PINGLE INDUSTRIES LTD., SECUNDERABAD versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, HYDERABAD
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 April 1960 | [1960] 3 S.C.R. 681 | 1960 INSC 90
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 April 1960
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 190/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 3 S.C.R. 681
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 90
Text of the judgment
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREl\iE COURT.REPORTS
681
PING LE INDUSTRIES LTD., SECUNDERABAD
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, HYDERABAD·
(S. K. DAs, ]. L. KAPUR and M. HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Income Tax-Business Expenditure-Right to extract stou~s
fmm quarries-Character of expenditure-Test, whether revenue or
capital in nature-Hyderabad Income Tax Act (Hyderabad VIII oj
1357 F), s. l2(2)(xv)-lndian Income Tax Act, s. 10(2)(xv).
Under a quolnama the assessec company was granted exclusive rights in the nature of a monopoly to extract Shahabad Flag
Stones without limit to quantity or measurement from quarries
situated in six villages for a period of 12 years on annual payment of Rs. 28,000 but not to manufacture cement. The stones
had to be extracted methodically and skilfully before they could
be dressed and sold. The assessee company paid an initial sum
of Rs. 96,000 as security and the balance of Rs, 20,000 was payable
each year in monthly instalments of Rs. 1,666-10-8 each. The
payments were to be made even if no stones were extracted or
could not be extracted. The question was whether the amount>
paid were allowable as business expenditure under s. 12(2)(xv)
of the Hvderabad Income Tax Act:
Held (Per Kapur and Hidayatullah, JJ. S. K. Das, J.,
dissenting), that under the quolnama the assessee acquired by
his long term lease a right to win stones and the lease conveyed
to him a part of land. The stones in situ were not his stock-intrade in a business sense but a capital asset from which after
extraction he converred the stones into his stock-in-trade. The
payment though periodic in fact was neither rent nor royalty but
a lump sum payment in instalments for acquiring· a capital asset
of enduring benefit to his trade. The right acquired is to a
source from which the raw material was to be extracted. The
expenditure was outgoings on capital account and was not
allowable as deductions under s. 12(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad
Income Tax Act.
Per S. K. Das, J.-That on its true construction the transaction was the sale of raw materials coupled with a licence to
the assessee to come on the land and remove the materials
sold, the purchase price being paid partly in a lump sum and
partly in mon·hly instalments, that the object was the procuring
of the stones for making flag stones and not the acquisition of
an enduring asset or advantage, that the payments made were
the price of raw materials and that the ·assessee was therefore
entitled to claim them as business expenditure under s. 12(2)(xv)
of the Hyderabad Income Tax Act.
Assam Bengal Cement Works Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income
Tax. West Bengal, r1955] 1 S.C.R. 972, distinguished.
C1v1L APPELLATE
JuR1sri1cnoN: Civil
Appeal
No. I 90 of 1955.
1960
April 26.
682
1960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960].
Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 31,
1953, of the Hyderabad High Court in Reference Case
Pinglt Induslrits
No. 302/5 of 1951-52.
Ltd., Stc1mderabad
N. A. Palhivala and R. Ganapathy Tyer,. for the
v.
Commissi~nu of appellants:
lncomt·lax,
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
H)'derabad
H.]. Uinrignr and D. Gupta, for the respondent..
1960. April 26. The Judgment of Kapur and
Hidayatullah, .JJ., was delivered by HidayaLUllah, J.
S. K. Das, ]., delivered a separate Judgment.
S. K. DAS, ].-This is an appeal by the assessee
S.K. Das].
with leave of the High Court of Hyderabad gr<imed
under s. 66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
The short facts arc these. The appellant is a private
limited company carrying on the business, inter alia,
of sale of Shahabad stones (flag stones) which had to
be extracted from quarries, dressed and then sold. For
the purpose of its business, the appellant took on
contract the right to excavate stones from certain
quarries in six villages in Tandur taluk for a period of
twelve years under a Quolnama dated 9th Mehr, 1343F,
from the then jagirdar of the taluk, named Nawab
Mehdi Jung Bahadur. The contract provided that
the jagirdar should be paid annually a sum of Rs. 28,000
as consideration for extracting the stones till the end
of the contract period, as per a plan prepared, within
the six villages specified therein. Tht: appellant had
no right or interest in the land; nor did he have am·
other interest in the quarries apart from excavating
stones therefrom. The contract specifically provided
that the appellant, called the contractor, had no right
to manufacture cement from the stones; he had onlv
the right to excavate stones from the quarries till th~
end of tbe contract period. I may here quote · some
of the relevant provisions of the Quolnama as to how
the annual consideration of Rs. 28,000 was to be paid.
It said;
"l. The period of contract for excavating stones
from the quarries of the villages noted above is for 12
years from !st Ardibehisht 1346 Fasli to the end of the
Farwardi, 1358 Fasli and the contractor will be given
possession from I st Ardibehisht 1346 Fasli.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
1960
2. The annual contract amount would be Rs. 28,000.
3. For the surety of the contract the sum of Pingie Industries
Rs. 96,000 0. S. has b~en. received and deposited in the Ltd., Secunderabad
v.
treasury of the Jagir towards the advance and earnest
Commissioner
of
money and the security, a receipt for the same has
Income-tax,
been issued separately.
Hyderabad
4. The remaining annual balance sum of Rs. 20,000
S.K. Das J.
may be deposited in the Jagir Tre;:isury by instalment
every month of Rs. 1,667-10-8; if there be any default
in p~ying the instalment regularly, interest at' the rate
of one rupee per cent. per mensem will be charged to
the contractor till the full payment.
There was another lease or contract taken from
Government for a period of five years for which the
appellant was required to pay Rs. 9,000 per year in
monthly instalments of Rs. '7SO. . That was also in
respect of stone quarries. The terms of the said
contract with Government have not been printed in
the paper book, presumably because they were similar
in nature to those of the Ouolnama referred to above.
The Income-tax Appellate 'Tribunal found. and. there
is no dispute as to this, that under the· aforesaid two
contracts the appellant had merely the right to extract
Shahabad stones. The Tribunal said:
"Flag stones of required thickness are found in
layers in those mines or quarries. Before one gets
these flag stones of the required thickness, one has
<'.lso to extract flag stones of gTeater thickness. The
assessee sells thesf flag stones both of the usual thickness and thickness greater than usual one,. after working on them. if necessary." There was no finding as
to how deep the quarrying had to be done to extract
the stones of required thickness.
According to the appellant's books of account, it paid
each year of account Rs. 37.000 as lease or contract
money to extract the stones under the two contracts
and it claimed an allowance in respect thereof under
s. l 2(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act, corresponding to s. 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax
Act, 1922.
The Tribunal stated that the Income-tax
Officer was under some misapprehension or error while
examining the appellant's books of account, and held
for the assessment year l 357F that the expenditure
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
of Rs. 27,054 as lease or contract money was capital
Pingle
Industries expenditure, in respect of which the appellant was not
Ltd., Secunderabad entitled to claim any allowance under the
relevant
v.
provision of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act. For the
Commissioner of assessment year l 358F he similarly held that the sum
Income-tax,
of Rs. 28,1.58 was capital expenditure am! not revenue
Hyderabad
expenditure. There were two appeals to the Appellate
S.K. Das J.
Assistant Commissioner who also held that the expenditure was capital expenditure. Then, there was an
appeal to th.e Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay.
The Accountant member of the Tribunal held that
the payments in question stood on the same footing
as royalties and deacl rent which are
allowable as
working expenses in cases of mines and quarries. The
President of the Tribunal expressed his finding thus:
"In the present case. the assessee purchased his
stock-in-trade. Instead of paving so much for so many
cubit. feet, he pays a lump sum every year. Parties
might as well agree that the so called lessee shall pay a
sum of monev bearing a proportion to the sales or
quantum of material extracted or a lump sum for the
purpose of convenience. Because these quarry leases
are called leases. the assessee does not: get an asset of
an enduring benefit. In fact, I find that the leases are
renewed from time to time. The lease money is,
therefore. in my opinion, not capital expenditure but
revenue expenditure and should be allowed in computing the assessee's income from the quarries."
In the result. the Tribunal allowed the claim of the
appellant that the payment of the two sums of
Rs. 27,054 and Rs. 28, 158 for the assessment years
1357F ancl 1358F respectively was in its true nature a
revenue expenditure rather than capital expenditure.
