THE PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK, LTD. versus ITS WORKMEN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 24 September 1959 | [1960] 1 S.C.R. 806 | 1959 INSC 119
Key facts
- Decided
- 24 September 1959
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 519/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 1 S.C.R. 806
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 119
Text of the judgment
806
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
1959
Respondents 6 and 7 raised before us the question of
costs.
They stated that the trial Judge had given two
Narayan
sets
of
costs,
which was changed to one set by the
Bhagwantrao
Gosavi Balajiwale High Court. These resp'.mdents should have crossobjected on this point against the judgment of the
v.
Gopal Vi1iayak High Court, and in the absence of any such cross-objecGo5avi
tion, no relief can be granted to them. For the same
reason, no relief can be given to respondent 7, in
Hidayatullah ].
respect of whom the finding that he had no right of
performing the seva and getting emoluments attached
to that right, as respondents 1 to 4, has not been
vacated, as was done in the case of respondent 6. In
view of our observations that these matters were alien
to the suit which had been filed, we do not propose to
deal with them.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant
will personally pay the costs of Respondent 1. The
other set of respondents will bear their own costs.
Appeal dismissed.
1959
September z4
THE PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK, LTD.
v.
ITS WORKMEN
(B. P. SINHA, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and
K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Dismissal by employer pending adjudication
-Omission to hold proper enquiry or obtain permission of the
Tribunal-Su.ch dismissal, if wholly void- Jurisdiction of Tribunal,
Scope of-Pen-down strike-Legality-If disentitles a dismissed
employee to reinstatem'ent-Ind·ustrial Disputes Act, I947 (I4 of
I947), SS. 2(q), IO, 33, 33A.
The employees of the appellant Bank commenced pen-down
strikes, which were followed by a general strike, pending arbitration of an industrial dispute between them. The Government of
India intervened and as the result of an agreement that followed
the Bank reinstated all the employees except lSO, against whom
it had positive objections, and the Government referred their
cases under s. IO of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1047, to the
Industrial Tribunal for arljudication. The two issues before the
Industrial Tribunal were whether the rso employees had been
wrongly dismissed and what wages and allowances would the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
807
employees be entitled to on reinstatement. The case of the
z959
employees was that the Bank wanted to penalise the active trade
-·
unio.n workers by the said dismissals while the Bank mai:gtained
!h• Punjab
that the employees were guilty of participation in illegal strikes National Bank, Ltd.
intended to paralyse its business and scare away its customers.
v.
The Industrial Tribunal did not hear evidence and, by its final Its Workmen
award, held that. the strikes being illegal, the Bank was, on that
ground alone, justified in dismissing the employees. Efen so, it
directed the Bank to make certain payments to the employees on
compassionate grounds. The Bank as well as the employees
appealed. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that even though
the strikes· were illegal under s. 23(b) read with s. 24(1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947• the Bank had, by entering into
the agreement with the Government of India, waived its right to
take penal action against the employees for joining the illegal
strikes and that, therefore, an enquiry should be held on additional evidence to decide the disputes on merits. Against this
interlocutory order the Bank appealed to this Court and it was
held by this Court that while the strikes were no doubt illegal
under s. 23(b) of the Act, the orders of dismissal 'Passed by the
Bank were no less so under s. 33 of the Act, and it dismissed the
appeal. The Appellate Tribunal, thereafter, heard the cases on
merits, directed the reinstatement of 136 of the said employees,
but refused to reinstate the re;;t whorn it found guilty of issuing
posters and circulars subversive of the credit of the Bank. Both
the parties appealed to this Court. Preliminary objections were
raised on behalf of the said employees that, (1) in view of ·the
decision of this Court dismissing the Bank's appeal against the
said interlocutory order the subseqm:nt inquiry by the Tribunal
and the orders of dismissal must be held to be void and, (2) no
charges having been admittedly framed nor any proper enquiry
helcl by the Bank against the employees, the orders of dismissal
were wholly invalid. It was urged, inter .aJia, on behalf of the
Bank in the appeals that participation 'in a pen-down strike by
itself amounted to misconduct sufficient to disentitle an employee
to reinstatement and that the entire body of strikers, being
collectively responsible for the publication of the subversive
documents in question, the dismissed employees could by no
means escape liability.
H~ld (per curiam), that the preliminary objections must be
negatived and the decision of the Appellate Tribunal affirmed
with this modification that, in view of its inconsistent findings,
the appeal of one of the employees must be allowed.
Per Sinha and Gajendragadkar, JJ.-The purpose the
Legislature had in view in enacting s. 33 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, was to maintain the status quo by placing a
ban on any action by the employer pending adjudication.
But the jurisdiction conferred on the Industrial Tribunal by
s. 33 of the Act was a limited one. Where a p~oper enquiry had
been hdd and no victimisation or unfair labour practice had been
808
SUPREME C1JURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
resorted to, the Tribunal in granting permission had only to
satisfy itself that there was a prima facie case against the
The Punjab
employee and not to consider the propriety or adequacy of the
National Bank, Ltd. proposed action. But to such permission, when granted. the
v.
Tribunal could attach no conditions; it can either grant or
z959
Its Workmen
refuse it.
The effect of such permission was only to remove the ban
imposed by s. 33 of the Act. It could neither validate a dismissal
nor prevent it from being challenged in an industrial dispute;
but in such a rlispute, when raised, the employer could justify its
action only on such grounds as were specified in the original
charge-sheet and no others.
There was substantial difference between non-compliance
with s. 33 of the Act and that with Art. 3u(2) of the Constitution. Compliance with s. 33 only avoided the penalty under
s. 3r(r) of the Act, while compliance with Art. 3u(2) of the
Constitution made the order of dismissal final.
Atherton West c5- Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union, [1953]
S.C.R. 780, The Automobile Products of India ltd. v. Rukmaji Bula,
[1955] I S.C.R. 1241, Lakshmi Devi S1'gar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Rum
Sarup, [1956] S.C.R. 916, Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their
Workmen, [1958] S.C.R. 667 and McKe.nzie c5- Co. Ltd. v. Its
Workmen, [1959] S.C.R. (Suppl.) 222 referred to.
It was not, therefore, correct to contend that non-compliance
with s. 33 of the Act could render the orders of dismissal wholly
void or take away the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hold the
enquiry. Nor could the failure to hold a proper enquiry have
that effect.
Under s. 33A of the Act, as construed by this Court, the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal was not limited to an enquiry as to
the contravention of s. 33 of the Act. Even if such contravention was. proved, the employer could still justify the impugned
dismissal on merits and there was no difference in this regard
between a reference under s. ro of the Act and a dispnte raised
under s. 33A of the Act.
The Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala, [r<155]
l S.C.R. 1241 and Equitable Coal Co. Ltd. v. Algu Singh, A.I.R.
1958 S.C. 761, referred to.
Although there can be no doubt that in proper cases the
Industrial Tribunal has the power to direct reinstatement in
disputes arising out of dismissal of employees, it is not possible
to lay down any hard and fast rule to be applied to such cases.
In coming to its decision, the Industrial Tribunal has to reconcile
the conflicting claims of the employer and the employee,-the
latter's right to protection against wrongful dismissal, and in
such a case the normal rule is reinstatement, and the interest and
safety of the industry itself. Its approach to such a problem
cannot, therefore, be legalistic or doctrinaire or as is permissible
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
809
in a ci:vil court deciding the validity of dismissals under s. 240 of
.c959
the Government of India Act, 1935. or Art. 311(2) of . the
Constitution.
The Punjab
Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, National Ban/I, Lid.
Bombay, [1949] F.C.R. 321 and Buckingham & Carnatic Mills Ltd.
v.
v. Their Workmen, (1955) II L.L.J. 314, referred to.
Its W1Wkmen
If no enquiry is held by the employer before it passes an
order of dismissal, the propriety of such <lismissal.can be adjudged
by the Tribunal on evidence and no employer can be allowed to
object to it on the ground that it interferes with the exercise of its
managerial function.
The Madras Electric Tram'liJays, (r904) Ltd. Madras v. Their
Workers, (1951) II L.L.J. 204, distinguished and held inapplicable.
The propriety of reinstatement in a case of wrongful or
illegal dismissal is normally a question of fact and wbere the
Industrial Tribunal on a proper consideration of the relevant
factors refuses to pass such an order this Court would be reluctant, in absence of any general or substantial question of law,
,to interfere under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
A pen-down strike falls within the definition of a strike
contained ins. 2(q) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and is
not per sc illegal. Even if it might involve an element of civil
trespass, as in the present case, that cannot disentitle an employee
to reinstatement.
M/s. Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, A.I.R. 1959 S.C.
529, referred to.
It is not safe to extend principles of American decisions to
such a strike without a careful scrutiny of the relevant provisions
of the American Statute and·the facts on which the said decisions
are based.
National Labour Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corporation, 306 U.S. 238, considered and held inapplicable.
William Truax v. Michael Corrigan, 66 Law. Ed. 311, referred
to.
Since in the instant case, the peaceful and non-violent
conduct of the strikers, as found by the Appellate Tribunal, could
not amouut to criminal trespass within the meaning of s. 441 of
th~ Indian Penal Code, mere participation in the pen-down strike
did not disentitle them to reinstatement.
T. H. Bird v. King-emperor, (1934) L.R. XIII Pat. 268, held
inapplicable.
The mere fact that the employer had engaged new hands
during the strike. was not sufficient to defeat the claim to
reinstatement of such employees as were subsequently found to
have been wrongfully dismissed.
National Transport and General Co. Lttl. v. The Workmen, C.A.
No. 3u of 1956, decided on January 2a, 1957, referred to.
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
But where, as in the instant case, the Appellate Tribunal
took a common-sense view of the matter of evidence and held
The Punjab
certain office-bearers and leaders of the union liable for subversive
National Bank, Ltd. acts and refused to extend. such liability to the entire body of
v.
strikers on theoretical and academic grounds, no principles of
Its Worh1ntn
natural justice could be said to have been contravened by it.
1959
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 519 to 521 of.1958.
Appeal by special leave from the decision dated
January 4, 1955, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of
India, Calcutta, in Appeals Nos. Cal. 69/52 and
Cal. 70/52.
AND
Civil Appeal No. 521 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the decision dated
.J:muary 4, 1955, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of
India, Calcutta in Appeal No. Cal. 70/52.
Ram Lal Anand and Naunit Lal, for the appellant
in C.A. No. 519 of 58.
·
H. N. Sanyal, Addiflional Solicitor-General of India,
Ram Lal Anand and Naunit Lal, for the appellants in
C.A. No. 520/58 and respondents in C.A. No. 521of58.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, 0( K.
Daphtary, Solicitor-General, M. K. Ramamurthi, Syed
Mahummud, R. J(. Garg, Miss. A. B. Varma and
Janardan Sharma, for respondent No. l in C.A. Nos.
519 and 520 of 58 and appellant in C.A. No. 521 of 58.
Hardyal Hardy and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for
respondent No. 2 in C.As, Nos. 519 & 520 of 58.
1959. September 24. The judgment of Sinha and
Gajendragadkar, JJ., was delivered by Gajendragadkar, J. Subba Rao, J., delivered a separate judgment.
Gajendragadkar ].
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-These three appeals arise out
of ii.n industrial dispute between the Punjab National
Bank, Ltd. (hereinafter called the Bank) and two sets
of its employees represented by the AU-India Punjab
National Bank Employees' Federation (hereinafter
called tbe :Federation) and the U.P. Bank Employees'
Union hereinafter called the Union) respeotively.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
On July 2, 1951, this dispute was referred by the
x959
~ntral Goverm.nent for adjudication to. the industrial
The Punjab
tribunal of wh10h Mr. A. N. Sen, a retired Judge of National Bank, Lid.
the Calcutta High Court, was the 1'1ole. member. It
v.
raised two issues. The first was whether the 150 lls Workme><
workmen mentioned in Sch. II.attached to the refer- G . d-dk I
ence had been wrongfully dismissed by the Bank, and a1en raga ar •
the second had reference to the claim for reinstatement and payment of wages and '1.Uowances from the
date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement. The
reference thus made has gone through a long and protracted career and the final decision of the dispute would
be reached after we dispose of the present appeals. In
order to appreciate the points raised for our decision in
these appeals it is necessary to indicate briefly at the
outset the salient points of controversy between the
parties, the findings made by the original tribunal, the
conclusions reached by the Labour Appellate Tribunal
in its interlocutory and final judgments and the decision of this Court in the appeal which had been brought
before it by the Bank against the interlocutory judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
The 150 employees, whose dismissal has given risf:l to
the present dispute are spread over several branches
of the Bank. 52 of them work at its head office in
Delhi, 15 in Bombay, 73 in East Punjab and IO in U.P.
140 workmen in the first three areas a.re represented
by the Federation while the last 10 in U.P. are represented by the Union. All of these employees took
part in strike which, according to the Bank, were illegal. The strikes in which the two respective groups of
workmen took part were, however, for different
reasons.
