Y. MAHABOOB SHERIFF AND OTHERS versus MYSORE STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 November 1959 | [1960] 2 S.C.R. 146 | 1959 INSC 142
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 November 1959
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, J.L. KAPUR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 54/1959
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1960] 2 S.C.R. 146
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 142
Text of the judgment
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)1
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to the Department. We order parties to bear their
Shrinivasrt Reddy own costs of this petition taking into account that
Petition No. 117 of 1959 filed by the petitioners with
v.
The State of
respect to the validity of the scheme has been withMysore
drawn by them at a late stage and we have directed
parties to bear their own costs of that petition also.
Kapur].
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Nov~mber
6
Y. MAHABOOB SHERIFF AND OTHERS
v.
MYSORE STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY
AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR,
K. N. WANCHOO and K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Motor vehicles-Stage carriage per1nit-Period of renrwalDuty of Transport Authority-Motor Vehicles Act, I939 (IV of
I939), as amended by Act IOO of I956, s. 58.
Suh-section (r)(a) of s. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
provides," A stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit other
than a temporary permit issued under s. 62 shall be effective
without rene\\ al for such period not less than three years and
1
not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority
may specify in the permit. "
Sub-section (2) provides," A permit may be renewed on an application made and dis·
posed of as if it were an application for a permit."
Provided that ......................... "
The stage carriage permits of the petitioners were ending on
March 31, 1958. and they applied to the Regional Transport
Authority, Bangalore. for a renewal of them. The Tran,port
Department of the Mysore State Government opposed such
renewal and applied that fresh permits for the routes in question
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might be granted to it as the State Government int:ended to
nationalise the transport services. The Authority, however, dismissed the applications of both the contending parties, but, on
appeal, its orders were set aside and the ma1ter was remanded
for a fresh decision. A scheme under s. 68C of Ch. IVA of the
Act was in the meantime published and approved by the State
Government, which was later on quashed qy the High Court. at
the instance of the petitiJners. The Authority passed orders
renewil)g the permits of the petitioners for a period of one year
from April I, 1958, to March 31, 1959· Appeals against the said
orders having proved abortive the petitioners appiicd to the
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High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution and
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those applications were summarily dismissed and certificates to
appeal to this Court refused. The petitioners thereupon applied Mahaboob Sheriff
to this Court under Art. 32 of the S::onstitution. The question
v.
for determination was whether on a proper construction of Mysore State
• sub-s. (1)(a) and, sub-s. (2) of s. 58 of the Act, read together, the Transport Authority
period of renewal was to be the same as provided for the grant
of permits under the former and the Authority in renewing a
permit was bound to specify the period of such renewal. It was
contended on behalf of the Department that; even supposing that
a renewal must be for the same period as provided for the
original grant, this Court by writ could do no more than quash
the order made by the Authority, leaving it to decide the question of renewal in accordance with the law as laid down by it.
Held (per Sinha, C.J., Imam, Wanchoo and Das Gupta, JJ.),
that under s. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, properly·
construed, the period for which a permit could be renewed under
sub-s. (2) of that section must be not less than three years and
' not more than five years as provided for the grant of a permit
under sub-s. (1)(a) thereof and the Regional Transport Authority,
in eisercising its discretion to grant a renewal where it chose to
do so, must specify the. r;eriod of renewal accordingly.
The words "without renewal" occurring in sub-s. (1)(a) do
not signify a contrary intention.
V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. The Regional Transport Authority,
Coimbatore, [1957] S.C.R. 663, distinguished.
Since, in the instant case, the intention of the Authority to
grant renewal was clear, but in doing so it had, under a misapprehension of the law, limited the renewal to one year only, it
was open to this Court to sever the legal part of its order from
the illegal and quash the latter.
R. M. D. Chamarbaughwalla v. The Union of India, [1957]
S.C.R. 930 and Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd v. The Collector of
Customs, [1959] S.C.R. 821, referred to .
Since this Court was not bound by the technical rules relating
to issue of writs by English Courts, a direction in the nature of
ma1idamus must issue requiring the Authority to specify the
period of renewal in accordance with the law as laid down J:>y
this Court.
T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 250, relied on
Per Kapur, J.-In cases such as the one under review, the•
power of judicial review possessed by this Court under Art. 32 of
the Constitution extends to quashing and not substituting an
order in place of what an Administrative tribunal has done or to
direct what it should do.
All that the Court can do is to quash the order ard leave it
to the tribunal to reconsider the matter and to e> ercise its
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
jurisdiction keeping in view the law laid down by the Court. In
issuing such orders the courts would act in consonance with the
Mahaboob Sheriff broad and fundamental principles governing the granting of writs
v.
in English Law.
·
Myso" Stats
Consequent Iy, even assuming
·
tiiat in
· renewing
· a permit
· t he
T
p tA th .t
rans or u ori Y Regional Authority had to do so for a period of not less than
three and not more than five years, this Court would only quash
the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority in the
present case, and leave it to that Authority to reconsider the
matter in the light of the decision of this Court.
Associated Provincial Pictur< Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corporation, (1948) l K.B. 223, Tlte King v. Willesden Justices,
Ex Parle Utley, (1948) l K.B. 397, Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and
Raman Ltd., [1952) S.C.R. 584 and Basappa v. Nagappa, [r95'5)
I S. C.R. 250, referred to.
Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs,
[r959) S.C.R. 821, explained and distinguished.
R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, [1959] S.C.R.
930, held inapplicable.
Kochunni v. State of Madras, A.LR. t959 S.C. 725 and
United Motors Transport Co. v. Sree Laltshmi Motor Transport Co
Ltd. A.LR. 1945 Cal. 260 distinguished.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 54, 75 and
76 of 1959.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of ]'undamental Rights.
Wanchoo J.
G. ](. Daphtary, Solicitor.General of India, and
B. R. L. Iyengar, for the petitioners.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen, for the respondent
No. 3 in Petitions Nos. 54 and 75 of 1959.
1959. November 6. The judgments of Sinha, C.J.,
Imam, Wanchoo and Das Gupta, JJ. was delivered by
Wanchoo, J. Kapur, J., delivered a separate judgment.
Petitions Nos. 54 and 75 of 1959.
• WANCHOO J.-These are two connected petitions '
nnder Act. 32 of the Constitution and raise similar
points and will be disposed of by this judgment.