On being satisfied that a question of law arose out of its
order, the Tribunal stated the followini!; question for
the decision of the High Court:
"v\Thether the lease money paid by the as.sessec
company to Nawab Mehdi Jung Bahadnr and to
Government is capital expenditure or revenne expcndi tu re"
The High Court answered the question against the
appellant. Hence the present appeal.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
1960
My learned brethren have come to the conclusion
that the expenditure in question was capital expend- Pingle Industries
iture. Reluctantly and much to my regret I have Ltd., Secunderabad
v.
come to a different conclusion, and I proceed now to
state the reasons for my conclusion as briefly as I can. Commissioner of
Income-tax,
It is not disputed that if the expenditure was capital
Hyderabad
expenditure, then the appellant was not entitled to
S.K. Das J.
the benefit of s. l 2(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Income. tax Act in the relevant years. It is equally undisputed
that· if the expenditure was revenue expenditure, then
the appellant could claim an allowance in respect
thereof. Therefore, it is unnecessary to read the
provisions of s. l 2(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Income-tax
Act or the corresponding provisions of s. 10(2)(xv)
of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. I plunge at
once in medias res to a consideration of the crucial
question in this case: where the two payments in question of the nature of capital expenditure or revenue
expenditure?
This distinction between capital and revenue, either
on the receipt or expenditure side, is almost a perennial problem in Income-tax law. In general the
distinction is well-recognisecl and is based on certain
principles which are easy of application in some cases;
but from time to time cases arise which make the
distinction difficult of application. A large number of
decisions were cited before us, but no infallible criterion of universal application emerges therefrom and
each case must turn, on its own facts, though ' the
decisions are useful as illustrations and as affording
indication of the kind of considerations which may
relevantly be Dorne in mind in approaching the problem. I shall refer in this judgment to such decisions
only as have a bearing on the real controversy between
the parties.
In view of the submissions made before us, the real
controversy in this cas~ appears to me to be this: in
the context of the terms of the contract between the
parties, was the expenditure incurred intended to
create or bring into existence an asset or advantage
of an enduring character or . was it intended to get
only the stock-in-trade or the raw materials for the
business? If it was the former, then it was capital
25--6 SCI/ND/82
686
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
expenditure; if latter, then revenue expcndit:ur_e.
There is no doubt that receipts and l)ayments m
Pingle Industries
Ltd., Sernnd,,abad connexion with acquiring or disposing of leasehol<;ls
v.
of mines or minerals are usually on capital account
Commissioner of (Kamakshya Narain Singh v. Cortimissioner of hlcomeIncome-tax,
tax (')). The reason wby the price paid for the purHyderabad
chase of mining rights is a capital expenditure was
S.K. Das :J.
explained by Channell, J., in Alianza Co. v. Bell (')
in the following words:
"Jn the ordinary case, the cost of the material
worked up in a manufactory is not a capital expenditure; it is a current expenditure and does not become
a capital expenditure merely because the material is
provided by something like a forward contract, under
·which a person for the payment of a lump sum down
secures a supply of the raw material for a period
extending over several years ................ If it is merely
a manufacturing business, then the procuring of the
raw material would not be a capital expenditure. Bnt
if it is like the working of a particular mine or bed
of brick earth and converting the stu!f workecl into a
marketable commodity, then the money paid for the
prime cost of the stuff so clealt with is as much capital
as the money sunk in the machinery or buildings."
Learned counsel for the Department bas strongly relied
on these observations and. has contended that the
appellant had no manufacturing business rn the
present case and the price he paid for working the
quarries was as much capital expenditure as money
sunk in machinery or buildings. But this contention
ignores the absence of one very in1portant c.ircu1nstance in this case. The acquisition of a mine or a
mining right is an encluring asset, because it is not a
mere purchase of minerals but is an acquisiLion of a
source from which flows the right to extract minerals;
in other words, the acquisition provides the means of
obtaining the raw material rather than the raw material itself; therefore, it relates to fixed capital, and in
a business sense the acquiring of a leasehold of a mine
is not the purchase of raw materials only. It is something more than that. In the case before us except
the stones, nothing else was acquirecl. Clauses .~ and 7
of the Quolnama said:
(1)
[19431 11 l.T.R. 513.
(2)
[19011 2 K.Jl. G6G.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
"5. The contractor shall have no right to excavate
stones from other places of the Jagir Ilaqa except
the villages specified within the prescribed period of
contract. The J agir authorities will ndt allow any
other person to excavate these stones within the
jurisdiction of villages other than the villages specified
above."
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'\7. The contractor shall have to excavate stones
from the quarries as per the plan. In case he requires
a further area of land in the village for excavation of
stones, this will be don~ on his application four months
in advance. The contractor will have no right to
manufacture cement · from the s'tones in the villages
noted above."
In view of these clauses and the recital in the Quolnama that it was a quarry contract for excavating
stones only, it is in my view not reasonable to hold
that what the appellant acquired in the present case
was the means of obtaining raw material rather than
'the raw material itself.
It is, I think, an accepted position now that the
expression "capital expenditure··
must normally be
construed in a business sense and emphasis should be
placed upon the business aspect of the transaction
rather than on the purely legal and technical aspect.
It is not, therefore, necessary to determine whether
the Quolnama in the present case was in law a lease,
or a license, or a license coupled with a grant. vVhat
we have to consider is the nature of the transaction
from the business point of view, and it seems to me
that having regard to the terms of the Quolnama, the
transaction in its true nature and quality was a sale
of raw materials coupled with a license to the appellant to come on the land and remove the materials
sold; the purchase price was to be paid partly in a
lump sum and partly in monthly instalments. If that
is the true nature of the transaction, there is no
difficulty in answering the question raised. The only
answer then is that the payments in question were
revenue expenditure.
1960
Pingk Industrie&
Ltd. Secunderabad
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
Hyderabad
S.K. Das J .
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
I now refer to four decisions which in my opinion
come
closest to the controversy before 11>. \I) In re:
Pingle lndustri.ts
Ltd., Secunderabad Benarsi Das ]agannalh CJ; (2) Mohanlal
f-largovind
v.
of ]ubbul/1ote v. Commissioner of Income-lax, C. P. and
Commissioner of Berar, Nagpw· (2); (3) Abdul Kayoom v. Commissioner
Incom1-tax,
of Income-tax, Madras (') and (4) Stow Bardolj1h Gravel
l'f;derabad
Co. Ltd. v. Poole (Inspector of Taxes) ('). The first is a
S.K. Das].
decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court,
the second, a decision of the Privy Council, the third, a
decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court
and the last a decision of the Court of Appeal in
England. The facts in Benarsi Das ]agan11ath (') were
these. The assessee, who was a manufacturer of bricks,
obtai11ed certain lands on leases for the purpose of
digging out earth for the manufacture of bricks.
Under the deeds he had the right to dig earth up to
three to three and a half feet. He had no interest left
in the lands as soon as the earth was dug out and
removed. The periods of the leases varied from six
months to three years. The Income-tax authorities
and the Appellate Tribunal held that the consideration paid by the assessee to the owners of the lands
was a capital expenditure and was therefore not an
allowable deduction under s. I 0(2)(xv) of the Indian
Income-lax Act:. It was held by the Full Bench that
the main object of the agreement was the procuring
of earth for manufacturing bricks and not the acquisition of an advantage of a permanent nature or .of an
~nduring character, that the payments made were the
price of raw material and that the assessee was therefore entitled to claim them as business expenditure
under s. 10(2)(xv). It was worthy of note that this
decision was approved by this Court: in Assa111 Bengal
Cement Co. Ltd v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West
Bengal C). Bhagwati, J., delivering the judgment of
this Court said:
"This synthesis attempted by the Full Bench of
the Lahore High Court truly enunciates the principles
which emerge from the authorities. In cases where
the expenditure is made for the initial outlay or for
(') [194G] I.L.R. 27 Lah. 307. (') [1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 23>.
(') 1.L.R. [1%3] Mad. 1133. (') [195.\] 27 I.T.R. 14G.
(') [1955] 1 S.C.R. 972.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
]960
extension of a business or a substantial replacement
of the equipment. there is no dmibt that it is capital Pingle~ Industries
expenditure. 1} capital asset of the business is either Ltd., Secunderabad
v.
acquired or extended or substantially replaced and
that outlay whatever be its source whether it is drawn Commissiouer ef
Income-tax,
from the capital or the income of the concern ·is
Hyderabad
The
certainly in the nature of capital expenditure.
question, however, arises for consideration where S.K. Das].
expenditure is incurred while the business is going on
and is not incurred either for extension of the business or for the substantial replacement of its equipment.
