MST. RUKHMABAI versus LALA LAXMINARAYAN AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 17 November 1959 | [1960] 2 S.C.R. 253 | 1959 INSC 148
Key facts
- Decided
- 17 November 1959
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 173/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 2 S.C.R. 253
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 148
Text of the judgment
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.,
253
MST. RUKHMABAI
v.
.
LALA LAXMINARAYAN AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO and
J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
/
...
\
.
Hindu Law-Joint family-Partition-Admissions of members
accepting partition, value of-New point-When can be allowed to be
raised-Suit for declaration of deed as sham- -Right to sue, when
accrues-Limitation-Specific Relief Act, r877, (I of r877), s. 42Indian Limitation Act, r908 (lX ofr908), Sch. I, art. rzo.
A joint Hindu family which was heavily indebted owned
extensive properties and business. In 1915 certain members of
the family including one Govindprasad executed a registered
deed of relinquishment in favour of another member. The deed
recited that the members of the family had become separated in
1898, by a deed of relinquishment which was not registered and
so a fresh one was being executed confirming the earlier arrangement. On February 17, 1916, Govindprasad executed a trust
deed in favour of two minors, Chandanlal, a son of one of his
brothers and Rukhmabai, a daughter of another brother. The
trust was created in a sum of Rs. 15,000 for constructing a building
or buying land therewith and paying the net income from it to
the two beneficiaries in equal shares. With a part of. this money
a site was purchased and a ,building was constructed thereon. On
October 25, 1929, Rukhmabai filed a suit against Chandanlal for
partition of the said property and obtained a decree. When the
Commissioner appointed by the Court went to effect the partition
on February 13, 1937, the respondent, who is a brother of
Chandanlal, obstructed him, and, on October 8, 1940, he filed a
suit for a declaration that the trust deed executed by Govindprasad was a sham document and that the property was joint
family property. Apart from oral and documentary evidence the•
appellant relied also upon certain admissions made by .members
of the family accepting the partition. The Court dismissed the
suit holding that Govindprasad had become separated in 1898,
that the trust deed was genuine and that the trust money was
his self-acquired property. In.the appeal before the High Court
by the respondent the appellant raised two new pleas, namely,
(i) that the suit for a mere declaration was barred by s. 42 of the
Specific Relief Act and (ii) that the suit was barred by limitation
under art. 120 of the Limitation Act as it was not filed within
six years
the knowledge of the respondent of the fraudulent
nature of the transactions which he had in 1917, or at least in
1929, when the appellant filed her ~uit for partition. The High
Court rejected both these contentions, held that the two relinquishment deeds and the deed of trust were sham documents
and set aside the decree of the trial court and decreed the
of
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254
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
respondent's suit. The appellant obtained a certificate and
appealed.
Rukkmabai
Held, that the documents in question were sham documents,
v.
that the property in suit was joint family property and that the
Lala Laxminarayan suit had been rightly decreed.
·
•nd Others
The admissions made by one or other members of the family
to meet particular contingencies or to get an advantage were not
of much value in determining the question whether some of the
members of the joint Hindu family had separated. Persons sometimes made statements which served their purpose, or proceeded
upon ignorance of the true position; and it was not their statements but their relations, with the estate, which should be taken
in to consideration in determining the issue.
Alluri Venkatapathi Raju v. Dantulttri Venkatanarasimha
Raju, (r935-36) L.R. 63 I.A. 397, relied on.
The new point raised by the appellant that the suit was
barred by s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act could not be allowed to
be raised as it was not raised in the trial Court. If the point had
been raised at the earliest stage the respondent could have asked
for the necessary amendment to comply with the provisions of
s. 42. It was a well settled rule of practice not to dismiss suits
automatically but to allow the plaintiff to make the necessary
amendment if he sought to do so. But the new point of limitation could be allowed to be raised in appeal as even if it had been
raised at the earliest stage the respondent could not have pleaded
or proved any new facts to meet the point.
The suit was not barred by limitation. The right to sue
under art. 120 of the Limitation Act accrued when the defendant
clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted
by the plaintiff. Every threat to such a right was not a clear
and unequivocal threat as to compel the plaintiff to file a suit.
The execution of the Trust deed in 19I6 and the construction
of the house did not constitute any invasion of the respondent's
-right as the deed was a sham document executed for the benefit
of the family. Till 1926 the respondent's father lived in the
house and since 1936 the respondent had been residing in the
house. The decree in the suit filed by Rukhmabai could not bind
him or affect his possession of the house. The respondent's right
was not effectively threatened till the commissioner came to
partition the property on february 17, 1937, and the suit was
filed within six years from that date.
·
Bolo v. Koklan, (1929-30) L.R. 57 I.A. 325, Annamalai
Chettiar v. A.M.K.C.T. Muthukaruppan Chettiar, (1930) I.L.R. 8
Rang. 645, Govinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh, (1930-31)
L.R. 58 I.A. 125 and Pothukujchi Appa Rao v. Secretary of State,
A.LR. 1938 Mad. 193. relied on.
, 959
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
173 of 1955.
No.
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SUPREME COUR'.r REPORtS
S.C.:R.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated Septemz959
her 9, 1949, of the former Nagpur High Court, in first
R kh b .
appeal No. 45of1944, arising out of th_e judgment and
u ;a a•
dec_ree dated April 24, 1944, of the First Additionahala LaxminaYaya11
District Judge, Nagpur, in Civil Suit No. 12A of 1940.
and Others
.;·
,
W. S. Barlingay, Shankar Anand and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appel1ant.
·
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. K. Monohar, S. N.
Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for
the respondents.
1959. November 17. The Judgme~t of the 'court
was delivered by
SuBBA RAO J.-This appeal by certificate ls directed
against the decree and judgment of the High Court at
Nagpur, reversing those of the First Additional District
Judge, Nagpur, in Civil ·Suit No. 12-A of 1940. It
would be convenient at the outset to give the following geneology which would help to understood the
contentions of the parties.
(The geneology is given on the next page) .
•
Subba Rao J.
•
•
•
Ramasahai
(d. i897)
I
I
Ganesh-
prasad
Jank1-
(d. 1912)
prasad
I
(d. 1923)
Govindprasad
(d. 1034)
Adopted son
Daul":hter
Mst.
Rukhmabai
=
I
Ajodhyaprasad
(d. 1928)
I
I
I .
Ratanlal
(d. lg26)
I
I
Chandanlal
(d. 31-1-1940)
adopted
son Kisanlal
I
. I
· Saqooprasad
Mangalprasad
\d. 1903)
Ramchand
(d. 5-10-1950)
I
I
(d i914)
adopted son
Tulsiram
(defendant 3)
I
Ghasiram
(d. 1917)
I
Daughter
Tarabai
Lala
Chhotelal
(defendant 8)
Lala
Sheoshankar
(defendant 1)
Widow Mst.
Annapurnabai
(defendant 2)
I
----1
Ramprasad
(defendant4)
I
daughter
Saroobai
Ganga-
=
(defendant5)
prasad
Lala
Sunderlal
I
LAXMINARAYAN
(plaintiff)
I
Cbandanlal
(adopted to
Ajodhya-
prasad)
I
Kisanlal
(adopted to
Govindprasad)
1----i-Tulsiram Sheonarayan
(adopted to (defendant6)
Sarjoo-
prasad)
__I I
Harnarayae
{defendant;).
I
Kamal
Narayan
(d. 1924)
s.C.R.
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SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
257
During the life time of Ramasahai, he and his eight
z959
sons and one cousin, pamely, Sitaram, constituted a
.
·JOin
· t H'm d u .tam1
.c · 'l y w1·t· h R amasa h a1· as I'ts manager.
Rukhmabai
The joint family carried on its ancestral family busi- LalaLax:.inarayan
ness of excise contracts in several districts in the and Others
former C. P. & Berar provinces. On January 24,
1897, Ramasahai died and, at the time of his death, SubbaRa 0 !·
the family, though heavily indebted, had extensive
properties distributed at various places like Nagpur,
Kainptee Rajnandgaon, Raipur, Jabalpur etc. Sarjooprasad died in 1903', Ajodhyaprasad in 1912, Mangalprasad in 1914, Jankiprasad in 1923, Ratanlal in 1926,
Ganeshprasad in 1928, Govindprasad jn 1934, and 1
Ramchand in 1940. On February 27, 1915, Ganeshprasad, Jankiprasad, Govindprasad, Ratanlal and
Ramchand, the surviving brothers executed a registered deed of relinquishment in favour of Jankiprasad.
