THE PRINTERS (MYSORE) PRIVATE LTD. versus POTHAN JOSEPH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 April 1960 | [1960] 3 S.C.R. 713 | 1960 INSC 91
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 April 1960
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 107/1960
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 3 S.C.R. 713
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 91
Text of the judgment
3 S.C.R.
713
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1960
All these cases turned on different facts, and it is
not necessary to decide which of them in the special Pingle Industries
nrcumstances were correctly decided.
This enquiry Ltd., Secunderabad
v.
will hardly help in the solution of the case in hand.
We are, however, satisfied that in this case the asse~ rommissioner of
Income-tax,
see acquired by his long-term lease a right to win
Hyderabad
~tones, and the leases conveyed to him a part of land.
The stones in situ were not his stock-in-trade 111 a Hidayatullah J.
business sense . but a capital asset from which
after
extraction he converted the stones into his stock-intrade.
The payment, though periodic in fact, wa~
neither rent nor royalty but a lump payment in instalments for acquiring a capital asset of enduring benefit
to his trade.
In this view of the matter, the High 1
Court was right in treating the outgoings as on capital
account.
In the result, the appeal fails, and will be dismissed
with costs.
BY CQUR'I': In accordance with the majority
judgment of the Court, the appeal is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
THE PRINTERS (MYSORE) PRIVATE LTD.
v.
/
POTHAN JOSEPH.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. vVANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
· ' Arbitration Agreement:-Power of court to st~y legal proceedings
-Order by trial court refusing stay of proceedings affirmed in appeal
-Supreme Court, if and when can interfere with concurrent exercise
of discretion by the courts below-Arbitration Act, 1940 (x of 1940),
s. 34-Constitution of India, Art. 136.
The respondent was the Editor of the Deccan Herald, owned
and published by the appellant, and the two contracts executed
by the parties contained an arbitration clause that if in the interpretation or applicatio.n of the contract any difference arose
between the parties the same shall _ be referred to arbitration :ind
the award shall be binding between the parties and also provided
for, apart from his monthly salary, the payment of 10% of the
profits to the respondent. Upon the termination of his services
by the appellant, the respondent brought a suit for ·accounts and
payment of the profits ·found. due to him. The appellant by an
1960
April 27.
714
SUPREJVlE COURT REPORTS
l l 9GOJ
1960
application pleaded that the suit ought to be stayed under s. 34
of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the dispute referred to arbitraPrinters ( ft{J•sort') tion in accordance with the agreement between the parties. The
Privatt' Ltd.
trial Judge refused to exercise his discretion in favour of the
v.
appellant and refused to stay the suit. On appeal the High Court
Pothan Jostjih
confirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellant came up
to this Court special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution:
Held, that the power conferred on the court by s. 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940.., is discretionary and even though the conditions specified therein were fulfilled no party could claim thereunder a stay of legal proceedings instituted in a court as a matter
of" right. But the discretion vested in the court is a judicial
discretion and must be exercised as such in the facts and circumstances of each case. No inflexible rules can, therefore, be laid
down for its exercise and the court has to act according to common
sense and iusticc.
Gard11'1· v. Jay, (1885) 29 Ch. D. SO, referred to.
Where the discretion under the section has been properly
and judiciously exercised by the trial court the appeallate court
would not be justified in interferin? with sU:ch exercise_ of discretion n1crely on the ground that it would have taken a contrary
decision if it had considered the matter at the trial stage.- But if
it appears to the appellate court that the trial court has exercised
its discretion unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant
facts or has approached the matter unjudiciou.sly, it would be its
duty to intetfere.
Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton, (1942) A.C. 130, referred
to.
The words "interpretation and application of the contract'',
frequently used in arbitration clauses_, as they have been in the
contracts in question cover not only disputes relating to the
construction of the relevant terms of the contract but also their
effect. and unless the context compels a contrary construction, a
dispute relating to the working of the contract falls within such
a clause.
But the Suoreme Court would not lightly interfere under
Art. 136 of the Constitution with the concurrent exercise of discretion of the courts below under s. 34 of the Act. Before it
can justly do so, the appellant must satisfy the Court, on the relevant facts referred to bv the courts below, that thev exercised
their discretion in a manifestly unreasonablt.: or p~rversc way
which was likelv to defeat the ends of justice.
