HAMDARD DAWAKHANA (WAKF) LAL KUAN, DELHI AND ANOTHER versus UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 18 December 1959 | [1960] 2 S.C.R. 671 | 1959 INSC 168
Key facts
- Decided
- 18 December 1959
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, J.L. KAPUR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 81/1959
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1960] 2 S.C.R. 671
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 168
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
671
HAMDARD DAWAKHANA (WAKF) LAL KUAN,
DELHI AND ANOTHER
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR,
K. N. WANCHOO and K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
.,
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Advertisement, Control of-Advertis~ment, when relates to
freedom of speech-Statute prohibiting advertisements of drugs f 01
certain diseases-Constitutionality of-Whether curtails freedom of
speech-Conferment of power on executive to add to diseases falling
within mischief of statute-If amouttis to delegation of legislative
power-Statute empowering executive to seize offending articles,
without providing safeguards-Whether imposes reasonable restrictions-Constitution of India, Arts. r9(r)(a), I9(I)(g), r9(r)(j) and
I9( 6). The Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, I954 (2I of r954), ss. 2(a), 3(d), 8 and r4(c).
When an enactment is chall.enged on the ground of violation
of fundamental rights it is necessary to ascertain its true nature
and character, i.e., its subject matter, the area in which it is
intended to operate, its purport and intent. In order to do so it
is legitimate to take into consideration all the factors such as the
history of the legislation, the purpose the~of, the surrounding
circumstances and conditions, the mischief intended to be suppressed, the remedy proposed by the legislature and the true reason
for the remedy. Initially, there is a presumption in favour of
the constitutionality of an enactment.
Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, [1955]
2 S.C.R. 603, R. M. D. Chamarbaughwala v. The Union of India,
[1957] S.C.R 930, Mahant Moti Das & Others v. S. P. Sahi, A.LR.
1959 S.C. 942, Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India &
Others, [1950] S.C.R. 869 and The State of Bombay v. F. N. Bulsara,
[1951] S.C.R. 682, referred to.
On examining the history of the legislation, the surrounding
circumstances and the scheme of the Act it was clear that the
object of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisem'ent) Act, 1954, was the prevention of self-medication and
self-treatment by prohibiting instruments which may be nsed to
advocate the same or which tended to spread the evil. Its
object was not merely the stopping of advertisements offending
against morality and decency.
Advertisement is no doubt a form of speech, but its true
character is reflected by the object for the promotion of which it
is employed. It is only when an advertisement is concerned
with the expression or propagation of ideas that it can be said to
relate to freedom of speech. But it cannot be said that the right
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to publish and distribute commercial advertisements advertising
an individual's personal business is a part of the freedom of
Hamda'd
speech guaranteed by the Constitution. The provisions of the
Dawakhana (Wakf) Act which prohibited advertisements commending the efficacy,
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value and importance in the treatment of particular diseases of
v.
certain drugs and medicines did not fall under Art. 19(1)(a) of the
UiJion °1 India Constitution. The scope and object of the Act its true nature
and character was not interference with the right of freedom of
speech but it dealt with trade and business.
Lewis]. Valentine v. F. ]. Chrcstensen, 86 Law. Ed. 1262;
R. M. D. Chamarbaughwala v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R.
930, State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaughwala, [1957] S.C.R.
874; john W. Rast v. Van Deman 0- Lewis Company, 60 Law.
Ed. 679, Alice Lee Grosjean "./. The American Press Co., So Law.
Ed. 660, Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India,
[1959] S.C.R. 12 and ]. M. Near v. State of Minnesota, 75 Law.
Ed. 1357, referred to.
The definition of "advertisement" which included labels on
cartons and bottles and instructions inside cartons was not too
wide in view of the object of the Act. lf the definition was not
so broad and inclusive it would defeat the very purpose for which
the Act was brought into existence. The use of the word
"suggest" in s. 3 did not suppmt the contention that the restraint placed by that section was disproportionate. The provisions
of s. 14(c) and r. 6 which allowed the prohibited advertisements
to be sent confidentially by post to a registered medical practitioner, to a wholesale or retail chemist, to a hospital or a
laboratory only when the words "for the use only of registered
medical practitioners or a hospital or a laboratory" had been
inscribed on the outside of every packet containing the advertisement did not impose excessive restraint. The ·provisions of the
Act were in the interests of the general public and placed
reasonable restrictions on the trade and business of the petitioners
and were saved by Art. 19(6) ..
Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] S.C.R.
759 and Dwarka Das Srinivas of Bombay v. The Shotapur Spinning
0- Weaving Company Limited. [1954] S.C.R. 674, referred to.
The words " or any other disease or condition which may be
specified in the rules made under this Act " in cl. (d) of s. 3
which empowered the Central Government to add to the diseases
falling within the mischief of s. 3 conferred uncanalised and
uncontrolled power on the executive and were ultra vires. The
legislature had established no criteria or standards and had not
prescribed any principle on which a particular disease or condition
was to be specified. As a consequence the Schedule to the rules
also become ultra vires. But the striking down of the impugned
words did not affect the validity of the rest of cl. (d) or of the
other clauses of s. 3 as these words were severable.
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The first part of s. 8 which empowered any person authorised
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by the State Government in this behalf to seize and detain any
document, article or thing which such person had reason to
HamdariJ
believe contained any advertisement contravening the provisions Dawakhana (Wakf)
of the Act imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamenLal Kuan
ta! rights of the petitioners and was unconstitutional. This
v.
portion of s. 8 went far beyond the purpose for which the Act Union of India
was enacted and failed to provide proper safeguards in regard
to the exercise of the power of seizure and detention as had been
provided by the legislature in other statutes. If this portion was
excised from the section the remaining portion would be unintelligible and could not be upheld.
By a portion of cl. (d) of s. 3 and the whole of s. 8 being
declared unconstitutional, the operation of the remaining portion
of the Act remained unimpaired as these were severable.
R. M. D. Chamarbaughwala v. Union of India [1957] S.C.R.
930, referred to.
ORIGIN.AL JURISDICTION: Petition Nos. 81, 62, 63 &
3of1959 .
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for
enforcement of ]'undamental rights.
K. M. 11funshi, N. 0. Chatterjee, L. R. Das Gupta,
G. K. Munshi, D. N. MukherjeeandR. Gopalakrishnan,
. for the petitioners.
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. N.
Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L.
Iyengar, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for respondents
Nos. 1 to 10 (in Petn. No. 81 of 59), Nos. 1 to 3 (in
Petn. No. 62 of 59), No. 1 (in Petns. Nos. 63 and 3 of
59) and Nos. 2 and 3 (in Petn. No. 3 of 59).
G. N. Dikshit and 0. P. Lal, for respondent No. 11
(in Petn. No. 81 of 59) and No. 2 (in Petn. No. 63 of 59).
R. Gopalakrishnan, for the intervener.
1959. December 18, The Judgment of the court
was delivered by
KAPUR, J.-These petitions under Art. 32 of the
Constitution raise the question of the constitutionality
of the Drug and Magic Remedies (Objectionable
Advertisement) Act (XXI of 1954) hereinafter referred
to as the Act. As the petitions raise a common question. of law they may·conveni.ently be disposed of by
one )Udgment.
