SMT. NAGINDRA BALA MITRA AND ANOTHER versus SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 February 1960 | [1960] 3 S.C.R. 1 | 1960 INSC 24
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 February 1960
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 170/1956
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 3 S.C.R. 1
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 24
Text of the judgment
THE ~UPREME COURT REPORTS
·February, rz
SMT. NAGINDRA BALA MITRA
AND ANOTHER
v.
SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER
,.
(S. K. DAs, A. K. SARKAR AND M. HrnAYATULLAH. JJ.}
Trial by Jury-Charge to the Jury-Duty'of Judge-Misdirection-Verdict of the jury, when could be interfered with-Code of
Criminal Procedure, I898 (Act V of I898). ss. I62, 297, 323, 325.
In a trial by jury, the judge should in his charge to the jury
be careful to lead them to a correct appreciation of the evidence
so that the essential issues in the case rriay be correctly determined
by them after understanding the true import of the · evidence on
the rival sides. Since a verdict of the jury depends upon the
charge, if it fails to perform this basic purpose it cannot be regarded as a proper charge and if it contains also misdirections as to
law, the verdiCt cannot be upheld; but if, upon the general view
taken, the case has been fairly left within the jury's province, the
verdict cannot be set aside unless something gross amounting to a
complete misdescription of the whole bearing of the evidence has
ocCJJrred.
Mushtak Hussein v.The State of Bombay, [1953] S.C.R. 809,
Ramkrishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State of Bombay, [1955]
l S.C.R. 903 and Arnold v. King Emperor, (1914) L.R. 41 I.A, 149,
relied on.
Per S. K. Das and Sarkar,-JJ.-Though the charge to the
jury in.the present case was lengthy, the length was due in part
to a protracted narrative of facts and the many disputed questions
of fact to which the attention of. the jury had to be drawn, and as
the Judge did state the several disputed points arising therefrom
and their bearing on the main questions at issue, the jury were
not misled.
-.t,
Held, that there was no misdirection and that the verdict of
the jur.y could not be interfered with.
Per Hidayatullah, J.-In his charge to the jury, in the present
case, (1) the judge took each' witness, turn by turn, paraphrased
his evidence, sentence by sentence and read out those portions
which he did not paraphrase, without trying to.draw the atten. tion of the jury to the relevancy or materiality of the various
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
[1960]
parts ; and did not make any difference between the testimony
of the eye witnesses and of the formal witnesses in the
Smt. Nagindra matter of t.reatment, (2) while telling the jury that they
Bala Mslra
could give the benefit of the doubt on proof of any individual
. v.
fact if they felt 'any doubt about the proof, the judge did
Sunil Chandra Roy not at the same time caution them that the totality of facts must
be viewed in relation to the offence charged and that the benefit
resulting in acquittal could be given only if they felt that when all
was seen and considered; there was doubt as to whether the
accused had committed the crime or not, (3) the judge while
explaining the ingredients of the offence of grievous hurt under
s. 325 of the Indian Penal Code failed to tell the jury that grievous
hurt was only an aggravated form of hurt and that even if they
held that the accused did not cause a grievous injury it would be
open to them to hold that he caused a simple injury which would
bring the matter within s. 323 of the Code, and (4) omissions
\Vere treated as contradictions and placed before the jury in
complete disregard of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
Held, that these defects amounted to misdirections and that
the verdict could not be accepted.
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s. K. Das J.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 170 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 14, 1954, of the Calcutta High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 13 ofl954, arising out
of the Judgment and order dated January 13; 1954,
of the said High Court in Case No, 55 of 1953.
Purshottam Tricumdas, H.J. Umrigar and B. P.
Maheshwari, for the appellants.
N. C. Chatter.iee, R. L. Anand and D, N ..Mukherjee, for respondent No. I.
A. C. Mitra, A. M. Pal and P. K. Bose, for respondent No. 2.
1960. February 12. The Judgment of S. K. Das
and Sarkar, JJ., was delivered by S. K. Das, J.
Hidayatullah, J., delivered a separate.Judgment.
S. K."DAs J.-This is an. unfortunate case in more
than one sense. So far back as August II, 1950, there
was some incident in premises No. 18, Bondel Road in
Calcutta in the course of which one Col. S. C. Mitra; a
Gynaecologist arid Surgeon, lost his life. Col. Mitra
was the husband of petitioner No. l and father of
petitioner No. 2. In connection with the Colonel's
death, Sunil Chandra Roy, at present respondent No. 1,
and his two brothers were placed on their trial for
offences under ss. 302, 323 and 44 7 of the Indian Penal
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Code. Very shortly put, the case against them was
z960
that they had trepassed into 18, Bondel Road, following upon a quarrel regarding the supply of water to Sm~. Nr;J'.ndra
1
premises No. 17, Bonde! Road which belonged to
a av •tra
petitioner No. 2 and consisted of several flats one of sunil Ch;ndra Roy
which on the second floor was in occupation of Sunil
as a tenant; thttt they had attacked Col. Mitra and s. K. Das J.
petitioner No. 2; that Sunil had inflicted a blow or
blows on the Colonel wnich caused his death and that
one of his brothers Satyen had inflicted some minor
injuries on the person of petitioner No. 2. There was
also a charge a,gainst · Sunil for an assault alleged to
have been committed on Mrs. Sati Mitra, wife· of
petitioner No. 2. The accused persons were, in the
first instance, tried by the Additional Sessions Judge
of Alipur with the result, that Sunil was convicted
under ss. 325 and 447 and Satyen under ss. 323 and
447, Indian Penal Code. So far as the third brother
Amalesh was concern~d, his case was referred to the
High Court as the learned Judge did not agree with
the jury's verdict of not guilty.
Sunil and Satyen appealed to the High Court against
their convictions and sentences ; the State of West
Bengal obtained a Rule for enhancement of the
sentences passed on Sunil and Satyen. The appeal,
the Rule and Reference were heard together. The
appeal was allowed, an<J the High Court of Calcutta
directed that Sunil and Satyen be retried at the
Criminal Sessions of the High Court. The Reference
in respect of Amalesh was rejected and the Rule for
enhancement of the sentences passed necessarily fell
through.
Sunil and Satyen were then tried at the Criminal
Sessions of the High Court by Mitter, J., with the aid
of a special jury. The jury unanimously found Sunil
guilty ·under sections 325 and 447, and Satyen under
sections 323 and 447, Indian Penal Code. The learned
Judge accepted the verdict and sentenced both Sunil
and Satyen to various terms of imprisonment and
fines.
An appeal was then preferred by S\mil and Satyen.
This appeal was again allowed, and another retrial
was directed at the Criminal Sessions of the High Court.
4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
The retrial was held by P. B. Mukherjee, J. Before
the
commencement of the trial, the State withdrewf
Smt. Nagindra
Bala Mitra
the case against Satyen on the ground of the state o
v.
his health. Therefore, Sunil alone was tried, and the
Su•il Chandra Roy charges against him at the third trial were two in
number : one under s. 325 Indian Penal Code for
5
· K. Das J.
vountarily causing grievous hurt to Col. Mitra and
the other under s. 447 Indian Penal Code for criminal
trespass into premises No. 18, Bandel Road with
intent to intimidate, insult or annoy Col. Mitra or his
son Nirmal, petitioner No. 2 herein. This time the
jury, by a majority verdict of 7 to 2, found Sunil not
guilty of the charge under s. 325 Indian Penal Code
and, by a majority of 6 to 3, found him not guilty of
the other charge also. The learned Judge accepted
the verdicts and acquitted Sunil.
Then, the State of West Bengal preferred an appeal
to the High Court against the order of acquit.ta!, but
the High Court summarily dismissed it on June 14,
1954, on the ground that no case had been made out
for the admission of the appeal under the provisions
of s. 411A(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Then, on July 22, 1954, the petitioners herein made
an application to the High Court for a certificate
under Article 134(1) (c) of the Constitution that the
case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court, and
the grounds alleged in support of the application
substantially were-(1) that in his charge to the jury,
the learned Judge had failed to marshal! and sift the
evidence properly so as to give such assistance as the
jury were entitled to receive ; (2) that the learned
Judge had misdirected the jury on several points,
both with regard to the evidence of the eye-witnesses
and the evidence of medical experts; (3) that the
learned Judge did not properly explain the law relating to the charges; (4) that he admitted inadmissible
evidence and shut out evidence which was admissible
and this had vitiated the verdict of the jury ; and
(5) that the learned Judge had not dealt with the
prosecution and defence versions in the same way and
by the same standard and had been guilty of various
non-directions which resulted in a manifestly erroneous verdict. This application was dismissed by the
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5
High Court on July 26, 1954, mainly on two grounds:
r960
(1) the petitioner had no locus standi to maintain an
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, 5~· t;J~ndra
and (2) no appeal lay under Article 134 of the Constitua av.' ra
tfon from an order of acquittal. The High Court Sunil Chandra Roy
then said:
"In view of the opinion we have formed as regards s. K. Das J.
the competence of the present application, it is not
necessary for us to say anything on the merits, but
for the sake of completeness we shall observe that the
grounds which have been set out in the petition are
all grounds which had been taken in the appeal preferred by the State and we did not think then and do
not think now that those grounds would justify us in
either admitting the appeal from the order of acquittal
or giving leave to appeal from oul' order to the
Supreme Court."
