THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA versus THEIR WORKMEN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 May 1959 | [1960] 1 S.C.R. 200 | 1959 INSC 76
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 May 1959
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, S.K. DAS, K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 56/1957
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1960] 1 S.C.R. 200
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 76
Text of the judgment
200
.l959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
arriv,ing at the profits or ,gains of the appellant which
Calcutta Company were liable to tax. Consistently enough with this
Lta.
attitu~e, the Revenue ought to have expressed· its
v.
willingness to treat only a sum of Rs. 29,392-11-9 as
The Commission~r the actual receipt of the appellant during the account~
of Income-ta.-r_ ing year and made up the computation of the profits
Bhagwati J.
1959
May IZ.
and gains of the appellant's business on that basis. 'l'he
Revenue, however, did nothing of the sort and insisted
upon having its pound of flesh, asking us to delete the
whole of the item of Rs. 24,809 from the debit side of
the account which it was certainly not entitled to do.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and answer the referred qu~s
tion in the affirmative. The respondent will of course
pay the appellant's costs ~hroughout.
Appeal allowed.
THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA
v.
THEIR WORKMEN
(and connected appeals)
(S. R. DAs, C. J., JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAs,
K. N. WANCHOO and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Bonus-Banking Companies-Bank Employees-Whether disentitled to bonus-" Remuneration" meaning of
-Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, I956 (95 of r956), amended
s. ro, whether retrospective-Banking Companies Act, I949, (ro
of I949), S. IO.
Section ro(r)(b)(ii) of the Banking Companies Act, 1949,
provided: "No banking company shall employ any person
whose remuneration or part of who~e remuneration takes the
form ... of a share in the profits of the company."
The dispute between the appellant Banks and their
employees related, inter alia, to the question whether, the provisions of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, prohibit the grant
of bonus to bank employees. The Labour Appellate Tribunal
took the v·iew that s. IO of the Act did not stand in the way of
granting bonus to bank employees, because bonus according to it
was not a share in the profits of the company. On appeal, it was
contended for the appellant Banks that bonus as awarded by the
Industrial Courts is remuneration within the meaning of s. IO
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
201
read with s. 2 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, and that it
I959
was also a share in profits, and therefore, the express provisions
of i. 10 read with s. 2 override the provisions of the Industrial The Central Bank
Disputes Act, 1947, so far as banking companies are concerned,
of India
and prohibit the award of bonus to employees of Banks.
v.
Held : (I) that the expression " shall employ any person " Their Workmen
in s. 10 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, means and includes
" shall have in employment any person " and that in this respect
the amendment of 1956, merely makes clear what was already
meant by the section ;
(2) that the word "remuneration" in s. ro of the Act has
been used in the widest sense and includes bonus ;
(3) that bonus in the industrial s~nse comes out of the
available surplus of profits, and when paid, it fills the gap,
wholly or in part, between the living wage and the actual wage.
It is labour's share in the profits, and as it is a remuneration
which takes the form of a share in profits, it comes within the
mischief of s.' ro of the Act ;
.
(4) The Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1956, is not
a declaratory Act, and except in the sn1all matter of the expression "shall continue tQ employ" in sub-s. \r), it does not purport to explain :any former law or declare what the law has
always been. Consequently, though s. 10 as amended by the Act
of 1956 does not stand in the way of the grant of industrial
bonus, for the period relating to the present appeals, the amended
section had no retrospectivt ·effect.
Accordingly, s. 10 of the Banking Act, prior to the amendment of I956, prohibited the grant of industrial bonus to bank
employees inasmuch as such bonus is remuneration which takes
the form of a share in the profits of the banking company.
CrviL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.
56 to 62 of 1957.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and
order dated April 28. 1954 of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal of India (Special Bench-Banks), Bombay,in
Appeals Nos. 122, 129, 130, 142, 144, 145, 152, 153,
154, 155, 162, 169, 217 & 218 of 1953.
N. A. Palkhiwala, J. B. Dadaclwnji and 8. N.
Andley, for the appellants in C. As. Nos. 56 & 60 of
1957.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, J. B.
DadacluLnji and S. N. Andley, for the appellants in
C. As. Nos. 57, 58, 59 & 61 of.l957.
~6
202
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and
Naunit Lal, for the appellant (Punjab National Bank)
The Central Bank
in C. A. No. 62 of 1957.
of India
N. V. Phadke, T. S. Venkataraman, K. R. Slw.rma
v.
Their Workmen and K. R. Choudhury, for respondent No. 1 in C. A.
No. 56 oi 1957.
N. G. Cootterjee, Sadhan Chandra Gupta, Janardan
Soorma, M. K. Ramamurthi and M. R. K. Pillai,
for respondents in C. As. Nos. 57 to 61 of ·1957
(Represented by All India Bank Employees Association)
B. P. Mahe,r;hwari, for respondent No. 3 (Association of the Punjab National Bank Employees) in C. A.
No. 62 of 1957.