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[1960(2)]
The allegation of the petitioners was that various
actions had been taken against them by the respondDawak=:n:;Wakf) ents which violated their fundamental rights under
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Art. 19(l)(a) and 19(l)(f) & (g). They also challenged
v.
the Act because it contrvened the provisions of Art. 14
Upion of[ndia and Arts. 21 and 31.
The Act passed on April 30, 1954, came into force
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on April 1, 1955, along with the rules made thereunder.
As provided in its preamble it was
"An Act to control the advertisement of drugs in
certain cases, to prohibit the advertisement for
certain purposes of remedies alleged to possess magic
qualities and to provide for matters connected
therewith."
The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 81.of 1959, the
Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) and another, alleged
that soon after the Act came into force they experienced difficulty in the matter of publicity for their
products and various objections were raised by the
authorities in regard to their advertisements. On
December 4, 1958, the Drugs Controller, Delhi, intimated to the petitioners .that the provisions of s. 3 of the
Act had been contravened by them and called upon
them to recall their products sent to Bombay and
other States. As a result of this, correspondence
ensued between the petitioners and the authorities.
On December 4, 1958, the Drugs Controller, Delhi
State, stopped the sale of forty of their products set
out in the petition. Subsequently, objection was taken
by the Drugs Controller to the advertisements in regard
to .other drugs. Similarly objections were taken by the
Drugs Controllers of other States to various advertisements in regard to medicines and drugs prepared by
the petitioners. They submitted that the various
advertisements which had been objected--to were prepared in accordance with the Unani system and the
drugs bore Unani nomenclature which had been
recognised in the whole world for several centuries
past. The Act is assailed on the ground of discrimination under Art. 14, excessive delegation and infringement of the right of free speech under Art.19(l)(a) and
their right to carry on trade a:nd business under
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Art. 19(l)(f) & (g). Objection is also taken under
Arts. 21 and 31. The petitioners therefore prayed for
a declaration that the Act and the Rules made there- Daw:!:::,,a~7vakf)
under were ultra vires and void as violative of Part III
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of the Constitution and for the issuing of a writ of
v.
Mandamus and Prohibition and for quashing the Union of India
proceedings and the notices issued by the various
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authorities-the respondents.
In their counter affidavit the respondents submitted
that the method and manner of advertisement of drugs
by the petitioners and others clearly indicated the
necessity of having an Act like the impugned Act and
its rigorous enforcement. -The allegations in regard to
discrimination and impairment of fundamental rights
under Art. 19(l)(a), (f) & (g) and any infringement of
Arts. 21 and 31 were denied and it was stated:"The restriction is about the advertisement to the
people in general. I say that the main object and
purpose of the Act is· to prevent people from selfmedicating with regard to various serious diseases.
Self-medication in respect of diseases of serious
nature mentioned in the Act and the Rules has a
deleterious effect on the health of the community
and is likely to affect the well-being of the people.
Having thus found that some medicines have
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tendency to induce people to resort to self-medication by reason of. elated advertisements, it was
thought necessary in the interest of public health
that the puffing up of the advertisements is put to a
complete check and that the manufacturers are
compelled to route their products through recognised
sources so that the products of these manufacturers
could be put to valid and proper test and consideration by expert agencies.'?
It was also pleaded that the advertisements were of
an objectionable character and taking into consideration the mode and method of advertising conducted
by the petitioners the implementation of the provisions of the impugned Act was justified. Along- with
their counter-affidavit the respondents have placed on
record Ext.-A, which is a copy o{ the literature which
676
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[1960(2)]
accompanied one of the various medicines put on sale
by the petitioners and/or was stated on the cartons in
Hamdard
which the medicine was contained. In their affidavit
Dawakhana (Wakj) ·
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•t t d th a t U nam· an d
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m reiom
er th e pet•t•
I 10ners re1 era e
v.
Ayurvedic systems had been discriminated against;
Union of India that self-medication had no deleterious effect on the
health of the community ; on the contrary itKapur].
" is likely to affect the well-being of the people, in
the context of effective household and domestic
remedies based on local herbs popularly known to
them in rural areas. Self-medication has its permission(?) limits even in America and Canada where
unlicensed itinerant vendors serve the people effectively."
For the petitioners in all the petitions Mr. Munshi
raised four points:
(1) Advertisement is a vehicle by means of which
( freedom of speech guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(a) is
exercised and the restrictions which are imposed by
the Act are such that they are not covered by cl. (2)
of Art. 19;
(2) That Act, the Rules made thereunder and the
schedule in the rules impose arbitrary and excessive.
restrictions on the rights guaranteed to the petitioners
by Art. 19(1 )(f) & (g);
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(3) Section 3 of the Act surrenders unguided and
uncanalised power to the exe.cutive to add to the
diseases enumerated in s. 3;
(4) Power of confiscation under s. 8 of the Act is
violative of the rights under Arts. 21 and 31 of the
Constitution.
In Petitions Nos. 62 and 63 of 1939 which relate to
two branches of Sadhana Ausadhalaya at Poona and
Allahabad respectively, Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, after
giving the peculiar facts of those petitions and the fact
that the peJitioners' Poona branch was raided without a warrant, a number of medicines had been seized,
and a complaint filed against the petitioners in that
petition, submitted that s. 3(b) of the Act was meant
to strike down abnormal sexual activities, that advertisements in that case merely mentioned the names of
the diseases and suggested the drug for the treatment
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of those diseases, that the prohibition of such adverI959
tisements was an unreasonable restriction on their
d d
fundamental right; that there was nothing indecent Daw:i.~:n:~Wakf)
in saying that their medicine was a cure for a partiLal Kuan
cular disease and that the Act was an undue interv•
ference with cure and treatment of diseases.
Union of India
We now proceed to consider the vitality of the
Kapur].
arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners. Firstly
it was submitted that the restriction on advertisements was a direct abridgement of the right of free
speech and advertisements could not be brought out
of the guaranteed freedom under Art. 19(l)(a) because
no dividing line could be drawn and freedom of speech
could not be curtailed by making it subject to any
other activity. The learned Solicitor-General on the
otherhand, contended that it was necessary to examine the pith and substance of the impugned Act and
if it was properly considered it could not be said
to have in any way curtailed, abridged or impaired the
rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Art. 19(l)(a).
He also contended that the prohibited advertisements did not fall within the connotation of " freedom of speech". The doctrine of pith and substance,
submitted Mr. Munshi; was created for the purpose
of determining the legislative competence of a legislature to enact a law and he sought to get support
from the following observation of Venkatarama
Aiyar, J., in A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras (1) :" ...... and the Privy Council had time and
again to pass on the constitutionality of laws made
by the Dominion_ and Provincial legislatures. It
was in this situation that the Privy Council evolved
the doctrine, that for deciding whether an impugned legislation was intra vires regard must be had
to its pith and substance. "
Though the doctrine of ' pith and substance' was
evolved to determine the constitutio_nality of an
enactment in reference to the legislative competence
of a legislature particularly under a federal constitution with a distributive system of powers it has been
used in other contexts in some cases, e.g., in connection
{l) [1957] S.C.R. 399, 406, 410.
