MINERAL DEVELOPMENT LTD. versus THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 December 1959 | [1960] 2 S.C.R. 609 | 1959 INSC 165
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 December 1959
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 159/1956
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Citation
- [1960] 2 S.C.R. 609
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 165
Text of the judgment
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
609
manufacturing process, namely sugarcane, were
workers within the meaning of the Factories Act and
accordingly they were excluded from the definition of
' Commercial Establishment' under the Act. However,
even if the Supervisors and Kamdars were employed
"in any other kind of work connected with the subject
of manufacturing process", unless they were employed
in the factory, the provisions of the Factories Act do
not apply to them, there is_ no dispute that they are
employees of a ' Commercial Establishment ' within
the meaning of the Act.
.
The High Court was therefore in error in acquitting
the respondents of the offences of which they were
convicted by the Trial Magistrate. The orders of
acquittal passed by the High Court are set aside and
the orders of conviction -and sentence passed by the
Trial Magistrate are restored. In view of the order
of this Court dated October I, 1956, made at the time
of granting special leave, the respondents are entitled
to their costs of hearing in this court.
Appeal allowed.
-
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT LTD.
-
,
.,. •
.r959
TM State oj
Ultar Pradesh
v.
M. P. Singh
Shah].
v.
.r959
THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. SuBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GuPTA and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
December .r5.
Fundamental Rights-Restriction by State imposed by la1t1Reasonableness-Objective test-Duty of Court-Constitutionit
validity-Bihar Mica Act, r947, s. 25(r)(c)-Constitution of India,
Arts. Ig(r)(j), (g) and r9(5) & (6).
The Secretary of the Government of Bihar in the Revenue
Department issued a notice to the petitioner company who were
the lessees of mining lease, charging it with violation of ss. IO, 12
and 14 of the Bihar Mica Act, 1947, and calling upon it to show
cause why action should not be taken to cancel its licence which
was being issued from year to year for mining Mica. The
company asked for particulars of the alleged violation of the
provisions of the Act from the Government which was furnished.
The company sent a written representation to the Government
denying the allegations. After two years of the said representation, the Government issued a notification cancelling the
78
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610
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
petitioner company's licence under the provisions of s. 25(r)(c) of
the Act.
Mineral
The company moved th\> Supreme Court under Art. 32 of
Development Ltd. the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the
v.
said order of the Government of Bihar cancell!ng the licence and
The Slate of
for the issue of writ of mandatnus directing them to forbear
Bihar
from giving effect to the said order of cancellation, on ground
inter alia that the Government acted illegally and with mala fides
and infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioner under
Art. rg(r), sub-els. (f) and (g) of the Constitution and that the
provision of s. 25(r)(c) of the Bihar Mica Act, 1947, operate as an
unreasonable restriction on the said right, and even if the said
section did not infringe its fundamental rights, the order of the
Government in cancelling the lease without affording it a reasonable opportunity to show cause within the meaning of the second
proviso to that section, infringed its fundamental rights.
Held, that the provisions of s. 25(1)(c) of the Bihar Mica Act,
does not impose an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental
rights under Art. rg(r)(f) & (g) of the Constitution.
1
The restrictions 'vhich a State is authorised to impose under
cls.. (5) & (6) of Art. rg of the Constitution, in the interest of the
general public over the fundamental rights of a citizen under
sub-els. (f) & (g) of clause (r) of Art. rg must be reasonable and
must not depend upon the mere uncontrolled discretion of. the
executive.
It is the duty of this Court to decide having regard to the
concept and principle of reasonableness which is correctly laid
down in The State of Madras v. V. G. Row, whether a particular
Statute satisfied the objective test of "reasonableness."
The statutory conditions of the Bihar Mica Act, subject to
which the licence is given are, obviously, reasonable and necess_ary for regulating the mining industry. The power to cancel
the licence which is conferred on the Government under s. 25 of
the said Act is only to achieve the object of the Act, i.e., to
enforce provisions which have been enacted in the interest of the
public, and that power is exercisable on the basis of objective
tests and in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
The general proposition that whenever discretionary power
is conferred on a State Government or the Union Government by
law, the said law 1nust necessarily operate as a reasonable
restriction on a fundamental right, negatives the concept of
fundamental rights for the simple reason that fundamental rights
are guaranteed against State action. Therefore, the conferment
of such a power on the State Government and not upon a subordinate officer is only one of the considerations that may enter into
the judicial verdict on reasonableness of a particular law and the
reasq_nableness of that law falls to be decided only on the
cumulative effect of the circumstances under which such power
is conferred.
