THE STATE OF BIHAR versus HIRALAL KEJRIWAL AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 September 1959 | [1960] 1 S.C.R. 726 | 1959 INSC 114
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 September 1959
- Bench
- SYED JAFFER IMAM*, K. SUBBA RAO
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 36/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 1 S.C.R. 726
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 114
Text of the judgment
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1))
r959
s. 25E of the Act. It was conceded on behalf the
,
.-d
respondent workmen that the lay-off in the factory was
nsso"ate Cement d
Companies
ue to the non-supp1y of l'Imestone b y reason of the
v.
strike in the limestone quarry and the strike was
Their Workmen decided on by the same Union which consisted of the
5
• K. Das J.
workmen at the factory and the quarry. That being
the position, the disqualification in cl. (iii) aforesaid
clearly applied and the workmen at the factory were
not entitled to claim lay-off compensation.
The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds
and is allowed and the award of the Industrial Tribunal is set aside. In the circumstances of the ·case in
which a difficult question of interpretation arose for
decision for the first time, we pass no order as to
costs.
Appeal allowed.
r959
THE STATE OF BIHAR
September z4
v.
HIRALAL KEJRIWAL AND ANOTHER
(SYED JAFER IMAM and K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.)
Repeal of Statute-Saving clause-Interpretation of-Cotton
Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, r948, whether continues in
force-Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, r946 (XXIV oj
r946),, ss. r(3) and 3(r)-Essential Commodities Ordinance, r955,
(Ordinance I of r955), s. r6-Esscntial Commodities Act, r955 (X of
r955), S, I6.
Appeal by special leave-Interference in-Constitution of India,
Art. r36.
In exercise of the powers under s. 3 of the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, the Central Government made the
Cotton Textile (Control of Movement) Order, 1948. The 1946
Act was to expire on January 26, 1955, but before that, on
January 21, l<j55, the Essential Commodities Ordinance was
promulgated which conferred on the Central Government a power
similar to that conferred by s. 3 of the 1946 Act. Section 16 of
the Ordinance provided that all Orders made under the 1946 Act
in so far as such Orders could be made under the Ordinance shall
continue in force and that accordingly any appointment made,
license or permit granted or direction issued under any such
Order shall continue in force. The Essential Commodities Act,
1955 by s. l6(1)(a) repealed the Ordinance and by s, l6(1)(b)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
repealed any other law in force in any State in so far as such law
z959
controlled the production, supply and distribution of, and trade
~.
and commerce in any essential commodity. The savings clause The State of Bihar
s. 16(2) of the 1955 Act was a repetition of s. 16 of the Ordinance. H" 1 /k . . 1
The respondent contended that the amplitude of the first part of ira; A e{~iwa
s. 16 of the Ordinance was cut down by the second part and
an
no er
consequently s. 16 did not save the Order but only the acts done
under the Order, and that even if the Order was saved by s. 16
of the Ordinance it was repealed by s. l6(1)(b) of the 1955 Act
and was not continued under that Act.
Held, that the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order,
1948 was saved by s. 16 of the Ordinande and was continued by
s. 16(2) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and was in force
on August 30, 1955. when the offence was committed. The first
part of s. 16 of the Ordinance saved the order and the acts done
under the Order subsequent to the coming into force of the
Ordinance and the second part of s. 16 saved past acts done under
the Order before the coming into force of the Ordinance. The
words "any other law" in s. 16(1)(b) of the 1955 Act meant any
law other than the Ordinance and an order made or deemed to
be made under the Ordinance was not repealed by s. l6(1)(b).
Such an order was saved by s. l6(1)(a) of the Act.
Held, further, that this was not a fit case for interference
under Art. 136 of the Constitution with the order of the High
Court discharging the respondent. The offence was committed
more than four years ago; the application by the appellant to the
High Court for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme
Court was belated ; there was plausible justification for the belief
of the accused that the Order did not survive the expiry of the
1946 Act in view of the varying views expressed by the Courts;
the State filed the appeal presumably to get the legal position
clarified ; in such circumstances public interest did not require
that the stale matter should be resuscitated.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 36of1958,
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated May 9, 1957, of the Patna High Court, in
Criminal Reference No. 51 of 1957 and Criminal
Revision No. 323of1957, arising out of the judgment
and order dated March 20, 1957, of the First Additional Sessions Judge, Patna in Criminal Revision
No. 14 of 1957.
