A. S. T. ARUNACHALAM PILLAI versus M/S. SOUTHERN ROADWAYS (PRIVATE) LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 April 1960 | [1960] 3 S.C.R. 764 | 1960 INSC 95
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 April 1960
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 262/1958
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1960] 3 S.C.R. 764
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 95
Text of the judgment
764
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
case and the validity of s. 11 could not in view of
Art. 31-A be challenged. The validity of the proviJadab Singh
sions for acquisition by the State of the lands of the
Himach;i Prnd"h land-owners for compensation determinable in accordAdm;nJStration ance with the provisions of Sch. II is also not liable
to be challenged under Art. 31 read with Art. 31-A.
Shah ].
In that view of the case, all these petitions must
fail and they are ordered to be dismissed with costs.
Petitions dismissed.
1960
A. S. T. ARUNACHALAM PILLAI
-
v.
1960
April 29.
M/S. SOUTHERN ROADWAYS (PRIVATE) LTD.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. SuBBA RAO and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Motor Vehicles-Stage carriage permits, variation of-]urisdiction of Regional Transport Officer-State Government's power of
revision-Motor Vehicles Act, I939 (4 of I939l. as amended by the
Madras Act, 2oof I948, ss. 44A, 64A.
The question for decision in this appeal was whether the
Regional Transport Officer under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
as amended by the Madras State Legislature, had the power to
vary the terms of a stage carriage permit granted under that Act.
The appellant, holder of a stage carriage permit, applied on July
t9, 1954, to the Regional Transport Officer for a variation of the
route specified in his permit. The Regional Officer after hearing
objections rejected the application. The appellant applied to the
State Government for revision of the order under s. 64A of the Act
and the Government after hearing objections set aside the order of
the Regional Transport Officer and granted variation of the permit
as sought for. Against this order the respondent moved the
Madras High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The
Single Judge who heard the matter, following a decision of a
Division Bench of that Court, held that the Regional Transport
Officer had no jurisdiction to deal with the appellant's application and the State Government for that very reason could have
no power in revision to grant the same, and set aside the order of
the Madras Government :
Held (per Sinha, C. J., Imam, Sarkar and Shah, JJ.). Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, introduced into the Act by
the Madras Legislature, although couched in wide language,
does not confer on the State Government any original jurisdiction
or authorise it to pass in revision an order which the authority,
.whose order it seeks to revise, has no jurisdiction to pass. While
undoubtedly it can set aside an order of ap auwority or officer
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
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765
subordinate to it passed without jurisdiction under Ch. IV of the
c960
Act, it cannot substitute its own order directing a variation of the
. .
stage carriage permit granted to a particular person. Sections 43 Arunachalam Pilla•
and 48 of the Act make it quite clear that no such authority is
v.
vested in the State Government and the words "as it thinks fit" Southern Roadways
in s. 64A must mean within the ambit of the provisions of the (Private) Ltd.
Act.
The words "ap.y officer subordinate to him" used in s. 44A
of the Act, as amended by the Madras State Legislature are of
wide import and cannot be given a restricted meaning and must
include an officer in any way subordinate to the Transport
Commissioner.
The Regional Transport Officer who was admittedly and
without doubt administratively subordinate to the Transport
Commissioner by virtue of the Madras Government notification
dated February 14, 1953, at the time the application was made
and was duly authorised in this behalf, had the jurisdiction to
vary the conditions of the permit issued to the appellant.
Section 44A of the Act did not depend for its operation on
any rules to be framed under s. l33A of the Act, which was merely
an enabling section, by the Government.
Consequently, there can be no doubt that the State Government had the power under s. 64A of the Act to vary the terms of
the permit which the Regional Transport Officer had refused to
do.
B. Veeraswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.LR. 1959
And. Pradesh 413, approved.
T. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar v. P. S. Palani Pillai, A.LR. 1957
Mad. 599, disapproved. ·
.
Per Subba Rao, ].-Section 44A of the Act does not authorise
the State Government to appoint subordinate officers to the
Transport Commissioner but only enables it to confer statutory
powers on officers subordinate to him. ·The State Government
has made no rules under s. l33A of the Act making the Regional
Transport Officer subordinate to the commissioner. It is, therefore, manifest that neither under the statute nor under any
rules made thereunder is the Regional Transport Officer subordinate to the Commissioner in any way within the meaning
of s. 44A of the Act.
Even assuming that the State Government administratively
treated the Regional Transport Officer as a subordinate to the
Transport Commissioner and the word 'may' in s. r33A of the
Act conferred a discretionary power on it either to frame rules
or not to do so, it is wrong to say that it could do administratively
what it was empowered to do by rules. If .the Governmoot
really intended to make the Regional Transport Officer subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner, the only way in which
it could do so was by framing a rule under s. 133A(3) of the Act,
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 262 of 1958.
iQQ
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
766
StJPRE~1E COURT REPORTS
[1960
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
. .July 17, 1957, of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal
Arunachalam Pillai No. 110 of ·1956, ar1srng
· ·
· d gment an d
out of t h e JU
southernvRoadwaysorder dated September 3, 1956, of the said High Conrt
(P,ivate) Ltd;
in Writ Petition No. 2/1956.
1960
--
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. N.
Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.
V ohra, for the appellant.
R. Ganapathy Iyer, N. R. Govindachari and
G. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent No. 1.
Imam J.
1960. April 29. The Judgment of Sinha, C. J., Imam,
Sarkar and Shah, JJ., was delivered by Imam, J.,
Subba Rao, J., delivered a separate Judgment.
IMAM, J.-This appeal is on a certificate granted by
the Madras High Court as in its opinion it involved a
substantial question of law to the effect" whether the
delegation to the Regional Transport Officer of the
power to vary the conditions of a permit is valid ".
The appellant is the proprietor of Sri Vinayagar
Transports, Woriyur, Tiruchirapalli. He held a permit
to ply his bus on the route Tiruchirapalli Mainguard
Gate to Tiruchirapalli l'tailway Station via Palakarai
and Round Tana. He applied on July 19, 1954, to the
Regional Transport Officer, Tiruchirapalli, for variation of the route so as to ply bis bus between Mainguard Gate and Golden Rock via Palakarai, Round
Tana, Tiruchirapalli Railway Station and retrace
again to Round Tana and thence to Golden Rock.