1959
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
611
I959
The concept of " reasonable opportunity " is an elastic one
and is not susceptible of easy and· precise definition. What is
Mineral
reasonable opportunity under one set of circumstances need not Development Ltd.
be reasonable under different circum~tances. It is the duty of
v.
the Court to ascertain in each case, having regard to the overall
The State of
picture before it, to come to a conclusion whether reasonable
Bihar
opportunity is given to a person to "show cause. "
Tribunals or authorities who are entrusted with quasijudicial functions are as much bound by the relevant principles
governing the " doctrine of bias" as any other judicial tribunal.
In the instant case the Revenue Minister had personal bias
within the meaning of the decisions and he should not have taken
part in either initiating the enquiry or in cancelling the licence.
Neither the necessary conditions to enable the Government to
take action under s. 25(1)(c) of the Act has been established nor
the State Government has afforded reasonable opportunity to the
petitioner within the meaning of the second proviso to s. 25(1) of
the Act.
Staie of Madras v. V. G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597, followed.
Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, [1953]
S.C.R. 1049, held inapplicable.
•
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 159 of 1956.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
N. 0. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the petitioners.
Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of
Bihar, Bajrang Sahai and R. 0. Prasad, for the respondents.
J
1959. December 15. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SUBBA RAO J.-This petit:ion . under Art. 32 of the
Constitution is filed by the Mineral Development
Limited against the State of Bihar and another for
the issue of a writ of certforari to quash the order of
the Government of Bihar dated September 7, 1955,
cancelling the petitioner's licence and for the issue of
a writ of mandamus directing them to forbear from
giving effect to the said order of cancellation.
One Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh (hereinaner called the proprietor) was the proprietor of
Ramgarh and Serampur estates in the district of
Sub~a Rao].
612
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
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Hazaribagh in the State of Bihar. On December 29,
Mineral
194 7, the said proprietor executed a mining lease in
Dev•lopment Ltd. fayour of the Mineral Development Limited (herein-
v.
after called the Company) for all minerals in respect
of 3,026 villages for a period of 999 years. On or about
January 3, 1951, the Deputy Commissioner, HazariSubb•Rao J.
bagh, granted the Company a licence bearing No. H.L.
261-H in form 'B' under s. 6 of the Bihar Mica Act,
1947 (hereinafter called the Act) for mining mica. The
licence was renewed from year to year by the relevant
authority and the last of the renewals expired on
December 31, 1954. The Secretary to the Government
of Bihar in the Revenue Department issued a notice
dated March 7, 1953, to the Company charging it with
violations of ss. 10, 12 and 14 of the Act and calling
upon it to show cause within 15 days of the receipt of
the said notice why action should not be taken to
cancel the licence issued in favour of the Company.
By letter dated March 20, 1953, the Company requested the Secretary to the Government, Revenue Department, Bihar,. to furnish the Company with particulars
of the alleged violations of the provisions of the Act.
After a reminder was sent, the Company was furnished
by the Government with the particulars by its letter
dated May 1, 1953. On or about May 17, 1953, the
Company sent a written representation to the Govern' ment denying the allegations made against it and
explaining how the Company complied with the provisions of the Act. After this letter, no further
correspondence passed bet~een the Government and
the Company. But on September 7, 1955, i.e., two
years after the said representation, the Government
issued a notification cancelling the Company's licence
No. 261-H of 1951. The result of this notification was
that the Company was prevented from carrying on
the mining operations in large tracts of land it had
taken on lease from the said proprietor.
The Company in its petition has stated that it liad
invested a large sum of about Its. 16 lakhs to obtain
the mining lease and spent a considerable sum in
prospecting and developing the mines, that by the
arbitrary act of the Government it could not work the
The State of
Bihar
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
mines, that a large number of labourers had been
z959
thrown out of employment and that in the result it
Mineral
was being put to heavy loss. It has filed the present Development Ltd.
petition for the reliefs mentioned already for the
v •.
reasons, among others, that the Government acted. The State of
illegally and with mala fides and infringed the fundaBihar
mental rights of the petitioner under Art. 19(1), sub- Subba Rao J.
els. (f) and (g) of the Constitution. The first respondent
to the petition is the State of Bihar and the second
respondent is the Additional Secretary to the Government of Bihar in the Revenue Department. They
filed a counter denying the allegations made against
the Government and particularly stated that they had
acted within their rights and cancelled the licence in
strict compliance with the provisions of the Act.