K. P. Varma and R. 0. Prasad,, for the appellant.
H. J. Umrigar a.nd B. P. Maheshwari, for the
respondents.
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
1959. September 14. The Judgment ofthe Court
The Stale of Bihar Was delivered by
lvK
• ..
SuBBA RAO J.-This is an appeal by special leave
.
1
H ira1a
e;riwa b
.
h . d
f t he
and Another
y t he State of B'h
1 ar agamst t e JU gment o
High Court of Judicature at Patna quashing the
Subba Rao J.
criminal proceedings launched against the respondents
in the Court of Munsif-Magistrate, Patna.
The two respondents were the proprietors of a firm
called M/s. Patna Textiles doing business in cotton at
Patna. On August 30, 1955, they despatched two
bales of saries to M/s. Hiralal Basudev Prasad, cloth
merchants of Balia, from Patna Ghat without
obtaining a permit from the Textile Controller, Bihar.
They were prosecuted under s. 7 of the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955 (X of 1955), hereinafter called
the Act, read with s. 3 of the Cotton Textiles (Control
of Movement) Order, 1948, hereinafter called the
Order, in the Court of the Munsif-Magistrate, Patna.
The respondents filed a petition before the said
Munsif-Magistrate praying for their discharge on the
ground that the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946 (XXIV of 1946), hereinafter called
the 1946 Act, whereunder the said Order was made,
had been repealed, and, therefore, the Order ceased to
have any legal force thereafter, and consequently they
could not be prosecuted under the expired Order.
The Munsif-Magistrate rejected that petition. The
Additional Sessions Judge, Patna; after perusing the
records transmitted the same to the High Court under
s. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with his
opinion that the order of the Munsif-Magistrate was
wrong and, therefore, it might be set aside with the
direction to the Munsif-1\fagistrate to discharge the
accused. The respondents also filed a revision to the
High Court against the order of the Munsif-Magistrate.
The reference as well as the revision were heard
together by Imam, J., of the High Court at Patna, and
the learned Judge ,accepting the reference and the
revision set aside the order of the Munsif-Magistrate
and directed the accused to be discharged. Hence the
appeal.
'959
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
The learned Counsel appe~ring for the state contendz959
ed that the Or<ler made under the 1946 Act was Tk 5 0 - 01 B"h
saved under s. 16 of the Essential Commodities Ordin- • ' ':.
' '"
ance bf 1955, hereinafter called the Ordinance, and Hiralal Kejriwal
s. 16 (2) of the Act, and, therefore, the accused were and Another
validly prosecuted under the provisions of the Order.
The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that Subba Rao J.
the order was not saved under either of the said two
sections.
To appreciate the contention of the parties, it is
necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the
1946 Act, the Order, the Ordinance and the Act.
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946.
S. 1 (3): It shall cease to have effect on the
twenty-sixth day of January, 1955, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before that
date, and section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
(X of 1897), shall apply upon the expiry of this Act
as if it had then been repealed by a Central Act..
S. 3 (1): The Central Government, so far as it
appears to it to be necessary or expedient for
maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential
commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, may by order
provide for regulating or prohibiting the production,
supply and distribution thereof and trade and
commerce therein.
Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948.
S. 3: No person shall transport or cause to be
transported by rail, road, air, sea or inland navigation any cloth, yarn or apparel except under and
in accordance with(i) a general permit notified in the Gaz~tte of
India by the Textile Commissioner ; or
(ii) a special transport permit issued by the
Textile Commissioner.
The Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955.
Preamble : " Whereas the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (XXIV of 1946),
which confers powers to control the production,
730
I959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce
in,
certain commodities, expires on the 26th day
The State of Bihar
of January, 1955 ; ........................................... ,.
v.
