KAVALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 May 1960 | [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 | 1960 INSC 100
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 May 1960
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 443/1955
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 100
Text of the judgment
3 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
887
against the excess dividends. In our opinion, the
z960
question of modification of the language cannot arise Commissioner of
in the circumstances of the case. Our reasons have .Income-tax, been given in Civil Appeal No. 427 of 1957, decided toBombay
day, and we need not go over the ground again.
v.
..
· a 1so no ques t"10n of unJUS
· t ness invo
·
1ve d . Th e Jalgaon
Electricity
There is
supply co. Ltd.
Income-tax law seeks to p11t in the net certain class
of income, and can only successfully do so, if it frames Hidayatullah J.
a provision appropriate to that end. If the law fails
and the tax-payer cannot be brought within its letter,
no question of unjustness as such, arises. The answers
given by the High Court to the two questions were
correct in the circumstances of the case.
In the result, the appeal fails, and will be dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed .
KA V ALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI
AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. SUBBA RAO and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
Marumakkathayam Law-Enactment for removal of doubtsConstitutional validity-Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of
Doubts) Act, I955 (32 of r955)-Constitution of India, Arts. r9(r)
(f), ]I, 3rA.
These petitions by the holder of Kavalappara Sthanam, his
wife, daughters and son challenged the constitutional validity of
the Madr8s Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955,
passed by the Madras Legislature soon after the Privy Council
had declared the properties in possession of the Sthanee to be
Sthanam properties in which the members of the tarwad had no
interest. Section 2 of the Act, which contained the substantive
provision, was as follows:-" 2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in
respect of which :~a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the
properties of the sthanam and the properties of the tarwad, or
(b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving maintenance from the properties purporting to be sthanam properties
as of right, or in pursuance of a custom or otherwise, or
(c) there had at any time been a vacancy caused by there
being no male member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the
Sthanam,
I960
May 4.
888
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have
been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the properties appertainf( avalnppaya
ing to such a sthanam shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed
K nlt11Yathil
always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad to which
Kochuni
the provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Mad.
v.
XXII of 1933), shall apply."
Stale of Madt"as
The question for decision was whether the impugned Act
infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed by
Arts. 4, 19(r)(f) and 31 of the Constitution.
Held (per Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.) that the
three tests laid down by the Act were contrary to the well-settled
principles of Marumakkathayam Law with regard to which there
could be no scope for doubt and as such not only not germane but
extraneous to the object it sought to achieve. They were a device
to deprive the sthanam of its properties and vest them in the
tarwad and as such directly hit by Art. 19(r)(f) and could not be
saved by Art. 1915).
Assuming that the Sthanam properties were held in janmam
right and as such were estates within the meaning of Art. 31A,
tbe impugned Act was immune from challenge. That Article,
properly construed, envisages agrarian reform and provides for
the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietory
and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called
the estate solely for that purpose arid must be limited to it.
Although it may not be permissible to refer to the statement of
objects and reasons of its amendment for purposes of construction,
it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the
conditions prevailing at the time and purpose underlying the
amendment.
Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S.C.R. 1, considered.
There is no substance in the argument that since the
impugned Act seeks to regulate the rights of the Sthanee and the
junior members of the tarwad inter se it falls within by cl. (2)(b)
of Art. 31A. That clause has to be read with cl. (1)(a) of the
Article and since the impugned Act does not contemplate any
agrarian reform or seek to regulate the rights inter se between
landlords and tenants or modify or extinguish any of the rights
appertaining janmam right, leaving all its characteristics intact,
it does not come within the purview of Art. 31A of the Constitution.
Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. I
S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. I
S.C.R. 748, referred to.
Fundamental rights have a transcendental position in the
Constitution and before an Article embodying a fundamental
right can be construed to exclude another every attempt should
be made to harmonise them and not until it is found impossible
to do so, can one be made to yield to the other. Barring .. such
exceptional cases, any law that infringes any of the fundamental
rights must be void,
1~
L
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
889
The word 'law' in Art. 31(1) must mean a valid law, and
such a law must satisfy two tests, (1) that the legislature must be
competent to enact it and (2) that it must not infringe any funda- Kavalappara
Ko ttarathit
mental rights. A law that deprives a citizen of his property must,
Kpchuni
therefore, be invalid if it infringes Art. r9(1)(f) of the Constituv.
tion.
Deep Chand v. State of U. P., [1959] Supp. (2) S.C.R. 8, and State of Madras
Basheshwar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, [1959]
Supp. l S.C.R. 528, referred to.
Article 31 of the Constitution, since its amendment by the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, is no longer a selfcontained Article prnviding for a subject different from that dealt
with by Art. 19, but deals with two different subjects, els. (2) and
(2A) dealing with acquisition and requisition and cl. (1) with
deprivation of property by authority of law, and can no longer
be construed on the analogy of Art. 21 so as to exclude the operation of Art. 19.
The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954] S.C.R.
587, A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88,
referred to.
State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Anr., [1955] l S.C.R.
777, held inapplicable.
Nor does Art. 31(1) deal with police power. Although such
power, as understood in America, is no arbitrary power divorced
from social control and public good, there can be no need of
importing such a doctrine into the Indian Constitution.
I
The word 'law' used by Art. 31(1) indicates its limitation
and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31(1)
can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes are reasonable
and in the interest of the general public. The Constitution does
not confer on the Indian Parliament the same power which the
Parliament of England possesses and while it does contemplate a
welfare State, that has to be brought about within its frame-work
of the Constitution itself.
The correct approach should, therefore, be first to ascertain
the fundamental right and then to see whether the law infringes
that right. If ex facie it does so, it has to stand the test of Art.
19(5). In certain circumstances, however, deprivation of fundamental right to property may also amount to a reasonable restriction under the Article.
Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 375,
referred to.
Individual proprietary rights being ordinarily inviolable
unless a clear case is made out for restricting them, there must be
a harmonious balancing between the fundamental rights declared
by Art. 19(1) and social control permitted by Art. 19(5). It is
a.::_,, implicit in the nature of restrictions that no inflexible standard
r : can be laid down and each case must be decided on its own facts.
But the restrictions must not be arbitrary and must have a
reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and shall
be in the interest of the general public.
r
I
(
890
Ig6o
Kavalappara
Koitaralhil
Ko&huni
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19ti0 J
State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, [1952] S.C.R. 597, Henry
Webster v. Peter Cooper, 14 Law Ed. 5ro, and The Citizens'
Savings and Loan Association and Cleaveland, Ohio v. Topeka City,
22 Law Ed. 455, referred to.
Although the redress of a real and genuine grievance of a
. section of the community may be in public interest, it is imposSlate of Madras sible to hold that the impugned legislation was either justified or
v.
in such public interest. .
Iswari Prasad v. N. R. Sen, A.LR.. 1952 Cal. 273, held in-
applicable.
.
Marumakkathayam Law is a body of customs and usages
that have received judicial recognition, and is fundamentally
different from Hindu Law, being a matriarchal system. The
family, called tarwad, consists of all the descendants of one common ancestor. It consists of a mother and her male and female
children and the children of those female children and so on.
Only the senior-most male member can attain the sthanam,
which is a position of dignity with specific properties attached to
it. When he does so and becomes the Sthanee he ceases to have.
any interest in the tarwad properties. Occasionally a female
member also becomes the Sthanee. Like a Hindu widow or an
impartible estate-holder the Sthanee has an absolnte interest in
the income of the Sthanam properties or acquisitions therefrom.
A member of the tarwad has no right to maintenance from out of
the Sthanam properties nor can such property be converted into
tarwad property by the grant of such maintenance by custom or
otherwise or intermingling of the Sthanam properties with the
tarwad properties by the Sthanee. His position approximates to
that of a member separated from a Hindu family and there can
be no scope for the application of the doctrine of blending. Like
the Sthanee who ceases to have any present proprietary interest
in the tarwad, the members of the tarwad also can have no present
proprietary interest in the sthanam property. They continue to
be blood relations with a contingent right of succession to each
others' property that is no more than a spes successionis. The
right of a subsequently born male member of the tarwad to succeed to the Sthanam and its property is judicially recognised.
Case-law reviewed.
Per Imam and Sarkar, JJ.-The impugned Act is protected
by Art. 31A and is not open to question in the ground that it
violates Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. There
is no basis for the contention that Art. 31(1)(a) contemplates a
law relating to agrarian reform only. The Article makes no
mention of any such reform and there can be no doubt that under
it a janmam right may be acquired, extinguished or modified
whether the land held in such right is agricultural or not.
It is not permissible to refer to the objects and reasons
stated in the Bills, by which the Acts amending Art. 31A of the ·
Constitution were introduced, for the construction of the statute
and, therefore, the word 'law' in Art. 31A(1) cannot be read in
relation to sub-cl. (a) only as a law intended to achieve agrarian
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
891
reform on the basis of the supposed object of the Legislature in
enacting Art. 31A.
Kavalappara
Aswini Kumar Ghos~ v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S.C.R. l,
Kottarathil
referred to.
lfochuni
It is not correct to say that the impugned Act does not effect
v.
any modification of janmam rights and therefore it does not come State oj Mad1as
within Art. 31A. When the Article speaks of modification of
janmam rights, it does not speak of such rights in the abstract
but contemplates the modification of such rights held by a person.
It would be as much modification of janmam rights, if such rights
held by one person are directed to be held by a number of
persons jointly, as when the incidents of such rights are altered.
Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, [1959]
Supp. l S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959]
Supp. l S.C.R. 748, relied on.
It is not correct to say that the Legislature in giving the
provisions of the impugned Act retrospective operation or in providing that they should prevail notwithstanding any decision of
the court to the contrary, was acting judicially and not in a legislative capacity and that the Act was on that ground invalid.
The rule obtaining in America that legislative action cannot
retroact on past controversies and reverse decisions of courts
and the relevant American decisions can have no application in
India.
I;iare Dusadh's case, [1944] F.C.R. 6I, referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 443 of
i955 and 40-41 of 1956.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.
Vohra, for the petitioners (In all the petitions).
fl. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the State of
Madras.
K. V. Suryanarayana Iyer, Advocate-General for the
State of Kerala and T. M. Sen, for the State of
Kerala.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. R. Krishna Pillai,
for respondents Nos. 2 to 9.
Purshottam Trikamdas and M. R. Krishna Pillai,
for respondent No. 12 (In Petn. Nos. 40-41 of 56).
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. R. Krishnaswami,
for respondents Nos. 13 and 15-17 (In Petn. No. 443
of 55).
K. R. Krishnaswami for respondents Nos.11 and 14
(In all the petitions).
892
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
Purshottam Trikamdas and K. R. K rishnaswami,
for respondent No. 12 (In Petn. No. 443 of 55).
Kavulappa'Ta
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. R. Krishna Pillai,
l(ottarathU
Kochuni
for Intervener No. 1.
v.
Sardar Bahadur, for Intervener No. 2.
';tate of Mad'Tas
1960. May 4. The judgment of Sinha, 0. J., Subba
Rao and Shah, JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao, ;r.·
The judgment of Imam and Sarkar, JJ. was delivered
by Sarkar, J.
SuBBA RAO, J.-These three connected petitions
Subba Rao ].
filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution raise the quest.ion of the const.itutional validity of the Madras
Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955,
(Madras Act 32 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the
impugned Act). These petitions were heard by this
Court on a preliminary question raised by the res·pondents and the judgment thereon was delivered on
March 4, 1959. This Court rejected t.he preliminary
objection and directed the petitions to be heard on
merits, and pursuant to that order, these petitions
were posted for disposal on merits.
The facts have been fully stated by Das, C. J., in
the prelimina.ry judgment and it would, therefore, be
sufficient if the relevant facts pertaining to the ques·
tions raised were stated here.
The petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955 is
Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni @ Moopil Nair.
He is the holder of the Kavalappara sthanam to which
is attached Kavalappara estate situate in Walluvanad Taluk in the district of South Malabar. In
pre-British times the Kavalappa.ra Moopil Nair,
who was the seniormost male member ofKavalappara
Swaroopam (dynasty), was the ruler of Kavalappara
territory. He had sovereign rights over his territory.
Besides the Rajasthanam, the Kavalappara Moopil
Nair held five other sthanams granted by the Raja
of Palghat for rendering military services and two
other sthanams granted to his ancestors by the Raja
of Cochin for rendering similar services. Properties
are attached to .each of these sthanams. The petitioner's immediate predecessor died in 1925 and· the
petitioner became the Moopil Nair of Kavalappara
estate and as such the sthanee of the properties
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
893
-· attached
to the various sthanams held by him. The
-
petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955 will herea.fter Kov,lrippara
be referred to as "the sthanee ". Respondents 2 to 17
K oltarathil
Krchuni
are the junior members of the Kavalappara tarwad,
and, according to the sthanee, they have no interest State ofv.Madras
in the said properties.
In 1932, the Madras Marumakkathayam Act (Wad. Suiba Rao].
Act XXII of 1932) came into force whercunder the
members of a Malabar tarwad were given a right to
•
enforce partition oftarwad properties or to have them
registered as impartible. After some infructuous
proceedings under the provisions of the said Act, respondents 10 to 17, who then constituted the entire
Kavalappara ta,rwad, filed O.S. No. 46 of 1934 in the
court of the Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam for a
declaration that all the properties under the management of the sthanee were tarwad properties belonging
equally and jointly to the sthanee and the members
of the tarwad. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the
s11it. On appeal, the High C.mrt of Madras on April 9,
1943, allowed the appeal and reversed the decision
&f the Subordinate Judge and decreed the suit. On
further appeal to the Privy Council, the Board by its
judgment dated July 29, 1947, restored the judgment
of the Subordinate Judge. The Privy Council found
that the Kavalappara estate in Walluvanad Taluk
was an impartible estate and that nothing had happened to alter the original character of the property
in its relation to the members of the family. On that
finding, the Privy Council held that respondents 10
t0 17 were not entitled to the declaration they sought
in that case. The result of that litigation was that
all the properties in the possession of the sthanee
were declared to be sthanam properties and that the
members of the. tar wad had no interest therein.
After the title of the sthanee was thus established,
the Madras Legislature passed the impugned Act in
1955. Under the impugned Act, every sthanam
possessing one or other of the three characteristics mentioned therein-it is common case that the impugned
Act applies to the petitioner's sthanam-shall be
deemed and shall be deemed always to have been
properties belonging to the tarwad. The sthanee
n6
894
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
states that the impugned Act is ultra vires the Madras
Legislature, void and inoperative and that the said
Kavalaf'pnra
Act
cannot affect the rights of the sthanee or his
]{ ottarathil
Kochuni
estate to any extent.
v.
The first petitioner in Petition No. 40 of 1956 is the
State of ;l!adras
wife of the sthanee, who has also been added as respondent 18 to this petition; and petitioners 2 and 3
S.ubba Rao ] .
therein are their daughters. The first respondent to
the said petition is the State of Madras and respon.
•
dents 2 to 17 are the members of the tarwad. On
August 3, 1955, the sthanee executed a gift deed in
favour of the petitioners in the said petition in respect
of properties granted to his predecessor by the Raja of
Palghat. This petition raised the Sil-me questions as
Petition No. 443 of 1955 and seeks for the same
reliefs.