The strike in which the Federation took part was
the result of the suspension by the Bank of its typist
Sabharwal employed in the Delhi Branch of the Bank
on April 17, 1951. It appears that Sabharwal, who
was the Secretary of the Punjab National Bank
Employees' Union, Delhi, had applied for leave foi:
seven days on April 3, 1951, but his application was
rejected; even so he absented himself from duty and
went to Bombay. As soon as he resumed his duties on
812
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
April 14, 1951, he was supplied with a writ.ten charge.
sheet for absence without leave which he refused to
N Th•.t;n!::'Ltd accept. It was then sent to him by registered post, and
"''an v. • • ·on April 17 he wss suspended. This suspension was
Its Workmen
followed by an immediate pen-down strike at the head
office of the Delhi Branch subsequent to which the
Gajendragadkar J. Bank suspended 60 other employees. This led to a
general strike in Delhi and many other branches and
it commenced at d1ffe'rent dates from April 18 to 20,
1951. On April 21-22, 1951, the Bank issued notices
calling upon all striking members of the staff to report
for duty by 10 a. m. on April 24, 1951, and it warned
them that if they did not comply with the notice it
would be taken that they had voluntarily ceased to be
its employees and their services would be deemed to
have terminated from that date. This was followed by
another notice on April 24 which announced. that the
s'trikers who had failed to report for duty as aforesaid
had ceased to be the employees of the Bank from
April 24, 1951. An option was, however, given to the
strikers who were still willing to rejoin duty to apply in
that behalf and explain their action in staying away.
It is common ground that the 140 employees represented by the Fed'.lration who had taken part in the strike
were dismissed by the Bank for absence due to the
strike. That is the genesis of th«i dispute between the
Bank and the Federation in relation to the 140
employees of the Bank.
The strike in which the remaining 10 employees of
the Bank from the U.P. branches are concerned commenced on April 23, 1951. This strike was in pursuance
of the strike notice served by the Union on the Bank
on April 22, 1951. This pen-down strike was a pa.rt of
the general strike which affected not only the Bank
but also the Allahabad Bank and other banks in the U.P.
region. The Regional Labour Commissioner of the U.P.
Government who intervened suggested that the general
strike should be called off and recommended that some
of the demands made by the strikers should be referre<l to the industrial tribunal for adjudication; in
accordance with this request, on April 30, 1951, the
strike committee decided to call off the strike and
r959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
advised workmen to join duty from May 1, 1951.
x959
This advice, however, did. not reach all the branches The Punjab
in time with the result that some of the employees of National Bank, Ltd.
the Bank offered to resume work on May 3, 1951. The
v.
other banks in the U.P. region took back their em- Its Workmen
ployees who rejoined on May 3, but the Bank refused . -to take back its employees on the ground that they Ga3endragadkar J.
had not offered to rejoin on or before the date fixed;
and so it proceeded to dismiss them. The dismissal
of the said 10 employees is also the subject-matter of
the present reference. That is how the reference is
concerned with the dismissal of 150 employees of the
Bank in all.
The strikes in question which affected the head office
and the large number of branches of the Bank operating in more than one State and a very large number
of its .employees caused public concern, and so the
Prime Minister and the Labour Department of the
Central Government thought it necessary to intervene;
and a conference was arranged at New Delhi between
the officers of the Government and the Bank. To this
conference the representatives of the Federation or the
Union were, however, not invited. This conference
led to an agreement as a result of which the Bank
undertook to reinstate all its employees who had taken
part in the strikes except those to whose reinstatement
it had" positive objections". This, however, was subject to the reservation that the number of such
employees was not to exceed 150 and that their cases
would be referred by the Central Government for
adjudication by a tribunal. This agreement was the
result of several meetings between the representatives
of the Bank and the Labour Department of the Central
Government and it was reached on or about May 9,
1951.
Thereafter the head office of the Bank sent a
circular letter to all its branches calling for names of
the employees who according to the branch managers
could not be considered for reinstatement. The list
of such employees received by the head office from
the respective managers of its branches was examined
by the head office and the Bank then compiled the
IO~
814
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]
list of 150 workmen whom it was not prepared to
reinstate. This list was in due course communicated
The P u"1k·abLtd by the Bank to the Central Government ; and in
N ationa 1 8 an •
. pursuance of t h e agreement aioresa1
"
"d t he Central
v.
Its workmen
Government referred the dispute in rl'!spect of the said
150 workmen for adjudication before the tribunal by
Gajendragadkar J. its notification issued on July 2, 1951.
Before the tribunal the case for the Federation and
the Union was that the refusal of the Bank to take
back the 150 workmen in question was a part of the
concerted and deliberate plan adopted by the management of the Bank for victimising the President, the
Vice-President, the General Secretary and Secretaries
and Treasurer of the Federation and of the working
committees of the different trade unions of workers
and the members of the strike committees, and it
showed that the sole object of the Bank in refusing to
take back those employees was to teach a lesson to
the Federation and the Union and to penalise all
active trade union workers who supported the cause
of the employees.
On the other hand, the Bank contended that the
strikes in which the 150 employees had participated
were illegal and had been resorted to not with a view
to obtain relief for the employees but with a view to
paralyse the business of the Bank and to scare away
its customers. 'l'he Bank further alleged that the
said 150 employees were guilty of "unpardonable
acts of violence, intimidation, coercion and victimisation."
The tribunal gave two interim awards by which it
directed the Bank to make some payments to the 150
employees by way of allowance pending the final
disposal of the dispute. On February 2, 1952, t.\ie
tribunal pronounced its final award. It held that the
strikes were illegal and that the Bank was entitled to
dismiss the employees solely on the ground that the
said employees had participated in an illegal strike. On
this view the tribunal did not think it necessary to
allow evidence to be given on the question as to
whether some of the strikers were guilty of specific
subversive or violent acts. It also did not allow
'959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOH.'l'S
815
evidence to be led by workmen in support of their
z959
:plea: that their ?ismissal w_as the result of victim- The Pllnjab
1sat10n. It demded the dispute on the sole ground National Bank, Ltd.
that the strikes were illegal and participation in illegal
v.
strikes justified the dismissal of the employees. Even Its Workmen
so the tribunal made an order directing the Bank to
pay certain amounts to the said employees on com- Gajendragadkar J.
passionate grounds.
The direction issued by the tribunal for the payment of the said amount was challenged by the Bank
by its appeal (No. 25 of 1952) before the Labour
Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called the appellate
tribunal), whereas the decision of the tribunal that the
150 employees were not entitled to reinstatement was
challenged by the two sets of employees by two different appeals (Nos. 69 and 70 of 1952). The appellate
tribunal recorded its interlocutary decision on September 22, 1952. As a result of this decision the
dispute was set down for further hearing on the points
indicated by it. It was. urged by the Bank before the
appellate tribunal as a prnliminary objection that the
appeals preferred by the employees were incompetent.
This objection was overruled. The appellate tribunal
then proceeded to consider two questions of law, (I)
whether an employer has the right to dismiss a workman for his absence from duty by reason of his mere
participation in an illegal strike, and (2) if he has, can
the tribunal scrutinise the exercise of that right and
grant relief to such a wor-kman when it comes to the
conclusion that the right has been exercised capriciously or by unfair labour practice. The appellate
tribunal held that the strike started by the Federation was illegal under s. 23 (b) read with s. 24 (I)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(14of1947) (hereinafter called the Act). It appears that on February 21, 1950, an industrial dispute between the Bank
and the Federation had been referred to the arbitration of Mr. Campbell Puri, and whilst the proceedings
in the said reference were pending before the tribunal
the strike was commenced on or about April 17, 1951.
That is why the strike was illegal. The appellate
tribunal, however, held that, even if mere participation
816
~959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
in an illegal strike by workmen is assumed to give the
employer certain rights against the striking workmen,
Natio:alB:;,; Ltd.the employer can waive these rights, that is to say,
v.
'
rafrain from exercising those rights against the work/ts Workmen
men. According to the appellate tribunal such waiver
. ·. or relinquishment can be inferred from conduct,
Ga1endragadkar /. and it thought that the conduct of the Bank evidenced by the agreement which it reached with the
Central Government on or about May 9, 1951, unambiguously proved that it had waived or relinquished its
rights to take any penal action against its employees
merely for their participation in the illegal strike. In
other words, the effect of the findings of the appellate
tribunal was that, though the strike was illegal, by its
conduct the Bank had precluded itself from exercising
its alleged right to dismiss its employees for their
participation in such an illegal strike.
The appellate tribunal also considered the general
question of law as to whether participation in an
illegal strike can be said to d.eserv«J dismissal of the
striking workmen. It took the view that an illegal
strike absolves the liability of the employer to pay to
its employees wages during the period of absence of
the striking workmen, but that it cannot be stated as
a genera.I proposition that participation in. an illegal
strike would by itself necessarily involve the penalty
of dismissal. The Bank attempted to justify the dismissal in the present case by urging that the 150
employees were guilty of violent or subversive acts
but the appellate tribunal held that it was not open to
the Bank at that stage to plead in justification of
their dismissal any such acts of violence or subversive
acts. "There is abundant authority", observed the
appellate tribunal, " for the proposition that an employer can justify before the tribunal a di~missa.l only
on the ground on which he purported to dismiss him
and not a ground different from it". That is why in
· the end the appellate tribunal held that the dismissals
were wrongful. The appellate tribunal had no doubt
that mere participation by a workman in an illegal
strike or his absence due to such participation does
not entitle an employer to dismiss him and that it is
Th P
. b
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
817
open to a tribunal to order reinstatement in a proper
x959
case. Having reached this conclusion the appellate Th -;- . b
tribunal observed that "thoug~ in the case of wrong- Natio:az ;0~:. Ltd.
ful dismissals the normal rule is that .the employees
v.
wrongfully dismissed should be reinstated, it would Its Workmen
nevertheless be necessary to consider the question of ..
reinstatement in the case of each individual employee Ga;endragadkar f.
in the light of requirements of social justice and fair
play for which the employee claims and industrial
peace and discipline which the employer emphasizes."
In order to decide the cases of the several employees
from this twofold point of view the appellate tribunal
thought it was necessary to allow the parties to lead
additional evidence on relevant points. The employees
wanted to lead evidence in support of their case
of victimisation and they were allowed to do so by the
appellate tribunal. The Bank wanted.to lead evidence
on five points. The appellate tribunal held that
evidence on items (3) and (5) would be irrelevant and
it thought that item (4) was too vague. That is why
the Bank was allowed to lead evidence only in respect
of item (2) and some heads mentioned in item (1). In
the result opportunity was given to the parties to lead
evidence on the following points: (1) victimisation, (2)
past service records of the 150 employees, (3) conduct
of those 150 employees or any of them during the
strike confined to acts of violence, intimidating loyal
workers and acts subversive of the credit of the Bank,
(4) employment which any of those 150 persons got
after this dismissal, the period during which they
were in employment and the wages or emoluments
they received. The appellate tribunal ,then directed
the Bank to file a statement within a month giving
particulars of the acts confined to the matters on which
the Bank was allowed to lead evidence in respect of
each one 0f the 150 employees after supplying .a copy
of the same, one to the Federation and one to the
Union. In the meanwhile the appellate tribunal
directed the Bank to make interim payments to the
employees as indicated in its order.
This interlocutary judgment was challenged by the
Bank before this Court by its appeal under Art. 136
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
of the Constitution. On behalf of the Bank it was
urged that the conclusion of the appellate tribunal
Nati.:al ;:~:.Ltd. that the Bank had ,condoned the illegal strike by its
v.
workmen was 1mjustified and that it was open to the
Its Workmen
Bank to rely upon the illegal strike as justifying the
dismissal of the said workmen. The case of the Bank
Gajendragadkar f. thus was that the order passed by the appellate
tribunal setting down the dispute for further enquiry
was illegal and should be set aside. The judgment of
this Court delivered by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., shows
that this Court thought it unnecessary to express any
opinion on the question of condonation or waiver of
the illegal strike because, in its opinion, even if there
was no such condonation or waiver and even if it was
open to the Bank to rely upon the illegal strike as a
valid ground for dismissing its employees, there was
no doubt that the order of dismissal was illegal having
regard to the provisions of s. 33 of the Act. The said
section furnished a short answer to the Bank's conten·
tion that the appellate tribunal had no jurisdiction to
order reinstatement of the 150 workmen. In other
words, just as the strike of the employees was illegal so
was the order of dismissal passed by the Bank illegal
and for a similar reason. S. 23(b) of the Act made the
strike illegal while s. 33 of the Act made the dismissal
also illegal. In the result the appeal preferred by the
Bank was dismissed; and it was held that there was no
substance in the plea of the Bank that the appellate
tribunal had no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement of
the employees. This judgment was pronounced on
April 10, 1953.
The proceedings before the appellate tribunal were
subsequently resumed and they terminated on January 4, 1955, when the appellate tribunal directed the
reinstatement of the 136 employees and passed
incidental orders about the payment of their wages.
