkar, J., observed:" We see no justification for holding that cases of
income escaping assessment must always be cases
where income has not been assessed owing to inadvertence or oversight or owing to the fact that
no return has been submitted. In our opinion,
even in a case where a return has been submitted,
(t) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 338.
(2) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 10, 18, 19.
3 S.C.R.
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
995
if the Income-tax Officer erroneously fails to tax a
part of assessable income, it is a ease where the said Commissioner of
part of the income has escaped assessment. The Income Tax ·
v.
appellant's attempt to put a very narrow and
.lVagsee
artificial limitation on the meaning of the word N arse.~&Co.
' escape ' in section 34( 1)(b) cannot therefore
succeed".
Kapur /.
This passage was quoted with approval in another
case by this Court in Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar
Singh v. State of Bihar (1) (per Hidayatullah, J.). Chatturam Horilrarn Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax(2)
was a somewhat different case. There assessment
proceedings had been taken but h~Ld failed to result
in a valid assessment owing to some lacuna other
than that attributable to the Assessing Authorities
and it was held to be a case of chargeable income
escaping assessment and not a case of mere nonassessment of income-tax.
All these cases show that the words "escaping
assessment " apply equally to cases where a notice
was received by the assessee but resulted in no assessment at all and to cases where due to any reason no
notice was issued to the assessee and, therefore, there
was no assessment of his income. It is also clear
from the language of s. 14 of the Act that when a
notice is issued under that section all the requirements
of the notice under s. 11 apply and the Income-tax
Officer has to proceed in the manner as if the notice
was issued under s. 11. Therefore, any advantage or
relief which was available to the assessee under
s. 11 as to allowable deductions, deficiency, etc., would
be equally available, if the notice is issued under
s. 14.
, The legislature has adopted the language of s. 34(1)
of the Income-tax Act in s. 14 of the Act and it must,
therefore, be considered to have adopted the construction of that section applied by the courts. Secondly,
this Court has construed the words "escaping assessment" as used ins. 34(1) of the Income-tax Act. The
same words in the same context as employed ins. 14
of the Act must have the same meaning. It was submitted that in the present case a different meaning
(r) (1960].r S.C.R. 332.
(2)·[1955) 2 S.C.R. 290. ·
.
996
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
'
~
I
should be given because although ins. 34 of the Indian
Income-tax Act and s. 14 of the Act, the words
Commissioner o_f
"escaping assessment" are used the language of
!11c1 nie Tax
v
s.11(1) of the Act and ofs. 22(2) of the Indian IncomeNarsee Nagsee
tax Act is different in so far in the former the notice
&·Co.
requires an assessee to furnish a return of the income
l{ upur .f,
of the previous year and in the latter he has to
furnish the particulars with respect to any chargeable
accounting period of the profits of the business. It
becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the provisions
of the Act as to the chargeable accounting periods
and other provisions relevant thereto. In s. 2(2)
of the Act " Accounting period" in relation to any
business means any period which is or has been
determined as the previous year for the purpose of the
Indian Income-tax Act. Under s. 2(4) of the Act
"Chargeable accounting period ".means:(a) "any accounting period falling wholly within
the term beginning on the first day of April, 1946,
and ending on the thirty-first day of March, 1947;
(b) where any accounting period falls partly
within and partly without the said term, such part
of that accounting period as falls within the said
-
term''.
According to this definition, therefore, where the
previous year was the financial year 1946-4 7 then the
accounting period and the chargeable accounting
period would be coincident, i.e., they would both be
1946-47 ; but if the previous year was the calendar
year or the Diwali year the accounting periods of
nine months in the former case, i.e., April 1, 1946, to
December 31, 1946, and 7 months in the latter, i.e.,
April 1, 1946, to November I, 1946, would be the chargeable accounting periods for the purposes of the Act.
The extent of the periods will vary according to the
determination of the previous year under the Incometax Act. It might be a full year or less which appears
to be the reason for adopting the nomenclature which
has been adopted in the Act instead of the previous
year. It would be incongruous to call a period ofless
than a year as the previous year. For the chargeable
accounting periods mentioned above the Business
Profits Tax would be charged, levied and paid in the
,..
' -
'--
3 S.C.R.
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·-,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997
financial year 1947-48 at the rate mentioned ins. 4 of
the Act on every business falling under s. 5. But for Commissioner of
all these periods the assessment year would be the Income I'a:r
financial year 1947-48. Keeping this in view we may ·Narsee v..J.Vagsee
now see what changes were made by the :Finance Act
&- Co.
of 1948. By that Act the Act was continued for
Kapur].
another one year and for the figure "1947" in the
definition of chargeable accounting period in s. 2(4)(a)
the figure " 1948 " was substituted and the following
proviso was added :
"Provided that where an accounting period falls
partly before, and partly after, the end of March,
1947, so much of that accounting period as falls
before, and so much of that accounting period as
falls after, the end of March, 1947, shall be deemed
each to be a separate chargeable accounting
period ".
By this proviso the accounting period or the
previous year was split up in cases where it was not
the preceding financial year or 1947-48. Thus the
calendar year 1947 became two chargeable accounting periods of 3 months and 9 months, i.e., from
January 1, 1947, to March 31, 194 7, and April 1, 1947,
to December 31, 1947, and the same would apply to
accounting period from Diwali to Diwali, i.e., 5
months and 7 months. In effect the whole year's
profits thus became chargeable to Business Profits
Tax instead of only of a part of the year as was the
case for the financial year 1947-48. Other changes
made by the Finance Act of 1948 were in s. 4 where
under s. 10 of the Finance Act the rate of tax for
the chargeable accounting period up to the end of
March, 194 7, remained at 16 2/3 per cent. 'but for the
chargeable accounting period after that date was to
be fixed by the Annual Finance Act and by s. 11(1)
of that Act the rate was fixed at ten per cent. Thus
Business Profits Tax rates also were to be fixed by the
Annual Finance Act as were the Income-tax rates.
Then came the Finance Act of 1949 which continued
the Act for another year and under s. 4 fixed the
rate chargeable in respect of any chargeable accounting period after March 31, 1948. The Finance Act
of 1950 did not continue the Act and it thus came to
i29
998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
an end except for liabilities which had already arisen
or accrued under the Act.
C?mmissi(Jner of
· As the tax under the Act is charged, levied and
/nr,ome Tnx ·
paid on the taxable profits of a chargeable accountv.
N arsf'l1 J,.7 ag.~te ing period but assessment is in respect of the finanr1Y Cn.
cial year in which the Act operates it is not an unreasonable inference that notice for the chargeable
/(aj 1t1Y J.
accounting period must issue in the financial year
following that period. No difficulty would arise in
regard to accounting periods which coincide with
previous years, i.e., 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49.
For these years the notice will issue in the following
chargeable accounting period which again will be
the financial year in which the Act would be operative. But the question is how the proviso to s. 2(4)
added by the Finance Act of 1948 would affect this
rule. Taking a calendar year 1946 as the accounting
period, for the financial year 1947-48 the chargeable
accounting period would be the nine months period
from April l, 1946, to December 31, 1946, and notice
under s. ll(l) of the Act must issue in the financial
year because the tax is leviable and assessment is
made for the year beginning April 1, 1947, when the
Act came into force and remained operative during
the year 1947-48. After the Finance Act of 1948 the
accounting year, if it was a calendar year, became
divided into two parts and both were assessable in
the assessment year beginning with April 1, 1948,
and, therefore, notice had to be given in the financial
year 1948-49. Similarly in the financial year 1949-50
notice would have to be given in that year for the
preceding chargeable accounting period. In this
view of the matter the contention that there is no
provision ins. 11(1) of the Act as to the chargeable
accounting period as there is for the previous year
in s. 22(2) of the Income-tax Act is not well-founded.