Such expenditure can be looked at either from the
point of view of what is acquired or from the point of
view of what is the source from which the expenditure
is incurred. If the expenditure is made for acquiring
or bringing into existence an asset or advantage for
the enduring benefit of the business it is properly
attributable to capital and is of the nature of capita~
expenditure. If on the other hand it is made not for
the purpose of bringing into existence of any asset or
advantage but for running the· business or working it
with a view to produce . the profits it is a revenue
expenditure. If any such asset or advantage for the
enduring benefit of the business is thus acquired or
brought into existence it would be immaterial whether
the source of the payment was the capital or the
income of the concern or whether the payment was
made once and for all or was made periodically. Thi;
aim and object of the expenditure would determine
the character of the expenditure whether it is a
capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure. The
source or the manner of the payment would then be of
no consequence. It is only in those cases where this
test is of no avail that one may go to the test of fixed
or circulating capital and consider whether the expenditure incurred was part of the fixed capital of the
business or part of its circulating capital. If it was
part of the fixed capital of the business it would be of
the nature of capital expenditure and if it was part of its
circulating capital it would be of the nature of revenue
expenditure. These tests are thus mutually exclusive
and have to be1 applied to the facts of each particular
case in the manner above indicated. It has been rightly
690
SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS
[19GO]
observed that in the great diversity of human affairs
the complicated nature of business operations it
and
Pinglt lnd11.>tries
is
difficult
to lay down a test which would apply to all .
Ltd., Secunderr-bad
v.
situations. One has therefore got to apply these
Commissioner of
criteria one after the other from the business point of
Income-tax,
view and come to the conclusion whether on a fair
H)'duabad
appreciation of the whole situation the expenditure
S.K. Da< ].
incurred in a particular case is of the nature of capital
expenditure or revenue expenditure in which latter
event only it would be a deductible allowance under
section I 0(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The question
has all along been considered to be a question of fact
to be determined by the Income-tax authorities on an
application of the broad principles laid down above
and the Courts of law would not ordinarily interfere
with such findings of fact if they have been arrived at
on a proper application of those principles"
[ do not read these observations as merely indicating
an approval of certain general principles, but not
necessarily an approval of the actual decision in
Berwrsidas .f11gannath (') In cases of this nature it
is the application of t.he principles to the facts of a
case which presents difficulties, and I do not think
that this Court. would have made the observations it
made, unless it was ap~oroving the actual decision m
Benarsidos .faganalh' (') In cases of this nature it
general principles to the facts of that case l see no
significant distinction between that case and the one
before us. In both cases, what was acquired was raw
material--earth in one case and stone in the other-and
the payments made were the price of the raw material.
The only distinction pointed out is the difference in
the period of the contracts; that is a relevant factor
bnt not determinative of the problem before us. Even
in our case the contract in favour of Government was
for five years only. Surely, it cannot be argued that
three years in one case and five years in the other will
make all the difference. I think· that the real test is,
in the context of the controversy before us, what was
acquired-an enduring asset or advantage, or raw
materials for running the business? Judged hy that
test the present case stands on the same footing as the
nise of Benarsidas .Jagannath (').
1960
(')
[1946] I.L.R. 27 Lah. 307.
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691
1960
In Mohanlal Hargovind (1) the facts were these. The
assessees carried on business at several places as manu- Pi rigle fod11slries
factures and vendors of country made cigarettes Ltd., Securiderabad·
v.
known as bidis. These cigarettes were composed of
Commissioner
of
tobacco rolled in leaves of a tree known as tendu leaves,
Income-tax,
which were obtained by the assessees by entering into
Hyderabad
a nuinber of short term contracts· with the Government
and other owners of forests. Under the contracts·, in S.K. Das.].
consideration of certain sum payable by instalments,
the assessees were granted the exclusive right to pick
and carry away the tendu leaves from the forest area
described: The assessees were allowed to coppice
small tenclu plants a few months in advance to obtain
good leaves and to pollard tendu trees a few months
,in advance to obtain better and bigger leaves. The
picking of the leaves however had to start at once or
practically at once and to proceed continuously. The
Privy Council distinguished Alianza Co. v. Bell (') and
overruling the decision in Income-tax Appellate Trihunal v. Haji Sabumiyan Haji Sirajuddin (') held that
'the expenditure was to secure raW1 material and was
allowable as being on revenue account Lord Greene,
delivering the judgment of the. Board said:
"lt appears to their Lordships that there has been
some misapprehension as to the true nature of these
agreements and they wish to state at once what in
their opinion is and what is not the effect of them.
Thev are merely examples of many similar contracts
entered into by the appellants wholly and exclusively
for the purpose of their business, that purpose being
to supply themselves with one of the raw materials
of that business. The contracts grant no interest in
land and no interest in the trees or plants themselves.
They .are simply and solely contracts giving to the
grantees the right to pick and car11y away leaves,
which, of course, implies the right to appropriate them
as their own property."
·
. "In the present case the trees were not acquired:
nor were the leaves acquired until the appellants had
reduced them into their own 1 possession and ownership
by picking them. If the tendu leaves had been stored
(1)
[1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 235.
(2) [1904] 2 K.B. 666.
(3) [1946] 14 I.T.R. 447.
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
in a merchant's g·oclown and the appellants had bought
Pingfr Iud.,,,.;,, the right to go and fetch them and so reduce them
Ltd., S<cundunbnd into their possession and ownership it could scarcely
v.
have been suggested that the purchase price was
Comrr,issio11er of capital expenditure.
Their Lordships see no ground
Income-lax,
in principle or reason for differentiating· the present
Hyderabad
case from that supposed."
SX. Da; J.
I also see no ground in principle or reason for
differentiating the present case from that of Mohanlal
H argovind (').
In K. T. M. T. M. Abdul Ka"/OOrn and Hussain Sahib
v. Commissioner of lncorn.e-taC:., Madras(') a Full Bench
of the Madras High Court dissenting from its earlier
decisions held that rent paid by a dealer in chank under
an agreement in the form of a "lease" with the
Government under which he had an exclusive right
"to fish for, take and carry away all the chank shells
· in the sea off the coast line" of a certain district, was
allowable as revenue expenditure. It was further held
there that it made no difference whether what was
acquired was raw material for a manufacturing business or stock-in-trade which was intended to be sold
without being subject to any manufacturing process.
This decision is the subject of Civil Appeal No. 64 of
19.16 which has been heard along with this appeal. I
do not see how the present case can be distinguished
from the Madras case without holding that the
Madras decision was incorrect.
Last, I come to Stow Bardolph Grnvd Co. Ltd. (').
·1 ·hat was a case in which it was held that sums paid
b' a dealer in gravel as consideration for the right to
excavate and take away deposits of gravel represented
capital expenditure. The decision rested on the fact
that the subject matter of the agreement consiste<l of
" deposit of gravel lying some feet beneath the surface
of the land and requiring to be won from the land by
a process of excavation. I find it difficult to reconcile
this decision with the decision in. Benars£rl,1s .Taganuath (') and A l"lul Kayoom (') in both of which also
excavation or exploration \Vas 11ecessary to 'vln the
raw material. If, as I hold, the decision in Benarsidas
]agannath (') was approved by this Court then we
(I) (1949) L.R. 7G IA 23".
(3) [1955] 27 J.T.R. \.,!.).
(2)
l.L.R. [1953] M"d. 1133.
en (19Hi) I.L.R. 27 T.1.h, 307.
...
.
-
•
3 S.C.R.
+
=- •
>
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
1960
must accept that decision as correct in preference to
me decision of the Court of Appeal in England. I Pingle Indusa·ies
may point out here what Evershed, M. R., said in the Lui., Secunderabad
v.
course of his judgment in that case:
Commissioner of
"The Commissioners for the General Purpose of
Income-tax,
Hyderab·ad
the Income Tax were of opinion that these claims to
make deductions were not admissible, but Harman, ] .,
5.K. Das J.
was of opinion that the deductions were admissible.
