INDIA GENERAL NAVIGATION AND RAILWAY CO. LTD. versus THEIR WORKMEN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 October 1959 | [1960] 2 S.C.R. 1 | 1959 INSC 132
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 October 1959
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 86/1958
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1960] 2 S.C.R. 1
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 132
Text of the judgment
•
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
INDJA GENERAL NAVIGATION AND RAILWAY
CO. LTD.
v.
THEIR ,WORKMEN
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and
K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Illegal strike in public utility serviceLock out-Dismissal of workmen-Legality-Function of Industriat
Tribunal-Measure of punishment-Award, finality of-Power of
Supreme Court-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (I4 of r947), ss. IJ,
r7A, 22, 24(3)-Constitution of India, Art. r36.
•
.
It was a contradiction in terms to say that a strike in a
public utility service, which was clearly illegal, could also be
justified. The law does not contemplate such a position nor is it
warranted by any distinction made by the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. It should be clearly understood by workmen who
participate in such a strike that they cannot escape their liability
for such participation and any tendency to condone such a strike
must be deprecated.
The only question of practical importance that arises in such
a strike is, what should be the kind and quantum of the punishment to be meted out to the participants and that question has to
be decided on the charge-sheet served on each individual workman and modulated accordingly.
In determining the question of punishment, distinction has
to be made between those who merely participated in such a
strike and those who were guilty of obstructing others or violent
demonstrations or defiance of law, for a wholesale dismissal of
all the workmen must be detrimental to the industry itself.
If the employer, before dismissing a workman, gives him
sufficient opportunity of explaining his conduct, and no question
of mala jides or victimisation arises, it is not for the Tribunal, in
adjudicating the propriety of such dismissal, to look into the
sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence led before the enquiring
officer or insist on the same dPgree of proof as is required in a
Court of Law, as if it was sitting in appeal over the decision of
the employer. In such a case it is the duty of the Tribunal to
uphold the order of dismissal.
Consequently, in the present case, where the appellants, who
were carrying on busiqess in water transport service, notified as
a public utility service, dismissed their workmen for joining an
ille~al strike, on enquiry but without serving a charge-sheet on
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October I4•
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SUPltEME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
each individual workman and the Industrial Tribunal directed
their reinstatement, excluding only those who had been convicted
f. G. N. & Rly. under s. 143 of the Indian Penal Code but including those convictCo. Ltd.
ed under s. r88 of the Code, with full back-wages and allowances,v.
Held, that the decision of the Tribunal to reinstate those who
Their Worknien had been convicted under s. 188 of the Code must be set aside
and the wages and allowances allowed to those reinstated must
be reduced by half and the award modified accordingly.
Held, further, that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must
be read as subject to the paramount law of the land, namely, the
Constitution, and the finality attaching to an a\vard under ss. 17
and 17 A of the Act, must, therefore, yield to the overriding
powers of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
As the award in the instant case did not fall within the
provisos to s. 17 of the Act, it was not correct to contend that
the appellants had any other remedies thereunder to exhaust
before they could come up in appeal to this Court.
Nor was it correct to contend that the Government of Assam
was a necessary party in the appeal inasmuch as it had acted by
virtue of delegated powers of legislation under the Act in making
the award enforceable as law. A State Government plays no
part in such a proceeding except to make the reference under
s. ro of the Act, nor has it anything to do with regard to the
publication of the award, which is automatic under s. 17 of the
Act, or its operation, unless the case falls within the provisos to
s. 17 A of the Act.
A lock-out lawfully declared under s. 24(3) of the Act, does
not cease to be legal by its continuance beyond the strike, although
such continuance may be unjustified,
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
86of1958.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated
November 15, 1956, of the Industrial Tribunal, Assam,
at Dhubri.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, S. N.
Mukherjee and B. N. Ghose, for the appellants.
Niha1·endu Dutt JYiazumdar and Dipak Dutta
Choudhri, for the respondents.
1959. October 14. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Sinha J.
SINHA C. J.-This IS an appeal by special leave
- from the Award dated November 15, 1956, made by
the Industrial Tribunal, Assam. The dispute arose
b\ltween the employers, the Indian General Navigation
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SUPREME COURT B.EPORTS
& Railway Company Limited, carrying on business at
No. 4, Fairlie Place, Calcutta, and the Rivers Steam
Navigation Company Limited, carrying on business at
No. 2, Fairlie Place, Calcutta, which will be referred
to, in the course of this judgment, as 'the appellants',
and their workmen at Dhubri Ghat, represented by the
Dhubri Transhipment Labour. Union and Dhubri
Local Ghat Transhipment Labour Union, Dhubri,
which will be referred to hereinafter as .'the respondents'. The Award aforesaid was published in the
Assam Gazette on December 19, 1956.
It is necessary to state the following facts in order
to appreciate the points arising for decision in this
case : The appellants carry on business of inland
water transport in North East India and in Pakistan,
in association with'. each other, and· are commonly
known as the Joint Steamer Companies. The appellants jointly maintain a large number of wharves;
jetties, godowns, etc., at different river stations in
India and in Pakistan, for the purposes of their
business. One such station is at Dhubri in Assam.
At that station, a large number of workmen are employed for the purpose of loading and unloading the
appellant's vessels and for transhipping goods from
railway wagons to the appellants' vessels and vice
versa; Before May, 1954, such workmen were employed by a contractor called the Assam Labour Supply
Syndicate which will hereinafter be referred to as
'the Syndicate'. Those workmen were organized
under two labour unions, called (1) the Dhubri Transbipment Labour Union which was affiliated to the
Indian National Trade Union Congress which is a
Federation of Trade Unions, and (2) the Dhubri
Local Ghat Transhipment Labour Union. There were
differences between the Syndicate and its employees
who made certain demands, and has threatened to go
on strike to enforce their demands. Conciliation proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act), took
place, in the course of which certain agreements to be
referred to in greater detail hereinafter, were reached
between the Syndicate and the respondents on
r959
I. G. N. & Rly.
Co. Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
Sinha ].
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SUPREMI<J COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)]
February 23, 1953, and March 30, 1953. On May 3,
1954,
by virtue of a Memorandum of that date, an
I.G.N.&Rly.
agreement
was arrived at between the appellants and
Co, Ltd.
the
respondents,
whereby the appellants agreed that
v.
Their Workmen instead of employing a contractor to handle the work
of loading and unloading and transhipment of goods,
Sinha j.
the appellants would employ supervisors and agents to
handle the work "pending the proposed Tripartite
Conference to decide the issue of permanent direct employment of employees for the future". The appellants also agreed to maintain continuity of service of
the workmen and the existing terms and conditions of
their service. The Tripartite Conference contemplated
by the Agreement, was to consist of the representatives of the appellants, the workmen and the Government of Assam. As a result of the Tripartite Conference held on July 9 & 10, 1954, an agreement was
reached betwef)n the appellants and the Indian
National Trade Union Congress, which was incorporated in the form of a letter dated July 16, 1954, from
the General Secretary of the Congress, Assam Branch,
Dhubri Ghat, to the several Unions at different
stations, including Dhubri. As a result of this agreement, the appellants agreed, inter alia, to introduce
permanent direct employment at all the transhipment
ghats of Assam, progressively, without prejudicing. the
agreement of May 3, 1954. It will be necessary hereinafter to consider some of the terms of this agreement
in detail, when dealing with the several points in
controversy between the parties.
