THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NAGPUR versus ITS EMPLOYEES
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 February 1960 | [1960] 2 S.C.R. 942 | 1960 INSC 22
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 February 1960
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, K.C. DAS GUPTA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 143/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 2 S.C.R. 942
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 22
Text of the judgment
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"terminal charges" means "for the provision of"
and not" for the user of".
The necessary conclusion that follows is that
v.
irrespective of the fact of the actual user by any
Upper Doob Sugar particular consignor of the stations sidings and other
Mills Ltd.
things mentioned in s. 3(14) "term'inal charges" are
Das Gupta . leviable by reason of the mere fact that these 'things
1
have been provided by the Railway Administration.
The conclusion that necessarily follows therefrom is
that the charges of Rs. 4·11 at either end sought to
be levied by the Railway Administration in addition
to the charges for carriage was " terminal charges"
within the meaning of the Railways Act and the proposed levy being in accordance with Government
Notification under s. 32 of the Act was nothing more
than the application of standardized terminal charges.
The Tribunal had therefore no jurisdiction to investigate the reasonableness or otherwise of the same and
had no jurisdiction to reduce the same. The order
made by the majority of the Tribunal cannot therefore be allowed to stand.
The order made by the Tribunal is therefore set
aside. The application made under s. 41 in respect
of this levy of Rs. 9·6 per 4 wheeler truck in addition
to the carriage is rejected. The appeal is allowed
with costs.
Appeal allowed.
S. S. Light
Railway Co. Ltd.
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0
THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF
NAGPUR
Februa,ry. IO
v.
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ITS EMPLOYEES
(P. I3. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND
K.C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Services undertaken by City Corporation-If
and when industry-Test-'Inditstry'. Meaning of--Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, r947 (C.P. &
Berar XXIII of r947). s. 2 (r4)-City of Nagpur Corporation Act.
r948 (Madhya Pradesh 2 of Ig50).
The question for determination in these appeals was whether
and to what extent the municipal activities of the Corporation of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
943
Nagpur City fell within the term 'industry' as defined bys. 2 (14)
z960
of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947·
Disputes having arisen between the said Corporation and its February ro
employees in its various departments, ·the State Government
referred them for adjudication to the State Industrial Court
under s. 39 of the Act and that Court by its award held that the
Corporation and all its departments were covered by the said
definition. Against that award the Corporation made an application to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The
High Court rejected its contention that the Corporation was not
an industry within the meaning of the said section and remanded
the case to the Industrial Court for determination as to which of
its departments fell within the definition and making an award
accordingly. Thereafter The Industrial Court found all the
departments of the Corporation except those dealing with
(1) assessment and le'1y of house-tax (2) assessment and levy of
Octroi, (3) removal of encroachment and removal and pulling
down of dilapidated houses, (4) prevention and control of food ,
adulteration, and (S) maintenance of cattle pounds, to be industries within the meaning of the definition and passed its award
accordingly. The Corporation appealed to this Court by special
leave, but there was no appeal on behalf of the employees of the
five departments excluded from the definition. ,
Held, that the decision of the Industrial Court except so far
as it related to the five departments in respect of which there
was no appeal, must be affirmed.
The definition of the word 'industry' in s. 2 (14) of the C.P.
and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, although in
a language somewhat different from that of s. 2 (j) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, is very comprehensive. It is in two parts,
cl. (a) defines it from the standpoint of employers and cl. (b)
from that of the employee. An activity that falls within any of
the two clauses must be an industry.
D.N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee [1953] S.C.R. 302 and Baroda
Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen. [1957] S.C.R. 33, applied.
It is not necessary that an activity of the Corporation must
share the common characteristics of an industry before it can
come within the section. The words of s. 2 (14) of the Act are
clear and unambiguous ,and the maxim noscitur a socii can have
no application. · The history of industrial disputes and the
legislation, however, recognises the basic concept that the activity
must be an organised one and not one that pertains· to private or
personal employment.
State of Bombayv. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha. [1960] 2 S.C.R.
866 and Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Rep. 7 b., referred to.
· But the definition, however wide, cannot include the regal,
primary and inalienable, functions of the State though statutorily
delegated to a corporation and the ambit of such functions cannot
be extended so as to include the welfare activities of a modern
state and must be confmed to legislative power, administration
of law and judicial power.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
Ig60
Richard Coomber v. The Justices of the County of Berks, Berks.
(1883-84) 9 A.C. 6r and The Federated State School Teachers' AssociaCorporation of the tion of Australia v. The State of Victoria. (1928-29) 41 C.L.R. 569,
City of .J.Vagpur Cou.nty Council of Middlesex v. Asscssntent Coinniittee of St. George's
v.
Union. (1896) 2 Q.B.D. 143, Verisimo Vasquez Vilas v. City of
Its Employees
Manila, 220 U.S. 345, and The Federated Municipal and Shire
Coundl Employees' Union of Australia v. Melbo11rne Corporation.
(1918-19) 26 C.L.R. 508, referred to.
The real test as to \vhcther a service undertaken by a
corporation is an industry must be \vhether that service, if
performed by an individual or a private person, \vould be an
industry. lVIonetary cosideration cannot be an essential characteristic of industry in a modern State. ~It \vas, therefore, incorrect to say that only such activities as were analogous to trade
or business could come within s. 2 (r4) of the Act.
D. N. Banerji v. P.R. Mu.kherjee, [1953] s:c.R. 302, explained.
The Federated Mu.nicipal and Shire Council Employees' Union
of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation. (r9r8-r9) 26 C.L.R. 508,
Federated Engine-Driver and Firenien's Association and Ors. v. The
Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited and Ors. (1913) 16 C.L.R.
235 and The Federated State School Teachers' Association Australiav.
The State of Victoria, (1929) 41 C.L.R. 569, referred to.
Where a service rendered by a Corporation is an industry,
the employees of the departments connected with that service,
whether financial, administrative or executive, \vould be entitled
to the benefits of the Act.
Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen. [1957] S.C.R. 33,
referred to.
If a department of a municipality discharges many functions,
some \Vithin and some without the definition of industry given
by the Act, the predominant functions of the department shall
be the criterion for the purposes of the Act.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 143 & 144 of 1959 and 545 of 1958.
Appeals by special leave from the Award dated
December 14, 1957, of the Seate Industrial Court at
Nagpur in Industrial References Nos. 18 of 1956 and 1
of 1957 respectively.
O. B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji,
Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants
(in all the appeals}.
A. V. ViswanathaSastri, W.S.Barlingay,S.W.Dhabe,
Shanker Anand and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent
No. 2 (in C. A. No. 144/59 and respondent (in C. A.
No. 143 of 1959).
H. R. Kha.nna and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent
No. 3 (in C.A. No. 144/59.)
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A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, W. S. Barlingay, Shankar
x960
Anand and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondents (in c
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r:45 f 1958)
orporation o1 t e
CA
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City of Nagpur
1960 Feb. 10. The Judgment of the Court was
v.
delivered by
,
Its Employees
SuBBA RAO, J.-This batch of three connected
appeals raises the question whether and to what Subba Rao J.
extent the activities of the Corporation of the City of
Nagpur come under the definition of "industry" in
s. 2(14) of the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act).
The appellant is the Corporation of the City of
Nagpur constituted under the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (Madhya Pradesh Act No. 2 of 1950).