The petitioners then applied for special leave from
this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and
substantially pleaded the same grounds some of which
were elaborated by examples given which they had
pleaded when asking for a certificate from the High
Court. This Court granted special leave on February
20, 1956, and the present appeal has come to us in
pursuance of the special leave granted by us.
In view of the special leave granted, the two questions dealt with by the High Court in its order dated
July 26, 1954, no longer require any consideration.
The principal question for consideration now is whether
the charge to the jury at the third trial is so defective
that it has led to a manifestly erroneous verdict,
resulting in a failure of justice. Therefore we intimated _to learned counsel for the parties that the arguments should be confined at this stage to that question,
and if counsel for the petitioners satisfied us that the
charge was so defective on the grounds alleged, then
the further question as to •Whether the case should be
remitted to the High Court or dealt with in this Court
on the evidence already recorded, would arise.
We proceed now to consider the principal question
before us. But before we do so, it is necessary perhaps
to give a few more details of the prosecution case and
the defence.
......
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
Col. Mitra was the owner of 18, Bonde! Road, but
he did not live in that house. He had his chambers
Smt. Nagindra on the ground floor of 18, Bonde! Road.
His son
Bala Mitra
v.
Nirma.I lived at 18, Bonde! Road with his wife. ,T ust
Sunil Chandra Roy by the side of 18, Bond el Road and west of it was
No. 17, Bonde! Road one of the flats of which was in
s. K. Das J. occupation of Sunil as a tenant. It was alleged that
the relation between landlord and tenant was not
good and there were proceedings between the two
before the Rent Controller. An order made in these
proceedings reduced the rent payable by the tenants
and fixed certain specific hours during which the pump
for water supply was to be worked. The prosecution
case was that on August 10, 1950. Col. Mitra came to
spend the night with Nirmal and was put up in the
easternmost bed room on the first floor. The building had three rooms on the first floor all facing south,
and the westernmost room was used by Nirmal as his
bed room. The intermediate room was· a drawing
room and had a telephone in it. According to the
prosecution case, in the early morning on the llth
August, 1950, Nirmal was still in bed when he was
roused by-the noise of a row and recognising the voice
of Sunil, he slightly opened the leaves of one of the
windows to see what was happening. He found that
Sunil amongst others, was standing at the window,
shouting abuse at Purna Mali (the gardener who wae
in charge of the pump) for not getting water which
was followed up by further abuse of Nirmal. After
that Sunil disappeared from the window. Nirmal's
wife had been up before Nirmal, and already served
tea to Colonel Mitra and she came into the room when
Nirmal was listening to the abuses. She came to call
him, that is, Nirmal, to join his father at tea, and
went back to the Colonel. Nirma] was greatly alarmed
at what he had seen and heard, and passing into the
drawing room sent a telephone message to the Karaya
Police Station asking for help. While Nirmal was
still speaking on the telephone, his wife Mrs. Sati Mitra
ran into the room and said that Sunil and his two
brothers who were also tenants at 17, Bondel Road,
had already entered the compound of 18, Bonde! Road
and his father, the Colonel, had gone down. Nirmal
z960
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3 S.C.R. SUPREM;E C9URT REPORTS
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who was telephoning the . police hurriedly aqded a
x96o
request to the police . to come soon. Nirmal coining
·
Nagindra
_ down f ound Purna Ma'li in t h e grasp
of Ama Ies h , and Smt.
Bala Mitra
Colonel Mitra was standing underneath the porch at
v.
18, Bonde! Road and remonstrating with Sunil and Sunil Chandra Roy
his brother. Nirmal immediately ordered accused
Sunil and his brothers to get out of the house where- s. K. Das J.
upon Satyen and Amalesh,' fell upon Nirmal. This
led the Colonel to remonstrate again whereupon the
Colonel was attacked by Sunil who caught hold of the
Colonel by the neck of his vest and began to drag him
towards the Bonde! Road, along the passage. to the
gate at 18, Bonde! Road. The building at 18, Bonde!
Road ·faces south, has a lawn to its south alongside
which runs a passage to the gate, and near the
western pillar of the gate there is a masonry letter
box built in the compound wall. To the south of the
lawn there is a row of tube roses through which there
is an opening leading· into the lawn. According to
the prosecution, case, as Sunil started dragging the
Colonel towards the road and the ga.te, Nirmal
ordered the Mali to close the gate. Accused Sunil
dragged the Colonel, according to the prosecution
case, and while near the Durwan's room Sunil dealt a
fist blow on the left temple of the Colonel. The
prosecution case further was that Sunil proceeded to
drag the Colonel past the western pillar of th.e gate
and then through the opening among the plants in
the lawn and there he struck a blow on the left forehead of the Colonel with a rod like object. On receiving the blow, the Colonel dropped down and fell on
his back on the lawn. Thereupon SunH stepped on
to the letter box, scaled the wall and hurriedly made
his escape. Two neighbours, Jiban Krishna Das and
Suku Sen, then came by scaling into the compound of
No. 18, and with their help and with the help of the
servants of the family, the Colonel's body was removed
to the verandah on the .ground floor of 18, Bondel
Road and placed on a "charpoi". Nirmal was one of
the persons who carried the body of his father, the
Colonel. Jiban had a car with him and was asked to
rush for a doctor which he did and within .~ few
minutes l>roµght -Ur. &chin Bose who exa,mined the
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SUPREME COU~T REPORTS
[1960]
6
°
Colonel and found him already dead. On receipt of
Smt. Nagina,• the telephone message from Nirmal, Pushpa Pal,
BalaMitra
Officer-in-charge, Karaya Police Sta"tion, deputed a
v.
Head-cmrntable named lVIathura Singh, to go to No.18
sunilChandmRoy but when the constable arrived, the incident was
over. The Officer-in-charge, Pushpa Pal, soon follows. K. Das J. ed and after obtaining from Nirmal a brief oral statement as to his version of the incident, proceeded to
No. 17, Bonde! Road. On the staircase of the house
at No. 17, Bondel Road, Puspha Pal met one Sarat
Banerji, said to be a priest of a neighbourhood called
Shitalatala. Pushpa Pal then went up and arrested
the accused Sunil.
The post-mortem examination of the Colonel's
body revealed that he had sustained a linear fracture
of his left temporal bone, vertical in character, an
abrasion laid obliquely across the middle of the left
half of his forehead, a lacerated wound bone deep laid
vertically across the middle of the eye-brow, an abrasion on the left cheek and one small lacerated wound
near the left ear. There was some clotted blood on the
top of the membrane over the fracture of the bone
and some on the inner surface of the scalp. In the opinion of Dr. Majumdar who carried out the post-mortem
examination as recorded in his report, the death of
the Colonel was due to shock caused by the head
injury, on top· of senile changes, and the head injury
which was ante-mortem must have been caused by
a fall on some hard substance_. The post-mortem
report was not signed till the 2nd September, 1950,
and not until the pathological report and the chemical
report had been obtained.
The defence of Sunil was that he did not strike or
assault the Colonel, either by a fist blow or a blow
with a l'Od like substance. The defence further was
that the fist blow on the left tern pie of the Colonel
was not specifically mentioned by any material witness until after the post-mortem report showed a
linear fracture of the left temporal bone and it was
suggested by the "defence that the fist blow was
invented to make a case that such blow fractured the
left temporal bone of the Colonel. The main suggestion on beha.lf of the defence was that the Colonel
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3, S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9
was an old man with heart trouble and 'his pathor96o
logical condition was such that he was excited at the Smt. Nagindra
time of the incident and fell down on a rough surface,
Bala Mitra
either on the passage or on the masonry letter box,
v.
and hurt himself. The injury was such that it could Sunil Chandra Roy
not be caused by one blow of a rod or rod-like substance. The defence against the charge of criminal s. K. Das f.
trespass was that Sunil entered the com pound of No. 18,
Bondel Road at the invitation of Purna Mali, who
asked Sunil to come and see if the pump was working,
the pump being within the compound of No. 18, Bondel
Road. Sunil did not, however, assault the Colonel in
any way.
It is in the context of the aforesaid two versions
that we have to consider the charge to the jury and
examine the criticisms made thereto. We must make
it clear that we are not called upon at this stage to
give our findings on any of the disputed questions of
fact. That was the function of the jury, and the jury
had given their verdict. The limited question before
us is whether that verdict is vitiated by reason of
any serious misdirection by the , Judge or of any
misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the
law laid down by him, which in fact has occasioned
a failure of justice. This Court said in Mushtak
Hussein v. The State uf Bombay (1 ): "Unless therefore
it is established in a case that there has been a serious
misdirection by the Judge in charging the jury which
has occasioned a failure of justice and has misled the
jury in giving its verdict,· the verdict of the jury
cannot be set aside." In a subsequent decision,
Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State of Bom•
bay(2) this Court observed that s. 297, Criminal
Procedure Code, imposed a duty on the Judge in
charging the jury to sum up the evidence for the
prosecution and defence and to lay down the law by
which the jury were to be guided; but summing up
for the prosecution and defence did not mean that
the Judge should give merely a summary of the evidence; he must marshall the evidence so as to give
proper assistance to the jury who are required to
decide which view of the facts is true. This Court
It) [1953] S.C.R. 809 at 815.