That the notion of the previous year or the aceounting period is as much applicable to the Act
as to the Indian Income-tax Act is shown by reference to Computation of Profits Rules in the Schedule
to the Act. There the computation is related to the
accounting periods. . The previous year is shown
applieable by reference to. the Rules under the Act
·-
L
3 S.O.R.
"
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
999
by which some ofthe Rules of the Income-tax Act
arc made applicable to the Act; and some of the
of
sections of that Act are made applicable by s. 19 and Conimissioner
Income Ta.x
by the Rules under the Act. Amongst the Rules
v.
applicable is r. 8 which, inter alia, related to allowances Narsee 1\Tagsre
& Co.
under s. 10(2)(vi) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The
first and the second provisos to this rule are as
Kapur].
follows:"Provided that if the buildings, machinery,
plant or furniture have been used by the assessee
in his business for not less than two months during
the previous year, the percentage shall be increased
proportionately according to the number of complete
months of user by the assessee :
Provided further that in the case of a seasonal
factory worked by the assessee during all the working seasons of the previous year, the percentage
shall be increased as if the buildings, machinery,
plant, or furniture had been in use throughout the
period the assessee was the owner thereof during
the previous year ".
Both these provisos use the word previous year which
is same as the accounting year under the Act.
By r. 4(A) of the Rules made under the Act certain
sections of the Indian Income-tax Act have been
adapted with modifications therein mentioned. Of
those s. 50 of the Income-tax Act is one. In the Act
it has been substituted by the following :" No claim to any refund of tax under the Act
shall be allowed unless it is made within four years
from the last day of the financial year commencing
next after the expiry of the accounting period
which constitutes or includes the chargeable accounting period in respect of which the claim to such
refund arises ".
All these sections show not only that the two statutes,
i.e., the Act and the Indian Income-tax Act, have to be
read together but also that the notion of the previous
year has been inducted into the Act.
The modified s. 50, as introduced into the Act by
the rules, means this that the refund, if any, can only
be allowed within four years of the financial year
which commenceoi after the expiry of the accounting
1000
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
period which itself constitutes the chargeable accounting period or includes in it the chargeable accounting
Commissioner of
period in respect of which the refund is claimed. If
Income Tax
v.
the contention of the appellant is correct then this
Narsee Nagsee section will be wholly otiose where the assessment is
& Co.
levied after say 10 years from the end of the chargeable accounting period because by no method of calKapuy ].
culation will a refund of tax in that circumstance be
claimable under s. 50. This furnishes a key to when
a notice under s. 11(1) has to be given. It must be
given within the financial year which commences next
after the expiry of the accounting period or the
previous year which is by itself or includes the chargeable accounting period in question. Section 48 of the
Income-tax Act, as amended and applied to the Act,
does not affect the operation of s. 50 because the two
sections have to be read together and the assessee
must apply for the refund within the period specified
by s. 50: Adam Haji Dawood & Go. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma (1 ).
The language of s. 14 and particularly the words
" may proceed to a8sess or reassess the amount of
such profits to Business Profits Tax" support the
contention of the respondent that it applies to cases
of no assessment due to notice not being given as to
cases of no assessment after notice was given and
proceedings proved ineffective. The words " assess "
and "reassess" do not mean the same thing and
signify two differrent cases. The former applies to
cases where there was no assessment to tax due to
notice not being given and the process has to commence with the issuing of such notice and the latter
to cases where the assessment process is recommenced
by issuing a second notice, the previous notice having
proved abortive or resulting in under-assessment, etc.
Construing in this manner effect is given to the
words "profits of any chargeable accounting period
......... have escaped assessment" and it also avoids
the anomaly that some cases where there was no
assessment can be dealt with under one section with
a time limit as under s. 14 but other equally clear
cases- of non-assessment are dealt with under s. 11
(I 1 (1y36] 4 IT. R. IDD (Rang.).
I•
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1001
without there being any limitation of time. If the
contention of the appellant is accepted then it would Comm1ssioner of
come to this that it would depend upon the lncome- Income Tax
tax Officer as to which of the two sections he uses for iVarseev..iVagsee
the purposes of assessment and would lead to this
& Co.
absurdity that in a case of definite information of proKapur],
fits having escaped assessment there will be a limitation
of four years and in cases where there is no such
information but only belief there will be no such
limitation.
If the words "profits escaping assessment " are
applicable to original assessments, i.e., where the
process of assessment did not commence, as also
to assessments where the process of assessment was
commenced but proved wholly abortive or partially
so, thens. 14 would apply to both such cases. Thus
construed s. 11 would apply to normal original assessments and s. 14 to profits escaping assessment as
construed above whether the assessment is an original
assessment or is a re-assessment.
In determining the scope of s. 14 of the Act
reference may be made to another statute which is
relevant for the purpose, i.e., the Excess Profits
Tax Act (Act XV of 1940), ss. 13 and 15 of which are
identical in language with ss. 11 and 14 of the Act.
Section 13 deals with the issue of a notice for assessment and s. 15 with profits escaping assessment.
Before the Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act 22of1947), there was a 5 years'
period oflimitation prescribed in s. 15 in the following
terms: " within five years of the end of the chargeable accounting period in question". By the aforesaid
amendment these words were deleted. The Act,
being Act 21 of 1947, as well as the Amendment Act
above referred to were enacted about the same time
one after the other. The legislature thought it necessary to remove the period of limitation and thereby
made profits escaping assessment liable to taxation
under the Excess Profits Tax Act without any period
of limitation but in the Act the legislature thought it
expedient to prescribe the period of limitation of
four years in s. 14. It cannot be said that this was
1002
SUPREME COURT ltEPORTS
[19oOJ
without any purpose and the argument that prescrib.
ing the period of lirnito,t.ion in s. 14 of the Act was
Connnissione,. uf
deliberate and was iutended to prevent taxing under
lnconie Tax
v.
the Act of profits which had escaped assessment for
l'Vutsee 1,ragsee
four years from the end of the chargeable accounting
& Co.
period in question is not without substance.
Kapur J.
It was argued for the appellant that s. 11(1) construed o,ccording to the plain meaning of the words
used therein o,pplies to original assessments and s. 14
to assessments in which notice was given but due to
any cause whatsoever the proceedings resulted in no
assessment or in under-assessment. He referred to
the words "require any person whom he believes to
be engaged in any business ............... or to have been
engaged during any chargeable accounting period or
to be otherwise liable", and submitted that these
words mean that if an Income-tax Officer has such
belief in regard to a person who is engaged in any
business or was engaged in any business during any
chargeable accounting period in question he can issue
a notice at any time without limitation of time
requiring a return to be filed. etc. In support counsel
for the appellant relied upon two judgments, Gokuldas
Ratanji Mandavia v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1 )
which was an appeal from East Africa and Telu
Ram Jain & Go. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (2 ), a
case decided by the Punjab High Court. In the
former case a notice was issued to the assessee under
s. 59(1) of the East African Income Tax (Management)
Act, 1952, which provided:"The commissioner may, by notice in writing,
require any person to furnish him within a reason.
able time, not being less than thirty days from the
date
. of service,, of such notice, with a return of
mcome ........ .