Petition No. 41 of 1956 is filed by Ravunniarath
Rajan Menon, who is the son of the sthanee. The
first respondent therein is the State of Madras and
respondents 2 to 17 are the members of the tarwad
itnd respondent 18 is the sthanee. This petitioner
alleges that on August 3, 1955, the sthanee executed
a gift deed in his favour in respect of the properties
granted to the sthanee's predecessor by the Raja of
Cochin. This petition contains similar allegations as
the other two petitions and asks for similar reliefs.
The learned Attorney-General, appearing for the
petitioners in all the three petitions, raised before, us
the following points: (1) The impugned Act is constitutionally void, because it offends against Art. 14 of the
Constitution. (2) It is also void because it deprives
the sthanee of his fundamental right to hold and
dispose of property and thereby offends against
Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and is not saved by
cl. (5) of Art. 19. (3) The impugned A_ct is further bad
because it has been. made by the Legislature not in
exercise of its legislative power but in exercise of
judicial power.
Learned counsel for the respondents while countering the arguments advanced by the learned AttorneyGeneral raised two further points, viz., (1) the petitioner's sthanam is an " estate " within the meaning
of Art. 31A of the Constitution and therefore the Act
IT)6o
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-
I
3 S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
t
895
extinguishing or modifying the rights pertaining to
the said sthanam cannot be questioned on the ground Kava!appara
that it infringes Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the ConstituJ<-0ttarathil
Kochun(
tion ; and (2) the impugned Act purports to deprive
v,.
the petitioner of his sthanam properties by aut.hority
State of M adr.as
oflaw within the meaning of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution and, as he is legally deprived of his properties, Subba Raoj,
Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution has no application,
for, it is said, Art. 19(1) (f) pre-supposes the existence
of the petitioner's title to the sthanam and its properties, and, as he is deprived of his title therein by the
impugned Act, he can no longer rely upon his fundamental right under Art. 19(1) (f).
Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the gifts of the sthanam properties by
the sthanee in favour of the petitioners in the other
two petitions were void and that, therefore, they
have no fundamental right to enable them to come to
this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution.
Before we pass on to the merits of the case, it would
be convenient at the outset to clear the ground. It
cannot be disputed that the impugned Act passed by
the Madras Legislature could not have had any
extra-territorial operation so as to affect the properties in the quondam Cochin State. It is not disputed
that, after the States J{eorganization, the provisions
of the Act were not extended by any legal process to
the properties situate in that area of the Kerala State
which originally formed part of Cochin State. In the
premises, we are not called upon to decide the fundamental right of the sthanee in respect of the sthanam
properties in the said area. We do not also propose to
express any opinion on the validity or otherwise of
the gift deeds executed by the sthanee in favour of
his wife and daughters, and son; for, if the gifts were
valid, the donees would have a right to maintain the
petitions, and if they were not valid, the donor would
continue to be the owner of the properties gifted.
The title inter se is not really germane to the present
enquiry, for the validity of the Act in respect of
sthanam properties other than those in the Cochin
State falls to. be decided in the first petition itself..
~96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
We, therefore, leave open the question of the validity
of the gift deeds.
Koval appara
We shall take first the contention of the respondents
KottarAhil
Kochuni
based on Art. 31A of the Constitution, for, if that
v.
contention was accepted, no other questions except
State of ..\! adras
one would arise for consideration.
Learned Attorney-Genera! contends that the quesSubba Rao ] .
tion was not specifically raised in the pleadings, that
it was a mixed question of fact and law, and that if
it was allowed to be raised at this stage, his clients
would be irreparably prejudiced. Further, he argues
that there is no material on the record on the basis of
which we can decide whether the properties of the
petitioners are held in janmam right or not. In the
counter-affidavit filed by respondents 2 to 17, no plea
on the basis of Art. 31A is taken. Only in the counter
filed by the State of Kerala, this contention is raised. ~
Paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit contains the said
plea and it is :
"I am advised that the impugned statute is not
open to attack on any of the grounds set forth in
the petition and further and in any view of the
case that it is saved by virtue of the provisions of
Art. 31 A of the Constitution as amended by the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955."
Except this bald statement, no statement is made to
the effect that all the properties of the sthanee, or
any . portion thereof, are held in janmam right.
Learned Advocate-General, appearing for the State of
Kerala, while conceding that the plea could have been
more precise, and supported by definite particulars,
contends that there is material on the record containing the admission of the petitioner in the first petition
that the properties are janmam properties, and, even
apart from such admission, whatever properties the
petitioner held as appertaining to the sthanam, they
could not be other thau janmam properties or properties held as a subordinate tenure-holder under a janmi
and that in either case they would form part of an
"estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A of the
Constitution.
It is true that in the previous proceedings which
went up to the Privy Council, there is a statement
1y60
::> S.C.1\,
,
'
~U.PHEME
COU]:{,T HE.POH.T~
897
1960
that in regard to the properties under the management of the Court of Wards, " sthanam registration
K • valappara
took place in Malabar and all the properties belongKottarathil
l<ochuni
ing to the sthanee were registered in the name of
Kavalappara Moopil Nair". But that in itself does State ofv.Madras
not conclude the matter. Ordinarily, when a question
raised depends upon elucidation of further facts not Subba Rao ].
disclosed in the statements already filed, we would be
very reluctant to allow a party to raise such a plea
at the time of arguments. But in this case we do not
think we would be justified in not allowing the respondents to raise the contention, as the validity of the
impugned Act depends upon the application of
Art. 31A of the Constitution. We would, therefore,
for the purpose of this petition, assume against the
petitioner that he is in possession of the properties in
janmam right and proceed to consider on that basis
the contention raised.
Learned counsel for the respondents contends that
Art. 31A of the Constitution excludes the operation of
Art.13 in the matter of the extinguishment or modification of any rights in an estate, that the impugned
legislation either extinguishes or modifies the sthanam
right in the janmam property which is an "estate"
as defined in the said Article and that, therefore, the
impugned Act cannot be challenged on the ground
that it infringes Arts. 14, 19 and 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. To appreciate this contention it
will be convenient to read the material portions of
Art. 31A.
Article 31A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained ii;i article 13, no law providing for(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or
of any rights therein or the extinguishment or
. modification of any such rights,
...............................................................
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is
inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of
the rights conferred by article 14,. article 19 or
article 31.
o o 0 0 0 o o 0 o 0 o 0 o o o o o o 0 0 o 0 o o o o o 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0.0 I 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 I
(2)
In this article,-
898
r960
Kavatappara
K ottarathil
Kochttni
v.
State of Madras
Subba Rao ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 J
(a) The expression "estate" shall, in relation to
any local area, have the same meaning as that
expression or its local equivalent has in the existing
law relating to land tenures in force in that area,
and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or
other similar grants and in the States of Madras
and Kerala any janmam right.
(b) the expression" right", in relation to an estate,
shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, subproprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat,
under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights
or privileges in respect of land revenue."
This Article was introduced in the Constitution by the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. As it
originally stood, the said Article only provided that no
law affecting rights of any proprietor or intermediate
holder in any estate shall be void on the ground that
it is inconsistent with any of the fundamental rights
included in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31A
has been amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. The object of the amendment was
explained in the Statement of the Objects and Reasons
and the relevant part thereof reads :
"It will be recalled that the Zamindari abolition
laws which came first in our programme of social
welfare legislation were attacked by the interests
affected mainly with reference to articles 14, HJ
and 31, and that in order to put an end to the
dilatory and wasteful litigation and place these laws
above challenge in the courts, articles 31A and 31B
and the Ninth Schedule were enacted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act. Subsequent judicial
decisions interpreting articles 14, 19 and 31 have
raised serious difficulties in the way of the Union
and the States putting through other and equally
important social welfare legislation on the desired
lines, e.g., the following :(i) While the abolition of zamindaries and the
numerou" '~'°F rn<>diaries between the State and the
tiller of tne soil has been achieved for the most part,
our next objectives in land reform are the fixing of
limits to.the extent of agricultural land that may
be owned or occupied by any person, the disposal of
·-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
899
·any land held in excess of the prescribed maximum
and the further modification of the rights of land
owners and tenants <in agricultural holdings.
:.-,-
Ig6o
Kavalnppara
Kottar<llhil
Kochuni
It is accordingly proposed in clause 3 of the Bill State ofv.Madras
to extend the scope of article 31A so as to cover
these categories of essential welfare legislation."
Subba Rao].
The object of the amendment relevant to the present
enquiry was only to enable the State to implement its
next objective in the land reform, namely, the fixing
of limits to the extent of agricultural lands that may
be owned or occupied by any person, the disposal of
any land held in excess of the prescribed maximum
and the further modification of the rights of land
owners and tenants in agricultural holdings. The
object was, therefore, to bring about a change in the
agricultural economy but not to recognize or confer
any title in the whole or a part of an estate on junior
members of a family. This Court has held in Aswini
Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose( 1 ) that the statement
of objects and reasons is not admissible as an aid to
the construction of a statute. But we are referring to
it only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the
conditions prevailing at the time the bill was introduced, and the purpose for which the amendment was
made.
Unhampered by any judicial decision, let us now
scrutinize the express terms of the Article to ascertain
its scope and limitations. Sub-cl. (a) of Art. 31A(l)
enables the State to acquire any estate or of any rights
therein or to extinguish or modify any such rights.
"Estate" is defined in cl. (2)(a) to have the same
meaning as that expression or its local equivalent bas
in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in
that area, and by inclusive definition it takes in any
jagir, inam, or muafi or other similar grants and in the
States of Madras and Kerala any janmam right.
Clause (2)(b) defines the expression " rights", in relation to an estate, to include any rights vesting in a
proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenureholder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and
any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue. If
(1) [r953J S~C.,R, I,
900
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
an estate so defined is acquired by the State, no law
enabling the State to acquire any such estate can be
J(aval 1ppara
questioned as inconsistent with 1the rights conferred by
f(ottarat hil
Kochuni
Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. So too, any
v.
law extinguishing or modifying any such rights menState oj Madras
tioned in cl. (l)(a) and defined in cl. (2)(b) cannot be
questioned on the said grounds. The broad contention
Subba Rao ].
that a law regulating inter se the rights of a proprietor
in his estate and the junior mem hers of his family is
also covered by the wide phraseology used in cl. (2)(b ),
may appear to be plausible but that argument cannot
be sustained if that clause is read along with the other
provisions of Art. 31A. The definition of "estate"
refers to an existing law relating to land tenures in a
particular area indicating thereby that the Article is
concerned only with the land tenure described as an
"estate ". The inclusive definition of the rights of
such an estate also enumerates the rights vested in the
proprietor and his subordinate tenure-holders. The
last clauqe in that definition, viz., that those rights also
include the rights or privileges in respect of land
revenue, emphasizes the fact that the Article is concerned with land- tenure. It is, therefore, manifest
that the said Article deals with a tenure called "estate"
and provides for its acquisition or the extinguishment
or modification of the rights of the land-holder or the
various subordinate tenure-holders in respect of their
rights in relation to the estate. The contrary view
would enable the State to divest a proprietor of his
estate and vest it in another without reference to any
agrarian reform. It would also enable the State to
compel a proprietor to divide his properties, though
self-acquired, between himself and other members of
his family or create interest therein in favour of persons other than tenants who had none before. Such
acts have no relation to land-tenures and they are
purely acts of expropriation of a citizen's propertv
without any reference to agrarian reform. Article 3IA
deprives citizens of their fundamental rights and such
an Article cannot be extended by interpretation to
overreach the object implicit in the Article. The
unqoundness of the wider interpretation will be made
clear if the Article is construed with reference to the
l'
-
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
-
901
janmam right. Under the definition, any janmam
right in Kerala is an "estate". A janmam right is Kavalappara
Kot,arath1l
the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala.
J<ochuni
Moor in his "Malabar Law and Custom" describes it
v.
as a hereditary proprietorship. A janmam interest State of Madras
may, therefore, be described as "proprietary interest
of a landlord in lands", and such a janmarn right is Subba Rao].
described as "estate" in the Constitution. Substituting
" janmam right " in place of "estate" in cl. 2 (b ), the
"rights" in Art. 31A (1) (a) will include the rights of
a proprietor and subordinate tenure-holders in respect
of a j1mmarn right. It follows that the extingnishment
or modification of a right refers to the rights of a
proprietor or a subordinate tenure-holder in the
janmam right. A proprietor called the janmi or his
subordinate tenure-holder has certain defined rights in
a "janmam right". Land-tenures in Malabar are
established by precedents or immemorial usage.
Janmam right is a freehold interest in property and the
landlord is called "janmi ". He can create many
subordinate interests or tenures therein, such a,; vprumpattom (simple lease), kusbikanom (mortgage of waste
land with a view to its being planted on), kushikanapattam (mortgage of waste land for improvements, the
tenant paying rent), kanom kuzhikanom (mortgage of
w1iste land for improvements, the landlord receiving
some pecuniary consideration), kanom (mortgage with
possession, a fee being generally paid), mel-ka.nom
(higher mortgage), koyu panayam (mortgage of the
right of cultivation), kanom poramkadam (loan advanced on the security of land already held on mortgage), otti usufructuary mortgage, the full value of the
land being advanced), kaivituka otti (usufru<>tua,ry
mortgage, with relinquishment of the power nf transfer),
ottikkumpuram (where a surn is advanced beyond the
otti amount), neerrnuthal (where a further sum is
advanced on an otti mortgage in addition to the ottikkumpuram), peruvartham (usufructuary mortgage,
the land being redeemable at its value in the market
at the time of redemption}, anubham or anubhavam
(relinquishment of land for enjoyment by the tenant
in perpetuity), karankari or jamma koyu (sale
117
902
K avalappnra
Kottarath11
Kochuni
v.
State of Madras
Subba Rao].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960)
or transfer in perpetuity of the right of cultivation), kariama (right of perpetual enjoyment),
cooderoopad or nelamuri (assignment of rent produce), kutti kanom (mortgage of forests, the mortgagee felling the timber for trade and paying a fee on
each stump or tree to the landlord). These rights
may be extinguished or modified. A law may regulate the rights between a janmi and his subordinate
tenure-holders ; but it may also affect his rights unconnected with the tenure. To illustrate : A janmi
holds 10 acres of land in janmam right, out of which
he may sell 2 acres each to five persons; the land is
divided into 5 plots held by different holders, but
each one continues to have full rights of a janmi; the
janmam right is not extinguished or modified, though
the land is divided between 5 persons. That is what
the imp_ugned Act purports to do. It does not modify
any of the rights appertaining to "janmam right",
but only confers shares in the property on other members of the tarwad. It is said that the inclusive
definition of the expression " rights " in cl. (2) (b)
takes in such a case as it extinguishes or modifies the
proprietor's right in the land. This is a superficial
reading of the Article. We have already explained
how such a modification is not a modification of a
right pertaining to a " janmam right ", but only a
deprivation of a particular janmi of his right in his
property or a curtailment of his right therein, leaving
all the characteristics of a janmam right intact. It
is said that a contrary construction has been accepted
by this Court in two decisions. The first is that in
Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay (1 ). In that
case, the constitutional validity of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act,
1956 (Born. XIII of 1956), was canvassed. Under that
Act the title to the land which vested originally in
the landlord passes to the tenant on the tiller's day or
within the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the
tenant failing to appear or making a statement that
he is not willing to purchase the land or committing
default in payment of the price thereof as determined
. (1) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489.