The Regional Transport Officer notified this application for variation and called for objections. The appellant's application and the objections thereon were
heard on July 15, 1955, but the Regional Transport
Officer rejected the application. The appellant filed a
Revision Petition before the Government of Madras
under s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, hereinafter
called the Act, s. 64A having been introduced into that
Act by the Legislature of the State of Madras. The
MJi,dras Government after having heard objections to
the Revision Petition, by its order dated December 28,
1955, set aside the order of the Regional Transport
Officer and directed the grant of the variation in the
permit of the appellant as prayed for by him. Against
the order of the Madras Government the respondent,
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3 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
60
the Southern Roadways (Private) Ltd., hereinafter
I9
called the respondent, filed a petition under Art. 226 Arunac;;;;;;mPillai
of the Constitution in the Madras High Court on
v.
·
January 2, 1956, for the issue of a writ of certiorari to Southern Roadways
quash the order of the Government of Madras.
(Private) Ltd.
When the petition came up for hearing before RajaImam].
gopalan, J., the respondent raised a plea which was
not taken in the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution to the effect that the Regional Transport
Officer had no jurisdiction to grant the variation asked
for by the appellant and the Government had likewise
no jurisdiction to grant, in revision, what the Regional
Transport Officer himself could not have granted.
This plea was made on account of a Division Bench
decision of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal
No. 107 of 1955, arrived at since the filing of the
petition, wherein it was held that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to deal with an application for variation of the conditions of a permit.
Rajagopalan, J., following the decision in Writ Appeal
No. 107 of 1955 held that the Regional Transport
Officer had no jurisdiction to deal with the appellant's
application for variation and that it followed that the
Government of Madras had equally no jurisdiction to
grant the variation on a revision petition filed against
the order of the Regional Transport Officer. The
learned Judge accordingly set aside the order of the
Government of Madras dated December 28, 1955,
without going into the other contentions raised by
the respondent in its petition under Art. 226. The
appellant appealed against the decision of Rajagopalan, J. Although in the appeal the correctness
of the decisio.n in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 was
questioned it was not pressed because of the decision
of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Writ
Appeals Nos. 56 and 57 of 1956 decided on April 12,
1957. The argument in the present case therefore
proceeded on the footing that the Regional Transport
Officer, Tiruchirapalli, had no jurisdiction to deal with
the appellant's application for variation.
In the High Court on behalf of the appellant it was
urged that the respondents had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Regional Tra.nsport Officer 'and
76S
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
therefore could not at a later stage obtain the discreof certiorari on the ground that there
. d'1ction.
.
I t was next conten d ed t h at
v.
was ac o iurrn
southern Roadways even if the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdic(Priv_•!•l Ltd.
tion to deal with the appellant's application for variation the order of the Government of Madras which
Imam J.
was sought to be quashed could not be said to be one
passed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
because the Government had undoubtedly power to
pass the order in question under s. 64A of the Act.
Both these contentions were rejected and the decision
of Rajagopalan, J., was affirmed. The High Court,
however, granted a certificate that the case was a fit
one for appeal to this Court.
The principal question for consideration in this
appeal is whether the Regional Transport Officer had
the power to vary the conditions of a permit to ply a
stage carriage. In order to decide that question some
sections of the Act, as amended by the Legislature of
the State of Madras, will require consideration, particularly the provisions of s. 44A. But before we proceed to do that the other two questions which were
decided against the appellant by the High Court may
first be considered.
In our opinion, although the respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport
Officer and had not in his petition under Art. 226 in
the High Court taken the objection that that officer
had no jurisdiction to vary the conditions of a permit,
the High Court acted rightly in allowing the respondent to urge that the Regional Transport Officer had
no jurisdiction to vary the conditions of a permit. It
was not until the decision of the High Court in Writ
Appeal No. 107 of 1955 that it became the considered
view of that Court that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to make any such variation.
When the law was so declared by the High Court it
could not reasonably be said that the High Court erred
in allowing the respondent to take this point although
in its petition under Art. 226 the point had not been
taken. This was obviously because the decision of the
High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1Q7 of 1955 h!j.d not
been gfren at the time of the filing of the petition
I
\
196o
p·zi . tionary writ
A runac ha1am • ••
1 k f .
,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
769
Since the question went to the root of the matter and
1960
it involved the question. whether the Regional Trans-A
h-. . d'10 t'10n t o vary the con d't'
port offi cer h a d 3uns
l 10ns o f runac alam Pillai
a permit the High Court, faced with a Division Bench southern vRoadways
decision of its own on the matter, could not very well (Private) Ltd.
refuse permission to the respondent to rely on that
decision in support of its petition questioning the
Imam J.
validity of the order of the Government of Madras
made under s. 64A of the Act.
It had been strongly urged in this Court on behalf
of the appellant that on a proper construction of
s. 64A of the Act there was ample power in the
Government of Madras to make an order directing the
variation sought in the conditions of the permit of
the appellant, even though the Regional Transport
Officer had no jurisdiction to do so. Section 64A
empowered the Government of Madras to pass such
orders as it thought fit with respect to any order
passed or proceedings taken under Chapter IV of the
Act by any authority or officer subordinate to it for
the purpose of satisfying itself of the legality, regularity or propriety of the order or proceeding, when
it had called for the records of the case. In our opinion, s. 64A is a power vested in the State Government by way of revision of orders passed under
Chapter IV of the Act by any authority or officer subordinate to it. This is not a power which the State
Government could exercise by way of original jurisdiction which was vested elsewhere. In our opinion,
although the words " may pass such order in reference
thereto as it thinks fit " are wide in expression, they
do not mean that the State Government could pass an
order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction which the
authority whose order the Government was revising
had no jurisdiction to pass. The State Government
could undoubtedly set aside an order of an authority
or officer subordinate to it who had no jurisdiction to
pass the order in question under Chapter IV but it
could not substitute for that order its own order directing the variation in the conditions of the permit of
the appellant. It is significant thats. 43 which deals
with the power of the State Government to control
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
z960
A
P"l . Road Transport does not mention that such a Govern1
'""""ha.v.
am Ka• ment h as t h e power to vary t h e con d"it10ns
•
•
of a permit,
Southem Roadways although the various powers conferred by that section
(P•ivate) Ltd.
are fully specified, including tho power to vary the
Imam j.
notification issued under the section. If the Act had
intended to give the power to the State Government
to vary the conditions of a stage carriage permit
granted to a particular person it would have specified
such a power in this section. The authority which is
empqwered to vary the conditions of a permit is stated
in s. 48A which certainly is not the State Government.
