RM. NL. RAMASWAMI CHETTIAR AND OTHERS. versus THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER, RAMANATHAPURAM AT MADURAI & OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 August 1959 | [1960] 1 S.C.R. 616 | 1959 INSC 106
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 August 1959
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, A.K. SARKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 207/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 1 S.C.R. 616
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 106
Text of the judgment
616
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
the Bill that it was in reality a new bill and therefore
a
fresh reference was necessary.
Babulal Parate
It is advisable, perhaps, to add a few more words
v.
The State of
about Art. 122( 1) of the Constitution. Learned counsel
Bombay
for the appellant has posed before us the question as
and Another
to what would be the effect of that Article if in
any Bill completely unrelated to any of the matters
S. K. Das ].
referred to in Cls. (a) to (e) of Art. 3 an amendment
was t!l be proposed and accepted changing (for example)
the name of a State. We do not think that we need
answer such a hypothetical question except merely to
say that if an amendment is of such a character that
it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative
of Art. 3, the question then will be not the validity of
proceedings in Parliament but the violation of a consitutional provision. That, however, is not the position
in the present case.
For these reasons, we hold that there was no violation of Art. 3 and the Act or any of its provisions are
not invalid on that ground.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
'959
I959
August 28.
RM. NL. RAMASW AMI CHE1'TIAR AND OTHERS.
v.
THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER,
RAMANATHAPURAM AT MADURAI & OTHERS
(S. K. DAs, A. K. SARKAR and K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.)
Insolvency--Decree-holder assigning decree-Adjudication as
insolvent on ground of assignment being fraudulent preference-Whether upon adjudication decree vests in Official Receiver-Order
annulling assignment-If relates back to date of assignment-Execution applications made by assignee before annulment order, whether
incompetent-Official Receiver making application for execution
after annulment order-Limitation- -Whether limitation saved by
applications made by assignee-Indian Limitation Act, r908 (V of
r908)--Provinciat Insolvency Act r920 (V of r920), ss. 28 and 54.
On May 9, 1935, one V obtained a decree against R and
later assigned the same in favour of his mother M. M made an
application for an order recognising her as the assignee and for
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
execution which was disposed of on September 27, r937. In
z959
1939, V was adjudicated an insolvent on the ground that the
Ramaswami
assignment was a f raudu1ent pre f erence. Th erea f ter M ma de a
.
Cihettiar
second application for execution which was disposed of on
September 30, 1940. The Official Receiver who had been ap~oint:·
.
ed receiver in insolvency applied under s. 54 of the Provincial The Official Receiver
Insolvency Act and on April, 9, 1943 obtained an order annulling
the assignment. On September 27, 1943, the Receiver applied
for execution of the decree relying upon the applications made
by M to save limitation under art. 182, Limitation Act. The
judgment debtor objected that the execution application was
time barred because, in view of the orders in the insolvency
proceedings, M was not entitled to the decree on the dates she
applied for execution and her applications were incompetent and
could not save limitation. The judgment debtor contended that
(i) the order of annulment related back to the date of assignment
and consequently M had never been entitled to the decree, (ii)
the order of adjudication had the effect itself of annulling the
assignment and vesting the decree in the receiver from the date
of presentation of the application for adjudication, and (iii) the
receiver was not entitled to take advantage of the applications
made by M as he was not claiming through her but against her.
Held, (per curiam) that the application for execution made
by the receiver was within time as the previous applications
made by M were competent and saved the limitation. The
assignment in favour of M stood till it was annulled and till then
M had the right to execute the decree. Even if the annulment
related back to the date of assignment, it did not make illegal the
exercise of the rights under the assignment made prior to the
annulment. Sub-sections (2) and (7) of s. 28 of the Provincial
Insolvency Act which provided that upon adjudication all the
assets of the insolvent vested in the receiver with effect from
the date of the application for adjudication, could not have the
effect of vesting the decree in the receiver. The order of adjudication, though it was based on the ground that the assignment
was a fraudulent preference amounting to an act of insolvency,
did not itself annul the assignment and the assignment stood
till it was annulled by an order under s. 54. As such M was
competent to execute the decree and the applications made by
her were in accordance with law and could be relied upon by the
receiver to save the limitation for the application made by him.
The fact that the receiver did not claim through M did not
disentitle him from taking advantage of the applications made
by M. Article 182, Limitation Act, merely required the application for execution of a decree to be made within three years of
the final order on a previous application made in accordance
with law for the execution of the same decree.
Mahomed Siddique Yousuf v. Official Assignee of Calcutta,
(1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 93; Ex parte Learoyd, (1878) 10 Ch. D. 3,
distinguished.
618
x959
Ramaswami
Cheltia,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1!!60(1)]
Subba Rao ].-The order of adjudication did not by its own
force divest the title of M and vest it in the Official Receiver. An
assignment made before the filing of the application for adjudication was binding on the Official Receiver until it was annulled
v.
und<'t ss. 53, 54 or 54-A of the Act.
The Official Receirer
Mahomed Siddique Yousuf v. Official Assignee of Calcutta,
(1943) LR. 70 I.A. 93 and Ex parte Learoyd, (1878) IO Ch. D. 3,
distinguished.
Official Receiver, Guntur v. Narra Gopala Krishnayya I.LR.
1945 Mad. 541 and D. G. Sahasrabudhe v. Kala Chand Deochand G
Co., Bombay, 1.1,.R. 1947 Nag. 35, approved.
(r) A transfer by a debtor before insolvency with a view to
give fraudulent preference conveyed a valid title to the transferee; (2) such a transfer was voidable against the Official
Receiver in circumstances mentioned in s. 54 of the Act; (3) when
the transfer was annulled· the property vested in the Official
Receiver who could administer it in the interest of the creditors;
and (4) even after annulment the transfer stood as between the
transferor and the transferee and the transferee was entitled to
the balance of the sale proceeds remaining after satisfying the
creditors.
Official Receiver, Coimbatore v. Palaniswami Chetti, (1925)
I.L.R. 48 Mad. 750, Amir Hasan v. Saiyid Hasan, (1935) I.LR. 57
All. goo, and Rukhmanbai v. Govindram l.L.R. 1946 Nag. 273,
relied on.
Sarkar J.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
207of1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated the 6th December 1950, of the Madras
High Court in C.M.A. No. 332 of 1945, arising out of
the judgment and order dated the 17th January 1945,
of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai in E. P. No. 90
of 1944 in 0. S. No. 14 of 1926.
M. S. K. Iyengar, for the appellants.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. R. V. Sastri for
respondent No. I.
1959. August 28. The judgment of S. K. Das and
A. K. Sarkar JJ. was delivered by Sarkar, J. Subba
Rao, J. delivered a separate judgment.
SARKAR J.-This appeal arises out of an application
for execution of a decree for money and the only
question is whether the application was made within
the time prescribed by the Limitation Act.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
'fhe decree was passed in favour of one Venkatar959
chalam Chettiar on May 9, 1935, against the appellants Ramaswami
and certain other persons. On :February 3, 1936,
Chettiar
Venkatachalam Chettiar transferred the decree to his
v.
mother, Meenakshi Achi, by an assignment in writing The Official Receiver
never having tried to execute it himself. Soon thereSarkar J.
after, namely, on March 26, 1936, a creditor of
Venkatachalam Chettiar presented a petition under
the Provincial Insolvency Act (hereinafter referred to
as the Act) for adjudicating him an insolvent on the
ground that the transfer of the decree to Meenakshi
Achi was a fraudulent preference and as such an act
of insolvency. This petition remained pending for
a considerable time and ultimately on January 7, 1939,
an order was made on it adjudicating Venkatachalam
Chettiar an insolvent. By that order respondent No. 1,
the Official Receiver of Ramanathapuram, was appointed the receiver in insolvency and the insolvent's
estate vested in him. This order was based on the
finding that the transfer of the decree by Venkatachalam Chettiar to Meenakshi Achi was a fraudulent
preference and an act of insolvency. On January 26,
1942, the receiver made an application in the insolvency proceedings for an order annulling the transfer
of the decree by the insolvent to Meenakshi Achi and
on this application an order was made on April 9,
1943, under s. 54 of the Act annulling that transfer.