2
(2) (1955] I S.C.R. 903 at 930.
10
SUPREME CQURT REPORTS
[1960)
referred with approval to the following observations
made by the Privy Council in Arnold v. King EmSmt. N•gindra peror (') :
.
Bala Milra
v.
"A charge to a jury must be read as a whole. If
Sunil Chandra Roy there are salient propositions of law in it, these will,
of course, be the subject of separate analysis. But in
s. K. Das J. a protracted narrative of facts the determination of
which is ultimately left to the jury, it must needs be
that the view of the Judge may not coincide with the
view of others who look upon the whole proceedings
in black type. It would, however, not be in accordance with usual or good practice to treat such cases
as cases of misdirection, if, upon the general view
taken, the case has been fairly left within the jury's
province. But in any case in the region of fact their
Lordships of the Judicial Committee would not interfere unless something gross amounting to a complete
misdescription of the whole bearing of the evidence
has occurred."
Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, we proceed now to consider the criticisms made on behalf of
the petitioners against the learned Judge's charge to
the jury. We had earlier classified the criticisms
under five different heads, and we shall deal with them
one by one. We shall refer to the main points urged
under each head, avoiding a detailed reference to the
evidence on minor points which do not advance the
case of the petitioners any further.
The first criticism is that the charge to the jury,
read as a whole, is nothing but a summary of the evidence witness. by witness and a summary of the
arguments of counsel which the jury had already
heard; that the learned Judge did not state the
points for decision under separate heads, nor did he
oollate and marshall the evidence topic-wise so as to
assist the jury to come to their conclusion one way or
the other, but left the jury with a mass of unnecessary
details which was mor~ likely to confuse than to help
them. Learned counsel for the petitioners has
pointed out that in the appeal from the judgment of
Mitter, J., in an earlier stage of this very case,
r960
(1) [1914] L.R. 41 I.A. 149.
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Chakravarti, C. J., had said in Sunil Chandra RO]J and
Another v. The State (1 ) :
"But I feel bound to say that the function of a Smt.
Nagindra
'Bala Mitra
\ charge is to put the jury in a position to weigh and
v.
\ assess the ·evidence properly in order that they may Sunil Chandra Roy
come to a right decision on questions of fact which,
.
under the law, is thei~ respo~sibi~ity. T~e .charge s. K. Das J.
·. must therefore address itself pnmanly to pomtmg out
what the questions of fact are, what the totality of
the evidence on each of the questions is, how the
different portions of that evidence, lying scattered in
-the depositions of several witnesses, fit with one
another, what issues or subsidiary questions they
raise for decision and what the effect will be according
f
as one part or another of the evidence is believed or
dis believed."
It was argued that what was condemned in an
earlier stage of this case has happened again.
We are unable to accept this line of criticisms as
substantially correct. It is, indeed, true that the
learned Judge followed the method of placing the evidence witness-wise rather than topic-wise. He started
~
his summing-up by stating: "I now propose to take
up the prosecution witnesses.individually with a view
to sum up the evidence of each witness and the suggestions made to each by the counsel for the accused."
But the real point for consideration is not whether
the learned Judge followed one method rather than
another : the real point is-did he properly discharge
his duty under s. 297, Criminal Procedure Code by
giving the jury the help and guidance to which they
were entitled ? Did he marshall the evidence in such
a way as to bring out the essential points for decision
and the probabilities and improbabilities bearing on
the disputed questions of fact on which the jury had
to come to their conclusion? The learned Judge gave
a lengthy charge to the jury ; and in summing up the
,
evidence of each witness, he did state the· disputed
"'- points arising therefrom and their bearing on the
main questions at issue, viz. whether Sunil had trespassed into 18, Bondel Road and had assaulted the
Colonel in the manner alleged by the prosecution.
J
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11
\1) 57 C,W.N. 962 at 1001.
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
The length of the charge was due in part to a protracted narrative of facts and the many disputed
Snit. Nag;ndra1 questions of fact to which the attention of the Jury
Bala Mitra
v.
had to be drawn. The principle laid down by the
sunilChandraRoy Privy Council in Arnold's case (3 ) and accepted by this
Court as correct is that it would not be in accordance
s. K. Das J. with good practfoe to trertt a case.as a case of misdirectiolil if, upon the general view taken, the case has
been fairly left within the jury's province, and this
Court will not interfere unless something gross
amounting to a complete misdescription of the whole
bearing of the evidence has occurred. Learned counsel for the petitioners has taken us through the entire
charge to the jury and while we may agree that some
·unnecessary details (e.g. how the spectacles of Mrs.
Sati Mitra fell down) -could have been avoided by the
learned Judge, we are unable to say that the method
followed by the learned Judge did not focus attention
of the jury to the questions of fact which they had to
decide or did not give help and guidance to the jury
to arrive at their conclusion on those questions. We
are far less satisfied that anything amounting to a
complete misdescription of the whole bearing of the
evidence has occurred in' this ca.se. · As to the observations which Chakravarti, C.J.; had made, it is well
to remember that they were made in respect of an
earlier charge to the jury which, to use the words of
the learned Chief Justice, was " all comment or mere
comment in the main." · Having carefully perused
the present charge to the jury, we think, on a general
view, that the case has been fairly left within the
jury's province, in spite of the criticism so strenuously
made that the charge to the jury contained a mass of
details which need not have been placed before the
jury. In a protracted narrative full of details, it is
perhaps easy to find fault with a charge to the jury
on the ground of prolixity. The question before us
is not whether the charge to the jury is perfect in all
respect : the question is-has something gross
occurred amounting to a complete misdescription of
the whole bearing of the evidence? We are unable
to say that there has been any such gross misdirection by the learned Judge.
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0
(t) [1954) L.R. 4' I.A. 149
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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The second criticism relates to certain misdirecI96o
tions alleged to have been committed by the learned
Judge in placing.the evidence of the eye-witnesses as Smt.
Nagimba
Bala Mitra
also of medical witnesses. No useful purpose will be
v.
served by referring to each and every example given Sunil Chandra Roy
before us ; we shall confine ourselves to some of the
salient points and state the general impression we 5 · I<. Das J.
have formed. In placing the evidence of e~ch eyewitness, the learned Judge referred to the suggestions
made by the defence. The comment is that he placed
the suggestions in such a way as to create the impression in the. minds of the jury that they were true,
even though they had been repudiated or explained
by the witness. We may give some examples. Nirmal
telephoned to his brother Dr. Lalit Mitra immediately
after Col. Mitra was pronounced to be dead. The
suggestion to Nirnial was that he had not told his
doctor brother then that his father had been beaten,·
but had said only that his father had " fainted ".
This suggestion was placed before the jury with
reference to Nirmal's deposition before the committing Magistrate. Nirmal said before the committing Magistrate that he did not Ul'le the English
word ' fainted' but had said in Bengali that ' father
has become unconscious'. The complaint of the
petitioners is that Nirma.I's explanation has not been
properly placed ?efore the jury. But the learned
Judge says in his charge that the jury had seen the
earlier deposition qf Nirmal, and if that is so, the distinction between ' fainting ' and ' becoming unconscious ' in explanation of the suggestion made to
Nirmal does not assume any great importance. It
was next suggested to Nirmal that he had told the
Police that his father - had heart trouble. This
suggestion was put before the jury in the following
way:
"The case was put by the defence that the Colonel
had heart trouble and that Nirmal was confronted
with, contradiction that he told the Magistrate and
the police that his father had heart trouble. Nirmal
had denied it."
Nirmal's explanation was that he did not tell the
Magistrate or the police that his father had heart
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
trouble; he merely said that his father used to have
occasional palpitation of heart when he ate too much
Smt. Nagindra or took irregular meals. Pushpa Pal, the investigating
Bala Mitr~
v.
police officer, understood this to mean heart trouble
sunil Chand.a Roy and he recorded "heart trouble " in Nirmal's statement. Pushpa Pal admitted that even if Nirmal had
s. K. Do• J. stated that Col. Mitra had palpitation of heart, he
would ha.ve recorded it as heart trouble. This part of
the evidence of Pushpa Pal also the learned Judge
placed before the jury. It cannot, therefore, be said
that the learned Judge misled the jury iu any way or
left the jury with the impression that Nirmal had
admitted that his father had heart trouble.
Similar ·comments were made with regard to the
placing of the evidence of other eye-witnesses, but their
general effect is the same. They do not, in our view,
establish that the jury were misled on any of the
points in dispute. We must, however, mention two
more points, one in connection with a person called
Sarat Banerji and the other with regard to Mrs.