Under the Act, therefore, no such authority was vested
in the State Government and the words in s. 64A " as
it thinks fit" must mean within the ambit of the provisions of the Act.
Coming now to the question whether the Regional
Transport Officer had the power to vary the conditions
of the permit of the appellant it would be necessary
to construe s. 44A of the Act. Before we proceed to
do so, reference to certain sections of the Act and the
Rules framed thereunder would be necessary as well as
certain refovant facts. Section 42 prohibits the owner
of a transport vehicle to use or permit its use, save in
accordance with the conditions of a permit granted
or counter-signed by a Regional or Provincial Transport Authority. Reference to s. 43 has already been
made which deals with the power of the State Government to control road transport. Section 43A empowers
the State Government to issue such orders and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary in respect of any matter relating to road transport to the State Transport Authority or Regional
Transport Authority and such Authority shall give
effect to all such orders and directions. Section 44 empowers the State Government by notification in the
Official Gazette to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities, the former
to exercise and discharge the functions specified in
sub-s. (3) and the latter to exercise powers as may be
specified in the notification in respect of each Regional
Transport Authority. Section 44A which is incorporated by the Madras Amending Act reads:
,
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT H.EPORTS
771
"The State Government may appoint a State
r960
Transport Commissioner and notwithstanding any-. con t ame
· dm
· t h"is A ct , may, by not1'fi cat10n
· m
· Atunachalam
th mg
v. Pillai
the Fort St. George Gazette, authorize such Comm is- southern Roadways
sioner or any officer subordinate to him, to exercise (Private) Ltd.
and discharge in lieu of any other authority preImam f.
scribed by or under this Act such powers and functions as may be specified in the notification".
Section 45 deals with applications for a permit and
directs that they shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed
to use the vehicle. Section 46 states the matters which
shall be stated in the application for a permit. Section 47 provides the procedure to be observed by a
Regional Transport Authority in considering applications for stage carriage permits. Section 48 empowers
a Regional Transport Authority to restrict the number
of stage carriages for which permits may be granted
in the region or in any specified area or on any specified
route within the region and to impose conditions on
such permits. One of these conditions is contained in
cl. (d)(ii-a) which is to the effect that stage carriage or
stage carriages shall be used only on specified routes
or in a specified area. Section 48A provides for the
alteration of the conditions attached to a permit and
reads:
"Any conditions attached to a stage carriage
permit in pursuance of cl. (d) of s. 48 may at "A.ny
time be varied, cancelled or added to by the State
Transport Authority, provided that this power shall
not be exercised to the prejudice of ,t;he holder of
the permit without giving not less than three
months' notice to him."
Section 133A(l) authorises the State Government for
the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of
the Act to establish a Motor Vehicles Department and
to appoint as officers thereof such persons as it thinks
fit. Sub-s. (3) authorises the State Government to
make rules to regulate the discharge by officers of the
Motor Vehicles Department of their functions and in
particular and without prejudice to the generality of
the foregoing power to prescribe the uuifor.w. to be
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
worn by them, the authorities to which they shall be subbe performed by them, the
· ble by po l"ice
v.
powers me u mg
e powers exerc1sa
southern Roadways officers under the Act) to be exercised by them and the
(Private) Ltd.
conditions governing the exercise of such powers. No
rules, in fact, had been framed.
Imam j.
It will be seen from what has been stated that it is
·the State Transport Authority and no other which is
authorised under s. 48A to vary the conditions of a
permit of a stage carriage. Section 44A, however,
authorises the State Government to appoint a State
Transport Commissioner. It further provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in the Act the
State Government may by notification authorise the
State Transport Commissioner or any officer subordinate
to him to exercise and discharge in lieu of any other
authority prescribed by or under the Act such powers
and functions ·as may be specified in the notification.
By this section, although under s. 48A it is the State
Transport Authority which can vary the conditions of
a stage carriage permit, the State Government could,
notwithstanding the provisions of that section, authorise the State Transport Commissioner to exercise such
powers in lieu of the State Transport Authority. It
could also confer such power on an officer subordinate
to the State Transport Commissioner. The vital question for determination is, how are the words " any
o:ffi.er subordinate to him" to be construed. In construing these words the provisions of s. 133A will have
to be kept in mind as it was contended on behalf of
the respondent that these sections should be read
together. It was urged on behalf of the respondent
that under s. 133A (3) as to who was subordinate to
whom in the Motor Vehicles Department had to be
prescribed by rules. As no rules had been framed it
could not be said that the Regional Transport Officer
was subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner.
The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the
case of T. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar v. P. S. Palani
Pillai (1) had occasion to consider whether a gegional
Transport Officer was subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner for the purposes of the Act. Three
r96o
p·ii .ordinate, the duties to
A runacha1am 1 ••
("
l d"
th
{r) A.I.R. 19'7 Mad. 599,
- lo-
3 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
773
1 60
views were pressed before it. The first view, which
9
w
. as favoured by a Division Bench of that Court, was A
- h p·•.z .
re
'
. s. 44A runac av.1am '' <U
to the euect
that
t he wor d ' su bord'mate , m
m<;iant "administrative subordination". The second Southern I<oadways
view was pressed by the Advocate-General of Madras (Private) Ltd..
who had urged that the word 'subordinate' in the
Imam],
section meant "functional subordination" and the
third view was pressed by Mr. Nambiar to the effect
that the word 'subordinate' meant "statutory subordination". It was the third view which was accepted
by the Full Bench and the High Court expressed its
opinion in the following words:"Of the three views placed before us we are
inclined to prefer the third. It appears to us to be
the most rational and the most free from objections.
It is in accord with all well established rules of
interpretation of Statutes. It does not require as
the theory of 'functional subordination ' seems to
require, the introduction of new words into 'the
section. It has the merit of being more flexible of
powers not merely at the State level but at the
regional level also. It ensures that there will be no
transfer or delegation of powers except to officers
whose subordination has been determined by rules
properly framed under the Act. It also ought to
a void the anomaly that has now occurred of a person
in the position of a Secretary of a. body being empowered to vary the condition of a· permit granted
by that body. We therefore adopt this view."