In that document it was recited that the brothers had
become separated on January 24, 1898, by a deed of
relinquishment of that date and that, as the said
document was not registered, they were . executing a
fresh one confirming the earlier arrangement. On
February 17, 1916, Govindprasad executed a trust
deed in favour of his nephew, Chandanlal, the son of
his deceased brother Ajodhyaprasad, and his niece,
Rukhmabai, the daughter of his brother Ganesh. prasad, both of whom were minors at that time. In
that deed Govindprasad, after asserting that he had
become divided from his brothers under the aforesaid
two deeds of relinquishment, Created a trust in a sum
of Rs. 15,000 for the benefit of the said minors, handed
over the said money to the trustees appointed thereunder and directed them to construct a building or
buy a land and pay the net income from the said
property in equal shares to the t.wo minor beneficiaries.
With a part of that amount a site was purchased in
Cotton Market, Nagpur, and between the years 1916
and 1921 a building was constructed thereon. On or
about October 25, 1929, Rukhmabai filed a suit against
Chandanlal for partition of the said property and
obtained a decree against him on January 5, 1934, for
partition and mesne profits. Chandanlal filed an
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
appeal against that decree and it was dismissed. After
Rukhmabai
the said decree, Chandanlal died on January 31, 1940.
v.
When the Commissioner appointed by the Court went
LalaLaxminarayan to the building to effect the partition by metes and
and Others
bounds, the respQildent, who was in the house,
Subba Rao f.
•
obstructed the Commissioner," and thereafter on October 8, 1940, filed a suit, out of which the present
appeal arises, for a declaration that the said trust deed
executed by Govindprasad in favour of the appellant
and Chand1mlal was a sham document.
The respondents' case, inter alia is that the first
relinquishment deed was brought into existence sometime before the second registered relinquishment deed
was executed and that the said deeds and the trust
deed were pai:_ts of a same scheme of fraud conceived
by the members of the family to defraud the creditors.
The appellant, on the other hand, alleges that Govindprasad had really separated himself from the other
members of the family, that he had his own busi'nesses, that from out of his self-acquisitions he created
the trust deed to benefit his minor nephew and niece
for whom he had great love and affection, and that
subsequently the trustees purchased a land and built
the house thereon with additional fonds supplied by
him. She also alleges that the first respondent, after
having set up by his natural brother, Chandanlal, to
to resist her claim to the building and having failed in
that attempt, started the present litigation to deprive
her of the fruits of her decree.
On the pleadings the learned District Judge framed
as many as 12 issues. He held, on a consideration of
the docume1its and oral evidence adduced, that
Govindprasad became divided from the members of
the joint family in 1898, thalt thereafter he was carrying on the business of money lending, was dealing in
gold and silver, and also was taking liquor contracts,
that out of his self.acquisitions he created the trust in
respect of Rs. 15,000, and that the land was purchased
and the 'suit building was put up with the trust
amount and additional amounts given by him. On
those findings, the suit was dismissed. The respondent
No. 1, (hereinafter called the respondent), preferred
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
259
an appeal against that decree to the Higl?- Court
r959
at Nagpur. The High Court held that the two
R kh b .
· relinquishment deeds were sham documents brought
" v~a ai
into existence to shield the liquid assets of the Lala Laxmiiiarayan
family, which were for that purpose placed in the
mid Others
hands of Govindprasad, t~at the trust deed was also
a sham one designed to achieve the same purpose and S 14 bba Rao J.
that the'house was also con,structed with the aid· of
the family funds. ]'or the first time before the High
Court the appellant raised a plea of limitation. The
learned Judges of the !Iigh Court held that the suit
was within time under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act.
It was also for the first time contended that the respondent should be non-suited as he failed to claim a
further relief within the meaning of the proviso to
sub-s. (1) of s. 42" of the Specific Relief Act. The High
Court negatived the said contentions. It is not
necessary to notice the oth~ points raised before the
High Court as they are not pressed before us. In the
result the decree of the District Judge was set aside
and the respondent's suit was decreed. Hence this
appeal.
The main point that arises for consideration is
whether the plaint-schedule house is the property of
the joint family or whether it was built out of the
self-acquisitions of Govindprasad in respect whereof
· he executed the trust deed. At the outset the relevant and well-settled principles of Hindu Law may be
briefly notic~d.
There is a presumption in Hindu Law that a family
is joint. There can be a division in status among the
members of a joint Hindu family by definement of
shares which is technically called "division in status",
or an actual division among them by allotment of
specific property to each one of them which is described . as " division by metes and bounds ". A
member n()ed not receive any share in the joint
estate· but m&y renoun<;e his interest therein, his
renunciation merely extinguishes his interest in the
estate but does not affect the status of the remaining
members vis-a-vis the family property. A division
260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
in status can be effected by an unambiguous declaration
to become divided from the others and that
Rukhmabai
v.
intention can be expressed by any process. Though
LalaLa•minarayanprimafacie a document cl.early expressing the intenand Others
tion to divide brings about a division in status, it is
open to a party to prove that the said document was
S1<bba Raa J.
a sham or a nominal one not intended to be acted
upon but was conceived and executed for an' ulterior
purpose. But there is no presumption that any property, whether movable or immovable, held by a member of a joint Hindu family, is joint family property.
The burden lies upon the person who asserts that a
particular property is joint family property to establish that fact. But if he proves that there was sufficient joint family nucleus from and out of which the
said property could have been acquired, the burden
shifts to the member of the family setting np the
claim that it is his personlj,[ property to establish that
the said property has been acquired without any
assistance from the joint family property.
Bearing the aforesaid principles in view, we shall
now proceed to consider the main issue in the appeal.
The appellant naturally relies upon the document of
1898, in support of her case that Govindprasad renounced his interest in the joint ·family" property in the
year 1898. That document is Ex. D. 54-A, dated
January 24, 1898, and is described as "farkatnama ".
The seven brothers, Ganeshprasad, Ajodhyaprasad,
Jankiprasad, Ratanlal, Mangalprasad, ~arjooprasad
and Ramchand, executed the said relinquishment deed
in favour of Govindprasad. It is stated therein as
follows:
" ... we are not pulling together well in affairs
and you and we are not on good terms in family
treatment. Ill-will between you and us all brot,hers
is consequently growing more and more from dayto-day. Similarly, as (our) father himself involved
all ancestral property into debt and the remaining
movables were partitioned.by all at that very time,
no movable and immovable ancestral property has
now remained. Consequently, we all have to
undergo trouble and sustain loss in our business:
'959
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
261
We, therefore, execute this pharkhatnama (deed of
z959
relinquishment) and hereby declare as follows:Rukkmabai
" Each brother should from this day enjoy his
v.
own self-acquired property and that he may acquireLalaLaxminarayan
with hia personal exertions-articles, grain, cash,
and Others
movable and immovable property, so on and so Subba Rao J.
forth. One has no connection with another, of
family relation in property, transactions ... (torn},
dealings and the like, of others. Each should enjoy
his benefit and sustain his loss ... (torn) unless (we)
give voluntarily (some property) to your children
and (you) give voluntarily (some property) to our
children, (they) shall have no manner of right
against each other "."
This document purports to have been signed by the
seven brothers. If this deed is not a sham document,
it clearly brings about a division of status between all
the members of the family. It also proves that
movables were divided between the brothers at the
time of the death of their father, and that the joint
family property, presumably because it was heavily
involved in debts, was not divided in metes and
bounds. Ex facie it does not support the appellant's
version that Govindprasad alone separated from the
joint family taking his share of movable properties at
the time of his father's death and relinquishing his
interest in all the immovable properties of the family.
The first respondent attacks this document mainly on
the ground that this was a sham one brought into
existence after the year 1912 as a part of a scheme to
defraud the creditors. The first circumstance relied
uponis that this docume1~t, though it purports' to
bring about a division in status among the members
of the family and, according to the appellant, amounts
to a relinquishment of Govindprasad's interest in the
extensive joint family property, was not registered.
Doubtless an unregistered document can affect separation in status ; but Ramasahai and his sons were
carrying on extensive businesses, purchased properties
in different places and in the course of their business
they were executing registered mortgage deeds, The
ostensible purpose of the execution of the document is
34
262
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
alleged to be the intention of Govindprasad to free
himself from the family troubles caused by its involveRukhmabai
ment in heavy debts and to eke out his livelihood by
Lala Lax:inamyan carrying on a new business of his own. lt is not likely
and Othm
that he would not have insisted upon. a registered
document to achieve that purpose. There is therefore
Subba Rao].
some justification for this comment. Secondly, if
there was a partition of the movable properties either
at the time of the execution of the document or even
earlier-a rich family like that of Ramasahai must
have had large extent of movables-the details of that
partition should have found a place in the document.
The absence of such details is indicative of the fact
that the document was not really intended to be a
formal document effecting a division between the
parties.