Disputes aro.se between the Corporation and the
e_mployees in various departments of the Corporation
in respect of wage scales, gratuity, provident fund,
house rent, confirmation, allowances etc. The Government of the State of Madhya Pradesh by its order
dated October 23, 1956, referred the said disputes
under s. 39 of the Act to the State Industrial Court,
Nagpur and the reference w.as numbered as Industrial
Reference No. 18 of 1956. The appellant filed a statement before the Industrial Court questioning the
jurisdiction of that Court, inter alia, on the ground
that the Corporation was not an industry as defined
by the Act. On February 13, 1957, the Industrial
Court made a preliminary order holding that the
Corp.oration was an industry and that the further
question whether any department of the Corporation
was an industry, or not, ·would be decided on the
evidence. The appellant challenged the correctness
of that order by filing a petition under Art. 226 of
the Constitution in ·the High Court of Bombay at
Nagpur, but that petition was dismissed, as the award
was made before its hearing. On June 3, 1957, the
Industrial Court made an award holding that the
Corporation was an industry and further that all
departments of the Corporation were covered by the
said definition. It also revised the pay scales of the
employees and accepted the major demands made by
them.· On July 15, 1957, the appellant again filed a
petition in the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
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questioning the validity and the correctness of the
said award. A division bench of the said High Court,
CMporntion
• ord er d ate d Septem lier 11 , 19"7
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d th e
c·t 0 i N. ofP the b y its
o , reJecte
'Y ''· ag "' contention of the appellant that the Corporation was
Its Employees
not an industry as defined by the Act and remanded
the case to the State Industrial Court to decide the
Subba Raa J.
activities of which departments of the Corporation
fell within the definition of "industry" given in the
Act and to re-examine the schedules and categories of
persons and to restrict the award to the persons
concerned within the definition of the word "industry"
in the Act. On remand, the said Industrial Court
scrutinized the activities of each of the departments
of the Corporation and held that all the departments
of the Corporation, except those dt'aling with (i) assessment and levy of house-tax, (ii) assessment and levy
of octroi, (iii) removal of encroachment and removal
and pulling down of dilapidated houses, (iv) prevention and control of food adulteration, and (v) maintenance of cattle pounds, were covered by the definition of "industry" under the Act. It further gave
findings in regard to the d·isputes between the parties
and also as to the persons entitled to the reliefs. It
is not necessary to give the particulars of the findings
arrived at or the reliefs given by the Industrial Court,
as nothing turns upon them in this a.ppeaL The
appellant by special leave filed in this Court Civil
Appeal No. 143 of 1959 against the award of the
Industrial Court. It also filed in this Court by special
leave Civil Appeal No. 144 of 1959 agaii1st the order
of the High Court holding that the activities of the
Corporation came under the definition of "in<lust1·y"
in the Act and remanding the case to the Industrial
Court for decision on merits in respect of ea.ch of the
activities of the Corporation.
Civil Appeal No. 545 of 1958, the third appeal in
this batch, arises out of o, reference made by the State
Government of Madhya Pradesh in regard to the
disputes between the appellant, i.e., the Corporation
of the City of Nagpur, and the employees of the
Corporation in the Fire Brigade Department, representing themselves· and other employees: The said
reference ,;ias numbered as Industifal Reference No. 1
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of 1957. As there was overlapping· of, the disputes
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. raised ~n Industrial Reference No. 18 of 1956 a~d Corporation of the
Industrial Reference No. 1 of 1957, the Industnal City of Nagput
Court heard both the references together and, by
v.
consent, the evidence in Reference No. 18 of 1956 was Its Employees
treated as evidence in Reference No. 1 of 1957. On
December 14, 1957, an award was made in Reference Suuba Rao J.
No. 1 of 1957 and it was based on 'the findings in the
award made in Reference No. 18 of 1956. The·Industrial Court held that the Fire Brigade Department
was an industry within the meaning of the Act and,
on that basis, gave the necessary reliefs to ~he
employees.
Mr. Aggarwala, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant in the first two appeals, raised before us the
following points: (1) No service rendered by the
Corporation would be an industry as defined by
s. 2(14) of the Act. (2) Assuming that some of the
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services of the Corporation are .comprehended by the
definition of'.' industry " in the Act, the said services,
in order to satisfy the definition, must be analogous
to a business or trade. (3) Even otherwise, the
activities of the Corporation to be called industry
must partake the common characteristics of an
industry. (4) The finding of the Industrial Court
holding that the various departments of the Corporation ·are industries is not correct, as the services
rendered by the said departments do not satisfy either
of the aforesaid two tests.
The first question need not detain us, for it has
now been finally decided by two decisions of this
Court against the appellant. In D. N. Banerji v.
P.R. Mukherjee (1), the chairman of a municipality
dismissed two of its employees, namely, the Sanitary
Inspector and the Head Clerk, and the Municipal
Workers' Union q1rnstioned the propriety of the
dismissal and claimed that they should be re-instated
and the matter was referred by the Government to
the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication under the
Industrial Disputes Act. In that case two questions
were raised before thi8 Court-one was· whether the
said dispute was industrial dispute within ' the
(I) iI953] S.C.R. 302'.
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[1960(2)]
meaning of s. 2(j) of th.e Industrial Disputes Act and
the
other was whether th~ Industrial Disputes Act
Corporation of the
was
invalia inasmuch as it allowed the Tribunal to•
City of Nagpur
re-instate employees and to that extent trenched on
v.
Its Employees
the power of the chairman to appoint and dismiss
employees. This Court held that the Act was not
Subba Rao]. invalid, as it was in pith and substance a law in
respect of industrial and labour disputes and that the
conser.vancy service rendered by the municipality·
was an industry and the dispute b<;Jtween the municipality and the employees of the conservan!)y department was an industrial dispute within the meaning of
the Industrial Disputes Act. This decision was
followed by this Court in Baroda Borough Municipality
v. Its Workmen (1 ). In that case the effect of the
earlier decision was summarized th us, at p. 38 :
" It is now finally settled by the decision of this
Court in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee(') that
a municipal undertaking of the nature we have
under consideration here is an " industry" within
the meaning of the definition of that word in s. 2(j)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the
expression "industrial dispute" in that Act
includes disputes between municipalities and their
employees in branches of work t.hat can be regarded
as analogous to the carrying on of a trade or
business."
In that case the workmen employed in the electricity
department of the Baroda Municipality demanded
bonus. The electricity undertaking of the Baroda
Municipality, was held to be an industry and the
dispute between the Municipality and it8 employees
an industrial dispute. Bonus was refused on other
grounds and we are not concerned wi~h that aspect
of the case here. These two cases, therefore, have
finally and authoritatively held that municipal
undertakings could be " industry " within the
meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act.
A faint argument is attempted to sustain a distinction between the definition of an "industry" in the
Industrial Disputes Act and the definition of the same
word in the Act in question. Section 2(j) of the
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 33.
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(2) [1953] S.C.R. 302
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949
Industrial Disputes Act defines " industry " to mean
x960
any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or
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• 1u d e any ca11"mg, Corporatum
ca11 mg
of emp Ioyers an d to me
ct 0f N ofP the
service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupa- 'Y v. ag ur
tion or avocation of workmen". Section 2(14) of the Its Employees
Act divides the definition into three parts, nameJy,
"(a) any business, trade, manufacturing or mimng SubbaRao ./.
undertaking or calling of employers, (b) any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial
occupation or avocation of employees, and (c) any
branch of an industry or a group of industries." A
comparative study of these two sections brings out
the following differences : While the definition of
."industry" in the .Industrial Disputes Act. means
certain things and includes others, the definition of
"industry " in the Act includes the three categories
described therein; while the definition in the former
Act places 'undertaking ' in a category different from
' manufacturing or mining ', in the latter Act it is
qualified by the words 'manufacturing or mining'.
In our view these differences do not justify us in
taking a different view from that accepted by this
Court in the foregoing decisions. Clause (a) of the
definition defines industry with reference to the
employers and cl. .(b) with reference to the employees.