The arguments of Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel
for the petitioner, may be broadly formulated under
the following four heads : (i) The Bihar Mica Act,
1947,-as amended by the Bihar Mica (Amendment)
Act, 1949, is ultra vires for want of constitutional
competence; (ii) the provisions of the Act are repugnant to the provisions of the Central Act 53 of 1948,
and, therefore, to the extent of such repugnancy the
former Act should yield to the latter Act, with the
result that the licensing provisions under the Act
ceased to have any legal effect; (iii) the petitioner has
the fundamental rights under Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) of
the Constitution to acquire, hold and dispose of his
property and to carry on any occupation, trade or
business in respect thereof, and that the provisions of
s. 25(l)(c) of the Act operate as an unreasonable restriction on the said rights, and are therefore void ; and
(iv) even if the said section did not infringe his fundamental rights, the order of the Government in
cancelling the lease without affording him reasonable
opportunity to show cause within the meaning ofthe
second proviso to that section infringed his fundamental right.
The first two contentions need not detain us; for
the petition may be disposed pf on the basis of th~
last two contentions.
·
f
614
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2))
The first question, therefore, is whether the provisions
of s. 25 of the Act infringe the fundamental rights
Mineral
of
the
petitioner under sub.els. (f) and (g) of Art. 19(1)
Development Ltd.
of the Constitution. The said provisions of the Consv.
The Slate of
titution read:
Bihar
Article 19: "(l) All citizens shall have the right*
•
•
Subba Rao J.
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property ; and
(g) to practi8e any profession, or to carry on any
occupation, trade or business."
Under sub-els. (f) and (g) of Art. 19(1), every citizen
has the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property,
and to practise any profession, or to carry on any
occupation, trade or business. But els. (5) and (6) of
Art. 19 authorize the State to make a law imposing
restrictions in the interest of the general public, but
· the restrictions so imposed must be reasonable. The
concept of reasonableness has been clearly explained
by Patanjali Sastri, C.J., in State of ~Madras v. V. G.
Row (1 ) as under :
"It is important in this context to bear in mind
that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed,
should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract st.andard, or general pattern of
reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all
cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been
infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions
imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought
to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the
imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time,
should all enter into the judicial verdict."
·These observations, if we may say so with great
respect, lay down the correct principle. I.t follows
that it is the duty of this Court to decide, having
regard to the aforesaid considerations and such others,
whether a particular statute satisfies the objective
test of "reasonableness". While not disputing the
general principle, the learned Counsel :for the petitioner strongly relied upon the decision of this Court
in Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer (2 )
in support of his contentions.- The facts in that case
(1) [1952) s.c.R. 597. 607.
12) [1953J s.c.R. 1049, 1055.
'959
S.C.R.
,(
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
were : s. 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records
z959
Act (XLII of 1950) provided that "if a landlord
Mineral
habitually infringes the rights of a tenant under this Development Ltd.
Act, he shall, notwithstanding anything in section 7
v.
of the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888 The Stale of
(I of 1888) be deemed to be a 'landlord who is disBihar
qualified to manage his own property' within the Subba Rao J.
meaning of section 6 of the said Regulation a.nd his
property shall be liable to be taken under the superin-tendence of the Court of Wards." The determination of the question whether a landlord had habitually infringed the rights of his tenants was left to
the Court of Wards. The petitioner whose estate
was taken over by the Court of Wards questioned the
validity of the power conferred on the Court of
Wards. This Court held that ·the said section was
void as being an unreasonable restriction on the rights
in property as the restriction made the enjoyment of
that right depend upon the mere discretion of the
executive. Mahajan, J., as he then was, observed:
"When a law deprives a person of possession of
his property for an indefinite period of time merely
on the subjective determination of an executive
officer, such a law can, on no construction of the
word "reasonable" be described as coming within
that expression, because it completely negatives the
fundamental right by making its enjoyment depend
on the mere pleasure and discretion of the executive, the citizen affected having no right to have
recourse for establishing the contrary in a civil
court."
In that case the combined operation of s. 112 of
Act XLII of 1950 and the provisions of Regulation
I of 1888 was that the Court of Wards could in its
own discretion and on its own subjective determination assume superintendence of the property of a,
landlord who habitually infringed the rights. of his
tenants. The Act also did not provide any machinery for determining the question whether a certain
landlord was a person who habitually infringed the
rights of his tenants. Even the condition precedent
for the assumption of superintendence by the Court
616
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(2))
of Wards, viz., the previous sanction of the Chief
Commissioner, was also a matter entirely resting on
Mineral
It will be seen that under that Act the
Developn1ent Ltd. his discretion.
entire question was left to the unbridled discretion of
v.