Sections 71(1) and 72 provided:" S. 71(1). The commissioner shall proceed to
assess every person chargeable with tax as soon as
may be after the expiration of the time allowed
to such person for the delivery of his return ...... "
"S. 72. Where it appears to the commissioner
that any person liable to tax has not been assessed
r960
l•) [1959] A.C 114,
(2) (1955) 27 l.T.R, 94.
\
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
._.
1003
............ the commissioner may ............ assess such
person at such amount ............... as, according to
of
his judgment, ought to have been charged ........... " Commissioner
Incon-w Tax
The notice requiring the assessee to furnish returns of
v.
his income for the years of assessment 1943-53 was N arsee /ll agsee
&- Co.
issued but no return was filed and assessment was
made under s. 72 of the East African Act for the
]{rtpur ].
vears 1943-51. The assessee contended that s. 72 did
i'10t apply until the machinery under s. 71 had been
put into operation and that the assessments were
1J,ltra vires and void because they were made before
the time allowed by s. 71. It was held that s. 71
applied to all original assessments and s. 72 with
reopening of cases which had been settled under a
normal procedure. Accepting the contention of the
assessee Lord Somervell of Harrow observed :"If the power to make an assessment under
section 72 applies to the making of an original
assessment their Lordships are unable to imply
a term restl'icting it to back cases or making it
ultra vires to operate it at any time. One would
expect an opportunity to make a, return to be a
condition precedent to assessment .. This is supported by the provisions for personal allowances in
Part VI of the Act. · If the respondent is right any
person can be assessed without having any such
opportunity. There would be two concurrent jurisdictions one providing reasonable protection for the
taxpayer and the other providing no protection
quoad the original assessment, apart from a right
to appeal. Such a construction seems to their
Lordships inconsistent with the general and mandatory provisions of s. 71. That section is providing how all original assessments are to be made".
The language of these ss. 59(1), 71 and 72 is different
from that of ss. 11 and 14 of the Act. Section 72 was
held not applicable because there would be two
concurrent jurisdictions, one providing reasonable
protection for the taxpayer and the other providing
no protection which would be contrary to the provisions of s. 71. According to the Privy Council it was
necessary to restrict the words of s. 72 to cases in
which the machinery of s. 59(1) having been operated
1004
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
no assessment resulted. The words of s. 14 are entirely
different.
It applies to cases of profits escaping
Commission.er of
assessment and the words "escaping assessment"
fncvmr Tax
v.
have already been interpreted under s. 34 of the
,Varsee Nagsee Income-tax Act and there is no reason why the same
& Co.
words occurring in a statute which is in pari materia
should be given a different meaning in the two Acts.
f<apur J.
Further the difficulty which the Privy Council felt in
regard to there being two jurisdictions, one giving
protection to the assessee and the other not giving
such protection, docs not exist in the present case
because the process of assessment under s. 14 of the
Act is ex11ctly the same as it is where notice is given
under s. 11(1) of the Act and all the adv11ntages which
an assessee would have under s. 11(1) are available to
him under s. 14.
The Punjab case to which our attention has been
drawn was a case under the Excess Profits Tax Act
11nd it was held that because of the removal of the
limitation clause ins. 15 of that Act assessments were
not hit by any period of limitation and a further
observ11tion not necessary for the decision of the case
w11s made that even otherwise the hnguage of s. 13 of
that Act was wide and there was no substance in the
contention that after the assessment period a notice
under s .. 13 of that Act could not be issued and that the
only notice which could be given was one under s. 15.
In view of the construction we have placed on s. 14
of the Act on the words" profits escaping assessment"
that they apply to assessments where notice has been
given and has resulted in no assessment and where
due to inadvertence, oversight or other circumstances
no notice was given, it is difficult to interpret s. 11 in
the manner contended for by the appellant.
In our opinion, the assessment which was sought to
be made was without jurisdiction and the appeal must,
therefore, fail.
We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.
r
r960
_,
'
Hidayatultah ].
HrnAYATULLAH, J.-The Commissioner of Incometax, Bombay has filed this appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dated
September
5, 1956, with the certificate of the High
. . . . . .
.
~-
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3 ~.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1005
Court granted under s. 19 of the Business Profits Tax
Act, 194 7 (hereinafter called the Act) read with
Commissioner of
s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Messrs. Income To:¥ ·
N arsee Nagsee & Co., Bombay (hereinafter referred to
v.
Na>see Nagsee
as the assessee firm), are the respondents.
b Co.
The assessee firm, at all material times, was doing
business in Bombay. For the chargeable accounting Hidayat111/ah ) .
period, November 13, 1947, to October 31, 1948, a
notice was issued on January 12, 1953, by the Incometax Officer under s. 11(1) of the Act calling upon the
assessee firm to submit its return. This notice was
served on the assessee firm on January 21, 1953, and
it filed a return under protest, stating that the notice
was barred under s. 14 of the Act. It may be mentioned that the assessment for purposes of income-tax
for the same year was completed on :February 17, 1953.
The objection of the assessee firm was overruled by
the Income-tax Officer, who completed the assessment
under s. 12(1) of the Act on November 30, 1953. The
assessee firm then appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who upheld the objection that the
notice was invalid under s. 14(1) of the Act. On
appeal taken by the Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay, the Appellate Tribunal concurred with the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner. At the instance
of the Commissioner, however, the Tribunal stated a
case, and referred two questions for the decision of
the Bombay High Court which were as under:
" (1) Whether the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to assess the assessee firm under the Business
Profits Tax Act by issue of a notice under Section 11(1) of the Business profits Tax Act on
12-1-1953 in respect of the chargeable accounting
period, 13-11-1947 to 31-10-1948, without having
recourse to section 14 of the Business Profits Tax
Act?
(2) If the answer to question No. 1 is in the
negative, whether the Business Profits Tax assessment could be considered to have been validl v
made~"
.
"
The High Court modified the first question by deleting its last 12 words. Both the questions were then
answered by the High Court in the negative. The
lJO
1006
SUPREME COURT REPUJ{TS
[l9U(;]
Commissioner of Income-tax obtained a certificatP
from
the High Court, and filed this appeal.
Comniissioner of
Before dealing with the reasons given by the High
Inc1 me Tax
v.
Court and the Tribunal and considering arguments
Narsee ~Vagsee urged in this appeal, it will be convenient to reproduce
&Co,
ss. 11(1) and 14 of the Act:
"11(1). The Income-tax Officer may, for the
Hidayatullah ].
purposes of this Act, n·quire any person w horn he
believes to be engaged in any business to which this
Act applies, or to have been so engaged dnring any
chargeable acconnting period, or to be otherwise
liable to pay business prnfits tax, to furnish within
such period, not being less than forty-five days
from the date of the service of the notice, as may be
specified in the notice, a return in the prescribed
form and verified in the prescribed manner setting
forth (along with such other particulars as may be
provided for in the notice) with respect to any
chargeable accounting period specified in the not ice,
the profits (the taxable profit") of the business or
the amount of deficiency, if a11y, available for rdief
under section 6 :
Provided that the Income-tax Officer may, in his
discretion, extend the datP for the delivery of the
return.
·
14. If, in consequence of definite information
which has come into his possession, the Income-tax
Officer discovers that profits of any chargeable
accounting period chargeable to business profits tax
have escaped assessment, or have been under-assessed, or have been the subject of excessive relief, be
may at any time within four years of the end oftbe
chargeable acwunting period in question serve on
the person liable to such tax a notice containing all
or any of the rpq uirements w hicb may be included
in a notice undPr section 11, and may proceed to
assess or reassess the amount of such profits liable
to businASS profits ta.x, and the provisions of this
Act shall, so far as may be, apply as if the notice
were a notice issued under that section."