In the meantime, Meenakshi Achi had made two
applications for execution of the decree as the assignee
of it and a reference to them is necessary. The first
of these applications was made on December 14, 1936,
for an order recognising her as the assignee of the
decree and for its execution against some of the judgment-debtors. This application was disposed of by an
order made on September 27, 1937, recognising her
right to execute the decree as the assignee and directing a certain compromise made presumably with the
judgment debtors concerned, to be recorded. The
terms of this compromise a.re not relevant for the
purpose of the appeal. Thereafter, on August 2, 1940,
Meenakshi Achi as the assignee of the decree made
another a.pplication for its execution and this
620
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
application was disposed of by an order made on
30, 1940, dismissing it for default of proseSeptember
. Rama.~u1ami
Chettiar
cution. It will be remembered that it was after these
v.
applications and the orders thereon had been made
The Official Receiver that the order annulling the assignment of the decree
to Meenakshi Achi was passed.
Sarkar J.
After the order annulling the transfer of the decree
to MeeBakshi Achi had been made, the receiver considering himself then entitled to the decree, made an
application for its execution on September 27, 1943.
It is this application which has given rise to the
present appeal.
The executing court dismissed the application as
having been made beyond the time prescribed by the
Limitation Act. On appeal, the High Court at Madras
set aside the order of the executing court and held
that the application was within time. Some of the
judgment-debtors have now come up in appeal to this
Court. The appeal is contested by the receiver, the
respondent No. 1. The other respondents among
whom are the remaining judgment-debtors or their
successors in interest, have not appeared.
Applications for execution like the present one are
governed by art. 182 of the Limitation Act. That
article provides a period of three years within which
the application must be made. The article prescribes·
different points of time for different cases from which
the period is to commence running. The first point of
time so prescribed is the date of the decree. The fifth
point of time prescribed is expressed in these words :
(Where the application next hereinafter mentioned
has been made) the date of the final order passed
· on an application made in accordance with law to
the proper court for execution .....
The question for determination is whether the fifth
point of time applies to the receiver's application for
execution. If it does not, the application must be held
to have been made out of time, while if it does, the
application would not be barred by limitation.
The receiver contends that the two applications by
Meenakshi Achi were "applications made in accorda.nc11 with la.w to th11 proper court for ex11cution "
1959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
within the meaning of the article and his application
x959
was within time as it had been made within three years Ramaswami
of the date on which the final order on Meenakshi
Chettiar
Ac.hi's last application was made.
v.
It is said on behalf of the appellants that in view The Official Receiver
of the orders in the insolvency proceedings it must be
-k-J
5
held that she was not entitled to the decree on any of
ar ar ·
the dates on which she applied for its execution and
that her applications were therefore incompetent ·and
not in accordance with law.
The appellants put their contention in several ways.
It is first said that the order annulling the assignment
of the decree to Meenakshi Achi related back to the
date of the assignment with the result that it has to be
deemed as if she had never been entitled to the decree
and that, therefore, the applications for execution by
her were not competent and hence were not in accordance with law.
We think this contention is wholly unfounded. We
will assume for the purpose of the present case that
when an order is made under s. 54 of the Act annulling a transfer, the transfer stands annulled as from
the date it was made. But even so, the transfer stands
till it is annulled and therefore, till then, the transferee
has all the rights in the property transferred. So long
as the transferee had such rights he was competent to
exercise them and such exercise would be legal and
fully in accordance with law.. The fact, if it be so,
th'at the transfer on annulment, become!'! void as from
the date of the transfer cannot turn the exercise of a
right under the transfer, made prior to the annulment
and which was legal when made, illegal. Meenaksh~
Achi had hence full legal competence to execute the
decree, till the transfer of it to her was annulled. Her
two applications for execution of the decree were, therefore, fully in accordance with law when they had been
made ana that is all that art. 182 requires.
Next, it is said that the provisions of sub-ss. (2) and
(7) of s. 28 of the Act make Meenakshi Achi's two
applications for execution incompetent in law. These
provisions have now to be considered. Sub-section (2)
79
622
'959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
says that upon the making of an order of adjudication
Ramaswam;
the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest
Chettiar
in the receiver and sub-s. (7) says that an order of
v.
adjudication shall relate back to and take effect from
TheOf/irial Receiver the date of the presentation of the petition on which it
Sarkar J.
is made. It is said that under these provisions, the
assets of the insolvent in this case, including the decree
under execution, became vested in the receiver on
March 26, 1936, when the petition for adjudicating him
an insolvent had been presenterl, and consequently,
the two applications for execution by Meenakshi Achi
which had been made after that date were incompetent
and not in accordance with law.
It seems to us that this <;ontention also is fallacious.
These sub-sections cannot have the effect of vesting
the decree in the receiver till its transfer to Meenakshi
Achi had been annulled. Till then it was not a part
of the insolvent's estate. The annulment, as we have
earlier pointed out, was made under s. 54 of the Act.
That section provides that certain transfers of property
by the insolvent would be deemed fraudulent and void
as against the receiver in insolvency and shall be
annulled by court. It is obvious that a transfer liable
to be annulled under this section remains a perfectly
valid transfer till it is annulled. If it had become
void automatimilly on an rm\or for adjudication being
made, there would be 110 need to provide for its
annulment by court. It wou Id follow that Meenakshi
Achi was legally posRes>;.:d of the rlecrce and competent
to apply for its execution till the transfer of the decree
to her was annullerl under s. 54.
It is then said that though it may generally be that
a transfer !iabk to be annulled unrler s. 54 remains
valid till it is anrn,!led, that is not so where the transfer is the act of insolvency upon which the order of
adjudication is founded, for, in such a case the order
itself annuls the transfer. So, it is said that as the
order of adjudication in this case was founded upon
the transfer of the decree to Meenakshi Achi, that
transfer became annulled on the order being made on
January 7, 1939, and the second application for
execution by Meenakshi Achi was incompetent. It is
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
true that if this in the correct view, then the receiver's
r959
application for execution must be held to have been
made beyond the time allowed, for; it had been Ramaswmni
Chelliar
made more than three years after the final order on
v.
the first application for execution by l\feenakshi which The Official Receiver
is the only order on which the receiver can on this
basis rely for resorting to the fifth point of time fixed
Sarkar J.
by art. 182.
Now this argument is based solely on the decision of
the Judicial Committee in .llfahomed Siddique Yousuf v.
O.fficial Assignee of Oalcutta( 1 ) which it is said held that
where a transfer is the act of insolvency on which the
order of adjudication is founded, that order itself has
the effect of annulling the transfer.
We think this case has been misunderstood. We find
nothing in it to lead to the view that an order of
adjudication founded on an act of insolvency constituted by a transfer of property amounting to a fraudulent
preference, itself and without more annuls that transfer. That was a case decided under the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act. In that case one of the acts of
insolvency on which the order of adjudication had
been founded was a transfer by the insolvent of a
certain decree in his favour to the appellant, which
was held to have been a fraudulent preference. The
transferee was not a party to the order of adjudication.