After the agreement aforesaid, there arose certain
differences amongst the workmen represented by the
two Unions aforesaid, in respect of the election of
their office-bearers. As a result of those internal
dissensions amongst the employees, two rival groups,
each claiming to represent a section of the workmen,
came into existence. The appellants, thereupon,
notified the _Indian National Trade Unions' Congress,
that recognition to the Dhubri Transhipment Labonr
Union, was being withdrawn pending satisfactory
settlement of the internal differences. Thus, came
into existence, a new Trade Union known as the
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SUPREME COURT R:ffiPOR'rS
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Dhubri Transhipment Wo.rkers' Union, in or about
July, 1955. Meanwhile, between May 2, 1955, and
J. G. N. & Rly.
July 31, 1955, the appellants, ·on five ·different occaCo. Ltd.
sions and on different charges, dismissed eight of their
v.
employees, after making such inquiries as they Their Workmen
thought necessary against those workmen, and after
Sinha].
giving them each an opportunity of explaining their
conduct.·
. On July 21, 1955, one B. Chakravarty, Secretary,
Dhubri Transhipment Labour Union, served a notice
on the appellants under sub-s. (i) of s. 22 of the Act,
tliat "I propose to call a strike on the 11th August,
1955, from zero hours, if the following demands be not
fulfilled within fourteen days on receipt of this notice".
Then followed an annexure containing ten demands
which need not be set out here. A similar notice was
also served· by the Secretary Dhubri Local Ghat
Transhipment Labour Union on the same date, the
annexure in this case containing eleven demands. On
July 26, 1955, the Conciliation Officer of the Government of Assam, received the notice of the strike. He
held conciliation proceedings on August 6, 1955, but
those proceedings ended abruptly without arriving at
any settlement. On August 8, 1955, the said Conciliation Officer, who was the Labour Officer of Gauhati,
by his letter bearing the same date, informed the
Labour Commissioner, Assam, about the failure of the
·conciliation proceedings, and forwarded copies of that
letter to the appellants and. the workmen's Union at
Dhuhri. Without waiting for the statutory period of
seven days from the date of failure of the conciliation
proceedings, a large number of workmen concerned
went on strike with effect from the mid-night of
August 10, 1953, in pursuance of the notices of strike
aforesaid. They were alleged by the appellants not
only to have gone on strike, but also to have forcibly
entered the appellants' jetties and other working places
and prevented the loyal workmen, who were willing to
carry on the transhipment work, from carrying on
their normal work. The strike is, therefore,· alleged
to have been illegal. On August 11;1955, the District
Magistrate,. Goal para, promulgated an order und~r
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SUPl'tEME COURT REPORTS
[1960 (2)) -
s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prohibiting
the "holding of any meetings, demonstrations, proI. G. N. & Rly.
cessions, or causing threat, obstructions, annoyance or
Co. Ltd.
injury directed against the persons lawfully employed
v.
Their Workmen in the following areas m the Dhubri Town and it$
suburbs". Then followed a specification of the ghats
Sinha ].
to which the prohibition applied. This order was to
remain in force till September 10, 1955, In consequence of the aforesaid strike which was treated by
the appellants as illegal, they declared a lock-out on
August 11, 1955, in respect of 91 workmen named in
the notice issued to' them. Another lock-out notice
was issued on August 13, 1955, in respect of a much
larger number of workmen in different groups described as belonging to a particular Sardar's gang. The
legality of these lock-out notices, was seriously
challenged by the respondents. The Workers' Union
called off the strike with effect from August 19, and
the appellants lifted the lock-out with effect from
August 27. The appellants took proceedings against
those employees who had taken part in the strike.
They suspended those workmen who were alleged to
to have not only taken part in the :;trike, but also had
obstructed those workmen who were willing to work.
But those workmen who were alleged to have only
participated in the strike, were not suspended during
the inquiry. On September 8, 1955, 37 of the employees were convicted under s. 188 of the Indian Penal
Code, for viola ti on of the aforesaid order under s. 144
of the Criminal Procedure Code, with the result that on
September 9, they were dismissed by the appellants.
Another batch of 52 employees were convicted under
s. 143/188 of the Indian Penal Code, on February 17,
1956.
Meanwhile, on September 13, 1955, the Government
of Assam had constituted a Board of Conciliation,
consisting of three persons, namely, (1) Labour Commissioner of Assam, as the Chairman, (2) D. N. Sarma of
Gauhati, as representing the interest of the employees,
and (3) P. J. Rayfield, as representing the interest of
the employers, with a view to promoting settlement of
the dispute between the appellants and their workmen
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at Dhubri. The appellants alleged that they had
dismissed-their workmen as a result of the inquiry I. G. N. & Rly.
held by their nominee into~ the conduct of the persons
Co. Ltd•. ·'
who had participated in the alleged illegal strike al).d/
v.
or had caused obstruction, before they became aware Their Workmen
of the constitution of the Board of Conciliation, as
Sinha].
aforesaid. On coming to know of the constitution of
'·
t~e said Board of Conciliation, the appellants subseguently passed orders, holding the order of dismissal
pf the two hundred and twenty three employees in
abeyance, pending the disposal of their application to
the Board for permission to dismiss the · saiq two
hundred and twenty three employees. The Board of
Conciliation, by majority, P. J. Rayfield dissenting,
came to the conclusion that as regard the dismissal
of the thirty seven workmen, the Management had
violated s. 33 of the Act, because, in their opinion,
the proceedings of the Board of Conciliation had
commenced from August 26, and not from September
~3. As regards the permission sought by the Management to dismiss the suspended two hundred and twenty
three workmen, by a similar majority, it was held that
although the strike prima f acie was illegal, it was not
unjustified. The dissenting member, P. J. Rayfield,
recorded his note of dissent to the effect that the
conciliation• proceedings commenced on September 13,
1955, and not earlier, as decided by the majority, and
consequently, the dismissal of the thirty seven workmen (' discharge ' of 37 workmen, as stated in the
·note of dissent), was not in contravention of s. 33 of
the Act, and that the permission to dismiss the two
hundred and twenty three workmen on the ground
that they had been found guilty, by a departmental
inquiry, of participating in an illegal strike and forcibly
preventing others from attending work, should have
been granted. This conclusion was sought to be based
on th,e alleged legal position that the Board had no
power to withhold the permission applied for, arid had
not the power to decide as to the kind of punishment
to be imposed upon the workmen who had admittedly
.taken part in a strike which had unanimously beep
held to be ille~al. The dif?sentin~ note also sou~ht tc;i
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
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show that the finding of the majority of the Board
that
the strike was justified, was not based on a proper
I. G. N. & Rly.
appreciation of the facts of the case. The report of
Co. Ltd.
v.
the Board of Conciliation was published on DecemTheir Workmen ber 5, 1955.
As the parties had come to a stalemate, the GovernSinha].
ment of Assam, by its order dated December 7; 1955,
as subsequently amended by its order dated January
23, 1956, referred the dispute to Shri Radhanath
Hazarika as an Industr.ial Tribunal, for the adjudication of the dispute on the following issues:
"1 (a) Are the Management of R.S.N. & I.G.N.
Railway Company Li111ited justified in dismissing
the following eight workers :
Manzoor Hussain, Sudam Singh, Idrish, Tazmal
Hussain (S/o S.K. Gaffur) Jahangir Sardar, Keayamat Hossain, Panchu Shah and Ram Ekbal Singh ?
(b) If not, what relief, if any, are they entitled
to?
(2) (a) Are the Management of R.S.N. & I.G.N.
Railway Company Limited justified in. dismissing
and/or suspending as the· case may be 260 workers
at Dhubri Ghat on or about the 29th August, 1955?