I have myself reached a different conclusion from
that reached by Harman, ]., and I have reached it, I
confess, with some slight feeling of regret and misgiving on two grounds: first, I think the result bears
a little hardly on the taxpayers for reasons which
will, I think, emerge without any necessity for emphasis as I recite the facts; second, I am not for my own
part satisfied that if close investigation were made of
the method whereby the taxpayers and others in the
same line of business carry on their businesses, it
might not emerge-I say no more than that-that the
commissioners would find as a fact, notwithstanding
the apparent legal consequences of the agreement to
which I have referred, Lhere was here in truth such a
taking possession of the deposit of gravel in question
that it could sensibly for t~,x purposes and rightly and
fairly be said that once the consideration money had
been paid under the agreement the deposit was in
truth the stock-in-trade of the taxpayer. However,
I have felt compelled to say that there is no finding
of fact to support such a conclusion, nor indeed is
there before us any evidence sufficient to warrant it.
It is in that respect, I apprehend, that I find myself
at variance with Harman, ]."
"If the facts were as the judge intimated, the
General Commissioners might find, and might justifiably find, that a case such as this is not really
distinguishable as a matter of law and common sense
from a sale of loose objects lying on the surface of the
ground, such as windfalls from apple trees, or even
from cases like those I have mentioned, which are
concerned with crops or leaves growing on trees. But
my difficulty is that I can find no justification for that
conclusion in the material before us."
26-6 scr I ND I 82
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
In view of these observations I have considerable
and I say this with great respect, in
hestitation,
Pingle Industries
Ltd., Secunderabad accepting the decision as a decision on a general quesv.
tion of law. The decision proceeded on the findings of
Commissiontr of the Commissioners and on the basis that there were no
Income-tax,
materials for the conclusion reached by Harman, J.
Hyderabad
If we proceed on the findings of the Tribunal in the
S.K. Das J,
present case, there are enough materials to support
the finding that the appellant acquired nothing but
raw materials by the transactions in question.
I fine! nothing in the decision in Stow Bardolfih
Gravel Co. Ltd. (') which need lead me to the conclusion that the decisions in Benarsidas Jagannath (')
and Abdul Kayoom (") were wrong and require reconsideration. If I may again say so with great respect,
the learned Master of the Rolls distinguished the
Privy Council decision in Mohan/al Hargovind (') by
saying that that decision rested upon the particular
circumstances of the case and upon the fact that the·
Board was able to say that from the moment the contract was entered into and before the leaves had
actually been picked, the tendu leaves were part of.
the raw material of the appellant. He added that 1ie
could not say the same of sand and gravel, which
were part of the earth itself and which could only
become part of the stock-in-trade of the gravel merchant's business when it had, in the true sense, been
won, been excavated and been taken into their possession. I do not, however, think that the decision in
l\fohan/al Hargovind (') proceeded on the basis suggested by the learned Master of the Rolls. In clear
and express terms Lord Greene said: "nor were the
leaves acquired until the appellant reduced them into
their possession and ownership by picking them."
This shows that the rl.ecision of the Privy Council did
not proceed on the ground alleged, n~mely, that even
before the leaves had actually been picked, they were
part of the raw ·material of the appellant of that case.
The decision proceeded on the footing that the leaves
became part of the raw material when they were
reduced into possession and ownership by picking
(I)
(3)
[195.5] 27 1.T.R. 146.
[1953] 24 1.T.R. 1 IG.
(2) [1946] J.L.R. 27 Lah. 307.
(4) [1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 235.
-
3 S.C.R.
-
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
1960
them. If that is the correct ratio of Mohanlal Hargovmd ('), then where is the distinction between that
Pingle Industrie,
case and -the case of the gravel merchant . in Stow Ltd.,
Secunderabad
Bardolph Gravel Co. Ltd. (')and the stone merchant in
v.
the present case? In my opinion there is none.
Commissioner of
Incomt-tax,
In the result and for the reasons given above, I
Hyderabad
hold that the expenditure in question was on revenue
account and the appellant was entitled to the allowance he claimed. The answer given by the High
Court was wrong and the appeal should be allowed
with costs.
HmAYATULLAH, ].-This is an assessee's appeal on Hidayatu/lah ].
a certificate of the High Court granted under s. 66A(2)
of the Indian Income-tax Act.
Pingle Industries Ltd. (hereinafter called the
assessee) is a ptivate limited Company which carries
on, among other businesses, the business of extracting
stones from quarries, which, after dressing, it sells as
flag stones. In the year 1343 Fasli, the assessee
. obtained from Nawab Mehdi Jung Bahadur of
Hyderabad the right to extract stones from certain
q1iarries belonging -to the Nawab. A quolnama (contract) was executed, and it has been produced in the
case. Under this quolnama, the assessee was granted
the right to extract stones from quarries situated in
six named villages for a period of 12 years (1346 Fasli
To
to 1358 Fasli) on annual payment of Rs. 28,000.
safeguard payment Rs. 96,000 representing a part of
the annual payment at Rs. 8,000 per year were paid
in advance as security, and the balance of Rs. 20,000
'vas payable each year in monthly instalments of
Rs. 1,666-10-8 each. In default of punctual payment
of these instalments, interest at Re. 1 per cent. was to
be charged. Some other conditions of the quolnama
may also be briefly mentioned here. The assessee
undertook not to manufacture cement and also to be
responsible for the payment of the money in spite of
"any celestial or terrestrial or unexpected calamity or
unforeseen event", while the Nawab on his part
undertook not to allow any other person to excavate
stones in the area of the six villages. It was agreed
that in case of default of instalment, the contract
(I)
[19+9] L.R. 76 LA. 235.
(2)
[1955] 27 I.T.R. 146.
G96
SUPREM.E COURT REPORTS
fl 9GO I
1960
would be re-auctioned after one month's notice to the
contractor, who would be responsible for any shortfall
Pingle Industrie~
Ltd., -Secunderabad but would not have the benefit of any extra amount.
;,
The assessee was assessed in the Fasli years 1.357
Commissfoner of and 1358 for the account years 1356 and J 357 Fasli.
b.come~l.ix,
It claimed deduction respectively of Rs. 27,051 and
Hyderabad
Rs. 28,159 paid to the Nawab in those years, as exHida;•atullah J. penditure under s. l 2(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Incometax Act, which· is the same as the corresponding provision under the Indian Income-tax Act. The claim
for de¢uction was refused by the Income-tax Officer,
who held that the amount in each year represented a
capital expenditure though tbe whole sum was being
paid in inst~lments. The assessee appealed against
the two orders of assessment to the Appellate Officer
of Income-tax, and questioned this decision. The
·appeals involved other matters also, with which we
are not now concerned. The appeals were dismissed.
The asses;ee appealed further to the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, and raised the same
contention. The Appellate Tribunal accepted the
appeals. Different reasons were given by the President and the Accountant Member. According to the
latter, the payment of these sums was similar to the
payment of royalties and dead rent which is allowable
as working expense in the case of mines and quarries.
The President relied upon Mohan/al Hargovind v.
Commissioner of Income-tax ('), and held that the
payments represented the purchase of the stock-intrade of the assessee, and that the leases did not create
an asset of an enduring character.
The Commissioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad Division, then asked for a reference of the case to the High
Court at Hyderabad, and the ,;.ppellate Tribunal
referred the following question of law under s. 66(1) of
the Hyderabad Income-tax Act.
"Whether the lease-money paid by the assessee
Company to Nawab Mehdi Jung Bahadur and to
Government is capital expenditure or revenue
expenditure."
The reference to Government in the question arises
in this way. It appears that there was yet another
(I)
[1949] I..R. 76 !.A. 235.
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
1960
lease which was taken from Government for 5 years'
and under which the assessee was reguired to pay
Pingle Industries
Rs. 9,000 per year in instalments of Rs. 750 per Ltd.,
Secunderabad
month. It does not appear that the terms of this
v.
lease were ascertained and the amount does not figure Commissioner of
11lcome~tax.
in the order of assessment, though apparently it was
H;·dercbad
assumed that what applied to the payment to the
Nawab held equally good in regard to the payment to
Hida)afullah J.
Government. In any event, the books of the assessee
kept in mercantile system showed both the sums each
year as lease money.
-
The High Court of Hyderabad after an examination
of several decisions rendered in India and the United
Kingdom, held that the payments in each year of
account \~•ere of a capital nature, and that no deduction could be given under s. 12(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad
Income-tax Act.
The assessee then applied, and
obtained the certificate as stated, and this appeal has
been filed.