It refused to reinstate the remaining 14 employees but
passed orders in regard to payment of compensation
even in their cases. Before the appellate tribunal four
general points were sought to be raised at this subsequent hearing. The first was in regard to the invalidity of the reference itself. The second was in regard to
'959
Th
P
. b
S.C.R.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
819
the ultra vires character of the relevant provisions of
z959
the Act. Both these contentions were not allowed to
h P
. b
be raised by the appellate tribunal and they have not N 1'{;,n:IB::~a Ltd.
been urged before us either. The third contention a
v.
'
raised was that both the strikes were not bona fide Its workmen
ar.d so the striking workmen were not entitled to
reinstatement; and the last contention was·that the Gajendragadkar f.
peri-down strike was illegal and participation in it
should be considered as a circumstance disqualifying
the strikers from reinstatement. The appellate tribunal
has held that the strikes in question were bona fide
and that mere participation in the pen-down strike
canno.t be treated as a valid ground for refusing reinstatement to the strikers. It considered the evidence
led by the parties in regard to the character of the
strike, and it held that the definite instruction issued
to the employees was to continue occupation of their
seats till the police intervened and threatened to arrest
and so it was not prepared to accept the employees'
case that the pen-down strikers "vacated their seats on
the mere a.sking by the management" According to
the finding, tlie persons who took part in the pen-down
strike not only ceased to work but continued to occupy
their seats. The appellate tribunal also found that the
pen-down strikers were quiet and peaceful, that no
slogans were shouted, no attempt at violence or
coercion was made and that they simply occupied their
seats without doing any work.
It was conceded before the appella~e tribunal that
pen-down strike falls within the definition of strike
prescribed by s. 2( q) of the Act ; but it was urged that
the act of not vacating their seats when asked by the
management to do so introduced an element of illegality and made the strikers liable in a civil court for
trespass. The appellate tribunal was not impressed
with this argument but it held that even if the striking
workmen are assumed to have made themselves liable
for civil trespass that itself would not be sufficient
ground for refusing reinstatement.
It appears that the Bank relied upon several documents to show that the employees w:ere guilty of subversive actions during the course of the strilce. The
820
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]
appellate tribunal was not satisfied that these docuThe----;;- ·.ab ments were genuine and could be effectively pressed
Nationarn:".:k, Ltd. iuto service by the Bank in support of its case. It was
v.
also urged by the Bank that during the course of the
Its Workmen
strike posters and circulars were issued which were
. clearly subversive of the credit of the Bank and it was
Ga1endragadkar J. contended that employees who were guilty of issuing
such posters and circulars did not deserve reinstatement. The appellate tribunal examined these documents and held that three of them amounted to subversive acts. They are Exs. 255(a), 255(c) and 302.
In regard to Ex. 302 the findings recorded by the
appellate tribunal in two places of its decision a.re
somewhat inconsistent; but the operative portion of
the decision shows that the appellate tribunal was
inclined to hold that Ex. 302 was also objectionable
and that it amounted to a subversive a.ct. The rest
of the documents no doubt use.d strong and intemperate language but the appellate tribunal was not prepared to treat them as constituting subversive activity.
On this finding a question which arose before the
appellate tribunal was: Who should be held responsible
for the offending documents ? The appellate tribunal
was not prepared to hold all the 150 employees responsible for them. In this connection it considered the
statement made by H. N. Puri in this evidence and
it held that sinlle Puri had admitted that he consulted
11 specified persons in preparing Exs. 255(a) and 255(c)
as well as other documents they must share the responsibility for the said documents along with Puri.
Similarly the appellate tribunal held that the persons
who were shown to have been responsible for Ex. 302
must be treated on the same basis. It was as a result of
this finding that the appellate tribunal refused to
direct reinstatement of 14 employees. In regard to
the remaining 136 employees the appellate tribunal
held that it would not be right to impute the responsibility for the publication of the three subversive documents to them merely because they were members of
the working committee or were otherwise active leaders
of the Union. The appellate tribunal the considered
the voluminous evidence led by the parties in respect
'9:19
..
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
of each one of the 150 employees, and it held that in
r959
regard to the 136 employ~es no case. had been made The Punjab
out by the Bank for refusmg them remstatement.
National Bank, Ltd.
It is clear from the decision of the appellate tribunal
v.
that it was not at all satisfied with a substantial part Its Workmen
of the documentary evidence
. d -dk
.
ladduced by the Bank. Ga1en
raga ar 1
· •
It held that the affida v1ts fi ed by the Bank were
sometimes prepared en masse and the deponents simply
put their signatures on them. In most of the affidavits
there were blank spaces for the name, parentage and
age of the deponents and they have been subsequently
filled up in ink. Some of them, though sworn at
different places, used identical language; while in some
others material additions and alterations have been
made which do not bear the initials either of the deponents or of the oath commissioner. It appeared to
the appellate tribunal that some of the statements
made by the witnesses of the Bank showed that their
affidavits had been prepared by the Bank's lawyers
and they simply put their signatures thereon and
affirmed them before the oath commissioner. Indeed the
appellate tribunal apparently thought that there was
some force in the contention raised by the employees
that some of the documents produced by the Bank
had been manufactured or tampered with long after
the strike was over. It has noticed the argument
urged by the Bank that even ifit was so the Bank cannot be condemned for the act or acts of its branch
managers in that behalf. This argument did not
appeal to the appellate tribunal. Thus the decision
of the appellate tribunal substantially upheld the case
made by the employees in that it directed the reinstatement of the 136 out of the 150 employees and
ordered payment of compensation to the remaining 14
whose reinstatement was not granted.
This decision has given rise to the three present
appeals before us. Civil Appeal No. 519 of 1958 has
been filed by the Bank against the order of reinstatement in respect of 126 employees represented by the
Federation. Similarly Civil Appeal No. 520 of 1958
has been filed by the Bank against the order directing
104
822
z959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
the reinstatement of 10 employees represented by the
Tiu Punjab
Union; and Civil ;!ppeal N~: 521 of 1958 has been
Nationa1Bank,L14. filed by the Federat10n on behalf of the 14 employees
v.
the claim for whose reinstatement has been rejected.
Ils Wtwk,....
In regard to the first two appeals preferred by the
• Bank special leave was granted to the Bank on
G•Jendr•g• 411., J, February 21, 1958, limited to grounds (b), (c), (d), (f)
and (g) set out in paragraph 162 of its petitions. These
grounds are :(b) Whether employees, who have been propagating against the stability and solvency of the Bank
by propagarn;la oral as well as written through open
letters, posters, leaflets and hand-bills amongst the
customers and constituents of the Bank and the
public at large before, during and after an illegal
strike are entitled to an order of reinstatement ?
(c) Whether after the declaration of an illegal
strike, forcible occupation of the seats and refusal to
vacate them, when ordered to do so by the Management;, does not constttute as act of criminal trespass,
it having been held by the appellate tribunal that
the employees formed a large riotous assembly in
and outside the premises of the Bank and delivered
fiery and provocative speeches to accompaniment of
scurrilous slogans directed against the institution
and its high officers with a view to render impossible
the business of the institution, are entitled to an
order of reinstatement ?
(d) Whether a 'pen-down' strike of such a character does not contravene the provisions of the law
of the land and is exempted under theTrade Unions
Act -0r the Industrial Disputes Act ?
(f) Whether employees, who, notwithstanding the
fact that they resorted to an illegal strike and were
guilty of rioting, had been invited by the Management to come back and resume work and who
spurned at this offer and in so m4tny words treated
it with contempt and whose places had, therefore,
to be replaced by fresh recruits are entitled to an
order that those fresh recruits be dismissed and
replaimd by the strikers ?
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
823
(g) Whether it is open to the employees of a
x959
concern to raise with their Employers a question a.s
to w~ether the Employers should employ in. their Nat~!:{;;!,;!:Ltd,
service employees of a concern other than their own
v.
and whether such a question constitutes an 'indus- Its Wo•lmun
trial dispute' within the meaning of the Industrial
Disputes Act ?
Gajendragadkar ].
It may be mentioned that the Bank's petitions had
raised several other grounds in paragraph 162 but
leaye has not been granted to the Bank to raise any
of ~hem.
Almost a month and a half after limited leave was
thus granted to the Bank the Federation filed its
petition for special leave on April 4, 1955, and it
applied for condonation of delay made in presenting
the petition. On April 9, 1956, this Court granted the
employees' application for condonation of delay and
gave special leave to them to prefer their appeal. This
leave has not been limited to any particular grounds.
Broadly stated these are the relevant facts which give
rise to the three present appeals.
Before dealing with the merits of these appeals we
must consider two preliminary objections raised by
the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the employees. He has claimed that if these objections are
upheld the Bank's appeals would have to be dismissed.
and the employees' appeal allowed without considering
the merits of the orders under appeal. In pressing
these objections he urged that the questions raised
were of considerable importance, and, though he
conceded that some aspects of the matter were covered
by the previous decisions of this Court, he requested
us to examine the whole question afresh once more.
We would accordingly deal with these contentions at
some length.
The first contention is that as a result of the decision
of this Court in the appeal preferred by the Bank
against the interlocutary judgment of the appellate
tribunal, the whole of the enquiry held by the said
tribunal pursuant to the said interlocutary judgment
is invalid and infructuous. 'rhis Court has held that
the dismissal of the 150 employees is illegal having
824
•959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
regard to the provisions of s. 33 of the Act; if the
The Punjab
dismissal is illegal it is void and inoperative and as
National Bank, Lia.such it cannot be said to have terminated the relationv.
ship of master and servant between the B>!-nk and its
11
' Workmen
employees. Despite the said order of dismissal the
Gajendragadkar
1_.employees continued to be in the employment of the
Bank and are entitled to reinstatement without any
further enquiry. That, it is said, is the effect of the
Bank's failure to comply with the provisions of s. 33.
It is next contended that the.Bank does not dispute
the fact that it had held no enquiry into the alleged
misconduct of its employees before it passed the
impugned orders of dismissal against them. It is well
established that even where an employer is justified in
terminating the services of his employees he is bound
to give them a charge-sheet and hold a proper enquiry
at which they would have a chance to meet the said
charge-sheet. This requirement is universally treated
as consistent with natural justice and fairplay and
since the Bank has not complied with it the impugned
orders of dismissal are wholly invalid for this additional reason ; and the result again would be that the
said orders are inoperative and void and the employees
are entitled to reinstatement as a matter of course.
In support of this argument reliance has been placed
on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of The
High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner
for Pakistan and I. M. Lall('). This decision holds
that the order of dismissal passed against a person
who is a member of the Civil Service of the Crown in
India without complying with the mandatory relevant
provisions of s. 240 of the Government of India Act,
l935, is void and inoperative, and that the Civil
Servant against whom such an order is passed is
entitled to a decla.ration that he remained a member
of the Indian Civil Service at the date of the institution of the suit in which he challenged the validity of
the impugned order. Similarly in Khem Chand v. The
Union of India('), this Court has held that an order
of dismissal passed against a public servant specified
in Art. 311 (a) without complying with the mandatory
(t) 75 I. A. 225.
(•) [1958) S.C.R. Io8o.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
825
provisions of Art. 311 (2) is void and that the public
x959
servant sought to be dismissed by such an invalid
h
order continued to be a member of the service at the Nation:!;:~':uil
date of the institution of the suit. It is in the light
v.
· •
of these decisions that the learned Attorney-General Its Workmm
asks us to hold that the relationship between the Bank . and its employees remains wholly unaffected hy the GaJendragadkar J.
orders of dismissal passed by the Bank against them;
and so, as soon as the orders are held to be void
nothing more remains to be done but to make a
declaration a.bout the the continua.nee of the relation~hip of master and servant between the parties and to
direct reinstatement. Thus presented the argument
no doubt appears prima facie to be attractive; but, in
our opinion, a careful examination of the relevant
sections of the Act shows that it is not valid.
The three sections of the Act which are relevant are
ss. 33, 33A and 10. Let us first considers. 33. This
section has uridergone several changes but we are
concerned with. it as it stood in 1951. It provides
inter alia that during the pendency of aµy proceedings
before a tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute
no employer shall discharge or punish, whether by
dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in
such dispute save with the express permission in
writing of the tribunal. It is clear that in cases to
which this section applies a ban has been imposed on
th~ power of the employer to dismiss his employees
save with· the express permission in writing of. the
tribunal. The object of the Legislature in enacting
this section is obvious. By imposing the ban s. 33
attempts to provide for the continuance and termination of the pending proceedings in a. peaceful atmosphere undisturbed by any causes of friction between
the employer and his employees. In substance it
insists upon the maintenance of the status quo pending
the disposal of the industrial dispute between the
parties; nevertheless it recognises that occasions may
arise when the employer may be justified in discharging or punishing by dismissal his employees ; and so
it allows the employer to take such action subject to
the condition that before doing so he must obtain the
826
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
'959
express permission in writing of the tribunal. It is
The Punjab
true that· the ban is imposed in terms which are
National Bank, Ltd.mandatory and s. 31(1) makes the contravention of
the provisions of s. 33 an offence punishable as
prescribed therein. But the question which calls for
our decision is: What is the effect of such contravenGaj•n4r•gadkar f·t"10n on the d e01s10n
' ·
' d us t na
· 1 d"isput e ansmg
' ·
of the m
from it?