(b) If not, to what relief, if any, are the workers
entitled? "
The parties to the dispute filed their written statement before the Tribunal, and tendered both oral and
documentary evidence before it. The Tribunal made
its Award which was published in the Assam Gazette
on December 19, 1956, as already stated. The Tribunal held that the strike, though illegal, was justified,
but that in the absence of standing orders whereby
participation in any illegal strike, could justify a
punishment of dismissal, the appellants were pot
entitled to dismiss those workmen whose case was
before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by its Award,
directed reinstatement of 208 out of 260 workmen
whom the appellants had dismissed, or had sought
permission to dismiss. The remaining 52 workmen
were ordered to be refused reinstatement on the ground
that they had been convicted under s. 143 of the
lnqian Penal Code, which implied an offence involving
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9
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use of criminal force. It also directed the appellants
to pay full wages and allowances from August 20, 1955, I. G. N. &. Rly.
till the date of reinstatement of the workmen who had
Co. Ltd.
been directed to be reinstated. The Tribunal also
v.
held that the dismissal of the eight workmen who were Their Workmen
the. subject.matter of the issue l(a) aforesaid of the
Reference, was bad, and therefore, those 8 workmen . Sinha}.
were also ordered to be reinstated with back wages.
The present appeal by special leave is directed against
the said A ward of the Tribunal.
Before we deal with the merits of the controversy
between the parties, it is convenient at this stage to
deal with certain arguments by way of preliminary
objections to the maintainability and competence of
the appeal, raised on behalf of the respondents. Those
objections are of a three-fold character, (1) no appeal
lies, (2) the appellants did not exhaust their statutory
remedies under s. 17 A of the Act, and (3) the appeal
is not competent also for the reason that the Government of Assam has not been impleaded as party-respondent to the appeal. In our opinion, there is no
substance in any one of these objections.
With reference to the first ground,· the argument
runs as follows: The Tribunal made its Award on
November 15, 1956, and submitted the same to the
Assam Government under s. 15 of the Act. On
December 8 of that year, the Government of Assam
directed the said Award to be published in the Assam
Gazette, and it was so published on December 19,
1956. According to the order of the State Government, the Award became enforceable under s. 17 A,
on the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication,
namely, December 19, 1956. Accordingly, the Award
became enforceable on January 18, 1957, and acquired
the force of law by the operation of the statute. By
virtue of s. 17(2) of the Act, the Award became "final
and shall not be called in question by any court in
any _manner whatsoever", subject to the provisions of
s. 17 A. It was, therefore, further contended that in
the events which had happened ·before January 18,
1957, the Award had become enforceable (1,Ud had
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
I959
acquired the force of law by operation of the statute,
I. G. N. &. Rly. had, thus, passed beyond the pale of litigation and
adjudication by any court of law. This argument
Co. Ltd.
v.
has only to be stated to be rejected in view of the
Their Workmen provisions of the Constitution.
It is manifest that the
provisions
of
the
Act
are
subject
to the paramount
Sinha].
law as laid down in the Constitution. Article 136 of
the Constitution, under which this Court grants special
leave to appeal (in this case, from a determination of
the Triq_unal), cannot be read as subject to the provisions of the Act, as the argument on behalf of the
respondents would postulate. The provisions of the
Act must be read subject to the over-riding provisions
of the Constitution, in this case, Art. 136. Therefore,
whatever finality may be claimed under the provisions
of the Act, in respect of the Award, by virtue of ss. 17
and 17 A of the Act, it must necessarily be subject to
the result of the determination of the appeal by
special leave.
It was further contended that the Award had
merged in the orders of the Government, on publication in the Official Gazette, under s. 17 of the . Act,
but this is the same argument stated in another form,
and any argument based on the provisions of the,
Act, making the Award final and enforceable, must
always be read a.s being subject to the decision of this
Court, in the event of special leave being granted
against such determination by the Tribunal and as
adopted by the Government. The same argument
was advanced in still another form, namely, that the
appellants should have moved this Court before the
lapse of the time contemplated by s. 17 and s. 17 A of
the Act, that is to say, before January 18, 1957.
Apart from the consideration that this argument
tends to curtail the period of limitation, prescribed
by this Court by statutory rules, the operation of
ss. 17 and 17 A of the Act, is not automatically stayed
by making an application for special leave. It is only
by virtue of specific ordPrs made by this Court,
staying the operation of the Award or some such
order, that the appellant becomes, for the time being,
immune from the operation of those provisions of the
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Act, which impose penalties for the infringement of
the terms of the Award.
1. G. N. & Rly.
Adverting to the second branch of the preliminary
Co. Ltd.
v.
objection, it appears that the provisions of s. l'lA,
Their Workme11
particularly, the provisos, have been sought to be
pressed in aid of the respondents' contention, without
Si11ha ].
realising that the Award in question in this case, does
not come within the purview of either of those
provisos. The State Government was not a party to
the Industrial dispute, nor was it an Award given by
a National Tribunal. Hence, there is no substance
in the contention that the appellants did not exhaust
their statutory remedies under s. 17fl- of the Act.
The third branch of the preliminary objection is
based on the contention that ·the Government of
Assam was a necessary and proper party, as it had
acted under delegated powers of legislation under the
Act, in making the Award enforceable and giving it
the force of law. It is a little difficult to appreciate
how the State Government became a necessary or
proper party to this appeal. The State Government
does not play any part in the proceedings, except
referring the dispute to the Tribunal under s. 10 of
the Act. The publication of the Award under s. 17,
is automatic on receipt of the same by the Government. Its coming into operation is also not subject
to any action on the part of the State Government,
unless the case is brought within the purview of either
of the provisos to s. 17 A. In view of these considerations, it must be held that there is no merit in the
preliminary objection. The appeal must, therefore,
be determined on its merits.
On the merits of the controversy between the
parties, it has been argued by the learned counsel for
·the appellants that the Tribunal, having held the
strike to be illegal, has erred in holding that it was
justified; that an illegal strike could never be justified
and that the Tribunal was wholly in error in losing
sight of the fact that the appellants were carrying on
what had been notified as a public utility service. In
this connection, it was further argued that in view of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2))
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the proviso to s. 10(1) of the Act, the State GovernI. G. N. & Rly. ment was bound to make a Reference of the dispute
to an Industrial Tribunal when notice of strike under
Co. Ltd.
v.
s. 22 of the Act had already been given, and that,
Their Workmen therefore, the failur(• of the employer to enter into
direct negotiations with the employees, upon receipt of
Sinha].
the strike notice, could not be used by the Tribunal
for coming to the finding that the strike was justified.
It was also urged that the Tribunal had clearly erred
in holding that the lock-out declared by the appellants,
was illegal, and that, in coming to that conclusion, it
had over-looked the provisions of s. 24(3) of the Act.