The arguments in the case involved the interpretation of the quolnama as to the right conveyed there
and the nature of the payments with reference to the
provision of the law under which the deduction was
claimed. That section reads as follows :
"1 2 (l): The tax shall be payable by an assessee
under the head profits and gains of business, profession or vocation in respect of the profits and gains
of any business, profession or vocation carried on
by him.
(2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after
making the following allowances, namely:~
;.,..
(xv) Any expenditure (not being in the nature of
capital expenditure or personal expenses of the
assessee) laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, profession or
vocation."
While the Appellate Tribunal looked to the periodicity of the payments, the High Court held that the
amot1nt payable '"ras Rs. 3,36,000 divided into annual
and redivided into monthly instalments. The Tribunal
also considered the payments as of 'the nature of rent
or royalty or as price for raw materials.
The High
G93
SUPREivlE COURT REPORTS
[19GO J
1960
Court, on the other hand, disagreed, and held that
there being no manufacturing business, the money
Pi11glt Industries
expended
could not be reg·arded as price of raw mateLtd., Secu11derabad
rials
or
even
as rent but as spent to acquire a capital
v.
asset
of
enduring
benefit to the assessee. The High
Commissioner of
lnrome-tax,
Court
referred
to
numerous decisions in which the
H_yduabaa
question whether a receipt or expenditure is on capital
or revenue account has been considered in· India and
Hida)'lllullah :J.
the United Kingdom.
Before us also, many of them
were again cited as illustrating, if not layii:ig clown.
certain general principles.
We shall refer to some of
the leading cases later, but we may say at once that
no conclusive tests have been laid down which can
apply to all the cases. The facts of one case differ so
much from those of another that the enquiry is often
somewhat fruitless.
If, however, the distinguishing
featmcs are not lost sight of, the decided cases do
afford a guide for the solution of the problem in band.·
The arguments of Mr. Palkhivala for the assessec
may be shortly stated. He contends that the quolnama
is a licence and not· a lease, becat1se it creates 110
interest in land and no premium is payable for the
right, but what is paid is periodic compensation corresponding to rent. He contends that the payments
can only be regarded as periodic compensation or
periodic rovaltv or licence fees and thus revenue in
character. 'I-le' further argues that even if held to be
a lump sum payment broken up into instalments, it is
still allowable as expenditure because it represents the
price for the acquisition of raw materials, viewed from
the business angle.
According to him, all cases of
mines and quarries fall into three classes which are:
(i) in which mmes and quaries are purchased
outright ;
(ii) in which ownership is not acquired but only
an interest in land; and
(iii) in which there is not even an interest in land
but there is an arrangement in praesenti and de
futnro to ensure supply of raw materials.
He contends that this being evidently not a case
within the first category, it matters not which 0£ the
other two categories it belong·s to, because in ·his submission, both the remaining categories exclude a case
.
-
-
3 S.C.R.
+
j
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
1960
of capital expenditure.
He, however, seems inclined
to put his case in the third category.
.S Pinglt Ind1<rtries
The learned Additional Solicitor-General on hi Ltd., Secund<rn bad
side enumerates the tests which determine whether an
v.
expenditure bears a capital or revenue character. Commissioner of
Income-to.x,
According to him, decided cases show that capital
Hyderabad
expenditure is ordinarily once and for all and not of
a periodic character, bui· contends that even a single Hidayatullah J.
sum chopped up into instalments is not a payment of
"!: -periodic character He submits that capital expenditure is "!:me which brings into existence an enduring
:idvantage, which, he maintains, is the case here,
because the monev was spent on the initiation of the
business and to obtain a permanent source of raw
,materials and not only the materials.
The quolnama shows that the agreement was for
12 years.
The assessee paid an initial sum of
Rs. -%.000 as security for the whole contract.
He
was required to pay Rs. 28,000 per year. The security
which was given was being diminished at the rate of
Rs. 8.000 per year. It was a guarantee against failure
to pziv the monthly instalments. but there was no
condition that the short payments were to be debited
to it. It was rather a guarantee for the overall payment and to reimburse the jagir for any loss occasioned bv a re-audion of the lease after default by the
assessee. Further, the payments were to be made even
if no stones were extracted or could not be extracted
due to force majeure. There was no limit to the quantity
to be extracted. There was also a condition that none
but the assessee was allowed to work the quarries,
which means that the right was exclusive and in the
nature of a monopoly. The payment, though divided
into instalments of Rs. l ,666-10-8 per month, was
really one for the entire lease and of Rs. 3,36,000.
Nothing, however. turns upon it.
It is pertinent to
s:iy that the assessee in its petition for leave to appeal
to this Court filed in the High Court, viewed the
amount as being Rs. 3.36.000 divided into various
parts. This is what it said:
"O i;ider the terms of the said lease. the Company
was required to pziv a .sum of H. S. Rs. 28,000 per
annum to the ,lessor. The total amount payable for
700
1960
Piiigle Industries
Ltd., Secmulerabad
v.
Commissioner
of
Incorne-tax,
}{yde.-aiad
Hidayatullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19601
the entire period amounted to Rs. 3.36,000 out of
which a sum of Rs. 96.000 was paid at the time of
the execution of the lease deed and the balance of
Rs. 2.40,000 was agreed to be paid at the rate of
Rs. 20,000 per annum in twelve years. It was also
agreed that this sum of Rs. 20,000 per annum should
be paid in equal instalments of Rs. 1,666-10,8 every
month. On the expiry of the period of lease, it was
renewed for a further period of five years and seven
months at an annual rent of Rs. 35,000."
These being the terms of the lease, the question is
_whether the payments in the account years can be
regarded as capital or revenue expenditure.
The question whether an expenditure 1s capital
or reventie in character is one of common occurrence.
Its frequency, however, has not served to elucidate
the tests with any degree of certainty and precision.
ft has now become customary to start with two propositions which appear to have been received without
much argument. The first was laid down in Vallaml1rosa Rubber Co. Ud. v. Farmer ('), where Lord
nuncrlin observed that "in a rough wav"
it was
"not a barl criterion of what is ca[iital ~xpcnditure
as against \\rhat lS incon1e expcnclit11re to say that
capital expenditure is a thing that is going to be spent
once and for all and income expenditure is a thing
which is going to recur ever)' year"'. This proposition
"·as further qualified by Lord Cave in A lherton. v.
British Insulated and .Helsl1y Cables Ltd. ( 2) 111 the
following words :
"\,Vhen an expenditure is made, not only once
anrl for all, but with a view to bring·ing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit
of a trade, I think there is very g·ood reason (in the
absence of special circumstances leading to the
oppo.,itc conclusion) for treating such an expenditure as properly attributable, not to revenue, but to ·
capital."
The words "enduring benefit of a trade" haYe been
further explained as. meaning not "everlasting", b':'t
"in the way capital endmes", sec Du Parcq, L. J., m
'I). (1910) 5 T.C.529.
(2)
[1926) A.C:. 20.5, 213.
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
Henriksen v. Grafton Hotel Ltd. (1) and Rowlatt, J.,
19d1J
in Anglo-Persian Oil Co. v. Dale (2).
Pingle Industries
Another test propounded by Viscount Haldane m Ltd., Secunderabad
]ohn Smith & Son. v. Moore (') is to distinguish, as
v.
economists do, between fixed and circulating capital. Commiuioner of
1
This appears to have appealed to Lord Hanworth,
'f'I;'de~~t:,d
M. R., in Golden Horse Shoe (New) Ltd. v. Thurgood(')
but in Van Den Berghs Limited v. Clark ('), Lord Hidayatullah J.
Macmillan observed that he did not find it very helpful.
Often enough, where the character of the expenditure
shows that what has resulted is something which is to
be used in the way of business, the test may be useful;
but in cases close to the dividing line, the test seems
useless.
A third test was laid clown by the Judicial Committee in Tata Hydro-Electric Agencies Ltd., Bombay
v. Commissioner of Income-tax ('). There, it was stated
that if the expenditure was part of the working e_xpenses in ordinary commercial trading it was not capital
but revenue. The Judicial Committee observed:
"What is 'money wholly and exclusively laid out
for the purposes of the trade' is a question which
must be determined upon the principles of ordinary
commercial trading. It is necessary, accordingly, to
attend to the true nature of the expenditure, and
to ask oneself the question, is it a part of the company's working expenses; is it expenditure laid out
as part of the process of profit earning.?"
In addition to these three tests, the last of which
was applied again by the Judicial Committee in
Mohanlal Hargovind's case ('), there are some supplementary tests, which have frequently been alluded to
Lord Sands in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.