CIVIL APPELLATE JtrRJSDICTJON: Civil Appeal
I 07 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the _iudgment and
order dat~d September 21, 1959, .of the Mysore High
Court, Bangalore, in Misc. Appeal No. 68 of 1959.
Pnrshottam Trikamdas, S: N.-,Andley, ].· Tl. Dadarhonji, Rames/wrar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the
appellant.
....
•
No.
,.
. 3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
K. R. Karanth and Naunit Lal, for the respondent.
1960. April 27. 'The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR,
J.-The respondent,
Pothan
Joseph, who was working a·s the Editor of the Deccan
Herald owned and published by the appellant. The
Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd., in Bangalore has Jiled
a suit against the appellant op two contr:icts executed
between the parties on April 1, 1948, and February
20, 195;1, respectively, ..and has claimed acc.ounts of
the working of the Deccan Herald newspaper from
April 1, 1948, to March 31, 1958, as well as payment of
the amount that mav be found due to him from the
appellant under the 'provisions of c~s. 2(d) and l(d) of
The services of the respondent
the said contracts.
were termina_ted by the appellant by its letter dated
September 28, 1957, in which the respondent was told
that the termination would ta.ke. effect from March
31, 19.58. However, by a subsequent letter writt.en by
the appellant to the respondent on March 17, 19.58,
the respondent was told that his services had been
terminated with immediate effect and he was asked
to hand over charge to his success6r, Mr. T. S. Ramachandra Rao.
Thereafter on July 14,' 1958, the respondent filed the present stiit against the appellant.
The appellant contended that the two contracts on
which the r~spondent's claim was based were subject
to an arbitration agreement, and so it was not open
to the respondent to file the_ present suit.. against the
The appellant, therefore, requested the
appellant.
Court under s. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, i 940,
(hereinafter called the Act), to stay the proceedings
initiated by the respondent and refer the dispute to
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement between the parties.
The learned trial judge who heard the appellant's
application, however, exercised his discretion against
it and refused to stay the proceedings. in the respondent's suit.
Thereupon the appellant preferred an
appeal in the Mysore High Court but his appeal failed
and the High Court confirmed the orde~ passed "by
•hp trial court though for different reasons. The -High
,.
-
-
715
'
' l
.
1960
i
Printas (A1jlsore)'
Private Ltd.
v.
Pothan Joseph
Gajendragadkar J.
;
716
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
Court, however, thought that the learned trial judge,
in dealing with the appellant's application "had
Printe.rs (Mjsore)
gone much further than he should have done, and
Private Lid.
hence it was desirable that the case should be tried by
v.
The respondent did not object,
some other judge".
Polhan :Joseph
arid so the High Court directed that the suit may be
Gajendragadkar J. transferred to the file of the Additional Civil Judge,
Bangalore.
The appellant then applied to .the High
Court for a certificate. His application was, however,
rejected on the ground that the decision nnder appeal
could not be considered as a judgment, decree or final
order under Art. 133(1) of the, Constitution; on that
view it was thought unnecessary to decide whether on
the merits the case was fit to be taken in appeal to
Then the appellant applied for and
this Co1irt.
obtained special leave from this Court.
That is how
this appeal has come before us; and the substantial
point which arises for our decision is whether the
courts pelow were in error in refusing to stay the suit
filed by the respondent against the appellant in vie.w
of the arbitration agreement between them.
Before we deal with the merits of the contentions
r'1ised by the parties in this appeal it is necessary to
set out briefly the relevant facts leading to the present
litigation.
The appellant is a printing company and
it owns and publishes the Deccan Herald in English
and Prajavani in Kannada at Bangalore.
By a contract dated April 1, 1948, the appellant engaged the
respondent as Editor of the Deccan Herald for a peri?d
of five years· on terms and conditions specified in the
said contract.
As provided by cl. (.~) of the said contract the period of the respondent's employment was
extended by another five years by a subsequent
contract entered into between the parties on February
20, 1953.
As we have already mentioned the services
of the respondent came to be terminated z,bruptly on
Jt appears that by his letter dated
March 17, I 9.~8.
October 16, 19.57, the respondent made certain claims
against the appellant under the provisions of the
\Vorking Journalists Act.
Besides, he demanded
1.110th of the profits made by the Deccan Herald from
1948 up to the elate of the termination of his . service
under the two respective contracts.