The brief facts necessary for their disposal are these:
The petitioners are transport operators in what is
known as the Anekal pocket of the State of Mysore.
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They held stage carriage permits for various routes,
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· which were expiring·on March 31, 1958.. They there.
fore applied for the renewal of the permits on various Mahaboob Shmff
dates in January 1958, as required under the law.. M v. 51 1
· app I"10at10nss
·
h ou Id h ave been d ispose
·
d TransportAuthority
ysore a e
N ormally, their
of before March 31, 1958. However, on February 1,
the.Mysore Government Road Transport Departme!).t Wanchoof.
(hereinafter called the Department) made applications
under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, No. IV
of 1939, (hereinafter called the Act) for grant of
permits on the same routes for which renewal applications were pending. The Department followed ~his
up by a letter dated February 25, 1958, to the Regional
Transport Authority, Bangalore, (hereinafter called
the Authority). In this letter, the Authority was
informed that the Department had already submitted applications for grant of permits for operation of
transport vehicles in the Anekal pocket and it was
proposed to take over these routes with effect from
April, I, 1958. It was also pointed out that the
Government of Mysore had been pursuing the policy of
nationalisation of road transport services with a view
to rationalise and co-ordinate the various forms of
transport and that the Department was operating 1,200
vehicles on 700 routes. The letter went on to point
out the advantages of granting permits to the Department resulting in rationalisation of the routes in the
Anekal pocket in which at that time there werCl. 20
routes and 58 operators. It was therefore requested
that the permits of the petitioners should not be
renewed and fresh permits granted to the Department.
The Authority met a number of times from March
to July 1958 but passed no orders on the applications
of the petitioners nor on those of the Department.
Eventually, on August 11, 1958, the Authority dismissed the petitioners' applications for renewal as well as
the Department's for grant of fresh permits. We must
say that this appea.rs to be a curious order, for the
result of this order strictly would be that no stage
carriages would be able to ply on these routes. However, both parties appealed on September 91 1958,
against the orders of August 11. In the meantime, a
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[1960 (2)]
scheme under s. 680 of Chapter IV-A of the Act was
This scheme was appr?ved on October 24, .
v.
1958, while the appeals were pendmg. On October 30,
M_"o" State ·the appeals of both parties were allowed and the
Transport Authority mn,tter wn,s remanded to the Authority for fresh
disposn,l. In the meantime, however, the petitioners
Wanchoo ].
had applied to the High Court for quashing the
scheme and it was quashed by the High Court on December 3, 1958. Thereafter the Authority met again
and passed orders renewing the permits of the petitioners for a period of one year from April 1, 1958 to March
31,.1959. The petitionem went up in appeal against
the orders granting them renewal only for one year on
the ground that they were entitled to renewal for three
years at least under s. 58 of the Act. Their appeals
were dismissed as not maintainable. They also applied
to the High Court of Mysore under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution but their petition was dismissed
in limine and a certificate to enable them to appeal
to this Court wn,s refused on March 30, 1959. Thereafter the present petitions were filed in this Court. In
the meantime, however, a fresh scheme was published
on January 22, 1959, and after necessary formalities
was approved on April 15, 1959, and finally published
as an approved scheme on April 23, 1959. What
happened thereafter is not really mn,terial for purposes
of these petitions but we may as well mention it to
complete the narrative. The Department applied for
permits under s. 68]' of the Act on April 24, 1959. On
April 30, 1959, the petitioners challenged the new
scheme before tho High Court of Mysore by a writ
petition. That petition was however dismissed on
June 1, 1959. Thereafter they ea me to this Court for
special leave and prayed for ex parte stay, which was
refused. Notice was however issued _on the stay
application which was served in June 18, 1959. It may
be mentioned here that in order to avoid inconvenience
to .the public temporary permits had been granted to
the petitioners on the expiry of the renewal upto
March 31, 1959, for a period of four months or upto
the time the Department was granted permits under
s. 68.l!', whichever was earlier. Consequently on June 23,
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Mahaboob Sheriff publishe~.
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1959, the Authority met and granted permits to the
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Department under s. 68F and rejected the renewal
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app1ICat10ns
of t h e pet't'
1 10ners w h'10 ·h were sa1·d t.o h ave Mahaboob
v. S e•iff
been filed under protest. On June 24, 1959, the Mysnre State
transport services in pursuance of the scheme were Tran;portAuthority
inaugurated by the Chief Minister. On the same day
the petitioners 'applied to the High Court by a writ Wanchoo f.
petition challenging the order of June 23, 1959. On
July 14, 1959, the High Court held that the grant of
permits to the Department was invalid and the
rejection of the renewal applications was incorrect.
But it did not pass any order in favour of the petitioners on the ground that the relief granted would
be short-lived and dismissed the writ petition. The
petitioners then applied for a certificate to enable them
to appeal to this Court and that application is still
pending. Thereaft.er the Department applied for
temporary permits which were granted on July 16,
1959. Another writ petition was filed on July 24,
1959, by the petitioners challenging the grant of
temporary permits to the Department which is
still pending. In the meantime, the petitioners filed
two other writ petitions in this Court which were
admitted and will be dealt with separately. Finally,
the special leave petition against the judgment of the
High Court dismissing the writ petition against the
approved scheme was dismissed by this Court· on
Sep~ember 7, 1959.
_
The main contention of the petitioners in these
cases is that they are entitled to carry on the business
of transport of passengers as a fundamental right '
guaranteed to them under Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution, and that this right can only be restricted in the
manner provided by the Act which is a regulatory
measure dealing with motor vehicles. They contend
that they were entitled under s. 58 of the Act to
renewal of their permits for three years in case the
Authority decided to renew them on the applications
which they had made in January 1958 and in so far
as the Authority gave them renewal only for one year
it was acting in contravention of the Act and was thus ·
committing a breach of ttleir fundamental right. They
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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therefore pray that this Court should come to their
their fun_damental right _to carry on
v.
the busmess of transport m accordance with the Act.
My'°" state
The prayer which they actually made is somewhat
Transport A1<thority inartistic hut in effect they want that the authority be
directed to renew their permits in accordance with the
Wan,hoo .I·
Act, which requires that the renewal must be for a
period of not less than three years and not more than
than five years so far as stage carriage permits are
concerned.