The Tribunal construed both these sections together,
and expressed the opinion that the notice under s. 11
in respect of a chargeable accounting period should
-
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOH,'l':)
1007
1960
issue before the commencement ofthe next chargeable
accounting period, and that if the notice was not so Commissioner of
issued, profits must be considered to have escaped I nconze Tax
V.
assessment, and that action could only be taken nnder
s. 14 within four years of the close of the chargeable 1Varsee ;..Vagsee
&Co.
accounting period in respect of which it was sought to
tax the assessee. The Tribunal, therefore, held that Hidayatuliah ].
inasmuch as the notice in this case was issued in
January, 1953, more than four years after October 31,
1948, when the chargeahle accounting period came to
an end, the notice and th i assessment were barred by
time. The Tribunal also pointed out that the intention of the legislature could be gathered from the fact
that though in s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act the
limitation of five years was deleted by Act 22 of 1947,
a similar amendment was not made in s. 14 of the
Act, which corresponds to s. 15 of the Excess Profits
Tax Act, though the Act was passed at the same time
being Act 21 of 1947. Holding, therefore, that the
profits which were not taxed at all and were never
brought under assessment must be deemed to have
"escaped assessment" because notice under s. 11 was
not issued in time, the Tribunal was of opinion that
action could only be taken under s. 14 of the Act
within the time specified there. The Bombay High
Court did not accept that the notice under s. 11 had
to be given before the end of the chargeable accounting period, but held that the two sections must be
interpreted together, and observed:
" Inasmuch as section 11 doeB not indicate any
period of time with regard to the issue of a notice,
would it or would it not be right for us to import into section 11 the consideration which led the Legislature to fix a limitation of time for the purpose of
issuing a notice under section 14? If wfl were not
to do that we would arrive at this rather extraordinary conclusion that the Legislature while
saving the subject from harassment of proceedings
with regard to escaped assessment or under-assPssment, permitted that harassment with regard to
the very initiation of the proceedings after the lapse
of four years. It is contended that the period of
four years mentioned in section 14 suppliPs a11
•
1008
Commissioner of
Tneome Tax
v.
Narsee Nagsee
&Co.
Hidr•yalullah ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
important indication for what the period of limitation should be with regard to the issue of a notice
under section 11. If income which has escaped
assessment can only be taxed within four years by
reason of section 14, then it must inferentially
follow that income must escape assessment at some
point of time anterior to the period of four years
mentioned in section 14.
•
..................................................................
On the facts of this case the most significant and
salient fact is that the notice has bPen issued four
years after the close of the chargeable accounting
period and as that notice is beyond the time mentioned in section 14, in our opinion, the notice is
not a valid notice under section ll."
The Commissioner has contended that. s. 11 deals
with the issuance of a notice for the first time before
any income has been returned or brought to tax The
notice under s. 11, it is submitted next, is without any
limit of time, and a limitation cannot be read into a
section, when the legislature has not thought it fit to
lay it down. According to the Commissioner, s. 14
deals with "escaped assessment", which, under the
scheme of the Act, must, be given a narrow meaning
as indicating the escapement of profits from tax either
wholly or partly for any reason, after the process of
assessment has taken place. Section 14, it is argued,
operates after one set of proceedings for assessment
of tax have taken place, and applies only where the
profits either escape assessment, or are under-·assessed
or excessive relief has been granted, while s. l l, on
the other hand, applies to all cases, where the assessee
has not been called upon to file a return or has not
filed one himself. As against this, the assessee firm
adopts the reasons given by the Tribunal and the
High Court, and adds that whereas under s. 14 some
definite information must be possessed by the Incometax Officer before he can issue the notice, the Incometax Officer has only to entertain a belief that business
was carried on in the chargeable accounting period to
enable him to serve the notice under s. ll. The
assessee firm, therefore, contends that it would be
open to the Income· tax Officer to ignore s. 14
......
\
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:5 s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1009
altogether, and to issue a notice under s. 11 in a case
even after the expiry of a considerable time. The
Commis<ioner of
Commissioner contends that the liability to pay tax Income Tax
arises under s. 4 of the Act, and it remains till the
liability is discharged by payment of tax, and the N arsee N agsee
&Co.
higislature has, therefore, advisedly left the power to
the Income-tax Officer to assess the tax where there Hidayatullah ],
has been no proceeding to assess it, without imposing
any limit a.s to time. Section 14, on the other hand,
has been so framed that persons whose profits have
been brought to assessment once should not be
exposed to a double peril, except within the stated
period.
The two sections must be reconciled. The learned
Chief J·ustice of the Bombay High Court, who delivered the judgment of the Bench, stated that it was not
an easy matter to give a rational meaning to them.
He, however, felt that between the two rival contentions, the argument of the assessee firm was the more
reasonable, and that where two constructions were
possible, one strict and the other beneficial to the
assessee, the latter should be preferred if it was
equally reasonable.
The scheme of the Act, in so far as asking for a
return is concerned, is entirely different from that of
the Indian Income-tax Act. Under the latter Act, a
general notice is issued calling upon every assessee
whose income exceeds the minimum which is exempt
under the Income-tax Act, to file a return within the
period stated in the notice. The Income-tax Officer
has further power to issue a notice to any individual
assessee during any assessment year calling for a
return of his income during the previous year. An
assessee under the Income-tax Act is, therefore, bound,
if his income is liable to tax, to file a ret.urn whether
it be in answer to the general notice or to the special
notice issued to him. The assessee may ~ven file a
return voluntarily before the special notice is issued to
him. Even before 1939, though there was no general
notice the distinction between the previous year and
the assessment year obtained. The notice under s. 22
of the Indian Income-tax Act must issue befr re llH?
V,
-
1
1010
SUPitEM.E COUltT ltEPORTS
[HltiU]
close of the assessment year and cannot be issued
thereafter.
.
co,n;::~~i";:: of
The scheme of the Business Profits Tax Act is
v.
different. Business profits follow the assessment of
Nam' Nagsee income-tax, and are payable for any chargeable
& Co.
accounting period in which, the assessee having carried
. Hidoyatullah ]. on business, assessable profits have resulted.
Under
the Act, the Income-tax Officer, if he has reason to
believe that the assessee was engaged in any business
to which the Act applied, or to have been so engaged
during any chargeable accounting period or to be
otherwise liable to pay business profits tax, can Mil
upon the assessee to furnish a return. That is s. 11.
Then comes s. 14, which says that if in consequence of
definite information which has come into his possession the Income-tax Officer discovers that profits of
any chargeable accounting period chargeable to business profits tax have 'escaped assessment', he may at
any time within' four years from the end of the
chargeable accounting period in question serve on the
person liable to such tax, a notice. There is no compulsion to file a return except in answer to a notice
issued either under s. 11 or s. 14. There is no period
comparable to the assessment year. Mr. Palkhivala
attempted to bring in the conception of an ' assessment year' into the Act by saying that the next
chargeable accounting period could be taken to be the
assessment year for the previous chargeable accounting period. When it was pointed out to him that
where the chargeable accounting period of a business
ended, say, on March 15 every year the last chargeable accounting period would be compressed to 15
days, he had no adequate answer. The Tribunal also
stated that the chargeable accounting year was also
the 'assessment year'. This cannot be correct,
· because s. 11(1) speaks of the current as well as the
back chargeable accounting periods, as will be
explained in detail later. The question thus is whether
a narrow meaning should be given to the words
"profits which have escaped assessment" as denoting
only those profits which by reason of a prior notice
under s. 11 were sought to be assessed but had escaped
assessment, or a wide meaning to include those profits
1960
.