This claim was
-
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
1960
denied by the appellant. Correspondence then ensued
between the parties but since no common ground was
(Mysore)
disco\'iered between them the respondent filed the Printers
Private Ltd.
present suit. His case is that the two contracts entitlv.
ed him to claim 1 /10th of the profits made by the Pothan Joseph
Deccan Herald during
the period of his employment,
and so he claims an account of the said profits and' Gajendragadkar J.
his due share in them.
The learned trial judge found that the respective
contentions raised by the parties before him showed
that there was no dispute as such between them which
could attract the arbitration agreement. He also held
that an attempt was made by the parties to settle their
differences amicably through the. mediation of Mr. Behrarh Doctor but the said attempt failed because the
appellant was not serious about it and was just trying
"to protract, defeat and delay the plaintiff's moves".
According to the learned trial judge a plea of limitation would fall to be considered in ·the present suit
and it was desirable that the said plea should · be tried
by a competent court .rather than by arbitrators.
He
was, however, not impressed by the respondent's
contention_ that his character had been impeached by
the appellant and so he should be allowed to vindicate
his character in a trial before a court rather than
before the arbitrators.
In dismissing th~ appellant's
claim for stay of the suit the learned judge observed
that if the accounts of the Deccan Herald had not
been separately maintained it would be competent for
a qualified accountant to allocate expenses and capital
expenses among the different activities of the appellant
and then very little would be left for arbitrators · to
decide.
He had no doubt that the contract by which
the respondent was entitled to claim 1/10th 'share in
the profits of the De·ccan Herald necessarily postulated that· the accounts of the Deccan Herald would be
separately maintained.
On these considerations the
trial judge refused to stay the suit .
. W'hen the matter went in appeal the High Court
held that .the dispute between the parties did not fall
·within the arbitration· agreement.
The High Court
ci l<o considered the other points decided by the trial
court: it held that Mr. Behram Doctor had not been
29 -6 SCI/ND/82
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
appointed as an arbitrator between the parties
and
that the proceedings before him merely showed that
Printers (MJ,•sore)
the parties were exploring the possibility of having
Private Lta.
an
arbitration.
It observed that the appellant comv.
pany
was
a
big
concern
and referred to the respondent's
Pothart Joseph
apprehension that it was in a position to dodge the
Gajendmgadkar J. ·respondent's claim.
However, the High Court was
rot impressed by these apprehensions, and it was not
inclined to find fault with the conduct of the appellant
in the trial court.
It was also not satisfied that the
question of limitation which would arise in the suit as
well as the question of interpreting the contracts could
not be properly tried by arbitration.
It recognised
that there had been a complete change of front on the
pall of the appellant in regard to the pleas raised by
the appel~nt under the arbitration agreement when
the matter was discussed before Mr. Behram Doctor,
and when it reached the court in the form of the
The High Court then considered other
present suit.
facts which it thought were relevant.
It stated that
there was great deal of bad blood between the parties
and there was no meeting ground between them. The
appellant's plea that recourse to arbitration may help
an early disposal of the dispute did not appeal to the
High Court as sound, and so, on the whole, the High
Coiirt thought that the order passed by the trial court
refusing to stay the proceedings in suit shou Id be confirmed.
The appellant contends that the reasons
given by the High Court in refusing to stay the suit
are not convincing and that the discretion vesting in
the High Court in that behalf has not been properly
or judiciously exercised.
Section 34 of the Act confers power on the court to
stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration
agreement subject to the conditions specified in the
section.
The conditions thus specified are satisfied in
the present case, but the section clearly contemplate.;
that, even though there is an arbitration agreement
and the requisite conditioµs specified by it are satisfied,
the court may nevertheless refuse to grant stay if it is
satisfied that there are sufficient reasons why the
matter should not be referred in accordance with th~
arbitration agreement.
In other word,, the power to
-
<
3 S.C.R.
-,,
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
1960
stay legal proceedings is discretionary, and so a party
to an arbitration agreement against whom legal proceed·
(Mysort)
ings have been commenced cannot by relying on the Printlrs
Private Ltd;
arbitration agreement claim the stay of legal proceed·
v.
ings instituted in a court as a matter of right.
It is, Pothan Joseph
however, clear that the discretion vested in the court
must be properly and judicially exercised.
Ordinarily Gajendragadkar J;
where a dispute between the parties has by agreemem
between them to be referred to the decision of a
domestic tribunal the court would tlirect the parties to.
go before the tribunal of their choice and stay the
legal proceedings instituted before it by one of them.