Where an application is made by the employer for
the requisite permission under s. 33 the jurisdiction
of the tribunal in dealing with such an application is
limited. It has to consider whether a prima ja;:,ie
case has been made out by the employer for the dismis£al of the employee in question. If the employer has
held a proper enquiry into the alleged misr.onduct of
the employee, and if it does not appear that the proposed dismissal of the employee amounts to victimisation or an unfair labour practice, the tribunal has to
limit its enquiry only to the question as to whether
a prima ja;:,ie case has been made out or not. In these
proceedings it is not open to the tribunal to consider
whether the order proposed to be passed by the
employer is proper or adequate or "whether it errs on
the side of excessive severity; nor can the tribunal
grant permission, subject to certain conditions, which
it may deem to be fair. It has merely to consider the
prima fa;:,ie aspect of the matter and either grant the
permission or refuse it according as it holds that a
prima fa;:,ie case is or is not made out by the employer.
But it is significant that even if the requisite permission is granted to the employer under s. 33 that
would not be the end of the matter. It is not as if
the permission granted under s. 33 validates the order
of dismissal. It merely removes the ban ; and so the
validity of the ·order of dismissal still can be, and
often is, challenged by the union by raising an industrial dispute in that behalf. The effect of compliance
with the provisions of s. 33 is thus substantially different from the effect of compliance with s. 240 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, or Art. 311(2) of the
Constitution. In the latter classes of cases, an order
of dismissal passed after duly complying with the
v.
Its Workmen
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
i959
relevant statutory provisions is final and its validity
or propriety iB no longer open to dispute; but in the
. .ab
case of s. 33 the removal of the _ha~ merely enables t~e .Nat'f::,:{;;~11 • Lttl.
·employer to make an order of d1sm1ssal and thus av01d
v.
incurring the penalty imposed by s. 31(1). But if a.n Its Wo•kmen
industrial dispute is raised on such a dismissal, the
. . l passed even w1'th th e r~qms
. t e per- Gajendragatlkar J.
ord er of d ISm1ssa.
mission obtained under s. 33 has to face the scrutiny. of
the tribunal.
The decisions of this Court show that this position
is well established. In Atherton West & Go. Ltd. v.
Suti Mills 1~1azdoor Union (1) this Court was dealing
with the provisions of cl. 23 of the relevant U. P.
Government notification which is similar to the provisions of s. 33 of the Act. " The enquiry to be conducted by the Regional Conciliation Officer under the
said clause", observed Bhagwati, J., "was not an
enquiry into an industrial dispute as to the nonemployment of workmen who was sought to be
discharged or dismissed which industrial dispute would
only a.rise after an employer, his ag~t or manager
discharged or dismissed the workman in accordance
with the written permission obtained from the officer
concerned. The only effect of obtaining permiesion
from the officer concerned was to remove the ban
imposed on the employer. But the order of dismissal
passed after obtaining the requisite permission can
still become the subject-matter of a.n'industrial dispute
under s. 2(k) of the Act and the workman who has
been dismissed would be entitled to have the industrial dispute referred to the appropriate authority."
In The Automobile Products of India, Ltd. v. Rukmaji
Bala & Ors. (2 ), this Court was dealing with a similar
problem posed by the provisions of s. 22· of Act 48 of
1950, and s. 33 of the Act. Dea.ling with t.he effect of
these sections this Court held that the object of s. 33
was to protect the workmen against the victimisation
by the employer and to ensure the termination of the
proceedings in connection with the industrial disputes
in a. peaceful atmosphere. That being so, all that the
tribunal, exercising its jurisdiction uqder s. 33, is
(I) {I9S~l s.c.R. 780,
(11) [1955] I s.c.R. 1241.
828
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
required to do is to grant or withhold the permission,
that is to say, either to lift or to maintain the ban.
.
Na1Th•{';n1;bL<a This section does not confer any power on the tribunal
"""'v. an ' ·to adjudicate upon any other dispute or to impose
Its workmen
conditions as a prerequisite for granting the permission
asked for by the employer. The same view has been
Gajendragadkar !·expressed in Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt.
Ram Sariip (1).
In cases where an industrial dispute is raised on the
ground of dismissal and it is referred to the tribunal
for adjudication, the tribunal naturally wants to know
whether the impugned dismissal was preceded by a.
proper enquiry or not. Where such a proper enquiry
has been held in accordance with the provisions of the
relevant standing orders and it does not appear that
the employer was guilty of victimisation or any unfair
labour practice, that tribunal is generally reluctant to
interfere with the impugned order. The limits of the
tribunal's jurisdiction in dealing with such industrial
disputes have been recently considered by this Court
in the Indian· Iron & Steel Oo. Ltd. v. Their Work'
men(•) and it has been held that the powers of the
tribunal to interfere with cases of dismissal a.re not unlimited because the tribunal does not act as a court of
appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the
management. In this judgment this Court has indicated the classes of cases in which the tribunal would
·he justified in interfering with the impugned order of
dismissal. It would and should interfere when there
is want of good faith, when there is victimisation or
. unfair labour practice, when the management has been
guilty of a basic error or violation of the principle of
'natural justfoe, or when, on the .materials, the finding
of tlie management is completely baseless or perverse.
The same view has been again expresseu by this Court
in G. McKenzie & Oo., Ltd., and Its Workmen(•).
There is another prineiple which has to be borne in
mind when the tribunal deals with an industrial dis. pute a.rising from the dismissal of an employee. We
have already pointed out that before an employer can
'959
(1) [1956) S.C.R. 916.
(2) (1958] s.c.R. 667·
(') (1959) I L.L.]. 08••
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~lismiss his employee
829
he has to hold a proper enquiry
z959
into the alleged misconduct of th~ e~ployee and that Th• Punjab
such an enquiry must always begm with the supply of National /Jank, Ltd.
a specific crharge-shf'et to the employee. In Lakshmi
v.
Devi Sugar Mills, Ltd. (1), it has been held by this Its Workmen
CQurt that in dealing with the merits of the dismissal
of an employee the employer would be confined to the Gajen4ragadkar 1•
charge-sheet given by him to his employee when an
enquiry was held into his conduct. It would not be
open to the employer to add any further charges
against the employee and the case would have to be
considered on the original charge-sheet as it was framed. It i3 significant that in the case of Lakshmi Devi
Sugar Mills, Ltd. (1), this Court was apparently inclined
to take the view that the additional acts of insubordination on which the appellant-mills wanted to rely would
have justified the employee's dismissal; but even so it
was not allowed to raise that plea because the said plea
had not been included in the original charge-sheet.
It, thetefore, follows that where a proper enquiry has
been held by the employer and findings are recorded
against the employee that the principles laid down by
this Court in the case of Indian Iron & Steel Go.
Ltd. (2 ) would be applicable; and in applying the said
principles the employer would be confined to the
grounds set out by him in hi.S charge-sheet against the
employee.
This position is not disputed before us. Indeed the
learned Attorney-General contends that the principles
applicable to the decision of an industrial dispute
arising from the dismissal of an employee to which
we have just referred serve to emphasise the obligatory character of the limitation imposed on the
employer by s. 33 of the Act and by the requirements
of natural justice that every dismissal must be preceded by a proper enquiry. Where the ban imposed by
s. 33 of the Act has been defied and/or where a
proper enquiry has. · not been held at all the
action of the employer in dismissing his employee
must be treated as voi<j and inoperative. Such a case
(1) [1956J s.c.R. 916.
(al [1958) s.c.R. 66,-.
105
830
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
'95 9
stands outside the principles which we have discussed
The Punjab
so far. That iu brief is the main contention raised
National Bank.Ltd. by the employees.
v.
This contention is, however, untenable ~n view of
Its Workmen
the decisions of this Court where the provisions of
G .
s. 33A have been construed and considered, and so
d -
•Jen ragadkar f. we must now turn to s. 33A. This section was inserted
in the Act in 1950. Before it was enacted the only
remedy available to ,the employees against the breach
of s. 33 was to raise an industrial dispute in that
behalf and to move the appropriate Government for
its reference to the adjudication of a tribunal under
s. 10 of the Act. The trade union movement in the
country complained that the remedy of asking for a
reference under s. 10 involved delay and left the
redress of the grievance of the employees entirely in
the discretion of the appropriate Government;
because even in cases of contravention of s. 33 the
appropriate Government was not bound to refer the
f dispute under s. 10. That is why s. 33A was enacted
fpr making a special provision for adjudication as to
whether 8. 33 has been contravened. This section
enables an employee aggrieved by such contravention
to make a complaint in writing in the prescribed
manner to the tribunal and it adds that on receipt
of such complaint the tribunal shall adjudicate
upon it as if it is a dispute referred to it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It also requires
the tribunal to submit its award to the appropriate
Government and the provisions of the Act shall then
apply to the said award. It would thus be noticed
that by this section an employee aggrieved by a
wrongful
order of dismissal passed against him in
1
· contravention of s. 33 is given a right to move the
tribunal in redress of his grievance without having
to take recourse to s. 10 of the Act.
After this -section was thus enacted the scope of
the enquiry contemplated by it became the subjectmatter of controversy between the employers and the
employees. This Court had occasion to dea.l with this
controversy in the case of the Automobile Products of
India Ltd. ('). Das, J., as he then was, who delivered
I
(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 1241.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
the judgment of the Court construed s. 33A of the Act
z959
and the corresponding s. 23 of Act 48 of 1950, which Th P .ab
applied to the Labour Appellate Tribunal then in NatiO:az s:~k, Ltd."
existence, and observed that " the scheme of the
v.
section clearly indicates that the authority to whom Its Workmen
the complaint is made is to decide both the issues, . -viz., (1) the effect of contravention, and (2) the merits Ga;endragadkar f.
of the· act or order of the employer". "The provision in the section that the complaint shall be dealt
with by the tribunal as if it were a dispute referred to
or pending before it quite clearly indicates", said the
learned Judge, "that the jurisdiction of the authority
is not only to decide whether there has been a failure
on the part of the employer to obtain the permission
of the authority before taking action but also to go
into the merits of the complaint and grant appropriate
reliefs (p. 1253) ". It was urged before this Court
that in holding an enquiry under s. 33A the tribunal's
duty was only to find out whether there had been a
contravention of s. 33, and if it found that there was
such a. contravention to make a declaration to that
effect. 'l'he argument was that no further question
can or should be considered i,n such as enquiry. This
contention was, however, rejected.
The same question was raised before this Court in
Equitable Coal Co. Ltd. v. Algu Singh (1 ) and following
the previous decision of this Court in the case of the
Automobile Products of India Ltd. (2 ) it was held that
in an enquiry under s. 23 two qustions fall to be considered: ls the fact of contravention of the provisions
of s. 22 proved? If yes, is the order passed by the employer against the employee justified on the merits ?
Thus there can be no doubt that in an enquiry under
s. 33A the employee would not succeed in obtaining
an order of reinstatement merely by proving contravention of s. 33 by the employer. After such contravention is proved it would still be open to the employer to justify the impugned dismissal on the merits.
That is a part of the dispute which the tribunal has to
consider because the complaint made by the employee
is treated as a.n industrial dispute and all the relevant
(1) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 761.
(2) [1955] I 's.C.R. 1241.
832
SUPREME COURT REPOitTS [1960(1)]
aspects of the said dispute fall to be considered under
s. 33A. Therefore, we cannot accede to the argument
Nai{.!:/';;;::.bLtd. that th_e en_quiry under s. 33~ is confined only to the
v.
determmat10n of the quest10n as to whether the
Its workmen alleged contravention by the employer of the provisions of s. 33 has been proved or not.
Gajendragadkar 1 · In the present case the impugned orders of dismissal
have given rise to an industrial dispute which has
been referred to the tribunal by the appropriate
Government under s. 10. There can be no doubt that
if under a complaint filed under s. 33A a tribunal has
to deal not only with the question of contravention
but also with the merits of the order of dismissal, the
position cannot be any different when a reference is
made to the tribunal like the present under s. 10.
What is true about the scope of enquiry under s. 33A
is a fortiori true in the case of an enquiry under s. 10.
What is referred to the tribunal under s. 10 is the
industrial dispute between the Bank and its employees.
The alleged contravention by the Bank of s. 33 is no
doubt one of the points which the tribunal has to
decide ; but the decision on this question does not
conclude the enquiry. The tribunal would have also
to consider whether the impugned orders of dismissal
arc otherwise justified; and whether, in 'the light of
the relevant circumstances of the case, an order of
reinstatement should or should not be passed. It is
only after all these aspects have been considered by
the tribunal that it can adequately deal with the
industrial dispute referred to it and make an appropriate award.