The State of
the executive without providing for any machinery
Bihar
to ascertain the grounds for its action. That decision
cannot apply to the facts of the present case as they
Subba Rao].
differ in material respects from those considered by
·this Court in that decision.
The short question, therefore, is whether s. 25 of
the Act places unreasonable restrictions on the
petioner's fundamental rights under Ai:t. 19(l)(f) and
(g) of the Constitution. It is conceded that the State
can make a law imposing restrictions, in the interest
of the public, on citizens in respect of their enjoyment
of mineral rights; but the complaint is that the law
which enables the State in its uncontrolled discretion
to prevent the owner or the lessee of such a field from
enjoying his land or leasehold interest or to carry on
his mining operations permanently or for an indefinite
period is unreasonable. So stated there is plausibility
in the argument. But let us look at the law more
closely to ascertain whether it suffers from such a vice.
The Act was passed in the year 1947 and was amended from time to time. The declared object of the Act is
" to regulate the possession and transport of, and
trading in, mica in the Province of Bihar ". It was
necessitated, presumably, because of the scarcity of
mica and its importance in the industrial field, and
for that reason for regulating home consumption and
foreign export. The learned Counsel for the petitioner
did not controvert the position, and indeed conceded
that reasonable restrictions can legitimately be imposed on the mining operations of the petitioner.
Section 4 of the Act imposes a prohibition on the
possession of, and trading in, mica without licence,
proprietor's certificate, or digger's permit. Sections 5
and 6 prescribe a machinery for granting proprietor's
certificate, miner's or dealer's licence; Sections IO to
12 define the duties of licensees and registered proprietors in the matter of keeping accounts and
producing them for inspection. Section 14 prohibits
r959
S.C.R.
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617
the removal of mica from one place to another withr959
out a pass. Sections 17, 19 and 21A impose penalties
. 1
for the infringement of the provision.s of the Act and Devet:),:~:i Ltd.
the rules made thereunder. Sect10n 22 to 24 deal
v.
with miscellaneous matters, such as the power of a The State of
polic~ officer to arrest without warrant persons guilty
Bihar
of an offence under this Act, to search, seize and
detain mica removed without a pass etc. Then comes Subba Rao f.
s. 25. As the main argument of the learned Counsel
turns upon the provisions of s. 25, it is necessary to
read the entire section, which is as follows :
Section. 25. "(1) The State Government may
cancel the licence or proprietor's certificate of any
licensee or registered proprietor who(a) allows his licence or proprietor's certificate,
as the case may be, to be used on behalf of any
other person as authority to buy or have in his
possession or sell mica extracted from a mica mine
or from a mica dump, or
·
(b) being a person to whom a miner'1:1 lice';ice has
been granted extracts mica from a mine the particulars of which are not endorsed on his licence, or
(c) is guilty of repeated failure to comply with
any of the other provisions of this Act or rules
made thereunder, or
(d) is convicted of an offence under Chapter
XVII of the Indian Penal Code committed in respect of mica :
Provided that a licence or a proprietor's certificate
shall not be cancelled solely by reason of conviction
from which the licensee or the registered proprietor
has no right of appeal or revision;
Provided further · that a licence or a proprietor's
certificate shall not be cancelled unless the licensee
or the proprietor has been furnished with the
grounds for such cancellation and has been afforded
reasonable oppurtunity to show cause why his
licence shall not be cancelled.
(2) A fresh licence or proprietor's certificate shall
not, without the previous sanction of the State
Government, be granted to any licensee or registered
79
618
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(2)]
proprietor whose licence or proprietor's certificate
has
been cancelled under this section."
Mineral
Development Ltd. This section .embodies the severest punishment that
v.
can be imposed under the Act on a licensee or a
The Stat8 of
proprietor. It enables the State Government to
Bihar
cancel the licence. The power is entrusted to the
highest
executive in the State which ordinarily can
Subba Rao].