The Tribunal, it was further argued, had erred in holding that, in the absence of standing orders to the
effect that participation in an illegal strike is a gross
misconduct, an employer could not dismiss its workmen for mere participation in an illegal strike. Assuming that the last-stated argument was not well-founded,
it was argued that the standing orders governing the
relations between the Syndicate and the workmen,
would also govern the relations between the appellants
and the workmen, as a result of the agreement aforesaid
whereby the appellants undertook all the liabilities of
the Syndicate in relation to the workmen, and guaranteed to them the same conditions of service. In this
connection, it was also argued that the Tribunal had
made a serious mistake of record in treating the
standing orders .of the Syndicate as a mere draft and,
therefore, of no binding force as between the employers
and the employees; that the Tribunal erred, while
considering the case of the eight workmen dismissed before the commencement of the strike, in
proceeding upon an unfounded assumption that no
charge-sheets had been served upon those workmen
during the inquiry against them, and that, therefore,
the Award, in so far as it related to those 8 workmen,
was entirely erroneous. As against the two hundred
and eight workmen ordered by the Tribunal to be
reinstated, it was argued that the departmental inquiry
held by the appellants had resulted in the distinct
finding that they had not only participated in the
illegal strike, but had also instigated loyal workmen
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to join in the illegal strike, and had obstructed tranship-
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ment work by loyal workmen. In this connection, it J ..G. N. & Rly.
was also argued that in any view of the matter, the
Co. Ltd.
thirty seven persons, who had been convicted by the
v.
criminal court under s. 188 of th(l Indian Penal Code, Their Workmen
for having transgressed the prohibitions contained in
Sinha].
the prohibitory order under s. 144 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, were' clearly liable to be dismissed
on the findings of the criminal court itself, apart from
any other considerations bearing on the regularity of
the inquiry against them; that the Tribunal was in
error in holding that the inquiry against the dismissed
workmen was not in accordance with the prescribed,
procedure; and lastly, that this was not a case of
refostatement of the dismissed workmen, and that '
only compensation should have been awa.rded to
·them.
·
On behalf of the respondents, their learned counsel,
besides raising the preliminary objection already dealt
with, urged that the Tribunal was fully justified in
holding that the strike, though illegal, was " perfectly
justified" and virtually provoked by the appellants.
Though in the statement of the case, the argument
had been raised that the strike could not be illegal,
because the notification declaring the service at the
ghats to be public utility service, was ultra vires, tha:t
argument was not persisted in before us, but it was
vehemently argued that there were no standing orders
either of the Syndicate or of the appellants, which
could govern the service conditions· of the workmen,
and that in any event, mere participation in an illegal
strike would not entitle the employers to dismiss those
workmen who had joined the strike; that the dismissal
orders in all cases, were sheer acts of victimization and
unfair labour practice. It was also sought to be argued
that the lock-out was entirely illegal, and that in any
view of the matter, its continuance after the strike
had been called of, was wholly unjustified and against
the principles of "social justice". Further, it was
urged that the appellants had dismissed and/or suspended 260 workmen without framing any· specific charges
against them ; that the dismissal of the eight workmen
'
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2))
1959
in view of the incidents before the commencement cif
I. G. N. & Rly. the strike, was also illegal, and in any event, irregular,
because, it was urged, no specific charges had been
Co.Ltd.
framed against them. It was also sought to be argued
v.
Their Workmen that the notice, inviting the workmen to join their
work, being unconditional without any reservations,
Sinha j.
amounted to a condonation of the strike, and therefore,
the dismissal orders against the two hundred and sixty
workmen were bad in law. Some other arguments
also were advanced on behalf the respondents, but we
do not propose to take notice of them, because they
were ultimately found to be without any foundation in
the record of the case. As a matter of fact, the arguments on behalf of the respondents, were not marked
by that strict adherence to the record of the case, or
the case made out before the Tribunal, as ought to be
t,he case before courts of justice generally, and certainly,
before the highest Court in the land.
Now, turning to the merits, it is better to deal with
the first issue first, that is to say, whether the cli~mis
sal of the eight workmen, named in the Issue as
amended, was justified, and if not, to what relief they
were entitled. The Tribunal dealt with the individual
cases of those workmen, and came to the conclusion
that the dismissal of none of them was justified, and
that, therefore, all of them were entitled to reinstatement with all their back wages and other benefits
accruing to them from the date of their suspension and
subsequent dismissal until the date of their reinstatement, m.inus what had been paid to them. Thus, the
first issue in both the parts, was decided entirely in
favour of the workmen.
We have, therefore, to
examine how far the determination of Tribunal on the
first issue, is open to question. The cases of Manzoor
Hussain, Sudama Singh, Idrish and Tazmal Hussain,
have been dealt with together by the Tribunal below.
These four workmen had been dismissed by the appellants, upon a report made by
Rayfield, the
enquiring officer under the appellants, on the
allegation that they had assaulted their Labour
Supervisor S. P. Tevari on May 2, 1955. This
charge against those four workmen, was examined by
-
-
,.
•·
-
-
-
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
15
I959
a Magistrate who tried them for the alleged assault
on Tewari. The Magistrate found them not guilty J. G. N. & Rly.
and acquitted them by his judgment given in April,
Co. Ltd.
v.
1956. The ~epartmental inquiry by Rayfield was
held on May 17, 1955, when a. member of witnesses Their Workmen
were examined by him on behalf ·of the appellants.
Sinh.a J.
In their joint written statement, these four workmen
stated that as the police case was pending against
them in regard to these very charges, they were_ not
in a position to make any further statement in their
defence. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that,
on the,material before it, it had not been made nut
that Tewari had been actually assaulted, while on
duty, and that the dismissal order was passed "possibly with a view to frighten the other workmen and to
satisfy the whims of Tewari". We have examined the
record, and we do not find any justification for differ·
ing from the conclusions of the Tribunal.
With reference to the case against Panchu Shah
and Ram Ekbal Singh, it appears that the Tribunal
definitely came to the conclusion that their dimissal
order was vitiated because it was an act of victimization and was mal,a fide. In the face of this clear
finding, we do not think that we can interfere with
the determination of the Trlbunal in respect of these
two workmen.
But the case against Jahangir Sardar and Keayamat Hussain, stands on a different footing. The
charge against Jahangir was two-fold, namely, (1)
wilful insubordination and disobedience, and (2) conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. To
these charges, Jahangir demurred and objected, saying
he could not " understand the reasons for the chargesheet "- On this demurrer, a letter dated May 7,
1955, was issued to him, giving him the details of the
acts charged against him, with reference to the time,
date and place. The charge against Keayamat was
similarly a two-fold one, namely, (1) disorderly
behaviour and inciting others to disturbance and
violence, and (2) conduct prejudicial to good order
and discipline. Keayamat also demurred to the
charge in the same way that it was vague, and that
•
••
16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2))
I959
he was not aware of anything wrong having been
done
by him. On ]\fay 7, Keayainat was also given
I. G. N. & Rly.
a
similar
letter, explaining to him the details of the
Co. Ltd.
charge.
aforesaid,
with reference to the time, place and
v.
Their H1 orkmen date of the acts which formed the gravamen of the
charge against him. A number of witnesses were
Si"nha f,
examined by Rayfield who held the inquiry. In both
these cases, the Tribunal refused to accept the
result of the inquiry, chiefly on the ground that no
specific charge had been bid against them, and
that the allegations were much. too vague. In recording this find_ing, the Tribunal has fallen into a grievous error of record. It has completely omitted to
consider the letter issued to both these workmen on
May 7, giving foll particulars of the charges against
them. If it had c0nsidered that letter issued to both
these workmen, it would not have fallen into this
serious error which has vitiated its award in respect
of them. The Tribunal further proceeded to comment
on the evidence led before the enquiring officer ·and
remarked that the evidence was meagre or insufficient. It also observed that the "degree of proof,
even in the departmental enquiry, is the same as
required in a Court of Law". In our opinion, the
Tribunal misdirected itself in looking into the sufficiency of proof led before the enquiring officer, as
if it was sitting in appeal on the decision of the
employers. ln the case of these two employees,
there is no finding by the Tribunal that the order
of dismissal against them, was actuated by any
mala :fides, or was an act of vicitimization. In view
of these considerations, the dismissal order made by
the appellants on a proper inquiry, after giving the
the workmen concerned sufficient opportunity of
explaining their conduct, must be upheld. The appeal
in respect of the.se two workmen, must, therefore, be
allowed, and the order of the Tribunal in respect of
them, accordingly, set aside. The order of the
Tribunal in respect of the other six workmen, is
confirmed.