The High Court in rejecting the view submitted by the
Advocate-General observed that there were no qualifying words whatever to the word 'subordinate' in
s. 44A.
The Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the case of B. Veeraswamy v. State of
Andhra Pradesh( 1 ) did not agree with the Full Bench
decision of the Madras High Court. The Andhra
Pradesh High Court was of the opinion that the
Regional Transport Officer was an officer subordinate
to the Transport Commissioner within the meaning of
s. 44A of the Act. It laid emphasis on the word" any "
and observed that that word excluded limitation or
(1) A.LR. 19'9 An<j.. Pra,<j.esll 41~.
Illill
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
r96o
qualification and connoted wide generality. It com. prehended. not only the officer whose subordination
A •unachalam Pillai
. d , b ut a II e]'1g1'bl e su b or d'mate
was stat utor1·1y d et ermme
south,,.,, ~oadways officers and therefore the Regional Transport Officer
(P.ivafr) Ltd.
came within the ambit of the expression "any officer
-Imam J.
subordinate" used in s. 44A. Having examined the
reasons given in the decisions of the Fnll Bench of the
Madras High Court and the Full Bench of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court we are generally in agreement
with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court for the reasons which we now proceed to state.
We have not on the record any material to show
when the Madras Government appointed a State
Transport Commissioner nor have we any notification
in the Fort St. George Gazette as to what powers he
or an officer subordinate to him was authorized to
exercise and discharge in lieu of any other authority
prescribed by or under the Act. The Madras Road
Traffic Code of 1940 shows that on May 21, 1947, the
Governor of Madras constituted a Provincial Transport
Authority for the Province (now the State) of Madras,
a Regional Transport Authority for the district and
city of Madras and a Regional Transport Authority
for each of the other districts in the Province (now
the State) of Madras. This Code also contains the
Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, hereinafter called
the Rules. The Rules came into force on April I, 1940.
Under Rule 3(c) "Central Road Traffic Board" or
"Central Board" means the Provincial Transport
Authority constituted for the State of Madras under
sub-s. (I) of s. 44 of the Act. This definition obviously
must have been inserted in the Rules after the constitution of the Prov incial Transport Authority in the year
1947. This definition was again altered on December 20,
1955, and for the words "Central Road Traffic Board"
or "Central Board " the words " State Transport
Authority" was substituted. On the same date a further definition was added to the Rules by the insertion
of cl. (m) in Rule 3 which was to the effect that" Transport Department " means the Motor Vehicles Department set up under s.133Aofthe Act. The Government
of Madras issued a Notification No. G. 0. MS. 527 on
February 14, 1953, wherein it was stated that prior
>-
,-1
~
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
775
to the decision of the Madras High Court in Writ
.I960
Petition. . No. 806 of .1951 . hthe Regional Transport A , -h -1 r·rr .
Authorities were varymg w enever necessary a ll t h e runac av.am i at
conditions of the permits, but according to the deci- Southern Ra(ldways
sion of the High Court in that petition the Regional (Private) _Ltd.
Transport Authorities could not vary the existing
Imam].
conditions of a stage carriage permit imposed under
s. 48(d) of the Act and that it was only the State
Transport Authority which could do so under s. 48A
of the Act. The decision of the High Court resulted
in great administrative inconvenience as all applications for variation of conditions of permit would have
now to be made to the State Transport Authority
which involved delay and inconvenience to operators.
It further stated that the Government of India had
under consideration a proposal to amend s. 48 of the
Act so as to empower the Regional Transport Authorities to vary all conditions of permits, but some time
would be taken to carry out the necessary legislation.
Pending the legislation the Government of Madras
had decided to empower Regional Transport Officers,
as a temporary measure, to vary conditions of permits
now dealt with by the State Transport Authority.
The notification further went on to say that in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 44A of the Act the
Governor of Madras authorized the Regional Transport Officers and the Secretary, Road Traffic Board,
Madras, to exercise the powers and discharge the
functions of the State Transport Authority under
ss. 48A, 51A and 56A of the Act. On October 20, 1955,
the Government of Madras issued a further notification reorganizing the Motor Transport Department
with reference to the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1944 (Act XXXIX of 1944). According to
this notification a Member of the Board of Revenue
should be appointed as Transport Commissioner under
s. 44A of the Act and the present post of Transport
Commissioner should be abolished ; that an officer
of the Transport Department should be appointed
as State Transport Authority who will also be the
Assistant Transport Commissioner ; that the post of
Secretary, Central Road Traffic Board, should be re~
designated as Secretary, State Transport Authority ;
776
196o
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
that Collectors of districts in the mofussil and the
-Commissioner of Police in the City of Madras should
Arunachalam Pi1/aib
•
d as R eg10na
·
1T ransport A ut h onties
' ' un der
v.
e appomte
south"n Roadwavs s. 44 of the Act; that the Regional Transport Officers
(P,ivate) Ltd.· in the mofussil and the Deputy Commissioner of Police
Imam ].
(Traffic & Licensing) in the Madras City should be
the Secretaries to the Regional Transport Authorities
and that an officer of the grade of a District Judge
should be appellate authority prescribed under s. 64(1)
of the Act, as amended, to deal with appeals against
the orders of the Regional Transport Authorities and
be designated as the State Transport Appellate Tribu.
nal. Under cl. (2) of the notification the Member of
the Board of Revenue to be appointed as Transport
Commissioner would be the Head of the Transport
Department and would have general responsibility for
administration of the Act. He would be empowered
by the Government under s. 44A to exercise the
powers now exercised by the State Transport Authority under sub-ss. 3(a) and (c) and (4) of s. 44 of the
Act. In the discharge of these functions the Transport Commissioner will have administrative control
over the organisation at present working under the
Transport Commi~sioner. Under cl. (4) (ii) the powers
under ss. 48A, 51A and 56A of the Act to alter the
conditions of stage carriage permits, contract carriage
permits and public carriers permits, exercised by the
Regional Transport Officers, would hereafter be exer.
cised by the Regional Transport Authorities. Under
cl. 5(i) the Regional Transport Officer would he the
Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority and
·in that capacity he would assist the Regional Transport Authority in the performance of the functions
prescribed in cl. (4). It is, however, to be remembered
that when on July 19, 1954, the appellant applied to
the Regional Transport Authority for the variation of
the conditions of his permit, the Notification No. G.O.