. .,
...
·--. -.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
903
by the Tribunal constituted for that purpose. This
Act was, therefore, enacted to implement the agra- K avalapp~ra
rian reform in that part of the country and it
Kottarathil
Kochuni
expressly confers certain rights on tenants in respect
of their tenements which they did not have before. St1te ofv.Madras
The Act creates absolute rights in a tenant which
was either by the extinguishment or by modification Subba Rao)._
of a landlord's rights and conferment of the same on
the tenant. This law is, therefore, one pertaining to
the land-tenure of the State.
The second decision is that in Atma Ram v. State
of Punjab (1). There, this Court was concerned with
the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure
Act (10 of 1953) (as amended by Act 11 of 1955).
Under that Act, the substantive rights of a landowner were modified in three respects, namely, (1) it
modified his rights of settling his lands on _any terms
and to any one he chooses ; (2) it modified, if it did
not altogether extinguish, his right to cultivate the
surplus area as understood under the Act; and (3) it
modified his right of transfer in so far as it obliged
him to sell lands not at his own price but at a price
fixed under the statute, and not to any one but to
specified persons, in accordance with the provisions of
the Act. It is clear from the said Act that the provisions thereof purport to regulate the rights in
respect of lands which are estates within the meaning
of the law relating to land-tenures in Punjab. It was
contended therein that in the purview of Art. 31A,
only the entire estates were included but not portions
thereof, but that contention was negatived. Sinha, J.
(as he then was), who delivered the judgment of the
Court, observed at p. 526 thus:
"Keeping in view the fact that Art. 31A was
enacted by two successive amendments-one in
1951 (First Amendment), and the second in 1955
(Fourth Amendment)-with retrospective effect, in
order to save legislation effecting agra;rian reforms,
we have every reason to hold that those expressions have been used in their widest amplitude,
consistent with the purpose behind those amendments".
( l) (1959] Supp. x
s.c.R. 748.
904
K avalappara
Koltiirathil
J(ochuni
v.
State of Madras
Subba Rao).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
This Court has, therefore, recognised that the
amendments inserting Art. 31A in the Constitution
and subsequently amending it were to facilitate agrarian reforms and in that case it was held that the
impugned Act affected the rights of the landlords
and tenants.
Neither of the two decisions, therefore, supports
the contention that Art. 31A comprehends modification of the rights of an owner of land without
reference to the law of la.nd-tenures.
The impugned Act does not purport to modify or
extinguish any right in an estate. The avowed object
of it is only to declare particular sthanams to be
Marumakkathayam tarwads and the property pertaining to such sthanams as the property of the said
tarwads. It declares particular sthanams to have
always been tarwads and their property to have
always been tarwad. property. The result is that the
sole title of the sthanee is not recognised and the
members of the tarwad are given rights therein. The
impugned Act does not effectuate any ~grarian reform
and regulate the rights inter se between landlords and
tenants. We, therefore, hold that the respondents
cannot rely upon Art. 31A to deprive the petitioner
of his fundamental rights.
Now coming to the arguments advanced by the
learned Attorney-General, as we propose to hold in
his favour on point (2), we are relieved of the necessity to express our opinion on points (1) and (3) raised
by him. On the basis of this elimination, the question that falls to be decided is whether the impugned
Act deprives the petitioner of his fundamental right
to hold and. dispose of property and is not protected
by cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. This question is inextricably connected wit'h the contention
raised by the respondents that Art. 31(1) excludes the
operation of .Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. We
shall, therefore, proceed to consider both these
questions.
The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is that Art. 19(l)(f) must give place to
Art. 31(1) of the Constitution. In other words, a
r
:::: 8.C.R.
SUPREME COURT l{.EPOl~T~
905
person's fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is con.ditioned by the existence of K avalappara
property and if he is deprived of that property by
Kottarathil
Kochuni
authority of law under Art. 31(1), his fundamental
v.
right under Art. 19(l)(f) disappears with it.
State of Madras
Fundamental rights have a transcendental position
in the Constitution. Our Constitution describes cer- Subba Rao j.
tain rights as fundamental rights and places them in
a separate Part. It provides a machinery for enforcing those rights. Article 32 prescribes a guaranteed
remedy for the enforcement of those rights and makes
the remedial right itself a fundamental right. Article 13(1) declares that "All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement
of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent
of such inconsistency, be void "; and Art. 13(2) prohibits the State from making any law which takes away
or abridges the rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution and declares that any law made in
contravention of that clause shall, to the extent of
the contravention, be void. It is true that any other
Article of the Constitution may exclude the operation
of the fundamental rights in respect of a specific
matter-for instance, Arts. 31A and 31B. It may
also be that an Article embodying a fundamental
right may exclude another by necessary implication,
but before such a construction excluding the operation of one or other of the fundamental rights is
accepted, every attempt should be made to harmonise
the two Articles so as to make them co-exist, and
only if it is not possible to do so, one can be made to
yield to the other. Barring such exceptional circumstances, any law made would be void if it infringes
any one of the fundamental rights. The relevant
Articles read :
Article 19. (1) All citizens shall have the right-
·······························································
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property ...
(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the
said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State
906
.1960
Kavalappara
KottaraJhil
Kochuni
v.
State of Madras
Subba Rao].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred
by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the
general public or for the protection of the interests
of any Scheduled Tribe.
"Article 31. (1) No person shall be deprived of
his property save by authority of law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired
or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save
by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned
and either fixes the amount of the compensation or
specifies the principles on which, and the manner
in which, the compensation is to be determined and
given ; and no such la -iv shall be called in question
in any court on the ground that the compensation
provided by that law is not adequate.
(2A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any
property to the State or to a Corporation owned or
controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to
provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives
any person of his property."
Clause (2) of Art. 31 has been amended and cl. (2A)
has been inserted in Art. 31 by the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. The said cl. (2) in
its original form, i.e., before the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955, read as follows :
"(2) No property, moveable or immoveable,
including any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall
be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes
under any law authorizing the taking of such
possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken
possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount
of the compensation, or specifies the principles on
which and the manner in which, the compensation
is to be determined and given."
To have a correct appreciation of the scope of the
amended clauses of Art. 31, it is necessary to consider,
3 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
907
in the words of Lord Coke, the following circumstances:
K aval opp·na
(i) What was the law before the Act was passed;
K ottara thil
Koch uni
(ii) What was the mischief or defect for which
v.
the law had not provided;
Staten; Madras
(iii) What remedy Parliament has appointed;
and
Suhba Rao ].
(iv) the reason of the remedy.
The unamended clauses of the Article were the subject
of judicial scrutiny by this Court in the State of West
Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1). There, the respondent
purchased certain property at a revenue sale and as
such purchaser he acquired under s. 37 of the Bengal
Revenue Sales Act, 1859, the right "to avoid and
annul all under-tenures and forthwith to eject all
under-tenants" with certain exceptions. In exercise
of that right he brought a suit for eviction of certain
under-tenants and obtained a decree therein. When
the appeal against the said decree was pending, the
Act was amended. The amending Act substituted
by s. 4 the new s. 37 in place of the original s. 37 and
it provided by s. 7 that all pending suits, appeals and
other proceedings which had not already resulted in
delivery of possession, should abate·. It was contended
on behalf of one of the respondents therein that s. 7
was void as abridging his fundamental rights under
Art. 19(l)(f) and Art .. 31. The Court by a majority
held that the Act was void as it infringed Art. 31 of
the Constitution. The majority of the Judges, who
constituted the bench, took the view that els. (1) and
(2) of Art. 31 related to the same subject of eminent
domain and that the State had no power to seriously
impair the rights of a citizen in property without
paying compensation. Patanjali Sastri, C. J., expressed his view thus at p. 618 :
"Under the Constitution of India, however, such
questions must be determined with reference to the
expression " taken possession of or acquired " as
interpreted above, namely, that it must be read
along with the word "deprived" in clause (1) and
understood as having reference to such substantial
abridgement of the rights of. ownership as would
(r: [1954] S.C.R. 5$7.
908
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
amount to deprivation of the owner of his property.
No
cut and dried test can be formulated as to
K aval'1ppara
whether in a given case the owner is "deprived "
Fotta,ath1l
I<ochuni
of his property within the meaning of article 31 ;
v.
each
case must be decided as it arises on its own
State of Madras
facts. Broadly speaking it may be said that an
abridgement would be so substantial as to amount
Subba Rao /.
to a deprivation within the meaning of article 31,
if, in effect, it withheld the property from tb.e
possession and enjoyment of the owner, or seriously
impaired its use and enjoyment by him, or
materially reduced its value."
Das, J. (as he then was), observed that Art. 31(2) dealt
.with only acquisition and requisition of property
whereunder title passed to the State and that Art.
31(1) conferred police power on the State. Ghulam
Hasan, J., concurred with the view of the Chief Justice.
Jagannadhadas, J., did not agree with the view of
Das, J., that Art. 31(1) conferred police power on the
State, but he was not also able to agree with the view
of the Chief Justice that Art. 31(1) has reference only
to the power of eminent domain. He also expressed
his disagreement with the view of Das, J., that acquisition and taking possession in Art. 31(2) have to be
taken as necessarily involving transfer of title or
possession. The result of the decision is that this Court
by majority held that Art. 31(1) and (2) provided for
the doctrine of eminent domain and that under cl. (2)
a person must be deemed to have been deprived of
his property, if he is " substantially dispossessed " or
if his right to use and enjoy his property has been
" seriously impaired " or the value of the property is
"materially reduced" by the impugned law. This
view was followed in Dwarakada;; Shrinivas of Bombay
v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Go. Ltd. (1 ) and
in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. (2 ). Presumably,
Parliament accepted the minority view of Das, J., on
the interpretation of cl. (2) of Art. 31 and amended
the Constitution by the Constitution (]'ourth Amendment) Act, 1955. The amendment made it clear that
cl. (2) of Art. 31 applies only to acquisition and requisition. Clause (2A) of the said Article which was inserted
(1) [1954] s C.R. 674.
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 707.
-
-
I
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
909
r960
by the said amendment. explains that unless a law
provides for the transfer of the ownership or right to K avalappara
K ottarathil
possession of any property to the State or to a corpoKochuni
ration owned ·or controlled by the State, it shall not
v.
be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition 'itate of Madras
or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it
deprives any person of his property. The result is Subba Rao].
that it did not accept the majority view of this Court
that deprivation of property need not be by acquisition alone but also by any serious impairment of an
individual's right to property, whether his ownership
or right to possession of the property has been transferred to the State or its nominee or not. This amendment also in effect accepted the view of Das, J., that
deprivation of property in cl. (1) of Art. 31 covers
cases other than acquisition or requisition of property
by the State. But the amendment in other respects
does not give any indication as regards the interpretation of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution, for no change
in the phraseology of that clause is made.
Therefore, we must look at the terms of that clause
to ascertain its true meaning. The words are clear
and unambiguous and they do not give rise to any
difficulty of construction. The said clause says in a
negative form that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. The law must
obviously be a valid law. Article 13(2) says that" the
State shall not make any law which takes away or
abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law
made in contravention of this clause shall, to the
extent of the contravention, be void". The law
depriving a person of his property cannot, therefore,
take away or abridge the right conferred by Part III
of the Constitution. In a recent decision in Deep Chand
v. State of U.P. (1) this Court considered the limitations placed by the Constitution on the Parliament
and the Legislatures of the States· in making laws.
After reading Arts. 245, 246, 13 and 31 of the Constitution, this Court proceeded to state, at p. 655,
thus:
"The combined effect of the said provisions may
be stated thus : Parliament and the Legislatures of
States have power to make laws in respect of any
(r) [1959] Supp. (2) S.C.R. 8.
us
910
SUPREME COURT REIORTS
(1960)
of the matters enumerated in the relevant lists in
the Seventh Schedule and that power to make laws
K avalappara
is subject to the provisions of the Constitution
J(ottaYathil
f(ochuni
including Art. 13 i.e., the power is made subject
v.
to the limitations imposed by Part III of the
•'·date oj MadYas
Constitution ............ When cl. (2) of Art. 13 says in
clear and unambiguous terms that no State shall
Subba Rao].
make any law which takes away or abridges the
rights conferred by Part III, it will not avail the
State to contend either that the clause does not
embody a curtailment of the power to lPgislate or
that it imposes only a check but not a prohibition.
A constitutional prohibition against a State making
certain laws cannot be whittled down by analogy
or by drawing inspiration from decisions on the
provisions of other comtitutions; nor can we
appreciate the argument that the words "any law"
in the second line of Art. 13(2) posit the survival of
the law made in the teeth of such prohibition."
The same view was expressed by this Court in Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi (1).
Therein Das, C. J., says at p. 158 thus :
"As regards the legislative organ of the State,
the fundamental right is further consolidated by the
provisions of Art. 13. Clause (I) of that Article
provides that all laws in force in the territories of
India immediately before the commencement of the
Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with
the provi•ions of Part III shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be void. Likewise cl. (2) of this
' Article prohibits the State from making any law
which takes away or abridges the rights conferred
by the same Part and follows it up by saying that
any law made in contravention of this clause shall,·
to the extent of the contravention, be void. It will
be observed that, so far as this Article is concerned,
there is no relaxation of the restriction imposed by
it such as there are in some of the other Articles
"
Bhagwati, J., observed much to the same effect at
p. 161 thus:
"It is absolutely clear on a perusal of Art. 13(2)
of the Constitution that it is a constitutional mandate
{I) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 528.
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
911
ry6o
to the State and no citizen can by any act or conduct relieve the State of the solemn obligation imposKavalappara
ed on it by Art. 13(2) ............... "
K ottarathil
Kochuni
One of us had also stated to the same effect, after
v.
citing Art. 13, at p. 181 :
State of Madras
"This Article, in clear and unambiguous terms,
not only declares that all laws in force before the Subba Rao].
commencement of the Constitution and made thereafter taking away or abridging the said rights would
be void to the extent of the contravention but also
prohibits the State from making any law taking
away or abridging the said rights."
It is, therefore, manifest that the law must satisfy two
tests before it can be a valid law, namely, (1) that the
appropriate legislature has competency to make the
law; and (2) that it does not take away or abridge
any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III
of the Constitution. It follows that the law depriving a person of his property will be an invalid law if
it infringes either Art. 19(l){f) or any other Article of
Part III.
Learned counsel, appearing for the respondents,
while conceding that the validity of a law must pass
the test of the foregoing two conditions, contends that
in the context of Art. 31, we should apply the construction analogous to that put upon by this Court on
the word "law" in Art. 21 of the Constitution in the
case of A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(1). In
the said case, the question was whether the provisions
of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV of 1950),
were ultra vires the Constitution. This Court by a
majority held that the said Act, with the exception of
s. 14 thereof, did not contravene any of the Articles
of the Constitution and, therefore, the detention of the
petitioner therein was not illegal. In that context, a
question was raised whether the said Act must be
struck down as infringing Art. 19{l){d) of the Constitution. This Court held that the concept of the right
" to move freely throughout the territory of India"
referred to in Art. 19(l){d) of the Constitution was
entirely different from the concept of the right to
"personal liberty" referred to in Art. 21 and that Art. 21
(rj [1950] S.C.R. 88.