The respondents to these petitions are the Mysore
State Transport Authority, the Regional Transport
Authority and the General Manager, Mysore Government Road Transport Department. No appearance
has been put in on behalf of the first two. The petitions are being opposed by the third respondent,
namely, the Department; and the main contention on
· \ its behalf is that on a correct interpretation of s. 58 of
the Aet it is open to the Authority to renew a permit
for any period it chooses to fix and therefore it was
aeting in accordanee with the law when it fixed the
period at one year. It is further contended that even
if the Authority must fix a period of not less than
three years anrLnot more than five years, the only
order that this Court should pass in these cases is to
quash the order of the Authority dated December 15,
1958, and direct it to decide the renewal applications
in accordance with the law to be laid down by this
Court.
It will be clear from the above contentions of the
parties that the first and foremost question in this case
is the interpretation of s. 58 of the Act. That section
appears in Chapter IV of the Act which deals with
Control of Transport Vehicles in which term is included
"a stage carriage" with which we are concerned here.
It is necessary therefore to consider the scheme of
Chapter IV in order to interpret s. 58 thereof. That
Chapter begins with s. 42 which prohibits the owner of
a transport vehicle from using it except in accordance
with the conditions of a permit granted or counter,signed by a Regional or State Transport Authority.
Section 44 provides for the constitution of the State
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Mahaboob Sheriff aid and. protect
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and Regional Transport Authorities. Then comes ss. 45
and 46, which provide for making of an applicatfon Mahaboob Sheriff
for permit and the contents of such an application.
v.
Section 47 sets out matters to which a Regional Trans- Mysore State
port Authority shall have regard in considering the Transport Authority
application for a stage carriage permit. Section 48
gives power to the Regional Transport Authority to Wanchoo J.
grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the
application or with such modifications as it deems fit .
It also provides that every stage carriage permit shall
be expressed to be valid. for specified route or routes
·and sets out the conditions which may subject to any
rules, be attached to a permit.. We are not concerned
in these cases with ss. 49 to 56, which deal with other
kinds of tr~nsport vehicles. Section 57 provides the
procedure in applying for and granting of permits.
Then comes s. 58, which deals with duration and renewal of permits and is in these terms :
"58(l)(a)-A stage carriage permit or a contract
carriage permit other than a temporary permit issued
under s. 62 shall be effective without renewal for
such period, not less than three years and not more
than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority
may specify in the permit.
(b)-A private carrier's permit or a p~blic carrier's permit other than a temporary permit issued
, under s. 62 shall be effective without renewal for a
period of five years.
(2)-A permit may be i:enewed on an application
made and disposed of as if it were an application
for a peJ;mit :
Provided that the application for the renewal of
a permit shall be made-:(a) in the case of a stage carriage permit or
public carrier's permit, not less than sixty days
before the date of the expiry ; and
(b) in any other case, not less than thirty days
before the date of its expiry :
Providing further that, other conditions being
equal, an application for renewal shall be. given
preference over ne:v applications for permits •
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
(3) .•.•.... ,, .
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It will be seen from this scheme of the Act that the
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duration of a permit is not one of the conrlitions
Myso" State
attached to it but is specifically provided for in s. 58.
TransportAuthoritySub-s. (l)(a) thereof comes into play after the Authority has decided to grant a permit and lays down that
wa'"" 00 f. a stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit
other than a temporary permit issued under s. 62 shall
be effective without renewal for such period not less
than three years and not more than five years as the
Authority may specify in the permit. This sub-section
therefore casts a duty on the Authority .after it has
decided to grant a stage carriage permit to specify
therein the period for which it shall be valid and this
period can in no case be less than three years and
more than five years. This sub-section applies to
grant of a permit. Then comes sub-s. (2), which lays
down that a permit may be renewed on an application
made and disposed of as if it were an application for a
permit. The contention on behalf of the petitioners
is that this provision means that an application for
renewal shall in all respects be treated as an a pplication for a permit and therefore the period provided
under s. 58(1) (a) for a permit would also govern the
period for which the renewal should be granted.
On the i>ther hand, it is contended for the Department that sub-s. (2) only refers to the procedure
for gral!ting permits and the duration provided
for sub-s. (l)(a)being not a matter of procedure will
not apply to a renewal. It is conceded that there is
no other provision in the Act which lays. down the
period for which a renewal should be made. But it
is urged that this means that it is open to the
Authority to fix any reasonable period for renewal.
Reliance in this connection was placed in particular
on the words " without renewal " appearing in
s. 58(1) and also on a decision of this Court in
V. 0. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. The Regional Transport
Authority, Coimbatore (1). That case however did not
deal with the question before us but with a different
question altogether. The question there was whether
h b b Sh
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(1) [19~7) 1 S.C.R. 66J .
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a renewal amounted to a grant of a fresh permit or
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was merely a continuation of the original permit. Mahaboob Sheriff
This Court held that the renewal was a continuation
v.
of the original permit. It had no occasion then to Mysore State
deal with the question specifically before us, namely, Transport Authority
whether a renewal should also be for the same period Wanchoo /.
as provided in s. 58 (l)(a).
Let us therefore turn to the contention based on the
words "without renewal" appearing in s. 58 (l)(a).
\ It is urged that these words clearly indicate that
s. 58(l)(a) applies only to the first grant of the permit
and cannot in any circumstances apply to a renewal of
the permit. As we have already said, s. 58(l)(a)
specifically deals only with the grant of a permit and
not with a renewal. The words "without renewal" '
appearing in that sub-section only signify that . in
counting the pe!iod of a permit renewals should be
disregarded. It was necessary to put in these words to
meet a possible contention arising out of the fact that a
renewal only amounts to a continuation of the original
permit. The effect of these words is that in considering
the period of a permit the period of the renewal should
not be added to the period of the permit, thus making
the total period which may be more than five years
invalid under s. 58(l)(a). For example, a permit may
be granted for five years. It is then - renewed for
another five years. Now the permit is the same
and the renewal is only endorsed upon it. If the
words " without 'renewal " were not in the sub-section
it might be contended that the permit being the
same its period was ten years and therefore it contravened s. 5S (l)(a). These words therefore were necessary to meet ·this contention and · are no indicatioa
that the period mentioned in s. 58(l)(a) does not apply
to renewals. We may in this connection refer to the
language of s. IO where· also the same two words
occur, i.e. :
" A driving licence issued or renewed under this
Act shall, subject to the provisions contained in this
Act as to the cancellation of driving licences and
disqualification of holders of driving licences for
holding or obtaining driving licences, be effective
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960 (2)]
without renewal for a period of three years only,
from the date of the issue of the licence or, as the
Maflabo~b Sheriff
case may be, from the date with effect from which
Mywe state
the licence is renewed under s. 11."