be relied upon to discharge . its duties honestly,
impartially and in the interest of the public without
any extraneous consid_erations. The section provides
clearly ascertainable standards for the State Government to apply to the facts of each case. Clauses (a),
(b), (c) and (d) of s. 25(1) describe with sufficient
particularity the nature of the defaults to be committed and the abuses to be guilty of by the licensee
in order to attract the penal provisions. Clause (c)
with which we are directly concerned embodies the
last step that can be resorted to by the State
Government to eliminate the recalcitrant operator
from the field of mining industry if only he is guilty
of repeated failures to comply with any of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder
other than those mentioned in the other clauses of
the section. The discretion of the State Government under cl. (c) of s. 25(1) is hedged in by two
important restrictions: viz., (i) the failure to comply
with the provisions of the Act or the rules made
thereunder, should be a repeated failure and not a
mere sporadic one, i.e., the defaulter must be a
recalcitrant one; (ii) before cancelling the licence
the State Government should afford reasonable
opportunity to the licensee to show cause why
his licence should not be cancelled. That apart, the
cancellation of the licence has not-the effect of barring
the licensee or the proprietor from applying for a fresh
licence. The only condition imposed is that a fresh
licence shall not be granted to him without the
previous sanction of the State Government. In the
foregoing circumstances, can it be said that the section
imposes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner's
fundamental rights? The statutory conditions subject
to which the licence is given are, obviously, reasonable
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
and necessary for regulating the mining industry. The
1959
provisions of the Act, as we have already pointed·out,
, 1
were only designed to compel a licensee. ~o keep Deve:;:::, Ltd.
accounts, produce them before the authorities when
v.
required, to prevent him from removing mica from the The State of
fields without passes and to impose penalties for
Bihar
contravening the rules. The only vice is said to lie
in the power to cancel a licence conferred on the Subba Rao f.
State Government under s. 25 of the Act. The power
given to the State Government is only to achieve
the object of the Act i.e., to enforce the said provisions, which have been enacted in the interest of the
public; and that power, as we have indicated, is
exercisable on the basis of objective tests and in
accoi:dance with the principles of natural justice. We.
cannot, therefore, hold that s. 25(l)(c) of the Act
imposes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner's
fundamental rights under Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) of the
Constitution.
Before leaving this part of the case, we must make
it clear that we do not intend to lay down as a proposition that whenever discretionary power is conferred
on a State Government or the Union Government by
law, the said law m11'3t neces;;artly operate as a reasonable restriction on a fundamental right. Such a general
proposition negatives the concept of fundamental
rights for the simple reason that fundamental rights
are guaranteed against State action. Therefore, the
conferment of such a power on the State Government
and not upon a subordinate officer is only one of the
considerations that may enter into the judicial verdict
on the reasonableness of a particular law and the
reasonableness of that law falls to be decided only on
the cumulat,ive effect of the circumstances under which
such power is conferred.
The next question is, did the State Government
comply with the provision of s. 25(1)(c), read with the
second proviso thereto, of the Act? Under the said
proviso the State. Government can cancel a licence
after affording reasonable opportunity to the licensee
to show cause why his licence should not be cancelled.
This proviso confers a quasi-judicial power on the
.620
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
State Government. The concept of "reasonable
opportunity " is an elastic one and is not ·susceptible
Mineral
of easy and precise definition. The decisions on cases
Development Ltd.
under Art. 311 of the Constitution afford illustrations
v.
of the applications of the said doctrine to varying
The State of
Bihar
situations. What is reasonable opportunity under one
set of circumstances need not be reasonable under
Subba Rao].
different circumstances. It is the duty of the Court to
ascertain in each case, having regard to the overall
picture before it, to come to a conclusion whether
reasonable opportunity is given to a person " to show
cause" within the meaning of the second proviso to
s. 25(1) of the Act. Tribunals or authorities who are
entrusted with quasi-judicial functions are as much
bound by the relevant principles governing the
"doctrine of bias" as any other judicial tribunal. This
Court in a recent decision in Gullapxlli N ageswara Rao
v. The State of Andhra Pradesh (1 ) observed:
"The principles governing the "doctrine of bias"
vis-a-vis judicial tribunals are well-settled and they
are: (i) no man shall be a judge in his own cause ;
(ii) justice should not only be done but manifestly
and undoubtedly seem to be done. The two maxims
yield the r8sult that if a member of a judicial body
is "subject to a bias (whether financial or other) in
favour of, or against, any party to a dispute, or is
in such a position that a bias must be assumed to
exist, he ought not take part in the decision or sit
on the tribunal" ; and that "any direct pecuniary
interest, however small, in the subject.matter of
inquiry will disqualify a judge, and any interest,
though not pecuniary, will have the same effect, if it is
sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias". The said principles are equally
applicable to authorities, though they are not courts
of justice or judicial tribunals, who have to act
judicially in deciding the rights of o.thers, i.e.,
authorities who are empowered to discharge quasijudicial functfoms."
In view of the foregoing principles the first question
to be considered is whether in the present case the
'959
(1) (1959] S.C.R. Supp. (1) 319.