Granite City Steamship Co. Ltd. (') characterised as
capital an outlay made for the initiation of a business,
for extension of a business. or for a substantial replacement of equipment. In that case, there was extensive
damage to a ship, and repairs were necessary to resume
trading, such expense being held to be capital expend(II
(3)
(5)
(7)
(1942) 24 T.C. 453, 462, C.A.
(1920) 12 T.C. 266, 282.
(1935) 19 T.C. 390.
(1949) L.R. 76 I.A. 235.
27-6 SCT/ND/82
(2) (1931) 16 T.C. 253, 262.
(4) (1933) 18 T.C. 280, 298.
(6) (1937) L.R. 64 I.A. 215.
(8) (1927) 13 T. C.1, 14.
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]
1960
iture. The questions which Lord Clyde posed in
Robert Addie & Sons Collieries Ltd. v. Commissioners
Pingle Industries
Ltd., SecUnderabad of Inland Revenue ('), namely:
v.
"Is it part of the Company's working expenses.
Commissioner of
is it expenditure laid out as part of the process of
Income-tax,
profit earning?-or, on the other hand, is it capital
H.J•derabad
outlay, is it expenditm;e necessary for the acquisition of property or of rights of a permanent characHidayatul/ah J.
ter, the possession of which is a condition of carrying
on its trade at all ? "
influenced the Privy Council in Tata Hydro-Electric
Agencies Ltd., Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax(')
(at p. 209), and the latter part of the question is the
test laid down by Lord Sands, to which 'we have
referred. .
There is then the test whether by the expenditure
the taxpayer was ensuring supplies of raw material or
purchasing them. This test is adverted to by Channell, J., in Alianza Co. Ltd. v. Bell (") and approved
by the House of Lords. Says Channell, J. :
"In the ordinary case, the cost of the material
worked up in a manufactory is not a capital expenditure, it is a current expenditure and does not become
a capital expenditure merely because the ma~erial
is provided by something like a forward contract,
under which a person for the payment of a lump
sum s~cures a supply of the raw material for a period
extending over several years ...... If it is merely a
manufacturing business, then the procuring of the
raw material would not be a capital expenditure.
But if it is like the working of a particular mine,
or bed of brick earth and converting the stuff into
a marketable commodity, then the money paid for
the prime cost of the stuff so dealt with is just as
much capital as the money sunk in machinerv or
buildings."
The application of this proposition finds an example
in M ohanlal H argovind' s case ('), where tendu leaves
were the subject of expenditure. The firm in that
case had paid for purchasing a right to collect tendu
leaves from forest, which right included the right of
-
(I)
(3)
(1924) 8 T.C. 671, 676.
(1910) 5 T.C. 60,
(2)
(4)
(1937) L.R. 64 I.A. 21.5.
(1949) L.R. 76 I.A. 23.5.
.!.--<.
~
3 S.C.R.
·,.
.,
SUPREME.COURT REPORTS
703
1960
entry and coppicing and pollarding.
No right in the
land or, the trees and plants was conveyed, .and the Pingle Industries
Judicial Committee laid emphasis on the nature of the Ltd., Secunderabad
v.
business of the firm, and equated the expenditure to
of
one for acquiring the raw materials for the manufac- Commissioner
lncome~tax,
turing business.
·
Hyderabad
The cases to which we have referred and many more
Hidayatullah J,
of the High Courts in India where the principles were
applied with the exception of the one last cited, were
all considered by this Court in Assam Bengal Cement
Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax(1).
In that
case, Bhagwati, J., referred to a decision of the Punjab
High Court in Banarsidas ]agannath, In re (2), where
Mahajan, ]. (as he then was), summarised the position
and the various tests. This Court quoted with approval this summary, and observed at p. 45 :
"In cases where the expenditure is made for the
initial outlay or for extension of a business or a
substantial replacement of the equipment, there is
no doubt that it is capital expenditure. A capital asset
of the business is either acquired· or extended or
substantially replaced and that outlay whatever be
its source whether it is drawn from the capital or
the income of the concern is certainly in the nature
of capital expenditure. The question however arises
for consideration where expenditure is incurred
while the business is going on and is not incurred
either for extension of the business or for the substantial replacement of its equipment. Such expenoiture can be looked at either from the point of .view
of what i.s acquired or from the point of view of
what is the source from which the expenditure is
incurred. If the expenditure is made for acquiring
or bringing into existence an asset or advantage for
the enduring benefit of the business it is properly
attributable to capital and is of the nature of capital
expenditure. If on the other hand it is made not
for the purpose of bringing into existence any such
asset or advantage but for running the business
or working it with a view to produce the profits
it is a revenue expenditure. If any such asset or
advantage for the enduring benefit of the business is
(')
(1955) I S.C.R. 972.
(')
(1946) I.L.R. 27 Lah. 307.
704
1960
Pingle JndtjJ/ries
l.Jd., So;.,.,U,abad
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
Hyderabad
Hiaayalullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
thus acquired or brought into existence it would be
immaterial whether the source of the payment was
the capital or the income of the concern or whether
the payment was made once and for all or was
made periodically.
The aim and object of the
expenditure would determine the character of the
expenditure whether it is a capital expenditure or
a revenue expenditure. The source or the manner
of the payment would then be of no consequence.
It is only in those cases where this test is of no avail
that one may go to the test of fixed or circulating
capital and consider whether the expenditure incurred was part of the fixed capital of the business or
part of its circulating capital.
If it was part of
the fixed capital of the business it· would be of
the nature of capital expenditure and if it was
part of its circulating capital it would be of the
nature of revenue expenditure. These tests are thus
mutually exclusive and have to be applied to the
facts of each particular case in the manner above
indicated."
Learned counsel in the present case rested his case
upon the decision of the Punjab High Court in
Benarsidas case ('), and stated that after its approval
bi this Court, the expenditure here could not but be
held as on capital account.
He relied strongly also
upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Mohanlal H argovind' s case (2). Reference was made to other
decisions, which we will briefly notice later.
In Benarsidas case ('), the person sought to be
assessed was a manufacturer of bricks. He obtained
certain lands for digging out earth for his manufacture.
Under the deeds which g·ave him this right, he could
dig up to a depth of 3 feet.. to 3~ feet. He had no
interest in the land, and as soon as the earth was
removed, his right was at an end. It was held in that
case that the main object of the agreements was the
procuring of eat th as ,:aw materials, arid by the expenditure the lessee had not acquired any advantage of a
permanent or enduring character. It is, however, to
be noticed that the duration of the leases was from six
months to three years.
The Full Bench referred to
(')
(194G) I.L.R. 27 Lah. 307.
(')
(1994) L.R. 76 I.A. 235.
-
3-S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
1960.
' some other leases in which the duration was longer,
and observec:l:
Pingle Industries
"There are other agreements which are not before Ltd., Secunderabad
V.·
us and it seems that the items mentioned in the
Commissioner
of
question referred relate to those agreements as well.
Income-tax,
We do not know the nature of the agreements, but
Hyderabad
the question can be answered by saying that expenses incurred during the year of assessment for Hidayatulfoh J.
purchase of earth on basis of agreements of the
nature mentioned in the case of Benarsidas or of the
nature like Exhibit T. E. are admissible deductions,
while sums spent for obtaining leases for a substantially long period varying from 10 to .20 years cannot be held to be valid deductions if they amount
to an acquisition o fan asset of an enduring advan·
tage to the lessee."
It appears that the Full Bench was persuaded to this
The first was that
view from two considerations.
what was acquired was earth with no interest in land,
and the other was the short term of the leases.
The approval given to Benarsidas case(1) by this
Court does not extend beyo~d the summary of the
tests setlled in it, and the tests have· to be applied to
the facts of each case in the manner indicated by this
Court.
But the actual decision was not before this
Court, and cannot be said to have been approved.
The agreements in the present . case are long-term
They give the right to extract stones in
contracts.
six villages without any limit by measurement· or
quantity.
They give the right exclusively to quarry
for a number of years.
This case is thus very different on facts.
Further, the duration of the _right
which seems to have weighed with the Full Bench in
>
the Punjab High Court has little to do with the
character of the expenditure even if it be a relevant
In Henriksen' s case (') the right
factor to consider.
was only for 3 years, but monopoly value having been
paid for it, the result was a capital asset of an 'enduring character.