As in. other· matters of judicial discretion, so in the
case of the discretion conferred on the court by s. 34
it would be difficult, and it is indeed inexpedient, to
lay down any inflexible rules which should govern the
exerci<e of the said discretion.
No test can indeed be
laid down the automatic application of which will help
the solution of the problem of the exercise of judicial
discretion.
As was observed by Bowen, L. J., in
·Gardner v. jay (') "that discretion, like other judicial
discretion, must be exercised according to corrunon
sense and according to justice."
In exercising its discretion under s. 34 the court
~hould not refuse to stay the legal proceedings merely
because one of the parties to the arbitration agreement
is unwilling to go before an arbitrator _and in effect
wants to resile from the said agreement, nor can stay
be refused merely on the ground that the relations
between the parties to the dispute have been embittered or that the proceedings before the a1 bitrator may
cause unnecessary delay as a result of the said relations. It may not always be reasonable or proper to
refuse to stay legal proceedings merely because some
questions of law would arise in resolving the dispute
betwef'n the parties.
On the other hand, if fraud or
dishonesty is alleged against a party it may he open
to the party whose character is impeached to claim
that it should be given an opportunity to vindicate its
character in an open trial before the court rather than
before the domestic tribunal, and in a proper case the
court may consider that fact as relevant for deciding
(I) (1885) 29 Ch. D 50, 58,
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ll 9GO]
1960
whether stay should be granted or not.
Jf there has
been a long delay in making an application for stay
Printers ( k(>•sore)
and the said delay may reasonably be attributed to
Private Ltd.
the fact that the parties may have abandoned the
v.
arbitration agreement the court may consider the
Pothan Joseph
delay as a relevant fact in deciding whether stay
Gajendragadkar J. should be granted or not.
Similarly, if complicated
questions of law or constitutional issues arise in the
decision of the dispute and the court is satisfied that
it would be inexpedient to leave the decision of such
complex issues to the arbitrator, it may, in ·a proper
case, refuse to grant stay on that ground; indeed, in
such cases the arbitrator can and may state a special
case for the opinion of the court under s. J 3(b) of the
Act.
Thus, the question as to whether legal proceedings should be stayed under s. 34 .must always be
decider! by the ·court in a judicial manner having
regard to the relevant facts and circumstances of each
case.
Where the discretion vested in the court under s. 34
has been exercised by the trial court the appellate
court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of
the said discretion.
In dealing with the matter raised
before it at the appellate stage the appellate court
would normally not be justified in interfering with the
exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the
ground that if it had considered the matter at the
trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion.
If the discretion has been exercised by the
trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the
fact that the appellate court would have taken a
ditferent view may not justify interference with the
trial court's exercise of discretion. As is often said, it
is ordinarily not open to the appellate court to substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the trial
judge; but if it appears to the appellate court that in
exercising its discretion the trial court has acted
unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant
facts and has adopted an unjudicial approach then it
would certainly be open . to the appellate court-and
in niany cases it may be its duty-to interfere with the
trial court's exercise of discretion.
In cases falling
under this class the exercise of discretion by the trial
'
,..
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
1960
conn is 111 law wrongful and improper and that would
certainly justify and call for interference from the
( .tlfysore)
appellate court. These principles are well established: Printers
Private Ltd.,
but, as has been observed by Viscount Simon, L. C., in
v.
Chareles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston (1) "the law as to the. Potluiii Joseph
reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a
judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well Gajmdragadkar J.
established, and any difficulty that arises is due only
to the application of well settled principles m an
individual case".
In the present case there is one more fact which
has to be borne in mind in dealing with the merits
of the controversy before us.
The appellant has
come to this Court by special leave under Art. 136; in
other words the appellant is not entitled to challenge
the correctness of the decision of the High Court as a
matter of ri1?;ht.
It is only in the discretion of this
(
Court that it can be permitted to dispute the correc.ness or the propriety of the decision of the High Court,'
and so in deciding whether or not this Court should
interfere with the order under appeal it would be
relevant for us to take into aocount the fact that the
remedy sought for by the appellant is by an appeal
which is a discretionary matter so far as this Court is
concerned.
It is in the light of these principles that
we must consider whether or. not the appellant's complaint agaimt the High Court's order can be upheld.