012
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l!!\JOJ
should not, therefore, be read as-controlled by the
provisions
of Art. 19. Though the learned Judges
Kavalappara
excluded the operation of Art. 19 in considering the
Kottarathil
Kochuni
question of fundamental right under Art. 21, the
v.
judgment of the Court discloses three shades of
State of !11adras
opinion. As much of the argument is centred on the
Subba Rao]. analogy drawn from this decision, the relevant Articles
may be summarized:
Under Art. 21, no person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. Clauses (1) and (2) of
Art. 22 afford protection in the matter of arrest and
detention in certain cases. Clauses 4, (5) and (6) thereof
provide for preventive detention and constitutional
safeguards relating thereto. It may not be inappropriate to describe these provisions as forming an
exhaustive code, as they elaborately deal with a particular subject, namely, life and personal liberty. In
construing the said provisions, Kania, C. J., said at
p. 100-101 thus:
" So read, it clearly means that the legislation to
be examined must be directly in respect of one of
the rights mentioned in the sub-clauses. If there is
a legislation directly attempting to control a citizen's
freedom of speech or expression, or his right to
assemble peaceably and without arms, etc., the
question whether that legislation is saved by the
relevant saving clause of article 19 will arise. If,
however, the legislation is not directly in respect of
any of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for1instance, for punitive or
preventive detei;ition, his right under any of these
sub-clauses is abridged, the question of the application of article 19 does not arise. The true approach
is only to consider the directness of the legislation
and not what will be the result of the detention
otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenue's life."
Mahajan, J. (as he then was), gave the reason for his
conclusion at p. 226:
"I am satisfied on a review of the whole scheme
of the Constitution that the intention was to make
article 22 self-contained in respect of laws on the
subject of preventive detention."
r
-. 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
\
913
The learned Judge further elaborated the point thus
z9oo
at p. 228:
Kavalappara
"If the intention of the Constitution was that a
Kottarathil
law made on the subject of preventive detention
Kochuni
had to be. tested on the touchstone •of reasonableness, 51a 1e oJ.1 vM. ad ras
then it would not have troubled itself by expressly
making provision in article 22 about the precise subba Rao J.
scope of the limitation subject to which such a law
could be made and by mentioning the procedure
that the law dealing with that subject had to
provide. Some of the provisions of article 22 would
then have been redundant .................. "
Mukherjea, J. (as he then was), said much to the
same effect at p. 225 :
" In my opinion, the group of articles 20 to 22
embody the entire protection guaranteed by the
Constitution in relation to deprivation of life and
personal liberty both with regard to substantive as
well as to procedural law."
Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was), stated at p. 191 :
"Read as a whole and viewed in its setting
among the group of provisions (articles .19 to 22)
relating to "Right to Freedom'', article 19 seems
to my mind to pre-suppose that the citizen to whom
the possession of ~hese fundamental rights is secured
retains the substratum of personal freedom on
which alone the enjoyment of these rights necessarily rests."
The learned Judge further dilated on the point at p. 191.
"Deprivation of personal liberty in such a situation is not, in my opinion, within the purview of
article 19 at all but is dealt with by the succeeding
articles 20 and ,21. In other words, article 19
guarantees to the citizens the enjoyment of certain
civil liberties while they are free; while articles 20-22
secure to all persons-citizens and non-citizenscertain constitutional guarantees in regard to
punishment and prevention of crime."
Das, J. (as he then was), stated at p. 302 thus:
"The purpose of article 19(l)(d) is to guarantee
that there shall be no State barrier. It gives protection against provincialism. It has nothing to do
with the freedom of the person as such."
914
I960
Kavalappara
· Kottarathil
Koch uni
v.
State of Madras
Subb:J Rao].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
The learned Judge continued to state at p. 304:
" Therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that the
rights protected by article 19(1 ), in so far as they
relate to rights attached to the person, i.e., the rights
referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g), are rights
which only a free citizen, who has the freedom of
his person unimpaired, cari exercise."
The views of the learned Judges may be broadly summarized under three heads, viz., ( 1) to invoke Art. 19( 1),
a law shall be made directly infringing that right;
(2) Arts. 21 and 22 constitute a self-contained code;
and (-3) the freedoms in Art. 19 postulate a free man.
On the basis of the said theories, this Court, with
Faz) Ali, J., dissenting, rejected the plea that a law
made under Art. 21 shall not infringe Art. 19(1). Had
the question been res integra, some of us would have
been inclined to agree with the dissenting view expressed by Fazl Ali, J.; but we are bound by this judgment.
Even so, there is no analogy between Art. 21, as interpreted by this Court, and Art. 31(1). Article 21 deals
with personal liberty. Personal liberty, Kania, C.J.,
observed, includes "the right to eat or sleep when
one likes or to work or not to work as and when one
pleases and several such rights" and "deprivation of
such liberty'', in the words of the l(larned Chief Justice,
"is quite different from restriction (which is only a
partial control) of the right to move freely (which is
relatively a minor right of a citizen)". "Personal
Liberty " is a more comprehensive concept and has a
much wider connotation than the right conferred
under Art. 19(l)(d). Arts. 19(1)(d) and 22 deal with
different subjects, whereas both Arts.19(l)(f) and 31(1)
deal with the same subject, namely, property; while
under Art. 19(1)(f), a citizen has the right to acquire,
hold and dispose of property, Art. 31(1) enables the
State to make a law to deprive him of that property.
Such a law directly infringes the fundamental right
given under Art. 19(l)(f). Further, Arts. 21 and 22
are linked up together; while Art. 21 enables the State
to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty
according to the procedure established by law, Art. 22
prescribes certain procedure in respect of both punitive and preventive detention. They constitute an
f.
...
,,.
.
3 S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
915
integrated code in the matter of personal liberty. On
t h.e other hand, Art. 31( 1), by reason of the amend- K avalappara
ment, ceases to be a part of the guarantee against Kotlarathil
Kochuni
acquisition or requisition of property without t.he
authority of law and must therefore be construed on State ofv.Madras
its own terms.
The said Articles are not in pari materia and they Subba Rao ].
differ in their scope and content. There is material
difference not only in the phraseology but also in their
setting. Article 31(1), therefore, cannot be construed
on the basis of the construction placed upon Art. 21.
The decision in The State of Bombxy v. Bhanji
Munji (1), on which reliance is placed by learned
counsel for the respondents in support of their contention that Art. 31(1) excludes the operation of Art. 19(1 ),
is one based on the pre-existing law before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. In that case it
was contendeu that ss. 5(1) and 6(4)(a) of the Bombay
Land Requisition Act, 1948 {Born. Act XXXIII of
1948), as amended by Bombay Act II of 1950 and
Bombay Act XXXIX of 1950, were ultra vires
Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution. The premises in question there belonging to the respondents
were requisitioned by the Governor of Bombay under
the said Act.. The Act also provided for compensation,
anu this Court found that there was a clear public
purpose for the requisition, and upheld the law under
Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. This Court also considered the alternative argument advanced, namely,
that the Act was hit by Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution inasmuch as unreasonable restrictions were imposed on the rights of the respondents to acquire, hold
and dispose of property. In rejecting that argument,
Bose, J., speaking for the Court, observed at p. 780
thus:
" We need not examine those differences here
because it is enough to say that article l9(l)(f) read
with clause (5) postulates the existence of property
which can be enjoyed and over which rights can
be exercised because otherwise the reasonable restrictions contemplated by clause (5) could not be
brought into play. If there is no property which
can be acquired, held or disposed of, no restriction
(x) [1955] 1 s.c.R. 177.
916
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire,
hold
and dis1)ose of it, and as clause (5) conterrKavalappara
plates
the placing of reasonable restrictions on tLe
K ottarathil
f<ochuni
exercise of those rights it must follow that the
v.
article postulates the existence of property over
State o_f Madras
which these rights can be exercised." · .
For
these observations the learned Judge has drawn
Subba Rao ].
upon the principle laid down in A. K. Gopalan's Case(').
These observations primafacie appear to be against
the contentions of the petitioner herein. But a further
scrutiny reveals that they have no bearing on the
construction of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution after
.cl. (2) of Art. 31 has been amended and cl. (2A) has
been inserted in that Article by the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. Before the amE1ndment, this Court, as we have already noticed, held by
a majority in The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal
Bose (2 ) that els. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 were not mutually
exclusive in scope and content, but should be read
together and understood as dealing with the same
subject, namely, the acquisition or taking possession
of property referred to in cl. (2) of Art. 31. In that
view, Art. 31, before the amendment, was a self.
contained Article providing for a subject different
from that dealt with in Art. 19. On that basis it was
possible to hold, as this Court held in The State of
Bombay v. Bhanji Munji (3 ), on the analogy drawn
from Art; 21, that when the property therein was
requisitioned within the meaning of Art. 31, the operation of Art. 19 was excluded. But there is no scope
for drawing such an analogy after the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, as thereafter they
dealt with two different subjects: Art. 31(2) and (2A)
with acquisition and requisition and Art. 31(1) with
deprivation of property by authority of law. The
decision of this Court in Bhanji M unji' s Case (3 ) no
longer holds the field after the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955.
· Strong reliance is placed upon the observations of
Das, J. (as he then was), in Subodh Gopal Bose's
Case (2). Therein the learned Judge dissented from
the view of the majority on the interpretation of
Art. 31(1) and (2) of the Constitution. In the course
{I) (1950) S.C R. 88
.
(2) [1954) S.C,R !)87.
(3) (1955) I S.C R. 777•
r
-
.
.....1
-
•.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
917
of his dissenting judgment, the learned Judge made
certain observations on the effect of his interpretation
Kovalappara
of Art. 31 on Art. 19. The learned Judge said at
K n:ta rathil
Kochuni
p. 632 thus:
v.
" Such being the correct correlation between Stale of Madras
article 19(1), sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) on the one
hand and article 21 on the other, the question Subba Rao /.
necessarily arises as to the correlation between
article 19(1) (f) and article 31. Article 19(l)(f) guarantees to a citizen, as one of his freedoms, the right
to acquire, hold and dispose of property but reasonable restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of
that right to the extent indicated in clause (5).
Article 31, as its heading shows, guarantees to all
persons, citizens and non-citizens, the 'right to
property' as a fundamental right to the extent
therein mentioned. What, I ask myself, is the
correlation between article 19(l)(f) read with article 19(5) and article 31? If, as held by my Lord in
A. If.. Gopalan's Gase (1) at p. 191, sub-clauses (a) to
(e) and (g) of article 19(1) read with the relevant
clauses (2) to (6) ' presuppose that the citizen to
whom the possession of these fundamental rights is
secured retains the substratum of personal freedom
on which alone the enjoyment of these rights necessarily rests', it must follow logically that article
19(l)(f) read with article 19(5) must likewise presuppose that the person to whom that fundamental
right is guaranteed retains his property over or
with respect to which alone that right may be
exercised. I found myself unable to escape from
this logical conclusion."
The learned Judge earlier expressed the same opinion
in Ohiranjit Lal Ohowdhuri v. The Union of India (2 ).
When it was pointed out to the learned Judge that,
if his view was correct, the legislature while it cannot
restrict a person's right to property unless the restriction is reasonable and for a public purpose, it can
deprive him of his property without any such limitations, the learned Judge negatived the objection in the
following words at p. 654 :
(r)
II9
[1~50] S.C.R. 88.
(2) [1950J S.C.R. 869.
918
[(avalappara
](ottarathil
Kochuni
v.
State of Madras
Subba Rao].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960]
" What is abnormal if our Constitution has trusted
the legislature, as the people. of Great Britain have
trusted their Parliament ? Right to life and personal
liberty and the right to private property still exist
in Great Britain in spite of the supremacy of Parliament. Why should we assume or apprehend that
our Parliament or State legislatures should act like
mad men and deprive us of our property without
any rhyme or reason ?"
Further, the learned Judge was of the view that unless
Art. 31(1) was construed in the manner he did, it would
not be possible for the State to bring about a welfare
State which our Constitution directs it to do. Elaborating this point, the learned Judge observed, at
p.655,thus:
"'1Ve must reconcile ourselves to the plain truth
that emphasis has now unmistakably shifted from
the individual to the community. We cannot overlook that the avowed purpose of our Constitution is
to set up a welfare State by subordinating the social
interest in individual liberty or property to the larger
social interest in the rights of the community. As
already observed, the police power of the State is
'the most essential of powers, at times most insistent,
and always one of the least !imitable powers of the
government'. . ..... In the matter of deprivation of
property otherwise than by the taking of possession
or by the acquisition of it within the meaning of
article 31(2) our Constitution has trusted our legislature and has not thought fit to impose any limitation on the legislature's exercise of the State's police
power over private property".
Relying upon the said observations, learned counsel
for the respondents pressed on us the follo.wing three
points: (1) After the . Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, cl. ( l) of Art. 31 must be read
independently of cl. (2) thereof and, if so read, cl. (1)
must be held to deal with police power. (2) Without
such power the State cannot usher in a welfare State
which the Constitution enjoins it to do. (3) The fact
that there is no limitation on the power of the legislature to make law depriving a citizen of his property
need not deter us from recognising such power, as we
r
-
.•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
919
can trust our legislatures and Parliament as the people
of Great Britain have trusted their Parliament.
Kavalappara
We cannot agree with the contention of the learned
Koftarothil
Kochuni
counsel that Art. 31(1) deals with "police power". In
the view expressed by Das, J. (as he then was), the State ofv.lvfodras
legislature can make any law depriving a person of his
-·property and the only limitation on such power is its Subba Rao].
good sense. But" police power", as it is understood
in American Law, can never be an arbitrary power .
....-1,
" Willis on Constitutiorni I Law " says at p. 727 :
\
"The United States Supreme Court has said that
'the police power embraces regulations designed to
promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote
the public health, the public morals or the public
safety'. "
In the Constitution of the United States of America,
prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library
of Congress (Senate Document No. 170, 82D Congress),
" police power" is generally defined thus at p. 982 :
"The police power of a State today embraces
regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity as well as those
to promote public safety, health, morals, and is not
confined to the suppression of what is offensive,
disorderly, or unsanitary, but extends to what is for
the greatest welfare of the State ".
Prof. Willoughby states in his Constit,utional Law of
the United States (Vol. III, p. 1774) : " ...... the police
power knows no definite limit. It extends to every
possible phase of what the Courts deem to be the
public welfare". Holmes, J., in Noble State Bank v.
Haskell (1) concisely defines "police power" thus:
" It may be said in a general way that the police power
extends to all the great public needs". It is, therefore,
clear that police power cannot be divorced from social
control and public good. We cannot, therefore, import
. the doctrine of police power in our Constitution
~' divorced from the necessary restrictions on that power
as evolved by judicial decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States. Indeed, uninfluenced by any
such doctrine, the plain meaning of the clear words
-
( !) ·.u9 U.S. 104.
920
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
used in Art. 31(1) of the Constitution enables the State
to
discharge its functions.in the interest of social and
/(avalappara
public welfare which the State in America can do in
Kotta,,athd
Koehuni
exercise of police power. The limitation on the power
v.
of the State to make a law depriving a person of his
State of Madras
property, as we have already stated, is found in the
Subba Rao J.
word "law" and that takes us back to Art. 19 and
the law made can be sustained only if it imposes
reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general
public.