The official assignee, that is, the receiver in insolvency,
applied to have that transfer annulled, It was contendPd on behalf of the official assignee before the
judge in insolvency in the High Court that the oeder
of adjudication holding the transfer to be a fraudnlent
preference was conclusive and binding on the transferee
though he was not a party to the insolvency petition.
It was said that thitt had been held in Ex parte
Learoyd(") which turned on the English Bankruptcy
Act, 1869, the terms of which were similar to the
relevant provisions in the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act. The learned judge felt some difficulty in
view of a decision of the ~fadras High Court to which
it is unnecessary to refer, whether the principle of the
(I) (x943) L. R. 70 I.A 93·
(2) (1878) IO Ch. D. 3·
624
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
English decision applied to a case under the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act. He, therefore, went into the
R•masw•mi
facts and came to the conclusion that the transfer
Chetliar
v.
amounted to a fraudulent preference and thereupon
TheOffe;ialReceiuermade an order annulling it. On appeal the appellate
Judges of the High Court "expressed some doubt
Sarkar J.
whether the intent to prefer was in fact proved ; but
they were both of opinion (following Ex parte
Learoyd (') that the order of adjudication was conclu.
sive and could not be disputed." They held that this
was so though the transferee was not a party to the
order of adjudioation. In that view of the matter the
appellate Judges felt that there was a decision binding
on the transferee that the transfer was void as a
fraudulent preference and they thereupon annulled the
transfer as a matter of course. The judgments in the
High Court are reported in 45 C.W.N. 441. The transferee who was not a party to the insolvency petition,
then asked for an extension of time to prefer an appeal
from the order of adjudication but this was refused.
Then the matter was taken up to the Judicial Committee in further appeal. The Judicial Committee held
that the appellate Judges of the High Court were right
in their view that the principle of Ex parte Learoyd (' ),
applied to cases under the Presidency-towns Insolvency
Act, but they thought that in the circumstances of the
case the order of the a ppelb te judges refusing to extend
titne for the transferee to appeal from the order of
adjudication was not justified and set it aside and
extended the time to appeal. In order, however, to
make the order in the contemplated appeal, should it
succeed, effective, they also set aside the order annulling the transfer though in their view it was "plairtly
right". This would appear from their observations at
p. 99 of the report :
" It is plain that an appeal against the adjudication order would be useless while the orders stand in
this independent proceeding declaring the transfer
void because of the adjudication order itself. On the
other hand, the decision of the High Court avoiding
the transfer is plainly right while the adjudication
z959
(1) (1878) JO Ch. D. 3·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
order stands and the appellant as a condition of the
·H'1
extension of time must p-ay, as he has offered to do, Ramaswami
the costs thrown away."
Chettiar
And at p. 100 they said,
v.
"The order is without prejudice to the right of the The Official Receiller
official assignee, if he is so advised, to make a further
Sarkar J.
application to have the transfer declared void." .
It is therefore abundantly clear that all that the
Judicial Committee held in Mahomed Siddique
You~'f's case(1) was that in a. case under the Presiden · -towns Insolvency Act, when the act of
inso vency upon which an order of adjudication is
founded is a transfer amounting to a fraudulent preference, the transferee cannot so long as the order of
adjudication stands, question that finding, namely, that
the transfer was a fraudulent preference and that,
therefore, in an application by the official assignee to
have that transfer annulled on the ground that it was
a fraudulent. preference, the order of adjudication is
is coaelusive proof that the transfer was by way of a
fraudulenL preference and it was not open .to the
transferee to lead evidence to·prove that the transfer
was not a fraudulent preference. In such a case
therefore the order of annulment had to be made as a
matter of course on proof of the order of adjudication.
The Judicial Committee did not hold that in such a
case the order of adjudication itself annulled the
transfer and no separate order of annulment was
required for the purpose. In fact, it is obvious that
they thought that a separate order annulling the
transfer would be necessary even in such a case for
otherwise they would not have stated that "the decision of the High Court avoiding the transfer is plainly
right " nor while setting aside the order annulling the
transfer reserved the right of the official assignee,
should the occasion arise, to make a further application to have the transfer declared void. The case
· therefore does not support the proposition for whiCh it
has been cited. On the contrary, it. clearly proceeds
on the basis that even where the order of adjudication
is based on an a.ct of insolvency constituted by a.
(1 l (1943) L.R, 70 I.A. 93·
626
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
transfer of property found to be a fraudulent preference,
the transfer stands till it is set aside. In our view,
Ramaswa1ni
Chettiar
. this is the correct position and nothing to the contrary
v.
has been brought to our notice.
The Official Receiver
An argument had been raised at the bar that under
the Provincial Insolveney Act an order of adjudicaSarkar].
tion has not that binding force which Mahomed
Siddique Yousuf's case (1 ) held it had under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act. It was said that this
was so because the terms of the two Acts were dissimilar. We <lo not think it necessary to express any
opinion on this question. We have discussed 11-Jahomed
Siddique Yoiisuf's case(') only to show that it does not
support the proposition for which it was cited. It is unnecessary for us to say whether it will govern a case
1Jnder the Provincial Insolvency Act or what the effect
of' the dissimilarity pointed out in the terms of the
two Acts is. That question is not before us.
There remains one other point to deal with. It is
said that the official receiver was not entitled to take
advantage of the applications for execution ma<lc by
:M:eenakshi Achi as he had not been claiming under
her but had actually claimed against her. This contention is equally unfounded. Article 182 does not
say that no advantage of a previous application can
be taken for the purposes of saving the bar of limitation, unless it hatl been made by a person under w horn
the applicant in a later application, which is said to be
barre<l by limitation, claimed. All that the article
contemplates is an application for execution of a decree
made within three years of the final order on a previous application made in aecorclance with law for the
execution of the same decree. That being 1>0, we must
reject this contention of the appellants also.
In view of what we have already said, it becomes
unnecessary to deal with the other points raised at
the bar.
In the result, we think that the appeal should be
dismissed and we order accordingly. The appellant
must pay the costs of this appeal.
'959
(I) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 9~·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
627
SuBBA RAO J.-This appeal l'aises a question of
r959
limitation. There is no dispute about the facts. On
May 9, 1935, one Venkatachalam Chettiar obtained a R~7,~~::mi
compromise decree against the appellants and respondv.
en ts 2, 3 and 4 and predecessors in interest of res- The Oficial 11ecei11n
pondents u and 6 in A. S. No. 226 of 1930, on the
file of the High Court of Madras. Under the decree Subba Rao J.
the defendants were directed to pay the plaintiffs
therein a sum of Rs.1,10,101-4-0 together with interest
at 3 per cent. per annum in certain instalments, the
last of the inRtalments being payable on May 30, 1942.
The decree also provided that in the event of a default
in payment of any one of the instalments, the entire
decree amount would become payable. On February 27,
1937, one Visvanathan Chettiar obtained a decree
against the said Venkatachalam Chettiar in 0. S. No.
22 of 1936, on the file of the Court of Subordinate
Judge, Devakottai, for a sum of Rs. 33,000. The
suit ending in the above decree was filed on January 29,
1936. On February 3, 1936, Venkatachalam Chettiar
executed a deed of assignment transferring the decree
obtained by him in C. S. No. 14of1926 to his mother,
Meenakshi Achi, for consideration. On March 26,
1936, Visvanathan Chettiar filed I. P. No. 10 of 1936
in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, for
adjudicating Venkatachalam Chettiar an insolvent on
the ground that the transfer of the decree in favour
of l\'Ieenakshi Achi was an act of insolvency. On
December 14, 1936, the arssignec, :Meena:kshi Achi, filed
E.P. No. 37 of 1937 for recognition of the assignment
in her favour and for execution of the decree. The
judgment-debtors did not object either to the recogni~
tion of the assignment of the decree or the execution
thereof. The said Visvanathan Chettiar intervened
in the execution petition and applied inE.A. No. 817 of
1937 for stay of execution of the decree on the ground
that he had filed an insolvency petition against the
decree-holder and also on the ground that the said
assignment was nominal. The learned Subordinate
Judge disallowed the objection of the creditor, recognised the assignment, and permitted the assignee-decreeholder to proceed with the execution of the decree.