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[1960 (2)]
with the determination of the constitutionality of
statutes restricting the rights to carry on certain
Dawak:;;;,:;wakf)activities and the. consequ~nt infri?gement of Art.
Lal Kuan
19(l)(g) : byMahaJan, C.J., m CooverJee B. Boorucha v.
v.
The Excise Commissioner & The Chief Commissioner of
Union of India Ajmer (')in the case of Excise Regulation I of 1915
regulating the import, export, transport, manuKapur].
facture, sale and possession of intoxicating drugs
and liquor and imposing duties thereon; by Das, C.J.,
in State of. Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbughwala (') in
connection with a statute which was held not to be
interference with trade, commerce or intercourse as
such but to save it from anti-social activities.
It is unnecessary to decide in the present case
whether in its scope it extends to the determination
of the constitutionality of an enactment with
reference to the various sub-clauses of cl. (l)of Art. 19.
A more appropriate approach to the question is, in our
opinion, contained in the dictum of Mahajan, J. (as
he then was) in M/s. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh (3). There he held that" in
order to decide whether a particular legislative
measure contravenes any of the provisions of Part
III of the Constitution it is necessary to examine
with some strictness the substance of the legislation
in order to decide what the legislature has really
done. Of course the legislature cannot bypass such
constitutional prohibition by employing indirect
methods and therefore the Court has to look behind
the form and appearance to discover the true character and nature of the legislation. "
Therefore, ·when the constitutionality of an enact/ ment is challenged on the ground of violation of any
of the articles in Part III of the Constitution, the
ascertainment of its true nature and character
becomes necessary, i.e., its subject matter, the area in
which it is intended to operate, its purport and intent
have to be determined. In order to do so it is legitimate to take into consideration all the factors such
as history of the legislation, the purpose thereof, the
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(1) [1954] s.c.R. Bn 877.
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 874.
(3) [•9541 s.c.R. 674, 682.
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surrounding circumstances and conditions, the
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mischief which it intended to suppress, the remedy
H
a a
for the disease which the legislature resolved to cure Dawak:::;,aa~Wakf)
f!,nd the true reason for the remedy; Bengal Immunity
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Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar (1 ); R._._M.D. Ohamarv.
baughwala v. The Union of India (2 ) ; Mahant Moti Das Union °! India
& Ors. v. S. P. Saki (3).
Kapur].
Another principle which has to borne in mind in
examining the constitutionality of a statute is that
it must be assumed that the legislature understands
and appreciates the need of the people and the laws
it enacts are directed to problems which are made
manifest by experience and that the elected representatives assembled in a legislature enact laws which
they consider to be reasonable for the purpose for
which they are enacted. Presumption is, therefore,
in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment.
Oharanjit Lal Ohowdhuri v. The Union of India &
Ors.(4); The State of Bo;nbay v. F.N. Bulsara (5); Mahant
Moti Das v. S. P. Saki (3 ).
What then was the history behind the impugned
legislation and what was the material before the
Parliament upon which it set to enact the impugned
Act.
(1) In 1927 a resolution was adopted by then·
Council of State recommending to the Central and
Provincial Governments to take immediate measures
to control the indiscriminate use of medical drugs
and for standardisation of the preparation and for
the sale of such drugs. In August 1930, in response
to the public opinion on the subject and in pursuance
of that resolution the Government of India appointed
the Drugs Enquiry Committee with Sir R. N. Chopra
as its Chairman to enquire into the extent of the
quality and strength of drugs imported, manufactured
or sold in India and to recommend steps for controlling such imports, manufacture and sale in the interest
of the public. This Committee made a report pointing
out the necessity of exercising control over import, '
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603, 632 & 633.
(3) A.LR. (1959) S.C. 942, 948.
(2) (1957] S.C.R. 930, 936.
(4) [1950] S.C.R. 869,
(~) [I9$rJ S.C,R. 682 1 708,
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manufacture and sale of patent and propri~tary medicines in the interest of the safety of the public and
D ~:mda;~v k') public health. The report pointed out in paragraph
aw~at':uan a • 256-259 how in other countries control was exercised
v.
and restrictive laws to achieve that end had been
Union of India enacted. In the Appendix to this Report was given
a list of a number of samples of advertisements of
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patent and proprietary medicines dealing with cures
of all kinds of diseases:
(2) As a r!)sult of the Chopra Committee Report
the Drugs Act was passed in 1940.
(3) In 1948 The Pharmacy -.Act was passed to
regulate the provisions of pharmacy. As a result of
these two enactments the State Governments were
given the responsibility of controlling the manufacture
of drugs and pharmaceuticals and their sales through
qualified personnel and the Central Government was
given the control on quality of drugs and pharmaceuticals imported into the counpry.
(4) The Chopra Committee Report dealt with the
popularity of the patent and proprietary medicines in
the following words :
"The pride of place must be accorded to ingenious
propaganda clever and attractive dissemination of
their supposed virtues and wide and alluring
advertisements. The credulity and gullibility of the
masses, especially when 'certain cures' are assured
in utterly hopeless cases, can well be imagined.
Perusal of the advertisements of 'cures' produces a
great effect on patients who have tried treatment
by medical men without success. Such patients
resort to any and every drug that comes in their
way. In an infinitesimal small number of cases
spontaneous cures are also effected. Widest publicity
is given to these and the preparations become in vested with miraculous virtues. The reassurances of
cure, the force of argument. advanced to guarantee
it and the certificates of persons said to have been
cured which are all set out in advertisements make
a deep impression, especially on those with weak
nerves. The love of mystery and secrecy inherent
in human nature, the natural disinclination and
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shyness to disclose details of one's illness especially
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those involving moral turpitude, the peculiar
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temperament of the people who, high and low, rich Dawak:;,aa~Wakf
and poor, demand 'something in a bottle' for the
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treatment of every ailment and poverty ·of the
v.
people who cannot afford to pay the doctor's bills Union of India
or the high prices current for dispensed medicines,
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ha.ve all been enlarged upon as tending to self.
diagnosis and self-medication by patent and proprietary medicines."
(5) Evidence was led before the Chopra Committee
deprecating the increasing sale of proprietary medicines particularly those with secret formulae as such
drugs were positively harmful and were a serious and
increasing menace. There were advertisements and
pamphlets issued in connection with these medicines
which showed fraudulent practices and extravagant
claims for these medicines.
(6) The Chopra Committee Report had also made
a recommendation for a strict measure of control over
proprietary medicines .
(7) The Bhatia Committee was set up in pursuance
to a resolution No. CI-1(12)/52 dated February 14,
1953, and between March 1953, and end of that year it
examined a large number of witnesses in different
towns of India some of whom represented chemists
and druggists, some were leading medical practi~ioners
and some were State Ministers for Health. The
Bhatia Committee issued a Questionnaire to various
organisations and witnesses. It contained questions
in regard to advertisement of drugs and therefore one
of the objects of this Committee ·which was inaugurated by the Health Minister on March 12, 1953, was
amongst other things to look into the control to be
exercised over objectionable and unethical advertisements.