B.P. Maheshwari, for Surat Bank Employees Union.
B. G. Ghose, and I. S. Sawhney, for All India
Central Bank Employees' Association.
1
1959. May 12. The Judgment of the- Court was
delivered by
s. K. Das J.
S. K. D.As J.-These are seven appeals on behalf of
different Banks working in this country, some incorporated in India and some outside India. It is necessary
that we should very briefly state the background of
the industrial dispute which bas given rise to these
appeals. .It is now well-known that there was a sharp
rise in the prices of commodities during and after
World War No. II. This rise in prices very seriously
affected salaried employees belonging to the middle
class including such employees in the banking industry.
In or about the year 1946 trade unions of bank employees presented demands for higher salaries and allowances and better conditions of service. In some cases
notices of threatened strike were also served on the
employers. The unrest became particularly acute in
the provinces of Bombay, the United Provinces, and
Bengal as they were then known. The local Governments
of those provinces referred these industrial disputes
for adjudication: this resulted in some regional awards
which came to be known in Bombay as the Divatia
Award, in the United Provinces as the B. B. Singh
I959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURt REPORTS
203
1
Award and in Bengal as the Gupta, Chakravarty
959
and Sen Awards. Notwithstanding these a~ards, The Centra~ Bank
the general unrest amongst Bank employees contmued
of India
and there was a clamour for control of the banking
v.
industry by the Central Government. On April 30, Their Worknu"
1949, was passed the Industrial Disputes (Banking and
Insurance ·Companies) Ordinance (Ordinance VI of s. K . D~Js f.
1949) under the provisions of which all banking companies having branches or other establishments in
more than one province came under the jurisdiction of
the Central Government for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947). By a notification dated June 13, 1949, the Central Government
constituted an ad hoc Tribunal consisting of Shri K. C.
Sen, a retired Judge of the Bombay High Court, as
Chairman, ·with two other persons as members to
adjudicate upon an industrial disput~ between several
banking companies and their workmen. On the same
day, the industrial dispute was referred to the Tribunal
by a separate order. The dispute covered several
items, and some more were added from time to time.
For the sake of convenience, we shall hereafter refer to
this Tribunal as the Sen Tribunal and its award as the
Sen Award. After a very exhaustive enquiry, the Sen
Tribunal made its award which was published on
August 12, 1950. Some of the leading Banks being
dissatisfied with the award applied to Supreme Court
and obtained special leave to appeal against the said
award, as it had been specially exempted from the
jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal)
Act, 1950 (XLVIII of 195~). This Court ultimately
held that the award of the Sen Tribunal was void
in toto for want of jurisdiction, but did not go into the
merits of the award with regard to any of the matters
dealt with therein. The consequence of this decision
was that the dispute in the banking industry remained
unresolved. 8oon after there were some strikes consequent on certain action taken by some of the Banks.
The result was that the Central Government had to
ta~e steps afresh to r;;ettle this long standing dispute.
Attempts were a.t first made .through the machinery of
~04
1959
SUPI~EME COURT REPOR~rs
[1960(1)]
conciliation to settle the dispute, but these attempts
failed.
On June 26, 1951, was enacted the Industrial
The Central Bank
Disputes
(Amendment and Temporary Provisions) Act,
of India
1951 (XL of 1951) which had the effect of temporarily
v.
Their Wodm1et~ freezing some of the gains of labour under the Sen
Award. In ,July 1951 the Central Government
S. J(. Das ].
made a fresh reference to an Industrial Tribunal
consisting of Shri H. V. Divatia, a retired Judge as
Chairman and two other members, but the Chairman
and the members resigned within a short time. On
January 5, 1952, two notifications were made. By one
notification a new Tribunal was constituted to be called
the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes).
The Chairman of this Tribunal was Shri Panchapagesa
Sastry, ·another retired Judge. The other two members
were Shri M. L. Tannan and Shri V. L. D'Souza. Hereafter we shall refer to this Tribunal as the Sastry
Tribunal. By another notification of the same date
the Central Government referred the matters specified in sch. II of the notification, which: were the
matters in dispute between the employers and workmen of the banking companies specified in sch. I, to
the Tribunal for. adjudication. We need not set out
here the matters specified in sch. II, but shall presently
refer to those items only with which we are concerned
in theRe appeals. The Sastry Tribunal made its award
which was published on April 20, 1953. This award
eame up for consideration of a Special Bench of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal on appeals preferred by
the employees of banks all over India and of the
Banks themselves. The decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was given on April28, 1954. Some of the
Banks moved this Court for special leave to appeal
from the decision dated April 28, 1954, of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal and such leave was granted ori
October 4, 1954. The same order which granted special
leave also directed that the appeals be copsolidated.