In this connection it would be relevant to remember
that in dPaling with industrial disputes arising out of
dismissal of employees the tribunal undoubtedly has
jurisdiction to direct reinstatement in propgr cases.
The question about the jurisdiction of an industrial
tribunal to direct reinstatement was raised as early as
1949, before the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay(').
In this case the Federal Court considered the larger
question about the powers of industrial tribunals in
r959
.
(1) [1949) F.C.R. 321.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
all its aspects and rejected the argur.ient of the emx959
ployer that to invest the tribunal with jurisdiction to Tk - ; . b
order re-employment amounts to giving it authority Nation:z B:=~~ I.Id.
to make a contract between two persons when one of
v.
them is unwilling to enter into a contract of employ- Its Workmen
ment at all. " This argument ", observed Mahajan, J ., . as he then was, "overlooks the fact that when a Ga1endragadkar J.
dispute arises about the employment of a person at the
instance of a trade union or a trade union objects to
the employment of a certain person, the definition of
industrial dispute would cover both those cases. In
each of those cases, although the employer may be
unwilling to do so, there will be jurisdiction in the
tribunal to direct the employment or non-employment
of the person by the employer". The learned Judge
also added that " the disputes of this character being
covered by the definition of the expression ' industrial
disputes,' there appears no logical ground to exclude
an award of reinstatement from the jurisdiction of
the inJustrial tribunal." Since this judgment was
pronounced the authority of the industrial tribunals
to direct reinstatement in appropriate cases has never
been questioned.
In exercising its jurisdiction to direct reinstattiment
of dismissed employees industrial tribunals have
indicated certain general considerations for their own
guidance. In the case of a wrongful dismissal the
normal rule adopted in industrial adjudication is that
reinstatement should be ordered. "But", observed the
:Full Bench of the Labour Appellate 'rribunal in
Buckingham & Carnatic 11fills Ltd., And Their Workmen (1 ), " in so ordering the tribunal is expected to be
inspired by a sense of fairplay towards the employee
on the one hand and considerations of discipline in
the concern on the other. The past record of the
employee, the nature of his alleged present lapse and
the ground on which the order of the management is
set aside are also relevant factors for consider'ation."
It is obvious that no hard and fast rule can be laid
down in dealing with this problem. Each case must
be considered on its own merits, and, in reaching the
(1) [1951] Il L.L.J. 3I•h
834
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
final decision an attempt must be made to reconcile
'959
the conflicting claims made by the employee and the
.
employer. The employee is entitled to security of
Th• Pun1ab
service and should be protected against wrongful disNatwnal Bank, Ltd. missals, and so the normal rule would be reinstate11, ;;,kmen
ment in such cases. Nevertheless in unusual or
exceptional cases the tribunal may have to consider
Gajendragadkar J ·whether,.in the interest of the industry itself, it would
be desirable or expeaient not to direct reinstatement.
As in many other matters arising before the industrial
courts for their decision this question also has to be
decided after balancing the relevant factors and without adopting any legalistic or doctrinaire a pp roach.
No such considerations can be relevant in cases where
in civil courts the validity of dismissals is challenged
on the ground of non-compliance with s. 240 of the
Government of India Act, 1935 or Art. 311(2) of the
Constitution.
There is one more point which still remains to be
considered and that is the effect of the Bank's default
it not holding an enquiry in the present case. If the
Bank has not held any enquiry it cannot obviously
contend before the tribunal that it has bona fide exercised the managerial functions and authority in passing
the orders of dismissal and that the tribunal should be
slow to interfere with the said orders. It is true as we
have already pointed out that if the employer holds a
proper enquiry, makes a finding in respect of the
alleged misconduct of the employee and then passes
an order of dismissal the tribunal would be slow to
interfere wi.th such an order and would exercise its
jurisdiction within the limits prescribed by this Court
in The case of Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (1).
But it follows that if no enquiry has in fact ·been
held by the employer; the issue about the merits of the
impugned order of dismissal is at large before the
tribunal and, on the evidence adduced before it, the
tribunal has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved, and if yes, what would be
proper order to make. In such a case the point about
the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at
(3J [1958] S.C.R. 667,
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
835
all. This answers the argument which Mr. Sanyal has
I959
raised before us in his appeal.
Th p . b
.
•
e un1a
Mr. Sanyal, however, seeks to derive support to his National Bank, Ltd.
argument from the decision of the Labour Appellate
v.
Tribunal in The Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd., Its Workmen
1lfadras And Their Workers(!). In that case the orderG. d-dk
.
of remstatement
passe d b y t h e tn'b una l was reverse d a1en raga ar 1•
in appeal by the appellate tribunal which observed
that in dealing with cases of dismissal where the
management had acted bona fide and with knowledge
and experience of the problems which confronted in
the daily work of the concern it should be considered
to be well qualified to judge what sentence would be
appropriate, and the sentence imposed by the management should normally stand subject to the qualification that it must not be unduly severe. It is obvious
that in that case the management had held a proper
enquiry and the question which arose for decision was
what are the limits of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
in dealing with an industrial dispute arising from an
order of dismissal passed by an employer after holding a proper enquiry. The principles applicable to
such a case have been already considered by us; but
they can have no application to the present case
where the employer has held no enquiry at all. Therefore, this decision on which Mr. Sanyal relies is
irrelevant.
The position then is that the effect of the double
default committed by the employer is not to limit the
enquiry to the decision of the sole question as to the
commission of the said default, and so.. despite the
said default the subsequent enquiry held by· the
appellate tribunal pursuant to its interlocutory judgment was proper and legal. The two preliminary
objections raised by the learned Attorney-General must,
therefore, fail.
Let us now deal with the two appeals filed by the
Bank (Civil Appeals Nos. 519 and 520 of 1958). We
have already indicated that in dealing with these
appeals we have to bear in mind the limitations
imposed by the nature of the limited leave granted to
(1) (1951) II L.L.J. 204.
836
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
•959
the Bank; it is only the grounds specifically covered
The Punjab . by the leave which fall to be considered, and even
National Bank, Ltd these grounds will necessarily have to be dealt with in
v.
the light of the findings already recorded by the
11
' Wo~men
appellate tribunal whi?h are no longer open to challenge.
Gajendragadkar
The subsequent enqmry held by the appellate tribunal
1
·was limited to the question as to whether the Bank
was able to prove any specific circumstances which
disentitled the employees from claiming reinstatement.
In other words, the object of the said enquiry was to
ascertain the nature of the "positive objections" which
the Bank had against each one of them. The rest of
the matters in dispute between the parties are concluded by the other findings which have become final.
Considered in the light of these limitations the grounds
on which leave has been granted to the Bank must
first be examined. A bare perusal of the said grounds
would show that some of them are vague and they are
urged on assumptions of fact which run coun.ter to the
findings recorded by the appellate tribunal. That is
why when those appeals were urged before us,
Mr. Anand and Mr. Sanyal have recast their contentions within the frame-work of the grounds in respect
of which leave has been granted and have urged tho
following points before us: (l) that participation in a
pen-down strike is itself an activity of such a subversive
character that it disqualifies the employees who took
part in it from claiming the relief of reinstatement, (2)
that the publication and circulation of subversive
documents was the result of a concerted plan and
represent a collective activity of all the strikers and as
such all the employees before us should be held
responsible for it and on this ground reinstatement
should be refused to them, (3) that the finding recorded
by the appellate tribunal that only 14 persons were
directly and actively concerned with the preparation
and publication of the subversive documents is opposed
to the weight of evidence and is perverse, (4) that the
appellate tribunal erred in law in not taking into
account the fact that after the 150 employees were
dismissed the Bank has engaged fresh hands and the
order of reinstatement would, therefore, be unjust and
...
S.C.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
unfair, and (5) that the appellate tribunal was also in
z959
error in not taking into account the fact that some of The P . b
the employees have in the meanwhile taken employ- National;:~:. Ltd.
ment elsewhere. It is these five grounds which we are
v.
asked to consider by the Bank in its present appeals. Its workmen
Before dealing with these contentions we would like
to make one general observation. Though not in the Gajendragadkar J.
same form, in substance these contentions were raised
before the appellate tribunal in support of the plea
that the dismissed employees should not be reinstated.
As we have already emphasized whether or not reinstatement should be ordered in cases of wrongful or
illegal dismissals is normally a question of fact and in
deciding it several relevant factors have to be borne
in mind. If the appellate tribunal applied its mind to
those relevant factors and came to the conclusion that
14 employees did not deserve to be reinstated while
the remaining 136 did, we would be reluctant to interfere with the said order under Art. 136 unless it is
shown that the order suffers from an error which
raises a general or substantial question of law.
The first contention raised by the Bank is in regard
to the conduct of the employees in entering upon a
pen-down strike and its effect on their claim for reinstatement. The finding of the tribunal on this point
is that the persons who took part in the pen-down
strike not only ceased to work but continued to occupy
their seats. A tumultuou~ crowd .had gathered outside
the premises of the Bank and some pe,rsons in the
crowd were shouting slogans in support of the strike.
The strikers had been definitely instructed to stick to
their seats until the police intervened and threatened
arrest or until orders of discharge or suspension were
served on them. There has been some argument before
us as to the number of persons who actually took part
in this kind of pen-down strike. For the Bank Mr.
Anand has urged that the finding of the appellate
tribunal suggests that most of the strikers took part in
this strike ; and in any event, according to him,
at least 52 persons took part in it. He has filed in this
Court a list of these 52 employees. On the other hand1
J9~
838
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
the learned Attorney-General has contended that on
the findings recorded by the appellate tribunal not
The IPBun1kabL more than 10 persons can be said to have taken part
N aliona an • Id..
. h th e presen t con t en t'ion of t h e
v. .
m i•t. I n d ea l'mg wit
Its workmen
Bank we are prepared to assume that most of the
strikers participated in the pen-down or sit-down strike
Gajendragadkar J. as generally found by the tribunal.
Is this pen-down strike a strike within s. 2( q) of the
Act or not? S. 2( q) defines a strike as meaning a
cessation of work by a body of persons employed in
any industry acting in combination, or a concerted
refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding,
of any number of persons who are or have been so
employed to continue to work or to accept employment. It was conceded before the appellate tribunal
that a pen-down strike falls within this definition, and
this position is not seriously disputed before us either.
On a plain and grammatical construction of this
definition it would be difficult to exclude a strike where
workmen enter the premises of their employment and
refuse to take their tools in hand and start their usual
work. Refusal under common understanding to
continue to work is a strike and if in pursuance of
such common understanding the employees entered
the premises of the Bank and refused to take their
pens in their hands that would no doubt be a strike
under s. 2(q). The main grievance of the Bank is that
these employees not only sat in their places and refused to work but they would not vacate their seats when
they were asked to do so by their superior officers.
Such conduct may introduce an element of insubordination but that is a different matter. In our opinion,
therefore, the pen-down strike in which the employees
participated in the present case cannot be said to be
outside s. 2( q) of the Act.
It was, however, urged that the entry of the strikers
in the premises of the Bank amounted to civil trespass.
The argument is that by virtue of their employment
the employees had a licence to enter the premises of the
Bank but this licence is subject to the condition that
the employees are willing to carry out their obligation
of the contract and do their allotted work durins the
'959
.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
839
office hours. If the employees had decided not to
z9j9
work they were not entitled to the licence in question
and so their entry into the Bank itself constituted a The Punjab
· "l t respass. On th eir
· h an d , th e emp1oyees con t end National Bank, Ltd.
c1v1
that during the continuance of their employment they Its w:~kmen
are entitled to enter the premises of the Bank and
having thus entered they were also entitled to exercise Gajendragadkar J.
their right of going on strike. They entered the premises as employees of the Bank and having taken their
seats they exercised their right of striking work. If
the Bank had suspended the employees it would have
been another matter; but so long as the relationship
of master and servant continued the employees could
not be said to have committed civil trespass when they
entered the premises at the time.
In support of its case the Bank has relied on the
proposition that "even if a person has a right of entry
on the land of another for a specific purpose he
commits a trespass if he enters for any other purpose
or under any other claim or title apart from that under
which he might lawfully enter. As an illustration of
t.his proposition it is stated that if a person having a
licence for entry on land enters the land not by virtue ,
of the said licence but in order to contest the licensor's
title, he commits a trespass " (1 ). " But this proposition. is subject to the exception that if a person enters
for a lawful purpose he is not a trespasser unless the
case is one to which the doctrine of trespass ab initio
applies" (2 ). So the decision of this technical point
would depend on whether or not the ·employees are
given a limited or conditional licence to enter the premises and that if they have decided to go on strike the
said conditional or limited licence is no longer avail~
able to them. We do not think it necessary to consider
this academic question in the present proceedings
because, in our opinion, the appellate tribunal was
obviously right in holding that even if civil trespass
was involved in the conduct of the employees that by
itself cannot justify the rejection of their claim for
reinstatement. Incidentally we may add that even
(1) Salmond on Torts, 12th Ed.,~ 158.