Hiralal Kejriwal
the President in pleased to promulgate the following
and Another
Ordinance : "
S. 16: Any order made or deemed to be made
Subba Rao].
under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act, 1946 (XXIV of 1946), and in force immediately
before the commencement of this Ordinance shall,
in so far as such order may be made under this Ordinance, be deemed to be made under this Ordinance
and continue in force, and accordingly any appointment made, licence or permit granted or direction
issued under any such order and in force immedi.
ately before such commencement shall continue in
force unless and until it is superseded by any appointment made, licence or permit granted or
direction issued under this Ordinance.
This Ordinance was published in the Gazette of India
on January 21, 1955, and came into force on January 26, 1955.
The Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
S. 3 (1) : If the Central Government is of opinion
that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential
commodity or for securing their equitable distribution
and availability at fair prices, it may, by order
provide for regulating or prohibiting the production,
supply and distribution thereof and trade and
commerce therein.
S. 7 (1): If any person contravenes any order
made under section 3(a) he shall be punishable(i) in the case of an order made with reference
to clause (h) or clause {i) of sub-section (2) of
that section, with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one year and shall
also be liable to fine, and
(ii) in the case of any other order, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years and shall also be liable to fine:
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
Provided that if the Court is of opinion that a
I959
sentence of fine only will meet the ends of justice, The State of 1'ihar
it may, for reasons. to be recorded, refrain from
v.
imposing a sentence of imprisonment; . . . . . .
Hiralal Kejriwal.
.
l
and A not lier
S. 16 (1): The followmg laws are hereby repea ed:Subba Rao J.
(a) the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955;
(b) any other law in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in so
far as such law controls or authorizes the control
of the production, supply and distribution of, and
trade and commerce in, any esse~tial commodity.
(2) : Notwithstanding such repeal, any order made
or deemed t'> be made by any authority whatsoever,
under any law repealed hereby and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall,
in so far as such order may be made under this Act,
be deemed to be made under this Act and continue
in. force, and accordingly any appointment made,
licence or permit granted or direction issued under
any such order and in force immediately before such
commencement shall continue in force until and
unless it is superseded by any appointment made,
licence or permit granted or direction issued under
this Act.
(3): The provisions of sub-section (2) shall be
without prejudice to the provisions contained in
section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of
1897), which shall also apply to the repeal of the
Ordinance or other law referred to in sub-section (1)
as if such Ordinance or other law had been an enactment.
The said provisions may be briefly summarized thus :
Under the Act of 1946, the Central Government had
the power to make an order for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of essential
commodities. That Act itself provided that it would
cease to have effect on January 26, 1955. In exercise
of the powers conferred under s. 3 of the said Act, the
Central Government made the Cotton Textile (Control
of Movement) Order, 1948, prohibiting any person
732
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
from transporting cloth, among others, without the
permit of the Textile Commissioner. Before the Act
The Stat•;. of Bihar ceased to have effect, i.e., on January 26, 1955, the
HiralatKejdwal Ordinance was promulgated on January 21, 1955,
and Another
conferring on the Central Government a power similar
to that conferred upon it under s. 3 of the 1946 Act.
subba Rao J.
The said Ordinance also provided for saving clauses
in respect of certain things done under the 1946 Act.
On April 1, 1955, the Act was passed practically reenacting the same provisions of the Ordinance, and
thereunder the same power exercised by the Central
Government under s. 3 of the 1946 Act and s. 3 of the
Ordinance was preserved. The Act also provided for
repeals and savings. The question, therefore, is
whether, on the date of commission of the offence, the
Order whereunder the prosecution was launched was
subsisting or whether it ceased to exist. It is common
case that an Order made under an Act ceases to have
any legal force after the expiry of the term for 'Y hi ch
the Act is made. But it is contended that the Order
survived the expiry of the 1946 Act by reason of the
saving clauses provided by the Ordinance and the Act.
Ordinarily, the Order should have expired on January
26, 1955. Unless it was saved by s.16 of the Ordinance
the saving clause of the Act could not operate on it.
We shall, therefore, consider the question from two
aspects: (i) whether s. 16 of the Ordinance saved the
operation of the Order; and (ii) if it saved it, whether
s. 16(2) of the Act gave it a further lease of life.