Transport Autho>ity Thus, though the earlier part of s. 10 specifically deals
with issue and qmewal of driving licences, the words
Wanchoo f.
•· without renewal" are to be found in the latter part
and that clearly indicates that these words were
necessary to be put in to meet the contention that the
licence remaining the same even after renewal its
period could not in any case exceed three years in all.
It was however submitted that s. 10 specifically provides for renewals also for three years and that is not
provided in s. 58(l)(a). That is undoubtedly so. But
the reason why s. 58(l)(a) does not provide specifically
for renewals is to be found in the fact that there is
s. 58(2) specifically providing that an application for
renewal shall be made and disposed of as if it were an
application for a permit. Section 11 which deals with
renewal of licences has no comparable words, for it
merely says that any licensing authority may on
application made to it, renew a licence issued under
the provisions of this Act from the date of its expiry.
Different language used in sub-s. (2) of s. 58 therefore
must have a different effect and the contention on
behalf of the petitioners is that s. 58(2) when it says
that an application for renewal shall be made and
disposed of as if it were an application for a permit
must mean that all incidents which apply to a permit
shall also apply to a renewal application. One of the
incidents which applies to a permit is that the Authority
is enjoined by sub-s. (l)(a) of s. 58 to indicate a period
of not less than three years and not more than five
years in the permit, so far as its duration is concerned.
The same must apply to a renewal and the Authority
must indicate when granting a renewal a period of
not less than three years and not more than five years
as the duration.
We are of opinion that the contention of the petitioners as to the effect of s. 58(2) is correct. There is no
~
other provision in the Act which fixes the duration
of a renewal. 1t could hardly be the intention of the
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legislature that the duration of the renewal should be
x959
left entirely to the discretion of the Regional Trans- M h b--;Sh 'ff
port Authority, particularly when the legislature took a a ~. eri
care to fix the duration- for the permit itself. It is Mysore Stitte
urged that the legislature intended that the duration Transport Authority
of the renewal should be left to the Authority which
would prescribe a reasonable period, which may even Wanchoo J.
be less than three years. If that was so, it would be
equally open to the Authority to specify a period for
more than five years which it may consider reasonable. We do not think that this was the intention of
the legislature and the reason why no other prQvision •
was made for the duration of a renewal was that the
legislature intended by these words in s. 58(2) that
the renewal would be for such period as was prescribed in s. (l)(a) for a fresh permit. It is not disputed that the effect of s. 58(2) is that the considerations for renewal would be the same as for the
grant of the permit and the procedure would also
be the same. But it is said that the legislature did
not intend to go further and prescribe the same
duration for a renewal as for a permit. We are of
opinion that there is no reason why we should stop
short at s. 57 and should not take ·into account
s. 58(l)(a) as applying to a renewal along with all
other considerations that apply to the grant of a
permit. S. 58(2) lays down that a renewal application
shall be made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit and we think that all that applies
to the grant of a permit would also apply to the grant
of a renewal. One of the provisions which apply to
the grant of a permit is s. 58(l)(a) relating to the
duration of a permit and that must in our opinion on
the words of s. 58(2) apply to the duration of a
renewal.
,
It may also be mentioned that there were amendments of s. 58 by various State legislatures by which
the duration of a permit could be fixed at less than
three years. When, however, the Central legislature
made amendments in the Act by the Amending Act
No. 109 of 1956, the amendments made by the State
legislatures earlier fell througli and the Central
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SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
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legislature did not think it fit to give power to the State
. legislatures to i·educe the period below three years in
Mahaboob Shedff the case of a permit. If it were intended that a
Myso;; State
permit may be granted for less than three years and
Transport Authority a renewal may be made also for less than three years,
we would have expected some provision to that effect
Wanchoo J.
in the Amending Act of 1956, for the Central legislature could not be unware of the amendments made
by the various State legislatures. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the duration of a permit
under s. 58( 1)(a) being not less than three years and
• more than five years, the same a pp lies to a renewal.
'Ve,' therefore, hold that reading ss. 58(1)(a) and 58(2)
together, a renewal must also be governed by the same
provision which governs the duration of a permit.
This brings us to the question of relief to be granted to the petitioners. It is contended on behalf of
the Department that all that this Court can do is to
quash the order of December 15, 1958, and send the
case back to the Authoritv for consideration of the
question of renewal afresh." On the other hand, the
petitioners contend that this Court should quash the
illegal condition limiting the duration of the renewal
to one year and direct the Authority to specify a
period of not less than three years and not more than
five years in conformity with s. 58(1)(a) in the order
of renewal. This raises the question of severability
of a part of the order passed by the Authority. The
principles on which any unconstitutional provision
can be severed and struck down leaving other parts of
a statute untouched were laid down by this Court in
R. M. D. Charnarbaugwalla v. The Union of India (1 ),
and the first principle is whether the legislature would
have enacted tho valid part if it had known that the
rest of the statute was invalid. This principle relating
to statutes was extended by this Court to orders in
Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. 'l'he Collector of
Custorns and Others (2 ), where a part of the order of the
Collector of Customs was quashed. The question
therefore resolves into this: l'\'ould the Authority have
ordered renewal if it knew that it could not reduce
r959
--
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 930.
(2) [1959] S.C.R, 821.
'
•
-
-
S.O.R..
-
SUPREME COURT REPOR,TS
159
the period of a permit to below three years? ·Lookr959
ing at the facts of these cases wlfich we have set out Mahaboob Sheriff
earlier, it is to our mind ob vious t h at t h e A uth ority
v.
would have granted renewal in the circumstances of Mysore stats
these cases when it did so in December 1958. The pre- Transport Authority
vious permits in these cases had expired on March 31,
1958, and the petitioners had been plying their stage Wanchoo I
carriages right up to the time when the order was
passed. on December 15, 1958; they could not do so
. without a permit in view of s. 42 of the Act. Therefore, renewal in these cases was certain when the order
was passed on December 15, 1958. In the circumstances it is open to us to sever the illegal part of the
order from the part which is legal, namely, the grant
of the renewal.