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
authority functioning for the State Government-it is
x959
admitted ~hat the then Revenue Minister of the S~ate
Mineral
made the impugned order-had personal bias agamst Development Ltd.
the petitioner. Secondly, we will have to scrutinize
v.
the record to ascertain whether reasonable opportunity The state of
was given to the petitioner to show cause or whether
Bihar
it was denied that right. Thirdly, we will have to
ascertain whether the State Government found that Subba Rao f.
the petitioner was guilty of repeated failure to comply
with any of the other provisions of the Act or the rules
made thereunder and cancelled the licence on the
basis .of that finding. It may be mentioned that the
learned Advocate General, who appeared before
us on behalf of the State, submitted that the State
Government exercised its power under s. 25(l)(c)
of the Act.
The notice to show cause was issued by the State
Government to the petitioner on March 7, 1953. The
licence granted in favour of the petitioner was cancelled by the State Government by its notification dat.ed
September 1, 1955. Admittedly, during this period Sri
Krishna Ballav Sahay was the Revenue Minister of
the Government of Bihar, and he was in charge of the
department dealing with mines. There was political
rivalry between the said Minister and Sri Raja
Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh, the ex.landlord
of Ramgarh and Serampur estates in the district of
Hazaribagh, who leased the lands in question to the
petitioner. The case of the State is that the said lease
was benami only for the said proprietor ; and the case
of the petitioner is that the wife of the proprietor,
Rani Lalita Rajya Luxmi Devi, is the registered
shareholder of the Company. The question whether
the lease is only benami for the proprietor or not is
,
now in dispute in title suit No. 53 of 1954 pending on
the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge,
0
Hazaribagh. We shall, therefore, assume for the
purpose of this case that there is a disp'\].te on the
question of title, the State Government asserting that
the lease is only benami for the proprietor and the
petitioner claiming to be the real lessee and the wife
of the proprietor only a registered shareholder of the
'
622
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
Company. Whichever version is true, the proprietor,
directly or because of his wife, is very much interested
Mineral Ltd. m
• the C,ompany, a t any rate, th e Government ' s case
Developme"t
v.
is that he is the owner. It is alleged in the petition
The Stale of
that the ·said proprietor opposed the Revenue
Biha'
Minister in the general election held in 1952 to the
Bihar Legislative Assembly in the constituency of
Subba Rao J.
Giridih and Barkagaon and defeated him. It is also
~tated that before the said election, the Revenue
Minister filed a criminal case against the proprietor in
the District Court of Hazaribagh charging him uuder
s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court in
& judgment dated April 15, 1952, delivered in the
petition to transfer the said case to some other Court
recorded the admitted fact that there was political
rivalry between the Minister and the proprietor.
Ultimately, this Court transferred the said criminal
case from the State of Bihar to the file of a Magistrate's
Court in Delhi on the ground that there was political
rivalry between the two persons. These facts are not
denied in the counter-affidavit filed by the State. In
the said counter-affidavit the following cryptic statement occurs :
"That the allegations in para. 14(b) of the petition
about the alleged political rivalry between Sri
Kamakshya Narain Singh and Sri Krishna Ballav
Sahay, the then Minister, Revenue, has no bearing
on the facts of this case so far as the orders of the
Government are concerned and to that extent the
allegations are denied."
It may, therefore, be taken that the allegations of
personal bias of the Revenue Minister against the
proprietor is not denied. It is also not disputed that
' the proceedings against the petitioner were started
during the tenure of the said Revenue Minister and
that the actual order of cancellation was made by him .
We have no hesitation in holding that the Revenue
Minister had personal bias against the proprietor and
that he was also acting on the belief that the lease
was only benami for the said proprietor. We, therefore, hold that the said Revenue Minister had personal
z959
.
•
bias within the meaning of the decisions and he should
-
S.C.R.
'/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
not have taken part in either initiating the enquiry or
x959
in cancelling the licence.
M"
1
On the basis that s. 25 of the Act is constitutionally Devslo;::;:1 Ltd.
valid, the question is whether the provisions of that
v.
section have been complied with in the present case. The State of
If they were not complied with, the order of the State
Billa•
Government mA.de in derogation of the said provisions s~bba Rao J.
would certainly infringe the fundamental rights of the
petitioner. The main objection to the validity of the
impugned order is that the State Government did not
afford the petitioner reasonable opportunity to show
cause why his licence should not be cancelled. The
subject-matter of the mining leasehold interest is· in
respect of 3,026 villages for a period of 999 years. It is
alleged in the petition that a large amount of about
Rs. 16 lakhs were spent by the petitioner to obtain the
mining lease and in addition a considerable sum was
spent in prospecting and developing the mines. On
March 7, 1953, the Government of Bihar through its
Secretary in the Revenue Department issued a notice
to the petitioner asking it to show cause within
15 days of the receipt of the said notice why action to
cancel the miner's licence No. 261-H under.s. 25(l)(c)
of the Act should not be taken by the Government.