This document did not see the light of da)7 till the
year 1915, when Govindprasad, for the first time, made
a reference to it in Ex. D. 32, a registered .relinquishment deed executed by him. On September 7, 1912,
Govindprasad executed a Will, Ex. P. 1, bequeathing
some properties described by him as his self-acquisitions. In that Will he stated thus:
" This property shown above is all my acquisition,
and the ancestral property is not included in this or
received by me. I too have not retained my right
over the ancestral property. . .. "
"My father expired on 27-1-1897 A.D. From
that time without taking any share in my father's
property, I have acquired this property by solely
doing business; business of relations are not included
in this nor have I joined in their business. Hence,
nobody has any right to this."
If really there was in existence on that date a written
relinquishment deed, Ex. D. 54, it is not likely that
Govindprasad would not have mentioned that fact in
the formal document he executed bequeathing his
property. In contrast with this recital, in the Will
Ex. P. 2, executed by him on May 1, 1919, the following recital is found :
". . . I have taken no share at all in the
movable and immovable property left by him, and
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S.C.R.
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263
all the pi·operty in my possession on my earning it
r959
is acquired by me, and consequently, my brothers,
b .
Lala Ganeshprasad, Jankiprasad Ratanlal, RamRt</l~~a a•
chandra and all other brothers had executed a Lala La:rminarayan
pharkath-nama (deed of relinquishment) in my favour
and Others
on 24-1-1898 A.D .... "
Subba Rao].
What could be the reason for Govindprasad not
referring to the deed of relinquishment of the year
1898 in his Will of 1912, but thought fit to do so in
his Will of 1919? The only possible explanation is
that in between these two documents, another relinquishment deed, Ex. D. 32, executed by him on
]'ebruary 27, 1915, came into existence. We will have
to say more about this document at a later stage of our
judgment. This document, for the first time, affirms
the recitals of the earlier alleged relinquishment deed
of 1898 and is also registered. It is therefore a permissible inference that Ex. D. 54 might not have been in
exist{'4lce before Ex. D. 32 was executed or, at any
rate, before Ex. P. 1 was executed by Govindprasad.
Reliance is also placed by the respondent on the
alleged discrepancies between the particulars of partition given in Ex. D-54 and Ex. D-32. But we do not
find much force in this contention, as the-argument cuts
both ways. If Ex. D-54 was forged to support Ex. D-32,
there could not have been any room for introducing
discrepancies between the two documents. We find
no such irreconcilable discrepancies between the two
documents and in substance the recitals are similar.
The respondent attacks the genuineness of Ex. D-54
by attempting te> establish that the signatures of
Ajodhyaprasad and Mangalprasad were forged after
their death. If this was proved, this document might
have come into existence only after 1914, i.e., after
Mangalprasad had passed away. On the other hand,
if Mangalprasad's signature was genuine, but Ajodhyaprasad's signature was a forged one, this document
could have come into existence after 1912 but before
•
1914. The learned District Judge disposed of this
contention with the following remarks :
..
"The expert examined the admitted signatures on
document executed in the years 1903and1904while
264
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2))
the disputed document was executed in the year
1898. The opinion of the expert does not carry
Rukhmabai
conviction
and is not corroborated by circumstances.
v.
The
farkatnama
was found to be genuine in tho preLala Laxmimirayan
and Oth~rs
vious litigation."
It may be noticed that the learned District Judge did
Subba Rao].
not scrutinize the signatures with the help of the
expert's evidence, and has not expressed any considered view thereon. But the High Court bestowed
greater care on this aspect of the case, as it should,
for, if this document was a forgery, it would go a long
way to support the respondent's version. The learned
,Juclges of the High Court considered the evidence of
the expert, scrutinized the impugned signature of
Ajodhyaprasad, compared it with his admitted
signatures and agreed with the expert in holding that
the disputed signature was not that of Ajodhyaprasad.
So far as Mangalprasad's signature was concerned, the
learned Judges were not able, on the evidence ad+luced,
to hold that it was not his signature. The expert was
examined as P.W. 3. He is practising as handwriting
and finger-print expert in Nagpur since 1937, and he
also keeps a branch office in Bombay. He has examined the impugned signature of Ajodhyaprasad wiLh the
latter's admitted signatures found in the mortgage
deeds, Exs. P-7 dated March 10, 1898, P-66 dated
November 2, 1902, and P-6 dated June 25, 1904. He
has examined the disputed signatures synthetically
and analytically and found differences in the pictorial
aspect of the admitted signatures and the disputed
signature in that that the admitted signatures are
fluently scribed with no hesitation and with a flourish,
whereas both the fluency and flourish 11.re lacking in
the disputed signature. Ex11.mining the signatures
analytically, he gives the following differences between
the impugned signature and the admitted signatures:
(i) in the disputed signature the down strokes end
bluntly, whereas in the admitted signatures, they end
•
in a flourishing manner with ticks to the right; (ii) in
the disputed signature, the down strokes have a
tendency to curve in the centre quite differently from
the down strokes in the admitted signatures ; (iii) in
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265
the disputed signature there are dots after the letter
r959 ·
"dha" in "dhasthur"
instead
of the usual dashes found
.
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Rukhmabai
in the admitted signatures; (iv) in the admitted
signature in speiling the name "Ajodhyaprasad" the LalaLax:.inarayan
letters "Joo" have been used, whereas in the disputed and Otlters
signatures, the letters "Jo" have been used; (v) in
the disputed signature there is uneven pen-pressure Subba Rao J.
which is not found in the admitted signatures; (vi)
there are over-writings in the disputed signature; and
(vii) there is a marked difference in the formation of
letters between those found in the admitted signatures
and those found in the disputed signature. The
credentials of this expert have not been questioned in
the cross-examination. Except suggesting some
irrelevant theories, no real attempt has been made to
discredit this witness or demolish his factual observations or his conclusions. The appellant has not thought
fit to examine another expert to contradict this witness
or to prove her case. In the circumstances, we derive
great assistance from the expert's evidence in our
attempt to compare for ourselves the disputed
signature with the admitted signatures. The learned
Judges of the High Court also compared the signatures
with the help of a powerful magnifying glass. Hidayatulhih, J., as he then was, gives the results of his
observation thus:
"To begin with the pictorial aspect differs in
many respects a.nd even to a person not versed in
the identification of handwritings they would appear
to be dissimilar. The letter formations are different;
the strokes and the little curls at the end of vertical
strokes ·are all wrong. There is also a spelling
change. Whereas the writer usually wrote ' joo ', in
the disputed signature this has been changed to
'jo'. This detracts somewhat from the force of
this argument but the document Exhibit P-81 is
merely a copy of a copy and· we were unable to
compare the signatures as such. The fact however
remains that barring this solitary instance, the
admitted signatures contain the other spelling.'~
Mudholkar, J., agreed with the observations ofHidayatullah, J. We must also give due weight to the
266
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
observations of the learned Judges. We have also
compared the impugned si0<Ynature with the admitted
Rukhmabai
v.
signatures with the help of tlie expert's evidence, and
LalaLaxminarayan we are inclined to agree with the view of the expert
and Others
and the learned Judges of the High Court. The learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to pla f'fl
Subba Rao J.
before us any material to compel us to take a view
different from that of the High Court.. We, therefore,
agree with the Hjgh Court that it has been established
that the impugned signature of Ajodhyaprasad in
Ex. D-54 is not his. ·This conclusion lends strong
support to the respondent's version that Ex. D-54
must have been brought into existence at a later stage
when Ajodhyaprasad was no more.
It leads us to the consideration of Ex.D-32. It is
<hted February 27, 1915, and purports to be a relinquishment deed executed by Ganeshprasad, J ankiprasad, Itatanlal and Hamchand in favour of Govindprasad. In this document, referring to Ex.D-54 it is
stated that the brothers became separated on that date
and that as the earlier document was not registered,
they executed a fresh document and registered the
same. A recital is also made, persumably to explain
the conduct of some of the brothers in living together
and having a common mess, that by such common
living they should not be deemed to be united. This
document, as we have already indicated, is attaoked
on the ground that it was part of a scheme of fraud
and that it was executed only nominally to achieve
the purpose of the said scheme. Our finding that the
document of January 24, 1898, was subsequently got
up after the death of Ajodhyapra.sad undermines to
some extent the reality of the transaction. That
apart, we shall furt,her scrutinize with great care the
surrounding circumstances to unravel, if possible, the
true purpose of this document. It is common case
that. the members of the family had been executing
nominal documents such as mortgage deeds, sale deeds
etc. in favour of family friends to defeat or, at any
rnte, delay the creditors. Our attempt, therefore,
will be to draw a real picture of the attempted scheme
of fraud and to see whether this document will fit
into that picture.
'959
t
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
267
We have already noticed that at the time of the
r959
death of Ramasahai the family was heavily indebted.
Rukhmabai
On June 12, 1895, Ramasahai, Sitaram, Ganeshprasad
v.
and Mangalprasad had executed a mortgage deed in Lala La:rminarayan
favour of one Buty. On March 2, 1898, the said Buty
and Others
filed Civil Suit No. 5 of 1898 against the members of
the joint family for recovery of the amount due under Subba Rao f.
the mortgage and obtained a decree on June 16, 1900.