The next question is what order should be passed in
the circumstances. This depends on the exigencies of
each case, for this Court is not confined by the technical rules relating to issue of writs by the English
Courts. In T. 0. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another (1),
this Court observed as follows at p. 256 :
" The language used in articles 32 and 226 of our
Constitution is very wide and the powers of the
Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in
India extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, manrlamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari as may
be considered necessary for enforcement of the
fundamental rights and in the case of the High
Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the
• express provision in our Constitution we need not
now look back to the early history or the procedural
technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel
oppressed by any difference· or change of opinion
expressed in particular cases by English Judges.
We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature
of certiorari in all appropriate" cases and in appro_priate manner, so long as we keep to the broaq and
fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of
jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in
English law."
·
.
\1) [19,?~] 1 S.C.R, 2,:;o.
160
r959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
It is therefore upon to us to issue a direction in the
Mahaboo; Sheriff nature of mandamus requiring the Authority to follow
v.
· the law as laid down by this Court in respect to the
Mysore State
order of renewal granted by it in accordance with
Transport Authority s. 58 (1) (a). It is true that where it is a case of discre-
Wamhoo f.
tion of an authority, this Court will only quash the
order and ask the authority to reconsider the matter
if the discretion has not been properly exercised. But
in this .case, the discretion is not absolute; it is
circumscribed by the provision of s. 58(l)(a), which
lays down a duty on the Authority which grants a
renewal to specify a period which is not less than three
years and not more than five years. The duty being
laid on the Authority which has in this case decided
to grant a renewal to specify a period not less than
three and not more than five years as the duration of
the renewal, it is in our opinion open to this Court to
direct the Authority to carry out the duty laid on it
by s. 58 (1) (a) read with s. 58 (2), when it has granted
the renewal.
We therefore allow the petitions and quash that
part of the order complained against which specified
the renewal of the permits upto March 31, Hl59, and
direct the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, to
comply with the requirements of the law as laid down
in s. 58 (1) (a) read withs. 58 (2) in the order of renewal
made by it in favour of the petitioners on December 15, 1958. The petitioners will; get one set of costs
from the Mysore Government Road Transport Department which alone has contested these petitions.
Petition No. 76 of 1959.
W ANCHOO ;J.-This is a petition under Art. 32 of
the Constitution by certain transport operators in the
State of Mysore and raises a question as to the interpretation of s. 58(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, No. IV
of 1939 (hereinafter ca'lled the Act.) The brief facts
which are necessary for our purpose are these : . The
petitioners were operating on the basis of stage carriage
permits on certain routes which are under the control
of the Regional Transport Authorities, Bangalore and
Kolar (hereinafter called the Authorities). The routes
•
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
161
1959
being inter-district routes, the permits are issued. by
the Regional Transport' Authority, Bangalore, and are
countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority, Mahabo~~ Sheriff
Kolar. That is why both have been made parties to Mysore State
the petition. The permits of the petitioners were Transport 4uthority
expiring on- December 31, 1957, and were renewed upto
March 31, 1958. Applications for renewal were invited Wanchoo .f.
thereafter for three years from April 1, 1958. Consequently the petitioner inade applications for renewal
of their permits .. It appears that the Mysore Government Road Transport Department (hereinafter called
the Department) also applied for permits for the same
routes. The Department also wrote a letter each to
th~ two Authorities in which it pointed out that the
Government of Mysore was pursuing a policy of
·nationalisation of road transport services in the State
and that it would be in a better position to run the
services on these routes and would be able to rationalise
and co-ordinate the various forms of transport and
offer better service to the public. It therefore requested that the permits of the petitioners should not be
renewed and that the Department was prepared to
take over the services from April 1, 1958. Though
meetings were held from May to December 1958, the
Authorities did not pass any orders on the applications
for renewal. It appears, however, that the applications
of the Department for grant of permits were dismissed
in September 1958. The Department wei;it up in
appeal against this order which was allowed in March
1959 and the Authorities were directed to reconsider
the applications. In the meantime the Regional
Transport Authority, Bangali:>re, ordered in January
1959 that the applications for renewal should be renotified and this was done. Upon this, the Depart.
ment wrote again to the Bangalore Authority on
February 20, 1!)59, not to renew the permits of the
petitioners. Eventually, the Regional Transport Au tho·
rity, Bangalore, met on March 29, 1959, and renewed
permits relating to certain other routes for three years
while the applications of the· present petitioners were
postponed. There was another meeting on April·30,
1959, when the permits of the petitioners were renewed
162
'959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
till September 30, 1959; It is this order which is being
Mahab:-;;Sh"iff challenged by the present petition. The petitioners
v.
case is that they are entitled to carry on the business
Mysore State
of transport of passengers as a fundamental right
TransportAuthority guaranteed to them under Art. 19(1)(g) of the ConstiWanchoo l ·
tution, and that this right can only be restricted in
the manner provided by the Act which is a regulatory
measure dealing with motor vehicles. They contend
that they were entitled under s. 58 of the Act to renewal
of their permits for at least three years in case the
Authorities decided to grant renewal on the applications which they had made in January 1958 and in so
far as the Authorities gave them renewal only upto
September 30, 1958, they were acting in contravention
of the Act and were thus committing a breach of their
fundamental right. They therefore pray that this
Court should come to their aid and protect their fundamental right to carry on the business of transport in
accordance with the Act. The prayer which they
actually made is somewhat inartistic but in effect they
want that the Authorities be directed to renew their
permits in accordance with the Act, which requires
that the renewal must be for a period of not less than
three years and not more than five years so far as
stage carriage permits are concerned.
The petition has been opposed by the Department
and the main contention on its behalf is that on a
correct interpretation of s. 58 of the Act it is open to a
Regional Transport Authority to renew a permit for
any period it chooses to fix and therefore the Authorities in this case were acting in accordance with the
law when they renewed the permits of the petitioners
upto September 30, 1959. It is further contended that
even if the Regional Transport Authority must fix a
period of not less than three years and not more than
five years, the only order that this Cotirt should pass
is to quash the order dated April 30, 1959, renewing
the permits upto September 30, 1959, and direct the
Authorities to decide the renewal applications in
accordance with the law to be laid down by this
Court.