Excluding the words "manufacturing or mining
undertaking" from cl. (a) of the definition, the other
words in els. (a) and (b) thereof are comprehensive
enough to take in all the categories which the
definition of "industry" in the Industrial Disputes
Act will take in. That apart, a perusal of the decision
of this Court in D. N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee (1)
does not indicate that this Court would have come to
a different conclusion if the word "und~rtaking " in
the Industrial Disputes Act was qualified by the
words "manufacturing or mining". The decision
was founded on a broader basis, having regard to the
history of the legislation, the cognate definitions in
the Act and the' inclusive part of the definition
corresponding to s. 2(14)(b) of the Act. We, therefore, hold that a service rendered by a corporation, if
it complies with the conditions implicit in the
definition-which we would consider at a later stage
(I) (1953] S.C.R. 302
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of the judgment-will be an "industry" within the
meaning
of the definition in the Act.
Corporation of the
..
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Oty of Nagpu'
The next question is whether activity ot t e
v.
Corporation is not " industry " unless it shares
Its Employees
the common characteristics of an industry. The
foliowing five characteristics are stated to be the
Subba Rao J.
coi1ditions implicit in the definition: (il the activity
must concern the production or distribution of goods
or services; (ii) it must be to servo others but not to
oneself; (iii) it must involve co-operative effort
between employer and employee, between capital and
labour; (iv) it must be done as a commercial transaction; and (v) it must not be in exercise of purely
governmental functions.
.
We have considered this aspect in State of Bombay
v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha(') in the context of
the definition of "industry" in the Industrial
Disputes Act and formulated certain broad principles.
But as this case is concerned wit.Ji the definition of
"industry" in a different Act, we shall briefly resurvey
the law on the subject with specific reference to a
corporation.
Let us scrutinize the definition of "industry" to
- ascertain whether all or some of the conditions are
implicit in the definition and whether the said conditions constitute the necessary basis for it. The
true meaning of the section must be gathered from
the expressed intention of the Legislature. Maxwell
in his book "On the Interpretation of Statutes",
10th Edn., rightly points out at p. 2 that "If the
words of the statute a.re in themselves precise and
unambiguous no more is necessary than to <'xpound
those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the
words them~elves in such· case best declaring the
intention of the legislature". The words used in the
section are clear and unambiguous and they prima
facie are of the widest import. We have pointed out
that the section is in two parts: cl. (a) defines
" industry " with reference to 'employers and cl.
(b) defines it with refen•nce to employees. Clause
(c) extends the definition to any branch of an industry
or a group of industries, i.e., industries coming within
the definition of els. (a) and (b). It is said that in
1 960
\I) [1960] ZS CR. 866 .
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951
construing ~the definition we must adopt the rule of
I9 60 .
construction no8cuntur a sociis. Maxwell explains this
·
332 h
Cotporation o1 the
d octrme
at p.
t us:
.
.
City of Nagpur
"When two or more words which are susceptible
v.
of analogous meaning are coupled together no8cuntur Its Employees
a 8ociis. They are ui:i.derstood to be used in their
cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour Subba Rao, J.
from each other, that is, the more general is
restricted to a sense analogous to the less general."
On the basis of this doctrine, it is argued that the
words following the words " any business, trade,
manufacturing or mining undertaking " shall partake
the characteristics of any business, trade, manufacturing or mining undertaking, and the words " any
calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial
occupation or avocation of employees" shall sha_re
the qualities of an industrial occupation or avocation.
In other words, the general word " calling " 'in cl. (a)
is controlled by the words preceding it, and the
general words "calling, service etc." in· cl. {b) are
restricted by · the succeeding words "industrial
occupation or avocation". This doctrine was dealt
with by this Court in State of Bombay v. The Ho8pital
M azdoor Sabha (1). Therein this Court has considered
the scope of this doctrine and has observed thus:
"It must be borne in mind that no8cuntur a sociis
is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail
in cases where it is clear that the wider words have
been deliberately used in order to make the scope
of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is
only where the intention of the Legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied. It can also be
applied where the· meaning of the words of wider
import is doubtful; but where the object of the
Legislature in using wider words is clear and free
of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question
cannot be pressed into service. "
The said doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked in
cases where the intention of the Legislature is clear
and free of ambiguity. · The phraseology used in the ·
(r) [1960] 2 S.C,R. 866
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2))
section is very clear and it is not susceptible of any
ambiguity. The words used in the first part of cl. (b)
Corporation of the
l"fi d
d th e qua l"f"
t"
· ·
d
City of Nagpur are unqua 1 e ; an
1 1ca 1 • is mtro uced
v.
only in the later part. If the words "calling, service,
Its Employees employment, handicraft" are r·eally intended to be
qualified by the adjective "'industrial", one should
Subba Rao J.
expect the Legislature to affix the adjective to the
first word "calling" rather than to the last word
"occupation". The inclusive definition is a wellrecognized device to enlarge the meaning of the word
defined, and, therefore, the word "industry " must be
construed as comprehending not only such things as
it signifies according to its natural import but also
those things the definition declares that it should
include: see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 2, p.
1416. So construed, every calling, service, employment of an employee or any business, trade or calling
of an employer will be an industry. But such a wide
meat1ing appears to overr~ach the objects for which
the Act was passed. It, is, therefore, necessary to
limit its scope on permissible grounds, having regard
to the aim, scope and the object of the whole Act. To
arrive at the real meaning of the words, Lord Coke in
Heydon' s case (1 ) says that the following matters are to
be considered: (1) \Vhat was the law before the Act
was passed ; (2) What was the mischief or defect for
which the law had not provided; (3) What remedy
Parliament has appointed; and (4) The reason of the
remedy. The word "employers" in cl. (a) and the
word" employees" in cl. (b) indicatcthat the fundamental basis for the application of the definition is
the existence of that relationship. The cognate
definitions of "industrial dispute'', "employer",
"employee", also support it. The long title of the
Act as well as its preamble show that the Act was
passed to make provision for the promotion of
industries and peaceful and amicable settlement of
disputes between employers and employees in an
organized activity by conciliation and a.rbitratiori and
for certain other purposes. If the preamble is read
with the historical background for the passing of the
Act, it is manifest that the Act was introduced as an
x960
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important step in achieving social justice. The .Act
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seeks to ameliorate the service conditions of 'the c
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k
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their
· c·ey
orporation oft e
wor· k ers, t o prov1"de a mac h"mery .rior reso1vmg
Nagpur
01
conflicts and to encourage co-operative effort in the • v.
service of the community. The history of labour Its Employees
legislation both in England and India also shows that
it was aimed more to ameliorate the · conditions of Subba Rao J,
service of the labour in organized activities than to
anything else. The .Act was not intended to reach the
personal i;;ervices which do not depEnd upon the
employment of a labour force.
positive aspects of the definiBefore consiQ.ering
tion, what is not an industry may be. considered.
However wide the definition of " industry " may be,
it cannot include the regal or sovereign functions of
State. This is the agreed basis of the arguments at
the Bar, though· the learned counsel differed on the
ambit of snch functions. While the learned counsel
for the Corporation would like to enlarge the scope
of these functions so as to comprehend all the welfare
actiyities of a modern State, the learned counsel for
the respondoots would seek to confine them to what
are aptly termed "the primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional government". It is said that
in a modern State the sovereign power extends to all
the statutory functions of the State except to the
business of trading and industrial transactions undertaken by it in its quasi-private personality. Sustenance for this contention is sought to be draw1t from
Holland's Jurisprudence, wherein the learned author
divides the general heading "Public Law" into
four sub-heads and under the sub-head" .Administrative
Law" he deals with a variety of topics including
welfare and social activities of a State. The treatment
of the subject" Public Law" by Holland and other
authors, in our view, has no relevancy in appreciating
the scope of the concept of regal powers which have
acquirerl a definite connotation. Lord ·Watson, in
Coomber v. Justices of Berks (1 ), describes the functions
such as administration of justice, maintenance of
order and repression of crime, as among the primary
tpe
-·
.