(8) There were a large number of objectionable
advertisements in the Press in regard to patent medicines which were after the Act came into force pointed
out by the Press Commission Report but it cannot be
said that this fact was unknown to Parliament as this
Committee also examined a number of witnesses.
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(9) The Indian Medical Association had suggested.
to this Press Committee which was presided over by
Dawak::::.:;Wakf) the late Mr. Justice Rajadhyaksha the barring of
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advertisements of medicines which claim to cure or
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alleviate any of the following diseases :
Union of India
Cancer, Bright's disease, Cataract, Diabetes,
Epilepsy,
Glaucoma, Locomotor ataxia, Paralysis,
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Tuberculosis.
(10) In the United Kingdom, advertisements of
drugs or treatment for these diseases are governed by
the Cancer Act of 1939 and the Pharmacy and Medi·
cines Act of 1941. (Advertisement relating to the
treatment of venereal diseases are governed by the
Venereal Diseases Act of 1917).
(ll) Wyndham E.B. Lloyd in his book 'Hundred
years of medicine' published in 1936 wrote about the
outstanding evils which arise from the use of secret
remedies and nostrums. It also drew attention to the
dangers of advertisements in regard to them and what
the British Medical Association had said about them.
(12) The British Medical Association had in a book
entitled 'Secret Remedies vVhat they cost and contain'
exposed ruthlessly the harmful effects of such remedies.
The council on Pharmacy and Chemistry of American
Medical Association had also given its opinion on the
harmful effects of indiscriminate self-medication by
the public and the grave danger which ensued from·
such misdirected and inadequate treatment, and the
failure to recognise seriousness of the disease only
when it was too late.
It is not necessary to refer to the recommendations
of the Bhatia Committee or the Press Enquiry Committee because they were published in June and July
1954 respectively.
In England as far back as 1889, an Act called the
Indecent Advertisements Act (52 and 53 Viet. Ch. 18)
was passed to suppress indecent advertisements in
which advertisements relating to syphilis, gonorrhoea,
nervous debility or other complaints or infirmity arising from intercourse was prohibited. In 1917 the
Venereal Diseases Act (7 and 8 Geo. V Ch. 21) was
passed in England. This placed restrictions on
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advertisements relating to treatment for venereal
diseases. In 1941, The Pharmacy and Medicine Act,
1941 (4 and 5 Geo. VI Ch. 42) was passed which corres- Daw:J:;,:a~~akf)
ponds in material particulars to the impugned Act. It
Lal Kuan
cannot be said that there was no material before Parliav.
ment on the basis of which it proceeded to enact the Union of India
impugned legislation. This material shows the history
Kapur J .
. of the legislation, the ascertained evil intended to be
cured and the circumstances in which the enactment
was passed. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri
Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1 ), Das, C.J., observed:"that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration
matters of common knowledge, the history of the
times and may assume every state of facts which
can be conceived existing at the time of legislation;"
Thus it is open to the court for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of the Act to take all these
facts into consideration and in the present case we find
that there was the evil of self-medication, which both
in this country and in other countries, the medical
profession and those, who were conversant with its
dangers, had brought to the notice of the people at
large and the Government in particular. They had
also warned against the dangers of self-medication and ·
of the consequences of unethical advertisement relating to proprietary medicines particularising those
diseases which were more likely to be affected by the
evil. There is reason, therefore, for us to assume that
the state of facts existed at the time of the legislation
which necessitated the Act. These facts we have
already set out and it is not necessary to reiterate
them.
With this background in vie'w we proceed to examine ~
the provisions of the Act and ascertain the predominant purpose, true intent, scope and the object of the
Act. The preamble shows that the object of the Act
was to control the advertisement of drugs in certain
cases, i.e., diseases and to prohibit advertisements
relating to remedies pretending to have magic qualities
and provide for other matters connected therewith.
(r) (1959] S.C.R. 279, 297,
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
The title of the Act also shows that it is directed
against objectionable advertisements. The definition
Dawak~::;wakf)Section (s. 2) in cl. (a) defines advertisements and in
Lal Kuan
cl. (b) drugs which include (i) medicines for use of
v.
human beings and animals, (ii) substances for use of
Union °! India diagnosis, treatment or prevention of diseases in
human beings and animals, (iii) articles. other than
J(a.pur ].
food which affect the organic functions of the body of .
human beings or animals and (iv) articles intended for
use as a component of any medicine etc., cl. (c) defines
magic remedies to include a talisman, mantra, ka vacha
and other charms and (d) relates to the publication of
any aavertisement and (e) what a venereal disease is.
·Section 3 prohibits advertisement of drugs for treatment of diseases and disorders. Clause (a) of s. 3 deals
with procurement of miscarriage in women ror prevention of conception; cl. (b) with maintenance or improvement of capacity of human beings for sexual pleasure;
cl. (c) with diagnosis and cure of venereal and other
diseases. Section 4 prohibits misleading advertisements relating to drugs. Section 5 similarly prohibits
a,dvertiscments of magic remedies efficacious for purposes specified in s. 3. Section 6 prohibits the import
into and export from India of certain advertisement.
. Section 14 is a saving clause which excludes registered
practitioners, treatises or books, advertisements sent
confidentially to medical practitioners, wholesale or
retail chemists for distribution among registered
medical practitioners or to hospitals or laboratories. It
also excludes advertisements printed or published by
Government or with the previous sanction of the
Government. Section 15 gives the Government the
power to grant exemptions from the application of
ss. 3, 4, 5 and 6 in certain cases.
As already stated when an enactment is impugned
on the ground that it is ultra vires and unconstitutional
what has to be ascertained is the true character of the
legislation and. for that purpose regard must be had to
the enactment as a whole, to its objects, purpose and
true intention and to the scope and effect of its provisions or what they are directed against and what they
aim at (A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras (1)). Thus
'959
H
d
d
(1) [1957J s.c.R. 399, 406, 410.
-
,
-
-
-
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
examined it cannot be said that the object of the Act
r959
was mer.ely to put a curb on advertisements which
offend against decency or morality but the object truly
Hamdard
lf
d'
t'
Dau:akhana (Wakf)
.
t
t
1
d
t
d
d
an proper y un ers oo IS o preven se -me ica ).On
Lal Kuan
or treatment by prohibiting instruments which may be
v.
used to advocate the same or which tend to spread the Union of India
evil. No doubt ins. 3 diseases are expressly mentioned
which have relation to sex and disorders peculiar to
Kapur J.
women but taken as a whole it cannot be said that the
object of the Act was to deal only with matters which
relate to indecency or immorality. The name and the
preamble are indicative of the purpose being the control of all advertisements relating to drugs and the use
of the word animals in cl. (b) of the definition section
negatives the object being merely to curb the emphasis
on sex and indecency. Section 4 further suggests that
the legislature was trying to stop misleading advertisements relating to drugs. Section 5 also tends to
support the object being prohibition of advertisements
suggesting remedies for all kinds of diseases. Section 6
also points in the same direction, i.e., to stop advertisements as to drugs. Sections 14 and 15 are a clearer
indication that there should be no advertisements for
drugs for certain diseases in order that the general
public may not be misled into using them for ailments
which they may imagine they are suffering from and
which they might believe to be curable thereby. That
this is so is shown by the fact that such advertisements
can be sent to medical practitioners, hospitals and
laboratories. The exclusion of Government advertise'
ments and the power to give exemption all point to
the objective being the stopping of advertisements of
drugs for the object above-mentioned and not merely
to stop advertisements offending against morality and
decency.