T
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
This case is similar to Writ Petitions Nos. 54 and 75
r959
of 1959, in which judgment has been just delivered
. .
Mahaboob Sheriff
.
. · h" h h
today and raises the same two quest10ns w ic
ave . v.
been raised there. The only difference is that there is Mysore State
no scheme prepared under Chapter IV-A in connection TransportAutkority
with the routes with which we are concerned here.
We have considered the interpretation of s. 58(2) read
with s. 58(1)(a) in Writ Petitions Nos. 75 and 54 of
1959 and the form of the order to be passed. For
reasons given in those petitions, we are of opinion that
this petition should be allowed.
We therefore allow the petition and quash that part
of the order complained against which specified the
i;enewal of the permits upto September 30, 1959, and
direct the Authorities to comply with the requirements
of the law as laid down ins. 58(l)(a) read with s. 58(2)
in the order of renewal made qy them in favour of the
petitioners on April 30, 1959.
The petitioners will get their costs, except hearing
costs as the hearing was common with Petition No. 75
of 1959, from the Mysore Government Road Transport
Department which alone bas opposed the petition.
Petitirms Nos. 54, 75 and 76 of 1959.
. ,KAPUR J.-In the circumstances of this case I do
Kapur J.
riot propose to give any opinion on the question
whether in renewing a permit the Regional Transport
Authority had to do so for a period of ·not less than
three and not more than five years. Assuming that it
should have been so, what is the form of order that
this Court could and should make in a case like the
present. The petitioners' prayer was as follows :"Wherefore your petitioners most humbly.·pray
that the order of the· 2nd respondent dated 15th
- December, 1958, and be quashed as illegal, arbitary,
unreasonable, unconstitutional and void and the 2nd
respondent be directed to grant renewal of your
petitioners' permit strictly according to law as has
been done in the case of all other operators in that
region, upto 31st March, 1961."
If the Impugned order is without jurisdiction then it
is liable to be quashed. If it is such that no reasonable
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960(2)]
body could have given it then it must be deemed
-to be in excess of jurisdiction and in that case also it
Mahaboob Sher;p· is liable to be quashed.
The power of a superior court
Myw~; State in su9h_ cases is n~t. that of an Appella.te A:ithorit,Y
TfansportAnt1w;1y overndmg the dec1s10n of the Admm1strat1ve Tribunal-in this case the Regional Transport Authority:
Kapur J
Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation(').
The Petitioners submitted that the Regional Transport Authority be directed to grant renewal of the
permits for a period of three years; in other words
what the petitioners want is not only that the order
of the Regional Transport Authority be quashed but it
should be substituted by the order directing the
Authority to act in a particular manner, that is, to
renew the permits for a period of not less than three
and not more than five years. By doing this this
Court will be directing an order in substitution of the
order passed and not merely quashing the order made
by the Regional Transport Authority but also amending it. In England the power of certiorari did not
extend to ordering an amendment of an order: The
King v. Willesden Justices, Ex parte Utley('). In that
case a person was pro,perly convicted for an offence
by the Justices but was erroneously fined in a sum in
excess of the statutory maximum and it was held that
the conviction was bad on the face of it and the order
must be quashed because unlike the Appeal Court a
court acting in its extra'tlrdinary prerogative jurisdiction had no power to amend the order and all that
could be decided in a case of that kind was whether
the conviction was good in law. In a number of other
_cases a similar view was taken by the English Courts.
Even where the matter is one which falls under the
-power of issuing a rnandarnus the order can only
command the Tribunals to hear aod decide the particular matter and no writ will be issued dictating to
them in what manner they are to decide. This rule
holds good even though the decision is erroneous not
only as to facts but also in point of law and although
the particular circumstances of the case are such that
1959
r
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
165
there is only one way of performing the duty in ques1959
tion. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, M h b b Sh ~!
Vol. 11, page 101, paragraph 187. This principle was a a ~. . . ,
accepted in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman &Raman Ltd.( 1 ). Mysore State
Chandrasekhara Iyer, J., while delivering the judgment TransportAuthority
of this Court said at page 596 :
J{apur ].
"Further, it will be noticed that the High Court
here did not content itself with merely quashing the
proceedings, it went further and directed the Regional
Transport Authority, Tanjore, "to grant to the
petitioner permit in respect of the five buses in
respect of which a joint application was made originally by the petitioner and Balasubramania Pillai
and that in case the above buses have been condemneq, the petitioner shall be at liberty to provide
substitutes within such timf) as may be prescribed
by the authorities". Such a direction· was clearly
in excess of its powers and jurisdiction".
In Basappa v. Nagappa (2 ) this case was referred to
with approval. ·
The petitioners relying upon two judgments of this
Court submitted that the impugned order was sever.
able and it should be severed and the portion whicp is
not in accordance with law should be excised and a
• direction given that the tribunal should specify a
period of not less than three years and not exceeding
five years. In my. opinion this is nothing more than
substituting an order in place of the order passed by
the Regional Transport Authority itself. It must be
recognised that under Art. 32 this Court has the power
to enforce fundamental rights and a right under
Art. 32 itself is a fondamental right but when this
Court exercises the power of judicial review in the
matter of enforcement of fundap:iental rights which
are alleged to be infringed because of some order
passed by an administrative Tribunal in the exercise
of its jurisdiction this Court has to proceed on certain
principles and one of the recognised principles is that :
"; .... "in the whole of administrative law the
functions that can be performed by judicial review
0
(1) [1952] s.c.R. 584.
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. ::150,
166
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(2)]
~
are fairly limited". The role of the courts in this
field " is to serve as a check on the administrative
."llr! ahabooh Sheriff
branch
of government-a check against excess of
v.
power and abusive exercise of power in derogation
Mysore State
Transport A uehority
of private right". The judicial function is thus one
of control: we may expect " judicial review to
Kapur].
check-not to supplant-administrative action."
(Bernard Schwartz on American Administrative
Law, page 113).