·-
•
----
..
and inalienable functions of a constitutional Govern(1) (1883-84) 9 App. Cas, 61, 74
•
•
954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
ment. Isaacs, J., in his dissenting judgment in The
Federated State School Teachers' Association of
Corporation of the
Australia
v. The State of Victoria (1 ), concisely states
City of Nagpur
thus at p. 585 :
·
v.
Its Employees
" Regal functions are inescapable and inalienable.
Such are the legislative power, the administr11tion of
Subba Rao ].
laws, the exercise of the judicial power. Non-regal
functions may be assumed by means of the legislative power. But when they are assumed the State
acts simply as a huge corporation, with its legislation as the charter. Its action under the legislation, so far as it is not regal d:ecutiori of the law is
merely analogous to that of a private company
similarly authorised."
These words clearly mark out the ambit of the regal
functions as distinguished from the other powers of a
State. It could not have been, therefore, in the contemplation of the Legislature to bring in the regal
functions of the State within the definition of industry
and thus confer jurisdiction on Industrial Courts to
decide disputes in respect thereof. v\T e, therefore,
exclude the regal functions of.a State from the definition of industry.
This leads us to the question whether the Corporation can be said to exercise regal functions by legislative delegation. The Corporation functions under a
statute and its powers, duties and liabilities are
regulated by it. It is a juristic person and it can sue
and be sued in its name. The statute constituting it
may confer upon it some strictly regal functions and
other municipal functions. In County Council of
Middlesex v: Assessment Committee of St. George's
Union (2 ), certain premises were used for the administration of justice and also for municipal purposes.
The question raised was whether the said premises
were rateable and the Court held that they were
rateable in so far as they were occupied for
municipal purposes and not rateable in so far as they
wer.e occupied for the administration of justice, which
was held to be a function of the Crown. So too, the
Supreme Court of America in Verisimo Vasquez Vilas
(1) (1929) 41 C.L.R. 569.
•
(2) (1896) 2 Q.B.D. 143,
r
-
-
S.C.R.
,
)
y
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ,
955
v. City of Manila (i) expounded the dual character of
z96o
a municipal corporation thus:
Corporation of the
"They exercise powers which are governmental City of Nagpur
and powers which are of a private or business
v.
character. In the one character a municipal corpo-, Its Employees
ration is a governmental sub-division, and for that
purpose exercises by delegation a part of the Subba Rao f.
sovereignty of the State. In the other character it is
a mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter
character it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere
ofthe public purposes for which its governmental
powers are conferred. "
Isaacs and Rich, JJ., in The Federated Municipal and
Shire Council Employees' Union of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation (2 ) in the context of the dual func~ •
tions of State say much to the same effect at p. 530:
"Here we have the discrimen of Crown exemption. If a municipality either (1) is legally
empowered to perform and does perform any
function whatever for the Crown, or (2) is lawfully
empowered to perform and does perform any function which constitutionally is inalienably a Crown
function-as, for instance, the administration of
justice-the municipality is in law presumed to
represent the Crown, and the exemption applies.
Otherwise, it is outside that exemption, and, if
impliedly exempted at all, some other· principle
must be resorted to. The making and maintenance
of streets in the municipality is not within either
•
proposition."
A corporation may, therefore, discharge a dual function : it may be statutorily entrusted with regal
functions strictly so-called, such as making of laws,
disposal of certain cases judi'cially etc., and also with
other welfare activities. The former, being delegated
regal functions, must be excluded from the ambit of
tl:ie definition of "industry".
The next head of exclusion from the definition is
-put by the learned counsel for the appellant thus :
A municipality in the modern polity is also a trading
(r) 220 U.S. 345, 356; 55 L. Ed. 491, 495. '
(2) (1918-19) 26 C.L.R. 508, 530-53x.
•
•
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
•
I960
and industrial corporation and in that capacity is
empowered to carry on undertakings partaking the
Corporation of the
City of Nagpur character of business and trade, and that the definition of "industry" in the Act only takes in such
v.
Its Employees
undertakings and no other statutory activities. To
· state it differently, the contention is that activities
Subba Rao ].
which partake the character of trade and business in
the hands of a private individual would be an industry
if undertaken by a corporation. Some observations
made by this Court in D. N. Baneiji v. P.R. Mukkerjee (1 ) are relied upon in support of this contention.
Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J.; speaking for the Court
made the following observations at p. 317 :
"Having regard to the definitions found in our
Act, the aim or objective that the Legislature had
in view and the nature, variety and range of disputes that occur between employeYs and employees,
we are forced to the conclusioh. that the definitions
in our Act include also dfaputes that might arise
between munieipalities and their employees in
branches of work that can be said to be analogous
to the carrying out of a trade or business."
Emphasis is,laid upon the words " analogous to the
carrying out of a trade or business" and :m argum(lnt
is built upon those words to the effect that this Court
held that only such activities of municipalities analogous to trade or business would be industry within
the meaning of the definition of "industry" in the
Act. This argument, if we may say so, is the result
of an incorrect reading of the decision. There the
•
question was whether the sanitary department of a
municipality was an industry. within the meaning of
the Industrial Disputes Act and whether the dispute
between the municipality and its employees in that
department was an industrial dispute thereunder.
At p. 311, the learned Judge specifically deals with a
ccintE!htion based upon the collocation of the words
in the section and observes :
"Though the word "undertaking" in the definition of "industry" is wedged in between business
and trade on the one hantl. and manufacture on the
other, and though therefore it might mean only a
business or trade undertaking, still it must be
(t) [•953] S.C.R. 302
•
•
•
'
-
-
S.C.R;
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
remembered. that if that were so, there was no need
r96°
to use the word separately from business or trade. c P -1 ~ fth
.
t is
. a tt rac t ed even more cl early City
or ora wn o
e
The w1'der 1mpor
of Nagpur
when we look at the latter part of the definition
v.
which refers to "calling, service, employment, or Its Employees
industrial occupation or avocation of workmen."
"Undertaking" in the first part of the definition Subba Rao .f.
and "industrial occupation or avocation" in the
second part obviously mean much more than what
is ordinarily understood by trade or business. The
definition was apparently intended to includ@ within
its scope what might not strictly be called a trade
or business venture."
This passage leaves no room for doubt that this Court
construed the terms of the definition of "industry" in
a way which takes in activities which are not strictly
called trade or business. Therefore, the words "not
strictly be called a trade or business venture" and the
words "analogous to the carrying out of a trade or
business" emphasize more the nature of the organised
activity implicit in a trade or business than to equate
the other activities with trade or business. This is
made more clear by the learned Judge when he
expressly reserves the Court's opinion on a wider
question in the following words at p. 318:
"It is unnecessary to decide whether disputes
arising in relation to purely administrative work
fall within their ambit."
We c~nnot, therefore, agree with the contention that
the said decision, when it expressly accepted the
comprehensive meaning which the words of the section
naturally bear, intended to circumscribe the wide
sweep of the section to business or trade and activities
in the nature of trade or bpsiness. Nor a fair reading
of the section bears out such a construction. We have
already indicated our view on the construction of the
section, having regard to the clear phraseology used
therein, that the section cannot be confined to trade
or business or activities analogous to trade or business .
A more workable and reasonable test is laid down
in an Australian decision cited at the Bar, and that
test has also been accepted and applied by this Court.
In Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association
•
•
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
of Australia and Others v. The Broken Hill Proprietary
Company
Limited and Others (1 ) a distinction was
Corporation of the
City of Nagpur dru,wn between trading and non-trading operations,
but t'.rn question u,s to how far non-trading operations
v.