Having dealt with the orders of dismissal in respect
of the incidents before the strike of August 1I, Hl55,
-
-
-
-
S.O.R. .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
17
r959
we now turn to the strike itself. The first question
that arises in this connection, is whether the strike was I. G. N. & R/y.
illegal, as alleged by the appellants and as found by
Co. Ltd.
v.
the Tribunal. The learned counsel for the respondents
sought to reopen the finding about the illegality of the Their Workmm
strike, basing his submissions mainly on the contention
Sinha].
that there were no conciliation proceedings pending
either in fact or in law on the date of the strike, and
that, therefore, the finding of the Tribunal was not
correct. It was not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the notices of the strike given by the workmen on July 21, 1955, had been duly received by the ·
Conciliation Officer on July 26, 1955, and that the
conciliation proceedings were commenced on August 6,
1955. \Vhat was contended on their behalf, was that
the proceedings had to be stopped, as it appears from
the record of those proceedings, without any settlement
of the dispute as the "workers' representative expressed their inability to take further part in the
proceedings, on a question of leave to their other
representatives". We shall examine the question later
as to which party was to blame for the break-down of
the conciliation proceedings at the very outset. It is
enough to. observe that under s. 20 of the Act, the
conciliation proceedings must be deemed to have
commenced on July 26, 1955, when the notice of the
strike was received by the Conciliation Officer, and
those proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded
when the report of the Concilia.tion Officer is received
by the Government. In this case, the report to the
Government was made by the Conciliation Officer on
August 8, 1955. It is not absolutely clear as to when
this report of the Conciliation Officer was actually
received by the Government. It is clear, therefore,
that the conciliation proceedings certainly lasted
between July 26 and August 8, 1955. The strike,
having commenced on August 11, was clearly illegal in
view of the provisions of s. 22 of the Act. We must,
therefore, hold in agreement with the Tribunal, that
the strike was clearly illegal. ~
The Tribunal, having held that the strike was
illegal, proceeded to discuss the question whether it
3
18 -
SUPl'tEME COURT REPORTS [1!160(2)]
1959
was justified, and came to the conclusion that it was
"perfectly
justified". In the first place, it is a little
I G. N. & Rly.
difficult
to
understand how a strike in respect of a
Co. Ltd.
public
utility
service, which is clearly, illegal, could at
v.
the
same
time
be characterized as "perfectly justified".
Their Workmen
These two conclusions cannot in law co-exist. The law
Sinha].
has made a distinction between a strike which is illegal
and one which is not, but it has not made any distinction between an illegal strike which may be said to be
justifiable and one which is not justifiable. This
distinction is not warranted by the Act, 'and is wholly
misconceived, specially in the case of employees in a
public utility service. Every one participating in an
illegal strike, is liable to be dealt with departmentally,
of course, subject to the action of the Department
being questioned before an Industrial Tribunal, but it
is not permissible to characterize an illegal strike as
justifiable. The only question of practical importance
which may arise in the case of an illegal strike, would
be the kind or quantum of punishment, and that, of
course, has to be modulated in accordance with the
facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, the
tendency to condone what has been declared to be
illegal by statute, must be deprecated, and it must be
clearly understood by those who take part in an
illegal strike that thereby they make themselves liable
to be dealt with by their employers. There may be
reasons for distinguishing the case of those who may
have acted as mere dumb driven cattle from those who
have taken an active part in fomenting the trouble and
instigating workmen to join such a strike, or have
taken recourse to violence.
Apart from the basic error of treating the illegal
strike to be perfectly justified, the Tribunal has
indulged in language which is not characteristic of a
judicial approach. The following observations by the
Tribunal, in the course of its inordinately long Award,
covering about 42 pages in print, are illustrative of the
attitude of the Tribunal towards the appellants:"By this letter the Company's Joint Agent at
Dhubri instead of taking a friendly attitude approached the District Magistrate asking for police help.
•
-
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
I959
If the Company's Agent at Dhubri had the honest
intention he could have immediately moved the
appropriate authority to come immediately to the I. G. N . .,,, Rly.
Co. Ltd.
.
d f
spot to stop the proposed stri k e. B ut mstea o
v.
that he has provoked the Union by adopting this Their Workmen
back door policy to suppress the demands of the
Sinha].
workers. It was really unfair on the part of the
Agent. It seems that he had mala fide intention."
For this outburst of the Tribunal, justification is sought
in the letter which D. J. Milner, the Joint Agent of
the appellants, wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Transport and Industries Department,
Labour Commissioner, Government of Assam, Superintendent of Poli9e, Goalpara District, Labour Officer,
Lower Assam, and General Secretary, I.N.T.U.C.,
Assam Branch, on August 9, 1955, informing them of
the threatened strike. The last paragraph of the
letter explained the reasons for the long letter addressed by the Joint Agent : " In the interest of maintaining
this vital link in Assam's flood-stricken communications
and protecting our property, and that of the Railway,
as well as our own staff, Railway Staff and loyal
labourers, we have to request that adequate police be
available at each of.our Ghats from shortly prior to
midnight on the 10th instant in order that unlawful
damage may not be caused by these illegal strikers
who will_ be acting in defiance of Government regulations, and accepted industrial dispute procedure". We
see nothing sinister in this letter, justifying the remarks
by the Tribunal, quoted above. It was tbe usual
request for the maintenance of public peace and for /
the prevention of acts of violence by misguided persons. It was also addressed to the I.N.T.U.C., the
guardian of Labour.
On the same d1J>te, that is, August 9, 1955, B. Chakravarty, the Secretary of the Dhubri Transhipment
Labour Union, addressed alettertotheSuperintendent
of Police, Goalpara, and Deputy Commissioner,
Goal para, alleging that the Joint Agent of the
appellants had instructed the officers in-charge of the
jetties at the Ghats tcr raise a "hallah" after the zero
hour of August 11, 1955, that the labourers of the
20
'959
I. G. N. &- Rly.
Co.Lid.
v.
Their Workmen
Sinha].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2))
Transhipment Department were looting the goods of
the ship, when they would go for picketing purposes
to strengthen their strike. Those allegations of the
Secretary, the Tribunal has taken as proof of those
allegations, and has observed :
" . . . it is clear that Mr. Milner hatched a plan to
create a trouble and the Secretary of the Union got
scent of all the secret arrangements made by the
Company to create disturbance at the Ghats just
immediately after the strike is declared."
This is the first reason assigned by the Tribunal for
coming to the conclusion that the strike was "perfectly
justified". The second reason for coming to this conclusion, according to the Tribunal, is to be found in
the Conciliation Officer's report that the appellants did
not agree to grant leave to the labour representatives
to sit in the conciliation proceedings which were held
on August 6, 1955. The Tribunal has observed that. it
appeared also from the appellant's attitude in refusing
to grant leave to the five representatives of the Union,
that the appellants were not inclined to give facilities
for the conciliation proceedings. Is this observation
justified on the record as it stands ? As already indicated, the Conciliation Officer received a copy of the
strike notice on July 26, 1955. He fixed August 6,
1955, 10 a.m., at Dhubri, for the conciliation proceedings. The parties to the dispute were apprised of this
meeting of August 6, 1955, on August 1, 1955 (ext. 0,
p. l19). From the proceedings of the Conciliation Officer,
it appears that the Union applied to the appellants
for leave to five workmen, officials of the Union, to
enable them to represent the workmen in the conciliation proceedings. The attitude of the appellants was
that they were agreeable to grant leave even on a
verbal request, if the request came from those individual workmen, either direct or through the Union,
but the appellants were not prepared to grant leave on
a petition from the Union alone. On the other hand,
the Union was not agreeable that the petition for leave
should be made by the workmen themselves, and the
Union insisted that it·had the right to apply for leave
on behalf of those workmen. Upon this, the Union
-
S.C.R.