(2) Salmond on Torts, 12th Ed., p. 159.
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960(1)]
in America "the simple act of trespassing upon the
employer's property is no bar to reinstatement nor is
Th•Pun1ab
the act which at most a civil tort" (1).
National Bank, Ltd.
.
v.
Does the conduct of the strikers as found by the
Its workmen
appellate tribunal constitute criminal trespass under
s. 441 of the Indian Penal Code? That is the next
Gajendragadkar J. point which calls for decision.
It is argued that the
conduct of the employees amounts to criminal trespass
which is an offence and as such those who committed
criminal trespass would not be entitled to reinstatement. According to the Bank the employees committed
the criminal trespass inasmuch as they either entered
unlawfiilly or having lawfully entered continued to
remain there unlawfully with intent thereby to insult or
annoy their superior officers. It would be noticed that
there are two essential ingredients which must be established before crimimi,l trespass can be proved against
the employees. Even if we assume that the employees' entry in the premises was unlawful or that their
continuance in the premises became unlawful, it is difficult to appreciate the argument that the said entry was
made with intent to insult or annoy the superior officers. The sole intention of the strikers obviously was
to put pressure on the Bank to concede their demands.
Even if the strikers might have known that the strike
may annoy or insult the Bank's officers it is difficult
to hold that such knowledge would necessarily lead to
the inference of the requisite intention. In every case
where the impugned entry causes annoyance or insult
it cannot be said to be actuated by the intention to
cause the said result. The distinction between knowledge and intention is quite clear, and that distinction
must be borne in mind in deciding whether or not in
the present case the strikers were actuated by the
requisite intention. The said intention has always to
be gathered from the circumstances of the case and it
may be that the necessary or inevitable conseC]J.lence
of the impugned act may be one relevant circumstance.
But it is impossible to accede to the argument that the
likely consequence of the act and its possible knowledge
x959
.
(1) Ludwig Teller's "Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining" Vol II
p. sss.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
841
must necessarily import a corresponding intention.
r959
We think it is unnecessary to elaborate this point; Th P . b
we would only like to add that the decision of the Nation:/;:~:
Patna High Court, in T. H. Bird v. King-Emperor (1 )
v.
'
on which reliance was placed by the Bank is wholly Its Workmen
inconsistent with the contention raised by it. Thus
our conclusion is that the Bank has failed to prove Gajendragadkar J.
that the conduct of the strikers as found by the appellate tribunal· amounted to criminal trespass under
s. 441 of the Code.
In ~sisting the employees' claim for reinstatement
on the ground that participation in a pendown strike
creates a bar against such a claim the Bank has
strongly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court
of America in National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation( 2 ). Both Mr. Anand and
Mr. Sanyal have contended that this decision is an
authority for the proposition that participation in
pen-down strikes necessarily disqualifies the strikers
from claiming reinstatement. It is, therefore, necessary to examine this case carefully. In this case, the
National Labor Relations Board had directed the
· reinstatement of participants in a sit-down strike whom,
upon their refusal to leave the employer's plant, the
employer declared to be discharged. The Board had
held that despite the illegal strike and the consequent
order of discharge the status of the employees continued by virtue of the definition of the term
"employee" in s. 2, sub-s. (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act. It had also taken the view that it had
jurisdiction to direct reinstatement of the said employees under s. lO(c) of the said act with a view to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Both these conclu- .
sions were reversed by the Supreme Court by a majority judgment. According to the majority view, when
the Congress enacted the National Labor Relations
Act it " did not intend to compel employers to retain
persons in their .employ regardless of their unlawful
conduct,-to invest those who go on strike with an
immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or
violence against the employer's property, which they
Lta.
-
•
(I) (1934) I.L.R. XIII Pat. 268.
(2) 3o6 U.S. 238; 83 Law. Ed. 627.
842
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1))
'959
would not have enjoyed had they remained at work."
Th -;:- .ab
It was also held that " the Congress was intent upon
Nation:!
;.;,k
Ltd. protection of employees' right to self-organisation and
to the selection of representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining without restraint or
. coercion. " On the facts the conclusion of the majority
Ga1endragadkar J. was that the strike was illegal in its inception and prosecution. This was really not the exercise of the right
to strike to which the Act referred. It was an illegal
seizure of the building in order to prevent their use by
the employer in a lawful manner, and thus by acts of
force and violence compel the employer to submit. The
conclusion, therfore, was that to provide for the reinstatement or re-employment of employees guilty of the
acts which even according to the Board had been committed would not only not effectuate any policy of the
Act but would directly tend to make abortive its plan
for peaceable procedure. Mr. Justice Reed, who delivered a dissenting judgment thought that both labour
and management had erred grievously in their respective conduct and so it would not be unreasonable to
restore both to their former status. That is why he
was not prepared to reverse the order of reinstatement
passed by the Board. The Bank naturally relies upon
the majority decision in support of its contention -that
.its employees who participated in the pen-down strike
are not entitled to reinstatement.
In considering the question as to whether the principle underlying the majority decision should be applied
to a pen-down strike in India it is necessary to remember that the pen'.down strike properly so-called is
recognised as a strike under s. 2( q) of the Act and so it
would not be safe to extend the principles of American
decisions bearing on this question without a careful
scrutiny of the relevant provisions of the American
statute and the facts on which the said decisions are
based. Let us then condsider the facts on which the
majority decision was based. It appears that an
acrimonious dispute had been going on between the
Corporation and its employees for some time before
February 17, 1937 when the pen-down strike commenc-.
ed. The Corporation wa·s not prepared to recognise the
v.
'
Its Workmen
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
843
outside union and had employed a labor spy to engage
r959
in espionage within the union and continued the The Punjab
employment of the said spy. It also appears that the National Bank, Lid.
superintendent of the Corporation when requested to
v.
meet the deputation of the union required that the Its Workmen
deputation should consist only of employees of five . years' standing. Subsequently the superintendent Ga1endragadkar J.
refused to confer with the committee in which the
outside organisation had been included ; and as a
punitive measure he required the president of the
union to work in a room adjoining his office with the
purpose of keeping him away from the other workers.
It was in this background of bitter relationship that
the strike commenced.
In the afternoon of February 17 the union committee
decided upon a sit-down strike by taking over and
holding two of the respondent's key buildings. These
were then occupied by about 95 employees, as a result
of which work in the plant stopped. In the evening
the superintendent accompanied by police officials
went to each of the building and demanded that the
men leave. They, however, refused whereupon the
respondent's counsel who had accompanied the superintendent announced in loud tone that all the men in
the plant were discharged for the seizure and detention
of the buildings. Even so the men continued to
occupy the builidings until February 26. Their fellow
members brought them food, blankets, stoYes, cigarettes and other supplies. Meanwhile on February
18, the respondent obtained from the state court
an injunction requiring the men to surrender the
premises. The men refused to obey the order and a
writ of attachment for contempt was served on them
on February 19. When the men refused to submit
a pitched battle ensued and the men successfully
resisted the attempt by the sheriff to evict and arrest
them. Efforts at mediation failed. Ultimately on
:February 26, the sheriff with an increased force of
deputies made a further attempt and this time, after
another battle, the men were ousted and placed under
arrest. They were subsequently prosecuted and most
of them were fined and given jail sentence for viola.ting
844
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]
the injunctions. A bare statement of these facts
would clearly bring out the true character of the
ThelPBun;kabLtd strike with which the Supreme Court was dealing.
Nationa an •
• I t was not mere1y an illega1 but v10
. 1ent str1.ke ; it
.
Its 'w:~kmen
was a strike which began with the wrongful seizure
of the employer's property and his exclusion from it;
Gajemfragadkar J. a strike accompanied by violence which led to pitched
battles between the strikers and the sheriff's men; a
strike contin.ued by the strikers even after they were
formally discharged from the employment and against
an order of injunction by a competent court. It is
difficult to accede to the argument that the majority
decision in that case can be extended to the facts
before us. As Teller has observed " the strike in
question can be more accurately defined as a strike in
the traditional sense to which is added the element of
trespass of the strikers upon the property of the
employer". (1 ) Therefore, in our opinion, this decision does not assist the Bank in support of its
case that mere-particip<;ttion in the illegal strike in the
present case can by itself defeat the claim of the
employees for reinstatement.
In this .connection we may point out that, according to Teller the Fansteel decision marks "what is
hoped to be an end of an unfortunate chapter in the
history of American labor activity " ; he has added
that "there is danger, however, in viewing the sitdown strike solely as the reflection of lawless labour
leadership. The causes of its emergence are deeper.
Indeed labour has contended that capital and labor
share equal responsibility for its rise and development. No analysis of a sit-down strike can claim a
broad view of the subject, says labor, without a full
measure of consideration of the infamous Mohawk
Valley methods used by Remington-Rand to break
strikes, nor to the facts elicited in the recent RandBergoff trial under the Byrnes Act. . ..... The
anarchy of law which resulted from unlawful employer utilisation of instruments of violence and
chicanery in disregard· of law needed the sit-down
z959
.
(1) Ludwig Teller's "Labour Disputes and Collective Bargaining"
Vol I, p. 311, s. 106,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
845
strike as an effective counterpoise " ; and so the
x959
author significantly concludes that " it is no coincid- T' P . b
· · sh ow a pre01p1
· "ta t e d rop m
· t h e National
ne Bank
un;a Ltd
ence t h at stat1st10s
of
sit-down
strikes
immediately
upon
valid' ·
revalence
P
v.
ation by the United States Supreme Court of the Its workmen
National Labor Relations Act." It is in the light of
this background that the Supreme Court had been Gajentlragarlkar J.
called upon to decide the question of reinstating
employees in the Fansteel case (1).
The history of the trade union legislation in England shows that the trade union movement had to
wage a long and bitter struggle to secure recognition
for the workmen's right to organise themselves into
unions and to exercise their right of collective bargaining if necessary by the use of the weapon of strikes.
In America a similar struggle took place, and, as we
have just pointed out, it was marked by violence on
the part of both capital and labour, because the
employer's theory of" hire and fire" offered relentless
resistence to the workmen's claim to form unions and
to resort to strikes for trade union purposes. In
Williams Truax v. Michael Corrigan (2 ) Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in his dissenting judgment, has given a.
very illuminating account of the history and progress
of the trade union movement in the United States, in
England and the Colonies. " Practically every
change in the law", observed Mr. Justice Brandeis,
" governing the relation of the employer and the
employees must abridge in some respect the liberty or
property of one of the parties, if liberty and property
is measured by the standard of the law theretofore
prevailing. If such changes are made by acts of the
Legislature we call the' modification an exercise of the
police power, and ·although the change may involve
an interference with existing liberty or property of
individuals, the statue will not be declared a violn.tion
of the due process clause unless the court finds that
interference is arbitrary or unreasonable, or that,
considered as a means, the measure has no real or
substantial relation of cause to a permissible end",
(t) 306 U.S. 238; 83 Law. Ed. 627.
(2) 66 Law. Edn. 3u ; 257 U.S 254.
107
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
In that case the validity of the prohibition of Ariz.
Civil' Code 1913, ci. 1464 against the interference
by injunction between employers and employees in
cases growing out of a dispute concerning terms or
Its. Workmen
conditions of employment was challenged ; and the
. challenge was upheld by a majority of the learned
Ga;endragadkar J. judges who took the view that the said provision
was contrary to the 14th Amendment of the Constitution. Holmes, Pitney, Clarke and Brandeis, JJ.,
however, dissented. The main decision in that case
is not of direct assistance in the present appeals. No
doubt Mr. Anand has attempted to contend that the
acts of which the strikers were held guilty in that
case are similar to the acts alleged against the employees in the present appeals; but this argument
would be relevant only if it is shown by the Bank
that the specific subversive acts alleged have been
committed by the. specific individual employees. To
that point we will refer later on. Incidentally the
present decision is of some importance because the
dissenting opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Brandeis
has been subsequently treated as an authoritative
exposition of the problem of trade unionism and the
history of its growth and development.
Fortunately, as the Indian Trade Unions Act 1926,
(16 of 1926), the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act 1946 (20 of 1946), and the Industrial
Disputes Act 1947 (14 of 1947) show, our Legislature
has very wisely benefitted by the experiences of other
countries in the matter of the development of trade
union movement, and has made progressive, just and
fair provisions governing the import.ant problem of
industrial relationships, the formation of trade unions,
and the settlement of industrial disputes, It can be
justly claimed that though we have witnessed capitallabour conflicts in our country, on the wh0le neither
party has departed from the pursuit of peaceful
methods, and both parties submit their disputes to be
resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
In dealing with industrial disputes like the present, we
must, therefore, primarily consider the relevant statutory provisions and the material Indian decisions.
1959
Th-;- . b
Nation:I
v.