Mr. Munshi's argument was that s. 3 was the key to
the Act and that the object and direct effect of the Act
was to stop advertisements and thereby impair the
right of free speech by directly putting a prohibition
on advertisement. If the contention of Mr. Munshi
were accepted then the restriction to be valid must
fall within cl. (2) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. In
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
other wmds it must have relationship with decency or
morality because the other restrictions of that clause
D ~:mda;:V kf)have no application. If on the other hand the subaw~az";;'uan a mission of the learned Solicitor-General is accepted
v.
then the matter would fall under sub-els. (f) and (g)
Union of India and the restriction under Art. 19(6). The object of
the Act as shown by the scheme of the Act and
Kapur 1as stated in the affidavit of Mr. Merchant is the
prevention of self-medication and self-treatment and
a curb on such advertisements is a means to achieve
that end. Objection was taken that the preamble
in the Act does not indicate the object to be the
prevention of treatment of diseases otherwise than by
qualified medical practitioners as the English Venereal Diseases Act 1917 does. In this Court in many
cases affidavits were allowed to be given to show the
reasons for the enactment of a law, the circumstances
in which it was conceived and the evils it was to cure.
This was done in the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia
v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar ('). Similarly, in Kathi
Raning v. The State of Saurashtra (2 ) and in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni v. The State of Madras(')
affidavits were.allowed to be filed setting out in detail
the circumstances which led to the passing of the
respective enactments.
In support of his argument that any limitation of his
right to advertise his goods was an infringement of his
freedom of speech because advertisement was a part of
that freedom Mr. Munshi relied upon Alma Lovell v.
City of Griffin('). In that case the objection was taken
to the validity of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the
distribution without a permit of circulars, handbooks,
advertising or literature of any kind on the ground that
such ordinance violated the first and the 14th
amendment by abridging the freedom of the Press
and it was held' that such prohibition was invalid at
its face as infringing the constitutional freedom of the
Press and constitutional guarantee of such freedom
embraced pamphlets and leaflets. The actual violation
which was complained of in that case consisted of the
z959
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 279.
(2) (1952) S.C.R. 435.
(3) A.LR. (1959) S.C. 725.
(4) 82 Law Ed. 949; 303 U.S. 444·
-
-
S.C.R.
•-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
distribution without the required permission of
x959
pamphlets and magazines in the n~ture of religious
Hamdard
tracts. Chief Justice Hughes, said:Dawakhana (Wakf)
" The ordinance in its broad sweep prohibits the
Lal Kuan
distribution of "circulars, handbooks, advertising or
v.
literature of any kind." It manifestly applies to Union of India
pamphlets, magazines and periodicals."
Kapur J.
No doubt the word advertisement was used both in the
ordinance as well as in the opinion by the learned Chief
Justice but the case actually related to the distribution
of pamphlets and magazines. Mr. Munshi also relied
on Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union
of India (1 ), where the cases dealing with freedom of
. speech were discussed by Bhagwati, J., but the question of advertisements as such did not arise in that
case.
An advertisement is no doubt a form of speech but
its true character is reflected by the object for the
promotion of which it is employed. It assumes the
attributes and elements of the activity under Art. 19(1)
which it seeks to aid by bringing it to the notice of
the public. When it takes the form of a commercial
advertisement which has an element of trade or
commerce it no longer falls within the concept of
freedom of speech for the object is not propagation of
ideas-social, political or economic or furtherance of
literature .or human thought ; but as in the present
case the commendation of the efficacy, value and
importance in treatment of particular diseases by
certain drugs and medicines. In such a case,
advertisement is a part of business even though as
described by Mr. Munshi its creative part, and it was
being used for the purpose of furthering the business
of the petitioners and had no relationship with what
may be called the essential concept of the freedom of
speech. It cannot be said that the right to publish_,
and distribute commercial advertisements advertising
an individual's personal business is a part of freedom
of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. In Lewis J. '
Valentine v. F. J. Chrestensen (2 ). It was held that the
constitutional right of free speech is not infringed by
\1) \1959) S.C.R. 12, 123-133.
(2) 86 Law. Ed. 1262.
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
prohibiting the distribution in city streets of handbills
bearing on one side a protest against action taken by
Daw~::::~~akf) public ?fficials an~ on the other advertising m~t~er.
Lal Kuan
The object of affixmg of the protest to the advert1smg
v.
circular was the evasion of the prohibition of a city
Union of India ordinance forbidding the distribution in the city streets
of commercial and business advertising matter.
Kapur].
Mr. Justice Roberts, delivering the opinion of the court
said:." This court has unequivocally held that the
streets are pro per places for the exercise of the
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and
municipalities may appropriately regulate the
privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly
burden or proscribe its employment in these public
thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising ......
.. . ...If the respondent was attempting to use the
streets of New York by distributing commercial
advertising, the prohibition of the Code provisions
was lawfully invoked against such conduct."
It cannot be said therefore that every advertisement
- is a matter dealing with freedom of speech nor can it
be said that it is an expression of ideas. In every
case one has to see what is the nature of the advertisement and what activity falling under Art. 19(1) it
•
seeks to further. The advertisements in the instant
case relate to commerce or trade and not to propagating of ideas; and advertising of prohibited drugs or
commodities of which the sale is not in the interest of
the general public cannot be speech within the meaning of freedom of speech and would not fall within
Art. 19(l)(a). The main purpose and true intent and
aim, object and scope of the Act is to prevent self.
medication or self-treatment and for that purpose
advertisements commending certain drugs and medicines have been prohibited. Can it be said that this is
an abridgement of the petitioners' right of free speech.
In our opinion it is not. Just as in Chamarbaughwalla's
case (1 ) it was said that activities undertaken and
I959
(•l [1957J s.c.R. 930.
...
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
carried on with a view to earning profits e.g. the
r959
business of betting and gambling will not be protected
Hamdard
as falling within the guaranteed right of carryingnawakhana(Wakf)
on business or trade, so it cannot be said that an Lal Kuan
advertisement commending drugs and substances
v.
r
· d"
·
·
Union o/lndia
as appropriate cure 1or certam iseases is an exercise
of the right of freedom of speech. Das, C.J., in State of Kapur J.