...
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
21
I959
did not take any further part in the proceedings. It
would be a travesty of facts to suggest that· the I. G. N. &- Rly.
appellants were not prepared to grant leave to those
Co. Ltd.
v.
five workmen. In the first instance, leave should
have been applied for before the date fixed for Their Workmen
the commencement of the conciliation proceedings.
Sinha].
Secondly, the application should have been made by
the workmen 0 oncerned, either direct or through the
Union. The Tribunal seems to have been under the
impression that this attitude of the appellants amounted to a breach of one of the terms of the agreement as
a result of the Tripartite Conference aforesaid. That,
again, is an assumption which is not justified by the
terms of the Agreement.. Secondly, the five workmen
selected for rl,'lpresenting the workmen in the conciliation proceedings, should have applied in good time to
their employers for leave for the purpose, but what we
find is that an application (ext. Mat p. ll8) was made
on August 6, 1955, not by those workmen themselves,
but by the Secretary of the Union, and a copy of the
application was forwarded to the Labour Officer and
to the Deputy Commissioner, for information.
Apparently, the Union was treating the matter as of
sufficient importance, but they did not think it necessary to put in the application in time on· behalf of the
workmen themselves, even though the application
might have been made through the Union. That the
appellants were not to blame for the attitude they
took in the matter of the procedure for application for
leave to particular workmen, becomes clear on a refe.rence to the terms of the Agreement dated February 23, 1953, between the Syndicate and their workmen
represented by the Dhubri Transhipment Labour
Union, at p. 75, Part I of the record. The Demand 5(f)
was agreed to in these terms :"AU leave applications be submitted by a repre- ·
sentative of the Union on Tuesday or Friday in a
week before the Management, and the decision be
communicated to the Union the next day of submis- ·
sion of the application."
On thfl othllr ha.nd, in respect of leave, the terms of
the Agreement reached between the Syndicate and the
22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
Dhubri Local Ghat Transhipment Labour Union, on
March 13, 1953, are as follows :I. G. N. 0- Rly.
" It is agreed that the workers will submit leave
Co.Ltd.
applications
to the management who will communicv.
ate their decision to the workers direct within three
Their Workmen
days of receipt of the applications and a copy
Sinha].
thereof will be sent to the Union for information".
It is clear, therefore, that the conciliation proceedings
stopped abruptly not because the Management was to
blame for not granting leave to the five chosen representatives of the workmen, but because B. Chakravarty insisted that the leave application would not be
made by individual workmen but only by the Union.
Even that application was made too late, and in the
teeth of the terms of the Agreement, quoted above. If
the Secretary had not taken this unreasonable attitude,
and if he had been anxious that the conciliation proceedings should continue, the easiest thing for him
to have done, was to g!'t those five workmen to make
their applications for leave, which the Management
was prepared to grant even at that late hour. In our
opinion, the conciliation proceedings failed because
the Secretary took an unreasonable attitude. The Tribunal, therefore, was in error in throwing the blame
for the failure of the conciliation proceedings on the
Management.
The third ground of attack on the bona fides of the
appellants, was said to have been the attempt of the
Management to interfere in the internal affairs of the
Unions. The following remarks of the Tribunal are
another instance of its intemperate language with
which the Award bristles:"Curiously enough it appears that the Company's
Joint Agent at Dhubri dabbled in politics and
meddled in internal administration of the Unions.
He propped up another Union and backed it up
to stand iis a rival Union."
On an examination of the record of the case, it
appears that the Indian National Trade Unions'
Congress, to which the Unions were affiliated, was not
in favour of the strike. That would be an indication
of the fact that the relation between the employers
I959
-
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23
I9S9
and the employees had i:iot come to the breakingpoint, and that the Congress, naturally, expected
· 1.G. N.& Rly.
that conditions of service of the employees, could be
Co. Ltd.
improved more effectively by peaceful negotiations
v.
than by taking recourse to a strike in respect of a TheiY Workmen
service which had been declared by the Government
Sinha Jto be a public utility service. But the Secretary of
one of the Unions, B. Chakravarty aforesaid, appears
to have brought matters to a head without giving the
Conciliation Officer a reasonable chance, as a~ready
indicated, of bringing about a reconciliation between
the view-points of the employers and the employees.
The appellants had only recently taken over the
workmen under their direct employment, and the
Tripartite Conference between them, the representatives of the employees, and the Government, was yet
to settle all the outstanding questions between the
parties. Hence, the fact that two rival Unions had
come into existence, could not be laid at the door of
the appellants as an act of unfair labour practice. The
Tribunal was not, there~ore, in our opinion, justified
in holding that the Management had either meddled
in the internal administration of the Unions, or dabbled in politics, and had, thus, been guilty of unfair
labour practice. The Tribunal has been rather generous to the workmen without being just to the appellants. This· is also shown by the fact that, after
having held the strike to be illegal, the Tribunal
considered the legality of the lock-out declared by the
appellants on August 11, 1955, in respect of one Ghat,
and on August 13, 1955, in respect of the other Ghat.
In this connection, the conclusion of the Tribunal
may best be stated in its own words to demonstrate
- its attitude to the appellants:"In this case the Company used the weapon of
lock-out just to intimidate and put pressure on the
employees to withdraw the demands. The lock-out
is also prohibited under Section 22(2)(d) of the Act.
Therefore, both lock-out and strike are illegal. The
Company had no justification whatsoever to declare
a lock-out;ll
-
24
'959
J.G.N.&Rly.
Co. Ltd.
v.
]'heir JVorhmen
Sinha].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
Apparently, the Tribunal ignored the provisions of
s. 24(3) of the Act. The lock-out was clearly not
illegal. It is another question whether there was a
justification for the appellants to continue the lockout even after the strike had been called off on August
19. The Joint Agent of the appellants, by his letter
dated August 17, 1955, to the two Unions, had intimated to them that in view of the illegal strikes, lockout had been declared at the local Ghat on August 11,
and at the Transhipment Ghat on August 13, and that
the lock-out " will remain in force until disciplinary
act.ion can be instituted against those of our employees chiefly responsible for leading and continuing
the illegal strikes". The continuance of the lock-out
after August 19, may be unjustified; but that does
not make the lock-out itself illegal.
It was in pursuance of that order of the Joint,
Agent, that proceedings were taken against the so.
called leading strikers, leading upto their dismissal.
Those orders of dismissal, to be presently discussed,
are the main points in contrqversy between the parties
in this Court. But before those orders of dismissal
were passed, the Management issued a notice on
August 26, 1955, lifting the lock-out with effect
from the next day. It required the employees to
report for duty to the Joint Agent personally, at
his office between the hours of 9 and 10 a.m. It
also contained the threat that any employee who
did not report for duty on August 30, "will in the
absence of a letter of explanation and good reason,
be treated as having voluntarily terminated his
services." R. N. Biswas was then appointed the
Inquiry Officer by the appellants, and he held the
inquiry in batches, the first batch consisting of 26
workmen, the second, of 114, the third, of 68, the
fourth, of 17 and the fifth, of 7. These inquiries related
to different incidents in connection with the strikes.