628
1959
SU PRE1"1E COUR'f REPORTS
. On September 27, 1937, .a settlement
[1960(1)]
was entered into
between the assignee-decree-holder and the jndgmentdebtors and the said execution petition was closed.
v.
Ori January 7, 1939, Venkatachalam Chcttiar was
The O.ufoa111o"i"" adjudicated insolvent on the ground that the assignment of the srticl decree by him in favour of his mother,
Subba Rao J.
Meenakshi Aehi, was an aet of insolvency, whereupon
his properti0s Yested in tlie fo·st rPspondent, the Official HecteiYer, Ramarmthapuram at Madurai. On
August 2, 1940, the assigncc-dccreo-holclel' fiied another
execution petition, E.P. No. 243 of 1940, and it was
struck off on 8eptemhcr 30, 1940. On January 26,
1942, the Offic'.al Receiver filer! I.A. Xo. 20 of 1942
in I. P. No. 10 Gf 1936 in the Court of the 8nbordinate Judge, J)evakott.ai, for setting 1Lsidc Hie
assignment, and by mtler dated April !.J, 1943, the
assignment was set aside by the Court on the gnmnd
of frauduhmt prcforenee within the meaning nf s. 54 of
t.he Provindal lm;olv<mcy Act, l!J20, herei1mftcr called
the Act. On Septemher 27, 1943, the Official Receiver
filed a freRh exe~ntioJJ prelition, Kl'. l\n. 90 of 1944.
for executing thP decree. lt wn.s allege1l by tfa• rtppellants and the respondents 2 to 6, ·inter nlia, tlrnt the
said execution petition was barred liy limitar.ioll on
the ground that the t.wo earlier execution pAti1io11s were
not in accordance with law within thP meaning of
art. 182, cl. 5, of the Limitation Ad. The Of1foial
Receiver eontt·rnlcd that they WPl'e in aecordance with
law and therefore tho present ex<;<:ution pet.ition was
in time. He further pleaded that the present execution petition was also saved from the bar of limitation
by the payments made by the judgment-debtors to
Meenakshi Achi, and that. in any event, the decree in
respect of the last three instalments was not barred
by limitation. The learned Subordinate .Judge rejected
the contentions of the Ofikial Receiver and held that
the execution petition was barred by limit:;ttion. The
Official Receiver preferred an appeal against the said
order of the Subordinate Judge to the High Court of
Madras. Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed,
JJ., of the said High Court came to the conclusion that
the earlier execution petitions were in accordance with
Ramasw'"'"
Ch,ttiar
0
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
i959
law and, therefore, the present execution petition was
within time. They also expressed the view that the
payments made by the judgment-debtors to Meenakshi Ra;;sw_ami
Achi were valid payments and therefore they also saved
~'.iar
the bar of limitation. In any view, they found that The Official Receiver
the last two instalments were not barred by limitation.
On their findings, the learned judges of the High Court Subba Rao].
set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge
and remanded the execution petition to the Court of
the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, for taking steps in
furtherance of execution. The present appeal to this
Court was filed against the said order of remand.
Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that
the execution petitions, E.P. No. 37 of 1937 and E.P.
No. 243 of 1940, were not in accordance with law for
the following reasons: (l) The order dated April 9, 1943,
annulling the assignment of the decree by Venkatachalam Chettiar in favour of his mother, Meenakshi
Achi, related back to the date of the transfer, i.e.,
February 3, 1936, and, therefore, E.P. No. 37 of 1937,
which was filed on December 14, 1936 and E. P.
No. 243 of 1940 which was filed on August 2, 1940,
were ineffective to save the bar of limitation, as
on the dates they were filed Meenakshi Achi had
no title in the decree ; (2) the order of adjudication
dated January 7, 1939, was based on the finding that'
the said assignment of the decree was an act of fraudulent preference and that the order related back to
the date of the filing of I. P. No. 10of1936 on March 26,
1936, and, therefore, the two execution petitions
filed thereafter were filed by a person without title,
with the result that the said two petitions were not in
accordance with law; (3) assuming that the said two
execution petitions were in accordance with law, the
Official Receiver neither claims under, nor represents,
the assignee-decree-holder, and, therefore, he has no
locus standi to file the present execution petition; (4)
payments made by the judgment-debtors to Meenakshi
Achi, who had no title in the decree, could not save
the bar of limitation; and (5) as Meenakshi Achi
in her execution petitions, by exercising her option,
claimed the entire decree amount, the Official Receiver
So
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
1959
cannot now claim that the last two instalments are
within
time.
Ramaswami
Chettiar
At the outset it may be stated that it would be suffiv.
cient if we consider the objections of the appellants
TkeOfficialReceiv"in regard to E. P. No. 243of1940, for, if that was not
in accordance with law, the present execution petition
Subba Rao f.
would be barred by limitation. The validity of E. P.
No. 37 of 1937 was also questioned on the same
grounds of attack taken against the later execution
petition.
The relevant part of the Limitation Act is art. 182
and it reads ~
Description of
application
For the execution of a
decree or order of any
Civil Court not provided
for by article 183 or by
section 48 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908.
Pt'riod of
Limitation
Time from 'vhich period
begins to run
Three years; or,
5. (where the applicawhere a certified copy tion, next hereinafter
of the decree or order mentioned has
been
has been registered, made) the date of the
six years.
final order passed on an
application
made
in
accordance with law to
the proper Court for
execution, or to take some
step in aid of execution
of the decree or order.
Under this article the latesi, execution petition should
have been filed within three years from the date of the
final order passed on an application made in accordance
with law to the proper Court of execution. Taking
first the second contention of the learned Counsel for
the appellants, the q"estion may be po~ed thus:
Whether the execution petition, E.P. No. 243 of 1940,
filed on August 2, 1940, by Meenakshi Achi after
Venkatachalam Chetli<tr was adjudicated insolvent on
January 7, 1939, was one in accordance with law? If the
order of adjudication of Venkatachalam Chettiar on the
ground that the assignment of the decree made by him
in favour of Meenakshi Achi was an act of insolvency
ex proprio vigore annul the transfer in her favour, the
execution petition filed by her after the said order of
adj11dication wo11ld not be one filed in accordance with
law. On the other hand, if the assignment of the decree
continued to be ggod till it was annulled on a:rv application filed by the Official Receiver, which was done in
..,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
the present case on April 9, 1943, the execution petiz959
tion, subject to another argument that I would con- Ramaswami
sider at a later stage, would be one filed in accordance
Chettiar
with law. What then is the legal effect of such an
v.
order of adjudication? The question in the main falls The Official Receiver
to be decided on a true construction of the relevant
provisions of the Act. Section 6 of the Act defines the Subba Rao J.
act of insolvency; it enumerates eight acts of insolvency, and one of them is.a transfer made by a debtor
which would be void as a fraudulent preferel\ce if he
w~re adjudicated insolvent. Section 7 enables a creditor
oil a debter to present an insolvency petition for
adjudicating the debtor an insolvent. Section 9 lays
down the conditions on which a debtor may petition.
Section 13 prescribes the particulars a creditor has to
give in his petition, and one of the particulars to be
·given is the act of insolvency committed by the debtor.