Bombay v. R.M.D. Ohamarbaughwala's (1 ) case said at
page 920:
" We have no doubt that there are certain activities
which can under no circumstances be regarded as
trade or business or commerce although the usual
forms and instruments are employed therein. To
exclude those activities from the meaning of those
words is not to cut down their meaning at all but
to say only that they are not within the true
meaning of those words."
One has only to substitute for the words "trade or
business or commerce" the phrase "freedom of speech"
to see how it applies to the present case. Freedom of
speech goes to the heart of the natural right of an
organised freedom-loving society to "impart and
acquire inform,ation about that common interest". If
any limitation is placed which results in the society
being deprived of such right then no doubt it would
· fall withip. the guaranteed freedom under Art. 19(1)(a.).
But if all it does is that it .deprives a trader from
commending his wares it would not fall within that
term. In John W. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis
Company(~), Mr. Justice McKenna, dealing with
advertisements said:"Advertising is merely identification and description, apprising of quality and place. It has no
other object than to draw attention to the article to
be sold and the acquisition of the article to be sold
constitutes the only inducement to its purchase."
·As we have said above advertisement takes the same
attributes as the object it seeks to promote or bring to
the notice of the public to be used by it. Examples
can be multiplied which would show that advertisement dealing with trade and business has rela.tion
(I) (I957] S.C.R, 874;
~8
690
z959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
with the item "business or trade" and not with
Hamdard
"freedom of speech". Thus advertisements sought to
Dawakhana (Wakf) be banned do not fall under Art. 19(l)(a).
Lal Kuan
v.
Union .of India
Kapur J.
It was also contended that the prohibition against
advertisements of the petitioners was a direct
· h t of f ree d om of speech and
a b ri d gement of t h e rig
Alice Lee Grosjean v. The American Press Co. (') was
relied upon. That was a case in which a tax was
levied based on gross receipts for the privilege of
engaging"in the business of public advertisements in
newspapers, magazines etc. having a specified circulation and it was there held that such a statute abridged
the freedom of the press because its effect was not
merely to reduce revenue but it had tendency to
c'lrtail circulation. This subject was discussed in
Express Newspapers' case(') at pages 128 to 133 where
the question was whether the Wage Board Act specifying the wages and conditions of service of the
working journalists and thus imposing certain financial burden on the press was an interference with the
right of freedom of Press and Bhagwati, J., said at
page 135:" Unless these were the direct or inevitable consequences of the measures enacted in the impugned
Act, it would not be possible to strike down the
legislation as having that effect and operation. A
possible eventuality of this type woul.d not necessarily be the consequence which could be in the
contemplation of the legislature while enacting a
measure of this type for the benefit of the workmen
concerned."
· In considering the con•titutionality of a statute the
Court has regard to substance and not to mere
matters of form and the statute must be decided by its
operation and effect; J.M. Near v. State of Minnesota(').
In the present case therefore (1) the advertisements
affocted by the Act do not fall wit bin the words
freedom of speech within Art. 19(l)(a); (2) the scope
and object of the Act its true nature and character is
not interference with the right of freedom of speech
(I) So Law Ed. 660.
(2) [1959] S.C.R. "· 123-133.
(3) 75 Law Ed. 1~57, 1363-4.
-
-
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
but it deals with trade or business; and (3) there is no
x959
direct abridgement of the right of free speech and a
H
d d
mere incidental interference with such right would not Dawak~=n:~wakfl
alter the character of the law; Ram Singh v. The
Lal Kuan
State of Delhi(1); ExpressNewspapers(Private) Ltd. v.
v.
The Union of lndia(2).
Union of India
It is not the form or incidental infringement that
Kapur].
determines the constitutionality of a· statute in reference to the rights guaranteed in Art. 19(1), but the
reality and substance. The Act read as a whole
does not merely prohibit advertisements relating to
drugs and medicines connected with diseases expressly
mentioned in s. 3 of the Act but they cover all
advertisements which are objectionable or unethical
and are used to promote self-medication or self-treatment. This is the content of the Act. Viewed in this
way, it does not select any of the elements or attributes of freedom of speech falling within Art. 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution.
·
It was next argued that assuming that the matter
was within clauses (f) & (g) of Art. 19(1), the restraint
was disproportionate to the purpose of ,the Act, the
object sought to be achieved and the evil sought to
be remedied. It was further argued that it could not
be said that the restrictions imposed by the Act were
in the interest of the general public. The basis of this
argument was (1) the very wide definition of the word
'advertisement' in s. 2(a); (2) the use of the word
'suggest' in s. 3; (3) the uncanalised delegated power
to add diseases to the schedule; (4) the existence of
s. 14(c) read with rule 6 of the Rules and (5) the procedural part ins. 8 of the Act; all of which, according
to counsel, showed that it was beyond all allowable
limits of restraint under cl. 6 of Art. 19.
'Advertisement' in the Act, it was argued, included
not only advertisements in newspapers and periodicals
and other forms of publication but also on cartons,
bottles and instructions inside a carton. Without
this latter kind of advertisement, it was submitted, the
user would be unable to know 'what the medicine was,
what it was to be used for and how ? If the purpose
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 451, 455:
(2) [1959] S.C.R. u, 123-133.
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
of the Act is to prevent objectionable and unethical
advertisements in order to discourage self.medication
Dawak~~n:~wakf) and self-treatment it cannot be said that the definition
Lal Kuan
is too wide keeping in view the object and the purpose
v.
of the Act which have been set out above. It is these
Union °! India evils which the Act seeks to cure and if the definition
of the word 'advertisment' was not so broad and
Kapur].
inclusive it would defeat the very purpose for which
the Act was brought into existence.
The argument that the word 'suggest' is something
subjective is, in our opinion, also not well-founded.
'Suggest' has many shades of meaning and in the
context it means commendatory publication. It connotes a direct approach and its use in s. 3 does not
support the contention that the restraint is disproportionate. In another part of the judgment we shall
discuss the constitutionality of the power of delegation
reasonableness of the range of diseases added in the
schedule and it is unnecessary to go over the same
field here.
Then we come to s. 14(c) and r. 6, i.e., prohibited
advertisement is to be sent confidentially by post to a
registered medical practitioner or to a wholesale and
retail chemist or a hospital and laboratory and the
following words have to be inscribed on the outside of
every packet containing the advertisement, i.e., "for
the use only of registered medical practitioners or a.
hospital or a. laboratory". If the purpose is to discourage self-medication and encourage treatment by
properly qualified medical practitioners then such a
regulatory provision cannot be considered an excessive
restraint. The mere fact that in the corresponding
English Act certain other persons are also mentioned
and that such advertisements can be published in
certain medical journals and scientific treatises is not
a ground for holding the restriction to be disproportionate_ It is not a proper method of judging the
reasonableness of the restrictions to compare every
section of the Act with the corresponding English Act
and then to hold it unreasonable merely because the
corresponding section of the two Acts are different.
The evil may be the si>mc but the circumstances and
H
'959
d d
...
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-
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
conditions in the two countries in regard to journals
z959
may be different and there are bound to be differences
HamdaYll,
in the degree of restrictiveness in the operative portions Dawakhana (Wakf)
of the two Acts. The policy behind the Act is that Lal Ku""
medication should be on the advice of qualified
v.
medical practitioners. Merely because the legislature Union of India
thought that it would not exclude advertisements in
Kap';'v J.
medical journals of the country would not be indic.
ative of the disproportion of the restraint.