We find it also very difficult to accept the second
and third aspects of the approach to the question.
The duty of this Court is only to interpret the provisions of the Constitution in a liberal spirit, but not to
eradicate or modify the fundamental rights. That
apart, our Constitution-makers thought otherwise.
The Constitution declares the fundamental rights of a
citizen and lays down that all laws made abridging
or taking away such rights shall be void. That is a
clear indication that the makers of the Constitution
did not think fit to give our Parliament the same
powers which the Parliament of England has. While
the Constitution contemplates a welfare State, it also
provides that it should be brought about by the legislature subject to the limitations imposed on its power.
If the makers of the Constitution intended to confer
unbridled power on the Pai'liament to make any law
it liked to bring about the welfare State, they would
not have provided for the fundamental rights. The
Constitution gives every scope for ordered progress of
society towards a welfare State. The State is expected
to bring about a welfare State within the framework
of the Constitution, for it is authorized to impose
reasonable restrictions, in the interests of the general
public, on the fundamental rights recognized in
Art. 19. If the interpretation sought to be placed on
Art. 31(1) was accepted, it would compel the importation of the entire doctrine of police power and grafting
it in Art. 31(1) or the recognition of arbitrary power in
the legislature with the hope or consolation suggested
that our Parliament and legislatures may be trusted
not to act arbitrarily. The first suggestion is not legally
· permissible 11uJ the second does not stand to reason,
3 S.C.R. SUPRElfE COURT RJ<JPORTS
r'"'\
921
for the Constitution thought fit to impose limitations
on the power of the legislatures even in the case of Kavalappara
lesser infringements of the rights of a citizen.
K o/tarathil
Kochuni
Another argument raised by learned counsel for the
v.
respondents may also be noticed. If the view exprrssed State of Mad•as
by us be correct, the argument proceedt>, the law
depriving a person of his property-however ur~ent Subba Rao J.
the need may be and whatever grave danger or serious
vice it seeks to avert or suppress-can never be a
reasonable restriction on the right to enjoy property
and therefore every such law would be void. The
learned Attorney-General argues that in the present
case the petitioner is not deprived of his property, but
his right is only restricted. It depends upon the perspective from which we look at the facts. In one sense,
the petitioner has been deprived of his shares in the
property given by the statute to the respondents, but,
even on that assumption, we do not think that the
argument of the respondents has any substance. The
correct approach to the question is, first to ascertain
what is the fundamental right of the petitioners; then
to see, whether the law infringes that right. If the
law ex facie infringes that right, the State can support
that law only by establishing that the la.w imposes
reasonable restrictions on the petitioner's fundamental
. right in the interests of the general public. If so
approached, the impugned Act by seeking to deprive
the petitioner of his property certainly infringes his
fundamental right. There is absolutely nothing on
the record to sustain the validity of the law under
the said clause (5) of Art. 19. The apprehension that
deprivation can never be a restriction and therefore
every law depriving a person of his property must
necessarily be void, even if justifiable, cannot help the
respondents, for if it is not saved by cl. (5), that result
must ft.ow from the premises. But that apprehension
has no justification. This Court has held in a recent
decision that under certain circumstances a law depriving a citizen of his fundamental right to property may
amount to a reasonable restriction. In Narendra
Kumar v. The Union of India (1), Das Gupta., J.,
observed:
\II [1900] z s.c.R. 375·
•
922
1960
Kav-1lapp~ra
Kottarathil
Kochuni
v.
S'tate oj .\fadras
Subba Rao].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
" It is reasonable to think that the makers of the
Constitution considered the word 'restriction ' to
be sufficiently wide to save laws 'inconsistent'
with Art. 19(1), or 'taking away the rights' conferred by the Article, provided this inconsistency or
taking away was reasonable in the interests of the
different matters mentioned in the clause. There
can be no doubt therefore that they intended the
word 'restriction ' to include cases of ' prohibition' also. The contention that a Ia w prohibiting
the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case
saved, cannot therefore be accepted. It is undoubtedly correct, however, that when, as in the present
case, the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition
special care has to be taken by the Court to see that
the test of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater
the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny
by the Court. "
If so, the State can establish that a law, though it
purports to deprive the petitioner of his fundamental
right, under certain circumstances amounts to a
reasonable restriction within the meaning of cl. (5) of
Art. 19 of the Constitution.
We, therefore, hold that a law made depriving a
citizen of his property shall be void, unless the law so
made complies with the provisions of cl. (5) of Art. 19
of the Constitution.
This leads us to the question whether the provisions
of the Act infringe Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.
The impugned Act is The Madras Marumakkathayam
(Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 (Madras Act No. XXXII
of 1955). As the argument turns upon the provisions
of the Act and as the Act itself is a short one, it will
be convenient to set out all the provisions thereof.
The Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts)
Act, 1955 (Act No. XXXll of 1955).
(An Act to remove certain doubts in the Madras
Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act XXII of
1933), in regard to sthanams and sthanam properties).
Whereas doubts have arisen about the true legal
character of certain properties which are erroneously
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
923
I960
claimed to be or regarded as sthanam properties,
but which are properties of the tarwad, the male Kavalaj>para
members of which are entitled to succeed to the
J< ottarwthil
f{ochuni
sthanam and it is necessary to remove those doubts
V.
in respect of this question :
State of Madras
Be it enacted in the Sixth Year of the Republic
of India as follows :
Subba R,w J.
1. This Act may be called the MADRAS MARUMAKKATHAY AM (REMOVAL OF DOUBTS) ACT,
1955.
(2) It shall apply to all persons governed by the
Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act,
XXII of 1933).
2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any
sthanam in respect of which :(a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the propert,ies of the sthanam and the
properties of the tarwad, or
(b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving maintenance from the properties purporting to
be sthanam properties as of right, or in pursuance
of a custom or otherwise, or
(c) there had at any time been a vacancy caused
by there being no male member of the tarwad
eligible to succeed to the sthanam,
shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always
to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the
properties appertaining to such a sthanam shall be
deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have
been properties belonging to the tarwad to which
the provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam
Act, 1932 (Madras Act XXII of 1933), shall apply.
Explanation :-All words and expressions used in
this Act shall bear the same meaning as iu the
Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act
XXII of 1933).
The Act presupposes the existence of a sthanam and
its properties. It says tha.t the sthanam and its properties possessing one or more of the characteristics
mentioned therein shall be deemed and shall be
always deemed to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and its properties respectively. Thee
..
'
924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
impugned Act applies also to sthanams whose title
to properties has been declared by courts of law.
Kavnloppat'a
Further
the Act is given retrospective operation.
f(otta,,athil
It is suggested that the provisions of the Act
J(ochuni
v.
have not been happily worded and, if properly underState of Madt'as stood with the help of the preamble, it would be
clear that the sthanams were not converted into
Subba Rao].
tarwads but only tarwads which were wrongly claimed
to be sthanams were declared to be not sthanams.
The preamble of a statute is "a key to the understanding of it" and it is well established that" it may
legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity, or
to fix the meaning of words which may have more
than one, or to keep the effect of the Act within its
real scope, when ever the enacting part is in any of
these respects open to doubt". We do not find any
.ambiguity in the enacting part of the Act. Assuming
that there is some doubt, the preamble confirms our
view of the construction of the Act. According to the
preamble certain properties of the tarwad are erroneously claimed to be or regarded as sthanam properties.
and it has become necessary to remove those doubts~
by making the Act. The preamble also recognizes the
existence of sthanams and the doubts related only to
the title to the property of sthanams. The enacting
part purports to resolve these doubts by laying down .
three tests, and if any one of these tests is satisfied,
the sthanam shall be deemed to be a tarwad and the
properties tarwad properties. In short, the Act, read
with the preamble, takes the sthanam, lays down
certain tests and proceeds to say that if one or other
of the tests is satisfied in respect of any property
claimed to be that of the sthanam, the sthanam by
statutory fiction is treated as the tarwad and its
properties as tarwad properties. The tests, as we will
presently show, are arbitrary and not germane to the
question whether the properties belong to a sthanam
or a tar wad. Whatever may be the phraseology used,
in effect and substance,, the Act in the guise of applying certain tests seeks' to convert certain sthanams
into tarwards and their properties into tarwad properties. It applies equally to sthanams governed by
decrees of courts and sthanams whose character and
title to the properties can be established by clear
Tt}~O
-
.-
-- --
.
t
3 S.C.R.
-
....
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
925
1')00
evidence and to sthanams whose title is admitted. In
the said cases no question of doubt can conceivably Krivalnf'P""a
arise. The Act in the guise of dispelling doubts
I< otforathil
abolishes a class of sthanarns and deprives them of
their properties. The question is whether th0 said State ofv.Madras
legislation can stand the test of Art. 19(5) of the
Constitutiom
Sit/Jba Rao ].
The learned Advocate-General of Kernla seeks to
support the legislation on the ground that under the
Marninakkathayam law, the three characteristics of
properties mentioned in 13. 2 pertain to tarwad and,
therefore, when wrong decisions were given by c,1urts
introducing confusion in titles, the legislature rightly
stepped in to set right the wrong and declare such 8thanams possessing definite characteristics of the tarwad
to be and always to have been the tarwad properties.
He further argues that, as ehe law w<1s made to protect
the rights of the members of the tarwad in a p11rticular class of sthanams, the restrictions imposed on
the s_thanees' rights in their properties would be
reasonable and would be in the interests of the general
public, notwithstanding the fact that the legislation
indirectly affects the rights of a few decree-holder
sthanees, who have establit;hed their rights in a court
of law.
Mr. Purshottam Tricumdas supported the learned
Advocate-General in this contention.
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, who followed him,
preferred to found his contention on a broader basis,
namely, that the members of a tarwad and a sthanee
have some interest in each other's property and the
legislation did nothing more than regulate their
interest inter se to restore peace and harmony among
them and to change the m11tual relationship to bring
it in accord with the concept of a modern welfare
State. If that be the object of the Act, the argument
proceeds, the mere fact that the law incidently disturbs
the rights of parties whn have obtained decrees of
court does not make it unre1Lsonable.
Before we consider the v1Llidity of these arguments,
it would be convenient at this stage to notice the
scope of Art. 19(l)(f) and Art. 19(5) of the ·Constitution. The said Article:> read;
HQ
1.
926
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
Article 19. (1) All citizens shall have the rightK avalappara
Kottarnthil
Kochuni
v.
.'-'tale of 1\1 adras
Subba Rao J.
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the
said clause shall affect the operation of any existing
law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State
from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred
by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the
general public or for the protection of the interests
of any Scheduled Tribe.
Under cl. (5), the State can make a law imposing
reasonable restrictions on the fo.ndamental rights
embodied in Art.19(l)(f) in the interests of the general
public.
What is "reasonable restriction" has been succinctly stated by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in State of
Madras v. V. G. Raw( 1 ) thus at p. 607:
" It is important in this context to bear in
mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever
prescribed, should be applied to each individual
statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or
general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down
as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right
alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby,
the disproport.ion of the imposition, the prevailing
conditions at the time, should all enter into the
judicial verdict."
If we may say so, with respect, this passage summarizes the law on the subject fully and precisely. The
learned Chief Justice in his description of the test of
reasonableness, in our view, has not stated anything
more than the obvious, for the standard of reasonableness is inextricably conditioned by the state of society
and the urgency for eradicating the evil sought to be
remedied. Some of the American decisions and
passages from text-books cited at the Bar may be useful in ascertaining whether in the instant case the
restrictions imposed by the statute are reasonable,
(I) [1952] S.C.ll. 597·
.~-'
-
-
3 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
927
In Willoughby's Constitutional Law it is stated at
p. 795 thus:
Ka val appara
"As between individuals, no necessity, however
Kottamthil
[{ochuni
great, no exigency, however imminent, no improvev.
ment, however valuable, no refusal, however unState of .ifartras
neighbourly, no obstinacy, however unreasonable,
no offers of compensation, however extravagant, Subba Rao /.
can compel or require any man to part with an inch
of his estate."
The Supreme Court of th') United States of America
in Henry Webster v. Peter Cooper(1) observed:
"The result of the decision is, that the constitution of the State has secured to every citizen the
right of acquiring, possessing, and enjoying property
and that, by the true intent and meaning of this
section, property cannot, by a mere act of the
Legislature, be taken from one man and vested in
another directly ; nor can it, by the retrospective
operation of law, be indirectly transferred from one
to another, or be subjected to the government of
principles in a court of justice, which must necessarily produce that effect."
In The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City {2 ), the Supreme Court of
the United States of America again declares the
importance of individual property right thus:
" The theory of our governments, state and
national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited
power anywhere. The executive, the legislative and
the judicial branches of these governments are all
of limited and defined powers.
There are limitations on such power which grow
out of the essential nature of all free governments.
Implied reservations of individual rights, without
which the social compact could not exist, and which
are respected by all governments entitled to the
same. No court, for instance, would hesitate to
declare void a statute which enacted that A and B
who were husband and wife to each other should
be so no longer, but that A should thereafter be the
husband of C, and B the wife of D. Or which should
enact that the homestead now owned by A should
\1) i.~ Law Ed. 510, 517.
()28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
no longer be his, but should henceforth be the
property of B."
Knva7appara
We have cited the relevant passages from the text[{ ntta1athil
book
and the decisions not with a view to define the
Krchufli
v.
scope of "reasonable restrictions" in Art. 19(5) of
State cf Modrfl.<::. our ·Constitution, but only to point out that, as between citizens, the individual proprietary rights are
Subba Ran ].
ordinarily respected unless a clear case is made out
for imposing restrictions thereon. There must, therefore, be harmonious balancing between the fundamental· rights declared by Art. 19(1) and the social
control permitted by Art. 19(5). It is implicit in the
natu,re-. of restrictions that no inflexible standard can
be laid' down : each case must be decided on its facts.
But the restrictions sought to be imposed shall not
be arbitrary but must have reasonable relation to the
object sought to be achieved and shall be in the
interests of the general public.
Before we proceed to consider whether the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act are reasonable
within the meaning of cl. (5) of Art. 19, it would be
necessary to ascertain precisely the law on the follow ing three matters: (1) What is a sthanam in Marumakkat.hayam law?; (2) what is tarwad under
the said law ? ; and (3) what is the relationship between members of a tarwad and a sthanee?
Marumakkathayam law governs a large section of
people inhabiting the West Coast of South India.
l\farumakkathayam literally means descent through
sisters' children. It is a body of custom and usage
which have received judicial recognition. Though
Sundara Aiyar, J., in Krishnan Nair v. Damodaran
Nair1 1 ) suggested that "Malabar law is really only a
school of Hindu law", it has not been accepted by
others. There is a fundamental difference between
Hindu Law and Marumakkathayam system in that
the former is founded on agnatic family and the
latter is based on matriarchate. Marumakkathayam
family consists of all the descendants of the family
line of one common ancestor and is called a tarwad.
The incidents of a tarwad are so well-settled that it is
not necessary to consider the case-law, but it would
1960
{1) (191>, 1 I.L.R. 38 Mad. <18
.