(
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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-
IOU
which were never sought to be assessed or brought
under assessment· by the issuance of a notice under Commissioner (lf
s. 11.
lnconie Tnx
v.
The question is primarily one of construction of the
J\7a gsee
two sections of the Act. Before <foaling with it, it is Narsee&Co
necessary to look at the scheme of some of the basic
provisions of the Act. The accounting period under Hidayatul/uh J.
the Act is equated to the previous yE>ar of the business
for the purposes of the In<lian Income-tax Act., 1922.
The tax is laid on the taxable profits of the 'chargeable accounting period', which means an accounting
period falling wholly within the term beginning on the
first day of April, 1946, and ending on the thirty.first
day of Ma.rch, 1949, or where any accounting period
falls partly within and partly without the said trrm,
such part as falls within the said term. A proviso
further says that if the accounting period falls pa.rtly
before, and partly afer, the end of March, 1947, then
the period before and the period after shall be deemed
to be separate chargeable ar>counting periodf'. Then
comes s. 4, which is the charging section. That sect.ion, omitting the provisions about exemptions which
do not concern us, reads:
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, there
shall, in respect of any business to which this Act
applies, be charged, levied and paid on the amount
of the taxable profits during any chargeable accounting period, a tax (in this Act referred to as 'business profits tax ') which shall, in respect of any
chargeable accounting period ending on or before
the 31st day of March, 1947, be equal to sixteen and
two thirds per cent. of the taxable profits, and in
respect of any chargeable accounting period beginning after that date, be equal to such percentage of
the taxable profits as may be fixed by the annual
Finance Act.
Provided ............ " (omitted).
Section 5 deals with the application of the Act.
That section, omitting again the provisos that do not
affect the present matter, provides:
"This Act shall apply to every business of which
any part oft.he profits made during the chargeable
accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by
1012
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
virtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or subola
use (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4
Cornmissioner of
of the Indian Income-tax Ac!, 1922, or of clause(<·)
income Tux
v.
of that sub-section:
N arsee Na see
"Provided ............ " (omitted).
&Co.
It will appear from these sections quoted that the
\,Hidayatullah j. business profits tax comes in the wake of the incometax. That is to say, the assessability to profits tax
follows the assessability to incomP-tax. The tax is
laid on the taxable profits accruing within a stated
period which may include not more than four accounting periods corresponding either wholly or partly to
the previous year under the Income-tax Act. The
C'hargeability to income-tax is a condition precedent
to the chargeability to profits tax, but not every business which pays in0ome. tax· necessarily pays busi1wss
profits tax. The Act, however, does not prescribe a
period comparable to the assessment yt>1ir under the
Indian Income-tax Act. It does not lay down any
term within which the assessment should be completed.
The short question thus is whether in s. 11 of the
Act a limitation corresponding to the limitation contained in s. 14 must necessarily be read. It seems to
he agreed on all hands, and it was not denied at the
Bar before us that ifs. 11 is to be interpreted according to its own terms, then no such limitation can be
read in it. The Tribunal and the High Court resort
to s. 14 to do so.
It is always a serious matter to read into a section
what the legislature has not chosen to put there. As
pointed nut by Lord EshPr, M. H., in Curtis v.
Stovin (1 ) :
"It is, no doubt, very easy for a judge to say that
he is introducing words into an Act only by way of
construing it, while he is really making a new
Act".
S110h procedure is wholly out of place if the language
of the section does not admit of any extension.
The question invariably is not what the legislature
might have said, or might be supposed to have intended to say, but what it did say. This is more so in an
(I) (188\)) 22 Q.B.D. 5'J•
~·
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3 S.C.R.
_,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1013
1 60
Act which imposes a tax, and which cannot be added
9
to or subtracted from except perhaps for the most Com :;;;,.., of
clear and compelling reasons. Bearing these principles, r:C~me Tax
which have received recognition on many an occasion,
v.
in mind, I address myself to the task.
Narsee Nagsee
Under the scheme of the Act analysed above, it is
& Co,
quite clear that the liability to tax depends not on Hidayatullak 1 .
any action to be taken nuder the Act to recover the
tax, but it attaches itself to the taxable profits when
they have been made in any chargeable accounting
period. Once this liability attaches, it can only be
dissolved either by payment of the tax or by the levy
becoming impossible due to lapse of stated time. The
Commissioner contends that the liability to pay the
tax in the case of a business not brought to tax does
not cease by reason of any passage of time. It ceases
only when by reason of an attempted assessment once,
the proceedings under s. 14 cannot be initiated again
after the expiry of four years from the end of any
chargeable accounting period. The Commissioner contends that the phrase "profits have escaped assessment" in s. 14 must be limited to those cases only.
For this purpose, reliance is placed upon a recent
decision of the Privy Council in a case from Africa,
Gokulrlas Ratanji Manrlavia v. Commissioner of Incometax (1 ), which will be referred to in some detail.
The Income.tax authorities in Nairobi in that case
wrote on May 26, 1953, asking Mandavia for information and a deposit of£ 2,000 and saying :
"As you do not appear at any time to have
made a return of total income and claim for allowances, I am sending under separate cover forms
covering years of assessment 1943 to 1953. These
should be completed and submitted to me along
with the accounts of your professional activities and
of your property dealings as set out in the preceding
paragraphs".
Mandavia was at that time in England, and wrote on
June 4, asking for time till the end of July. On
June 15, 1953, the Regional Commissioner wrote to
inform him that he was proceeding to assess him and
impose penalties on the basis of such information as
(I) (1959] A, C. Il4,
131
1014
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
1960
had been submitted. These assessments were made
on
June 18, but were dated June 26 apparently to give
Commissioner of
the taxpayer more time in which to pay. Under s. 59
Income Tax
v.
of the East African Income Tax (Management) Act,
~Varsee Nagsee
1952, it was provided :
&Co.
"59(1 ). The commissioner may, by notice in
writing,
require any person to furnish him within a
Hidayatullah .J.
reasonable time, not being less than thirty days
from the date of service of such notice, with a
return of income and of such particulars as may be
required for the purposes of this Act with respect
to the income upon which such person appears to
be chargeable".
Under the third sub-section of that section, a duty
was laid upon every person to give notice to the
Commissioner before October 15 in the year following
the year of income that he was so chargeable, where
no notice had been served under sub-s. (1) and no
return had been furnished within nine months of the
close of the year of account. Then followed two sections, which need to be quoted partly. Section 71
provided, inter alia :
"(1). The commissioner shall proceed to assess
every person chargeable with tax as soon as may
be after the expiration of the time allowed to such
person for the delivery of his return."
The section provided by sub-s. (2) for cases in which
a return was made which was (a) accepted and (b) not
accepted, and by sub-s. (3), for cases where no return
was filed. Then followed s. 72 which provided (leaving out the proviso) :
"Where it appears to the commissioner that any
person liable to tax has not been assessed oi; has
been assessed at a Jess amount than that which
ought to have been charged, the commissioner may,
"within the year of income or within seven years
after the expiration thereof, assess such person at
such amount or additional amount as, according to
his judgment, ought to have been charged, and the
provisions of this Act as to notice of assessment,
appeal and other proceedings under this Act shall
apply to such assessment or additional assessment
and to the tax charged thereunder. "
,_ .