Objection was then taken to the procedural part in
s. 8 and it was submitted that the power of search,
seizure and detention was unfettered and very wide
and there is no proper procedure laid down as in the
Criminal Procedure Code or the Drugs Act and there
' are no rules and safeguards in regard to search
warrants or entry into premises as there are in the
Code of Criminal Procedure or the Drugs Act. In
another part of the judgment we shall deal with this
question and it is not necessary to do so here.
It was next contended that the Act was not in the
interest of the general public as it could not be said
that the mention of the names of diseases or instructions as to the use of particular medicines for those
diseases was not in the interest of the general public.
Besides, it would prevent the medicines being brought
to the notice of the practising medical practitioners or
distributing agencies. It would also prevent a properly
worded advertisement suggesting cure of diseases to
people who for the sake of prestige and other understandably valid reasons do not like to confide to any
person the nature of their diseases and that it would
prevent medical relief in a country where such ·relief
is notoriously inadequate. We have already set out
the purpose and scope of the Act, the conditions in
'which it was passed and the evils it seeks to cure. If
the object is to prevent self-medication or selftrea tment, as it appear& to be then these are exactly
the evils which such advertisements would subserve if
a piece of legislation like the Act did not exist. It has
not been shown tliat the restrictions laid down in the
Act are in any manner disproportionate to the object
sought to be attained by the Act nor has it been
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
I959
shown that the restrictions are outside the permissible
limits.
Hamdard
Mr. Ch a tterJee
· m
· d eal"mg wit
· h th"1s pomt
· d rew our
Dawakha••(Wakf)/
Lal Kuan
attention to the test of reasonablenses as laid down in
v.
Ghintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1 )
Union of India where it was said by Mahajan, J. (as he then was) at
pages 762 and 763 :Kapur j.
"The question for decision is whether the statute
under the guise of protecting public interests arbitrarily interferes with private business and imposes
unreasonable and unnecessarily restrictive regulations upon lawful occupation; in other words,
whether the total prohibition of carrying . on the
business of manufacture of bidis within the agricultural season amounts to a reasonable restriction
on the fundamental rights mentioned in article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution."
It has not been shown in the preeent case that under
the guise of protecting public interest the Act arbitrarily interferes with private business or imposes
unreasonable restrictions. If the true intention of
the Act is, as indeed it is, to stop objectionable
and unethical advertisements for the purpose of
discouraging self-medication no question of unreasonable restrictions arises. Mr. Chatterjee also relied
upon the observation of Bose,J.,in DwarkaDas Srinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving
Company Limited(') where the learned Judge said
that "the provisions in the Constitution touching
fundamental rights must be construed broadly and
liberally in favour of those on whom the rights have
been conferred ". With this statement we are in
accord. The interpretation should be such as to
subserve the protection of the fundamental rights of
the citizen but that is subject to limitations set out in
Art. 19 itself which are for the general welfare of all
citizens taken as a whole and are therefore for the
interest of the general public. Mr. Chatterjee further
contended that the restraint was excessive because
the prohibition of a mere mention of the name of a
disease and the suggestion of a cure for that could
(1) (1950] S.C.R. 759·
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 67~. 733·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
695
a
not ,be reasonable restriction. As submitted by the
I959
learned Solicitor-General the objection is not to the
H
d d
names but to the advertisements commending certainnawak~:n:~wakf)
medicines as a cure for the same and this is what the
Lal Kuan
Act is endeavouring to eliminate. In our opinion it
v.
cannot be said that the restrictions either excessive Union °1 Indi~
or disproportionate or are not in the interest of the
Kapur].
general public.
The third point raised by Mr. Munshi was that the · 1
words ' or any other disease or condition which may
be specified in the rules made under this Act' in cl.(d)
of s. 3 of the Act are delegated legislation and do not
lay down any certain criteria or proper standards,
and surrender unguided and uncanalised power to the
executiv~ to add to diseases in the schedule. The
learned Solicitor-General in reply supported the
schedule as a case of conditional legislation and not
the -exercise of delegated legislative power and he
further contended that even if it was held to be the
latter it was within the limits recognised ,by judicial
decisions. The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is this that in the
former the delegate's power is that of determining
when a l<1giHlative declared rule of conduct shall
become effective; Hampton & Go. v. U.S. (1 ) and the
latter involves delegation of rule making power which
constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent. This means that the legislature having
laid down the broad principles of its policy in the
legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by
the administrative authority. In other words by
delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute and in the case of conditional
legislation the power of legislation is exercised by the
legislature conditionally leaving to the discretion of
an external authority the time and manner of carrying its legislation · into effect as also the determination of the area to which it is to extend; (The Queen
v. Burak (2 ); Russell v. The Queen (3 ); King-Emperor v.
(r) 276 U.S. 394.
(2) (1878) 3 App. Cas. 889.
(3) (1882) 7 App. Cas. 829, 83~.
-
696
SUPREME CQURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
Benoarilal Sarma ('); Sardar Indar Singh v. State of
Rajasthan (2 ).) Thus when the delegate is given the
Hamdard
power of making rules and regulations in order to fill
Dawakhana (Wakf).
Lal Kuan
m t h e d eta1·1 s to carry out a;i d sub. serve th e pu:poses of
v.
the legislation the manner m wh10h the reqmrements
Union of India of the statute are to be met and the rights therein
created to be enjoyed it is an exercise of delegated
Kapur J.
legislation. But when the legislation is complete in
itself and the legislature has itself made the law and
the only function left to the delegate is to apply the
law to an area or to determine the time and manner
of carrying it into effect, it is conditional legislation.
To put it in the language of another American case:
"To assert that a law is less than a law because
it is made to depend upon a future event or act is
to rob the legislature of the power to act wisely for
the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating
to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things
future and impossible to fully know."
The proper distinction there pointed out was this:
"The legislature cannot delegate its power to
make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes or intends to make its
own action depend. There are many things upon
which wise and useful legislation must depend
which cannot be known to the law making power,
and must therefore be subject of enquiry and
determination outside the hall of legislature."
(In Lockes Appeal 72 Pa. 491; Field v. Clark 143
r959
u. s. 649.)
But the discretion should not be so wide that it is
impossible to discern its limits. There must instead
be definite boundaries within which the powers of the
administrative authority are exercisable. Delegation
should be not be so indefinite as to amount to an
abdication of the legislative function-Schwartz American Administrative Law, page 21.
In an Australian case relied upon by the learned
Solicitor General the prohibition by proclamation of
(I) (1944) L.R. 72 I.A. 57,
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 604.
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,i
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
goods under s. 52 of the Customs Act 1901 was held
x959
to be conditional legislation: Baxter v. Ah Way (1 ).