'
;.;.:Ltd.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT Rl!JPORTS
847
Thus considered the conclusion is inevitable that the
z959
pen-down strike is a strike within s. 2( q) and so per se Th P .ab
it cannot be treated as illegal; it has been found to Nation:l ;:~k Ltd.
be illegal in this case because it was commenced in
v.
'
contravention of s. 23(b) of the Act; but, as has been Its Workmen
held by this Court in M/s. Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Their . Workmen (1 ) mere participation in such an illegal Ga1endragadkar I·
strike cannot necessarily involve the rejection of the
striker's claim for reinstatement. As we have already
indicated, on the findings of the appellate tribunal
nothing more than such participation has been proved
against the employees whose reinstatement has been
ordered; and so, unless the said finding is reversed,
the first contention raised by the Bank must fail.
It has been strenuously urged before us that in the
case of a Bank which is a credit institution a pen-down
strike, if continued for a long period, is likely to
affect prejudicially the credit of the Bank. It is also
pointed out that, even in regard to industrial concerns,
if strikers entered the premises of the factory and sit
around the plant in large numbers, in the heat of the
moment unfortunate and ugly incidents are likely to
happen, and so such pen-down or sit-down strikes
should be positively discouraged. We are prepared to
concede that in the surcharged atmosphere which
generally accompanies strikes and when passions are
aroused, a large scale and continuous pen-down strike
may lead to untoward consequences. But, on the
other hand, even in the case of such a strike, the employer is not without a remedy. He may bar the
entry of the strikers within the premises by adopting
effective and legitimate methods in that behalf as in
fact the Bank did in the present case from April 23.
He may call upon the employees to vacate, and, on
their refusal to do so, take due steps to suspend them
from employment, proceed to hold proper enquires
according to the standing orders, and pass proper
orders against them subject to the relevant provisions
of the Act. If the Bank had been properly advised
to a.do-pt 1mch ai course, many of the difficulties which
it had to face in the present proceedings would not
(l) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 529.
848
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
probably have arisen. Therefore, we do not think
that the general hypothetical consideration that penNatio:,,I ;:~; Ltd. down strikes may in some cases lead to rowdy demonv.
'
strations or result in disturbances or violence or shake
Its Worl<»un
the credit of the Bank would justify the conclusion
.. that even if the strikers are peaceful and non-violent
Ga;endragadkar J. and have done nothing more than occupying their
seats during office hours, their participation in the
strike would by itself disqualify them from claiming
reinstatement.
Let us then consider the second contention raised
by the Bank. It is urged on behalf of the Bank that
it is really unnecessary to examine which particular
employee was directly associated with the preparation
and circulation of the subversive circular or posters.
The offensive posters and circulars had been d,rafted,
printed and circulated in pursuance of the common
object of the strikers, and each one of them must,
therefore, share the responsibility for the said act. It
is really an argument based on the theory of conspiracy which makes all conspirators liable for the act of
any one of them,
This argument is countered by the employees with
the contention that the activities of the Union do not
fall to be considered in the present enquiry. It is the
acts of '.individual strikers who ha.ve been dismissed
that have given rise to the dispute and the enquiry
must be confined to that dispute alone. The learned
Attorney-General seriously asked us to bear in mind
that the a pplicatiOn of the doctrine of conspiracy to
the decision of the present dispute may have far-reach·
ing consequences on the future of the trade union
movement itself, and he suggested that since the
Union and its activities were not the subject-matter of
the present enquiry we need not consider ~he argument
of conspiracy at all. Besides, according to him, if.
the theory of conspiracy was upheld it would mean that
if any office bearers ot the Union were guilty of any subversive acts the whole membership of the Union would
be constructively resptmsible and that is plainly unreasonable. In this connection he also referred us to
ss. 17, 18 and 19 of the Indian Trade Unions Act 1926
z959
Th P
. b
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
849
(16 of 1926). We have indicated this argument at
x959
this place by anticipation. In fact this argument has
.
been raiSed by the employees in their appeal but we N 1!h• IPBun;akbL d
'
'hbth
aiona an,t
' wou ldb e convement
t h ough t 1t
to d ea1 wit
o
v.
these aspects of the matter in one place.
Its Workmen
Now the answer to both these technical and academic contentions is the same. In industrial adjudica- Gajerulragadkar J.
tion tribunals should be slow to adopt any doctrinaire
or legalistic approach. TheY. should as far as is reasonably possible avoid the temptation of formulating
general principles and laying down general rules which
purport to cover all cases. Let us recall the nature of
the enquiry which the appellate tribunal had directed
as a result of its interlocutary judgment. This enquiry
is confined to the question as to whether in regard to
the case of each one of the dismissed employees, the
Bank has shown any positive circumstances as a result
of which reinstatement, which is the normal rule,
should not be directed. Thus considered we do not
think it necessary to deal with the academic points
raised by both the parties before us.
. The third argument urged by the1 bank is in regard
to the finding of the tribunal that pnly 14 employees
named by it are responsible for the' subversive posters
and hand bills. It is urged that this finding is perverse.
We are not impressed by this argument. There is no
doubt that the three posters Exs. 255 (a), 255 (c) and
302, to which strong exception has been taken by the
Bank are subversive of the credit of the Bank. They
make imputations about the honesty of the nia.nagement of the Bank and in terms suggest improper use
of the funds of the Bank for personal purposes. It is
also true that a large number of other documents
issued by the Union before and during the strike have
used exaggerated, and unduly militant intemperate,
language, and in our opinion the appellate tribunal
was justified in expressing its disapproval of the use of
such language; but the appellate tribunal thought
that none of these documents could really be taken to
be subversive of the credit of the Bank and with that
conclusion we are in full agreement. Therefore the
only question 'vhich we have to consider is whether
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
the view taken by the appellate tribunal that 14 persons were actively concerned with these offensive docuThe lPBunjkabLtd ments can be successfully challenged by the Bank
N ationa an ,
.b c
v.
eiore us.
Its Work•nen
In making its finding on this point the appellate
tribunal has substantially relied on the statement
. Ga1endragadkar J. made by H. L. Puri.
He was asked whether the drafts
of the letters issued by him had been approved at the
meeting of the working committee or on his individual
responsibility and he repiied that they were never
written on individual responsibility but were based on
consultation with the members of the working committee. Then he was asked whether he could name
the persons whom he consulted in drafting the poster
dated July 5, 1949 (Ex. 222). In reply to this he
enumerated the names of 9 persons and added the
word "so on." It appears that the appellate tribunal
asked him several questions on the same topic and the
effect of his admissions clearly was to show that most
of the documents were issued by the secretary or the
president after he had consulted the persons named
by Puri. In this connection Puri gave the names of.
the office bearers of the Federation at Delhi. It was
in the light of these admissions that the appellate
tribunal came to the conclusion that 14 persons named
by him can be safely taken to have been actively
associated with the drafting and the publication of the
subversive documents.
Mr. Anand contends that the list of office bearers
separately supplied by Puri includes a much larger
number of active workers of the Union and on the
evidence of Puri all these active workers should have
been held responsible for the said documents. In this
connection he has relied on the affidavit filed b.Y, Amar
Singh on behalf of the Bank. We do not think that
this argument is wellfounded. It is significant that
though the appellate tribunal had directed the Bank
by its interlocutary judgment to file a statement giving
particulars of the acts alleged against each one of the
employees no such statement was filed. Besides
it is fairly conceded before us by Mr. Anand that most
z959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
851
of the employees who made affidavits in the subseI9.S9
quent enquiry were not asked any general question
.
about their alleged subversive activities and no parti- ThelPBun;kabLtd
. was put to t h em m
. regar d to th erelevan t Nationa v. an , •
cular quest10n
subversive documents. The judgment of the appellate Its workmen
tribunal shows that it first considered the general
points and the evidence relied upon by the parties in Gajendragadkar I.
that behalf; and then it exhaustively dealt with theo
whole of the evidence bearing on the case of each
individual employees. We are satisfied that the Bank
is not justified in contendjng that in excluding 136
employees from the responsibility of direct participation in the drafting and publication of the subversive
circulars and hand-bills the appellate tribunal has
ignored any important evidence. The argument that
the said finding is opposed to the weight of evidence
and as such perverse must therefore be rejected.
Then Mr. Anand has invited us to consider some
individual cases. According to him the case against
Joshi had not been properly considered by the appellate tribunal. It does appear that Joshi admitted
that he had taken part in the drafting of documents
P. 272, 274, 279, 280 and 286; but none of these
documents has been found to be subversive and so it
is idle to contend that Joshi's connection with any of
the three subversive documents is established. So
there is no substance in the argument that Joshi's
case should be reconsidered.
Then our attention has been drawn to the cases of
five other employees Narain Das, Chuni Lal, Som Datt,
Trilok Chand and Charan Singh. In regard to these
persons the appellate tribunal has found that the Bank
had failed to prove any subversive acts against them,
and that undoubtedly is a question of fact and the
finding of the appellate tribunal cannot be reopened.
But Mr. Anand has attempted to challenge the correctness of this finding on the ground that it is entirely
inc;onsistent with one material document on the record.
This document is the report made by Dina Nath on
April 24 in which the incidents that took place on
April 23 and 24 have been set out and the names of
persons who took prominent part in the said incidents
852
z959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
have been enumerated.
(1960(1)]
This list includes the names
The Punjab
of the 'five. persons in question. Din:i- Nath had,
National Bank. Ltd. however, died at the date of the enqmry and so he
v.
could not give evidence. Jagan Nath, who was then
Its Workmen
the Superintendent of Police, proved this report. Mr.
.
--
Anand's grievance is that though the evidence of
Ga1endragadkar J. Jagan Nath had been accepted by the appellate tribunal
in a part of its judgment it has failed to consider his
testimony in dealing with the cases of these five
persons. In our opinion this argument is entirely
misconceived. It is not cqrrect to say that the appellate tribunal has accepted the whole of Jagan Nath's
evidence in any part of its judgment; while dealing
with the question about the conduct of the crowd the
appellate tribunal considered the evidence of Rajinder
Nath, Mehta, Ram Pratap and Amar Singh and held
that part of their evidence which was corroborated by
Jagan Nath and also partially by Puri must be
believed; that is all. Besides, the evidence of Jagan
Nath itself does not carry the Bank's case any further
against the five persons. No doubt, while proving the
report of Dina Nath, Jagan Nath first stated that the
facts narrated therein were correct; but in crossexamination when he was asked about some details
mentioned in the report he added that the report was
written by Dina Nath and he could not say anything
about it. Further he also admitted that during the
course of his visit and stay at the Bank when the
strike was going on he only knew t.hree persons who
took part in the activity which was described by
Dina Nath in his report. Thus the evidence of Jagan
Nath does not sho_w that he clearly knew any of the
five employees and the same comment obviously falls
to be made about Dina Nath himself who made the
report. Therefore it is not accurate to say that the
conclusion of the appellate tribunal in regard to thes€
five ca.ses suffers from any infirmity on which it can be
successfully challenged before us; besides the Bank
appar~ntly relied upon other evidence against these
five persons, and not the report of Dina Nath, and that
evidence has been disbelieved.
~
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
Mr. Anand has then urged that in directing reinr959
statement of 136 employees the appellate tribunal
failed to consider the fact that in the meanwhile the N 1~he 1 ~un{a~ttl
Bank has employed additional hands and it would be a •ona v.an' • ·
unfair to the Bank to direct that these dismissed Its workmen
employees should be taken back. The reinstatement
order would lead to complications and the Bank may Gajendragadkar ].
have to face the claims of those who have been
employed in the meanwhile. Mr. Anand wanted to
prove that the Bank had employed a large number of
hands in the meanwhile by referring to the statement
made by the Union in the bulletin and posters issued
during the strike. These statements seem to indicate
that the Union complained that pending the strike the
Bank was employing new hands. But if the Bank
wanted to urge this plea seriously it should have proved
the relevant facts, e.g., how many employees have
been appointed and on what terms. These are matters
within the special knowledge of the Bank and they
could have been proved very easily. The Bank did
not choose to prove these facts. Indeed it does not
appear that this plea was urged as a separate plea
against the order of reinstatement before the appellate
tribunal. In any case, in the absence of satisfactory
materials it would be difficult to deal with this plea on
the merits. Besides, if the Bank has failed to establish
its specific case against any of the 136 employees,
there is no reason why the normal rule should not
prevail and the employees shonld not get the relief of
reinstatement. The mere fact that the Bank may have
employed some other persons in the meanwhile would
not necessarily defeat such a claim for reinstatement.
As has been held by this Court in the National Transport and, General Go. Ltd. v. The Workmen (1), however
much the court may sympathise with the employer's
difficulty caused by the fact that after the wrongfol
dismissals in question he had engaged fresh hands, the
court cannot " overlook the claims of the employees
who, on the findings of the tribunals below, had been
wrongly dismissed. " In the case of such wrongful
(r) Civil Appeal No. 312 of 1956-Decirled by this Court on January 22,
1957.