Nagendra Bala Ghose. SaratBanerji, it appears, was
a priest who brought some holy water, and there was
some evidence to show that such water was sprinkled
on the Colonel soon after the incident. Sarat Banerji
was not examined in the case, and the question naturally arose whether he was present at the time of the
incident and if so, when did he come. to 18, Bonde!
Road? A number of prosecution witnesses were crossexamined on this point, and the learned Judge
repeatedly referred to this matter in summing up the
evidence of those witnesses. We do not agree with
learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned
Judge committed any misdirection in drawing the
attention of the jury to this matter.
As to Mrs. Nagendra Bala Ghose, the criticism was
that the learned Judge usurped the function of the
jury. About this witness the learned Judge said:
"Now, gentlemen, in cross-examination she was
cross-examined on her eyesight. She did succeed in
pointing out to an old man in Court. That is in
answer to Q. 30. But further ahead she could not see
properly. She is far too old a woman on whom any
reliance can be placed having regard to her state of
z960
-
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
15
health and having regard to her state of vision and
.I9 60
her power of memory. She was called by the prosecu- Smt. Nagindra
tion only to meet the defence suggestion that she was
Bala Misra
there at the time of the incident in Prof. Mahanti's
· v.
place and was being kept back."
. SwnilChandra Roy
It was submitted before us that Mrs. Ghose was no
doubt old, but she was a respectable and reliable wit- s. K. n,., f.
ness who was staying in a neighbouring house from
the verandah of which the place ofincident was visible t
. therefore, it was argued that the learned Judge was
not justified in expressing himself so strongly against
this witness, and in doing so, he improperly dissuaded
the jury from forming their own opinion about her
evidence. Having examined her evidence, we are
unable to hold that the comments of the learned
Judge were unjustified or that he wrongly influenced
the jury against the witness. It must be stated here
that the learned Judge had cautioned the jury that
they were not bound by his opinion on a question of
fact and were free to act on their own opinion.
This brings us to the medical evidence. The two
doctors of importance who were examined in the
case were Dr. Majumdar, who made the· post-mortem
examination, and Dr. Kabir Hussain,· Professor of
Forensic and State Medicine in the Calcutta Medical
College. Those two doctors expressed widely divergent
views as to the probable cause of the injuries sustained
by Col. Mitra and also of his death. The learned Judge
rightly placed before the jury these divergent views.
Dealing with the evidence of Dr. Majumdar, the
learned Judge said:
"Suggestions were made to Dr. Majumdar in cross.
examination.that in case a fist blow was given on the
left temporal region whether any external injury was
to be expected. He said that external injury was
expected and there was no external injury mentioned
in the post-mortem report in this case. Then Dr.
Majumdar's opinion is that such a man cannot be
expected to talk. It is also Dr. Majumdar's ...opinion
that the injury was due to a fall and he does not think
that the injuries Nos. 1, 2 and 3 could be ca.used by a
lathi blow or a blow by a .rod. .A,v9or~iqg t9 M.s
9tUQ.i9P., ~4~ fr{l;9tnr~ Wt'l-.1' P.liSP 4.l.l~ to a f11ll.. "
16
x96o
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
It, is contended that this must have misled the jury in
Smt. N•gimlra thinking that there was no external injury on the site
Bala Mitro
of the fracture on the left temporal region and therev.
fore it could not have been ca.used by a fist blow. Our
Suni!Chandra Roy attention was drawn to the evidence of Dr. Kabir
s. K. Das f.
Hussain, who opined that the haemorrhage on the
inner ~urface of the scalp near the site of the fracture
was an external injury. The point to be noticed in
thi~ connection is that the learned Judge did not omit
to place before the jury what Dr. Kabir Hussain had
said regarding what he thought to be the presence of
an external injury at the site of the fracture; he
placed in extenso the questions put to Dr. Kabir
Hussain and the answers given by him on this point.
The jury were, therefore, properly placed in possession
of the views of both the doctors, and it was for them
to decide which view should be accepted.
Both the doctors were asked questions as tow hether
the injuries sustained by Col. Mitra could be caused by
a fall on a rough substance like a masonry box or by a
blow of a hard weapon like a flexible rod. On this
point again the two doctors disagreed ; the learned
Judge did place before the jury the different views
expressed by the two doctors. A-grievance has been
made before us that in summing up the evidence of
Dr.-Kabir Hussain the learned Judge failed to draw
the attention of the jury to the answers given toquestions 73, 74 and 75 by which the doctor categorically
negatived the suggestion of the defence that a fracture
of the temporal bone of the kind sustained by the
Colonel could be caused by a fall on a hard substance.
It is true that the answers to questions 73, 74 and 75
were not specifically placed before the jmy, but reading the charge relating to the medical evidence as a
whole, we find that the learned Judge sufficiently indicated to the jury the disagreement between the two
doctors on the main questions of fact and the reasons
which each doctor gave for his opinion. It was the
province of the jury to accept one opinion or the
other. The learned Judge concluded his summing up
of the medical evidence in these words:
''Now, gentlemen, when a medical witness is called
in as an expert he is not a witness of . fact ... Medical
-
--J..
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
17
evidence of an expert is evidence of opinion, not of
z96o
fact. Where there are alleged eye-witnesses of Smt. Nagindra
physical violence whic h is said to h ave caused the
Bala Mitra
hurt, the value of medical evidence by prosecution is
v.
only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could Sunil ChandraRoy
have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing
more. The use which the defence can make of the s. K. Das f.
medical evidence, or any medical evidence which the
defence might itself choose to bring, is to prove that
the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the
manner alleged and thereby discredit the eye-witnesses. Therefore, you must remember this particular
point of-view that if you believe the eye-witnesses,
t.Q.en there is no question of having it supported by
medical evidence; unless the medical evidence again in
its turn goes so for that it completely rules out all possibility that such injuries could take place in the manner
alleged by the prosecution and that is a point which
you should bear in mind, because if you accept the
evidence of the eye-witnesses, no question of further
considering the medical evidence arises at all. The
only question in that case when you consider the
medical evidence is to test the eye-witnesses' version
as to whether any of the particular injuries shown in
the report can be caused in the manner alleged by the
prosecution. But if you don't believe the eye-witnesses, then consideration of the medical evidence in
any manner becomes unnecessary. "
We do not think that any exception can be taken to
the observations made above in the context of the
two versions which the jury had to consider. One
version was that the Colonel had been assaulted and
thereby sustained the injuries; the other version was
that he had sustained the injuries by a fall on a rough
surface like the masonry letter box. None of the two
doctors were giving direct evidence of how the injuries
were caused ; they were merely giving their opinion
as to how in all probability they were caused. The
learned Judge was, therefore, right in directing the
jury in the way he did about" the medioal evidence
in the case. We may also point out here that the
learned Judge drew the attention of the jury also to
the evidence of Dr. Suresh Sinha, who said that the
3
18
.
196o
Smt. Nagindra
SUPREME COURT REJ?ORTS
[1960]
fracture on the .temporal region could be the indirect
effect of the other injuries sustained by the Colonel.
Bala Mit•a
We now go on to third head of criticism viz., the
. Chv.d R learned Judge's exposition of the Ja.w relating to the
S 1 an ra oy
"uni
'l
•
T
h
s. K. Das J.
two charges on which Sum was tned.
hese c argcs
the learned Judge correctly explained with reference
to the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code.
But he made one error. Dealing with the word
'voluntarily' in s. 325, he said: "The word 'voluntarily' means what it says; it means 'of one's free
will'." Perhaps, the learned Judge forgot that the
word is defined in s. 39, Indian Penal Code, and that
definition should have been placed before the jury.
We do not, however, think that this minor lapse
misled the jury in any way or occasione-d a failure of
justice. There is one more point in this connection.
The learned Judge did not tell the jury that it was
open to them to return a verdict of guilt.y for an
offence under s. 323, Indian Penal Code, if they came
to the conclusion that Sunil gave a blow to the Colonel
with a flexible rod, but did not cause the fracture. In
the circumstances of the case, however, we do not
think that the failure to direct the jury that it was
open to them to return a verdict of guilty on a minor
offence occasioned any failure· of justice. If the
eye-witnesses for the prosecution were believed, it
would be undoubtedly a case under s. 325 Indian
Penal Code ; if on the .contrary, the eye-witnesses
were not believed and the defence version was a.ccepted that the Colonel sustained the injuries by a fall,
then there would be no case even under s. 323 Indian
Penal Code.
A grievance was made before us under the fourth
head of criticism_ that admissible evidence was shut
out and inadmissible evidence was let in. It was
submitted that Nirmal's statements to Pushpa Pal on
his arrival at No. 18, Bonde! Road or at least his statements to the Head Constable Mathura Singh, before
the arrival of the investigating officer, were not hit
by s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code and were clearly
admissible in evidence. The learned Judge said in
this connection :
...
-
...