3 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1015
Now, the Commissioner in the cited case justified
the assessments under s. 72, because it was contended
of
that the assessments were ultra vires and void, in that Commissioner
Income Ta"
they were made before the" time allowed". He relied
v.
upon the general words of s. 72, and submitted that Narsee Nagsee
&Co.
they covered even a case where a pe:\'son was not
assessed whether he had a notice and a "time allowed" Hidayatullah J.
under ss. 59 and 71 or not. The argument on behalf
of the taxpayer was that s. 72 only dealt with cases
where subsequent informq,tion led either to an assessment after a prior asses1ment or to an additional
assessment but had no application to cases in which
the machinery of s. 59(1) had not been operated.
The Privy Council accepted the contention of the
taxpayer. It held that before assessments could be
made, the "time allowed" had to elapse. It, however,
gave a narrow meaning to the words as to assessing
for the first time in s. 72, as restricted to "cases in
which, the machinery ofs. 59(1) having been operated,
no assessment has been made". Their Lordships
gave three reasons for this conclusion, which may be
set out in their own words :
"If the power to make an assessment under
section 72 applies to the making of an original
assessment their Lordships are unable to imply a
term restricting it to back cases or making it ultra
vires to operate it at any time. One would expect
an opportunity to make a return to be a condition
precedent to assessment. This is supported by the
provisions for personal allowances in Part VI of the
Act. If the respondent is right any person can be
assessed without having any such opportunity.
There would be two concurrent jurisdictions~ one
providing reasonable protection for the taxpayer
and the other providing no protection quoad the
original assessment, apart from a right to appeal.
Such a construction seems to their Lordships inconsistent with the general and mandatory provi·
sions of section 71. That section is providing how
all original assessments are to be made.
Section 72 deals, inter alia, with additional assess·
ments, with cases in which, owing presumably to
subsequent information, the Revenue desires to
1016
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960]
reopen what had apart from section 72 been settled.
Having regard to the wording of section 71 it seems
Commissioner of
to their Lordships necessary to restrict the words as
Income Tax
to assessing for the first time in section 72 to cases
v.
Narsee Nagsee
in which, the machinery of section 59 (1) having
c;. Co.
been operated, no assessment has been made. So far
as
the taxpayer is concerned, after he had made his
Hidayatullah J.
return or had an opportunity of doing so, it was
settled that he was under no liability to tax for
that year. Subsequent information leads the Revenue to reopen the matter and decide that he ought
to he assessed. ·
Section 72 is dealing with the reopening of cases
which had been settled under the normal procedure.
This explains the fact that section 72 contains a
prima facie limitation of seven years whereas section 71 contains no limitation. On the respondents'
arguments this seems inexplicable. On the other
argument it seems reasonable that there should
after a certain time be no reopening of what has
been settled unless there has been fraud or wilful
·
default.
The construction also gains support from the
words 'ought to have been charged', when they
occur for the second time in section 72. They there
apply to' such amount' as well as' such additional
amount'."
The case, though it is easily distinguishable on the
ground that the African Act and the Act are not in
pari materia, shows that by the compulsion of the
language employed and the scheme of taxation, a
restricted meaning may have to be given to certain
general words. When such a claim is made, only the
statute under which the claim is made, can be the
guide and not another not in pari materia. The decision is also distinguishable on the ground that there a
notice under s. 59 (1) was pending and the "time
allowed " had not expired.
The assessee relies upon a decision of the Bombay
High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. P. N.
Contractor ('), where the previous year ended on
March 31, 1934. No notice was served on the assessee
under s. 22(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act during
1•1 ~·~371 ~ r:r.:a. 336.
-
--"
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1017
the year of assessment. Then a notice under s. 34 of
the Income-tax Act was served on June 26, 1935. It Commissioner of
was held by Beaumont, C. J., and Rangnekar, J., that Income Tax
v.
s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act was wide enough to
Narsee Nagsee
include those cases in which there was no notice under
&Co.
s. 22 or a first assessment. Beaumont, C. J., dissented
from the observations of Sir George Rankin in In re Hidayatullah ].
Lachhiram Basantlal (1) made obiter that " income
cannot be said to have escaped assessment except in
the case where an assessment has been made which
does not include the income", and observed :
"Under s. 34 what must be escaped is assessment
and.that means the whole process of assessment,
which, in the case of individuals, starts with the
service of a notice under s. 22(2). The liability to
assessment is a risk to which every person in British
India entitled to income is liable, and I cannot see
why the process of assessment has not been just as
much escaped by a person who receives no notice
under s. 22(2) as by a person who receives such a
notice which proves in fact ineffective. It seems
to me that a person who receives no notice under
s. 22(2) has escaped assessment, although, through
no fault of his own, the process of assessment has
never been set in motion. "
The assessee also relied upon Commissioner of
Income-tax, Burma v. Ved Nath Singh (2 ), where
Roberts, C. J., Mya Bu and Dunkley, JJ., observed:
"We are of opinion that s. 34 is applicable to
cases in which either no assessment at all has been
made upon the person who received· the income,
profits or gains liable to assessment, or, where an
assessment has been made in the course of the year,
but some portion of the income, profits or gains of
such assessee for some reason or other has not
been included in the order of assessment; such
income is income which has 'escaped assessment' in
the year, and falls within the ambit of s. 34 of the
Act. "
These cases arose before the amendments of 1939
and in those days there was no provision for a general
(I) (1931) l.L.R 58 Cal. 909, 912.
\2) [1940] 8 I.T.R. 23a,
1018
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
notice such as is now issued under s. 22(1). Even in
those
days, the return asked for the particulars of
Commissioner of
the
total
income during the previous year. Thus, at
Jnc;onie Tax
v.
the end of the assessment year it was not possible to
N ar.~ee 1-lagsee issue a notice for a back period beyond the previous
&Co.
year. By the force of s. 22(2) it could be said at the
Hidayatullah ]. end of any assessment year that in so far as the
income of the corresponding previous year was concerned, it had escaped assessment. The logical result
of this was that if no notice calling for a return under
s. 22 was issued within the assessment year, thens. 34
was the only means to get at the tax: See Rajendra
Nath Mukerjee v. Commissioner of Income-tax {1 ). The
scheme of the Indian Income-tax Act is entirely
different, and by fixing a time limit for the issuance
of a notice under s. 22(2) makes it clear that in s. 34
of the Indian Income-tax Act the words "escaped
assessment" ex facie covered all cases of escaped
assessment whether within or without a prior assessment. The assessment there 'escapes' when once the
assessment year expires. The cases under the Incometax Act which expound s. 34 are, thus, not in point.
The cases of this Court relied upon by the assessee
also do not help. In Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of
Income-tax (2 ), it was held that the word "information " was wide enough to include information as to
the true and correct state of the law and the word
"escaped " was wide enough to cover cases of inadvertence or oversight on the part of the assessing
authorities. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas ('), the respondent assessee had
submitted a ' voluntary ' return showing no taxable
income, and it was held that the Income-tax Officer
could not ignore the return and proceed under s. 34
of the Income-tax Act. In Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar {4 ), the income returned
was not brought to tax and later under s. 26 of the
Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1938, it was
sought to be assessed. Section 26 of that Act was
held to cover such a case, and the language of that
section was extremely wide. These cases are hardly
in point.