When an insolvency petition is admitted, s. 19 provides
that notice should be given to creditors in such manner
as may be prescribed, and, when the debtor is not the
petitioner, notice of the order admitting the petition
should be served on the debtor. On the date fixed for
hearing, the Court should require proof of the matters
mentioned under s. 24 of the Act ; it enables the Court
to examine the debtor and the creditors and take the
evidence adduced by them. After making the necessary enquiry, the Court may dismiss the petition or
make an order of adjudication. On the making of the
said order of adjudication, the whole property of the
insolvent would vest in the Court or in the Receiver
appointed under the Act, and the said property becomes divisible among the creditors. Under sub-s. 7 of
s. 28 the order of adjudication shall relate back to, and
take effect from, the date of the presentation of the petition. Under s. 30 notice of an order of adjudication stating the name, address and description of the insolvent,
the date of adjudication, the period within which the
debtor should apply for his discharge and the Court by
which the adjudication is made, should be published in
the Official Gazette and in such manner as may be
prescribed. It will be seen from the aforesaid provisions that till an order of adjudication is made, the
ti:l2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
person to whom the insolvent transferred his property
does not come into the picture at all. The purchaser
Racmaswami
is neither a ·partv
to the proceedings nor any notice is
hettiar
,,
given to him. It would, therefore, be contrary to all
The Offic~;l Receiver principles of natural justice to hold that the finding
arrived at in regard to an a.ssignm~nt of a property by
Subba Rao J.
the insolvent, in favour of a third party behind his
back, is binding on him. If the legislature intended
that the order should have that effect, it would have
provided for personal, or, at any rate, public notice to
the purchasers, or would have given in express terms
such a binding effect; and the fact that it did not do
so is a clear indication of the legislative intention that
an incidental finding was not intended to have such
a far-reaching effect.
On the other hand, the Act makes ample provision
for setting aside such transfers. Sections 53 and 54 of
the Act enable the Official Receiver to have voluntary
transfers made within two years of the insolvency
petition and that made in fraudulent pi·eference of
one creditor over another within three months from
the date of the petition ·annulled by the Court. If the
legislature intended to exclude a transfer constituting
an act of insolvency from the operation of these
provisions, it would have introduced a proviso to that
effect.
Therefore, unless such a transfer is duly
annulled in the manner pr<1seribed, the transfer would
be valid.
That this is the intention of the legislature is also
made clear by the other provisions of the Act vis-avis transfers. The Act provides for three stages:
(1) Transfers made before the presentation of the
insolvency petition; (2) transfers made after the
presentation of the petition and before the order of
adjudication; and (3) transfers made after adjudication.
A transfer made after adjudication is not binding on the
Receiver. A transfer by an insolvent after the filing
of the petition is also not binding on the Receiver
subject to a protection clause. A purchase in good
faith under a sale in execution (s. 51(3)) and a transfer
inter vivos in good faith for valuable consideration
(s. 55) fall within the protected class of transactions.
z959
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
A transfer before the filing of the petition is binding
z959
on the Receiver unless it is annulled under ss. 53, 54 Ramaswami
or 54-A of the Act. The scheme of the Act in regard
Chettiar
to transfers clearly demonstrates that transfers before
Y.
the filing of the petition are good unless · they are The Official Receiv11
annulled in the manner prescribed in the Act and even s
J
the doctrine of relating back of the or<ler of adjudica- " a ao ·
tion does not reach them as they fall on the other side
of the line. If it was the intention of the legislature
that the said order by its own force should declare the
transaction void, it woultl have fixed the date of the
transfer as the datum line instead of the date of the
filing of the petition. It appears to me that this was
designedly done to give an opportunity to the party
affected to defend his title when the Official Receiver
filed an application to annul the transfer. Sections 53
54 and 28 must be reconciled and they can be reconciled wi.thout doing violence to the language of the
said sections if the order of adjudication is ·conclusive
only i11 regard to the status of the insolvent it declares
and the transfer, though it formed the basis of the
adjudication, so far as the transferee is concerned,
continues to be good till set aside.
Strong reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
Judicial Committee in Mohamed Siddique Yousuf v.
Official, Assignee of OalcuUa (1 ) in support of the contention that the finding that the transfer of the decree
in favour of Meenakshi Achi was an act of insolvency
was binding on tlfe transferee, though she was not a
party to the adjudication proceedings. That decision
turned upon the relevant provisions of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act, 1909, and the corresponding
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869. That decision cannot apply to a situation created under the
Provincial Insolvency Act, unless the provisions of
said Act are pari materia with those of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act and the Bankruptcy Act. A
comparative study of the three sets of provisions by
placing them in. juxtaposition will facilitate a better
understanding of the problem.
bb-;
(1) (1943) L.R. ?o I.A. 93.
634
r959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
Bankruptcy Act, i869
The Presidency-towns
Insolvency Act, 1909
Ra1naswa11ii
Chettiar
S. IO: A copy of an
s. II6 (I): A copy of
order of the Court the Official Gazette
v.
adjudging the debtor to containing any notice
The Official Receiver be bankrupt shall be inserted in pursuance
__
published in the London of this Act shall be
Gazette, and be adver- evidence of the facts
Subba Rao ] • tised locally in such stated in the notice.
manner (if =iny) as may
(2); A copy of the
be prescribed, and the Official Gazette containdate of such order shall ing any notice of an
be the date of the order of adjudication
adjudication for the shall be
conclusive
purposes of this Act, evidence of the order
and the production of having been duly made,
a copy of the Gazette and of its date.
containing such order as
aforesaid shall be conclusive evidence in all
legal proceedings of the
debtor having
been
The Provincial
Insolvency Act, 1920
S. 30: Notice of an
order of adjudication stating the name, address and
description of the insolvent, the date of the
adjudication, the period
within which the dc::btor
shall apply for his discharge. and the Court by
which the adjudication is
made, shall be published
in the Official Gazette and
in such other manner as
may be prescribed.
d1ily adjudged a bank-
1upt, and of the date of
the adjudication.
S. II: The bankruptcy of a debtor shall be
deemed to have relation
back to and to commence at the time of the
act
of
bankruptcy
being completed on
\Vhich the order is made
adjudging him to be
bankrupt~
or if the
bankrupt is proved to
have committed more
acts of bankruptcy than
one. to have relation
back and to commence
at the time of the first
of the acts of bankruptcy that may be proved
to have been committed by the bankrupt
within twelve months
next
preceding the
order of adjudication;
but the
bankrcptcy
shall not relate to any
prior act of bankruptcy,
unless it be that at the
time of committing such
vrior act the bankrupt
\vas indebted to some
creditor or creditors in
a 3um or sums sufficient
to support a petition in
bankruptcy, and unless
~uch debt or debts are
still remaining due at
the time of the adjudi·
ca.tion.
S. jI: The insolvency
of a debtor, whether
the same takes place on
the de0tor's own petition or u pan that of a
creditor or creditors,
shall be deemed to have
relation back to and to
commence at-(a) the time of the
commission of the act
of insolvency on which
an order of adjudication is made against
him, or
(b) if the insolvent is
proved to have committed more acti of insolvency than one, the
time of the first of the
acts of insolvency proved to have been commited by the insolvent
within three months
next preceding the date
of the pre.sentation of
tbe insolvency petition:
Provided that
no
insolvency petition or
order of adjudication
shall be rendered invalid by reason of any act
of insolvency committed anterior to the debt
of the petitioning credi·
tor.