On August 25, 1897, Ajodhyaprasad, Ratanlal and
Govindprasad executed a mortgage deed, Ex. P-81 in
favour ofBaliram Hari Bokhare for a sum of Rs. 2,400
alleged to have been borrowed from him on the
said date. This document was executed six months
before Buty filed his suit on his mortgage. Nothing
further was heard of this mortgage. In the circumstances it may be assumed that the mart.gage
deed was only a sham one brought into existence to
defraud the creditors. On March 10, 1898, Ganeshprasad, Ajodhyaprasad, Jankiprasad and Ratanlal
executed a mortgage deed, Ex. P-7, in favour of
one Hemraj for a sum of Rs. 2,000. Under this document, properties not covered by Ex. P-81 were
mortgaged. There is nothing on record to show what
has happened to this mortgage and whether the
alleged debt was discharged. This also appears to be
another sham transaction. On February .14, 1902,
Ganeshprasad executed a mortgage deed, Ex. P-75,
in favour of Sheoprasad: though this document is
dated February 14, 1902, the stamp for the document
appears to have been purchased only on April 27, 1902.
This document appears to have been ante-dated for
some ulterior purpose. On November 2, 1902, six of
the Lala brothers, i.e., all except Govindprasad and
Mangalprasad, executed another mortgage deed, Ex.
P-66, in favour of Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan
for a sum of Rs. 9,975 mortgaging thereunder the
family immovable properties. For this mortgage deed a
stamp paper purchased on June 25, 1898, was utilised.
Again on February 26, 1903, the same executants
executed another mortgage deed, Ex. P-74, in favour
of the said Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan for a sum
of Rs. 10,000. The stamp for this document was
268
1 959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
purchased on August 4, 1902.
[1960(2)]
Both the Exs. P-66
R1lkhmabai
and P-74 were presented for registration on Februv.
ary 26, 1903 but they were registered on March 4, 1903.
Lala Laxminarnyan This delay in the registration is presumably for the
and Others
S1<bba Raa .f.
reason that the Lala brothers waited till the mortgagee
executed an agreement, Ex. P-7, dated March 3, 1903,
in their favour. Under this agreement, the mortgagee admitted that the said mortgages had been
paid up and he also undertook to execute a written
" mortgage deed " and get the same registered at any
time when the mortgagors paid the full expenses in
that regard. This agreement proves beyond any doubt
thatthe said two mortgages in favour of Narayanrao
Govindrao Mahajan were colourable and sham transactions. On June 25, 1904, five out of the six executants,
Sarjooprasad having died meanwhile, executed a
mortgage deed, Ex. P-6, in favour of Awasarilal
for a sum of Rs. 2,000 for payment to Hemraj. It
has alreadv been noticed that there is no evidence
on record· to show that Hemraj paid any amount
and the record does not disclose any further details
in regard to this mortgage. On May 26, 1908, Ganeshprasad, Jankiprasad, l~atanlal and Ramchand executed a mortgage deed, Ex. P-76, in favour of one
Kasturchand Daga for a sum of Rs. 20,000. The
document discloses that all the family properties
mortgaged thereunder were purchased in execution
in the name of the mortgagee with the funds provided by him and that, as the said amount was
paid to him, the property was put in the possession
of the mortgagors. lt may be reasonably inferred
from this recital that the properties purchased in the
name of the said Daga were mortgaged to him for
the amounts advanced by him. This document also
recognized the existence of other mortgage debts due
by the family to Daga. It may be mentioned
that there is no dispute that the family was borrowing
moneys from Daga. This document was not executed by Ajodhyaprasad, but he attested it. On July 31,
1914, Ganeshprasad and Ratanlal executed another
mortgage deed, Ex. P-73, in favour of Narayanrao
Govindrao Mahajan for a sum of Rs. 18,925, being
(
t
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
269
the amount alleged to be due by the family under two
z959
registered documents dated February 26, 1903. This
.
mortgage was engrossed on a stamp paper purchased Rukhmabai
as early as January 31, 1903, and w.as r~gistered o.n Lala Lax:inarayan
November 23, 1914. Before the reg1strat1on of this and Others
document, the mortgagors obtained from the mort. gagee a deed of agreement, Ex. P-38, dated October 6, Subba Rao J.
1914, admitting that the said mortgage was a nominal
one. On June 18, 1915, Kasturchand Daga filed Civil
Suit No. 1 of 1915 against the Lala brothers on the
basis of the mortgage deed, Ex. P-76. Three days
prior to the filing of this suit i.e., on June 15, 1915,
Ganeshprasad, Rata.nlal. J ankiprasad and Ramchand
executed the following three sale-deeds: (i) sale-deed,
Ex. P-9 dated February 21, 1915 in favour of Baliram Hari Bokhare conveying the family properties
situated at Jubbulpore and Kamptee for a consideration of Rs. 9,500; (ii) sale-deed. dated February 21,
1915, Ex. P-71, executed in favour of the said Baliram
Hari Bokhare for a consideration of Rs. 9,250 in
respect of properties at Raipur and Kamptee : this
document was executed on a stamp paper purchased
on August 8, 1910; and (iii) sale-deed dated June 11,
1915, Ex. P-70, in favour of Narayanrao Govindrao
Mahajan for a consideration of Rs. 10,000 conveying
some property at Kamptee. The said three documents
were registered on June 15, 1915, though they were
all purported to have been executed on different dates.
On June 20, 1915, Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan
executed three documents, Exs. P-10, P-35 and P-36.
Ex. P-10 is an agreement executed by Narayanrao
Govindrao Mahajan in favour of the Lala brothers,
whereunder Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan agreed
to reconvey the property conveyed to him. Ex. P-35
is a receipt given by Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan
to Lala brothers, wherein it is mentioned that it was
agreed between them at the time of the execution of
the sale-deed that whenever the Lala brothers paid
Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan the amount of the
sale-deed and interest thereon, the latter would return
the said -prn-perty and would execute a. deed of reconvey-.
a.nee and that, as they have paid him a total amount
35 .
270
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
of Rs. 11,200, he would execute the reconveyance in
their
favour. Ex. P-36 of the same date is a Will
Rukhmabai
v.
executed by the said Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan
Lala Laxminarayan directing his heirs to convey the property to the Lala
and Others
brothers in case he died without executing the· said
document. It is not disputed that the grand-son of
5 "bba Rao].
Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan did execute a saledeed in favour of two members of the Lala brother's
family and the same was given to Kasturchand Daga
in discharge of his debt. The learned District Judge,
and, on appeal, the High Court held that the said saledeeds were nominal transactions and the appellant
did not, and could not, question the correctness of the
facts found by them .
. The two sale-deeds executed in favour of Baliram
Hari Bokhare for a total sum of Rs. 19,4'.l5, alleged to
be the amount due under earlier mortgages executed
in his favour are also colourable transactions; for, on
July 1, 1915, Baliram Hari Bokhare executed
Exs. P-11, P-33 and P-34-under Ex. P-11 he agreed
to reconvey the properties covered by the sale deeds
if the said amount was paid to him; Ex. P-33 is a
receipt given by Baliram Hari Bokhare to the Lala
brothers acknowledging the receipt of the said amount
and there is a recital in the document that he would
reconvey the said property to the Lala brothers; and
Ex. P-34 is a Will executed by Baliram Hari Bokhare
directing his heirs to transfer the said property to the
Lala brothers in case lie died before transferring the
same to the said brothers. It is, therefore, seen that
the same pattern was followed by the Lala brothers
in the case of the two sale-deeds executed by them in
favour of Baliram Hari Bokhare. It is said that the
three sale-deeds exhausted the family's unencumbered
immovable properties and there can hardly be any
doubt that the three documents were executed to
prevent the decree-holder in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1915,
from proceeding against them after exhausting the
mortgage properties. Both the District Judge and
the High Court· held that these documents were collusive; and, on the facts noticed, their finding is
correct.
1 959
(
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
271
The contesting respondent's case is that the
z959
farkatnama of February 27, 1915, was also executed
k
b •
as part of t h e sa1'd sc h en;e to p1:eserve t h e cas h ~n d Ru hma
v. a•
the movables of the family for itself. The nommaharaLaxminarayem
sale-deeds executed in favour of Narayanrao Govindand Others
rao Mahajan and Baliram Hari Bokhitre might be
used to screen the family's immovable properties Subba Rao].
from being proceeded against in execution of the
decree obtained against them, but could not prevent
the decree-holder from proceeding against the family's
movables and cash. It is said that the said farkatnama
was intended to plug this loophole in the scheme
of fraud. This document also was registered on the
date when the other documents were registered.