Its Employees 11ttmcted the definition of "industry" was left undecided. That question fell to be decided in The
Subba Rao J.
Federated 111unicipal and Shire Council Employees'
Union of Australia M elboure Corporation(') and that
decision, if 'we may say so, is illuminating and throws
considerable light on the question to be decided in
the present appeal. It was held by the High Court of
Australia that the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration had authority to determine by
award a dispute between an organization of employees
registered in connection with "municipal and shire
councils, municipal trusts and similar industries", and
municipal corporations constituted under State laws.
The dispute there related to those operations of
municipal corporations which consisted of the making,
maintenance, control and lighting of public streets.
The learned Judges discussed at length the meaning
of the word "industrial dispute" in s. 51 (XXXV) of
the Constitution of Australia. It is manifest from
this decision that even activities of a municipality
which cannot be described as tmding activities can be
the subject-matter of an industrial dispute. Isaacs, J.,
in his dissenting judgment in The Federated State
School 'l'eachers' Association of Australia v. The State of
Victoria (3), has concisely expressed this idea at p. 587
thus:
"The material question is : What is the nature of
the actual function assumed-is it a service that the
State could have left to private enterprise, and, if
so fulfilled, CQuld such a dipute bo "industrial" ?"
This test steers clear of thD argument that to be an
industry the activity shall be a trading activity. If
a service performed by u,n individual is u,n industry,
it will continue to be so notwithstanding the fact that
it is undertaken by a corporation.
Another test suggested by the learned counsel may
be scrutinized.
It is said that unles.s there is a
v.
-
(1) (19r3) 16 C.L.R. 245.
(2) (r918-19) 26 C.L.R. 508, 530-531
(3) (1929) 41 C.L.R. 569
~ ..
•
•
I
S.C._B:.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
z960
quid pro quo for the service, it cannot be an industry.
This is the same argument, namely, that the service c
· t h e nature of tra de m
· a d'werent
ir
orporation of the
must b e m
garb. City
N gp
01
1
This Court in D. N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee ( ) has
v. a UY
held that neither the investment of capital or the Its Employees
existence of profitearning motive seems to be a sine
qua non or necessary element in the modern concep- Subba Rao J.
tion of industry. The conception that unless the
public who are benefited by the services pay in cash
for the services rendered to them, the services so
rendered cannot be industry is based upon anexplodedtheory. As observed by Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J.,
"the conflicts between capital and labour have now
to be determined more from the standpoint of status
than of contract". Isaac and Rich, JJ., in The Fede-rated Municipal and Shire Council Employees' Union
of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation (2 ) formulated the
modern concept of industry at p. 554 thus :
"Industrial disputes occur when, in relation to
operations in which capital and labour are contributed in co-operation for the satisfaction of human
wants or desires, those engaged in co-operation
dispute as to the basis to be observed, by the
parties engaged, respecting either a share of the
product or any other terms and conditions of their
co-operation.
The learned Judges proceeded to state at p. 564:
"The question of profit-making may be important
from an income tax point of view, as in many
municipal cases in England ; but, from an industrial
dispute point of view, it cannot matter whether the
expenditure is met by fares from passengers or
from rates. In each case the municipality is performing a function ; and in the one case it performs
it with a variation in contrast with the other.
Isaac, J., elaborated the theme ·in his dissenting
judgment in The Federated State School Teachers'
Association of _Australia v. The State of Victoria (3) at
p. 577 thus:
" The contention sounds like an echo from the
dark ages of industry and political economy ......... .
. . . . . .Such disputes are not simply a claim to share
122
{I) [1953] S.C.R. 302
(2) [1918-19] 26 C.L.R. 50S, 530-53x.
(3) [1929] 41 C.L.R. 569.
J
•
•
960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[196Q (2)]
the material Wealth jointly produced and capable
. of registration in statistics. At heart they are a
Ccwf>-O~ation of the
struggle, constantly becoming more intense on the
City of Nagpur
part of the employed group engaged in co-operation
v.
with the employing group in rendering services to
· Its Employees
the community essential for a higher general
Subba Rao ].
human welfare, to share in tlmt welfare in a grea.ter
degree. All industrial enterprises contribute more
or less to the general welfare of the community,
and this is a most material consideration when we
come to determine the present question apart from
the-particular contention raised at the Bar.
Monetary considerations for service is, therefore, not
an essential characteristic of industry in a modern
State.
The learned counsel then sought to demarcate th~.
activities of a municipality into three categories,
namely, (i) the activities of the department which performs the services; (ii) those of the department which
only impose taxes, collect them and administer them;
and (iii) those of the departments which are purely in
administrative charge of other departments. We do
not see any justification for this artificial division of
municipal activities. Barring the regal functions of
a municipality, if such other activities of it, if undertaken by an individual, would be industry, then they
would equally be industry in the hands of a municipality. It would be unrealistic to draw a line between
a department doing a service and a department
controlling or feeding it. Supervision and actual
performance of service are integral part of the same
activity. In other words, whether these three functions are carried out by one department or divided
between three departments, the entire organizational
activity would be an industry. This aspect of the
question was incidentally touched upon by this Court
in Baroda Borough Municiiality v. Its Workmen (1)
and the following passage at p. 49 reads thus :
"We have already pointed out that under the
Municipal Act a municipality may perform various
functions, some obligatory and some diseretional.
The activities may be of a composite nature : some
-
-
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 33
'
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
961
of the departments may be mostly earning departr96o
ments and some mostly spending departments. For c
-.- ._
. h ll t
. . l orporationo1 1,..,
examp1e, th e d epar.t ~en t wh ic co. ec s mi;immpa City of Nagpur
taxes or other mummpal revenue, is essentially an
v.
earning department whereas the sanitary depart- Its Employees
ment or other service department is essentially a
spending dep1trtment. There may indeed be depart- Subba Rao f.
ments where the earning and spending may almost
balance each other."
We 1have extracted this passage only because the
observations are apposite to the discussion on hand
but not to express our concurrence with the conclusion
drawn in that case. The question of bonus does not
fall to be considered in the present &ppeal. These
observations lend suppoTt to our view that integrated
activities of a municipality cannot be lileparated. to
take in some under the definition of" industry " and
exclude others from it.
We can also visualize different situations. A
particular activity of a municipality may be covered
by the definition of "industry ". If the financial
and administrative departments are solely in charge
of that activity, there can be no difficulty in treating
those two departments also as part of the industry.
But there may be cases where the said two departments may not only be in charge of a particular
activity or serviee covered by the defi:r:iition of
"industry " but also in charge of other activity or
activities falling outside the definition of "industry".
In such cases a working rule may be evolved to
advance social justice consistent with the principles
of equity. In such cases the solution to the problem
depends upon the answer to the question whether
• such a department is primarily and predominantly
concerned with industrial activity or incidentally
connected therewith.
The result of the discussion may be summarized
thus: (1) The definition of" industry" in the Act is
very comprehensive. It is in two parts·: one part
defines it. from the standpoint of the employer and
the other ·from the standpoint of the employee. If
an activity falls under either part of the definition_
it will be an industry within the meaning of the Act.
•
•
962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
(2) The history of industrial disputes and the legisla-
r960
-~
tion recognizes the basic concept that the activity
C°'.poratio• of the shall be an organized one and not that which pertains
City of ~-agpur to private or personal employment. (3) The regal
Its Employees
; ,.,,'
•
•
~
00
I
functions described as primary and inalienable functions of State though statutorily delegated to a
corporation are necessarily excluded from the purview
of the definiti.on. Such regal functions shall be confined to legislative power, administration of law and
judicial power. (4) If a service rendered by an
individual or a private person would be an industry,
it would equally oe an industry in the hands of a
corporation. (5) If a service rendered by a corporation is an industry, the employees in the departments
connected with that service, whether financial,
administrative or executive, would be entitled to the
benefits of the 4ct. (6) If a department of a municipality discharges many functions, some pertaining to
industry as defined in the Act and other non-industrial activities, the predominant functions of the
department shall be the criterion for the purposes of
the Act.