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COU:RT REPORTS
-
19
" I would like to remind you that if any person
z960
makes any statement to the police, that is not
admissible evidence as a rule unless in the case of s..u,
Nagindra
Bala Mitra
contradietions which are formally proved, as you
v.
have seen the counsel for the accused has proved Sunil ChaHdra Roy
contradictions in some cases; but you must bear in
5
· K. Das J •
mind that except such cases, this is no evidence."
In the opinion which we have formed it is unnecessary to consi9.er whether the learned Judge was right
or wrong : because we are of the opinion that even if
those statements of Nirmal were admissible, they
would not be substantive evidence of the facts stated
therein ; and if Nirmal's evidence in Court was not
accepted, his statements to the police officers concerned
would hardly make any difference.
As to the admission of inadmissible evidence, learned
counsel for the petitioners placed before us those parts
of the charge to the jµry which dealt with the
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses on their
police statements. He submitted that a large part of
that cross-examination was inadmissible in view of
thE.t decision of this Court in Tahsildar Singh v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh (1 ). That decision dealt exhaustively with s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code and laid
down certain propositions to explain the scope of that
section; it was, however, observed that the examples
given therein were not exhaustive and the Judge must
decide in each case whether the recitals intended to be
used for contradiction satisfied the requirements of
the law. We agree that on th.e principles laid down
in Tahsildar Singh's decision (1 ) some of the statements
put to the prosecution witnesses were not really
contradictions and did not, therefore, fall within what
is permissible under s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code.
We may take, by way of example, what was put to
Nirmal. The learned Judge placed the following
contradictions in Nitmal's evidence to the jury:
"He was also cross-examined on his statement to
the police. The main point made in his cross-examination on his statement to the police, are firstly, that
the fist blow on the left temple was not mentioned by
him and then he only said assault with blows before
(I) A.I.R. 1959 S.C, IOU
20
[1960]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the police and that he also said that the Colonel was
hit near about the gate of the house and not beside
Smt. Nagindra the boundary wall. It was also suggested to him in
Bala Mitra
v.
defence that the Colonel did not fall on the lawn at
Sunil Chandra Roy all but fell on the letter box.
The further suggestion
to him was that the fist blow was a. false invention
s. K. Das J. and it was intended only after the post-mortem report
was out. He was also told that he did not mention
to the police that the Colonel was lying on his back.
He was also criticised for not having mentioned the
names of persons who carried his father after he had
fallen down. Nirmal's answer was that he was not
asked and that it was physically impos'sible for him
alone to carry his father. Then there was crossexamination as to whether the fist blow was before or
a'fter Sati Mitra had clasped the Colonel."
Now, on the principles laid down in Tahsildar Singh's
decision (1 ) Nirmal's failure to mention bef9re the
police that his father was lying on his back was not a
contradiction; but his failure to mention that a fist
blow on the left temple was given to his father was a
contradiction. Therefore, the point before us really
is this: assuming that some of the statements admitted
in evidence were not really contradictions, do they
materially affect the verdict? In our opinion, they
do not. By and large, the important statements made
before the police were admissible under s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code; but some minor statements were
not. We do not think that the verdict of the jury
Qll>n be said to have been vitiated on this ground.
Lastly, we come to the defence evidence. Here the
complaint is that the learned Judge has su.mmed up
the defence evidence qy adopting a different standard.
We are unable to agree. Even with regard 'to the
prosecution witnesses, the learned Judge had emphasised points in favour of the prosecution. For example,
dealing with the evidence of Purna Mali, the learned
Judge said:
"Now, gentlemen, these questions are important
because he does not improve the case or try to
improve the case by suggesting that he saw a fist
blow on the left temple and it is a mat~er for you· to
1960
(1) A.l.K 1959 S.C. 1012
. '••·
'
'
..
'
~
•
-
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
21
-J
consider in this conn~ction whether this is a witness
z96o
whom you would consider a liar because you will have Smt. Nagindra
to consider the suggestion that if he were then he Bala Mitra
would have probably tried to improve the case by
v.
suggestiQg to say that he did see a fist blow on the Sunil Chandra Roy
temple."
Dealing with the evidence of Pushpa Pal, the learned
Judge pointedly drew attention of the jury to a
circumstance which was partly in favour of the
prosecution and partly of the defence :
"You also remember that Pushpa Pal held an
inquest at about 9 a.m. on the 11th August, 1950. He
says that he examined the compound, the lawn, the
boundary wall, the gate, the masonry letter box, the
bricks on edge and the whole spot of 18, Bondel Road
including the pathway, but he found no blo6d marks
anywhere."
We have examined the charge to the jury ~arefully ;
it may suffer from a plethora of details and also
perhaps a meticulous statement of the divergent views
of the two doctors; but we have found no trace of the
adopt~on of a double standard, or of a serious misdirection on any question of fact or law.
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that on
the prineiples which this Court has adopted for inter~
ference with a jury verdict, no case for interference
has been made out in this case.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
HIDAYATULLAH, ·J.-I have had the advantage of Hidayatullah J.
reading the judgment just delivered by my learned
brother, S. K. Das, J. He is of the opinion that
the charge to the jury by the learned trial Juqge was
proper. Since I have the misfortune to ~iffer from
hiin in this conclusion, I am delivering a separate
judgment. In my opinion, the charge to the jury was
defective for several reasons, particularly misdirections in law·and absence of any guidance while setting
forth at enormous length, without comment, the evidence in the case.
My learned brother has pointed out that this is.an
unfortunate case, and I agree with him that it is so,
~n. vie~rof th~ ey:ents ,th.a~ pave happened. .TP:e ~acts
of t1fe case· were siriiplicity 'itself. Tue offence· alleged
~
I
22
60
SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS
(1960]
to have been committed as far back as August 11,
It was first
Smt, Nagindra 1950, has been the subi"ect of three trials.
Bala Mitra
tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Alipur
v.
who convicted the present respondent, Sunil, under
Su•il Ckandra Roy BS. 325 and 44 7 of the Indian Penal Code, agreeing
with the verdict of the jury. On appeal, t-he High
Hitiayatullah J. Court of Calcutta set aside the conviction, and
ordered a retrial at the Criminal Sessions of the High
Court. The case was then tried by Mitter, J. with a
special jury. The jury brought in an unanimous
verdict of guilty against Sunil under the two sections,
with which the learned Judge agreed. Sunil was
sentenced to a long term of imprisonment, but the
appellate side of the Calcutta High Court, on appeal,
set aside the conviction and sentence, and ordered a retrial. The third trial was conducted by
P. B. Mukherjee J. Before the trial, the State
Government withdrew the case against Sunil's
brother, Satyen, who was tried along with him in the
previous trials, and was also convicted. This, withdrawal of the case was on the somewhat unusual
ground that his health was bad. Sunil himself, it
appears, was defended at Government cost by one of
the Government advocates. The trial dragged through
a weary course, in which prolonged cross-examination
of the witnesses took place, and alleged contradictions
between their previous versions were put to them in
detail. After the arguments were over, the learned
Judge charged the jury at considerable length. I have
estimated that the charge is a document of some
50,000-60,000 words. How much of it was of any
real guidance to the jury is a matter, to which I shaU
address myself in the sequel; but it appears at the
outset that the length of the charge was somewhat
extraordinary, regard being had to the plain facts, to
which I now refer.
On August 11, 1950, Sunil and his brothers were
occupying a flat in No. 17 Bonde! Road, which
belonged to Nirmal, son of the late S. C. Mitra, a very
well-known Gynaecologist and Surgeon of Calcutta.
It• appears that the water supply to the flat was
irregul_ar and intermittent, and Sunil had, in common
with the other tenants, a complaint against the landZ9
-
~
·!'~
).
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23
lord, Nirmal. Incidents had taken place previously,
and Sunil had taken the matter to the :rent eontrol Smt. Nagi;ulra
authorities, and, it is alleged, had even threatened the- Bala Mitra
landlord with dire consequences, if the water supply
v.
was not impro-ved. Under an alleged agreement, the Sunil Chandra Roy
water supply was regulated by working the electric
pump during certain hours of the day; but nothing Hidayatullah .J
turns upon it. It appears that the water supply did
not improve, and often enough, an exaspexating
situation arose in so far as the tenants of No. 17,
Bondel Road, including the present respondent, Sunil,
were concerned.