The first point which calls for a decision relates to
the construction of the contracts between the parties.
As we have already stated two O?ntracts were executed
between them but their terms are substantially the
sarne and so we may deal with the subsequent;
contract which. was executed on February 20, 1953
(P. 2). Under this contrac.t the respondent was engaged
as the Editor of the Deccan Herald and his salary was
fixed at Rs. l ,.IJOO per rnensern under paragraph 1(a).
Paragraph l(b) and (c) deal with the other amenities
to which the respondent was entitled:
Clause (d) of
paragraph l provides that when the newspaper shows
a profit in the annual accounts the Editor shall be
entitled to I/10th share of it; it is pn this clause that
the respondent's claim in the present proceedings is
(I)
[1942] A.C. 130, 138.
•
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
based. The terms on which the respondent had to remain in the service of the appellant are specifiedinparaPri•ters
(Mysore)
Private
Ltd
grap h 2( a ) an d (b) . p aragrap h 3 prov1"d es f"or t h e renewa 1
v.
of the contract for a further period of five years if it is
Po than Joseph found that such renewal is for the mutual advantage of
. the parties. This paragraph also provides that during
Ga;endragadkar f. the continuance of his employment the respondent shall
not directly or indirectly be interested in any other
newspaper business than that of the appellant or any
other journalistic activities in competition with that of
the appellant. It also stipulates that if the contract is
determined the respondent shall not for a period of
three years thereafter be directly or indirectly interested
in any newspaper business of the S'lme kind as is carried on by the appellant within the Mysore State. It
would thus be seen that this paragraph shows the
liability imposed on the respondent as a consideration
for the benefit conferred on him by paragraph 1 in
general and cl. (d) of the said paragraph in particular.
Paragraph 4 contains an arbitration agreement. It
provides that if in the interpretation or application of
the contract any difference of opinion arises between
the parties the same shall be referred to arbitration.
The arbitrator can be named by both the parties but
if they failed to choose the same person each side will
choose an arbitrator and the two will elect another
person to complete the panel. Their award shall be
final and binding on both the parties.
The High Court has held that the present snit is
outside the arbitration agreement because neither
party disputes the applicability of the terms of the
contract in the decision of the dispute. The High
Court thought that in the context the words ' application of the contract' meant a dispute as to the
applicability of the contract, and since the applicability
of the contract was not in question and no dispute as
to the interpretation of the contract arose, the High
Court held that paragraph 4 was inapplicable to the
present suit. Mr. Purshottam, for the appellant, contends that the construction placed by the High Court
on the word "application" is erroneous. According
to him, any difference of opinion in regard to the
application of the contract must in the context mea.n
1960
--
3 S.C.R.
'
•...
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
the working out of the Gontract or giving effect to its
terms. In our opinion, this contention is well founded.
The words 'interpretation or application of the contract' are frequently used in arbitration agreements
and they generally cover disputes between the parties
in regard to the construction of .the relevant terms of
the contract as well as their effect, and unless the context. compels a contrary construction, a dispute in
regard to the working of the contract would generally
fall within the clause in question. It is not easy to
appreciate what kind of dispute according to the High
·Court would have attracted paragraph 4 when it refers
to a difference of opinion in the application of the
Since both the parties have signed the
contract.
c'cmtract the question about its applicability in that
forn~ e<ln hardly arise. Differences may, however, arise
and in fact have arisen as to the manner in which the
contract h'1s to be worked out and given eHect _to, and
it is .precisely such differences that are covered by the
arbitration agreement.
\Ne would accordingly hold
that the High Court was in error incoming to the conclusion that the present dispute between the parties
was outside the scope of paragraph 4 of the contract.
1f the High Court had refused to stay the present
proceedings only on this ground the appellant would
no doubt have succeeded; but the High Court has
based its decision not only, nor even mainly, on thr
construction of the contract.
The tenor of the judgment suggests that the High Court considered the
other relevant: facts to which its. attention '"'as invited
and the material findings· recorded by the trial judge.
and though it differed from some of the findings of the
trial judge, on the whole it felt no difficulty in coming
to. the conclusion that there was no reason to interfere
with the trial court's exercise of discretion under s. 34.
That is why, even though the appellant has succeeded
before us on the question of the construction of the
arbitration agreement, having regqrcl, to the limits
which we generally impose on the exercise of the
jurisdiction under Art. I%, he must still satisfy us
that we would be justified in interfering with the concurrent exercise of discretion by the two courts below,
and that would inevitably depend upon the other
1960
Printtrs ( A!6>sor•)
Privat• Ltd.
v.