L
'
''
\
3 s.c.n,
SUPL{E.\IE COUltT REPOltTS
929
be enough if the relevant passages from the book
"Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law" by Sundara . l\ava!appara
Aiyar are cited. The learned author says at p. 7
J{ ottarathil
J{ochuni
thus:
"The joint family in a Marumakkathayam Ni1yar State nfv.Madras
tarwad consists of a mother and her male and
female children, and the children of those female Su/,h.• Rao ].
children, and so on. The issue of the male children
do not belong to their titrwad but to the tarwad of
their consorts. The property belonging to the tarwad is the property of all the males and females
that compose it. Its affairs are administered by one
of those persons, usually the eldest male, called the
karnavan. The individual members are not entitled to enforce partition, but a partition may be
effected by common consent. The rights of the
junior members are stated to be (1) if males, to
succeed to management in their turn, (2) to be
maintained at the family house, (3) to object to an
improper alienation or administration of the family
property, (4) to see that the property is duly conserved, (5) to bar an adoption, and (6) to get a
share at any partition that may take place. These
are what may be called effective rights. Otherwise
everyone is a proprietor and has equal rights."
]'or the purpose of this case it is not necessary to go
into further ramifications of the incidents of a tarwad, for nothing turns upon them.
We are concerned in this case with a sthanam. In
the book of Sundara Aiyar the origin, scope and mcidents of a sthanam are discussed at p. 249:
" As a technical word, ' stanom ' means a position of dignity of this kind, that is, one to
which certain specific property is attached, and
which passes with it, and is held by the person as
the " stani ". . .................... The origin of stanom
is by no means clear and is more or less a matter
for speculation."
The learned author proceeds to give the three
modes of the origin of sthanams, namely, (1) in a
ruling family " it was considered necessary in the
circumstances that for the maintenance of the dignity
of the ruler he should own properties in which the
930
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
members of the tarwad as such had no right or interest and which would pass with the Crown to his
f( 11valatp11.Ya ,
successor"
: sthanams in the families of Zamorin,
f{ottrJ?athil
J(ochuni
Palghat, Wulluvanad and other Rajas are given as
v.
instances of this class of sthanams ; (2) " in the case
State of 1\1 adYaS
of some chieftains and public officers, sthanams were
created by the ruling king, who, when he appointed
Siihba Rao ].
the head of a particular family to an office with
hereditary succession attached also certain lands for
the maintenance of the officer-holder " : Para N ambi
is given as a prominent instance of this class ; and
(3) " when a family became very opulent and influential, it was sometimes deemed necessary in order to
keep its social position and influence that the head
should be able to maintain a certain amount of state,
and for that purpose the members of the family
agreed to set a part certain property for him, and such
property, would descend to the head of the family for
the time being". To some of the questions posed by
the decisions or that are likely to arise, the learned
author suggested some answers. The learned author
describes the position of a sthanee vis-a-vis the members of the tarwad thus :
"It is rather that of a member of a tarwad who
separates himself from it by division. His accession to the stanom operates as a severance from
the family. In consideration of his solely becoming
entitled to the stanom property it was probably
considered fair that he should give up his existing
right in the property of the tarwad. But he and
his tarwad will have the same right of succession
to the properties of each other as if his severance
from the family had been the result not of his
accession to the stanom, but a voluntary division
between him and the rest of the family."
Another difficulty visualized and attempted to be
answered by the learned author is the case of a family
which has no male member to succeed to the sthanam. He gives three possible answers, namely,
(i) escheat to the Crown; (ii) descent according to
the rules of devolution applicable to the property of
a divided member ; and (iii) on the assumption that
r
'-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
931
the property is dedicated for the purpose of the tar.
wad, reverting to the tarwad. On the question, what Ka-val ·1ppara
would happen to the sthanam, if at the time of the
/(ottaralhil
Kochuni
death of the sthanee there was no male member in
v.
the tarwad, though he cited a decision of the Madras
State oJ M adros
High Court where a subsequent born male infant was
given a decree to recover the properties, he was of Subba Rao ].
the view that the question was not an easy one to
decide.
·
The decided cases considered the nature of this
institution and also its incidents. A division bench
of the Madras High Court in Vira Rayen v. The Valia.
Rani of Pudia Kovilagom, Calicut (1 ) held that according to the custom obtaining in the family of the
Zamorin Rajas of Calicut, property acquired by a
sthanam-holder and not merged by him in the properties of his sthanam, or otherwise disposed of by
him in his lifetime, became, on his death, the property of the kovilagom in which he was born, and, if
found in the possession of a member of the kovilagom,
belonged presumably to the kovilagom as common
property. In the course of the judgment, the learned
judges pointed out that in the family of the Zamorin
of Calicut there were five sthanams or places of dignity with separate properties attached to them, which
were enjoyed in succession by the senior male members of the kovilagom. It appears from the judgment
that the senior lady of the whole family also enjoyed
a sthanam with separate property. The Judicial
Committee in Venkateswaraiyanv. Shekhari Varma (2 )
was considering the validity of a perpetual lease of
sthanam lands effected by one of the Valia Rajas of
Palghat. In that context, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee,
described a sthanam thus at p. 386:
"It appears that in the families of the Malabar
Rajas it is customary to have a number of palaces,
to each of which there is attached an establishment
with lands for maintaining it, called by the name
of a sthanam. The Palghat family have no less
than nine sthanams. Each sthanam has a raja as
its head or Sthanamdar. The Sthanamdar represents
(r) (1881) I.L.R. 3 Mad. 141.
(2) (1881) I.L.R. 3 Mad. 384.
932
K nvrll,.,ppa'ra
f(ottar ithil
/\. ochuni
v.
.'i't':lfe of J\.1ridr·is
Subl>a Rao ],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960]
the corpus of his sthanam much in the same way as
"· Hindu widow represents the estates which have
devolved upon her, and he may alienate the property
for the benefit or proper expenses of the sthanarn."
This passage equates a sthanamdar to a Hindu widow
vis-:i-vis his rights both in the matter of representation as well as his right to alienate the property
pert.aining t.o the sthanam. The decision in Mahomed
v. Krishnan (1 ) dealt with a suit filed by the junior
members of a tarwad, which consisted of the three
sthanams, against the karnavan and others, including
certain persons tow horn he had alienated some tarwad
propert.y, inter alia, for a declaration that the alienations were invalid as against the tarwad and for
possession of thA property alienated. One of the
questions raised was whether the plaintiffs were competent to maintain the suit. The suit was resisted on
several grounds and one of them was that the t.arwad
was not a Malabar family in the ordinary sense of the
term, but that it consisted of three sthanams and three
illakur houses or sub>idiary tarwads. In considering
the objections the learned Judges considered the
nature of a sthanam property and made the following
observations at p. 112:
"According to the custom of Malabar, the nature
of stanom property is such that the present holder
has in it a life interest and th" successor derives
no benefit from it during the life of his predecessor,
whereas in ordinary t<trwad property each member
of the tarwad has a concurrent interest and a joint
heneficial enjoyment.. Although the posit.ion of a stani
is analogous to that of a childless widow, in tha.t both
have a life interest, both represent the Astate or the
inheritance for the time being, and both have a
disposing power only to the estate taken by reverHioner. Each male reversioner becomes under
Hindu Law the full owner when the reversion falls
in, whereas the person that succeeds to a stanom
takes the same qualified estate that his predecPssor
had. The legal rd,ition therefore between the
Vayoth Nair and the other stanomdars and the
karnavans of the three subsidiary tarwa<ls is that
\i) (1888)· I.L.R,·11 l\1ad; 106,
r
•
3 S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPOltTS
933
which subsists among a group of personR entitled to
succeed to the stanom property in a certain order, K avalappara
each having only a life interest therein and qualified
Kottarathil
J{ochuni
power of disposition over it. The relation between
v.
the stani and the junior members of each subsidiary
State of Madras
tarwad is that which exists between the representative of the stanom for the time being and the Subba Rao ].
class of persons who may become karnavans of
their tarwads and therefore represent.atives of the
junior and senior stanoms in the order of seniority."
This decision not only brings out the differences
between a Hindu widow's estate and the sthanee's
interest in a sthanam property but also points out
that the interest of a member of a tarwad is only a right
to succeed to the sthanam property in a certain order.
It is nothing more than a spes successionis. Seshagiri
Ayyar, J., in Krishnan Kidavu v. Raman( 1 ) throws
some light on the relationship to the tarwad of a
person who had succeeded to a sthanam. The learned
Judge says at p. 920 thus:
"It is clear that if in his new sphere the stani
acquires property and does not dispose of it, his
tarwad will be entitled to it. The converse position
is at least arguable. If the tarwad becomes
extinct, the quondam member who had become a
stani may lay claim to the property. It cannot,
therefore, be said that the attainment to a sthanam
severs the relationship altogether. The person thus
ceasing to be a member is not in the position of a
stranger.''
The Judicial Committee in considering some of the
aspects of the institution of a sthanam in K. Kochunni v. K. K uttanunni (2), a case that was fought out
between the petitioner and some of the respondents
in the present petition, accepted the meaning given to
the word " sthanam" by Sundara Aiyar in his book
on" Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law", namely, that
it is a dignity to which property is attached for its
maintenance and for the fulfilment of the duties
attached to the position, but rejected the contention
that the following two circumstances indicated that
the sthanam was a tarwad: (1) maintenance was
(1) (1916) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 918.
I2I
(2) I.L.R. [1948j Mad. 672.
934
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19601
r
960
decreed against Moopil Nair to the junior members of
Kavalapparn
the family and that maintenance was being paid to
I<ottarath•l
the junior members; and (2) the Court of Wards
Kochuni
treated the sthanam property as tarwad property.
State.•; Madras The first circumstance was explained away with the
following remarks at p. 691:
Subba 1?.ao ].
" The maintenance claimed was a customary one,
originating in ancient times when admittedly the
Muppil Nair was a sthani iu possession of sthanam
rights. There is no evidence as to how the maintenance allowance arose, whether it was given in
recognition of a legal claim or was only a generous
provision made for the benefit of the women and
younger members, which the Raja was perfectly
competent to do out of property which he regarded
exclusively as his own. "
In respect of the second circumstance, the Judicial
Committee remarked at p. 693 thus:
" It appears from the evidence that the Court of
Wards throughout the entire period of their management from 1872 till 1910 treated the estate as if it
was a tarwad, but this was apparently without any
investigation into the true nature of the property .
. .............. Besides there was no adult male at that
time to question the trnatment by the Court of
Wards of the property as tarwad. property."
A third circumstance was relied upon, namely, that
in 1872 the only surviving member of the family was
then a girl of six years of age and th11t, therefore,
there being no male heir to succeed to the sthanam,
the sthanam became extinct. The Judicial Committee
did not allow this plea to be raised for the first time
before them. That apart, quoting from Sundara Aiyar's
book, they pointed out that the question whether a
sthanam becomes extinct on the extinction of the
male members or is only in abeyance during the
absence of the male members so as to be capable of
being revived, does not admit of an easy solution ..... .
. .. . . . . . . ". This decision lays down that if once it has
been established that a property is a sthanam property, the mere fact that the sthanamdar was giving
maintenance to the members of the family or t,hat the
Court of Wards treated the entire property as tarwad
'
-
3 8.C.R
"
-
SUPREME COURT H,EPORTS
935
property would not in itself convert what is sthanam
r9bo
property into a tarwad property.
Kaualappara
To summarize: The origin of the sthanam is lost Kottarathil
in antiquity. It primarily means a dignity and
Kocl1Hni
denotes the status of the senior Raja in a .Malabar 5
v· d
1 '11 a ras
. surmise
. d t liat st h anams ·ate o___
Kovilagom or palace. I t is
_
were also created by the Rajas by giving certain Subba Rao J.
properties to military chieftains and public offioers
and also by tarwads creating them and allocating
certain properties for their maintenance. Most of the
the incidents of a sthanan1 are well settled. Usually
the seniormost male member of the family and occasionally a female member attains a sthanam. Properties are attached to the sthanam for the maintenance
of its dignity. The legal position of a sthanee is
equated to that of a Hindu widow in that he represents
the estate for the time being and he can alienate the
properties for necessity or for the benefit of the estate.
Unlike a Hindu widow, the successor to a sthanee is
always a life-estate-holder. In that respect his position is more analogous to an impartible estate-holder.
He ceases to have any present interest in the tarwad
properties. Like a Hindu widow or an impartible
estate-holder, he has an absolute interest in the income
of the sthanam properties or acquisitions therefrom.
His position is approximated to a member separated
from the family and that the members of the tarwad
succeed to his acquisitions unless accreted to the
estate and he succeeds to the tarwad properties, if the
tarwad becomes extinct. Questions like what would
happen if there is no male heir to a sthanam at any
point of time-whether the properties pertaining to
the sthanam would escheat to the State or devolve
upon the members of the tarwad or whether a subsequent birth of a male heir would revive the sthanamare raised by Sundara Aiyar in his book, but there is
a decision of the Madras High Court where i.n the case
of Punnathoor family a subsequent born male heir
was given a decree for the possession of the properties
of a sthanam. On the question whether a sthanam
property, not being the property of a member of a
tarwad, be blended with the property of the tarwad
so as to make it a tarwad property, there is no direct
936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
decision. On principle if the sthanee, on attaining
the sthanam is in the position of a separated member
J( nvalappara
of a Hindu family, there may not be any scope for
K otta,athil
Kochuni
the application of the doctrine of blending. No memv.
ber
of a tarwa.d has any right to maintenance from
State nf A1adras
out of the sthanam properties and the mere fact that
a sthanee for the time being, out of generosity or
Subba Rao ].
otherwise, gives maintenance to one or other members of the tarwad cannot legally have the effect of
converting the sthanam property into a tarwad property; nor the fact that the sthanam properties are
treated as tarwad properties can have such a legal
effect.
Now, what is the relationship between the tarwad
and the sthanee? It is true that whatever may be
the origin of the sthanam, ordinarily, the seniormost
member of a tarwad succeeds to that position, but
once he succeeds, he ceases to have any proprietary
interest in the ta wad. So too, the members of the
tarwad have absolutely no proprietary interest in the
sthanam property. Thereafter, they continue to be
only "blood relations" with perhaps a right of succession to the property of each other on the happening
of some contingency. The said right is nothing more
than a spes successionis; the tarwad may snpply
future sthanees.
With this background let us look at the terms of
the Act to see what it purports to do. What is the
effect of the impugned Act? It is not the form that
matters but the substance of it in its operation on the
vested rights of citizens. The Act destroys the finality
of decrees of courts establishing the title of janmies to
the sthanam properties. It affects the undisputed
title of sthanees in sthanam properties, though they
may not have obtained decrees in respect thereof. It
statutorily confers title retrospectively on the members
of the tarwad who had none before. lt arbitrarily
dislocates the title of p;i,rticular sthanees in respect of
certain sthanam with particular characteristics, which
have no relation to the title of the sthauees. The first
characteristic mentioned in the impugned Act is that
there is or had been at any time a.n intermingling of
the propert.ies of the sthanam and the properties of
r
-
--
-·
•·
3 S.C.R.
SUPH,EM:E COURT REPORTl:3
D37
the tarwad. If the word "intermingling" conveys
only the idea of mere factual mixing up of the sthanam K avalappara
K otlarathil
properties with the tarwad properties, it cannot, by
Kochuni
any known legal notion of Marumakkathayam Law or
v.
on any analogy drawn from Hindu Law, convert the State of Madras
sthanam property into the tarwad property. Even if
it is understood in the sense of blending, the sthanee, Subba Rao].
who ceases to be a member of the tarwad and is in a
position of a separated member, cannot legally blend
his property with thttt of the tarwad, for the legal
concept of blending implies that the person who blends
his property with that of the family is an undivided
member of the family.