!--
I960
(1} L.R. {1933 1 6I I.A. Io.
(3) [1960] ' S.C.R. 114.
(2) f1959] Supp. l S.C.R. Io.
(4)[1960] I S.C.R. 332.
\....
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1019
We are thus thrown back upon the construction of
z96o
the two sections, and must find out where the compul- c ommisstoner
.-. o1
sion of the language employed and the general scheme Income Tax
of the provisions lead to. Before doing so, I shall
v.
discuss one other extraneous consideration called in Narsee Nagsee
aid by both the Tribunal and the High Court. The
& Co.
Act followed the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, which Hidayatullah J.
provided for the levy of tax on excess profits made
during the chargeable accounting periods within the
term beginning on the first day of September, 1939,
and ending on the thirty-first day of March, 1941. By
succeeding Finance Acts, the year 1941 was changed to
1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946. Thereafter came the
Act. Sections 13 ancl 15 of the Excess Profits Tax
Act correspond respectively to ss. 11 and 14 of the
Act with the difference that the limitation in s. 15
was five years. By Act 21 of 1947 (which immediately
preceded the Act) this period of limitation was removed, by deleting retrospectively the words "within five
years of the end of the chargeable accounting period
in quesLion" from s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax
Act. Thus, by the amendment there was no limitation for bringing to tax profits which had escaped
assessment, and it was so held by Falshaw and
Kapur, JJ., in Telu Ram Jain & Co. v. Commissioner
of Income-tax (1 ).
Now, the Tribunal and the High Court reason that
it was the simplest matter for the legislature to have
deleted similar words from s. 14 of the Act, if the
intention was to create no limitation for the assessment of profits which had not been assessed before.
The fact that there was no corresponding change in
the Act, it is said, shows that no first assessment or
reassessment could be made after a lapse of four years.
This argument views the matter from one angle
only. There is another side to it which is equally
plausible. The intention of the legislature in making
the amendment in the Excess Profits Tax Act was
manifestly to make the tax leviable by a first assessment and also by a reassessment without any limit of
time. After the amendment, no limitation existed
either in s.13 ors. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act.
(1) [1955] 27 I.T.R. 94·
1020
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
Such assessment or reassessment could be made at
any time or even after considerable time. The quesConitnissioner of
tion of hardship involved in calling for returns after
Income Tax
the lapse of considerable time, which has weighed
. v.
Narsee N11gsee heavily with the High Court, did not seem to ha,-e
&Co,
distressed the legislature. It is thus impossible to
think that the legislature left the Act untouched from
Hidayatullah J.
a converse motive. . '\Ve must not forget that the Act ·
was then freshly enacted, and the first chargeable
accounting period was hardly over for any assessee
and every case of escaped assessment or underassessment was also well within the time prescribed by
s. 14 of the Act. There would hardly be any present
need for such a drastic provision to start with. It
might well ha.ve been thought that there would not
be cases in which four years could not be considered
ample, except those cases where a particular business
was never brought to tax at all. ]'or that, it might
equally have been thought that s. 11, as is contende-d
by the Commissioner, was sufficient. The amendment
in s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act might have
been advisedly made to reach even those cases where
though the profits of a business had once been brought
to assessment, they needed to be re-assessed even
though the first assessment resulted in some tax or
no tax. For those cases it might have been felt that
the limit of :five years ought to go.
If this is as good an explanation of the intention of
the legislature in amending s. 15, then the reason
given by the High Court is not the only explanation,
and it cannot be accepted. If the intention of the
legislature can be gathered in two different ways, it is
sheer speculation to say which is the true intention.
As said earlier, it is always inadvisable to go by a
supposed intention of the legislature and construe
the words of the statute in the light of that supposed
intention. The intention must be gathered from the
words of the section in which the legislature has
chosen to express its intention and not vice versa. I
am accordingly of the view that this ground is not
valid.
The High Court and the Tribunal read s. 11(1)
somewhat differently. According to the Tribunal,
Ig6o
-
-
'
'
"I
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.....
1021
the notice under that section must issue before the
end of the chargeable accounting period, and accordCommissioner of
ing to the High Court, within four years from the end Income Ta:r
v.
thereof. There is nothing in the section which
N arsee N agsee
justifies any of these two readings. Three classes of
&Co.
persons are there mentioned. They are (a) p~rsons
believed to be engaged in any business, (b) persons Hidayatullah ].
believed to have been so engaged in any chargeable
accounting period, and (c) persons believed to be
otherwise liable to business profits tax. The first
two categories clearly show that whereas for the first
category the assessee must be engaged in business in
the year of notice, for the second category the notice
may issue in respect of a back chargeable accounting
period. The words "to be engaged" and "to have
been so engaged during any chargeable accounting
period" cannot but refer to " current" and "back"
chargeable accounting periods. The latter words
plainly refer to a " back " period and the word
"any" shows that it need not be the " back" period
immediately preceding the "current" chargeable
accounting period only. Indeed, it is possible to
issue the notice under s. 11(1) after March 31, 1949,
in respect of the very first chargeable accounting
period and also every succeeding period lying within
the term beginning on April 1, 1946, and ending on
March 31, 1949.
If this be the natural meaning of the section-and
this meaning is made more probable by the residuary
category, viz., persons otherwise liable to pay business
profits tax-it is an irresistible conclusion that no
period comparable to the assessment year under the
Income-tax Act was either introduced or contemplated.
The distinction between " back " chargeable
accounting periods and "current" chargeable accounting periods also disappears. Unless one can say when
or after how much lapse of time profits escape assessment, s. 14 cannot be made applicable at all. Section
4 of the Act says that in respect of any business to
which the Act applies, there shall be charged, levied
and paid a tax referred to as the busi.ness profits tax.
The liability that is incurred can bnly be discharged
by payment of the tax and the charging and levying
13~
1022
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
[1960]
are duties laid upon the Income-tax Officers who
them by issuing a notice under s. 11 and by
execute
Commissioner of
Income Lax
assessing and demanding the tax. For this purpose,
v.
any person believed to be engaged in business to
Narsee Nagsee
which the Act applies, or to have been so engaged or
&Co.
to be otherwise liable can be called upon to make a
Hidayatullah .J. return. Of course, the proceedings thus initiated may
or may not result in tax, but that is another matter.
This is the first operation of the Act against a likely
taxpayer. For this purpose, it is admitted, on all
hands, there is no express limitation in s. 11(1) or
elsewhere.
The question next is whether there is anything in
s. 14, which impliedly imposes such a limitation.
That section deals with "escaped assessment",
"under-assessment" or" excessive relief". The last
two categories ex facie refer to an assessment after a
prior assessment. The question thus is whether the
words" escaped assessment", refer also to an assessment after a prior assessment. The word "assessment ", was explained by the Judicial Committee in
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Khemchand Ramdas(').
It sometimes means the computation of income or
profits, sometimes, the determination of the amount
of tax payable, and, sometimes, the whole procedure
laid down in a taxing Act for imposing the liability
on an assessee. In s. 14 where the words "escaped
assessment " are used, it means that there was a
determination of the amount of the tax payable but
some profits escaped that process either wholly or
partly.
Profits cannot be said to have escaped assessment
when there are proceedings afoot and assessment is
being made. In my opinion, they cannot be said
to have escaped assessment when they are exposed
to assessment and assessment has yet to be done. It
is to be noticed that s. 14 requires "definite information" in the possession of the Income-tax Officer and
to " discovery " by him of the fact of escaped assessment as a condition precedent to action under that
section. If under s. 4 the liability to tax exists and
there is no limitation, and if under s. 11(1) it can be
(II) (t938) L.R:65 I.A 236.