It is stated in the notice that the petitioner committed
"violations of ss. 10, 12 and 14 in respect of their mica
godowns at Marhand and Sultana, ss. 10 and 12, in
respect of the godowns at Simaria ands. 10 in respect of
Kowabar godowns and have thus been guilty of repeated failures to comply with those provisions of the Bihar
Mica Act, 1947." On receipt of this notice, the petitioner by its letter dated March 20, 1953, asked the
Government to furnish it with partjculars of the allegations contained in the said notice and on March 27,
1953, renewed its request for the !'aid particulars. On
May I, 1953, the Government sent a Memorandum No.
A/MI-8022/53R. to the petitioner Con:ipany giving ·the
particulars of the violations of the provisions of the
Act. The subject of the memorandum is described as
"Repeated failure to comply with the provisions of the
Bihar Mica Act, 1947." The particulars show that
between December 3, 1952, and December 11, 1952,
624
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
the Inspector of Mica Accounts inspected different
godowns of the petitioner and found contravention
Miner-al
of the provisions of ss. IO, 12 and 14 of the Act.
Development Ltd.
What is important to notice is that the inspection,
v.
though spread over a few days, was really one inspecThe State of
Bihar
tion of different godowns and the particulars disclosed
were comparatively trivial defaults in carrying out the
Subba Rao ].
provisions of the Act. It may also be noticed that
one of the particulars related to an inspection alleged
to have been made on March 6, 1952; and, in respect
of that inspection, the petitioner was prosecuted and
convicted; but the licence was renewed for the next
two years in spite of the said conviction. The result
of that inspection is, therefore, not germane to the
enquiry initiated by the notice dated March 7, 1953,
After giving the particulars the memorandum con<iludes," it is clear that the Company has been guilty
of repeated failure to comply with the provisions of
the Bihar Mica Act, 194 7 " and on these allegations
the Company was directed to show cause why the
licence should not be cancelled under s. 25(l)(b) of the
Act. Section 25(l)(b) says that the State Government
may cancel the licence of any licensee who, "being a
person to whom a miners's licence has been granted
extracts mica from a mine the particulars of which are
not endorsed on his licence." It is admitted by the
lf(arned Advocate General that the Government did
not take action under cl. (b) of s. 25(1) and that the
mention of that clause in the memorandum was only
a mistake for cl. (c) ofs. 25(l)ofthe Act. On May 17;
1953, the petitioner submitted to the Government a
detailed explanation in regard to the charges levelled
against it. It premised its explanation with the statement that all the relevant books of accounts and stock
books had been seized by the Inspector of Mica
Accounts and had not been returned in spite of repeated requests aud that therefore it reserved its right to
make further submissions when the books were returned. It also pointed out that at the time of inspection it
was not asked to explain the alleged irregularity in
accordance with the usual procedure in regard to such
matters. In then proceeded to answe_r ev,ery one of
'959
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
625
the allegations made against it. The explanation
r959
given by t~e Company a ppe~rs to be plausible and the
Mineral
contraventions alleged, even if true, appear to be too Development Ltd.
trivial for the drastic action taken by the State. In
v.
1954 the Government filed- a suit against the s~id The State of
proprietor for a declaration that the various companies
Bikar
brought into existence by him were bogus ones and the Subba Rao].
various transactions entered into by him were all
benami for him. After the explanation given by the
petitioner, there was a lull for more than two years.
The State Government neither returned the account
books nor invited the petitioner to make further submissions by allowing it to look into the accounts seized
by the authorities concerned. Suddenly, on September 7, 1955, a notification was issued to the effect that
the Governor of Bihar was pleased to cancel the
petitioner's licence. It was also directed to stop
operating the mica mines forthwith and to produce
the books of account relating to the above mines in
respect of their godowns on September 12, 1955.