Pothat1 Joseph
Gajmdragadkar
724
SUPREl\lE COURT REPORTS
[ 1960]
relevant facts to which both -~the courts have referred,
and on which both of them have relied though m
Printers (Mysore)
different ways.
Private Ltd.
V.
·what then are the broad features of the case on
Potka11 ,7os~pk
which the trial judge and the High Court have respect·
ively relied? It is clear that the present dispute is not
Gajendragadknr J.
the resuJt of an ordinary commercial transaction containing an arbitration clause. The contract in question
is between a journalist and his employer by which the
remuneration of the journalist has been fixed in a
somewhat unusual manner by giving him a specified
percentage in the profit which the Deccan Herald
would make from year to year.
According to the
respondent he was surprised when the General Manager
of the paper informed him that 75% of the overall
expenditure incurred in the several activities of the
appellant: was being charged to the Deccan Herald, and
that the capital liabilities were charged in the same
proportion; he thought that this system of accounting
adopted by the appellant was repugnant: to the material
provisions in his contract. Indeed bis case is that after
he came to know about this system he protested to the
Director, Mr. Venkataswamy, who has been taking
active part in the affairs of the appellant, and Mr.
Venkataswamy assured him that as from the beginning
of 19ilii the accounts were being separately maintained.
It would appear that the information received by the
respondent from the General Mana12:er disillusioned
him and that appears to be the beginning of the present
dispute, according to the respondent's letter of May 24.
19.55, (D. 1). On February J 8, I 956, the respondent
invoked the arbitration agreement and told Mr.
Venkataswamy that Mr. Behram Doctor had agreed to
work as arbitrator and give his award ID. 2). \fr.
Venkataswamy who was addressed by the respondent
as the l\'fana~!ing Director told him by his reply of
March ~. I Y?>Ci, that he was not t:he Manap;ing Director
and added that in his view it was not open to the
respondent to invoke cl. 4 of the contract because he
was aware that no monies were payable to the respondent under cl. 1(d).
It would thus be seen that
\fr. \'enkataswamy's immediate response to the respondent's request for arbitration was that the rcspon- .
1960
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
d~nt 'could not· invoke, the arbitration clause (D. 3). It
)
'"
1960
is tnie that o'n April 23, . 1956, ·Mr. Venkataswamy
a_ttempted to explain this statement. by saying . that all Pr~~~~~AJ!tJ~re)
that he intendJd to. s:uggest was that· no occasion· for
v.
irwoking ·the arbitratio1J. agreement had arisen.
That, Pothan Joseph
ltq1~e\:er, .appears to , )Je an unsatisfactory explanation
...
(J?, 10), Even so, Mr. Venkataswamy agreed to meet Gajendragadkar J;
Mr. Bel)ram Doctor and so. on March 9, 1956, the
r~spondent gave to Jvt;r. Venkataswamy the address of
J\if r. Behram. Doctor and asked him to see him (D. S).
fie informed Mr. Bepram Doctor accor,dingly (D. 6).
Ii appears that subsequently Mr. Behtam Doctor
n1et both the respondent and Mr, Venkataswamy on
M,ay _9. J 956.
~be. proceeding.s of ,this meeting which
have been kept by Mr. Behram Doc.tor and copies of
which have been supplied by him to both the parties
indicate that Mr. . Behram Doctor attempted to mediate
between the parties and presumably t~e parties were
ag~eeable to secure the mediation of
Mr.. Behram
D~Ktor to resolve dispute.
v\Te ought to add . that
the copy of. the said proceedings produced by the
appellant contains a statement that Mr. Venk.ataswamy
at the outset told Mr. Behram Doctor that he had·
come 'oh an unofficial visit 'and was speaking without
the consent. of the other directors. This' statement is,'
however, not tq. be found in the copy' supplied by
Mr. Behram Doctor to the. resporn:lent. . Prim:i facie
it is m~t easy to 1,mders~and why Mr. Behram Doctor
should have omitted this material statement in the
copy SUp];lied by him to the respondent.
Th~t, however, is·a matter which we do not propose)o pl.Ii-sue
io the ptesent appeal.