The following are the various departments of the
Nagpur City Corporation: (1) General Administration Department; (2) Octroi Department; (3) Tax
Department; (4) Public Conveyance Department;
(5) Fire ..Brigade Department; (6) Lighting Department; (7) Water Works Department ; (8) City
Engineer Department; (9) Enforcement (encroachment)
Department: (10) Sewage Pumping Station Department; (11) Sewage Farm Department; (12) Health
Department; (13) Market Department; (14) Cattle
Pound Department; (15) Public Gardens Department; (16) Public \Vorks Department; (17) Assessment Department; (18) Estate Department; (19) Education Department; (20) Printing Press Department;
(21) Workshop Depa__rtment; and (22) Building
Department. Out of these departments, the State
Industrial Court has held that all the departments
except those pertaining to (i) assessment and levy
of house-tax, (ii) assessment and levy of octl'oi,
(iii) removal of encroachment and pulling down of
dilapidated houses, (iv) maintenance of cattle pounds,
-
-
-
S.C.R.
-.-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
963
and (v) prevention and control of food adulteration,
I96°
are industries. Even in regard to the departments c 0 -t'- 1 th .
which the State Industrial Tribunal held to be ;,~fy :;
industries it denied relief to persons who are not
v.
covered by the definition of "employees" in the Act. Its Employees
As the employees have not preferred any appeal
against the award in so far as it went against them, Subba Rao f
nothing further need be said in regard to the aforesaid
five departments.
Before we consider whether all or any of the
departments of the Corporation fall within the definition of " industry " in the Act, it will be convenient
to notice the scheme of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (Madhya Pradesh Act No. 2 of 1950).
Section 7 makes the Corporation a body corporate
with perpetual succession and a common seal. Section
6 describes the murricipal authorities charged with
the execution of the Act and they are: (a) the Corporation; (b) the Standing Committee; and (c) the
Chief Executive Officer. Chapter II of Part II
contains the aforesaid sections and it further provides
for the constitution of the Corporation and the mode
of election to the said body. Chapter III of the said
Part prescribes the procedure for the conduct of
business of the Qorporation. Chapter IV thereof
provides for ilhe appointment of municipal officers and
servants and for their punishment and removal. Chapter V deals with powers, duties. and functions of the
municipal authorities; it gives the obligatory and discretionary duties of the Corporation. Under s. 57, the
Corporation shall make adequate provision, by any
means or measures which it may lawfully use or take,
such as for lighting public streets, cleaning of public
streets, disposal of nightsoil and rubbish, maintenance of
firebrigade and other welfare activities in the interest
of the public. Section 58 confers a discretionary power
on the Corporation to provide for other amenities
not covered by s. 57, and which are comparatively
not absolutely essential but are necessary for the
happiness of the people of the State. Provisions of
Ch. VI enable the municipality to hold and acquire
properties, to manage public institutions maintained
out of municipal funds. Section 79 enjoins on the
i;:;pu/
•
•
964
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
municipality to apply the fund available with it to
discharge
its statutory duties and pay salaries and
Corporation of the
City of Nagpur allowances of its various servants. Chapter IX enables
the municipality to raise loans on the security of its
v.
Its Employees properties for discharging debts and for meeting the
capital expenditure. Part IV empowers the municiSubba Rao ].
pality to impose taxes fat· the purposes of this Act and
also describes the procedure for collecting the same.
Part V confers powers and imposes duties on the
Corporation and its officers in respect of public health,
safety and convenience. This Part deals with public
convenience, drains and privies, conservancy, sanitary
provisions, water supply and drainage, regulation of
factories and trades, markets· and slaughter places,
food, drink, drug and dangerous articles, prevention of
infectious diseases and disposal of the dead. Part VI
empowers the Corporation to draw up townplanning
schemes, . to· regulate erection and re-erection of
buildings, to close public streets, to remove obstruction in streets, to regulate laying of new streets, to
dispose of mad and stray dogs, to control public
begging, to prohibit brothels etc. Part VIIl lays
down the general provisions for carrying on the municipal administration and also enabling the Corporation
to make by-laws for carrying out the provisions and
intentions of the Act. Shortly stated, the Act creates
the Corporation a juristic person capable of holding
and dispo~ing of property, confers power on it to
impose and collect taxes and licence fees, to borrow
money, to decide disputes in the first instance in respect
thereof, constitutes the amounts so collected as the
fund of the municipality from and out of which the
liabilities of the Corporation are n:iet and the salaries
of its employees are paid, imposed on it duties to
carry out various welfare activities in the interest of
the public, confers on it powers for implementing their
duties satisfactorily and also powers to make by-laws
for regulating its various functions. In short, a
corporation is analogous to a big public company
carrying out most of the duties which such a company
can undertake to do with the difference that certain
statutory powers have been ·conferred on the corporation for carrying out its functions more satisfactorily .
z960
•
•
r
-
.,
'·
-
S.C.R.
--
......
-.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
965
With this background let us take each of the
r960
departments
of
the
Corporation
held
by
the
State
c
P - 1.- fth
·
,
b
A
or ora ion o
e
Industrial Court to be governed Y the ct.
City of Nagpur
(i) Tax Department : The main functions of this
v.
department are the imposition and collection of oonser- Its Employees
vancy, water and property taxes. No separate staff
has been employee). for the assessment and levy of Subba .Rao J.
property taxe.s : the same staff does the work connected
with assessment and collection of water rates as
well as scavenging taxes. It is not disputed that ~he
work of assessment and levy of water rate and
scavenging rate for private latrines is far heavier
than the other works entrusted to this department.
No attempt has been made to allocate specific propor- tion of the staff for different functions. We, therefore,
must accept the finding of the State Industrial Court
that the staff of this department doing clerical or
manual work preclominaritly does the work connected
with scavening taxes and water rate. The said rates are
really intended as fees for the service rendered. The
services, namely, scavenging and supply of water, can
equally be undertaken by a private firm or an individual for remuneration and the fact that the municipality does the same duty does not make it any the
less a service coming under t.he definition of "industry".
We would, however, prefer to sustain the finding on a
broader basis. There cannot be a distinction between
property tax and other taxes collected by the municipality for the purpose of designating the tax department as an industry or .otherwise. The scheme of the
Corporation Act is that taxes and fees are collectyd
in order to enable the municipality to discharge its
statutory functions. If the functions so discharged
are wholly or predominantly covered by the definition
of "industry", it would be illogical to exclude the
tax department from the definition. While in t,he
case of private individuals or firms services are paid
in cash or otherwise, in the case of public institutions,
as the services are rendered to the public, the taxes
collected from them constitute a fund for performing
those services. As most of the services rendered by
the municipality come under the definition of
"industry", we should hold that the employees of the
•
•
966
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
tax department are also entitled to the benefits under
the Act.
Corporation of the
(ii) Public Conveyance Department: This is a tax
City of Nagpur'
v.
which is a wheel-cum-road tax. Conveyance departIts Employees ment ·is meant to regulate the using of cycles,
rickshaws, bullock-carts etc. This department recovers
Subba Rao j.
r&gistration fees for rickshaws, licence fee from rickshaw drivers and wheel tax from bullock-carts. It
also recovers cycle tax on every cycle used in Corporation limits. (See 'the evidence of Witness No 1 for
Pasty No. 1). These taxes are therefore really fees
collected by the Corporlltion for the services rendered
to the owners of cycles and other conveyances by way
of maintenance and construction of roads. These
services can equally be performed by a private individual or a firni for remuneration. It satisfies the tests
laid down by us. This department, therefore, is an
industry within the meaning of the definition in the
Act.