On the fateful morning, matters came to a head,
because the water supply, as was frequent, failed in
the flat. Evidence has been led in the case to show
that Sunil was angry and started abusing and
expostulati.ng in a loud manner. He followed up his
expostulations by entering the compound of No. 18,
Bondel Road, whether to see to the working of the
pump himself, as he contended, or to remonstrate
more effectively with the landlord, as is the prosecution case. However it be, Nirmal's father, Col. Mitra,
happened to be present that morning, and he came
out to talk the matter over with Sunil, who apparently was quite loud in his remonstrances. Whether the
Colonel gave any offence to Sunil by rebuking him is
not much to the present purpose, because I am not
determining:the true faQts in this order. The case for
the prosecution is that Sunil grappled with the
Colonel, and gave him a blow upon the head with
what is described as a 'rod-like' object, and also hit
him on the temple with his fist. The Colonel, it is
alleged, fell down, while Sunil chunbered the parapet
wall, and made good his escape, because the Colonel
had previously ordered that the gates be shut. Mea.nwhile, the Colonel was taken and laid on a cot, where
he expired. A phone call having been made to the
police, the Investigating Officer arrived on the scene,
and after taking some statements including one from •
Sunil, he went and arrested him and also his two
brothers. Post-mortem examination revealed a linear
fracture of the temporal bone with a haematoma
under the su!'face. On the forehead of the Colonel
24
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
was a mark of the injury alleged to have been given
with t.he 'rod-like ' object, though over the seat of
Smt. N agindra
Bola Mifra
the fracture
no outward visibl e injury was seen. T h e
v.
doctor who performed the autopsy also found certain
Sunil Chandra Roy pathological defects in the liver and the gall bladder,
and he asked the Chemical Examiner to examine the
Hidayatullah J, viscera for possible p6ison_ing. He gave the opinion
that death was "due to shock consequent to head
injury, i.e., injuries on the top of senile changes and
pathological liver and gall bladder as well as to
inhibition." With regard to the head injury which
was certified to be ante-mortem, the doctor was of
opinion that it was likely to have been caused by a
fall on some hard substance.
T!ie charge against Sunil, in the first instance, was
under s. 302, but the ca,se proceeded in the subsequent
trials only under s. 325 read with a further charge
under s. 44 7 of the Indian Penal Code for house trespass, with intention to intimidate, insult or annoy the
owner.
The above facts clearly show that the essence of
the case lay in a very narrow compass. The questions
which the jury had to determine were whether Sunil
trespassed into the premises of No. 18, Bonde! Road
with the intention of insulting, intimidating or
annoying the owner and further, whether Sunil struck
one or more blows either with a ' rod-like ' object or
his fist or'l the head of Col. Mitra, thereby causing
him injuries, simple or grievous. Alternatively, the
jury had to determine whether Col. Mitra suffered
these injuries not at the hands of Sunil but by a fall,
which was the defence. No doubt, the case involved
a very lengthy cross-examination of the_witnesses for
the prosecution, who alleged that they had witnessed
the entire occurrence. The issues to be decided were
simple. One would have expected that the learned
Judge in charging the jury would have, at least,
pointed out to the jury what were the points for
determination after weighing the evidence, pro and
con, in the case ; but the learned Judge did not, in
spite of the voluminous charge, put these simple
points b\)fore the jury. The attention of the jury was
never directed to thes.e simple matters,, but, on the
r96o
-
,_
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
)
25
other hand, it was directed to almost everything
z96o
else.
Smt. Nagindra
No doubt, a verdict of the jury is entitled to the
Bala Mitra
greatest weight, not only before the Court of trial but
v.
in all appeals including that before this Court. The Sunil Chandra Roy
law does not allow an appeal against the verdict,
except only if the Judge in his charge to the jury is Hidayatullah f.
guilty of a wrong direction in law or of a substantial
misdirection. Since the verdict of the jury depends
upon the charge, the charge becomes a most vital
document in judging whether the verdict be sustained
or not. It is the charge which one pas to examine, to
find out whether the verdict is defective or not. Such an important stage in the trial requires that the Judge
should be careful to lead the jury to a correct appreciation of the evidence, so that the essential issues in
the case may be correctly determined by them, after
understanding the true import of the evidence on the
rival sid(;)s. A charge which fails to perform. this
basic purpose cannot be regarded as a proper charge,
and if it contains also misdirections as to law, it
cannot be upheld.
·
The learned Judge in his charge to the jury began
by telling the jury in a sentence or two each, what
were the essential things they had to remember,
before making up their minds as to the verdict. He
told the jury that tl).ey were the judges of fact, and
that it was their function to determine all issues of
fact, without accepting any view which he might feel
disposed to express upon the credibility or otherwise
of the witnesses. These observations in black and
white do read quite well; but, in view of the fact that
the Judge expressed almost no opinion as to the
credibility or otherwise of the witnesses, it lost in
practical application all its point. Then, the Judge
stated that every accused was presumed to be innocent, until the contrary was proved, and further, that
the jury should convict only if the facts were compatible with his guilt. So far as this direction went,
nothing can be said against it. The Judge next proceeded to explain what was meant by the expression
"fact proved". He paraphrased the definition of
" proved " from the Evidence Act. In dealing with
4
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
zg6 o
this topic, he omitted to explain also the expressions
"
disproved" and "not proved "; but that too cannot
Smt. Nagindra
Bala Mitra
be said to be a serious defect. He then expatiated· on
,
v.
reasonable doubt, the benefit of which, according to
Sunil Chandra Roy him, must go to the accused. In dealing with this
subjeet, he observed as follows:
Hidayatullah j."The law further says, if you have any reasonable doubt, then the fact is not proved and the
verdict you bring would be a verdict of not guilty.
If you have no reasonable doubt, then the verdict
you are to give is the verdict of guilty. A further
question that you should b~ar in mind is that you
may be in a state where you cannot decide. That
is a case of benefit of doubt and if you reach
such a stage, then the law says that you will give
the benefit of doubt to the accused. That means
that if you have a kind of doubt which makes you
unable to decide, then the accused is not guilty.
Again, if you have no such doubt, then the accused
is guilty. These are the main principles of criminal
-trial which I think, you should bear in mind while
you are approaching the evidence in this case."
This statement of the law is partly true but not
wholly true. The learned Judge, with due respect,
did not make it clear to the jury that the prosecution
case is built up of numerous facts, though the fact
to be determined ls the guilt of the accused, and that
a reasonable doubt may arise not only in conpection
with the whole oft.he case but also in relation to any
one or more of the numerous facts, which the prosecution seeks to establish. Every individual fact
on which doubt may be entertained may be held
against the prosecution; but it does not mean
that if the jury entertained a doubt about any
individual fact, the benefit of that doubt must
result in their bringing in a verdict 'of not guilty'.
This, however, seems to be the effect of this direction
which incidentally is almost the only direction on the
point of law which the learned Judge, apart from
what I have stated earlier, has chosen to give. In
my opinion, the learned Judge should have told the
jury that they could give the benefit of the doubt on
·proof of any individual fa~t, if they felt any doubt
.
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27 -
about the proof. But he should have cautioned them
z960
that the totality of facts must be viewed in relation
to the offence charged, and the benefit resulting in SmtBala
.. Na'ginba
Mitra ·
acquittal could be given only if they felt that when
v.
all was seen and considered, there was doubt as to Sunil Chandra Ro:Y
whether the accused had committed the crime or not. · ·· · - ·
··
The direction on the point of law contained in the flid ..yatulla~ {
above passage was too attenuated, and, in my opinion
misleading, al!l.d led to the inference, possibly, that
if the jury felt a doubt· about even one circumstance,
they must bring in a verdict of not ' guilty'.
Having laid down the law to the extent indicated
above, the learned Judge next explained the ingredients of Ii. 325 of the Indian Penal Code. He explained
thii;i wit:b. reference only to grievous hurt, drawing the
attention of the jury to ' fracture of bone ' or injury
endangering life ' in the definition. He failed to say
that grievous hurt was only an aggravated form of
. hurt, a.nd that the liability of the aecused did noti
oea.se, if he committed an act which resulted in a
simple hurt. Ind@ed, the learned Judge did not tell
the jury that even if they held that the accused did
not cause a grievous injury, i.t would be open to them
to hold that he caused a simple injury, which would
bring the matter within s. 323 of the Indian Penal
Code. I may further point out tha.t after the verdict
of 'not guilty' under s. 325, the learned Judge did
not question the jury whether they thought that the
accused was guilty of causing at least simple hurt.
The jury gave no reasons; they only answered the
query whether they thought that the accused was
quilty of the offence of causing grievous hurt. But
they were noti questioned whether they thought, on
the facts of the case, that the accused had committed
the lesser offence of causing simple hurt. It must be
remembered that the prosecution case was that two
blows were given, one causing the injury to the
temple resulting in a fracture of the temporal bone
and the other, causing an. injury on the forehead of
of Col. Mitra. One of them was grievous; the other
was not. Of course, the jury were perfectly entitled
to hold that the accused caused neither of these
injuries; but it is possible that the jury, if questioned,
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
would have answered that they thought that the
accused had caused the simple injury but not the one
Smt. Nagindra
· m
· t h e f racture of t h e tempora1 bone. T he
Bala Mitra
resu ltmg
v.
failure to question the jury with regard to the lesser
Sunil Chandra Roy offence completely ruled out that aspect of the case
from the minds of the jury, with the result that the
Hidayatullah J. jury were limited to a case of grievous hurt and not
lesser offence.