MS. 527 dated February 14, 1953, of the Government
of Madras was in force by virtue of which Regional
Transport Officers were authorised to discharge the
functions of the State Transport Authority under
ss. 48A, 51 A anrl 56A of the Act.
.......
,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
,'
I
--
)
J~
In paragraph 6 of the statement of the case filed by
z96o
the respondent it was stated that in the exercise of A
; - ru .
1
the powers conferred under s. 44(1) of the Act the rnnac ~.am ' '"
Government of Madras constituted Provincial and Southern Roadways
Regional Transport Authorities. It also set up a .(Private) Ltd.
Motor Transport Department with a Transport ComImam 1.
missioner as its head and officers in t,hat Department,
in the lower scale, were the Regional Transport Officers
who functioned as the Secretaries of the respective
Regional Transport Authorities called the Road Traffic Board. It was further stated in paragraph 7 that
although a Regional Transport Officer was a su.bordinate of the Transport Commissioner on the administrative side he could not be held to be a subordinate
officer within the meaning of s. 44A. The State
Government may establish a Motor Vehicles Department and appoint officers thereto under s. 133A, but
mere appointment of officers in that Department could
not invest them with statutory functions to be discharged under the Act and under the Rules. Sec.
tion 133A contemplates framing of rules to regulate
the discharge by officers of the department of their
functions as also to state the authorities to whom such
officers shall be subordinate and the duties to be performed by them. It was not suggested that any
duties or powers of a statutory nature had been vested
in the Tra.nsport Commissioner; nor was there any
rule showing that the Regional Transport Officer is a
subordinate of the Transport Commissioner for the
purposes of the Rules. 'l'he statement of the case
further stated that s. 44A required a functional subordination and not merely an administrative one.
The Madras Financial Code, Vol. II, Appendix I,
shows the list of Heads ofDepartments of the Government of Madras. The Transport Commissioner is
shown as the Head of a Department. The Half-Yearly
List of Gazetted Officers in the Transport Department corrected upto the 31st of July, 1955, shows
that the Transport Commissioner is also the Chairman, Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, and subordinate to him are the Secretary, Central Road Traffic
Board, Madras, Assistant Secretary, Road Traffic
Board, Madras and Regional Transport Officers.
778
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
There can be no question therefore that the Regional
officers subordinate to the
• perh aps £or t h"1s reason
v.
ransport omm1ss10ner. I t 1s
sou<hern Roadways that the respondent admits that the Regional Trans(Privale) Lid.
port Officers, administratively, are subordinate to the
Transport
Commissioner. Section 44A speaks merely
Imam].
of an officer subordinate to the Transport Commissioner to whom by notification the Government
of Madras may confer the authority in lieu of any
other authority prescribed by or under the Act to
discharge the powers and functions of that authority ..
It was, however, argued that until rules were framed
under s. 133A specifying as to who is subordinate
to which authority for the purposes of the Act and
the statutory functions to be performed under the
Act, administrative subordination is not what is
contemplated under s. 44A. On the other hand,
on behalf of the appellant it has been urged that
effect must be given to the weirds of s. 44A which
did not in the least indicate in what way the officer
has to be subordinate to the Transport Commissioner.
It was worthy of notice that s. 44A authorized the
State Government, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, to authorize any officer subordinate
to the Transport Commissioner to exercise and dis·
charge in lieu of any other authority such powers and
functions as may be exercised by that authority.
The section did not depend upon any rules to be
framed under s. 133A. Furthermore, s. 133A was an
enabling section by which a State Government could,
if it so wished, for the purpose of carrying into effect
the purposes of the Act establish a Motor Vehicles
Department. Until such a Department was established
the question of framing rules under the section did
not arise.
There is no clear material on the record or in the
Madras Road Traffic Code from which it can be ascer 1
tained precisely as to when the Madras Government established a Motor Vehicles Department. It is
significant, however, by a notification dated Decemlier 20, 1955, cl. (m) was added to Rule 3 of the Rules
and this stated that" Transport Department " means
the Motor Vehicles Department set up under s. 133A
z96o
p·ii . Transport Officers arc
A runae ha1am • "'T
C
· •
--
-
-
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
779
of the Act. Apparently, until this date Transport
r960
Department was something other than the Motor
~-·
. 1es D epartment set up un d er s. 133A of t h e Act. Arunachalam
V e h 1c
. Pillai
It is clear, therefore, that on Februa.ry 14, 1953, when Southernv~oadways
the Notification G.O. MS. No. 527 was issued by the (Private) Ltd.
Government of Madras the Regional Transport Officers
Imam .f.
were officers subordinate to the Transport Commissioner. Even if at some time or the other a Motor
Vehicles Department had been set up by the Government of Madras admittedly the Government of Madras
had framed no rules under s. 133A(3). If rules had
been framed under that section and they showed that
the Regional Transport Officers were not subordinate
to the Transport Commissioner then a question might
well have arisen as to how the words" any Officer
subordinate to him" should be construed owing to a
conflict between the Regional Transport officer being
administratively subordinate to the Transport Commissioner and yet not subordinate to him by virtue of
the rules framed under s. 133A. Since, however, no
rules have been fra.med under this section, so far as
s. 44A is concerned, any officer who is subordinate to
the Transport Commissioner in any way must include
the Regional Transport Officers in the Tran~port
Department. The words of the section are wide
enough for this interpretation and they are incapable
of being given the restricted meaning suggested on
behalf of the respondent. It was, however, suggested
that anomalies may occur if s. 44A is construed so
widely, because a Regional Transport Officer was a
Secretary of a Regional Transport Authority and
therefore subordinate to that authority and yet he
could be empowered to vary the conditions of a permit
which the State Transport Authority, to which the
Regional Transport Authority is subordinate, may
have declined to do. In the matter of interpretation
such considerations cannot be of much assistance. If
the words of s. 44A are wide enough to mean any
officer subordinate to the Transport Commissioner
they must be given effect to. In the matter of interpretation a Court could not, if the words were plain
enough, µroceed on the basis that possibly the
Government of Madras may misuse its powers.