There is no acceptable reason why this document
should have been executed and registered on the same
date when admittedly colourable documents were
executed by the family, if it was not intended to
support the same design. The appellant suggests
that the coincidence in dates was not decisive of the
question raised; for, it might well have been that
Govindprasad realising the danger which prompted his
brothers to resort to fraudulent transactions insisted
upon them to reaffirm the earlier transaction to avert
the same danger to his self-acquisitions. This may
be a plausible contention, but in the context of the
then existing circumstances it does not appeal to us.
The creditors' possible threat to proceed against
Govindprasad's alleged self-.acquisitions on the ground
that they were part of the joint family property had
always been there. What had happened wits that
instead of Buty, Daga become the creditor. There is,
therefore, no reason why the tell-tale date was fixed
for the execution of Ex. D-32, if it was not intended
to be a prop to the common design of fraud. Further,
it became necessary to put back the date of the alleged
division in status to 1898, i.e., to a date prior to the
filing of the suit by the creditor Buty against the
family on March 2, 1898, to meet the possible argument that the claim could be traced back to that of
Buty and therefore the alleged partition could not
· a.ffect the claim of Daga. Ex. D-32 purports to be a.
272
SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
[1960(2)]
confirmation of the farkatnama dated January 24,
1898. We have already held that the said document
Hukhmabai
v.
was an ante-dated one and that the signature of
Lala La>minarayan Ajodhyaprasad was forged therein. If so, it follows
a11d Others
that Ex. D-32 is another link in the chain of fraud
perpetrated by the family.
5
ubba Rao J.
To summarize: the family had joint business and
extensive properties as well as heavy debts at the
time of the death of Ramasahai on January 24, 1897.
After Ramasahai's death, the family creditor, Buty,
filed a suit against the members of the family to
enforce his mortgage. In the year 1898, the members
of the family executed nominal mortgages in favour of
Hemraj, Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan and Chunnilal Sonar, and when some of the family properties
were brought to sale in execution of the decree obtained by Buty, they were purchased by Kasturchand
Daga benami for the members of the family, and some
of the members of the family executed a mortgage
deed on May 26, 1908, for the sale price in favour of
the said Daga. The said Daga filed Civil Suit No. I
of 1915 against the family to enforce the mortgage,
on June 18, 1915. Three days before the filing of
this suit, i.e., on June 15, 1915, the brothers brought
into existence three nominal sale-deeds-·two in favour
of Baliram Hari Bokhare and another in favour of
Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan-and a relinquishment deed in favour of Govindprasad; and all the
documents were registered on the same day. Three
of them were admittedly nominal documents and
the fourth, viz., the relinquishment deed, has been
proved to be another nominal document. The said
facts disclose an integrated scheme of fraud and it is not
possible in the circumstances to single out therefrom
Ex. D-32 and hold that it is a bona fide transaction ;
on the other hand, the circumstances already narrated
by us indicate beyond any reasonable doubt that the
said document is also a part of that scheme·and intended
to protect the cash and movables of the family.
The appellant relies upon the Wills executed by
Govindprasad in 1912, 1919, 1920, 1926 and 1930 to
e2tablish that he was divided from the family, and
r959
r
S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
273
that he was treating some properties as his selfr959
acquisitions. If, as Wfl have held, neither Ex. D-54 Rukhmabai
nor Ex-D-32 effected a severance of Govindprasad
v.
from the joint family, the said documents would not Lala Laxminarayan
carry the matter further; for the Wills were based and Otl1ers
upon the assertions made by Govindprasad that he
w'as separated from his family in 1898 and that the Subba Rao J.
properties he was bequeathing were his self-acquistions. As we have held that there was no severance
of 1the joint family, the eviden.tiary value of these
documents must be rejected on the ground that they
were further attempts on the part of the family
to keep up the appearance consistent with th~ alleged
partition.
We now come to the consideration of the main
document in the case, namely, the trust deed dated
February 17, 1916. It is marked as Ex. D-12. It
purports to be a deed of trust executed by Govindprasad in favour of his nephew Chandanlal, the natural
son of his brother Ratanlal" and adopted son of his
another brother Ajodhyaprasad, and his niece,
Rukhmabai, the daughter of his eldest brother Ganeshprasad. Under this document Rs. 15,000 was set up
for the said beneficiaries, who were minors at that time.
Kasheo Rao Laxman Rao Aurangabadkar, Gujalal,
Davidin, Mahadeo, and Govindprasad were appointed
trustees. The document directed that the trustees
should carry on the management of the trust money
and that they should make over the money to the
minors on their attaining majority. They were also
directed to construct a building or buy a land which
might bring in good rent and to reserve one-fourth
for themselves for expenses of the building or
the land, as the case may be, and to distribute the
the remaining three-fourths in equal shares to the
two beneficiaries. Alternatively, they were also
directed to carry on a business with the said amount
and distribute the income therefrom tO the beneficiaries in equal shares. The first question that occurs
to one is, why did Govindprasad execute the trust deed
if his intention was to give a sum of Rs. 15,000 to his
nephew and niece; for, he ~could have easily achieved
274
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2))
that purpose by executing a Will or a settlement deed,
and
during his life time by giving them the income
b
kh
Ruma••
h
.
v.
t ere f
rom.m equal h
s ares.' The amount set a part rn
LalaLazminarayan comparatively small and is surprising that he should
and Others
have appointed five trustees for implementing the
trust. Secondly, the trust deed itself refers to thn
Subba. Rao J.
earlier deeds of relinquishment and we have already
held that the said two deeds were colourable transactions. The trustees appointed were the agents of the
family. Ex. P-72 dated September 9, 1913, the General
Power of Attorney, shows that two of the trustees,
Kasheo Rao Laxman Rao and Davidin were the family
agents of the Lala brothers. Ex._ P-38 dated October 6, l!l.14, indicates that Kasheo Rao Laxman Rao,
one of the trustees, attested the said document whereunder Narayanrao Govindrao Mahajan declared that
the mortgage deed executed in his favour by the Lala
brothers was a nominal transaction. This shows that
Kasheo Rao Laxman Rao was one of the close associates of the members of the family in executing the
fraudulent documents. Mahadeo is the brother-in-law
of Babula!, a servant of Ganeshprasad, who is the
father of Rukhmabai, the appellant. The fact that
most of the trustees were either the agents or the
servants of the family is also a circumstance, though
not conclusive, against the version of the appellant.
Two minor members of the family were selected for
the bequest; though ordinarily it may not have any
significance, in the peculiar circumstances of the case,
this fits in the general scheme of fraud perpetrated by
the family. What is more, the trust comes to an
abrupt end. Ex. D-3 is the deposition of Govindprasad
in Civil Suit No. 204 of 1931. Therein he describes
how the trust deed was implemented and how it came
to an end. He says that for building the house the
site opposite Cotton Market at Nagpur was acquired
from Babula!, and Rs. 10,000 out of the sum of
Rs. 15,000 was utilised for building the house and
Rs. 5,000 was given to Babula! by the trustees as loan.
The trustees demanded Rs. 5,000 more from him,
but he gave them only Rs. 2,500 and another sum of
Rs. 2,500 was given to ~hem by Sheoshankar, the
r959
.
•
(
"
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
- 275
husband of the appellant. The trust was dissolved in
r959
1921 and after that he commenced to construct the Rukkmabai
second storey and completed it with a sum of Rs. 6,000
v.
returned by Babulal. This evidence proves that the Lala Laxminarayan
trust was put to an end even before the completion of and Others
the building, and Govindprasad completed the construction. This conduct indicates that no distinction Subba Rao f.
was mr.tde between the trust property and his own
property, and that, though a registered document had
been executed, he was able to put to an end to the
trust when he chose to do so. Ex. D-30 is the copy
of the proceedings from the Proceeding Book filed by
the trustees in Civil Suit No. 55 of 1929. Therein
Govindprasad says that Ohandanlal and Rukmabai
became majors and, though he wanted to make over
the building to them, they did not like to take it and
agreed to have it left with him so long as he was alive
and that, as Davidin left the place, Gajulal passed
away, Mahadeo had gone to another district for a
service and Kasheo Rao was unwilling to take further
responsibility, he had taken over the building according to the wishes of his nephew and niece. This
laboured explanation also demonstrates the nominal
nature of the trust deed. Ex. D-35 is a Power of
Attorney dated January. 26, 1921, executed by
Rukhmabai and Chandanlal in favour of Govindprasad. In that document both of them, who had
become majors declared that they could not manag!'l
the property and therefore they appointed Govindprasad as their agent and authorized him to manage
the property and act for them in the courts. Whatever might be the reason, the said document shows
that the property was taken back by Govindprasad
and there is nothing on record to show that any benefit
from the trust reached the hands of either Chandanlal
or Rukhmabai. This conduct of Govindprasad also
fits in with the general scheme of colourable transactions : and the property in fact continued to be the
joint family property.