In M ohanlal H argovind' s case ('), the person assessed
was a bidi manufacturer who had obtained short-term
1
( )
(1946) I.L.R. 27 Lah. 307.
(2 ) (1942) 24 T.C, 453, 462, C.A.
(') ( 1949) L.R. 76 I.A 235.
706
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
1960
[l 960]
contrach with Government and other forest owners
to
obtain tendu leaves from the forests.
These tendu
Pingle lnduslrits
Ltd.,· Secunderabad leaves with tobacco are used to roll into cigarettes.
v.
The contracts. gave a right of entry into forests to
Commissioner of collect the leaves and also to coppice the plants and
. Income tax,
to 'pollard the tendu trees, but beyond this gave no
Hyd.rnbad
interest in land.
The Judicial Committee held that
Hidayatullah J. these contracts were in a
business sense for the purpose of securing supplies to the manufacturers of one
of the raw materials of his business.
They granted
no interest in land or the plants or trees.
The small
right of cultivation and the exclusive nature of the
grant were of no significance. Then, the Judicial
Committee observed as follows:
"Cases relating to the purchase or leasing of
mines, quarries, deposits of brick earth, land with
standing-timber, etc ... do not appear to their Lordships to be of assistance."
The Board distinguished Alianza Co. Ltd. v. Bell (')
which was said to be a case analogus to purcahse or
leasing of a mine and Kauri: Timber Company's case ('\,
which was a case of acquisition of land or of standing
timber which was an interest in land.
In either
case, it was a capital asset.
Thei1 Lordships finally
observed:
"In the present case the trees were not acquired;
nor were the leaves acquired until the appellant>
had reduced them into their own possession and
ownership by picking them.
The two cases can, in
their Lordships' opinion, in no sense be regarded
as comparable. If the tendu leaves had been stored
in a merchant's godown and the appellants had
bought the right to go and fetch them and so reduce
them into their possession and ownership it could
scarcely have been. suggested that the purchase
price was capital expenditure.
Their Lordships see
no ground in principle or reason for differentiating
the present case from that supposed."
It is to be noticed that the Privy Council case w;is
not applied but distinguished by the Court of Appeal
in England in Stow BnrdolfJh Gravel Co. Ltd. v. Poole(')
t'l (19101 .5 T.C. GO
('' [1913] A.C. 771.
(') [1954] 35 T.C. 459.
-
3 S.C.R.
-
.
"".
>
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
In that ease, the Company was doing the business of
selling sand ahd gravel.
It purchased two unworked
deposits, and it claimed that the payment should be
deducted from its profits as being expenditure for
acqumng its trading stock.
It was held that the
Company had acquired a capital asset and not a
stock-in-trade.
Harman, J., before whom the appeal
came from the decision of the General Commissioners,
said that the case · was indistinguishable from the
Golden Horse Shoe case ('), where the tailings were
regarded as the stock-in-trade of the taxpayer.
He
observed:
'"Now, it is said here that the opposite conclusion
should be reached, and I think in substance the
reason is because this. gravel had never been raked
oft the soil upon which it was lying.
There is no
question, in any true sense, of extracting gravel;
there is no process, as I understand it, gone through
here. It is not even suggested that a riddle or sieve
is used; you· merely dig it up or rake it up where
it lies, put it on the lorry and sell it wherever you
It is said what was bought was a mere right
can.
to go on the place and win the gravel, but, in effect,
in the Golden Horse Shoe case(') what was bought
was the licence to go on the land ;rnd take away
the tailings, and I myself think that it is a distinction without difference to suggest that, because
nobody had ever applied a rake to this gravel before,
it should be treated as capital, whereas if somebody had raked it into little heaps before the
contract was made then its purchase would constitute a different form of adventure.
It is the same
situation; it is no more and no less attached to the
land."
In dealing with this case on appeal, Lord Evershed,
M. R. (then Sir Raymond Evershed), felt that the case
was a little hard upon the taxpayer, and further
that it' might, if proper enquiry had been made, have
been possible to .hold that after the price was paid, the
sand and gravel become, in truth, the stock-in-trade
of the taxpayer. Taking the facts, however, as found,
he held that what ·was purchased was a part of the
( 1)
(1933) 18 T.C. 280, 298.
1960
Pingle ·Industries
Ltd., Secunderahcd
v.
Commisswner of
Income-tax,
Hy<krobad
Hida;•atullah J.
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1960.
[1960]
land itself, namely, the gravel in situ. He held that
distinction between the purchase of a
Pingle Industries there was a
Ltd., Secunderabad growing crop or leayes
and the purchase of gravel.
v.
Lord Evershed then analysed the agreement, and
Commissioner of observed as follows:
Income.tax,
H_yderabad
"I think that, once it has to be conceded that
there was no sale of the gravel in the way the
Hiday{jtullah J.
.Judge said there was, then it must follow that what
was here acquired was ... the means of getting the
gravel by excavating and making it part of the
stock-in-trade."
Reference was then made by him to cases in which
what was purchased or taken on lease was land or an
interest in land, and Mohanlal Ha,-govind's case (') was
distinguished on the ground that in that case it was possible to say of tendu leaves that they were acquired as
the raw material for manufacture.
The argument of
Mr. Magnus i'n the case described as an attempt to
substitute sand and gravel for tendu leaves was not
accepted, Lord Evershed observing:
"But I cannot say the same of the sand and
gravel, part of the earth itself, which was the subject of the contract here in question and which
I think only could sensibly become part of the
stock-in-trade of this gravel merchants' business
when it had in the true sense been won, had been
excavated and been taken into their possession."
\Ve are in entire agreement that such a distinction is
not only palpable but also sensible. The present case
is a fortiori. Here, the stones are not lying on the
surface but are part of a quarry from which thev
have to be extracted methodically and skillfully before
they can be dressed and sold.
These deposits are
extensive, and the work of the assessee carries him
deep under the earth. Such a deposit cannot be
described as the stock-in-trade of the assessee. but
stones detached and won can only be so described.
Before we deal with the other cases, we wiili to
state the distinguishing features of the cases alreadv
mentioned, and which have not often been viewed
together. In the A lianza case (2), the sale was Hot of
the caliche as such but of the right to win it from a
(')
(1949) L.R. 76 I.A. 23',,
(2)
(1910) 5 T.C. GO.
-
<
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709'
1960
deposit thereof, and it was treated as an expenditure
of a capital nature. In the Stow Bardolph case('), the Ping!• Jndustries
finding was that sand and gravel had to be won, and Ltd., Secunderabad
v.
it was held that they could not be treated as stock-intrade till they were actually won. The doubt expressed Commissioner of
/ncome• tax,
by Lord Evershed was that if the taking of sand and
Hyderaht;d
gravel involved merely taking them up and putting
them into trucks, the finding could have been other- Hidayatullak J.
Harman, J., made this distinction, but in view
wise.
of the finding, the Court of Appeal came to different
conclusion. Indeed, Harman, J., .. himself would have
decided differently if there was, in any true sense, a
question of extracting gravel. He, therefore, thought
that the case resembled the Golden Horse Shoe case(')
where the "tailing( were bargained for and paid
for, and became the stock-in-trade of the tax-prayer.
In Mohanlal Hargovind's case('), there being no
interest in land or trees or plants and the right of
cultivation and the exclusiveness o~ the right to the
le<1.ves being insignificant, the contracts were treated
as leading to acquisition of the raw materials.
The
leaves on trees were treated as equal to leaves ill a
shop. It was o,n this ground that that case was distin. guished from the. Kauri Timber ComfJany case('), in
which land and interest .in land in the ~hape of standing timber were involved. The case in Hood-Barrs v.
Cornmissioners of Inland Revenue(') was similar to
the last cited.
In the present case, the assessee
acquired a right to extract stones and his lease included
not only the stones on the top but also those buried
out of sight under tons of other stones, which he could
only reach after extracting those above.
This case is
thus within the rule of those cases in which the right
acquired is to a source from which the raw materials
are to be extracted.
The doubt expressed by Lord
Evershed does not apply to the facts here, because the
reasons given by Harman, .J., cannot be made applicable at all.
In Kamakshya Narain Singh v. Commissioner ?f
Income-tax('), the case involved payment of certam
annual sums by way of salami for mining rights, and
1
-
.
•
(l) [1955] 27 I.T.R. 146.
(3) [1949] 17 I.T.R. 473.
(5) [1958] 34 I.T.R. 238.
28-6 SCI/ND/82
(2) [1933] 18 T.C. 280.