(iii) Fire Brigade Department: Ex. N. A. 22 gives
the duties of the driver-cum-fitter of the Fire Brigade
Department. This exhibit indicates that the function
of this department is to attend to fire calls. Witness
No. 3 for Party No. 1 says that it is the duty of
the firebrigade to' supply water at marriage functions
and other public functions. The fire brigade employees
are not paid any extra amount for supplying water at
public or private functions. Though the department
renders some extra services, the main function of the
department is to attend to. "fire calls". Private
bodies also can undertake this service. It is said that
under s. 333 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act
powers are conferred on specified officers to remove
or order the removal of any person who interferes with
or impedes the operation for extinguishing the fire, to
close any street or passage in or near which any fire is
burning, to break into or pull down or use for the
passage of hoses or other appliances, any premises for
the purpose of extinguishing the fire and generally to
take such measures as may appear necessary for the
preservation of life or property, and that the services
of the ;i.rebrigade cannot be satisfactorily rendered
without such powers and that no private iudividual
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
967
60
can per.form the same. Here the argument tends to
I9
be fallacious as it ignores the distinction between the CorJ;or~tion of the
services and the statutory powers conferred to satis- :city of Nagpur
factorily discharge the said services. A private person
v.
or a firm can eqYally do the same serviaes and nothing Its Employees
prevents the legislature from conferring similar powers Subba Rao J.
on an individual or a i'irm. These services also satisfy
all the tests laid down by us and therefore we hold
that this department is also an industry.
(iv) Lighting Department : Lighting Department
looks after the arrangements for lighting the streets in
the Corporation area. There are two systems oflighting
streets, namely, (1) by electricity, and (2) by ke.rosene
oil lamps. Electric street lighting is given on contract
to Nagpur Light and Power Co., Nagpur, by the
Corporation. Kerosene oil street lighting is done
departmentally by the lighting department. Electric
Light and Power Co., is responsible to the Corporation
for stree,t lighting. The said Company has to fix
electric lights according to the programme given to it
by the Corporation. The burning hours are also fixed by
the Corporation. The Corporation does not charge
the public for street lighting. (See the evidero.ce of
Witness No. 5 for Party No. 1). We have already
indicated that quid pro quo in the shape of payment
of money for particular services rendered is not a necessary condition for the application of the definition of
"industry". The services rendered by the department
satisfy the terms of the definition. They also satisfy
both the positive and negative ~ests laid down by us.
We, therefore, hold that this department is an industry.
.
(v) Water Works Department: This department maintains three head-works, Kanhan, Gorewara, and
Ambazeri. There are pumping stations at Kanhan
and Gorewara. At the pumping stations the water is
filtered and pnrnped into service reservoir at Nagpur.
The Corporation has a separate staff at each pumping
station. It has also a separate staff for distribution.·
In addition it maintains an assessment department
to assess water cess for the distribution of water.
(See the evidence of Witness No. 9 for Party No. 1).
These three branches of ~he department have an
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968
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2))
administrative and an executive staff. Whether the
Corporation of the services rendered by the department are concerned
City of Nagpur with manufacturing proc~ss or not, they are certainly
v.
covered by the wide definition of "industry" in the
Its Employees Act. They also satisfy both the posit.ive and ·negative
tests laid down by us. None of them comprises
Subba Rao J.
delegated regal functions of State and they are such
that a private individual can equally undertake to
do. We, therefore, hold that the said department
comes under the definition of "industry".
(vi) City Engineers Department: The function of
this department is to exercise supervisory and administrative control over its subordinate departments.
The·City Engineer is the head of this department.
(See the evidence of Witness No. 5 for ·Party No. 1).
As we are of the view that the departments subordinate to this department come under the definition
of "industry", this department, which has administrative control over those subordinate departments,
must be considered a part of those departments. If
so, it follows that this department is also an industry.
(vii) Enforcement (encroachment) Department: The
function of this department is to remove encroachment and unauthorised constructions and dilapidated
houses. This department is a section of the Estate
Department. (See the evidence of Witness No. 5 for
Party No. 1). It is contended that the functions of
this department are all statutory and that no private
individual can perform them. Statutory powers are
conferred on the Corporation to remove encroachment and unauthorised construction and dilapidated
houses. These powers are necessary for the Corporation to protect its properties and to prevent encroachment thereon and to remove dilapidated houses in
the interest of the public. But if a distinction is made
between the powers and. the nature of the services
rendered, it would be obvious that the services rendered
are not peculiar to a corporation. A private firm may
undertake to manage the properties of otlrers. It
will have to appoint persons to detect encroachment
and to take steps to recover possession of lands encroached upon. The only difference between a firm
and a municipal corporation is that the corporation
•
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S.C.R.
-'·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
can, in exercise• of its statutory powers, remove the
r960
encroachment, but it does not prevent the aggrieved c
-.· t'tl
orporation of the
. t o a. mv1
. 'l cour t t o es t a bl'IS h. h IS
party f rom gomg
·1 e City
of Nagpur
to the property : but m the case of a firm, 1t cannot
v.
take the law into its own hands: it has to get the Its Emptoyeas
encroachment removed through a court of law. So
far as the nature of the service is concerned, namely, Subba Rao J.
protecting its properties in the interest of the public
from encroachment and to recover possession of the
lands encroached upon, there is no essential distinction
between the said service of the Corporation and a
similar service performed by a private firm. The
service satisfies not only the. terms of the definition,
but also the tests laid down by us.
Even so, it is contended that the said reasoning
·cannot be invoked in the case of the service rendered
by the municipality in removing dilapidated houses
and it is said that the said service is rendered in
exercise of a governmental function which a private
individual cannot himself discharge.· Here again the
incidental power is confused with the service. To
illustrate, a firm may undertake to remove dilapidated
houses and render the said service to those who
engage it. It may not have the power to remove
dilapidated houses of persons other than those who
employed its services. . The difference does not in any
way affect the character of the service. We, therefore,
hold that this department is also an industry.
(viii) Sewage Department; The sewage pumping
station is meant for pumping sewage at the outfall of
the underground sewers. The sewage is utilised.on
the land on broad irrigation system, and some crops
are also grown on the farm. (See the evidence of
Witness No. 8 for Party No. 1). In the cross-examination of the said witness it was elicited that whatever
sewage is left after irrigating the farm maintained by
the Corporation will be sold to the neighbouring
farms. ll'or the said reasons, it must be held that this
department is also an industry.
(ix) Health Department: This department looks
after scavenging, sanitation, control of epidemics,
control of food adulteration and running of public
dispensaries. Private institutions can also render
•
•
970
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
I9 60
these services. It is said that the control of food
adulteration and the control of epidemics cannot be
1
';;1:;:j
done by private individuals and institutions. We do
v.
not see why. There can be private medical units to
Its Employees help in the control of food adulteration and in the
control of epidemics for remuneration. Individuals
Subba Rao J.
may get the food articles purchased by them examined
by the medical unit and take necessary action against
guilty merchants. So too, they can take advantage
of such a unit to prevent epidemics by having necessary inocnlations and advice. This department also
satisfies the other tests laid down by us, and is an
industry within the meaning of the definition of
"industry" in the Act.
(x) Market Department: The function of the
Market Department is to issue licences, collect
ground-rent and registration fee and to detect short
weights and measures. Rents are collected for permitting persons to enter the Corporation land and
transact business thereon. Detection of short weights
and measures is a service to the people to prevent
their being cheated in the market. The setting apart
of market places, supervision of weights and measures
are services rendered to the public and the fees
collected are remuneration for the services so rendered.