There is also positive evidence, both documentary
and oral, to prove that the brothers, including Govindprasad, were living an members of a joint Hindu
276 .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
'959
family. Ex. P-63.A is a letter written by GaneshRtikhmabai
prasad to Chandanlal. This letter is not dated, but it
v.
appears to have been written in or about the year 1926.
Lala Laxminarayan In this letter Ganeshprasad points out :
and Others
5 ,.bba Rao J.
"I have so far helped all my brothers upto this
day and have been helping them so far as possible
in spite of experiencing such great miseries. What
should I do? Had I thought of passing my time by
living separate, it could have been done in a good
way; I would have not fallen in such difficulties.
With all this you are seeing how memberji is causing
different troubles. Whatever I have done, I have
done with my earnings; I have given to my menfamily."
In unravelling a fraud committed jointly by the
members of a family, only such l@tters that passed
inter se between them can give the clue to the truth.
This letter shows that notwithstanding the assertions
of the family to the contrary to suit a particular occasion, they were really living together as members of a
joint family and the whole responsibility of the conduct of the affairs of the family was taken by the
eldest member of it. Ex. P-5 dated January 21, 1922, is
a public notice given by all the members of the family
and published in "The Maharastra" on January 25,
1922. Therein they asserted that in Nagpur City
they owned an ancestral property, consisting of a
house, vacant land and a pacca well, constructed with
stones for drinking water for the public, and that
Mt. Deoka Bai, W 10 Sitaram Lala Kalar had no right
to sell the same. If Govindprasad had separated
himself from the family, as it is now contended, he
would not have joined in the issuing of this public
notice, for, in that event he would not have had any
interest in the ancestral property. Ex. P-59 is a copy
of the application made by Govindprasad to the
Secretary of State for India on May 19, 1922. In that
application Govindprasad states:
"I have now to mention that for the long standing three years, i.e., 1920.21, 1921-22, and the
remaining nine months of 1922, I have undergone and
{
'
S.O.R.
----..
SUPREME OOUl~T REPORTS
277
have to undergo a serious loss of about rupees twenty
r959
thousand which is heavy and unbearable to meet
Rukhmabai
the Government Revenue and to maintain my large
v.
family consisting of twenty-five (25) members."
LalaLaxminarayan
Govindprasad alone could not have lost so much
and Others
amount in his individual business. What is more, he
had no children and so his family of twenty-five Subba Rao f.
members must have reference only to the members of
the joint family.
_
There is also the evidence of P.Ws. 12, 13 and 14,
who are the common relatives of both the parties.
P.W. 12, Bhagwandas, is the brother of Lala Chotelal,
the husband of Tarabai, daughter of Ramasahai. He
has been acquainted with the affairs of the family for
about 30 years, i.e., since the time his brother was
married to Tara Bai. He is positive that Govindprasad used to live either at Kamptee or Nagpur in the
family house and that all the brothers were keeping
account books jointly. P.W. 13, Lala Sadanand, is the
brother of Mangalprasad's wife. He says that his
sister married Mangalprasad in 1896 or 1897 and his
knowledge of the family, therefore, went back to that
year. He asserts that the sons of Ramasahai were
members of a joint Hindu family and that their excise
contracts were also joint, and that none of the brothers
had separate trade or property. P.W. 14, Lala Sitaram's son was married to Ratanlal's daughter about
25 years before the date of his giving the evidence.
He supports the evidence of P. W s. 12 and 13. Nothing
has been elicited in the course of cross-examination of
any of these witnesses which would detract from the
weight of their evidence. They are natural witnesses
who could with authority speak to the affairs of the
family. The oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff
also establishes that there was no partition among the
members of the family.
We shall now briefly notice the admissions alleged to
have been made by one or other members of the family
accepting the partition. In this context, the observations of the Judicial Committee in Alluri Venkatapathi
J6
278
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
Raju ·v. Dantuluri V enkatanara8imha Raju (1) are a pt
and
they read:
Rukhmabai
"It sometimes happens that persons make statev.
ments which serve their purpose, or proceed upon
Lala La:nninarayi:ln
and Others
ignorance of the true position ; and it is not their
statements, but their relations with the estate,
Sttbba Rao ].
which should be taken into consideration in determinining the issue."
The issue in that case, as it is in the present case, was
whether one of the members of a joint Hindu family
separated himself from the others by renouncing his
interest in the joint family property.
Exhibit 49 is the rejoinder filed by Lala Laxminarayan in Civil Suit No. 260 of 1931 filed against
Sheoshankar, the husband of the appellant. Therein
he stated that the members of the family separated
from time to time and that the last but one group that
remained joint was the one with four brothers and
the very last was with two brothers, Ganeshprasad and
Ratanlal and that after the death of the two brothers
he (Lala Laxminarayan) was the only survivor. It is
ob.vious that the said statement was made to serve his
purpose in that suit and support his claim therein.
Ex. D-11 is an application dated November 10, 1938,
made by Lala Laxminarayan to the Deputy Commissioner, Nagpur, for exemption from furnishing security
at Excise Sales. Therein he alleged that Lala Ratanlal
owned and possessed immovable and movable properties worth about a lakh of rupees, which on his death
devolved on his son, the applicant therein, that all the
said properties were held by the applicant ~n his own
right as the sole owner thereof and that he was in
uninterrupted possession of the same since the death
of his father. He also alleged that the business was
inherited by the members of the family in 1890 and
that he had been doing the business of his forefathers
since the year 1927. In this document Laxminarayan
did not set up any case of partition in 1898; but it is
pointed out that he did not include the, trust property
in the schedule attached to that application. The
object of that application was to show that he owned
I959
(I) (1935-36) L.R. 63 I.A. 397, ~06.
•
s.O.:R.
SUPREM~ COURT REPORTS
219
large extent of properties, and the fact that· he had
r959
omitted some items of property would not establish
that the said items were not joint family properties.
Rukhmabai
That question has to be considered on other evidence. L 1 L v •.
..Impor t ant m
. E x. Dll"
B ut what IS
- IS h'IS asser t'10n t hat aaa:rminarayan
and Others
there was no partition in the family. If we do not
place much reliance on Ex. D-11, we should also, for Subba Rao J.
the same reason, not place much value on the assertions made in Ex. D-49. Exs. D-49 and D-11 show
that the plaintiff was making assertions to suit his
purpose. Ex. D-56 is the deposition of J ankiprasad in
Civil Suit No. 260 of 1931. Therein he stated that the
defendants were all brothers but were divided. That
•
was a suit filed by Kasturchand Daga against some of
the brothers and, perhaps, Jankiprasad thought that
it was necessary to assert separation so that some of
the family properties, . other than those mortgaged,
might be salvaged. The same Jankiprasad, in
Ex. P-80, asserted to the contrary. In that exhibit he
stated that the farkatnama was cancelled by him by
notice to Govindprasad and that he and Govindprasad
continued to have common food. The claim of the
creditor, Kasturch.and Daga, who sought to attach the
trust property along with other family properties, was
settled and some of the family properties were sold to
him under Ex. P-24 in discharge of his claim. On the
sale-deed, Govindprasad made the following endorsement:
·
·
"As I have been living separate for a number of
years from all the members of the family, I have no
right to this property and no objection to its sale."
This endorsement is entirely consistent with the case
of the re~pondent that the properties in the hands of
Govindprasad were intended to be preserved by this
compromise. That statement must have been made
to strengthen the case of the family. These contradictory statements were made by one or other
members of the family to meet a particular contingency or to get an advantage, and, therefore, these
cannot be of much value and the case really falls to be
deci<led not on such statements, but on the basis of
the relations of the various parties with the estate.
280
'959
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1960(2))
From the aforesaid evidence, we must hold that
Rukhmabai
there was no severance in the joint family of Govindv.
prasad and his brothers and that they continued to be
LalaLaxminarayan joint, doing joint business, that all of them collusively
and Others
brought into existence documents, including the
Subba Rao J.
•
relinquishment deeds, to tide over the financial difficulties in which they were involved.
On the basis of the finding that Govindprasad did
not relinquish his share in the joint family, but continued to be its member, the next question is whether
the sum of Rs. 15,000, in respect whereof the trust
deed was executed by Govindprasad and the moneys
spent to put up the suit house, came out of the selfacquisitions of Govindprasad. This question we must
approach on the basis of our finding that Govindprasad continued to be a member of the joint Hindu
family until his death. The initial burden is no doubt
on the contesting respondent to prove that the trust
property is part of the joint family property; but if it
was established that there was sufficient nucleus from
or with the aid of which the property could have been
acquired, the burden shifts to the appellant. The first
question, therefore, is whether the. joint family had
sufficient property or income out of which Govindprasad could have put aside Rs. 15,000, under the
trust deed and also could have advanced othn
amounts for constructing the building. We have
already noticed at an earlier stage of the judgment
that the family owned extensive properties distributed
at different places. Ex. 9-D-8 is a copy of the Valuation Register for 1923 in Civil Suit No. 260 of 1931.