(4) [1913] A.G. 77.1.
(6) [1943) 11 I.T.R . .'ill!. P.C
.
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
these were regarded as capital income. There were
also
two other payments, namely, royalty on coal
Pingle Industries
Ltd., Secunderabad raised and a provision for minimum royalty.
These
v.
were regarded as not capital receipts but as assessable
Commissioner of income.
In dealing with the nature of the working of
Income-tax,
a mine, certain observations were made.
It was conHyderabad
tended that the payments amounted to conversion of
Hida;•atullah J. a 'capital asset into cash.
The argument was repelled
by the Judicial Committee in these words:
"These are periodical payments, to be made by
the lessee under his covenants in consideration of
the benefits which he is granted by the lessor. What
these benefits may be is shown by the extract from
the lease quoted above, which illustrates how inadequate and fallacions it is to envisage the royalties
as merely the price of the actual tons of coal.
The
tonnage royalty is indeed payable when the coal or
coke is gotten and despatched; but that is merely
the last stage.
As preliminary and ancillary to that
culminating ac.t, liberties are granted to em.er on the
land and searlch, to dig and sink pits, to erect
engines and machinery, coke ovens, furnaces and
form railways and roads.
All these and the like
liberties show how fallacious it is to treat the lease
as merely one for the acquisition of a certain number of tons of coal, or the agreed item of royalty as
merely the price of each ton of coal. 'The contract
is in truth much more complex. The royaltv is 'in
substance a rent; it is the compensation which the
occupier pays the landlord for that spacies of occupation which the contract between them allows' to
quote the words of Lord Denman in R. v. W rsthrook ('). He was referring to leases of coal mines,
clay pits and slate quarries_
I-le added that in all
these the occupation was only valuable· by the
removal of portions of the_ soil.
It is true that he
was dealing with occupation from the point of. view
of rating, but compensation bas th_e same meaning
in its application to matters of taxation such as are
involved in this case."
Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the
assessee th_~t we should treat this quolnama as merely
(I)· (1875) IO Q.B. 178.
-
•
-
3 S.C.R.
-
~·
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
711
1960
showing a licence and not a ·lease creating interest in
land is not correct.
A lease to take out sand was des- Pingle Industries
cribed in Kanjee and Moolji Bros. v. Shanmugam Ltd., Secunderabad
v.
Pillai(') as amounting to a transfer of interest in
immovable property and also so, in connection with Commissioner of
Income-tax,
the Registration Act in Secretary of State for India v.
Hyderabad
Kuchwar Lime and S,tone Co. ('). It is thus clear that
what the, assessee acquired was land, a pi\rt of which Hidayatullah J.
in the shape of stones he was to appropriate under the
covenants.
He was not purchasing stones, and the
price paid could not in any sense be referable to stones
as stock-in-trade.
The stones extracted might have
become his stock-in-trade, but the stones in situ were
not so.
Nor do we agree that the. periodicity of payments
has any significance.
As was pointed out by Lord
· Greene, M. R., in H enrilden' s case('):
"If the sum payable is not in the nature. of
revenue expenditure, it cannot be made so by permitting it to be paid in annual instalments.
These
payments by instalments in respect of monopoly.
value have not the annual quality of the _payments
for the grant of the anriual excise licence, bm are of
the
a different character altogether ............ Here
Appellants were minded to acquire as asset in the
shape of a licence for a term of years."
The learned Master of the Rolls added tliat
the
annual payments gave "a false appearance of periodicity".
·
Applying the above test to the· present case, it is
obvious that the monthly payments of Rs. 1,666-10-8
did' not represent the lease amount for a month.
This
was a case in ~1 hich the assessee had acquired an
asset of an enduring character for which he had to
put his hand in his pocket for a very large sum indeed.
He paid Rs. 96,000 down, ·but for the rest he asked
for easy terms.
The amount paid every month was
not in any sense a payment for acquisition of the right
from month to month.
It was really the entire sum'
chopped into .small payments for his convenience.
Nor can the amount be described as a business
expense, because the outgoings every month were not
(1)
(1933) T.L.R. 56 Mad. 169.
(2) (1937) L.R. 65 I.A. 45, 54.
(3) (1942) 24 T.C. 453, 462, C.A.
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
to be taken as spent over purchase of stones but 111
discharge
of the entire liability to the jagir.
Pingle Industries
Ltd., Secunderabad
Some of the cases to which we were referred may
v.
now be briefly noted.
Hakim Ram Prasad, In re(')
Commissioner of was a
case
of
renting
of a cinema projector for
Income-tax,
10 years.
The amount paid was thus hire for the
H;,derabad
machine. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Globe
Hidayatullah j. Theatres Ltilf.(') the assessee advanced Rs. 10,000 to a
company for the construction of a cinema house which
was never built.
Since the amount was not salami or
premium but orily advance rent, it was held deduct·
ible. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kolhia J-11rdagarh
Co. Ltd.(") was a case of commission on every ton of
coal raised, and it was held to be revenue expenditure.
These cases are entirely different, and can be of no
authority for payments, such as we have.
Reliance was also placed' upon Parmanand Haveli
Ram In re('), Nand Lal Bhoj Raj, In re (')and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tika Ram & Sons (").
In
the first two, expenditure to acquire lands bearing
certain salts in the earth, which could be converted
into potassium nitrate, sodium chloride or saltpetre,
was regarded as revenue expenditure.
They follow
the line of reasoning which the same Court adopted in
the Full Bench case of Benaridas('), which we have
considered in detail earlier.
They involved shortterm contracts, and in the Full Bench case it was
stated that the case of long-term leases was on a
different footing, though, in our opinion, the decisive
factors in such cases will be the nature of the acquisition and the reason for the payment.
Cases on the
other side of the line where payments were regarded
as capital expenditure are Commissioner of lncometax v. Chengalroya Mudaliar(') and Chengalvaroya.
Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax ('). There the
expenditure was for a lease for excavation of lime
shells.
Since the lease conferred exclusive privilege
and a new business was started, the payment was
regarded not as the pnce for the shells but for the
right to win shells.
(I) [1936] 4 1.T.R. 104.
(2) [1950] 18 I.T.i<.. 403.
(3) [19491 17 I.T.R. 545.
(41 [1945) 13 1.T.R. 157,
(6) [1937] 5 l.T.R. 544.
(5) [1946) 14 LT.R. 181.
(8) [1935) I.L.R. 58 Mad, !.
(7) [1947) 15 l.T.R. 18.5.
(9) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 70,
-
3 S.C.R.
713
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1960
All these cases turned on different facts, and it is
not necessary to decide which of them in the special Pingle Industries
nrcumstances were correctly decided.
This enquiry Ltd., Secunderabad
v.
will hardly help in the solution of the case in hand.
We are, however, satisfied that in this case the asse~ rommissioner of
Income-tax,
see acquired by his long-term lease a right to win
Hyderabad
~tones, and the leases conveyed to him a part of land.
The stones in situ were not his stock-in-trade 111 a Hidayatullah J.
business sense . but a capital asset from which
after
extraction he converted the stones into his stock-intrade.
The payment, though periodic in fact, wa~
neither rent nor royalty but a lump payment in instalments for acquiring a capital asset of enduring benefit
to his trade.
In this view of the matter, the High 1
Court was right in treating the outgoings as on capital
account.
In the result, the appeal fails, and will be dismissed
with costs.
BY CQUR'I': In accordance with the majority
judgment of the Court, the appeal is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
THE PRINTERS (MYSORE) PRIVATE LTD.
v.
/
POTHAN JOSEPH.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. vVANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
· ' Arbitration Agreement:-Power of court to st~y legal proceedings
-Order by trial court refusing stay of proceedings affirmed in appeal
-Supreme Court, if and when can interfere with concurrent exercise
of discretion by the courts below-Arbitration Act, 1940 (x of 1940),
s. 34-Constitution of India, Art. 136.
The respondent was the Editor of the Deccan Herald, owned
and published by the appellant, and the two contracts executed
by the parties contained an arbitration clause that if in the interpretation or applicatio.n of the contract any difference arose
between the parties the same shall _ be referred to arbitration :ind
the award shall be binding between the parties and also provided
for, apart from his monthly salary, the payment of 10% of the
profits to the respondent. Upon the termination of his services
by the appellant, the respondent brought a suit for ·accounts and
payment of the profits ·found. due to him. The appellant by an
1960
April 27.
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