H d d
According to that case the legislature has to project Dawak:;,:~wakf)
its mind into the future and provide as far as
Lal Kuan
possible for all contingencies likely to arise in the
v.
application of the law, but as it is not possible to Union °! India
provide for all contingencies specifically for all cases,
Kapur].
the legislature resorts to conditional legislation leaving
it to some specified authority to determine in what
circumstances the ~aw should become operative or to
what its operation should be extended, or the particular class of persons ·or goods to which it should be
applied: Baxter's case (1 ) at pp. 637 & 638.
Broadly speaking these are the distinguishing
features of the two forms of delegation and these are
their characteristics. The question is in which
compartment does the power given in the Act fall. ·
The power given to the authority under that provision (S. 3) of the Act is contained in cl. (d) in the
•
following words :S. 3 "Subject to the provisions of this Act, no person shall take any part in the publication of any
advertisement referring to any drug in terms which
suggest or are calculated to lead to the use of that
drug for
.........................................................
.........................................................
(d) the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or
prevention of any venereal disease or any other
disease or condition which may be specified in rules
made under this Act."
And power to make rules is laid down ins. 16 which is
as follows :S. 16 (1) "The Central Government may by notific.
ation in the official gazette make rules for carrying
out the purposes of this Act.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing power, such rules may(a) specify any disease or condition to which the
provisions of s. 3 shall apply;
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.
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(r) 8 Com. L.R. 626, 634, 637, 6J8.
89
698
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
(b) prescribe the manner in which advertisement
of articles or things referred to in cl. (c) of sub-s. (1)
Hamdard
of
s. 14 may be sent confidentially."
Dawakhana ( Wakf)
Lal !(~an
For the petitioner it was argued that s. 3(d) is
v.
delegated legislation and not conditional legislation as
Union of India
the power delegated therein is only to specify conditions
and diseases in the rules.
Kapur j.
The interdiction under the Act is applicable to
conditions and diseases set out in the various clauses
of s. 3 and to those that may under the last part of
clause (d) be specified in the rules made under s. 16.
The first sub-section of s. 16 authorises the making of
rules to carry out the purposes of the Act and cl. (a) of
sub-section (2) of that section specifically authorises
the specification of diseases or conditions to which the
~·.visions of s. 3 shall apply. It is the first sub-section of s. 16 which confers the general rule making
power, i.e., it delegates to the administrative authority
the
power to frame rules and regulations to subserve
•
the object and purpose of the Act. Clause (a) of the
second sub-section is merely illustrative of the power
given under the first sub-section; King Emperor v.
Sibnath Banerji (1). Therefore, sub-s. 2(a) also has
the same object as sub-s. (1), i.e., to carry out the
purposes of the Act. Consequently, when the rule
making authority specifies conditions and diseases in
the schedule it exercises the same delegated authority aq it does \vhen it exercises powers under
sub-q. (1) and m:tk s othAr rules and therefore it is
delegated legislation. The question for decision then
-is, is the delegation constitutional in that the administrative authority has been supplied with propPr guidance. In. our view the wol'ds impuguPd are vague.
Parliament has established no criteria, no standards
and has not prescribed any principle on which a particular disease or condition is to be specified in the
Schedule. It is nots -•t.ed what facts or circumstances
are to be taken into consideration to include a particular condition or disease. Tne powPr of specifying
diseases and conditions as given in s. 3(d) must therefore be held to be going beyond permissible boundaries
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(1) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
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of valid delegation. As a consequence the Schedule
z959
in the rules must be struck down. But that would
H
a a
not affect such conditions and diseases which properly Dawak::,.:~wakf)
fall within the four clauses of s. 3 excluding the portion
Lal Kuan
of cl. (d) which has been declared to be unconsti- ·
v.
tutional. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary Union °! India
to consider the applicability of Baxter v. Ah Way (1 ).
• Kapur].
We are of the opinion therefore that the words " or
any other disease or condition which may be specified
in the rules made under this Act " confer uncanalised
and uncontrolled power to the Executive and are
therefore ult,ra vires. But their being taken out of
cl. (d) of s. 3 does not affect the constitutionality of
the rest.ofthe clause or section as they are severable;
R. M. D. Ohamarbaughwala v. The Union of India {2 ).
The constitutionality of s. 8 of the Act was challenged on the ground that it violated the petitioners' right
under Arts. 21 and 31. That section when quoted
runs as follows :
" Any person authorised by the State Government in this behalf may, at any time, seize ........... .
and detain any document, article or thing which
such person has reason to believe contains any
advertisement which contravenes any of the provi- ·
sions of this Act and the court trying such contravention may direct that such document,(including
all copies thereof) article or thing shall be forfeited
to the Government".
It was pointed out by Mr. Munshi that ,there was no
limitation placed on, no rules and regulations made
for and no safeguards provided in regard to the
powers of a person authorised in that behalf by
Government to seize and detain any document, article
or anything which in the opinion of such person
contains any advertisement contravening any of the
provisions of the Act. It was also submitted that in
the corresponding English Act of 1939, in s. 10 there
are proper safeguards provided in regard to the exercise of the power of seizure etc. The first part of s. 8
of the Act dealing with seizure and detention received
slender support from the Solicitor-General. It may
(x) 8 Com. L.R. 626, 634, 637, 638.
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699
(2) (1957] S.C.R. 930,
700
· SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
be, he contended, that having regard to the purpose
and object of the Act the Indian legislature did not
Dawak:;,:~Wakf) think it necessary to provide any safeguards and that
Lal K"an
the legislature thought that nobody would be prev.
judiced by reason of the want of safeguard previous
Union of India to the seizure. In our opinion this portion of the
section goes far beyond the purpose for which the Act
Kapur].
was enacted and, the absence of the safeguards which
the legislature has thought it necessary and expedient
in other statutes, e.g., the Indian Drugs Act, is an
unreasonable restriction on the·fundamental rights of
the petitioners and therefore the first portion of the
section, i.e.," any person authorised ...... by any of the
provisions of this Act" is unconstitutional. What
then is the consequence of this unconstitutionality?
If this portion is excised from the rest of the section
the remaining portion is not even intelligible and
cannot be upheld. The whole of the section must
therefore be struck down.
By a portion of cl. (d) of s. 3 and the whole of s. 8
being declared unconstitutional the Act is not thereby
affected as they are severable from the rest of the Act.
As a consequence of excision of that portion and of
s. 8 from the Act the operation of the remaining
portion of the Act remains unimpaired. R. M. D.
Ghamarbaughwala v. The Union of India('). As a
result of s. 8 being declared in valid, all the goods seized
from the petitioners having been seized without the
authority of law must be returned to the respective
petitioners. It will be for the Government to take
such action in regard to the proceedings taken or
prosecutions commenced as is in accordance with the
law laid down in this judgment.
We declare the portion of cl. (d) of s. 3 indicated
above and s. 8 unconstitutional and direct therefore
that a writ of mandamus shall issue directing the
respondents to return the goods seized: As the petitioners' challenge to the constituti?nality of the Act
is partially successful the proper order as to costs is
that the parties do pay their own costs.
H
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d d
P etitiona partly allowed.
(1) (1957] S.C.R. 930.
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