Section 16 of the Ordinance is in two parts. Under
the first part, "any order made or deemed to be
made under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act, 1946, and in force immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance shall, in so far as such
order may be made under this Ordinance, be deemed
to be made under this Ordinance and continue in force."
The necessary condition for the operation of this part
of s. 16 is admittedly complied with. The Order made
under s. 3 of the 1946 Act can be made under s. 3 of
the Ordinance ; and, if so, by reason of the express
words of the section, the Order must be deemed to be
made under the Ordinance and continue to be in force
I959
-_-
.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
after its promulgation. But it is said that the second
z959
part of the section cuts down the wide amplitude of
the phraseology used in the first part. After stating The;:;~~
that the said Order shall continue to be in force, the
v.
second part proceeds to state " and accordingly any Hiralal Kejriwal
appointment made, licence or permit granted or direc- and Another
tion issued under any such order and in force im- Subba Rao J.
mediately before sue h commencement shalI continue in
force unless and until it is superseded by any appointment made, licence or permit granted or direction
issued under this Ordinance". If the Order continues
in force, the argument proceeds, the second part of
the section becomes otiose, for the appointment made,
licence or permit granted or direction issued under the
Order automatically continues in force, and, therefore,
there is no necessity for enacting the second part of
s. 16. The anomaly occurs even if the argument be
accepted, for, in that event the first part,becomes unnecessary : The same result can be achieved by
enacting only the second part of s. 16 and omitting
the first part altogether. To ascertain the meaning
of a section it is not permissible to omit any part of
it : the whole section should be read together and an
attempt should be made to reconcile both the parts.
There is no ambiguity in the provisions of the first
part of the section. In clear and unambiguous terms
it posits the continuation in force of the Order notwithstanding the repeal of the Act; thereafter, it
proceeds to enumerate certain past acts done under
the Order, and in force immediately before the commencement of the Ordinance and says that they will
continue in force in consequence of the continuance
of the Order. The word "accordingly", which means
consequently, indicates that the enumerated acts will
not continue in force but for the continuance of the
Order itself: they depend upon the continuation of the
Order. It is said that this interpretation imputes
tautology to the legislature, and, therefore, should not
be accept~d. A scrutiny of the section shows that the
second part is not really redundant, as at the first
blush it appears to be. Under s. 16 of the Ordinance,
the Order made under the Act of 1946 continues to be
of
93
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
in force till another Order is made under the Ordinance.
It covers two periods : (i) the period up to the date of
The State of
Bihar
the commencement of t h e Or d inance; and (ii) the
v.
period thereafter. The first part gives life to that
Hiralal Kejriwal Order, and, therefore, the acts authorised under that
and Another
Order can be done subsequent to the coming into force
of the Ordinance. But a question may be raised
Subba Rao].
whether the past acts done under that Order are saved
by the continuance of the Order, or whether the acts
already done are covered by the words that the "Order
shall continue in force". The second part appears to
have been enacted for the purpose of a voiding this
difficulty or, at any rate, to dispel the ambiguity.
Under the section both the Order and the acts previously done under the Order are saved. If so, it follows
that the.Order was saved and the prosecution authorized
by the Order could legitimately be launched after the
Ordinance came into force.
Even so, it is contended that the Order saved by
a. 16 of the Ordinance fell with the repeal of that
Ordinance and was not continued under the Act. This
argument is based upon the provisions of s. 16(1) and
(2) of the Act. Section 16 has three sub-sections. For
the present argument we are concerned only with subss. (1) and (2) of s. 16. Sub-section (2) is a repetition of
s. 16 of the Ordinance. But it is said that s. 16(l)(b)
of the Act indicates that the Order was not saved
under that section. Under s. 16(l)(a), the Essential
Commodities Ordinance, 1955, is repealed, and under
s. 16( l )(b) " any other law in force in any State
immediately before the commencement of this Act in
so far as such law controls or authorizes the control of
the production, supply and distribution of, and trade
and commerce in, any essential commodity " is also
repealed. The argument is that the Order is comprehended by the words "any other law" in cl. (b) of
s. 16(1), and, therefore, when that Order is repealed
under cl. (b) of a. 16(1), it is unreasonable to hold that
it is restored under sub-s. (2) of s. 16, To put it in
other words, an intention cannot be imputed to the
legislature to repeal an order under one sub-section
11-nd restore it by another .sub-section. If we may say
z959
$.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
735
so, there is a fallacy underlying this argument. The
r959
words" any otherlaw" in s. l6(l)(b) can. only mean
any law other than the Essential Commodities Ordin" The State of
Bihar
ance, 1955, mentioned ins. 16(l)(a). It is admitted that
v.