S· 28{71: An order of
adjudication shall relate
back to, and take effect
from, the date of the
presentation of thE petition on v.·hich it is made.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Bankruptcy Act, 1869
635
The Presidency-towns
Insolvency Act, 1909
The Provincial
Insolvency Act, 1920
S. 56(r): Every transfer of property, every
payment made, every
obligation incurred, and
every judicial proceeding taken or suffered by
any person unable to
pay his debts as they
become due from his
O\Vll money in favour of
any creditor, with a
view of giving that
creditor a preference
over the other creditors.
shall, if such person is
adjudicated insolvent
on a petition presented
withjn three months
after the date thereof,
be deemed fraudulent
S. 54(r): Every transfer
and void as against the
Official assignee.
(2): This section shall
not affect the rights of
any person making title
in good faith and for
valuable consideration
through or under a
creditor of the insolvent.
I959
Ramaswami
Chettiar
of property, every payv.
ment made, every obliga- Th O'ffi . l R
.
tion incurred, and every
e
cia eceiver
judicial proceeding taken
or suffered by any person
SHbba Rao ].
unable to pay his debts
as they become due from
his own n1oney in favour
of any creditor with a
view of giving that creditor a preference over the
other creditors, shall, if
such person
is adjudged
1
insolve nt on a. petition
presented within three
months after the date
thereof, be deemed fraudulent and void as against
the receiver, and shall be
annuiled by the Court.
( 2) : This section shall
not affect the rights of
any person who in good
faith and for valuable
consideration has acquir~
ed a title through or
under a creditor of the
insolvent.
'Vith some difference in the phraseology, with which
we are not concerned, ss. 116 and 51 of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act are in terms similar to the
corresponding sections, ss. 10 and 11, of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 10 of the Bankruptcy Act and s. 116
of tho Presidency-towns Insolvency Act make the
copy of the Official Gazette containing. the order of
adjudication conclusive evidence of the date of adjudication and the fact that the order of adjudication was
duly made. But s. 30 of the Provincial Insolvency
Act only enjoins that the notice of the order of adjudication with the necessary particulars should be
published in the Official Gazette and in such manner
as may be prescribed; but a copy of the said Gazette
containing the said notification is not made conclusive
evidence either of the facts mentioned therein or of the
fact that adjudication has been duly made. Section 51
of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act is in terms
similar to that of s. 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, and
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
under both the sections the insolvency of a debtor
relates back to the time of the commission of the act
Ramaswami
of insolvencv on which the order of adjudication has
Ch~tHar
been made against him. But under s. 28(7) of the
The Offici:lReceiver Provincial Insolvency Act, the order of adjudication
relates back to and takes effect from the date of the
Subba Rao].
presentation of the application on which it is mad~.
Under s. 56 of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act,
transfer of a property in favour of a creditor with a
view to give preference to him over· other creditors
shall be deemed fraudulent and void as against the
Official Assignee, whereas under s. 54 of the Provincial
Insolvency Act, the said transfer has to be annulled
by the Court. There are, therefore, essential differences
in the structure of the scheme between the three
Acts in the matter of adjudication.
With this background let us look at the Privy
Council decision in Mohomed Siddique Yousuf's case (1 )
to ascertain the basis of that decision. The facts in
that case were: On January 20, 1939, the insolvent
assigned to the appellant a 'decree obtained by him
for consideration. On April 19, 1939, the petitioning
creditor filed a petition in the High Court for the
adjudication of the insolvent as such. One of the acts
of insolvency alleged was the said assignment of the
decree in favour of the appellant. On June 13, 1939,
· an adjudication order was made against the insolvent.
No one appeared except the petitioning creditor, and
the order recited that the insolvent had committed
each of the acts of insolvency alleged in the petition.
On November 23, 1939, the Official Assignee gave
notice of motion in the Insolvency Court for a declaration that the indenture of assignment dated January 20,
1939, should be declared void as against the
Official Assignee and that the transfer should be set
aside. The Judge in Insolvency held on the merits
• that the said transfer was void under s. 56 of the
Presidency-towns Insolvency Act. On appeal the
High Court held that the order of adjudication was
conclusiv.e evidence against the appellant that the
assignment was a fraudulent preference, and on that
1959
(1) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 93.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
ground it declared the transfer void. On further
r959
EJ.ppeal, the Privy Council agreed with the High Court. Ramaswami
Relying on the decision in Ex parte Learoyd (1 ), a deciChettiar
sion on analogous provisions of the Bankruptcy Act,
v.
the Privy Council made the following observations The Official Receiver
at p. 98:
Subba Rao].
"The provisions of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909, are also in similar terms, and their
Lordships feel no doubt that the principles of the
English decision are as valid in India as in England.
No doubt it is anomalous that a decision affecting
the right of a third party should be conclusively
determined against him in his absence, and even
without notice to him, but the words of the section
and the importance of maintaining the status of the
debtor as determined by an order of adjudication,
and the necessity of securing the stability of the
administration of the debtor's estate once his status
has been fixed, have been justly held to outweigh
the consideration of hardship to the private citizen."
But the Privy,Council came to the conclusion, on the
facts that a case was made out for the High Court for
excusing the delay in preferring the appeal against the
order of adjudication. On that view they set aside the
order of the High Court and made the following observations for its guidance, at p. 99:
"It may be that if the appellant takes advantage ·
of the extension of time and appeals, the IJ:igh Court
may adopt the procedure in Ex parte Tucker (2) and
content themselves with striking out the act of
bankruptcy complained of, and leaving the official
assignee to make a fresh application without
themselves determining the facts."
This decision decides three points, namely: (i) having
regard to the express provisions of the Presidency -towns
Insolvency Act, and for maintaining the status of the
debtor and the stability of the administration of his
estate, the decision affecting the rights of a third
party though made behind his back, would be binding
on him; (ii) an appeal can be entertained against the
(1) ( 1878) IO Ch. D 3·
81
(2) (1879) 12 Ch. D. 308.
638
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
order of the adjudication at the instance of the transferee, and, if necessary, by excusing the delay in
preferring the appeal; and (iii) in such an appeal, the
v.
High Court may strike out one of the acts of
The OfiicialReceiverinsolvency, i.e., the transfer in favour of the appel!ant, and leave it to the Official Assignee to make
Subba Rao]. a fresh application. Though the principles underlying
the relevant provisions of the Act were expounded,
the decision mainly rested on the express provisions of
the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act. Nor did the
Privy Council hold that when there was an order of
adjudication on the basis of an act of insolvency, there
was no necessity on the part of the Official Assignee to
take out an application for setting aside the transfer
constituting tho act of insolvency. Though it is not
very clear, it appears to me that what the Privy
Council stated was that in such a.n application the
decision on the transfer forming part of the order of
adjudication is conclusive evidence of the invalidity of
the transfer. To put it differently, in such an application the Official Assignee need not prove afresh that
the transfer was a fraud on creditors or an act of fraudulent preference. That, decision was mainly based
upon Ex parte Lea.royd (1 ), which in its turn was founded upon the interpretation of ss. 10 and 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act-sections corresponding to ss. 116
and 51 of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act. A
scrutiny of that decision, therefore, will disclose the
raison d'etre of the decision of the Privy Council. There,
on August 30, 1877, an insolvent executed in favour
of George Payne a bill of sale of his household furniture etc., by way of security for consideration. The
goods remained in the apparent possession of the
mortgagor until January 1, 1878, when Payne removed
them. On January 3, 1878, a bankruptcy petition
was presented against the insolvent by a creditor,
relying upon an alleged act of bankruptcy, namely,
that the insolvent, being a trader, departed from his
dwelling-house on December 31, 1877. On January 3,
1878, an order of adjudication was made on the petition
upon proof of the said a.ct of bankruptcy, and that
r959
Ra;,,;;::;;
(1) (1878) 10 Ch. D. 3•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COl!RT REPORTS
639
I959
order was advertised in the usual way in the London
Gazette. On January 8, 1878, the goods removed by· Ramaswami
Payne were sold on his behalf. The trustees in the
Chettiar
Bankruptcy claimed the proceeds of the sale, and the
v.