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
We accordingly hold that the Regional Transport
Officer, Tiruchirapalli, had jurisdiction to vary the
hunachalam
i lai
· t ue ofth e power con1erre
c
d
v.
con d"t"
1 10ns of a pernn•t by vir
southern Roadways on him by the Notification No. G.O. MS. 527 issued by
(Private) Ltd.
the Government of Madras. Consequently, that
Government
had the power under s. 64A to do that
Imam].
which the Regional Transport Officer could have done
but had refused to do.
In our opnion, the appeal must be allowed and the
judgments of the single Judge and Appellate Court of
the High Court must be set aside and the case remanded to the High Court for the rehearing of the
writ petition by the single Judge as several questions
which were raised in that petition have not been
decided by him. He had allowed the petition solely
on the ground that the decision of the Government
of Madras must be set aside as the Regional Transport
Officer had no jurisdiction to vary the conditions of
the permit and that being so the Government of
Madras could not make such an order in the exercise of
its revisional jurisdiction. The case will accordingly go
back to the single Judge for decision on the other points
raised in the writ petition filed by the respondent.
The appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal.
Th'e costs in the High Court will abide the result. .
r960
- - p·i
Subba Rao].
SuBBA RAO, J.-I have had the advantage_ of perusing the judgment of my learned brother, Imam, J.
I regret my inability to agree with him in regard to
the main question raised in the case, namely, whether
the Regional Transport Officer is subordinate to the
State Transport Commissioner within the meariing of
s. 44A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939)
(hereinafter referred to as the Act). The facts are
fully stated by my learned brother and it is not necessary to restate them here.
Section 44A was inserted in the Act by the Madras
Act 20 of 1948 and it reads :
"The State Government may appoint a State
Transport Commissioner, and notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, may, by notification in
the Fort St. George Gazette, authorize such Commissioner or any officer subordinate to him, to exercise
J
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT8
781
and discharge in lieu of any other authority prez96o
scribed by or under this
Act,
such
powers
and
funcA
h
.
.
•
.
.
runac a1am p·zi
i ai
tions as may be specified m the not1ficat10n."
v.
This section empowers the State Government to southern Roadways
appoint only a State Transport Commissioner and (Private) Ltd.
does not confer any power on it to appoint any officer Subba Rao J.
subordinate to him; that power must be found elsewhere in the Act or the rules made thereunder. This
section also does not enable the State Government to
confer any powers on or entrust any functions to, the
said Commissioner other than those exercisable by any
authority under the Act. On the interpretation of
this provision there is a conflict of views between the
full bench decision of the Madras High Court in
T. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar v. P. S. Palani Pillai (1)
and the full bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in B. Veeraswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2 ). In the former case, Balakrishna Ayyar, J.,
delivering the judgment of the Court, summarized his
views thus at p. 602 :
"Of the three views placed before us we are inclined to prefer the third (statutory subordination).
It appears to us to be the most rational and the
·most free from objections. It is in accord with all
well established rules of interpretation of Statutes.
It does not require as the theory of " functional
subordination" seems to require, the introduction
of new words into the section. It has the m·erit of
being more flexible and practical since it permits of
the transfer or delegation of powers not merely at
the State level but at the regional level also.
It ensures that there will be no transfer or delegation of powers except to officers whose subordinate
has been determined by rules properly framed under
the Act. It also ought to avoid the anomaly that
has now occurred of a person in the position of a
secretary of a body being empowered to vary the
condition of a permit granted by that body. We
therefore adopt this view."
On the other hand, Satyanarayana Raju, J., speaking
for the full bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court,
in the latter case summarizes his views thus at p. 416:
(1) A.LR. 1957 Mad. 599.
102
(2) A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 413.
782
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
" The Regional Transport Officer is an indj vidual
who is invested with the authority and is required
.A runa.&halam Pillai
to perform the duties incidental to an office and is
v.
therefore an officer. In the performance of his variSouthern Roadways
(Private) Ltd.
ous duties, he is subject to the direction and control
of the Transport Commissioner. He is thus an officer
Subba Rao].
subordinate to the Transport Commissioner."
The question is which of the two views is correct. It
falls to be decided on the provisions of the Act and
the rules framed thereunder. The Act was passed to
consolidate and amend the law relating to motor
vehicles. It deals with a variety of subjects relating
to motor vehicles, such as licensing of drivers (Ch. II),
registration of motor vehicles (Ch. III), control of
transport vehicles (Ch. IV), construction, equipment
and maintenance of motor vehicles (Ch. V), control of
traffic (Ch. VI), motor vehicles temporarily leaving or
visiting India (Ch. VII), insurance of motor vehicles·against third party risks (Ch. VIII), offences, penalties, and
procedure (Ch. IX), and miscellaneous (Ch. X). Each
chapter, with the exception of ch. X, provides for a
particular aspect relating to motor vehicles and is,
within its range, self-contained, and contains a separate
provision conferring power on the Government to
make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the
provisions of that chapter. Section 133A of the
chapter dealing with miscellaneous matters enables
the Government, for the purpose of carrying into effect
the provisions of the Act, to establish a motor vehicles
department, to appoint officers to the said department,
to make rules, inter alia, to regulate their functions
and duties and name the authorities to whom they
shall be subordinate. In short, the Act is comprehensive and self-contained ; the powers and duties of the
various authorities and their relationship inter se are
all laid down and regulated by the provisions of the
Act and the rules made thereunder.
With this background let us look at the relevant
provisions of ch. IV of the Act and the rules made
thereunder. Chapter IV deals with "Control of Transport Vehicles". Under s. 42, no owner of a transport
vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in
1960
•
3 S.C.R.
'\
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
783
any public place save in accordance with the condir96o
tions of a permit. Section 43 confers power on the A runacaam
h-- p·zi .
1
iai
v.
State Government to contro1 roa d transport. Section 43A which was inserted in the Act by Act 20 of Southern Roadways
1948 enables the Government to issue administrative (Private) Ltd.
directions to Transport Authorities created under the
Act. Section 44 empowers the State Government to Subba Rao f.
constitute for the State a State Transport Authority
and Regional Transport Authorities for different regions
to exercise and discharge throughout their respective
areas the powers and functions specified in the Act.