These defects in the charge to the jury on matters
of law are heightened by the manner in which the
facts have been laid before them. The charge to
the jury, as I havj'l stated, ran the course of 50,00060,000 words. The matter I have so far discussed is
contained in 1,000-1,500 words. Thereafter, the
learned Judge did nothing more than paraphrase
the evidence of each single witness in detail, or read
out extracts from it. Throughout the course of this
reading and paraphrasing, he made no attempt to
connect the evidence with. the fact to be tried. All
that he ever said-and he said it with monotonous
iteration-was that it was for the jury to decide
whether they believed the witnesses or not. No doubt,
a Judge in charging the jury is neither compelled nor
required to express his opinion on the evidence,
except on a matter of law. But Judges marsha.11
facts and evidence to draw the attention of the jury
to what is relevant and what is not. They do not
try to place everything that a witness states, before
the jury. It must be remembered that a charge is a
vital document, and the Judge's summing up is only
needed, because the minds of the jury must be directed to the salient points in the evidence, so that they
may avoid the irrelevant or immaterial parts thereof.
The learned Judge before dealing with the evidence,
prefaced his remarks by saying this :
"I now propose to take up the prosecution
witnesses individually with a view to sum up the
evidence of each witness and the suggestions made
to each by the counsel for the accused."
This represents a very fair and adequate summary
of what the Judge really did, except that he did not
sum up the evidence but placed it in its entirety. As
I have statecl, he took each witness, turn by turn
•960
-.
•
-
•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
....
••
29
paraphrased his evidence Sentence by Sentence, and
I960
read out those portions which·he did not paraphrase,
.
.
.
Nagindra
without trymg
to d raw t h e attent10n
o f t h e Jury
to Smt.
Bala Mitra
the relevancy or materiality of the various parts.
v.
The document is composed of a series of narrations Sunil Chandra Roy
with regard to the testimony of the witnesses, each
portion beginning with the words, " Then there is the Hidayatullah J•
. evidence of witness so and so ... " and ending with
"This is the evidence .of witness so and so ... " In
between is a voluminous account of everything that
each witness stated. Not only this; no difference was
made between the testimony of the eye-witnesses and
of the formal witnesses in the matter of treatment.
I quote verbatim from the charge what the learned
Judge said with regard to one of the police witnesses.
" Then comes the evidence of Head Constable
Mathura Singh. He reached No. 18; Bondel Road
in a lorry and he was' accompanied by a constable.
You remember he was first sent by Pushpa Pal.
This Head Constable l\'lathura Singh posted another
constable at the gate so as not to allow a crowd to
gather. He also saw Col. Mitter lying unconscious
like a dead person covered with a blanket. He also
had talk with Nirmal. I would like to remind you
that if any person makes any statement to the
police, that is not admissible evidence as a rule
unless in the case of contradictions which .. are formally proved as you have seen the Counsel for the
accused has proved contradictions in some cases
but you must bear in mind that ex:cept such cases,
this is no evidence.
Then thisConstableMathuraSingh went to No. l7
with the other constable and posted that other
constable at No. 17 to control the crowd so as 1ro
prevent any one eoming out of No.17 and then
while he was coming back to No. 18 to find out if he
could telephone the officer in charge, the constable
found the officer in charge at the gate ofNo.18. After
Pushpa Pal, the Officer in charge came out ofNo. 18,
Bondel Road, he went to No. 17 and brought down
the accused. That is the evidence of Constable
Mathura Singh also. This Constable took charge
of the accused and left for the thana with the accus-
30
SUPREl'lE COURT REPORTS
[1960]
ed at about 9 O'clock in the morning on the 11th
. August, 1950. Mathura Singh was cross-examined
5 1
"' · Nagindra
and he said in cross-examination that he did not
Bala Mitra
v.
note down the names of the persons forming the
Sunil Chaud.a Roy
crowd at No. 18. He did not go and find any article
at No. 17. His evidence is that he was there to
Hiday•tullah J.
guard No. 17 s'o that no one escaped from there. "
It needs no argument to apprehend that all this was
not only a waste of the Court's time but was also
likely to obliterate the impression which the jury had
gathered with regard to the other material evidence
in the case. This is only one passage quoted from the
evidence of one witness. Not only were several such
witnesses brought to the notice of the jury; but even
in the evidence of those that were relevant and
material, there was no attempt ma.de to extricate the
relevant from the irrelevant, the material from the
immaterial, the ore from the dross. The learned Judge,
as he had indicated, followed the pattern of putting
' all the.evidence before the jury without any .attempt
to focus their attention on the salient parts of it, and
without expressing his opinion either for or against
the accused.
There were only two passageB in the entire charge,
in which the learned Judge expressed his opinion.
One was with regard to an old lady who was an eyewitness and who viewed the incident from the upper
storey of a neighbouring hou3e. That lady was the
one person about whom it could be said that she was
entirely disinterested and whose respectability was
above reproach. She was old and had weak eyesight.
She had stated that she saw the quarrel going on, then
she asked for her spectacles and saw properly. Whether
she saw correctly or not was the question. The
learned Judge told the jury that the lady was too old
and unreliable to be a proper witness, without warning
them this time that his opinion was not binding on
them. The other comment is with regard to the
medical evidence, where the learned Judge in one part
promised the jury that he would give them adequate
guidance how to weigh the conflicting medical testimony, which, it appears, he forgot to do at the end,
and in another portion, he gave this direction :
x960
-
•
-
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
...:
31
"'Now, gentlemen, when a medical witness is
z96o
called as
an
expert
he
is
not
a
witness
of
fact.
.
Smt. Nagindra
Medical evidence of an expert is evidence of opinion,
Bala Mitra
not of fact. Where there are alleged eye-witness of
v.
.
physical violence which is said to have caused theS><nil Chandra Roy
hurt, the value of medical evidence by prosecution
is only corroborative. It proves that the injudes Hidayatullak J.
coukl have been caused in the manner alleged and
nothing more. The use which the defence oan make
of the medical evidence, or any medical evidence
which the defence might itself choose to bring, is to
prove that the injuries could not possibly have been
caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit
the eye-witnesses. Therefore, you must remember
this particular point of view that if you believe the
eye-witnesses, then there is no question of having
it supported by medical evidence ; unless the medical evidence again in its turn goes so far that it •
completely rules out all possibility that such injuries
could take place in the manner alleged by the
prosecution and that is a point which you should
bear in mind, because if you accept the evidence of the
eye-witnesses, no question of further considering the
medical evidence arises at all. The only questi9n
in that case when you consider the medical evidence
is to test the eye-witnesses' version as to whether
any of the particular injuries shown in the r'eport
can be caused in the manner alleged by the prosecution. But if you don't believe the eye-witnesses then
consideration of the medical evidence in any manner
becomes unnecessary. I think this will be gentlemen, a convenient time for you to halt, otherwise
it might be too tiring for you. (Foreman of the
jury expr'essed the desire to continue the Charge)."
I do not think that the direction is either correct or
complete. It is incorrect, because a medical witness
who performs a post-mortem examination is a witness
· of fact, though he also gives an opinion on certain
aspects of the case. Further, the value of a medical
witness is not merely a check upon the testimony of
eye-witnesses; it is also independent testimony, because
it may establish certain facts, quite apart from the
other oral evidence.· If a person is shot at close
•
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
range, the marks of tatooing found by the medical
witness would show that the range was small, quite
5
"'},~ 1 • ~;~,;· . apart from any other opinion of his. Similarly, fracv.
tures of bones, depth and size of the wounds would
Sunil Chandra Roy show the nature of the weapon used. It is wrong to
say that it is only opinion evidence; it is often direct
Hidayatullab J. evidence of the facts found upon the victim's person.
However that be, these two passages were the only
directions given by the learned Judge to the jury ;
the rest of the charge was only a paraphrase of the
medical evidence running the course of 15,000 words.
There is also a complete disregard of s. 162 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure both during the trial and
also during the charge. Omissions were treated as
Gontradictions and placed before the jury. The following two passages extracted from the charge illustrate
the defect at both stages :
"Q. 151. Did you tell the policii that you did not
•
see when the old man was assaulted and who
·assaulted him ?
A. I stated to the police that I had seen the old
man being dealt a fist blow, but I had not seen him
being struck with a rod.
Q. 152. Did you tell the police that you did not
-see when the old man was .assaulted and who
assaulted him ?
A. No. I did not make that statement.
'Gentlemen, that is a contradiction and it will be
for you to judge 110w far that goes to destroy the
credit of this witness. Another contradiction was
put to him that he did not mention that Sati Mitra
was pulled by hair, but he says it here. You will
find from his answer to Question 158 that even
before the police he made the statement that Sati
Mitra was pushed away. The language used was
'pushed away'. Then in answers to Questions 161
to 164 further contradictions with this police statement were made out in cross-examination. The .
first is that it was not mentioned by him before the
police that there was any fist blow on the Colonel ;
secondly, that it was not mentioned to the police
by him thGt Sati Mitra intervened in the m>itter by
clasping ~he Colonel, and also on the point whether
r96o
N
. d
-
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33
the Colonel was dragged by his shirt. I will read
r96o
out the relevant questions and answers:
<.· 1 N . d.h
. 5 m . agin
Q. Do you fi n d f urth er t h at you h ave stated m
BalaMitra
the next paragraph after that' I also saw another
v.
tall person stated to be the second brother was SunilChandra Roy
dragging the old man holding his wearing shirt'?