From the foregoing narration of facts it is obvious
that the licence affecting rights of great magnitude was
cancelled to say the least, for trivial reasons. The
enquiry was held by the department headed by the
Minister who was obviously biased against the petitioner. Some technical non-compliances of the rules
alleged to have been discovered during the inspection
of certain godowns were given as an excuse to withdraw the licence; no opportunity was given to the
petitioner to inspect its accounts and to explain the
alleged defaults with reference to the accounts. After
the petitioner gave its reply, a sense of false security
w:as created in the petitioner and after a period of two
years the Government issued the notification cancelling
the licence. Meanwhile, as a second string to the
bow, the state filed a suit against the proprietor for a ·
declaration that the lease was benami and for other
reliefS. The hidden hand of the Revenue Minister can be
seen in this enquiry. The proceedings were started
because ofpQlitical rivalry between the proprietor and
the Revenue Minister. Thobgh heavy stakes were involved, the enquiry was conducted in a manner which
So
t
626
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
did not give any real opportunity to the petitioner to
explain.its conduct and to disprove the allegations made
Mineral
against it; and the order of cancellation of the licence
Development Ltd.
was made admittedly by the same Revenue Minister,
v.
who was behind the enquify. In the circumstances, we
The State of
Bihar
must hold that no reasonable opportunity was given to
the petitioner within the meaning of the second proSubbaRao ].
viso to s. 25(1) of the Act.
That apart, the State Government did not find on
the material that the petitioner was guilty of repeated failure to comply with any of the provisions of the
Act. The particulars furnished by the Government
did not disclose any such repeated failure. Under
s. 25(1)(c) of the Act, repeated failure to comply with
any of the provisions of the Act is a necessary condition for the cancellation of a licence. Unless there is
repeated failure within the meaning of that clause the
State Government has no power to cancel the licence
under the said clause. That apart, neither in the notice
initiating the proceedings nor in the notification cancelling the licence issued by the Government it was
stated that the petitioner was guilty of " repeated
failure " within the meaning of the said clause. But
in the particulars furnished, the State Government
alleged that the petitioner had been guilty of repeated
failure to comply with thE1 provisions· of the Act, but
the particulars did not support that statement, for,
apart from the default of March, 1952, the alleged
contravention of rules were discovered by the Inspector of Mica Accounts only during the inspection of
some of the godowns between December 3, 1953, and
December 11, 1953. The result of that one continuous
inspection cannot be the basis for ·holding that the
petitioner was guilty of " repeated failure" within the
meaning of s. 25(l)(c).of the Act. There is nothing on
record to show that the petitioner was found to be
guilty of contravention of any of the provisions of the
Act on any other occasion after March, 1952. Apart
from the only prosecution, which we have already
noticed, the petitioner was not prosecuted for any
other contravention of the provisions of ss. 10, 12 or 14
of the Act. That prosecution cannot be pressed into
'959
'·
r
S.d.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
service, as the State Government renewed the licence
1959
for 1953-54. In this state of record we must hold that
the respondents failed to prove that the petitioner D 0
Ltd ·
was guilty of repeated failure to comply with the pro- eve ;.en
•
visions of the Act. On the basis of the said finding, The State of
the respondents would have no power to take action
Biha•
under s. 25(l)(c) of the Act.
The foregoing discussion establishes that neither Subba Rao f.
the necessary condition to enable the Government to
take action under s. 25(1)(c) of the Act has been estab,
lished nor the State Government had afforded reason•
able opportunity to t}J.e petitioner within phe meaning
of the second proviso to s. 25(1),
.
·
In the result we accept the petition and issue a writ
of certiorari against the respondents quashing the
order of the Government of Bihar dated September 1,
1955, cancelling miner's licence No. 261-H of 195~
granted in favour of the petitioner. The respondents
will pay the costs to the petitioner.
Petition allowed,.
t1t••a:
...
THE UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS
..
'
v.
MESSRS. BHAN A MAL GULZARI MAL
AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. SuBBA RAo, K. C. DAs GuPTA AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
.
Iron and Steel Control-Notification issued by.Controller fixing
maximum price of steel-Constitutional validity~Iron and Steel
(Control of Production and Distribution) Order, r94r, cl. IIBEssential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, r946 (XXIV of r946),
ss. 3, 4-Constitution of India, Arts. I9(I)(f) and (g).
....
The respondent company was registered a stock-holder under
the Iron and Steel (Control of Production and Distribution)
Order, r94r, issued by the Central Government in exercise of its
powers under r. 81(2).of the Defence of India Rules. On December ro, 1949, the Iron and Steel Controller issued a notification
under cl. nB of the Order decreasing the prices already fixed
all categories of steel by . Rs. 30 per hm: . Criminal .cases were
started against the. company' its three directors; its .general
for
1959
December x6.
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