Section 44A, which was inserted by Madras Act 20 of
1948, further empowers the State Government to
appoint a State Transport Commissioner and by notification authorize him or any officer subordinate to him
to exercise and discharge in lieu of any other authority
prescribed by or under the Act such powers and functions as may be specified in the notification. The
duties and functions of this Authority and its subordinate are confined only to notified statutory functions and duties imposed on other Authorities under
this Act in whose place they are appointed. Sections 45
to 56 lay down the procedure to be followed by the
Regional Transport Authority in issuing permits in
respect of stage, contract, private and public carriages
and also confer powers on the said Transport Authority to vary, cancel all or any of the conditions
attached to such permits. Section 58 deals with the
duration and renewal of permits and s. 59 gives the
statutory conditions attached to a permit. Section 60
enables the Transport Authority which granted a
permit to cancel or to suspend it on any of the
grounds mentioned therein. Section 64 confers a
right of appeal on an aggrieved party to prefer an
appeal against an order of the State or Regional
Transport Authority within the prescribed time to the
prescribed Authority in respect of matters mentioned
therein. Section 64A gives revisional jurisdiction to
the State Government to call for the records of any
order passed by any Authority or officer subordinate
to it for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the lega.
lity, regularity or propriety of such order. Section 68
confers on the State Government power to make rulef!l
784
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions
. .of this chapter; and under sub-s. (2)(a) thereof the
Arunachalam Pillai State Government is authorized to make rules in resSouthe.n vRoadways pect of the period of appointment and the terms of
. (Private) Ltd.
appointment of and the conduct of business by
Regional and State Transport Authorities and the
·Subba Rao J.
reports to be furnished by them.
This chapter, therefore, follows the same pattern
adopted in the Act. It creates Authorities, defines
their powers and duties, and provides for the regulation of their relationship inter se.
In exercise of the powers conferred under s. 44, the
State Government constituted in the State a State
Transport Authority and also Regional Transport
Authorities and appointed members to the said bodies.
The constitution of the said bodies was changed from
time to time. At the crucial period, i.e., on July 19,
1954, the State Transport Authority was described as
the Central Road Traffic Board (C.R. T. B.) and its
Chairman was the State Transport Commissioner. So
too, the State Government appointed Regional T1 .. nsport Authorities, described as Boards, and from time
to time changed their composition. During the
period in question the Regional Transport Authorities
consisted of District Magistrate, District Superintendent of Police, the President, District Board, and one
non-official person to be nominated by the Government.
It also appears from the judgment ofKrishnaswamy
Naidu, J., who referred the question to the full bench
of the Madras High Court, that the State Government
established a Motor Vehicles Department under
s. 133A of the Act and appointed Regional Transport
Officers. Their powers are regulated by the rules
made under the Act. Under r. 124, the Regional
Transport Officer is made the Secretary and executive
officer of the Board, i.e., the Regional Transport
Authority. Rules 131, 134, 134B and 135 define the
duties to be performed by the Secretary. Rule 134A
enables the Board, for the prompt and convenient
discharge of business, to delegate. to the Seeretary
functions described under that rule. Rule 134A
11uthorizes the Board to give general instructions as
rg6o
-
3 S.C.R.
-·~.
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
785
to the manner in which the Secretary shall exercise
r96o
the powers delegated to him. Under r. 147, appeals A
h-·- p·zz .
. t par t'icular orders of runac av.1am z at
Iie to t h e Centra1 Board agams
the Secretary and the Board. These rules positively Southern RoadwaJis
establish that the Regional Transport Officer is subor- (Private) Ltd.
dinate to the Board, i.e., the Regional Transport
.
d f
SubbaRao ].
Authority. He has statutory duties an
unctions
and in discharge of those 'duties he is under the control of the Board and in the matter of some quasijudicial duties an appeal lies to the Central Road
Traffic Board. It is, therefore, manifest that the
Regional Transport Officer is appointed by the
Government in exercise of its powers under s. 133A of
the Act, that his duties are statutorily defined and
that under the rules he is made subordinate to the
Board, i.e., the Regional Transport Authority.
Now coming to the State Transport Commissioner,
the State Government is authorized to appoint him
under s. 44A· of the Act, which was inserted in the year
1948. He is also a statutory authority. Both the
parties proceeded on the basis that the State Government established a Motor Vehicles Department and
the Commissioner was one ofits officers. The. division
bench of the Madras High Court which referred the
question to the full bench also accepted the fact that
the Madras Government created a Motor V,_ehicles
Department under s. 133A of the Act and the Commissioner is an officer of that Department. The full
bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court also founded
its conclusion on the fact that " the Transport Commissioner is constituted the head of the department of
transport which is the Motor Vehicles Department".
That apart, cl. (m) which was inserted in r. 3 on
December 20, 1955, clarifies the position by enacting
that the Transport Department is the Motor Vehicles
Department set up under s. 133A of the Act. It is,
therefore, clear that the State has created a Motor
Vehicles Department and appointed the Commissioner
as an officer in that Department. Neither s. 44 nor
s. 133A makes any officer subordinate to the said
Commissioner. Section 44 only enables the State
Government to confer on him powers and duties and
functions entrusted to any Authority under the Act.
786
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
No notification issued by the Government authorizing
Arunac-;;;;;::m Pillai the _Com~issioner to discharge any of the functions
v.
specified m the Act has been placed before us. No
Soulhun Roadways rule has been framed under sub-s. (3) of s. 133A of the
(Private) Ltd.
Act making the Regional Transport Authority subSubba Rao J.
ordinate to the State Transport Commissioner. The
only material available to us is that the Commissioner
was appointed by the State Government as Chairman
of the Central Road Traffic Board. Under the Act
and the rules framed thereunder, there are certain
statutory duties and functions allotted to the Central
Road Traffic Board, but no separate powers are conferred on the Chairman of the Board apart from his
being a part of the Board. It is, therefore, clear that
under the Act and the rules framed thereunder the
Regional Transport Officer is not made subordinate to
the State Transport Commissioner.
But what is contended is that though between the
Commissioner and the Regional Transport Officer,
there is no statutory subordination, the latter was
made by the Government administratively subordinate to the Commissioner. There is no order of the
Government making the Regional Transport Officer a
subordinate to the Commissioner placed before us.