Biswas appears from the record as placed before us,
to have recorded the statements of Milner, Rayfield,
C. R. Das and S. P. Tewari-officers of the appellants
-in proof of the allegations against the strikers. We
do not think any useful purpose will be served by
-
...•
...
-
S.C.R. ·
SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
25
I959
goineinto the details of the evidence' given by those
witnesses, because we have come to the conclusion that I. G. N. &> Rly.
those several inquiries suffer from the fundamental
Co. Ltd.
defect that there is no satisfactory evidence on the
v.
record that charges, giving the details of the acts of Their Workmen
violence or obstruction, against the strikers, were
Sinha ].
served upon the workmen against whom those inquiries
had been instituted. As a result of each one of these
inquiries, the Inquiry Officer, R. N. Biswas, reported
that the charge against each one of the workmen, had
been proved to his satisfaction. But before the inquiry
- was held, the Joint Agent on September 9, 1955,
informed the thirty· seven workmen who had been
convictPd as aforesaid, of the criminal charge under
section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, that their services
were terminated froll! that date, and that they were
to call at his office by the 15th of the month to collect
their dues and to vacate the quarters of the appellants.
As regards the remaining two hundred and twenty
three workmen, orders were passed on September 16,
to the effect that as the departmental inquiry made
against them, had resulted in the charges against
them being proved, they were dismissed from the
service of the appellants with effect from August 29,
1955. They were called upon to call at the Labour
Office on September 18, to collect their dues, and to
vacate the quarters of the appellants. Realising that
as the Government had appointed a Board of Conciliation on the 13th instant, to res_olve the dispute between
-the parties, the orders aforesaid of dismissal or termination of services of the thirty seven workmen and of
the two hundred and twenty three workmen, as aforesaid, would be illegal, the Joint Agent informed the
workmen on September 20, 1955, that those orders
would be held in abeyance, pending permission from
the Board to dismiss them, and they would be deemed
to be under suspension. It may be recalled that the
Government had constituted a Board of Conciliation,
consisting of three persons, viz., H. P. Duara, the
Labour Commissioner of Assam, as the Chairman, and
D. N. Sarma and P. J. Rayfield as members, represent·
ing the interests of the employees and the employers
t
26
'959
I. G. N. & Rly.
Co. Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
Sinha ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
respectively. The Board of Conciliation cons~ered
the question of the dismissal or suspension of those
thirty seven plus 223 workmen, along with the appJic.
ation of the Management, asking permission to
dismiss 223 workmen for their having taken part in
the illegal strike, and forcibly preventing willing
workmen from attending work. Two of the three
persons constituting the Board, namely, the Chairman
and D. N. Sarma, came to the conclusion that as
regards the dismissal of the thirty seven workmen the
order of dismissal was illegal, as in their opinion, the
conciliation proceedings had commenced from August
26, and not from September 13. On the question of
suspension of 223 workmen, the Board was of the
opinion that suspension without pay, pending the
permission of the Board to dismi~s the workmen, was
no punishment, and therefore, no action was called for.
As regards the permission sought by the Management
to dismiss the suspended two hundred and twenty three
workmen, again by a majority, those two members
were of the opinion that although the strike was prima
f acie illegal, it was not unjustified and therefore, the
permission sought, could not be given. Rayfield, the
other member of the Board, as already stated, submitted his Minute of dissent. He pointed out that the
conciliation proceedings commenced on September 13,
and therefore, the discharge of the t~irty seven workmen, was not in contravention of s. 33 of the Act.
He further held that the Board had no power to withhold the permission asked for to dismiss 223 workmen
on the ground that they had been found guilty, on a
departmental inquiry, of having participated in an
illegal strike, arid of having forcibly prevented workmen from attending work. He added that the grant
of the permission would not debar the Union from
raising an industrial dispute in that matter. It may
be added that the Board unanimously agreed that
dismissal "is an appropriate punishment for participation in an illegal and unjustified strike." The
Tribunal also took the same view of the legal position,
when it observed, "If the strike is not justified and
~t the same time it contravenes the provisioni, of
•
-
S.0.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
r959
Section 22 of the Act, ordinarily the workmen participating in it are not entitled to any relief." As a matter I. G. N. & Rly.
of fact, the Tribunal has closely followed the findings
Co. Ltd.
of the majority of the Board of Conciliation. But as
v.
we have already pointed out, there can be no question Their Workmen
of an illegal strike being justified. We have further
Sinha ].
held, in agreement with the Tribunal, that the strike
was illegal, and that it_ was not even justified-in
disagreement with the Tribunal- assuming that such
a situation could be envisaged, in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. We have, therefore, to determine the question what punishment, if any, should be
meted out to those workmen who took part in the
illegal strike.
To determine the question of punishment, a clear
distinction has to be made between those workmen
who not only joined in such a strike, but also took part
in obstructing the loyal workmen from carrying on
their work, or took part in violent demonstrations, or
acted in defiance of law and order, on the one hand,
and those workmen who were more or less silent
participators in such a strike, on the o,ther hand. It is
not in the interest of the Industry that there should
be a wholesale dismissal of all the workmen who merely
participated in such a strike. It is certainly not in
the interest of the workmen themselves'. An Industrial
Tribunal, therefore, has to consider the question of
punishment, keeping in view the over-riding consideration of the full and efficient working of the Industry
as a whole. The punishment of dismissal or termination of services, has, therefore, to be imposed on such
workmen as had not only participated in the illegal
strike, but had fomented it, and had been guilty of
violence or doing acts detrimental to the maintenance
of law and order in the locality where work had to be
-carried on. While dealing with this part of the case,
we are assuming, without deciding, that it is open to
the Management to dismiss a workman who has taken
part in an illegal strike. There was a great deal of
argument at the Bar on the question whether the
Management, in this case, was entitled to dismiss the
workmen who had taken part. in the illegal strike.
/
'
.
28
z959
!. G. N. & Rly.
Co. Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
Sinha ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
A good deal of argument was devoted to the further
question whether there were certified standing orders
as between the Syndicate and the workmen, or later,
as between the appellants and the workmen, and
whether, even apart from such standing orders, it was
open to the employers to deal so drastically with their
employees who had taken part in the illegal strike.
In our opinion, it is not necessary to decide those
general questions, in view of our conclusion, to be
presently stated, on the question of the regularity of
the inquiry held in different batches, as indicated
above, by Biswas, the officer appointed by the appellants to hold the departmental inquiry.
In order to find out which of the workmen, who had
participated in the illegal strike, belong to one of the
two categories of strikers who may, for the sake of
convenience, be classifiPd as (1) peaceful strikers, and
(2) violent strikers, we have to enquire into the part
played by them. That can only be done if a regular
inquiry has been held, after furnishing a charge-sheet
to each one of the WO!'kmen sought to be dealt with,
for his participation in the strike. Both the types of
workmen may have been equally guilty of participation
in the illegal strike, but it is manifest that both are
not liable to the same kind of punishment. We have,
therefore, to look into the nature of the inquiry alleged
to have been held by or on behalf of the appellants.
Oa the one hand, the workmen took the extreme position that no inquiry had at all been held, and on the
other hand, the employers took up the position that
the fnquiring Officer had held a regular inquiry, after
furnishing a charge-sheet to each one of the workmen
against whom the inquiry was held. That there was
an inquiry held by Biswas, admits of no doubt. The
proceedings before him and the evidence recorded by
him, have been placed on record. But the most serious
question that we have to determine is whether a
charge-sheet,, giving notiDe to each workman concerned, as to what the gravamen of the charge against him
was, had or had not been furnished to him. On this
part of the case, the record is admittedly incomplete.