Judge of the County Court ordered the payment. On The Offi•ialReceiv.r
appeal Bacon, C. J., allowed the appeal on the ground
that it had not been established that there was an act of Subba Rao f.
insolvency before Payne took possession of the goods.
On further appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the
judgment of Bacon, C.J., on the ground that by virtue
of ss. 10 and II of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, "a bill
of a sale holder is conclusively bound by the adjudication so long as it stands, and cannot dispute that the
act of bankruptcy on which the adjudication professedly proceeded was in fact committed," and that
the trustee's title related back to that act of bankruptcy
James, L.J., after a brief survey of the historic background of the Bankruptcy Act, based his judgment
mainly on the construction of the provisions of ss. IO
and II of the Bankruptcy Act. The learned Judge
observed at p. 8 :
" A man cannot ·be ' duly ' adjudged a bankr11'pt,
unless the great requisite of all exists, that he has
committed an act of bankruptcy. That is the capital
offence of which he must have been guilty before he
can be 'duly ' adjudged a bankrupt. That he has
been 'duly' adjudged a ba.nkruut, necesssarily involves the previous commission of an act of bankruptcy. The mere fact that an adjudication has been
made could have been proved without the a.id of
sect. IO. That section may, however, only involve
this, that some act of bankruptcy had been 'committed before the a.djudica.tion was made. But then
comes sect. II, which has no operation at all as
between the bankrupt and the trustee. The ba..nkrupt
has no rights whatever; all his rights have been
transferred to the trustee. The mere fact that sect. II
is dealing with the relation back of the trustee's
title, shews that it is dealing with the rights of hird
persons, and not merely with the rights of the bankrupt and persons indebted to him. . . . Then sect. II
goes on to provide that, by way of enlargement
,
640
SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS [1960(1))
of the trustee's title, he may go behind the act of
bankruptcy
on which the adi"udication was founded,
Ramaswami
CheteiaY
and may, under certain circumstances and subject
v.
to certain limitations, prove that other earlier acts
The OfficialR"eivey
of bankruptcy have been committed, and if this is
done the trustee's title is to relate back to the earliest
Subba Rao J.
act of bankruptcy which is proved to have been
committed within twelve months before the adjudication; This, however, is to be prov~d by evidence,
whereas the act of bankruptcy on which the adjudication is founded is proved by the production of the
adjudication itself. It seems to me to be impossible
to eva<J.e the words of these 8ections."
Baggallay, L. J., also, after emphasizing 011 the words
"duly made" in s. 10 of the Bankruptcy Act, remarked 011 the scope of s. 11 thus, at p. IO:
" But then comes sect. 11, which, I think, if more
was needed, makes the adjudication conclusive on
third persons that the act of bankruptcy on which
it was founded was really committed."
Thesiger, L. J., also said much to the same effect, at
p.11:
'
" We st!Lrt, therefore, with this, that we are bound
to hold conclusively that a 'due' adjudication was
m!Lde on the 3rd January. It must, therefore, have
been founded upon a proper act of bankruptcy.
Then sect. 11 goes still further, and it is important
to compare it with the provisions contained in the
prior Bankruptcy Acts. Sects. 234 and 235 enabled
third persons to dispute the act of bankruptcy upon
giving notice of their intention so to do. That provision is swept away by the Act of 1869, and in
language clear and distinct the·Legislature has said
by sect. 11 that 'the bankruptcy of a debtor shall
be deemed to have relation back to and to commence
at the time of the 'act of bankruptcy being completed on which the order is made adjudging him to be
bankrupt."
From the aforesaid extracts from the judgments, it is
manifest that the decision turned upon the express
provisions of ss. 10 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Under s. 10 of that Act, the gazette containing the
r959
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORT8
641
order was conclusive evidence that.the order of adjudiz959
cation was duly made on the basis of an act of Raniaswami
insolvency ands. 11 fixed the d,atum line for the cbmChettiar
mencement of the trustee's title from the act of
v.
bankruptcy. The. former section made the order of The OfficialReceiuer
adjudication conclusive against third parties and the
•
latter section vests the title of the property concerned Subba Rao].
in the official receiver from the date of the act of
insolvency. This judgment, therefore, cannot be
applied to an Act which differs in all respects from the
relevant provisions of ss. 10 and 11 of the Bankruptcy
Act on the basis of which that judgment was given.
In the Provincial Insolvency Act, neither the order of
adjudication is conclusive evidence that it has been
duly made, nor the trustee's title dates back to the act
of insolvency on which the adjudication is founded. I
am, therefore, of the view that neither the decision in
Ex parte Learoyd (1 ) based on the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, 1869, nor the Privy Council decision·
in M ahomed Siddique Yousuf v. Official Assignee of
Calcutta (2 ) based upon the provisions of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act, has any bearing in construing
the relevant provisions of the Provincial Insolvency
Act. A similar view was expressed by a :Full Bench of
the Madras High Court in The Official Receiver, Guntur
v. Narra Gopala Krishnayya( 8 ) and by a Full Bench of
the Nagpur High eourt in D. G. Sahasrabudhe v. Kila
Chand Deochand 'c~ Go., Bombay (4). • Both Courts held
that the decision of the Privy Council did not apply to
a case under the Provincial Insolvency Act and that a
transferee, who was not a party to the adjudication
proceeding, could contend in subsequent proceedings for
annulment that his transfer was good notwithstanding
that the order of adjudication was based on the alleged
transfer as being an act of insolvency. I accept the
correctness of the said two decisions. If so, it follows
that the order of adjudication made in the present case
did not by its own force divest the title of Meenakshi
Achi and vest it in the official receiver and that she
continued to be the transferee of the decree at the time
(1) (1878) IO Ch. D. 3·
(2) 1943 L.R. 70 I.A. 93·
(3) l.L.R. 1945 Mad. 541.
(4) l.L.R. 1947 Nag. 85:
642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960(1))
when she filed the second execution petition, E.P.
No. 243 of 1940.
Ramaswami
Chelliar
For the same reasons, when E.P. No. 37of1937, was
v.
filed, :Meenakshi Achi had subsisting title to the decree
The Official Receiver under the transfer deed dated February 3, 1936, and,
therefore, the said execution petition was also in
Subba Rao J · accordance with law.
The next argument of the learned Counsel for the
appellants is that the order of the Insolvency Court
dated April 9, 1943, related back to the date of the
transfer i.e., February 3, 1936, and that by the order
of annulment, the transfer became void from its incep·
tion with the result that on the dates when the
Execution Petitions Nos. 37 of 1937 and 243 of 1940
were filecl Meenakshi Achi had no title to the decree,
and, therefore, the said petitions were not filed in
a~,,ordance with law. The answer to this contention
depends upon the true legal effect of the order of
annulment of the transfer on the ground of fraudulent
preference. That part of s. 54 of the Provincial
Insolvency Act so far relevant to the present enquiry
reads thus:
S. 54 (1): "Every transfer of property ... in
favour of any creditor, with a view of giving that
creditor a preference over the other creditors, shall,
if such person is adjudged insolvent on a petition
presented within three months afrer the date thereof,
be deemed fraudulent and void as against the
receiver, and shall be annulled by the Court.
(2): This section shall not affect the rights of any
person who in good faith and for valuable consideration has acquired a title through or under a creditor
of the insolvent."