-
3 S.C.R.
-
I
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1023
enforced without any limit as to time, the profits
r96o
cannot be said to have escaped assessment any more
of
t han wh ere assessment procee d .mgs are a f oot an d are Commissioner
Income Tax
not yet over. This is not a case where by the operav.
tion of some other period of limitation the assessment Narsee Nagsee
proceedings can be said to be out of reach of the
& co.
Department. If the profits are still ass~ssable by Hidayatullah ].
reason of the charge under s. 4 and are subJeCt to the
process under s. 11(1), there is no "esca,ped assessment". There are here no "back" periods which
cannot be reached under c:. 11 like the period prior to
the previous year of the Income-tax Act, for which
only s. 34 is available. AU chargeable accounting
periods are on the same footing, and s. 11 is wide
enough to reach all of them. Further, it is to be
noticed that there is no time limit for completing an
assessment once begun. Also, if profits which have
never been processed can be dealt with both under
ss. 11 and 14 and both have the limit of 4 years, why
have two sections, one depending on belief and the
other on definite information? We must look to
some different meaning and different fields of operation. That can only be if the words "escaped assessment" are given a restricted meaning in s. 14.
In this view of the scheme of the Act and the clear
words of s. 11(1), it seems difficult to put a limit of
time because one is contained in s. 14 in respect of
profits escaping assessment. No doubt, both the
sections must be construed harmoniously; but as
was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Mohammad
Sher Khan v. Seth Swami Dayal (1 ), the provisions of
one section cannot be used to defeat those of another,
unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between
them. Equally both sections must not be made to
operate in the same field. In the Act with which we
are concerned, reconciliation is only possible if the
words of s. 11(1) and s. 14 are given meanings without
importing certain implications from one into the
other, and the only way different fields can be found
is to read them differently. The interpretation of the
High Court, if I may figuratively describe it, makes
the two sections march hand in hand during the four
(I) (1922] L.R. 49. I.A. 60.
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
years which ex facie could not have been intended, as
one section depends upon the entertainment of belief
Commissioner of
and
the other section requires definite information
Income Tax
leading
to a positive discovery.
v.
Read in this way, it is clear that s. 11 effectuates
Narsee Nagse8
&Co.
the assessment, levy and collection of tax from persons
believed to be liable, while s. 14 enables a reopenH idayatullah ] .
ing of cases where after an assessment there is discovery that profits have escaped assessment due to
one reason or another. The use of the words" escaped assessment" in the context of the Act has reference
only to those cases where profits of a business were
brought to process once but for some reason some
profits escaped assessment or were under-assessed or
received excessive relief. The insistence upon definite
information leading to such a discovery before action
is taken under s. 14, also points in the same direction.
"Definite information " denotes that there is something discovered which can demonstrate the falsity
of something done previously. The existence of belief shows the possibility of there existing some profits
which need to be taxed. Whereas "definite information" points to a state of affairs in which though
there was a processing of the profits before, something
definite having been found out the result of that
processing is discovered to be incorrect, the word
" belief" in s. 11 shows that the Income-tax Officer is
to embark upon a first enquiry as to whether the
business comes within the purview of the Act or not.
To summarise, therefore, though it is possible to
make the chargeable accounting period correspond
to the •previous year' under the Income-tax law,
there is no method by which the conception of an
assessment year can be brought in. To say that s. 11
operates for full four years is to find not an " assessment year" but an " assessment period ". During the
course of those four years, the tax would be realisable
under s. 11, because the assessment period could not
be said to be over. But then, there would be no room
for the operation of s. 14, particularly where it speaks
of" escaped assessment''. During the whole of the
four years, there would never be any escaped assessment, and there would be no further time available
I960
I
'
.....
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
1025
for the operation of s. 14. Even on this reasoning,
ry6o
some meaning other than what prevails under the
Income-tax Act will have to be given to the same Commissioner uf
Income Tax
words by the compulsion of the language employed
v.
in ss. 11 and 14. On the reasoning of the High Court, Narsee Nagsee
the whole of the period of four years would be the
& Co.
"assessment period". It would begin at the end of H'd - -1
.
. d an d en d a f ter t h e t ayatul
ak j.
t h e ch argea ble accountmg
per10
·
lapse of four years. It would embrace all the
chargeable accounting periods within reach. But
then, s. 14 also operates in the same manner and for
the same time. This construction renders s. 14 otiose.
Nor do I think that there is any unreasonableness
in the construction, which I have indicated apove.
The legislature might have been solicitous that
persons who have been subjected to the process of
assessment once should not be exposed to a second
peril except within the reasonable period of four years
from the end of the chargeable accounting period;
but it did not view in a similar way those persons who
were never troubled before but whose liability to pay
tax remained unaltered. The motive with which
limitation was introduced in one section cannot be the
motive for the Courts to introduce the same period in
quite another section. To adopt the reasoning of the
High Court would be to make no distinction between
ss. 11 and 14 and to render meaningless the fiction to
be found in the last words of s. 14. ]'or profits which
have never been brought to assessment, there would
be two notices possible in some cases, one under s. 11(1)
and the other under s. 14, one requiring only the
entertainment of a belief as to a certain state of things
and the other requiring definite information and
discovery that profits have escaped assessment. These
two conditions cannot co-exist in the same case.
Harmonious construction requires that there should
arise no impossible situations. Such situations are
avoided ifthe operation of s. 11 is confined to those
cases where there has been no prior assessment and
the operation of s. 14 to those cases where after a
prior assessment there is an escaped assessment,
under-assessment or excessive relief. For the subsequent and reopened assessment ~there is a limit of
1026
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
four years, but for the assessment for the first time
there is no limit.
Commissioner of
I have looked into the Rules framed under the Act.
Income Tax
v
No doubt, R. 50 speaks of a period during which
Narsee Nagsee refunds can be claimed, and it may be argued that
&Co.
this rule has to be interpreted in harmony with the
If the Rule cannot be reconciled with the Act,
Hidavatullah f. Act.
then the Rule must fail. See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 51, where the following
passage occurs :
"If reconciliation is impossible, the subordinate
provision must give way, and probably the instrument would be treated as subordinate to the
section."
See also Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood (1 )
and Minister of Health v. R: Ex parte Yaffe('). The
breakdown of R. 50 would leave into operation R. 48,
which is without any limitation of time, and refunds
would be available under that Rule. This argmnent
receives great support from the fact that under the
Excess Profits Tax Act ss. 48 and 50 of the Indian
Income-tax Act, were brought in mutatis mutandis.
If, as has been shown above, there is no limitation
either under s. 13 or s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act
s. 50 will have to be applied to that Act without any
limit as to time. It appears to me that R. 50 is not
framed in consonance with the spirit underlying s. 11,
and if it was necessary for me to say so, I would have
been disposed to thinking that being a Rule of the
Board of Revenue, it would have to give way, even
though under the Act it has to be read as a part
thereof. This argument, therefore, has no validity.
In my opinion, the answer to the first question
should be in the affirmative. In view of this answer,
the second question would not fall to be answered.
I would, therefore, allow the appeal with costs here
and below.
BY COURT : In accordance with the judgment of
the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) (1894] A.C. 347, 360,
\ZI (1931] A.C,· 494• ~03,
-
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