The second characteristic mentioned in the impugned Act is that the members have been receiving
maintenance from properties purporting to be sthanam
properties as of right or in pursuance of custom or
otherwise. This characteristic is foreign to the concept
of sthanam. No member of a tarwad is entitled as
of right to any maintenance from out of properties of
the sthanam. Under this clause, if maintenance is so
received, the sthanam is deemed to be a tarwad on
the basis that the receipt of maintenance from the
sthanee out of the sthanam property brings about the
said result. If a sthanee creates any such right in
favour of a tarwad, it may bind him, but it cannot
certainly be binding on the sthanam properties or its
successor. If a custom be established on evidence,
it may become an incident of the sthanam, but it
cannot obliterate or extinguish it or convert it into
a tarwad. The word " otherwise" in the context,
it is contended, must be construed by applying the
rule of ejusdem generis. The rule is that when general
words follow particular and specific words of the
same nature, the general words must be confined to
the things of the same kind as those specified. But it
is clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific
words must form a distinct genus or category. It is
not an inviola.ble rule of law, but is only permissible
inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary. On the basis of this rule, it is contended, that
the right or the custom mentioned in the clause is a
distinct genus and the words " or otherwise" must be
938
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 J
confined to things analogous to right or custom such
as
lost grant, immemorial user, etc. It appears to us
f{avalappara
f{otfarathil
that the word "otherwise" in the context only means
f{ochuni
"whatever may be the origin of the receipt of mainv.
tenance". One of the objects of the legislation is to
Stale of Madras
by-pass the decrees of courts and the Privy Council
observed that the receipt of maintenance might even
Subba Rao ].
be out of bounty. It is most likely that a word of the
widest amplitude was used to cover even acts of charity
and bounty. If that be so, under the impugned Act
even a payment of maintenance out of charity would
destroy the character of an admitted sthanam which
ex facie is expropriatory and unreasonable.
Nor does the third characteristic embody an unimpeachable test of the extinction of a sthanam or the
conversion of the same into a tarwad. Under the
impugned Act, if there had been at any time a vacancy
caused by there being no male member of the tarwad
eligible to succeed to the sthanam the sthanam would
be deemed to be a tarwad. Not only there is no justification for enacting that non-existence of such a male
heir at any poi_nt of time should put an end to the
character of the sthanam, but the only decided case of
the Madras High Court on the point recognized the
right of a subsequently born male member in a tarwad
to succeed to the sthanam and its properties.
Therefore, the three tests laid down by the impugned
Act to enable the drawing of the statutory fiction are
not only not germane but extraneous to the object
sought to be achieved.
What is more, the impugned Act is made retrospective so as to make the sthanee liable to arrears of
maintenance and past profits. The contention that
the impugned Act is nothing more than a readjustment
of rights inter se between the members of the tarwad
and the sthanee is without substance, for, before the
Act, except ties of blood and a right to succeed in a
particular contingency the members of the tarwad had
no interest in presenti in the sthanam property nor
vice versa. The impugned Act is only a legislative
device to take the property of one and vest it in
another withont compensation, and, therefore, on its
face stamped with unreasonableness. In short, the
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
939
impugned Act is expropriatory in character and is
directly hit by Art. 19(1) (f) and is not saved by cl. (5)
Havalappara
of Art. 19.
Hotta.rathil
J<ochuni
Another condition for the application of cl. (5) of
V,
Art. 19 is that the re1,t.rictions should be in the
State of Madras
interests of the· general public. We assume for the
purpose of this case thatJ there are sthanams with Subbl Rao j.
characteristic:> similar to those of the petitioner's
sthanam and that the Act confers title on the junior
members of tarwad in properties of such sthanams
and that they form a defined section of the public. If
so, a question arises whether a section of the public is
"general public " within the meaning of Art.. 19(5).
This fell to be considered bv a fuII bench of the Calcutta High Court in l8wari "Prasad v. N. R. Sen (1). It
was contended before the foII bench of the said High
Court that the words "in the interests of the general
public" mean "in the interests of the public of the
whole of the Republic of India". Negativing this
contention, Harries, C.J., observed at p. ~78 thus;
"The phrase 'in the interests of the general
public' means I think nothing more than 'in the
public interest', and it may well be that legislation
affecting a limited class of persons or a limited area
might well be legislation in the public interests,
though the public of other part;; of India might not
be directly affected by such legislation. If they are
indirectly affected such would be quite sufficient to
make such legislation in the public interest. Legisla.
tion affecting a particular class or a particular area
would only directly affect the members of that class
or the inhabitants of that particular area. But the
removal of some serious abuse or grievance or
discontent is a matter indirectly affecting the public
generally. It is not in the interests of the general
public or in the public interest to allow any class of
persons to labour under some grievance and to be
genuinely discontented. It is in the interests of the
general public or in the public interest that all classes
of the citizens of India are content and that their
grievances should be removed. A festering sore on
the human body may eventually affect the whole
(I) A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 273.
940
Kavalappara
K ottarathil
Kochuni
v.
State oj Mad1as
Subba Rao ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
body though at first its effect is localised. Grievances or discontent in some particular area or in
some State or in some class of persons may eventually affect the whole Republic of India, though
originally the effects might be limited. The removal
of any grievance, abusef or discontent is a matter
not only where the discorlMnt or grievance is genuine
it may well be in the public interest to remove such,
though the public in other parts of India may not
be directly affected. It is in the public interest that
persons should be governed justly and well and
removal of hardship and grievances of a particular
class is I think clearly a matter of public interest."
We agree with these observations.
Relying upon these observations, it is said that the
decision of the Privy Council created a stir among the
members of that class of the public who are governed
by the Marumakkathayam Law, either because the
pre-existing rights were disturbed or because there is
no justification in a welfare State for one member of
the tarwad succeeding to the entire sthanam property
to the exclusion of the other members of the tarwad,
and so, the argument proceeds, that the State has
stepped in to rectify the mistake or to do justice consistent with modern trends. It is further argued that
the redress of this grievance of a section of the community is in the interest of the public. This argument
is purely based on surmises. We have pointed out
that the junior members of the tarwad had never any
interest in the sthanam properties. We cannot say on
the materials placed before us that any public interest
will be served by depriving a sthanee of his properties
and conferring title in his properties so deprived on
others. Nor is there any evidence that there was a
real and genuine grievance in this particular section of
the public belonging to tarwads justifying the interference by the State. We cannot on the materials
placed before us hold that this reform is in the public
interest.
The learned Attorney-General raised a further point
that no law can impose restrictions retrospectively on
fundamental rights and, in support of his contention,
he relied upon the wording of cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the
-
3 S.C.H.
-
~
I
SUPH,EME COUR,T REPORTS
941
I960
Constitution and also on the decision of the Privy
Council in Punjab Province v. Daulrlt Singh (1 ). But, K avdlappa.a
as ,we have held that the restrictions imposed are not
K1dtarathil
Kochuni
reasonable within the meaning of cl. (5) of Art. 19 of
v.
the Constitution, this question need not be decided in
State of Madras
this case.
We declare that Madras Act 32 of 1955 is void and Subba Rao j,
ultra vires the Constitution and issue a writ of
mandamus restraining the State ofKerala from enforcing the provisions of the said Act against the petitioner
and his sthanams. In the result, Petition No. 443
of 1955 is allowed with costs; Petition No. 40 of 1956
is allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs ;
and Petition No. 41 of 1956 is dismissed, but in the
circumstances, without costs.
SARKAR, J.-In our view these petitions fail.
The petitions challenge the validity of an Act passed
by the Madras Legislature called the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955. The substantive provisions of the Act are contained in s. 2
which is in these terms:
"S. 2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any
sthanam in respect of which(a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the properties of the sthanam and the
properties of the tarwad, or
(b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving
maintenance from the properties purporting to be
sthanam properties as of right, or in pursuance of a
custom or otherwise, or
(c) there had at any time been a vacancy caused
by there being no male member of the tarwad
eligible to succeed to the sthanam,
shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed al ways
to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the
properties appertaining to such a sthanam shall be
deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have
been properties belonging to the tarwad to which
the provisions of the Madras Marumakkttthayam
Act, 1932 (Madras Act, XXII of 1933), shall apply."
(I)
p946] F.C.R. I.
J22
Sarkar j.
942
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
Sthanams and tarwads are peculiar institutions of
the
Malabar area and a few words about them are
J(avalappara
necessary. A tarwad is an undivided family governed
Kottarathil
Kochuni
by the MarumfLkkathayam Law, the customary law of
v.
Malabar.
The outstaqding feature of that law is
St ite of .lid adras
that for the purposes of inheritance, descent is traced
Sarhar J.
through the female line. The property of the tarwad
or family is owned by all its members but is managed
ordinarily by the eldest male member, such manager
being called the karnavan. BPfore the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932, was passed, a member of the
tarwad could not insist on a partition and a partition
took place only when all the adun members agreed.
The members had, however, the right to be maintained
by the karnavan and had certain other rights to
which it is not necessary for us to refer. The Madras
Marmnakkathayam Act, 1932, made some changes in
the customary law. The more important changes
were that the junior members were given power to
inspect the accounts of the karnavan and a right to
ask for partition subject to certain limitations.
We turn now to sthanams. A sthanam is a station,
rank or dignity. A sthani is the holder of a sthanam.
A sthanam usually has lands attached or granted to
keep up the station, rank or dignity of the sthani and
it appears to have come into existence in one or other
of the manners hereinafter stated. The ancient rulers
of the Malabar coast possessed sthanams and it may
be taken that the lands which they held as rulers were
regarded as being sthanam lands in character. The
sthanam held by a ruler went by the name of Rajasthanam. The Jtajasthanams have continued though
there are no rulers now. Apart from Rajasthanams,
there are other kinds of sthanams. The rulers often
granted sthanams with lands attached to them to
their subsidiary chieftains or other persons of consequence in their States. Sthanams with lands were also
sometimes granted for rendering military service.
Again when a family became opulent and influential
the members of the tarwad sometimes agreed to set
aside for the karnavan certain lands in order that he
might keep up his social position and influence and so
again a sthanam was created. A sthanam with the
r
19~0
t'
-
•'
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,
•
943
lands attached thereto devolved on the death of the
holder for the time being to the next senior member Kava!appara
of his tarwad. vVhen a member of the tarwad becomes Kottarathil
Kochuni
the sthani he loses his interest in the tarwad properties though he does not cease to be a member of the State ojv.Madras
tarwad. The members of the tarwad in their turn
have no interest in the sthanam lands. The sthani Sarkar J.
is entitled to utilize the income of the sthanam properties for his own purposes. For a more detailed statement of the character of a sthanam reference may be
made to P.R. Sundara Aivar's book on Malabar and
Aliyasanthana Law. We.have taken the greater part
of what we have said in this paragraph from Kuttan
Unni v. Kochunni (1). The important point to note for
the purposes of these petitions is that the sthani for
the time being is alone entitled to the lands of his
sthanam and the members of his tarwad are not Pntitled to them while all members of a tarwad except the
sthani are entitled jointly to all the properties of a
tarwad.
There are altogether three petitions before us bearing
numbers 443 of 1955 and 40 & 41 of 1956 and they
have been heard together. The petitioner in Petition
No. 443 of 1955 is the Moopil Nayar or the senior
member of the Kavalappara tarwad or family to
which the parties to this petition other than the States
of Kerala and Madras, belong. As the head of the
family he claimP<l to be entitled to eight sthanams
with the lands attached to them respectively.
It appears that the Kavalappara family was a ruling
dynasty in pre-British times and ruled over the
Kavalappara territory. The Moopil Nayar or senior
member of this family for the time being was the ruler
of the Kavalappara State. The Kav11lappara territory
was the Ruler's Rajasthanam. When Malabar was
ceded by Tippu Sultan to the East India Company in
1792, the Kavalappara family lost its sovereign rights.
The Kavalappara territory, however, continued as a
Rajasthanarn held by the Moopil Nayar or the senior
member of the family for the time being. The petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955 has been the Moopil
Nayar of the Kavalappara family since his elder
\11 l.L.R. [1944J Mad. 5r5.
9-14
SUPREME COUI{T REPORTS
[1960]
brother's death in 1925 and claims the lands of the
Rajasthanam as such. This is the first of the eight
K avalaf'para
sthanams
mentioned earlier. The head of the KavaK otlarathil
Kochuni
lappara family was entitled to five other sthanams
v.
granted from time to time by the rulers of Palghat to
State of Madras
whom the Kavalappara State was subordinate. Each
of these sthanams also had lands attached to it. The
Sarkar ].
lands attached to the Hajasthanam and sthanams
granted by the rulers of Palghat were situate in the
South Malabar district which originally appPrtained
to the State of Madras and is now part of the State of
Kerala. The head of the Kavalappara family was
also entitled to two further sthanams with the lands
attached to them which had been granted by the ruler
of Cochin. The lands belonging to these two sthanams
were situate in the former State of Cochin now merged
in the State of Kera la. The petitioner made a gift of
the lands attached to the five sthanams which had
been granted by the Raja of Palghat, to his wife and
daughters. The donees under this gift are the petitioners in Petition No. 40 of 1956. He likewise made
a gift of the lands attached to the two sthanams which
had been granted by the Raja of Cochin to his son
who is the petitioner in Petition No. 41 ofl956. These
gifts had been made before the impugned Act had
been passed.
It is necessary now to refer to a previous litigation.
On April 10, HJ34, the then junior mem hers of the
Kavalappara family filed a suit in the Court of the
Subordinate Judge ofOttapalam for a declaration that
all the properties managed by the Moopil Nayar were
tarwad properties belonging equally and jointly to all
the members of the tarwad including the Moopil Nayar
and that the latter was managing them as Karna van
and not as sthani. The defendant to this suit was
the petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955, the Moopil
Nayar or the senior member of the family. The
Moopil Nayar resisted the suit claiming to be solely
entitled to the disputed lands on the basis that they
were sthanam lands and he was the sthani. The suit
was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge but
on appeal the decision of the Subordinate Judge was
reversed by the High Court of Madras and a. decree
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
945
was pa'lsed as claimed in the suit. It is this judgment
of the High Court which is reported in I.L.R. [1944] K avalappara
K ottarathil
Mad. 515, to which referflnce has been made earlier.
Kochuni
On a further appeal to the Privy Council by the
v.
Moopil Nayar, the decision of the High Court was set State of Madras
aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored.
The decision of the Judicial Committee was given on
Sarkar ].
July 29, 1947. The result was that the petitioner,
Moopil Nayar, was declared to be entitled as sthani to
the disputed properties and it was held that those
properties were sthanam properties and not tarwad
properties.
The impugned Act came into force on October 19,
1955. At that time the South Malabar District was part
of the State of Madras. Later, with the formation of
the State of Kerala, this area became part of that State
and continued to be governed by the Act. That Act
was never extended to any other part of Kerala and
never applied to the territories covered by the former
Cochin State which had been merged in the State of
Kerala. The petitions were filed challenging the
validity of the Act soon after it came into force.