'r he appellants relied upon the following observations
•
\
S.C.:Bi,
.I
.
...
j
SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS
29
r959
of the Tribunal in support of their case that the
inquiry had been entirely regular :
I. G. N. & Rly.
" The charges are for fomenting and participating
Co. Ltd.
v.
in an illegal strike from the 11th August, 1955 and
Their·
Workmen
forcibly preventing other labourers from working on
the same day."
Sinha].
On the other hand, reliance was placed on behalf of
the workmen on the following passage in the Award
of the Tribunal:" In this case the Company has not framed any
specific charge against those 260 workers alleging
that they indulged in violence or acts subversive of
discipline."
.
The finding of the Tribunal is that no such individuai
charge-sheet was delivered to the workmen. This
conclusion of the Tribunal was assailed on behalf of
the appellants on the ground that as this point had
not been specifically made in the written statement of
the workmen, tlie appellants did not put in those
charge-sheets in evidencf), and had contented themselves· with only producing the record of proceedings
before the Inquiring Officer. As we, naturally, attached a great deal of importance ·to this question, we
were inclined to give another opportunity to the
appellants to remove the lacuna in the evidence
bearing upon that question, even at this late stage~ /
More than once, during the course of the arguments
by the learned Attorney-General, we suggested that he
might put in those charge-sheets, if they were in
existence, as additional evidence in this Court, so that
we might be satisfied that there had been a regular
inquiry according to the requirements of natural
justice. After making the necessary investigation, the
learned Attorney-General informed us on the last day
of the arguments, that no such documents were in
existence. It was alleged that the entire bundle of
documents, containing those individual charges, had
been lost, and that, therefore~ there were no means of
satisfying this Court by documentary evidence, that
there were in fact such individual charge-sheets
delivered to the workmen concerned. We find, therefore~ no good reasons for displacing the ·findi.ttg of the
30
I959
J.G.N. &-Rly.
Co. Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
Sinha j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
Tribunal that there were no such individual charges,
in spite of apparently conflicting observations made
by it, as quoted above.
The position, therefore, is that the strikes were
illegal, that there was no question of those strikes
being justified, and that, assuming that the strikers
were liable to be punished, the degtee and kind of
punishment had to be modulated according to the
gravity of their guilt. Hence, it is necessary to
distinguish between the two categories of strikers.
The Tribunal attempted to make·such a distinction by
directing that the 52 workmen, who had been convict.d under s. 143, read with s. 188 of the Indian Penal
Code, were not entitled to reinstatement, and the
remaining 208 workmen were so entitled. Dealing
with the case of the thirty seven workmen, who had
been convicted only under s. 188 of the Indian Penal
Code, for transgression of the prohibitory orders under
s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Tribunal
put those workmen on the same footing as the rest of
the workmen. But, in our opinion, those 37 workmen
do not stand on the same footing as the others. Those
37 workmen, who were convicted under s. 188 of the
Indian Penal Code, had been found to have violated
the prohibitory orders passed by the public authorities
to keep the public peace. Those convictions were
based upon evidence adduced before the Magistrate,
showing that the workmen had proceeded to the steamer flat through the jetty, in defiance of the orders promulgated under s. 144. We have exe.mined the record
and we find that there is sufficient indication that
those 37 workmen were among the violent strikers,
and could not be placed in the category of peaceful
strikers. Hence, it is clear that those workmen not
only joined the illegal strike by abstaining from their
assigned duty, but also violated regularly promulgated
orders for maintaining peace and order. Such persons,
apparently, cannot be said to be peaceful strikers, and
cannot, therefore, be dealt with as lightly as the Tribunal has done. The Tribunal, in our opinion, is wrong
in taking the view that the appellants had nothing to
do with the violation of the order under s. 144 of the
•
-
'
-'
S.C.R.
..
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
31
Code of Criminal Procedure, promulgated by the DisI959
trict Magistrate, with a view to maintaining peace and
6- Rly.
order at the site of work. These 37 workmen, there- J. G.Co.N.Lid.
fore, should not have been ordered to be reinstated.
v
As regards the remaining workmen, the questign is Their Workmen
whether the Tribunal was entirely correct in ordering
Sinka].
their reinstatement with full back wages and allowances on and from August 20, 1955, till reinstatement.
This would amount to wholly condoning the illegal act
of the strikers. On the findings arrived at before us,
the workmen were guilty of having participated in an
illegal strike, for which they were liable to be dealt
with "by their employers. It ii; also clear ·that the
inquiry held by the appellants, was not wholly regular,
as individual charge sheets had not been delivered to
the workmen proceeded against. When the blame
attaches to both the parties, we think that they should
divide the loss half and half between them. We,
therefore, direct that those workmen whose reinstatement by the Tribunal is upheld by us, should be entitled only to half of their wages during the period
between -the date of the cessation of the illegal strike
(i.e. from August 20, 1955) and the date the Award
became enforcea@le. After that date they will be entitled to their full wages, on reinstatement. In this
connection, it has also got to be borne in mind that
those workmen, as observed in the judgments of the
criqiinal courts which inflicted nominal fines on them
on their conviction, were "day labourers who earned
their livelihoods by day-to-day labour". It is only
natural that during a.ll these years that the workmen
have not been employed by the appellants, the workmen should have been earning their living by doing
day-to-day labour. It must, therefore, be assumed
that they were working for their living, and were not
wholly unemployed. Therefore, the burden of the
back w.ages for the long period that has elapsed between the date of the end of the strike and the date of
the Award, ordering their reinstatement, should be
divided half and half between the parties.
The appeal is, therefore, allowed in part, as indicated above, that is to say, (1) the order of reinstatement
32
•959
I. G. N. & Rly.
Co. Lid.
v.
Th1ir Workn1sn
Sinha].
I959
Octob~r I6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
in respect of Jahangir Sardar and Keayamat Hussain,
is set aside, (2) similarly, the order of reinstatement in
respect of the thirty seven workmen, who had been
convicted under s. 188 of the Indian Penal Code, is also
set a.side, and (3) the order for payment of full back
wages, etc., is modified by reducing those amounts by
half, for the period aforesaid. As success between the
parties has been divided, they are directed to bear
their own costs in this Court.
Appeal allowed in part.
THE INDIAN HUME PIPE CO. LTD.
v.
THE WORKMEN AND ANOTHER
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute--Retrenchment compensation-Grnt11ityWorkmen's claim for both on retrenchment-Maintainability-Use of
Statement of objects and reasons for construing statute-ValidityOrdinance V of r953, s. 25E(b)-Indmtrial Disputes Act, r947 (I4
of I947), SS. 2(rr), 25F(b).
Section 25F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
provided : "No workman employed in any industry who has
been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until ... (b) the
workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for
e:'ery complete~ year of service or any part thereof in excess of
s1x months ...
The dispute between the appellant company and its workmen
related to the claim for gratuity made by the latter and it was
the appellant's contention that in the scheme of gratuity framed
by the Tribunal no gratuity should be paid to workmen who
would be entitled to receive retrenchment cou1pensation under
s. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947· Before s. 25F was
introduced in the Act by Act 43 of 1953, workmen were given
the benefit of both retrenchment compensation and gratuity by
industrial awards, but the decisions were not always uniform.
Ordinance V was promulgated on October 24, 1953, by s. 25E(b)
of which it was provided that before a workman was retrenched
he must be paid at the time of retrenchment gratuity which shall
be equivalent to 15 days' average pay for every completed year
of service or any part thereof in excess of six months. The
-
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