The question is whether the powers given under
Art. 32 are such that this Court can direct the exercise of direction by the administrative tribunal in the
manner that this Court would have exercised it. It is.
said that the tribunal would have ordered the renewal
of the permits irrespective of whetlier they were
going to be for a period of not less than three and not
more than five years. There is slender basis for this
assumption and the fact that there was nationalisation in the offing do not give it much support. In
giving such a direction, as is proposed, this Court will
be substituting itself in place of the Regional Transport Authority and acting as if it was the Authority
itself which is beyond the scope of judicial review.
Reliance was placed by the petitioners on Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs (1 ).
In that case the Collector of Customs purporting to
act under section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act ordered (1) confiscation of the smuggled gold (2) in lieu
thereof an option to pay fine of Rs. 10 lakhs and (3) in
addition to pay proper customs duty and other charges
leviable thereupon and (4) imposed a condition that
the release of gold will be subject to the production of
a permit from the Reserve Bank of India within a
period specified in the order. It was conceded that
the Collector had no power to impose the last two
conditions and it was contended that the order being
a composite and integrated whole, part of it was
within jurisdiction of the Collector and part of it without and the superior bourt must quash the whole
order as being in excess of jurisdiction. Relying upon
.1959
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 821.
-
S.C.-R.
·
-
-
••
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
t>
167
r959
the judgment of this court in R. M. D. Ohamarbaugwalla v. Union of I ndia(1) this Court was of the opinion
Sheriff
· t.he order even Mahaboob
t hat there was no difficulty in en £orcmg
v.
after excising the two illegal conditions·. S. K. Das, J., Mysore State
in delivering the judgment of the Court said:TransportAuthority
" There is no legal difficulty in enforcing the rest
Kaput].
of the impugned order after separating the invalid
conditions th@refrom ; . . . For these reasons we
agree with the Division Bench of the High Court
that the invalid conditions imposed by the Collector
in this case are severable from the rest of the
impugned order."
But these observations have to be read in the context
of the facts and the decision of the case .The King v.
Willesden Justices, Ex parte Utley (2 ) was cited but
was not applied because of the observations of this
Court in T. 0. Basappa v. T. Nagappa & Anr. {4) to
which I shall refer presently. The main ground on
which the order of severability was passed was that
the appellant in that case had not merely asked for a
writ of certiorari but also for a writ of mandamus and
prohibition and that the prayers were neither unnecessary nor mere surplusages and they were appropriate for
the purpose. of getting rid of conditions imposed by the
Collector for the release of gold. It was held in that
case that if a decision of an inferior court or tribunal
was partly within and partly without its jurisdiction,
prohibition will lie against what is in excess of jurisdiction and reference was made to. Halsbury's Laws of
England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 11, page 116, paragraph
216 and also to Shree Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri
Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Ors. (4) where the principle
of severability was applied. In Shewpujanrai's case( 5 )
two passages from Basappa v. Nagappa(s) at page 257
were quoted with approval. After a review of these
various authorities S. K. Das, J., said at page 844 : ." Therefore, we do not see any insuperable difficulty in the present case in prohibiting respondents
1 to 3 from enforcing the two invalid conditions
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 930.
(3) [1955] r S.C.R. 250.
t2) t1948) I KB. 397.
(4) [1959] S.C.R. 279.
(,s) [1959) S.C.R. 821,
168
~
SUPREME COURT REPOR
[1960 (2))
which the Collector of Customs had imposed for
release of the gold on payment of the fine in lieu of
M ahaboob Sheriff
confiscation,
and the time limit of four months fixed
v.
My,m·e state
by the Collector must accordingly run from the date
TransportAuthority
of this order."
It
will be seen therefore that in Shewpujanrai's case(')
Kapur].
although this Court was of the opinion that the powers
of the.Court are wider than those of the Courts in
England yet in the exercise of those powers of issuing
writs the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction granting such writs in
English law will be observed. The case is no authority
for saying nor did it lay down that in the matter of
judiciar review this Court will proceed on different
principles than the . Courts in England. The main
decision in the case proceeded on the ground that a
writ of prohibition was prayed for, in granting which
it was open to the Court to issue a writ quashing that
portion which was in excess of jurisdiction. Besides,
in that case, by severing the illegal conditions which
had been imposed the order of the Collector still
remained one enforceable and not a truncated order
which would be incomplete by the excision of those
two conditions. Can it be said in the instant case that
the impugned order can remain one whole integrated
and intelligible order by taking away the condition in
regard to the period and could it fall within the rules
laid down in Ohamarbaughwalla's case (2 ). The 6th
condition there laid qown at page 951 was that if after
the invalid portion was expunged what remained
could not be enforced without making alterations and
modifications therein then the whole must be struck
down. Can it be said as it could be said in Shewpujanrai's case (1 ) that the order is enforceable without the
·period and without making a substituted order in
place of the order made by the Regional Transport
Authority. In my opinion it cannot be.
Then I come to the consideration in T. 0. Basappa
v. T. N agappa ('). That was a case which arose in
appeal against the decision of the Mysore High Court
'959
(1) (1959] S.C.R. 821.
(2) (1957] S.C.R. 930.
(3) [1955] l S.C.R. 250.
S.C.R.
•
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
1959
given· under Art. 226 in regard to an election matter
where the Election Tribunal had found cert.a.in issues M ahaboob Sheriff
in favour of the petitioner and had declared the elecv.
tion to be void and the respondent filed an application Mysore State
under Art. !::26 for a writ or direction in the nature ofTransportAuthority
certiorari which was allowed. The question raised in
Kapur].
this Court was that the Tribunal whose order had
been quashed had neither ·acted without jurisdiction
nor was th.ere any error apparent on the face of the
record and the two questions which arose for decision
were (1) what was the extent of the power of the High
Court in exercise of its powers under Art. 226 to grant
a writ of certiorari to quash the adjudication of an
Election Tribunal and (2) whether such grounds did
exist. After reference to the principles on which
,
superior courts in England act in issuhJg writs of
certiorari and how the power had developed, Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) observed that under tqe Constitution of India new and wide power had been
conferred on the High Courts of issuing directions,
orders or writs primarily for the enforcement of
fundamental rights and also included the power of
issuing such directions for any other purpose. At
p. 256 the learned Judge said:•
"In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early
history or the procedural technicalities of these
writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any
difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an
order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all
appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long
as we keep to the broad and fundamental principles
that regulate the exercise of jurisdictio.n in the matter
of granting such writs in English law." (Italics are
m.ine).