We will take up Petition No. 443 of 1955 first. In
this petition we are concerned only with the Kavalappara Rajasthanam. The petitioner, the Moopil
Nayar, was entitled at the date of the petition only to
the lands attached to that sthanam for he had earlier
given away the lands belonging to the other sthanams
to his wife, daughters and son as already stated. He
complains that as a result of the impugned Act he has
been deprived of the exclusive ownership of the lands
attached to the Kavalappara Rajasthanam and has to
share it with the other members of his tarwad or
family. It is not in dispute that the Act applies to
Kavalappara Rajasthanam. The respondents to this
petition are the junior members of the Kavalappara
family and the States of Kerala and Madras. The
State of Madras has not appeared perhaps because the
Act applies to lands which have since the filing of the
petition, been transferred from Madras to Kera.la, upon
which transfer the State of Kerala had been made a
party tq the petition. There are three interveners in
946
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
this petition two of whom support the respondents
and
one supports the petitioner.
[(avalappara
/(ottarathil
The petitioner, Moopil Nayar, first says that the Act
Kochuni
violates Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it
v.
applies to the sthanam held by him only and to no
'itate of Madras
other sthanams. This raises a question of fact. He,
however, also says that the Act is bad as infringing
Sarkar ].
Arts. 19(l)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution as it deprives
him of his right to hold property and that it is not
saved by cl. (5) of Art. 19. If, however, the Act enacts
a law within the meaning,of Art. 31A of the Constitution, the petitioner cannot be heard to complain of
violation of Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 31(1). So the
question arises, Is it saved by Art. 31A? That article
so far as is material in this case is set out below:"Art. 31A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law providing for(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or
of any rights therein or the extingui2hment or
modification of any such rights,
......................................................................
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is
inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges a.ny of
the rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or
article 31 :
Provided that where such law is a law made by
the Legislature of a State, provisions of this article
shall not apply thereto unless such law having been
reserved for the consideration of the President, has
received his assent.
(2) In this article,(a) the expression ' estate ' shall, in relation to
any local area, have the same meaning as that
expression or its local equivalent has in the existing
law relating to land tenures in force in that area,
and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or
other similar grant and in the S1!ates of Madras and
Kerala, any janmam right;
(b) the expression 'rights', in relation to an
estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenureholder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary
r
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
947
and any rights or privileges in respect of land
revenue".
[{avalappara
It appears that the Act had been reserved for the
F< ollatathil
I<ocituni
consideration of the President and had received his
v.
assent.
State of Madras
If, then, the Act provides for a modification of rights
in an "estate ", it •vould not be void on th~ ground
Sarhar ].
that it is inconsistent with Arts. 14, HI and 31 the
violation of which the petitioner complains. Under
Art. 31A (2) (a), an "estate" includes, in the State
of Kerala, any janrnam right. This of course means
lands held in janrnam rights for janmam rights exist
only in lands. Again, under sr1b-cl. (b) of cl. (2) of
Art. 31A the expression "rights" used in relation to
an "estate" in that article includes the rights of the
proprietor of the estate or others holding under him.
In regard to this sub-clause it has been held by this
Court in Atma Ram v. State of Punjab (1) that the
expression " rights" in relation to an estate has been
used in a. very comprehensive sense and includes not
only the interest of the proprietor or sub-proprietor
but also of lower grades of tenants, that is, all those
who have acquired rights under him by what are called
processes of sub-infeudation.
The respondents contend that the rights affected by
the Act are jamnam rights and, therefore, the Act is
one contemplated by Art. 31A. The petitioner, Moopil
Nayar, states that the respondents have not alleged
that the sthanam properties are held in janmam right.
It appears that in the affidavit of the State of Kerala
it is stated that the Act is saved by virtue of the provisions of Art. 31A. As we are concerned with lands
in the State of Kerala, the Act could be saved by
Art. 3 lA if the lands were held in janma.m rights or in
rights held under the holder of the janmam rights.
The allegation that the Act is saved by Art. 31A, therefore, clearly implies that the lands attached to the
sthanams were held in jamnam rights or rights
subordinate to janmam rights. There is no statement
by the petitioner anywhere on the records that the
lands were not held on such rights. On the other
hand, it would appear from what we state later that
(I} (1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 748,
948
r9"io
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
r
t hn rights in the lands were janmam rights or rights
subordinate to janmam rights.
Janmam right is really a freehold interest in land.
Ins.
3 (k) of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, a janmi
v.
has
been
defined as a person entitled to the absolute
State oj Madras
proprietorship of land. What we have earlier stated
Sarkar ].
leaves np doubt that the lands, belonging to the
sthanams were lands held in absolute proprietorship,
that is, in freehold interest. It has not been alleged
that the freehold interest in the sthanam lands has
undergone any change. Neither has it been shown to
us that in the Malabar area land can be held in any
right other than janmam right or subordinate rights
crnated by the holder of a janmam right. Again in bis
written statement in the suit of 1934, earlier mentioned,
which is on the record of this case, the petitioner,
Moopil Nayar, stated that the lands of the sthanams
situated in Madras remained in the management of
the Court of Wards, Madras, from 1872 to 1916 and
were registered as held in janmam rights. Therefore,
it seems to us that it has been established that the
lands belonging to the sthanams in South Malabar
district are held in janmam rights. That being so,
rights in such lands would be rights in an estate
withfrl--~e meaning of Art. 31A (1) (a).
It is said on behalf of the petitioner, Moopil Nayar,
that the Act,(lompels him to share the lands with the
other members of his family. If so it seems to us that
the effect of the Act is to modify the interest of a holder
of a sthanam in the lands attached thereto. His rights
as ~ole owner of the lands are modified by making him
on~ of the joint owners of them along with the other
members of his family. As the lands were held in
janmam rights or rights subordinate thereto, the Act
would be saved by Art. 31A though it may infringe
Arts. 14, 19 (l) (f) or 31(1).
The petitioner, however, contends that even if the
lands were held in janmam rights, Art. 31A would not
protect the Act. He first says that the Act contemplated by Art.. 31A(l)(a) is an Act passed with the
object of effecting agrarian reforms which the Act
before us is not. But we find nothing in the article to
justify this contention. The article does not mention
K avalrippara
Kottaralfiil
Kochuni
·-
-
-'1
J
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
949
any agrarian reform. Under it any janmam right
may be acquired, extinguished or modified; this would
be so whether the land held on janmam right was
agricultural land or land which can never be used for
agricultural purposes.
Article 31A was introduced into the Constitution by
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. It was
subsequently amended by the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955. Both these Acts made the
amendments with retrospertive effect from the commencement of the Constitution. The petitioner seeks
to support the contention that the Act contemplated
by Art. 31A (l)(a) is an Act dealing with agr11rian
reforms by referring to the objects and reasons stated in
the Bills by which the Acts amending the Constitution
were introduced in the Parliament. It does not seem
to us that it is permissible to refer to such objects and
reasons for the construction of a statute: see Aswini
KumarGhose v. Arabinda Bose( 1 ). We conceive therefore, that we are not entitled to read the word "law "
in Art. 31A (1) in relation to sub-cl. (a), only as a law
intended to achieve agrarian reforms on the basis
of the supposed object of the legislature in enacting
Art. 31A. We also observe that apart from the
objects and reasons found in the Bills, there iR nothing on which the contention that the law contemplated by Art. 31A (l)(a) is a law intended to achieve
agrarian reform, can be based.
It is next said that the Act did not effect any
modification of janmam rights and hence again
Art. 31A is of no avail to protect it. It is contended
that the mopification contemplated by the Article is a
modification of the incidents of the janmam rights.
It is said that what the Act did was to distribute
janmam rights among various persons 11.nd several
owners held the same janmam rights which, before
the Act, had been held by one. That, it may be stated,
is so but that does not affect the real question for
decision. When the Article talks of modific11tion of
janmam rights it does not talk of such rights in the
abstract. It contemplates the modificat.ion of the
(1) [rq53] S.C.R.1.
123
Kavalappara
Kottarathit
Koehuni
v.
State of Madras
Sarkar j.
950
1960
J(nvalappara
Kottarathfl
Kochunf
v•
.C)_tate of 111'adras
Sarkar" .J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
rights held by a person. It would be as much modification of janmam rights if such rights held by one
person are directed to be held by a number of persons
jointly, as when the incidents of such rights are
altered. Further our view receives support from two
decisions of this Court, namely, Sri Ram Ram Narain
Medhi v. The State of Bombay(') and Atma Ram v.
The State of Punjab (2 ). These cases dealt with Acts·
one of the provisions of which compelled a landlord
to sell to his tenant the whole or a portion of the land
hEo>ld by the latter at a price to be fixed in the manner
indicated. It was held that though this provision
violated Art. 19(l)(f) yet it was saved by Art. 31A.
It will be seen that here the incidents of the tenure on
which the landlord held the land were not altered.
After he had been compelled to transfer the lands to
his tenants, he held the remainder on the same terms
as before, yet it was held that the Acts compelling the
landlord to sell a part of the land held by him were
saved by Art. 31A. In our view, therefore, the Act
now before us is saved by Art. 31A and it cannot be
declared invalid even if it violates the provisions of
Arts. 19(l)(f), 14 and 31 (1) of the Constitution. In
this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to
consider whether the Act in fact violates Arts. 14,
19(l)(f) and 31(1) or any of them or is saved by
cl. (5) of Art. 19.
·
Next it is said that the Act. is bad as it is really an
exercise by the legislature of judicial power which it
does not possess and not an exercise of a legislative
power at all. We are unable to hold that this is so.
There are two things in the Act on which. this contention ha• heen based. The first is that the Act has
been given a retrospective operation. It is quite clear
to us that that by itself does not make the Act a
thing done in the exercise of judicial power. The
legislature has the power to give retrospective operation to an Act. That of course interferes with vested
rights but the legislature can interfere with such
rights in the exercise of its legislative power. That
is not adjudicating between parties affected by the
Act. It is laying down the law to be followed by
(1) (1959) Supp. I S.C.R. 489.
(2) [1959) Supp. I S.C.R. 748.
r
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COUI{,T REPOHTl::l
I
I
951
courts in future. It is so none the less that the law
is altered as from a past date.
Kavalappara
Koltatuthit
Then it is s1tid that the Act provides that it is to
Koch uni
have effect notwithstanding any decision of the Court
v.
contrary to its provisions. That the Act no doubt Stale of Madras
does. Can it be said that it thRreby adjudicates and
Sarkar j.
not legislates? In Piare Dusadh v. King Emperor(')
it was pointed out that in India the legislature very
often in the enactments that it makes sets aside decisions of Courts. In America a rule appears to obtain
that " Legislative action cannot be made to retroact
on past controversies and to reverse decisions which
the courts in the exercise of their undoubted authority have made": Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
8th Ed., p. 190. It was held in Piare Dusadh's case (1 )
at p. 104, that this rule had no application in India.
The observation there made may be set out:" It is clear from the American authorities that
this limitation has been derived from the interpretation placed by the American courts on what are
known as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
which provide against any person being "deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of
law". The expression "due process of law" has
. been interpreted as referring only to ' judicial
process ' and as not including legislation, ........... .
............ As this requirement had been made part
of the written constitution, it followed that no
enactment passed by a legislature limited by that
constitution could authorise anything in violation
ofit ..................... Hence the rule (stated by Cooley)
that ' it would be incompetent for the legislature,
by retrospective legislation, to make valid any
proceedings which had been had in the courts but
which were void for want of jurisdiction over the
parties.' The constitutional position in India is
different. "
It seems to us that this observation of the Federal
Court which no doubt wa.s made with reference to the
Government of India Act, 1935, applies with equal
force to the position obtaining under our Constitution.
It has been held by this Court that there is no scope
(1) [1944] F.C.R. 61.
952
z960
!{avalappara
Kottarathil
Kochuni
v.
Stale of Madras
Sarkar].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
under our Constitution for the application of the
American concept of "due process of law". The
American cases cited in support of the contention
tha.t a legislation cannot override judicial decisions
therefore afford no assistance in our country. Article 31B itself provides that it would apply notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court
to the contrary and it had been enacted by an Act
passed by the Parliament. Thero have been many
Acts passed since the Constitution came into force
which contained similar provisions. In no case has
it ever been contended that such an Act amounted to
an exercise of the judicial function by the legislature.
The Act before us lays down a law to be applied by
courts in fnture in the adjudication of disputes between parties. It also says that the courts shall apply
the law notwithstanding that there is an earlier decision on the rights of the parties which are being
litigated upon in a subsequent proceeding. The Act
does not itself annul any decision of auy court. All
that it says is that the law laid down is to be applied
by courts irrespective of any previous decision. It
does not in any sense adjudicate between parties. It,
therefore, seems to us that the contention that the
impugned Act is really an exercise of judicial power
is ill-founded.
In our view, the challenge brought against the
impugned Act fails. Petition No. 443 of 1955 should,
therefore, be dismissed with costs.
Coming now to the Petition No. 40 of 1956 the
petitioners here are the wife and the two daughters
of the petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955. The
respondents are t.he junior members of the tarwad as
also the Moopil Nayar. The petitioners claim as
donees from the Moopil Nayar to be entitled to the
sthanam lands in the Palghat area. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the petitioner in Petition No. 443of1955 h'1.d the right to make the gift
in favour of his wife and daughters. That question
has not been gone into by consent of the parties. If
the gift is valid then what we have said earlier in
connection with Petition No. 443 of 1955, will apply
this petition also and it must for the same res.son
to
(
(
•
3 S.C.R.
---'\
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
953
fail. If the gift is invalid, the petition must fail on
the ground that the Act has not affected the petitioners' rights in any lands held by them. We would,
therefore, dismiss that petition with costs except the
costs of the hearing before us for all the three petitions were heard together.
Lastly, we come to Petition No. 41 of 1956. This
petition must clearly be dismissed. It was filed by
the son of the petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955
claiming to be entitled to the sthanam lands situate
in an area which was formerly Pi1'rt of the Cochin
State. It is not in dispute that the impugned Act
was never extended to that area. Therefore, whether
the gift to him was valid or not, as to which we say
nothing, the petitioner in this petition is not affected
by that Act at all. His petition is clearly misconceived. His petition is, therefore, dismissed and he will
pay the costs excepting the costs of the hearing.
ORDER OF COURT.
In view of the judgment of the majority, Petition
No. 443 of 1955, is allowed with costs, Petition No. 40
of 1956, is allowed without costs, and Petition No. 41
of 1956, is dismissed without costs.
19~0
K avalappata
Kottarathil
Kochuni
v.
State of Madras
Sarkar }.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
BOMBAY
v.
THE ELPHINSTONE SPINNING AND
WEAVING MILLS LTD.
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Income-tax-Assessee incurring loss but paying dividendsAdditional income-tax, liability to pay-Construction of taxing
statute-Income-tax Act, I922 (XI of I922), s. 3-Finance Act,
I9SI (23 of I9SI), First Schedule, Paragraph B.
The assessee had made profits during the assessment year
1951-52 but after deduction of the depreciation allowance it was
found to have incurred a loss for income-tax purposes. In the
same year the assessee declared dividends. The Income-tax
Officer treated this amount as ' excess dividend ' and levied
additional income-tax as provided in paragraph B of Part I of
the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 195L The assessee
contended that inasmuch as there was no income at all which wa~
May 4,
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