There the annual income from one of the liquor shops,
Lala Eada Liquor Shop, from the yPar 1919 to 1923 is
given. The licence was for Rs. 15,000. The profit for
1919-20 was Rs. 1,329; for 1920 21 was Rs. 14,152;
for 1921-22 was Rs. 185; for 1922 was Rs. 7,650; and
for 1923 was Rs. 5,140. Ex. 9 D-7 is the copy of the
Valuation Register for 1924 in the same suit in respect
of Janajail Liquor Shop, Nagpur. It shows that the
profit for the year 1919-20 was R.s. 1,486; for 1920-21
was Rs. 8,814; for 1921-22 was Hs. 1,779; and for
1922-23 was Rs. 3,837. Ex. P-77 is a security bond
(
\
s.c.n.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
281
1 959
executed by the members of the family in favour of
Kasturchand Daga. It shows that security was given
Rukhmabai
in connection with the contract taken by the family in
v.
the name of Lala Ratanlal for retail dealing in liquor LalaLaxminarayan
in different shops at Kamptee and Nagpur during the
and Others
years 1906 and 1907. In that connection Ratanlal
deposited a sum of Rs. 54, 700. These three documents Subba Rao J.
show the extensive business the mem'bexs of the family
were doing in liquor. Indeed, the learned Oounsel for
the appellant does not dispute the fact that the family
was in a position to give Govindprasad the amount
covered by the trust deed and that spent for the construction 0f the building. If so, the question is
whether the appellant has proved that Govindprasad
paid the said amounts from and out of his self-acquisitions. If Govindprasad had a business of his own, he
must have had accounts, but no such accounts were
forth.coming. Summons was served on Tuljabai, the
wife of Ganeshprasad and mother of Rukhmabai, for
producing the account books of the Lala brothers from
the year 1897 to 1928, but no accounts were produced
except Ex. D-22, which is an extract from the accounts
of Ganeshprasad covering a period of only one month
of the year 1927. This extract does not help either
party. It may, therefore, be held that the accounts,
which could have thrown some light on the sources
from which Rs. 15,000, was drawn by Govindprasad
and ·the further amounts for building the house were
supplied, were not filed.
D.W. 1 is one Jainarayan, who was a member of
Legislative Council of the State from 1930 to 1936.
He states that Govindprasad was doing business in
shares and also in moneylending, that he had his own
account books; that before going to Jabalpore he
took away all his account books, and that he (the
witness) may still have one or two account books of
Govindprasad with hiril. This witness did not proquce
any account books. Rukhmabai also says in her
evidence that the account books of Govindprasad
were with him but she could not say whether they
were at Nagpur or at Kamptee. J?ut Govindprasad
in his deposition made on October 23, 1932, in Civil
282
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
Suit No. 204 of 1931 stated that he had no regular
account books showing his income or expenditure, but
Rukhmobai
h
·
v.
he h a d on 1y a sort of note b oo k an d t h at was not m
Lala Laxminarayan is possession then,
lJ Govindprasad was doing
and Others
business on a large scale, as the appellant asked us to
believe, he must have had account books. If we
Subba Rao f.
accept the statement of Govindprasad that he had no
account books, it shows that he could not have had
any exten.sive business; on the other hand, if we
accept the evidence of D. W. 1 and Rukhmabai that
he had account books, it was not explained why they
were not produced.
The only direct evidence in regard to Rs. 15,000,
the subject-matter of the trust deed, and the moneys
spent for building the house, is that of Govindprasad
in the earlier suit, viz., Civil Suit No. 204 of 1931, and
it has been marked as Ex. D.3. He has stated therein
that he had some deposits in banks and that out-of
affection he set apart Rs. 15,000 for his nephew and
niece and executed a trust deed in respect of that sum.
He adds that out of the said sum of Rs. 15,000,
Rs. 10,000 was spent in purchasing the site from
Babula! and for constructing a part of the suit house
thereon, and the balance of Rs. 5,000 was given to
Babulal as loan. He further stated that. the trust was
diasolved in 1921 and that thereafter he spent another
sum of Rs. 6,000 out of his own pocket in addition to
the sum of Rs. 6,000 returned by Babulal for completing the building and that Sheoshankar, the husband
of the appellant spent Rs. 2,500 in connection with
the building; but in the cross-examination he admitted that he had no shop for gold and silver and that he
used to do business in a small scale. He gave evasive
answers when he was asked whether the first defendant was managing the liquor shop in dispute ; he did
not know whether the defendant was managing the
liquor shop in dispute, he did not remember the year
in which the shop was opened in the suit building; he
could not say when the shop was discontinued; he
admitted that he had no regular account books showing his income or expenditure. Though he said that
he had a sort of note book, he said that he was not in
r959
.
'
-
S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
283
z959
possession of it then. Though he said in examinationin-chief that he spent Rs. 6,000 for the building, he. R kh b .
had to admit in the cross-examination that the said
u vma ai
money was not withdrawn from any bank. ·He also Lala Lax;,inarayan
admitted that the materials were bought by Ganeshand Others
prasad and Ratanlal and that he did not know when
they purchased them. The evidence of Govindprasad Subba Rao I
clearly establishes that he was merely lending his
name for the family and that the amounts were spent
from the family coffers under the supervision of one
or other members of the family. Ex. P-62-A is a copy
of the letter written by Ganeshprasad to Babulal in
the year 1922-Babulal was' acting as the agent of
Ganeshprasad. Therein Ganeshprasad complaints that
large amounts had already been spent but the upper
portion of the building had not yet been constructed.
Though it is suggested that Ganeshprasad was constructing some other building in the year 1922, there
is nothing on record to support that theory. Babula!
was certainly connected with the suit building and the
reference in the said document must be to the suit
building. This letter also shows that Ganeshprasad,
presumably on behalf of the family, was giving moneys
for the construction of the building. Ex. P-60-I-A is
another letter written by Ganeshprasad to Babulal.
Therein Ganeshprasad gave specific direction in regard
to the construction of the building. The building
referred to in this letter also must be the suit building.
Exs. D-63 to D-96 are the receipts for the amounts
disbursed in connection with the construction of the
suit building. Govindprasad states in Ex. D-3 that
he used to hand over the money to his brother
Ganeshprasad or Ratanlal for disbursement. This
lame explanation cannot explain away the fact that
the moneys were spent and receipts taken by the
other members of the family in regard to the construction of the house.
· Then remains the oral evidence of P.Ws. 4, 5, 9 and
13, who were some of the contractors connected with
the construction of the house and they say that either
Ganeshprasad or Ratanlal asked them to do the work
(l,,nd ::paid them tlw ~m.,011-µts dq<:i to tl;iem, '.!'heir
284
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
[1960 (2)]
evidence is consistent with the evidence of Govind
nrasad
in Ex. D-3. They are disinterested witnesses
Ruklnnabai
IJ
v.
and their evidence can safely be accepted. There is
Lala Laxminarayan also the evidence that the family liquor shop was
and Others
located in the suit building and that must be so
because it was built by the family.
Subba Rao ].
The foregoing discussion of the evidence brings out
the .following facts : (i) the family had extensi,ve
business and was in a position to purchase the land
and build the suit house; (ii) there is no reliable ·
evidence to sho~ that Govindprasad had separate
income from which he CQuld have set apart Rs. 15,000
and paid an additional sum of Rs. 6,000 for building
the house; (iii) there is evidence that Ganeshprasad
and Ratanlal supervised the construction of the building, paid the contractors and had taken receipts from
thAm; and (iv) though the trustees under the trust
deed pretended to function thereunder, they were the
agents of the family and the trust was abruptly put
an end to in 1921. On the said facts it must be held
that the appellant has failed to prove that Govindprasad had self-acquisitions and the suit site was
purchased and the building put up thereon with the
private funds of Govindprasad.
Before we close this aspect of the case, the conduct
of the respondent in not questioning the trust deed
from 1916 to 1940, when he filed the suit, requires
some explanation. The contesting respondent was a
minor. Even after he become a major, he could not
have had any grievance because the trust deed was
executed for the benefit of the family. It is in
evidence that Hatanlal, his father, was living in the
house till his death in the year 1926. It is also in
evidence that he was r(lsiding in the house from the
year 1936. It is true that when the litigation between
Hukhmabai and Ohandanlal was being conducted he
did not intervene; that may be because Ohandanlal
was his natural brother and he' might not have
thought fit to set up any claim against his brother.