It will thus be seen that in that case this court did not
hold that the principles that regulate the exercise of
jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in
English law were not to be keptin view. As a matter
of fact the learned Judge then gave quotations from
22
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196012)]
various English decisions e.g .. Rex v. Electricity Com-
'959
Muhobooh 51.,,1ff missioners (1 ) ; King v. Nat Btll Liquors Lim~ted ('). At
v.
page 258 a passage from the judgmrnt of Morris, L. J.,
Myme State
in Rex v. Northumberland Ccmpensation Appellate
TrnnsJ,ortAutho.ity Tribunal(') was quoted with approval and then a
Kapur J.
r
•
•
pasoage from the judgment ofChandrasekhara Iyer, J.,
in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd.(') at p. 594
"However extensive the jurisdiction may be it
seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to
enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court
of Appeal and examine for itself the correctness of
the decision impugned and decide what is the proper
view to be taken or the order to be made "
was quoted. After referring to these various passages
Mukherjea, J. (as ho then was) said:" These passages indicate with sufficient fullness
the general principles that govern the exercise of
jurisdiction in the matter of granting writs of
certiorari under article 226 of the Constitution. "
It cannot therefore be said th11t in Basappa's case(')
this Court said or intended to say that a superior court
acts in a manner different from that in which the
courts acted in England. All it intended to say was
that in that case on the facts and circumstances found
by the High Court a writ of certiorari was rightly
issued. This Court did not say that in issuing a writ
of certiorari a superior court could substitute orders
or direct what the order should be. In other words
judicial review extends to a check on administrative
tribunals and not to supplant administrative action.
In my opinion the power of this Court only extends to
quashing and not to substituting an order in place of
what an administrative tribunal has done or to direct
what it should do. Reference was made by the learned
Solicitor General to Kochunni v. State of Madras(') in
which certain observations were made as to the power
of this Court to frame its writs or orders to suit the
exigencies of the case. Th"t was not a ~ase of judicial
review of administrative action but of the exercise of
( 1) ( TQ24).I K.B
171 at p. 205.
(2) 11922) 2 AC. 128 at p. 156.
(3) , 1952) 1 K.B. 338 at p. 3o;7.
(4) [1051] S.C.R. 584.
(51 [19)5] S.C.R. 250.
(6) A.LR. \19591 S.C 725·
\
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
171
the powers under Art. 32 in a case where the validity
z959
of an Act eo instanti abridging the petitioner's rights M h b-;;Sh iJf
under Art. 19(l)(f) was in dispute. The decision, the a a ~. ers
o{>servations and the rule laid down must be read in Mysore state
the context and in the circumstances of that case. TransportAuthority
United Motors Transport Co. v. Bree Lakshmi Motors
Transport Co., Ltd. (1 ), also was not a case of judicial
Kapur f.
review but an appeal from a decree and does not affect
the question now before us.
The petitioners applied to the High Court under
Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution against the order
made by the Regional Transport Authority but that
was dismissed and a certificate for appeal was also
refused by the High Court. As to what is the legal
effect of the order of the High Court which has become
final by its not being appealed against, I do not propose to discuss in this case as we have not had the
advantage of its being debated at the Bar.
In my opinion no order commanding the Regional
Transport Authority as to what order it should pass
' and what period should be substituted in place of the .
order passed by the Regional Transport Authority can ..
be made by this Court and all that this Court can do
is to quash the order and leave it to the Regional
Transport Authority to reconsider the matter and
exercise its discretion keeping in view the law as l~id
down by this Court. As the petitroners' success would
be partial, I leave the parties to bear their own costs
in this Colfrt.
ORDERS OF COURT.
In Petitions Nos. 54 and 75 of 1959.
In accordance with the @pinion of the majority, we
allow the petitions and quash that part of the order
complained against which specified the renewal of the
permits upto March 31, 1959, and direct the Regional
Transport Authority, Bangalore, to comply with the
requirements of the law as laid down in s. 58 (l)(a)
read with s. 58(2) in the order of renewal made b,v it
in favour of the petitioners on December 15, 1958. The
~etitioners will get one set. of costs from. the Mysore
0
'
;
~
(I) A.I.R. (1945) Cal, 26o.
.,
172
z959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
Governme!lt Road Transport Department which alone
Mahaboob 'sh,,iff has contested these petitions.
:V.
·
In Petition No. 76 of 1959.
I n accord a1~c~ WI'th. . t h e op1n1on
· ·
· "ty, we
o f th e maJor1
allow the petit10n and quash that part of the order
complained against which ,specified the renewal of the
permits· upto September 30, 1959, and direct the
Authorities to comply with the requirements of the law
as laid down in s. 58(l)(a) read with s. 58(2) in the
order of renewal made by them in favour of the petitioners on April 30, 1959.
• The petitioners will get their costs; except hearing
costs as the hearing was common with Petition No. 75
of 1959, from the l\Iysore Government Road Transport
Department which alone has opposed-the petition.
Mysore Slate-· - Transpo,tAuthority
_
KapurJ.
BHAR,VAD MEPA DANA & ANOTHER
z959
N ovembeT IP
'
•
v.
STATE OF BOl\IBAY
(S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and l\I. HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Murder-Unlawf"l assembly-Commo;• object
"'-Acquittal of some, conviction of less than five-Legality ofCommon intention-No proof who gave fatal blows-Effect ofIndian Penal Code, z86o (XLV of z/!60), ss. 34 and z49.
T\velve named persons. including ·the t\vo appellants, \vere
charged with having forraed an unlawful as,embly with the
common object of committing the murder of three persons. The
Sessions Judge acquitted seven of the accused but convic,ed '
five· under s. 302 read with 149 and s. 302 read with 34 of the
Penal Code. He sentenced the appellants to death and the other
three to imprisonment for life. On appeal, the High Court
acquitted one of the other three convicted persons but maintained the conviction and sentences of the appellants and the
two others. The High Court held that there were te"n to thirteen
persons in the unlawful assembly though the identity of all the
· persons except four had not been established, that all these
. persons had the common object and the common intention of
killing the victims and that the killing was done in prosecution
of the common object of the unlawful assembly and in furtherance of the common intention of all. The appellants contended
that they having been charged with sharing the common object
and common intention with certain named. persons, it was not
;
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