It is clear from the provisions of this section that a
transfer of property by a debtor before insolvency in
favour of a creditor giving him preference over other
creditors is not absolutely void. As between the transferor and the transferee, the title in the property conveyed passes from one to the other, but it is liable to
be annulled at the instance of the receiver. This is
because the Insolvency Act confers -{Jn the official
receiver a title superior that of the insolvent enabling
z959
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
the former to get it annulled in the interest of the
z959
creditors. Sub-section 2 of that section also indicates Ramaswami
that the transfer is not void ab initio, for under that
Cheltiar;
sub-section the rights of any person, who.in good faith
':'·
.
and for v1 luable consideration acquired title through The OfftcialRecewer
or under a crcrl.itor of the in'?olvent, are protected. If Subba Rao 1
the transfer WM ab initio void in the sense that it is
a nullity, all the depending transactions should fall
with it. Emphasis is laid upon th~ word " void" in
s. 54(1) of the Act, but the said word in the context can
only mean voidable, for it is made void only against
the receiver and requires to be annulled by the Court.
It follows from the aforesaid premises that such a
transfer is valid till annulled in the manner prescribed
by the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act.
The legal effect of annulling a transfer under s. 53
of the Ac~ was considered by a Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in The Official Receiver, Coimbatore
v. Palaniswami Ohetti (t). In that decision, Devadoss, J.,
observed as under at p. 758 :
" But till such a. declaration is made by the
Insolvency Court under section 53, the transaction
is good and the mortgagee could proceed with the
suit or with the execution of his decree against the
insolvent's property."
Wallace, J., elaborated thus, at p. 764:
"Section 53 implies an attack by the Official
Receiver on behalf the general body of creditors,
and the remedy which he is entitled to get on proving
his case is that the transfer is voidable against him
and may be annulled by the Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . It
does not really affect the relationship of the transferor and transferee as m_ortgagor and mortgagee.
For example, if the property is sold by the Official
Receiver, and the creditors and costs a.re folly pa.id
out of the proceeds and there is a surplus i:.emaining,
that surplus belongs prima f acie to the transferee
and not to the transferor, and is his unless the
transferor ha.a by appropriate proceedings established his right to it.. . . . . . . . . . . The relationship
between the mortgagor and mortgagee remains
(1) (1925) I.L.R. 48 Mad. 750,
644
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
r959
unaffected by any proceedings under section 53, and
the
mortgagee is entitled therefore to enforce his
Ramaswami
mortgage against the mortgagor except so far as
Chettiar
proceedin!!S under section 53 may have held the
v.
The Ojfieial Receiver
property mortgaged as assets of the mortgagor at
the disposal of the general body of creditors."
Subba Rao].
The observations of the learned Judges establish two
propositions: (i) that the transaction inter se between
the debtor and transferee is good ; and (ii) it is not
binding on the Official Receiver so far as it is necessary
to protect the interests ·of the creditors. The decision
in Amir Ahmad v. Saiyid Hasan (1) is also one laying
down the legal effect of s. 53 of the Act. The learned
Judges made the following observations in that case,
at p. 903:
" It seems quite clear that if a transfer made by a
debtor is wholly fictitious and bogus and no interest
in the property passes to the transferee, then the
transfer is void ab initio and subsequent transferees
can never be protected because the foundation of their
title does not exist. . . . . . . . . . On the other hand, if
the transfer made .by the debtor was not wholly
fictitious and bogus but the intention of the parties
was that property should is fact pass to the transferee, then the result would depend on wh'ether the
transferee was a purchaser in good faith and for
valuable consideration, or not. The transfer for the
time being is valid, though it is voidable at the
option of the receiver, and it is discretionary with
court to annul it under section 53 of the Provincial
Insolvency Act."
The said observations will apply mutatis mutandia to
a situation under s. 54 of the Act. · Indeed, a Division
Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Rukhmanbai v.
Govindram (1 ), in the context of s. 54 of the Act, stated
to the savi.e effect thus at p. 275:
" The wording of the section (s. 54) thus very
clearly indicates that a transfer of the nature mentioned therein is voidable as against the receiver
and is not void ab in~tio and may be annulled by the
Court. . . . • . . • . It is thus clear from the section
(1) (1935) I.L.R. 57 All. 900.
(2) I.LR. 1946 Nag. 273-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
645
that till the transfer is actually annulled by the
I959
Court it remains a valid transaction."
Ramasmami
The aforesaid discussion yields the follewing result :
Chettiar
(1) a transfer by a debtor of his property before insol:·
.
vency in favour of a creditor with a view to giving The Official Rec•w•r
him preference over other creditors conveys a valid Subba Rao J.
title to the transforee r (2) nnder circumstances mentioned in s. 54 of the Act, it is voidable against the
receiver; (3) when it is annulled by the Court on the
ground of fraudulent preference, the property vests in
the official receiver, who can administer it in the
interest of the creditors; and (4) even after the transfer is annulled, it continues to Le good between the
transferor and transferee, and in a contingen()y of any
balance remaining of the sale proceeds after the creditors are fully paid, the transferee would be entitled
to the same.
Two liner; of decisions have been relied upon by the
learned Counsel for the appellants. The first one holds
that in the case of conflicting claims to an estate, the
claimant ultimately declared to be the owner thereof
by the final Court cannot rely, to save the bar of limitatfon, upon a petition filed by the rival claimant to
execute the decree pertaining to the estate at the time
the title was in his favour; and the other decides that
when a transfer is set aside on the ground of fraudulent preference, the official receiver can claim to
recover mesne profits from the transferee of the property of au insolvent from the date- of the transfer.
The first line of decisions turns upon the principle
that a defeated claimant had no title to the property
at the time he filed the application, for the effect· of
the final decree is that the said claimant had no title
at any time, and the second line of decisions is founded
on some equitable doctrine. There are also decisions
taking the contrary view. It is not necessary in this
case either to go into that question or attempt to
resolve the conflict. As I have held that in the case
of a transfer in fraud of creditors or by fraudulent
preference, the transfer is good till set aside by the
Court, the transferee would have title to file the execu·
tion petition before the tram;fer was set aside.
82
646
'959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
The third contention of the learned Counsel for the
Ramaswami
appellants is a weak one. It is said that the official
Ch•ttiar
receiver does not claim under Meenakshi Achi, and,
v.
therefore, he cannot rely upon the execution petition
The Official Receiver filed by her to save the bar of limitation. There is a
Subba Rao f,
I959
September 3
fallacy underlying this argument.· The question for
decision is not whether the official receiver claims
under Meenakshi Achi, but whether the execution
petitions filed by her were in accordance with Jaw. If
as I held, at the time the previous execution petitions
were filed, Meenakshi Achi had a valid title to execute
the decree, the execution petitions filed by her would
certainly be in accordance with law within the meaning of art. 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act. I,
therefore, reject this contention.
In view of the aforesaid conclusions arrived at by
me, the last two contentions based on payments of
instalments do not arise for consideration.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
VISH"V ANATH
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(SYED JAFER IMAM and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Right of private defence-When extends ta
causing death-Whether mere abduction which is not punishable
gives right of private defence to cause death of abductor-Husband
trying to take away wife forcibly from her father:s house-Wife's
brother stabbing husband and killing him-If protect.d by right of
private defence-Indian Penal Code, I86o (XLV of I86o), ss. 97, 99
and IOO,
The relations between one G and his wife were strained and
she went to live with her father B and her brother V, the appellant. G, with three others, went to the quarter of B and he went
inside and came out dragging his reluctant wife behind him. She
caught hold of the door and G started pulling her. At this the
appellant shouted to his father that G was adamant and thereupon B replied that he should be beaten. The appellant took
out a knife from his pocket and stabbed G once. The knife
penetrated the heart of G and he died. B and the appellant were
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