His conduct, therefore, is not such as to give rise to
any inference that the trust deed was executed in
regard to Govindprasad's self-acquired income,
z959
<
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
285
To summarize : There was no separation of the
r959
members of the family : all the members of the family
• d t o b e JOin
' ' t an d th e £am1'ly was d omg
•
Rukhmabai
con t mue
business in different places. They had extensive pro- Lala Lax';;,inarayan
perties and a fairly large income : they were also
and Others
heavily indebted. The family was involved in debts
in Ramasahai's life time and even after his death the Subba Rao J;
position continued to be the same. Various attempts
were made to salvage the properties of the family and
to keep both the movable and immovable ·properties
not mortgaged from the reach of the creditors. ThA
relinquishment deeds, innumerable mortgages, sale
deeds and the trust deed were all executed as parts of
the same scheme. We, therefore, hold that the suit
property was the joint family property and the
respondent is entitled to the declaration he has asked
for, namely, that the trust deed dated January 17,
1916, was a colourable and fictitious document and
could not affect the respondent's right to ownership
of the property in the suit.
The next question raised by the learned Counsel for
the appellant is that the suit should have been dismissed in limine as the plaintiff asked for a bare
declaration though he was in a position to ask for
further relief within the meaning of s. 42 of the
Specific Relief Act. The proviso to s. 42 of the said Act
enacts that " no Court shall make any such declaration when the plaintiff, being able to seek further
relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so."
It is a well-settled rule of practice not to dismiss
suits automatically but to allow the plaintiff to make
necessary amendment if he seeks to do so. The
learned Counsel for the appellant contends that in the
plaint the cause of action for the relief of declaration
was given as the execution of the partition decree
through the Commissioner appointed by the Court
and, therefore, the plaintiff should have asked for a
permanent injunction restraining the appellant from
,interfering with his possession. The appellant did
not take this plea in the written statement ; nor was
there any issue in respect thereof, though as many
as 12 issues were raised on the pleadings; nor does
37
286
1959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2))
the judgment of the learned District Judge disclose
Rukhmabai
that the appellant raised any such plea. For the first
v.
time the plea based on s. 42 of the Specific Relief
LalaLaxminarayan Act was raised before the High Court, and even then
and Others
the argument advanced was that the consequential
Subba Rao J.
relief should have been one for partition: the High
Court rejected 1 he contention on the ground that the
plaintiff, being in possession of the joint family property, was not bound to ask for partition if he did
not have the intention to separate himself from the
other members of the family. It is not necessary in this
case to express our opinion on the question whether
the consequential relief should have been asked for;
for, this question should have been raised at the earliest
point of time, in which event the plaintiff could have
asked for necessary [lmendment to comply with the
provisions of s. 42 of the_ Specific Belief Act. In the
circumstance, we are not justified in allowing the
appellant to raise the plea before us.
This leaves us with the only surviving question,
namely, whether the suit was barred by limitation.
This point was raised for the first time in the High
Court and the' High Court allowed the same to be
raised but negatived the contention. The learned
Counsel for the respondent contends that, for the
reasons mentioned in regard to the plea based upon
s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, we should also not
allow the appellant to raise this contention either.
But there is an essential distinction between the two
contentions; while in the former case, if the contention
was allowed to be raised, the respondent would be
prejudiced, in the latter· case, even if this plea was
taken at the earliest point of time, the contesting
respondent would not have adduced better evidence
or put before the Conrt further evidence. When the
Court asked the learned Counsel to state what further
facts he would have proved ia respect of this plea if
this contention was taken earlier, he was not able to
suggest any. In the circumstances, when the appellate Court allowed the appellant to raise the plea of
limitation, we do not think we are justified at this
stage to say that the High Court should not have
allowed the plea to be raised.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
287
The argument on the question of limitation is put
I959
thus: The plaintiff, respondent herein, had know-·
h
.
ledge of the fraudulent character of the trust deed Ruk mllba•
as early as 1917 or, at any rate, during the pend- LalaLax';;.inaraya"
ency of the partition suit between Rukhmabai and and Others
Chandanlal instituted in the year 1929, and the suit
filed in 1940, admittedly after six years of the said Subba Rao J.
knowledge, would be barred under Art. 120 of the
Limition Act. Article 120 of the Limitation Act reads :
'
Description of suit
Period
of
limitation.
Time from
which period begins
to run.
Suit for which no
period of limitation is
provided elsewhere in
this Schedule.
Six years
When the right to sue
accrues.
120.
-
This Article was subject to judicial scrutiny both by
the Judicial Committee as well as by the High Court
of various States. The leading decision . on the subject is that of the Judicial Committee in Bolo v"
Koklan (1). Therein, Sir Benod Mitter, observed:
"There can be no 'right to sue ' until there is
an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its
infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal
threat to infringe that right, by the defendant
against whom the suit is instituted."
The said principle was restated and followed by
the Judicial Committee in Annamalai Chettiar v.
A.M.K.C.T Muthulcaruppan Chettiar (2 ) and in Gobinda
Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh (3). The further
question is, if there are successive invasions or
denials of a right, when it can be held that a
person's right has been clearly and unequivocally
threatened so as to compel him to institute a suit to
establish that right. In Pothukutchi Appa Rao v.
Secretary of State('), a Division Bench of the Madras
High Court had to consider the said question. In that
case, Venkatasubba Rao, J., after considering the
relevant decisions, expressed his view thus:
"There is nothing in law which says that the
. moment a person's right is denied, he is boµnd at
(l) (19z9-30) L.R. 57 I.A. 325, 331.
(:1) (1930) I.L.R. 8 Rang. 645. .
(3) (1930-31) L.R . .58 l,A, IZ5,
(4) A.l.R. 1938 Mad.193, 198,
288
SUPREM.:E COUI~T REPOBTS [1960 (2)]
his peril to bring a suit for declaration. The Government beyond passing the order did nothi,!lg to
Rukhmabai
disturb the plaintiff's possession. It would be most
. v.
unreasonable to hold that a bare repudiation of a
Lala Laxminarayan
and Others
person's title, without even an overt act, would
make it incumbent on him to bring a declaratory
Subba Rao J.
suit".
He adds at p. 199:
"It is a more difficult question, what is the extent
of the injury or infringement that gives rise to, what
may be termed, a compulsory cause of action ? "
The legal position may be briefly stated thus : The
right to sue under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act
accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the
plaintiff in the suit. Every threat by a party to such
a right, however ineffective and inn?cuous it may be,
cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal
threat so as to compel him to file a suit. Whether a
particular threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of
action depends upon the question whether that threat
effectively invades or jeopardizes the said right.
The facts relevant to the question of limitation in
the present case may be briefly restated: The trust
deed was executed in 1916. The suit house was
constructed in 1920. If, as we have held, the trust
deed as well as the construction of the building were
for the benefit of the family, its execution could not
constitute any invasion of the plaintiff's right. Till
1926, the plaintiff's father, ltatanlal, was residing in
that house. In 1928 when Daga challenged the trust
deed, the family compromised the matter and salvaged
the house. From 1936 onwards the plaintiff has been
residing in the suit house. It is conceded that he had
knowledge of the litigation between Rukhmabai and
Chandanlal claiming the property under the trust
deed ; but, for that suit he was not a party and the
decision in that litigation did not in any way bind him
or affect his possession of the house. But in execution
ofthetlecree, the Commissioner appointed by the Court
came to the premises on .February 13, HJ37, to take
I959
;
-:
t
'
'
-
S.C.R.
289
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
measurements of the house for effecting partition of
i959
the property, when the plaintiff raised objection, and Rukhmabai
thereafter in 1940, filed the suit. From the aforesaid
v.
facts, it is manifest that the plaintiff's right to the Lala Laxminarayan
property was not effectively threatened by the appeland Others
lant till the Commissioner came to divide the property.
It was only then there was an effectual threat to his Subba Rao f . .
right to the suit property and the suit was filed within
six years thereafter. We, therefore, hold that the
suit was within time.
In. the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
S. M. BANERJI
1959
v.
'SRI KRISHNA AGARWAL
( B. P. SINHA, C.J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR
K. SuBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Election Petition-Amendment of-Petition alleging improper
acceptance of nomination-Amendment introducing ground of noncompliance with provisions-Whether can be allowed-Discretion of
Election Tribunal-Interference by High Court in appeal-Representation of the People Act, I95I (43 of I95I), ss. 33(3) and IOO.
-
The appellant held an office under the Government and was
dismissed from service on January 24; 1956, for a reason other
than corruption or disloyalty to the State. He filed his nomination paper for election to Parliament which did not disclose any
disqualifications. No objection was taken to the nomination and
it was accepted without making any enquiry. After the poll
the appellant was declared duly elected. The respondent filed
an election petition challenging the election of the appellant on
the ground, inter alia, that the nomination of the appellant had
been improperly accepted as he was dismissed from Government
service and he had failed to obtain a certificate from the Election
Commission that he had not been dismissed for corruption or
disloyalty to the State. After limitation for filing the petition
had expired, the respondent applied to the Election Tribunal for
amendment of the petition seeking to add to this ground the
statement that the nomination paper was not accompanied by
the prescribed certificate. The Tribunal disallowed the amendment on the ground that the amendment sought to introduce a
\)
November zo.
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