It is thus clear that though
Mr. Behram Dottor was not appointed an arbitrator
and no reference in ' writing was made to him an
attempt. was mad~ by' th~ 'parties to settle the dispute
with the assi&tance of Mr. Behrarri Doctor, and that
attempt fail~d.' Haying rega'rd 'to the facts which have
come on the recqrd it may not be unreasonable to infer
tliat the· appellaJ?t was not too kt;en,
pinsue the
rrfa ttcr on the l~ries · originally' adopted ·by ' both the
patties before Mr.· Behram Doctor.· ·
·
It' also app~ars th;;tt for some, years th~ accou~ts .of ,
flie'· D'eccan Herald 1 :had not been separately kept
tq
as'
30'-6 '.sCi-/ND/8.2·.:
..
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
they should have been according to the respondent"s
case.
The respondent alleges that they have not
Printers ( k(}isore) been kept separately throughout the
ten years; but
Private Ltd.
that
is
a
matter
which
is
yet
to
be
investigated.
If
v.
the accounts are not separately kept the question of
Pothan Joseph
allocating expenditure would inevitably arise and that
Gajendragadkar J. can be decided after adopting some ad hoc. principle
in that behalf.
A plea of limitation has also been
indicated by the appellant and it has ben suggested
that the first contract having merged in the second
it is only under the latter contract that the ffspondent
may have a cause of action.
Thus the eflect of the
two contracts considered together may have to be
adjudged in dealing with the question of limitation.
lt has also been suggested that the respondent
, knew how the accounts were kept from year to year
and in substance he may be deemed to have agreed
with the method adopted in keeping the accounts.
If
this point is raised by the appellant it may involve
the decision of the question about the effect of the
respondent's conduct on his present claim. The appellant has also suggested that the respondent has adopted an attitude of blackmailing the appellant and the
respondent treats that as an aspersion on his charac. ter. The relations between the parties have been very
much embittered and the respondent apprehends that
the appellant, being a powerful company, may delay
and seek to defeat the respondent's claim by protracting the proceedings before the arbitrators.
It now
looks impossible that the parties would agree to
appoint one arbitrator, and so if the matter goes
before the domestic tribunal the two arbitratots
appointed hy the two parties respectiv~ly may have to
nominate a third one to complete the constitution of
the domestic tribunal, and that it is ,aid may easily
lead to a deadlock.
In the trial court attempts were
made to sett.le this unfortunate dispute but they failed
and the respondent's grievance is that the appellant
adopted an unhelpful and non-co-operative attitude.
It appea1s fairly clear that when the parties entered
into the present contract and agreed that differences
between them in regard to the interpretation and
application of the contract should be referred to
1960
;
.
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
1960
arbitration they did not anticipate the complications
which have subsequently arisen. That is why an
(Mysore)
arbitration agreement may have been introduced in Printers
Privale Ltd.
the contract in question.
All these facts have been
v ..
considered by both the courts, and though it is true that Pothan Joseph
in their approach and final decisions in respect of
these facts the two courts have differed in material Gajendragailkar J.
particula1:s, they have in the result agreed with the
conclusion that the discretion vested in them should
be exercised in not granting stay as claimed by the
Under these circumstances we do not think
appellant.
we would be justified in substituting our discretion
for that of the courts below.
It may be that if we
were trying the appellant's application under s. 34 we
might have come to a different conclusion; and also
that we may have hesitated to confirm the order of
the tnal court if we had been dealing with the matter
as a court of first appeal; but the matter has now'
come to us under Art. 136, and so we can justly interfere with the concurrent exercise of the discretion by
the .courts below only if we feel that the said exercise of
discretion is patently and manifestly unreasonable,
capricious or perverse and that it may defeat the ends
of justice. Having regard to all the circumstances and
facts of this case we are not disposed to hold that a
case for our interference has been made out by the
That is why we dismiss this appeal but
appellant.
make no order as to costs throughout.
Appeal dismissed.
--· .
)
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
AHMEDABAD·
v.
'·
K:ARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD.,
AHMEDABAD.
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and
M. HIDAYADULLAH, JJ.)
Income-tax-Set-off-Business loss in Indian State-Profits in
British India-Applicability of the Act to business in Indian StateBusiness Profits Tax Act, 1947 (21 of 1947), ss. 2(3), 4, 5.
The assessee held the managing agency of a limited company
in what was then called "British India" and had also a pharma-
1960
April 28.
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