108
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1))
dismissal the normal rule would be that the employees
Th P . b
thus wrongfully dismissed must be reinstated. "The
NatiO:alB:": Ltd. hardship in question '', observed this Court, " has been
v.
'
brought about by the precipitate action of the appel11s Workmen
lants themselves who dismissed their workmen without holding the usual enquiries after framing a proper
Gajmdragadkar l ·charge against them. If they had proceeded in the
usual way and given a full and fair opportunity to the
workmen to, place their case before the enquiring
authority, the result may not have been so hard.''
These observations are equally applicable to the conduct of the Bank in the present appeals.
The last argument urged by Mr. Anand is that a
large number of employees who are clamouring for
reinstatement have secured employment on a fairly
permanent basis and so it is unnecessary that they
should be forced on the Bank. This argument cannot
be entertained because it has not been urged before the
appellate tribunal, and though it was sought to be
raised before us, Mr. Anand fairly conceded that in the
absence of any material it would not be possible for
him to press this point. Indeed it is the first two
general points which were seriously pressed before us
by Mr. Anand and Mr. Sanyal on behalf of the Bank.
Mr. Anand no doubt raised three additional subRidiary
points in Civil Appeal No. 519 of 1958, in which he
appeared, but as we have pointed out there is no substance in any one of them. In Civil Appeal No. 520 of
1958, in which Mr. Sanyal appeared for the Bank he
did not challep.ge the findings recorded by the appellate
tribunal in respect of the 10, employees concerned in
the said appeal. In the result both the appeals preferred by the Bank fail and are dismissed with costs.
That takes us to Civil Appeal No. 521 of 1958, filed
by the employees. In this appeal we are concerned
with the order refusing reinstatement to 14 employees.
In addition to the two preliminary objections which
we have already considered the learned AttorneyGeneral raised two general points for the appellant.
The first is that the appellate tribunal has erred in law
in virtually penalising the 14 employees for the activities of the Union, and in that connection he raised the
1 959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
question that the activities of the Union were outside
x959
the scope of the present enquiry. In dealing with the
h
.ab
Bank's appeals we have dealt with this question, and Na1~:a 11:a"/.,, Ltd
held that the order passed by the appellete tribunal
v. '
·
cannot be challenged on such a technical and academic Its Worknuis
ground. If the appellate tribunal held that those 14
persons were directly and actively concerned with the Gajentlragatlkar J.
preparation and publication of the offending circulars
it was certainly entitled to take that fact into account
in deciding whether each one of them should be
reinstated or not.
The other general contention raised is that in refusing reinstatement to the employees other than Puri
the appellate tribunal has acted contrary to natural
justice inasmuch as no opportunity was given to them·
to meet the case of the Bank that they were directly
and actively concerned with the offending documents.
The learned Attorney-Ceneral has strongly relied on
the principle that in enquiries of this kind the principles of natural justice must be followed and that the
employee against whom disciplinary action is sought
to be taken must be given a charge-sheet, evidence
against him must be recorded in his presence, and he
must have an opportunity to rebut the said evidence.
The validity of this principle is not in dispute (Vide:
Union of India v. T. R. Varma (1); New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd.( 2 );
and Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen( 3)). Has this
principle of natural justice been really contravened in
the present proceedings ? In our opinion, the answer
to this question must be in the negative. In dealing
with this point we cannot lose sight of the nature of
the question which the appellate tribunal was called
upon to consider. It is patent that in the present
dispute the Union's case was that the refusal of the
Bank to employ all the 150 employees was vindictive
and it constituted an act of victimisation. It was
known to the Bank that the strike was the result of
the Union's decision, said the Union, and that all the
acts committed by the Union and its officers before
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 499,
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 98.
(3) [1960] (1) S.C.R. 32.
856
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
and during the strike were the acts not of any individuals but of the Union as a whole; and so the Union
Nat;::./';;.:;:,bLtd. pleaded before the. appellate ~ri~1un'.'l that there was
v.
no room for makmg any d1stmct10n between one
Its Workmen
workman and another and if the Bank took back a
large number of strikers it should have taken back the
Ga;endragadkar J. 150 remaining workmen as well; but it refused to de
so because of its policy of victimisation. It wants tc
teach a lesson to all the office bearers and activt.
workers of the Union. This plea was denied by the
Bank, which in turn alleged positive grounds against
each one of the 150 employees.
The appellate tribunal was thus called upon to consider whether it would be justified in holding all the
· strikers responsible for each one of the acts of the
office bearers or leaders of the Union; and, after considering the evidence, it decided to limit the liability
for the said subversive acts only to 14 persons who, in
its opinion, could be regarded as directly and actively
responsible for them. In other words, the appellate
tribunal did not proceed to deal with the question on
any theoretical or academic basis and took a practical
and common-sense view of the matter. It considered
Puri's evidence and took into account the probabilities
of the case. None of these workmen ever said anything contrary to the case which was made out by the
Union and none of them made an attempt to deny the
statements made by Puri on oath. It is certainly
relevant to remember that Puri is undoubtedly one of
the leaders of the Union and he gave testimony to the
effect that these pei'sons had been consulted and were
responsible for the subversive documents. It is not a
case where evidence has been led by the Bank making
allegations against any of the employees in their
absence. It is a ca,se where one of the leaders of the
employees' union himself has made st;,temeuts on oath
on which the appellate tribunal relied. Indeed it
would be unreasonable to assume that it is the case of
these employees that the rekwant. statements made by
Puri are untrue. Besides the cc,nclusion of !he appellate tribunal is not based only on the evidence of
Puri; it is also based on the probabilities, and on the
z959
--
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
857
respective positions of those. persons in the Union and
r959
the part they are otherwise shown to have taken in the
.
ir •
• 't'ies. of' th e U ~non.
.
H av11!g
. regard t o National
The Pim;ab
aua1rs
an d ac~1v1
Bank, Ltd.
the manner m whrnh the 11nplementat10n of the
v.
Union's decisions is usually left to its leadership it Its workmen
would haYe been unreasonable and unrealistic to have
held the whole membership responsible for the offend- Gajendragadkar J.
ing documents. Besides the appellate tribunal took
the view that the reinstatement of the thirteen
persons would be harmful to the harmony and peace
in the Bank and would prejudice the interest of the
Bank; and that can not be said to be an irrelevant
consideration. Therefore, we do not think that in the
circumstances of this case it can be said that the
conclusion of the appellate tribunal against these
employees is vitiated by the contravention of any rule
of natural justice.
But apart from this aspect of the matt(W, in regard
to 4 out of these persons, the case fl.gainst Seighal,
Syal, Mahajan and Kedar Nath is based on the additional finding made by the appellate tribunal against
them. It has been found by the appellate tribunal
that on the first day of the strike an assemblage of
boisterous crowd had gathered in the head office compound and at that gathering violent speeches were
delivered by the leaders of the strike, obviously with
the intention to make the work of the Bank impossible.
The attitude of the crowd at this time was violent;
and on the evidence the appellate tribunal came to the
conclusion that in this activity, besides Puri, the four
persons just mentioned by us had taken a leading
part. In other words, on this finding itself it can be
reasonably held that these 4 persons are not entitled to
reinstatement. Then as to Sabharwal, he admitted
that he was actively associated with the offending
document Ex. 255 (c) and that would be enough to
justify the order of the appellate tribunal refusing him
refrstatement. Then as to Kakar, apart from Ex. 255 (a)
and Ex. 255 (c), there is no doubt that he was actively
concerned with the document Ex. 302, and if th'e
said document is subversive that alone would be
enough to disentitle him from claiming reinstatement.
,
858
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
In this connection our attention was drawn to £he
fact that in dealing with the individual case of Kakar
~he appellate tribunal has considered several documents
v.
moluding Ex. 302 and has observed that it did not
Its Workme"
find anything substantial therein which can be classed
. as subversive, whereas in an earlier part of the judgG•1••dragadk., f. ment this document has been treated as subversive.
Having regard to the fact that these apparently inc:msistent observations have been made in respect of
this document we have considered the said document
(Ex. 302) ourselves. It purports to be an open letter
to Y odh Raj, the General Manager of the Bank ; after
making several controversial statements which though
couched in intemperate language may not amount to
a subversive activity, it ends by saying that "the
Bank's interests are more dear to us than to the powerconceited management which has been exploiting this
foremost institution of the Punjabis for its own individual interests and self-aggrandisement, throwing to
the winds the interests of the shareholders, the depositors and the poor Bank employee~." This statement
is very similar to the statements contained in Exs.
P. 255 (a) and 255 (c), and, in our opinion, their publication can be regarded as subversive of the credit of
the Bank. Therefore, for his direct connection with
this document alone the appellate tribunal would have
been justified in refusing Kakar reinstatement. In
regard to Bery, the argument urged is purely technical.
Bery admitted that in March 1952 he had adopted go.
slow methods and had asked other workers also to goslow and reprimanded those who would not listen to
him. Go-slow methods have always been condemned
by industrial tribunals, and so, in dealing with Bery's
case, the appellate tribunal held that this past conduct
was against him. The argument is that the enquiry
was confined to the past records of the employees and
this conduct had not been entered in the past record of
Bery. In our opinion such a technicality is of no avail
particularly when the conduct in question is admitted
by Bery. Kedar Nath's case, is clearly unarguable and
has not been pressed before us. He was convicted by a
criminal court for an indecent assault on a girl of 11
'959
Th P . b
Natio:,,l ;.;,:,Ltd.
•
. S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
859
•
959
,..
years and sentenced to three months imprisonment. The
z
appellate tribunal thought, and quite rightly, that it Th P jab
would be meaningless and improper to direct his rein- Nati:,alB::k,Ltd.
statement. Thus it would be seen that in regard to five
v.
out of the 13 employees there are other grounds also Its Workmen
on which the final order is based and so the conten- . -dk
tion about the failure to comply with the requirements Gajendraga "' J.
of 'natural justice would ultimately be available only
in the cases of the remaining 5 employees. Out of
these we will presently deal with the case of l\Iunna
Lal s~parately. • \Ve have considered the cases of the
remaining 4, viz., Balraj Arya, Ved Parkash Sharma,
A. C. Thakur and Ham Parkash Bhalla and we are
satisfied that we would not be justified in interfering
with the order passed against them. That leaves
only one case to be considered and that is the case
of l\Innna Lal Gupta.
·
. In regard to l\Iunna Lal's case, the record suffers
from. confusion. In his evidence Puri has not referred
to any l\Iunna Lal at all. He. has referred to one
l\Ianohar Lal Gupta in connection with the subversive
documents : and no attempt has been made by
the Bank to show either that l\Ianohar Lal Gupta
has been wrongly taken down as l\Iunna Lal or that
the two names represent the same individual. l\Iunna
Lal does not appear to be a member of the working
committee either. It is true that in the first part of
its judgment the appellate tribunal has mentioned
l\Iunna Lal at Sr. No. 9 in. setting forth the relevant
evidence of Puri, which means that instead of l\Ianohar
Lal Gupta the appellate tribunal put down the name
of ·l\Iunna Lal in summarising the evidence of Puri;
and this would naturally suggest that according to
it l\Iunna. Lal was concerned with the said subversive
documents alon~with the other persons mentioned by
Puri. Curiously enough, in dealing with the individual case of l\Iunna La.I Gupta the appellate tribunal
has considered the other evidence produced by the
Bank against him and ordered that l\Iunna Lal Gupta
should be reinstated with continuity of service and
with compensation. Having made this· finding in
terms in fa v9qr of l\fm1na. Lal, in the last portion
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860
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SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
of its judgment it has again put l\Iunna Lal's
Th P . ;,
name in the list of 14 employes.s who are refused
Nation:z
Ltd. reinstatement. The position then is that Puri does
- _v.
· not refer to l\Iunna Lal by name and the appellate
Its IVorkme_n_ tribunal has made inconsistent findings in respect of
. - ,
him, Under these circumstances l\Ir. Sanyal found it
Ga;endragadkar J. difficult to press the case of the Bank against l\Iunna
___ Lal. -\Ve would, therefore, allow the appeal of l\Imina
Lal, set aside the order passed by the appellate tribu- /
nal and direct his ·reinstatement on the same terms
and conditions on which reinstatement of the pther
136 employees has been directed by the appellate
tribunal._ Subject to this -modification the appeal
preferred by the - employees fails and is dismissed.
Since the appeal has succeeded in respect of l\Iunna .
Lal, we direct that parties should bear - their own
costs of this appeal.
SunBA RAO J.-I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother,
Gajendragadkar, J. I agree with his 'conclusion. I
·would prefer not to express my opinion on the construction of s. 33-A of the Industrial _Disputes Act,
J947, for the reason that the argument which called
for a consideration of the said section had not been
raised at any of the earlier stages of .the dispute, but
was raised for the first time in this Court. -. ·
r959
n:"!;
Appeals Nos. 519 and 520 dismissed.
Appeal No. 521 allowed in part .
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