The only material is a notification issued by the
Government dated October 20, 1955, on which reliance
is placed to indicate that the Regional Transport
Officer is subordinate to the Commissioner. But
obviously it has no relevance to the present enquiry,
for the notification was issued on a date subsequent to
the date of the impugned order. · If there was an
earlier notification, the State or the appellant would
have produced it, but from its non-production it may
be assumed that there was no such notification. If
that is excluded, the only two remaining documents
are, (i) The Madras Financial Code giving a list of the
heads of departments of the Madras State, and (ii) the
Half-Yearly List of Gazetted Officers in the Madras
State Government. The former shows the Transport
Commissioner as one of the heads of departments. It
does not in itself show that the Regional Transport
Officer is his subordinate. The mere mention of the
Regional Transport Officers in the list of Gazetted
1 60
9
•
3 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
787
Officers in the department is not decisive of the fact
I9 60
that they are subordinate to the Tramiport Commis- A
h-p·zz .
. is
. no t poss1'ble t o runac av.1am ' ai
• state of recor d , it
sioner. In t h is
hold that even administratively the Regional Trans- southern Roadways
port Officer is subordinate to the State Transport (Private) Ltd.
Commissioner.
Subba Rao ].
I shall assume for the purpose of this case that the
Regional Transport officer is treated by the Government as a subordinate Officer to the Commissioner.
The question in this case is whether such administrative treatment in utter disregard of the statutory
provisions can confer upon the Regional Transport
Officer a right to function under s. 44A of the Act.
The foregoing provisions relevant to the present
enquiry may be summarised thus: The Act is a self.
contained one. Under specific provisions it empowers
the Government to constitute a State Transport Authority, the Regional Transport Authorities and a State
Transport Commissioner. Section 44A does not authorize the Government to appoint subordinate officers to
the Commissioner, but only enables it to confer statutory powers on an officer subordinate to the Commissioner. In exercise of the powers conferred under
s. 133A of the Act, the State Government created a
Motor Vehicles Department and appointed in that
Department a Commissioner, Regional Transport
officers and others. But the State Government has
not made any rules making the Regional Transport
officer a subordinate to the Commissioner. Indeed, the
rules made him the executive officer of the Regional
Transport Board indicating thereby that he is a subordinate to the Board. It is, therefore, manifest that
either under the Statute or under the rules made
thereunder the Regional Transport Officer is not
subordinate to the Commissioner.
Learned Attorney-General contends that s. 133A of
the Act only confers a discretionary power on the
State Government to make rules indicating the authorities to which the officers appointed shall be subordinate and, therefore, it is not bound to do so. Assuming
that the word " may " in the section confers a discretionary power on the State Government, is it permissible to contend tb11t the Government is entitled to do
788
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
administratively what it is empowered to do by rules?
the powers
.
v.
con erre un er su -s. (3) o s. 133 , 1t may withhold
Southern Roadways from doing so; but it cannot bring about the same
(Pn.,te) Ltd.
result administratively, i.e., by a process other than by
Subba Rao ., way of rules. If the contention were accepted, it
1
would be attributing to the legislature an intention to
make an unnecessary provision. If the State Government could act administratively in regard to matters
covered by sub-s. (3), why should the said sub-section
be made at all ? Either by making rules or without
making rules, the Government can achieve the same
object. There is an understandable reason for the
legislative preference to a statutory rule. Statutory
rules are placed before Parliament for its approval,
while administrative regulations are entirely in the
discretion of the executive government. Statutory
authorities under the Act are empowered to exercise
powers affecting valuable rights of citizens. The power
to issue permits and modify the conditions thereof
affects large interests and it may well be that the
legislature in insisting upon statutory rules seeks to
exercise supervision to prevent abuse of powers. The
only reasonable construction of s. 133A is that the
State can create subordination of one officer to another
by only statutory rules and not otherwise. I would,
therefore, hold that if the Government seeks to make
a particular officer of the Department subordinate to
another, it can only do so by making a statutory rule
under sub-s. (3) of s. 133A of the Act.
The result is that negatively there is no statutory
rule making the Regional Transport Officer subordinate
to the State Transport Commissioner, and positively
there is a rule making him subordinate to the Regional
Transport Authority (R.T.A.). If that be so, I must
hold that the Regional Transport officer is not a subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner within
the meaning of s. 44A of the Act.
.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs,
Appeal dismissed.
196°
- - P'll . If the Government decides not to exercise
Arunacha1am • a•
fi
d
d
b
f
A .
3 S.0.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
Ig6o
Order of Court.
In view of the majority judgment of the Court, the Arunachalam Pillai
appeal is allowed with costs in this Court, and the SouthernvRoadways
case rem.anded to the High Court for a re-hearing by (Private) L1a.
a single Judge. Costs in the High Court will . abide Subba Rao J.
the result.
Appeal allowed.
--
SHRIMANT DATTAJIRAO
BAHIROJIRAO GHORPADE
v.
SHRIMANT VIJAYASINHRAO AND ANOTHER.
. (S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
/
Saranjam Estate-Maintenance grant to junior member-Power
of Government to resume and re-grant-Custom of lineal primogeniture,
• extent and effect of-Suit challenging Government order of resumption
and re-grant-If barred-Saranjam Rules-Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, z876 (Bom. X of I876), s. 4.
Upon the death of the holder in 1932, the Government of
Bombay by order dated June 7, 1932, resumed the Saranjam
....
• I
estate of Gajendragad and re-granted the same to his eldest son.
By the same order the assignment of some lands out of the estate
in favour of B, a younger member of the family, by way of maintenance was also continued. On May 14, 1940, B died leaving
his widow, A, and his undivided brother, D. A asked the Government for permission to adopt a son but without the permission
being granted adopted Von July IO, l94I. By an order dated
December 17, 1941, the Government continued the maintenance
grant (Saranjam potgi) to D. Thereupon V filed a suit against
., the Government and D for recovery of the lands on the grounds
(i) that the order of the Government dated December 17, 1941,
was ultra vires, null and void, and (ii) that by the custom of
lineal primogeniture which prevailed in the family the lands,
upon the death of B and upon the adoption of V by A, devolved
upon V in preference to D. The suit was contested, inter alia, on
. the grounds : (i) that under the relevant Saranjam Rules the
interest of B came to an end on his death and was not such as
could devolve upon V despite the order dated December 17, 1941,
(ii) that the alleged family custom did not apply to maintenance
grants and (iii) that the suit was barred under s. 4 of the Bombay
Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 :
Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the lands either
under the Saranjam Rules or under the custom; further that
the suit was barred by s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction
A.ct, 1876,
IQ~
i960
April 29.
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