These servicas can equally be done by any private
individual. This department a.Jso si<tisfies the tests
laid down by us. We, therefore, hold that this department is an industry within the meaning of the Act.
(xi) Public Gardens Department : The functions
of this department are the maintenance of public
parks and gardens and laying of new gardens and
parks; and planting of trees on road sides. (See the
evidence of Witness No. 5 for Party No. 1). This
service is covered by the definition of "industry".
Any private individual can certainly perform the
functions stated above and the fact that the municipality has undertaken those duties does not affect the
nature of the service. This also satisfies 1;he tests laid
down by us. We, therefore, hold that this Department is an industry.
(xii) Public Works Depa'l'tment: This department
is in charge of construction and maintenance of public
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.
•,
S.C.R.
y
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
971
works such as roads, drains, buildings, markets, public
x96o
latrines etc. For the convenience of the public, this c
-.- th .
. d'iv1'ded m
. t o zones and every zone h as City
orporation o1 e
d epartment is
of Nagpur
its office. The outdoor staff in the P.W.D. consists
v.
of assistant engineer, overseers, sub-overseers, time- Its Employees
keepers, mates, carpenters, masons, blacksmiths and
coolies. The other staff, consisting of clerks and Subba Rao J
peons performs indoor duties. (See the evidence of
Witness No. 5 for Party No. 1). This department
performs both administrative and executive functions.
The services rendered are such that they can equally
be done by private individuals and they come under
the definition of "industry", satisfying both the positive and negative tests laid down by us in this regard.
We, therefore, hold that this department is an industry.
(xiii) Assessment Department: This department
deals with the assessment of taxes, fees and rates.
The same staff does the assessment work connected
not only with taxes strictly so called but also other
fees and rates. As the services rendered, nameJy,
scavenging and supply of water can be done by private
individuals, the State Industrial Court held that they
come under the definition of "industry" and therefore
the department assessing fees and rates is also part of
that industry. There is no reason why a distinction
should be made in regard to the assessment of taxes
so-called and that of fees and rates. The taxes are
collected only for enabling the Corporation to render
service to the public and, as most of the services come
. under the definition of "industry", this department
also, in our view, is an industry within the meaning
of the Act. That apart, the State lndustrial Court
•
has held that the same staff does the work of assessment of house-tax as well as other fees and rates
and the work of this department is predominantly
connected with the assessment of scavenging tax and
water rate. Applying the test of "paramount and
· predominant duty", this department falls within the
definition of" industry " in the Act.
(xiv) Estate Department: This department maintains the record of property acquired, vested or
transferred to the Corporation and all buildings and
roads constructed by the P.W.D. This department
•
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972
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
lets out lands and houses belonging to the Corporation by public auction and gets income therefrom,
CorpoYation of the
which no doubt is credited to the common fund. A
City of Nagpuy
department
like this is equally necessary in a private
v.
company which carries out functions similar to the
Its Employees
Corporation. Maintenance of records of the properties
Subba Rao ].
acquired, buildings and roads constructed and
properties leased, is a necessary administrative function correlated to the corresponding services. If the
service such as construction of buildings, roads etc., is
an industry, its administrative wing is also an
industry. The department as a whole, both with its
administrative and executive wings, for reasons
stated in connection with the other departments, is
an industry.
(xv) Education Department: This department looks
after the primary education, i.e., compulsory primary
education within the limits of the Corporation. (See
the evidence of Witness No. 1 for Party No. 1). This
service can equally be done by private persons. 'This
department satisfies the other tests. The employees
of this department coming under the definition of
"employees " under the Act would certainly be
entitled t.o the benefits of the Act.
(xvi) Print·ing Press Department : The printing
press is maintained by the Corporation for printing
passes. It. is also used for printing of by-laws and
the rules and proceedings and forms, and the by-laws
and the rules so printed are sold to the public. For
the reasons stated supra in tli.e case of the Water
Works Department, this department is also an
industry.
(xvii) Building Department : This department is
really a "building permission department". The
function of this department is to regulate construction of buildings by private individuals and to take
action against those who violate the by-laws and the
provisions of the Corporation Act pertaining to this ·
department. It is said that the functions of this
department are statutory and no private individual
can discharge those statutory functions. The
question is not whether the discharge of certain
functions by the Corporation have statutory backing,
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
but whether those functions can equally be perforz96o
med by private individuals. The provisions of the c
-.
.
b
"b
. orporatwn o1 the
Corporat10n Act and the y-laws prescri e certam City 01 Nagpur
specifications for submission of plans and for the
v.
sanction of the authorities concerned before the Its Employees
building is put up. The same thing can be done by a
co-operative society or a private individual. Co- Subba Rao J.
operative societies and private individuals can allot
lands for building houses in accordance with the
conditions prescribed by law in this regard. The
services of this department are therefore analogous to
those of a private individual with the difference that
one has the statutory sanction behind it and the
other is governed by terms of contracts. This department functions in the interest of the public and the
services rendered by this department satisfy both the
positive and negative tests laid down by us. We,
therefore, hold that this department is covered by the
definition of" industry ".
·
(xviii) General Administration Department : This
department co-ordinates the functions of all the
other departments. The State Industrial Court
describes the functions of this department thus :
"This department consists of treasury, accounts
section, records section in which are kept records of
all the different departments and public relations
section. It also consists· of a committee section the
duty of which is to look after the convening of
meetings, to draw up agenda, minutes of proceedings
and to draft by-laws. In the record section are kept
records of most of the departments including health
and engineering." Every big company with different
sections will have a general administration department. If the various departments collated with this
department are industries, this department would
also be a part of the industry. Indeed the efficient
rendering of all the services would depend upon the
proper working of this department, fqr, otherwise
there would be confusion and chaos. The state
Industrial Court in thiS case has held tliat all except
five of the departments of the Corpdration come
under the definition of "inilnstry" apd if so, it
follows that this department, dealing predominantly
1
I
I
•
•
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
with industrial departments, is also an industry.
Hence the employees of this department are also
Corporation of the entitled to the benefits of this Act.
City of Nagpur
The State Industrial Court held that five of the
v.
departments
of the Corporation did not fall within
Its Employees
the terms of the definition of" industry " in the Act.
Subba Rao ]. The employees of these departments did not file any
appeal against the finding of the State Industrial
Court and we do not propose to express our final
opinion on the correctness of the decision of the
Industrial Court in regard to these activities.
In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
(
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THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANY LTD.
z960
v.
February, I I
SHRI P. D. VY AS AND OTHERS.
(B. P. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Ind,,strial Disp,,te-Standing Orders-Draft su.bmitted by
employer for approval-Modification by Certifyitig OjficerJ"risdiction-Ind"strial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, I946
(20 of I946) SS. J, 4, 5, I5(2) (b). 1
The draft standing orders submitted by the appellants to
the certifying officer for certification under s. 3(1) of the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, were
altered by the latter on the footing that the modifications were
necessary so as to be in conformity \Vith the model standing
orders. Section 4 of the Act, before it was amended in 1956,
provided that "it shall not be the function of the certifying
officer or the appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness
or reasonableness of the provisions of any standing order,"
while under s. 3(2) the draft shall be, as far as is practicable, in
conformity with the model standing orders, where they have
been prescribed. The question was whether the certifying
officer had jurisdiction to make the modifications in the present
case.
Held, that there is a distinction between considerations of
fairness or reasonableness and those of practicability, and that
though the certifying officer may not modify the draft on the
ground that its provisions are unfair or unreasonable, he can
and must modify it in matters covered by the model standing
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