there are laws other than the said Ordinance in force Hiralal Kejriwal
in many States controlling the production, supply and and Another
distribution of essential commodities. An order made
or deemed to be made under the Commodities Ordin- Subba Rao f·
ance, 1955, cannot be described as a law other than
Essential Commodities Ordinance whereunder it is
made. Such an order is comprehended by cl. (a) of
s. 16(1) itself, and, therefore, cl. (b) thereof has no
application to it. In this view, an interpretation
different from that we have put on the provisions of
s. 16 of the Ordinance cannot be given to sub-s. (2) of
s. 16 of the Act. ]!'or the reasons we have given in
interpreting the provisions of s. 16 of the Ordinance,
we hold that undei• s. 16(2) both the order and the acts
enumerated in the second part of it survived the expiry
of the Ordinance and continued in force under the Act.
For the above reasons, we hold that the prosecution
was validly launched against the accused under s. 3 of
the Order.
Even sq, the. learned Counsel for the respondents
contends that it is not a fit case for this Court to inter·
fere under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The offence
was alleged to have been committed on August "30,
1955, i.e., more than four years ago. The varying
views expressed by the Courts indicate that there was
a plausible justification for reasonable belief on the
part of the accused that the Order did not survive the
ex11iry of the life of the 1946 Act. 'fhe order of the
High Court dismissing the application for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court shows that it was filed in
contravention of the provisions of r. 28 of the Patna
High Court Rules. Under the said Rules the application should have been filed immediately after the
judgment was delivered. In the affidavit filed in
supvort of that application the only reason given for
not doing so was that the appellant did not give the
necessary instructions. The learned Judge of the High
Court rightly did not accept that reason as a sufficient
736
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
ground for permitting the application tO be filed at a
later stage. In the application for special leave filed
The State of
in
this Court, though it was stated that the application
Bihar
filed
in the High Court for certificate was rejected, the
v.
Hiralal Kejriwal reason for the rejection was not disclosed. Further,
and Another
the State, presumably, filed this appeal to get the legal
position clarified. We also believe that public interest
Subba Rao ].
does not require that the stale matter should be
resuscitated. In the circumstances, we would be
justified not to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction,
and we accordingly dismiss the appeal.
A ppe<il dismissed.
'959
CHHADAMI LAL JAIN AND OTHERS
'959
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
ANOTHER
(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Commitment Order-Quashing of-Magistrate
starting trial as in warrant case-Prosecution witness examined and
cross-examined-Charge framed without giving opportunity to
accused to adduce defence evidence and co1nmitment order passed- -No
intimation to accused of intention to commit-Whether commitment
order illegal-Prejudice--Code of Criminal Procedure, I898 (V of
I898), SS. 208, 347 and 537.
A complaint was filed against seven persons under ss. 409,
465, 467, 471 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. After examining the complainant summonses were issued to the accused to
answer a charge under s. 406. The trial started as in a warrant
case; prosecution witnesses were examined and cross-examined
and the statements of the accused were recorded, and the
Magistrate heard arguments on the question of framing charges.
Thereafter, he framed charges under ss 409 and 465 read with
ss. 471 and 477A, and without giving previous intimation of his
intention to do so passed an order committing the appellants to
the Court of Sessions. The appellants, contended that the
commitment was illegal because the case having begun as a
warrant case it was incumbent upon the Magistrate, when he
decided to commit the case to the Court of Session, to follow the
procedure provided in Ch. XVIII Code of Criminal Procedure,
but he failed to comply with the provisions of ss. 208 to 213 of
1
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org