. A. I saw that person dragging the Colonel by lfidayatullah .]
holding his genji and when a fist blow was given to
the Colonel, Sati Mitter came and clasped him from
a side.
Q. 161. Do you find here that all that is written is
that you saw the Colonel being dragged and nothing
is mentioned about the fist . blow and Mrs. Sati
Mitter clasping her father-in-law and being pulled
away by the hair ?
A. I do not know how the police had recorded my
..statement. But I am telling you that (what) I saw.
I saw that when a fist blow was"given to the Colonel
Sati Mitter came and clasped the Colonel from a side
and she was thrown down by being caught by her
hair.
Q. 164. Forget about the g~nji and the shirt.
You find here that nothing is mentioned about your
evidence that you saw the Colonel being given a fist
blow by the accused on the left temple and then
Sati Mitter coming and clasping the Colonel round
his waist,-you find that is not mentioned ?
A. On my being repeatedlylasked about the lathi
blow I: denied to the police that I had seen any lathi
blow being given to him, but I said that I had seen
a fist blow being given."
The second passage is even more significant. This
is how it runs :
•
"She makes it clear that she saw the incident at
different stages having been to the kitphen in the
meantime and come back. She saw the Colonel after
h~r return from the kitchen. She does not r.emember
the dress of the assailant. She also says that the
gate of No. 18 was closed. Her evidence has been criticised also for contradiction between her evidence here
and her statement to the police first. It is said that
she. said before the police that she heard the hulla
herself; here she says that it was the children's cries
•~
-
s
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
which attracted her attention. Secondlv, she said to
, the police that she came first to the d~awing room ;
Smt. Nagindra here she savs that she came first to the verandah.
Bala Mitra
.J
v.
Thirdly, she also said to the police that she saw the
Sunil Chandro Roy person wearing Choti or pants and blue shirts.
Fourthly, before the police she said that she saw t.he
Hidayatullah J. three persons leaving Nirmal and started arguing.
Here she says that she did not see them arguing.
Fifthly, it is said she told the police she saw the
Colonel once go near the pillar of the gate on the
western side but she does not say so here. Then
again, it is said that she told the police that she saw
the assailant bring out a black looking object from
somewhere in his waist and she subsequently saw the
old ·man fallen down. She said here that she did not
see the old man falling down. Gentlemen, you will
again weigh these contra.dictions and see whether
they are such as to discredit the witness or are such
for which you can niake allowance. In fact, she said
in cross-examination that ' something' was brought
out by the assailant from his right side. I think,
gentlemen of the jury, you also asked her some
questions.
Q. During the examination it a.ppears that you
have told us that you saw Colonel Mitter being drawn
towards 17, Bonde! Road?
A. He was being dragged in the direction of the
Mansion House.
Q. ll 1. That is, towards the west of the path ?
A. Yes.
Q. ll2. How far was he from the boundary walls
abutting the Bonde! Road ?
A. I would not be able to tell you that because I
was seeing this from above, from a height.
Then the last question to her was this:
Q. 113. You have just given us more or less what
you saw. Could you also tell us exactly on what part
of the lawn, was it at the central portion of the lawn
or was it on the side of the lawn that you saw that
one person who was with the Colonel was bringing
out something from his side ? At what position were
the Colonel and that gentleman standing ?
r960
.
--
r
>
-
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
A. It is difficult for me to describe the position.
x960
But I can say that he was neither in the exact centre Smt. Nagind•a
of the lawn nor was he abso1ute1y on an extreme side Bala Mitra
of the lawn. He was somewhere about 4 or 5 cubits
v.
away from the gate of the boundary wall."
Sunil Chandra Roy
In the previous trials, the Calcutta High Court
rejected the verdict of the jury, because in the opinion H idayatullah J.
.r of Chakravarti, C.J. (Sarkar, J. concurring), it was
all comment and no evidence. It may be said that
this time it was all evidence and no comment or
arrangement. The Calcutta High Court has laid down
in a series of cases what the charge to the jury should
be, and I shall refer only to the Calcutta cases.
There is no settled rule or practice as to what a
'1f. charge should or should not contain.
That is dictated by the circumstances of each case. Sir James
Fitz-James Stephen in his History of Criminal Law
of England, Vol. I, pp. 455-456 (quoted in Trial by
Jury and Misdirection by Mukherji, 1937 Edn., at
p. 237)says:
"The slimming up again is a highly characteristic
part of the proceedings, but it is one on which I feel
it difficult to write. l think however that a Judge
who merely states to the Jury certain propositions
of law ·and then reads over his notes does not discharge his duty. This course was commoner in
former times than it iS now ...... I also think that a
Judge who forms a· decided opinion before he has
heard the whole case or who allows himself to be
in any degree actuated by an advocate's feelings in
regulating the proceedings; altogether fails to discharge his duty, but I further think that he ought
not to conceal his opinion from the Jury, nor do
I see how it is possible for him to do so, if he
arranges the evidence in the orderjin which-it strikes
his mind. The mere effort to see what is essential
to a story, in what order the important events
happened, and in what relation they stand to each
other must, of necessity, point to a conclusion. The
act of stating for the Jury the questions which they
have to answer and of stating the evidence bearing
on those questions and in showing in what respect
it is important, generally goes a considerable way
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
towards suggesting an answer to them, and· .if a
Judge doeshnot do as much at least as this, he does
Smt. Nagindra
Bala Mura
almost not ing.'.'
v.
As pointed out by Mukerji (ibid p. 253):
SunilChandraRoy
"Where the charge to the Jury was little more
than a rambling statement of the evidence as it
H idayat ullah J.
came from the mouths of the several witnesses who
were called and no attempt was made to sift the
·releva.nt and important matters from the irrelevant
and unimportant facts, held that the charge was
defective a,nd the trial was vitiated on that account.
(Jabed Silcdar) (1 ). It is not sufficient for the Judge
simply to point out this peaca of evidence and that,
this presumption and that, this bit of Jaw and that.
It is his duty to help and guide the Jury to a
proper conclusion. It is his duty to direct the
attention of the Jury to the essential facts. It is
his duty to point out to them the weight to be
attached to the evidence and to impress upon them
that if there is any doubt in their minds they must
give the benefit of the doubt to the accused. It is
not enough that the Judge ·has said something on
each of these matters somewhere in the charge. It
is the manner of saying it, the arrangement and
the structure of his charge which will make it either
of value or valueless to the Jury. (Molla Khan)(') ...
It is not enough to read out the evidence in extenso;
it is incumbent on the Judge to analyse it and place
it succinctly before the Jury (Rajab Ali) (')'."
The charge in this case goes manifestly against
these directions, It is no more than ;a recital of the
entire evidence in the case almost as detailed as the
evidence itself, and there is no attempt whatever to
give any guidance to the Jury.
No doubt, the Privy Council in Arnold v. King
Emperor(') stated that:
"A charge to a Jury must be read as a whole. If
there are _salient propositions of law in it, these
will, of course be the subject of separate analysis.
But in a protracted narrative of fact, the determination of which is ultimately left to the jury, it must
1960
(1) (1931) 35 C.W.N. 835.
(3) A.LR. 1927 Cal. 631.
(2) A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 169 (S.B.)
(4) (1914) L.R. 41 I.A. 149·
'
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
r
37
needs be that the view of the Judge may not
z960
coincide with the view.of others who look upon the
whole proceedings in black type. It would however, · Smt.
Nagindra
Bala Mitra
not be in accordance with usual or good practice to
v.
treat such cases as cases of misdirection, if, upon Sunil Chandra Roy
the general view taken, the case has been fairly left
within the Jury's province."
Hidayatullah J.
These observations apply only if the matter has been
fairly left to the jury. When this charge is read
through its vast length, the most astute person is left
guessing as to where it waslall driving the jury to. It
·is a protracted narrative no doubt, but it is so amorphous as to give no indication of its real purport and
import, and leaves the matter not in the· hands of the
jury, but, if I may so ~ay with great respect, in the air.
I think that this was a case for the exercise of the
powers of this Court under Art. 136. As was laid
down in Ramlcrishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State
of Bombay (1 ), the Judge in summing up for the
prosecution and defence should not give merely .a
summary of the evi<;}ence; he must ·marshall the evidence so as to give proper assistance to the jury, who
a.re required·to decide which view of the facts is true.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the charge to the
jury cannot be s.aid to be a proper charge on any
principle or precedent, and that the verdict cannot be
accepted. Though this case has taken already almost
ten. years, there is prima f acie reason to think that
justice has failed. Since the matter is now before the
highest Court, there is no likelihood of any further
delay in the case, and what is just therein can be
done. I would, therefore, proceed to hear the case
on merits.
By Court : In accordaince with the opinion of the
majority, this appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) (1955] I S.C.R. 903, 930.
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