These seven appeals on behalf of different Banks
against their workmen have been filed in pursuance of
the aforesaid leave granted by this Court.
In Civil Appeal No. 56 of 1957 in which the Imperial
Bank (now substituted as the State Bank of India) is
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
205
1
the appellant, a preliminary objection has been taken
959
on behalf of the respondent workmen of the Bank to Tit c nt al 8 flk
the effect that the appeal is incompetent. We shall e oil:dia a
presently consider this preliminary objection, but
v.
before we do so, it will be convenient to indicate the Thlir Worllmen
principal questions which arise for consideration in
these seven appeals.
s. 1'· Das r.
These questions have been formulated under four
heads:
(1) what is the scope of item 5 of schedule II of
the notification dated January 5, 1952, the item
being expressed in the following words-" Bonus,
including the qualifications for eligibility and method
of payment";
(2) does s. 10 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949
(prior to its amendment by Act 95 of 1956) prohibit
the grant of bonus to Bank employees;
(3) whether an industrial tribunal is enti~led in law
to compel Banks to disclose .. secret reserves " and
"other necessary provisions" made by them, for the
purpose of adjudication ;
(4) whether the Full Bench formula laid down by
the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Mill Owners'
Association, Bombay v. Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor
Sangh, Bmnbay (1) for the payment of bonus to
employees in the textile industry is applicable to
Banks.
Of the aforesaid four questions, the first t,wo directly
fall for decision in the appeals before us. For reasons
which we shall presently give, we consider that questions (3) and (4) do not call for any decision at tho
present stage.
We shall now state how the Sastry Trjbunal and the
Labour Appellate Tribunal dealt with the first two
questions. We have stated that item 5 of sch. II of the
notification dated January 5, 1952, referred to the
claim of bonus by Bank employees. We have also
quoted earlier the words.in which item 5 was expressed.
The Banks contended before the Sastry Tribunal that
the ~ispute referred to in item 5 did not contemplate
the determination of the quantum of bonus payable by
(1) [1952] L.A.C. 433·
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
any of the Banks for any particular year, but the item
The Central Batik merely referred to the question of bonus in general
of India
with special reference to qualifications for eligibility and
v.
method of payment. This contention of the Banks was
Their Workmen upheld by the Sastry Tribunal which said:
"The primary duty is on th!;l Government to be
S. I<. Das ].
satisfied subjectively whether a reference should be
made or not. In the circumstances aforesaid, we
hesitate to hold that we are concerned with the
question of quantum of benefits for particular banks
and for particular years in the past in the light of
profits of such banks during those periods. We
ruled out a request that evidence should be taken for
determination of the question. It may yet be open
to the concerned parties where there is a real
grievance to approach the Government to get a
suitable -reference for the future as well as for the
account ye~rs 1949, 1950 and 1951."
What the Sastry Tribunal did was to consider the
question whether there could be a bonus scheme for
future years and whether it should be made to apply
retrospectively to all Banks and for all years; and as
to the guiding principles for the ascertainment of
bonus, the Sa.stry Tribunal suggested certain lines of
approach and recommended them for the earnest
consideration of both the parties. The Labour Appellate Tribunal, however, came to a different conclusion
_ with regard to the scope of it~m 5 and held that it
embraced the claims to bonus for the relevant years.
Accordingly, it said:" It follows, therefore, that the claims to bonus .
made for the relevent years have not yet been
adjudicated upon and that the terms of the reference
have not been exhausted. The ad hoc Tribunal to
which this reference was made is no longer in existence and some other Tribunal will have to decide
what bonus, if auy, is payable by the Banks to its
employees for the .relevant years. "
The correctness of this part of the judgment of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal has been seriously contest.
ed before us on behalf of the appellants and this is the
first question which we have to decide.
1959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS
207
On the second question, namely A.S to the interpretr959
ation of s. 10 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 Th c alB nA
(prior to its amendment in 1950) there was again a e oJ~~dia a
difference .between the Sastry Tribunal and the Labour
v.
Appellate Tribunal. The Chairman of the Sastry Their Workmen
Tribunal was of the view that s. 10 of the Banking
Companies Act, 1949, did not stand in the way of a s. K . Das .J.
grant of bonus to Bank employees, but the other
members of the Sastry Tribunal apparently felt that
the matter was not free from doubt and the Tribunal
as a . whole recommended to Government that the
alleged legal difficulty by reason of s. 10 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, should be removed by suitable legislation. Perhaps, it was as a result of this
recommendation that s. 10 of the Banking Companies
Act, 1949, was amended in 1956. The Labour Appellate
Tribunal, however, by a majority of 2 to 1 came to the
conclusion that s. 10 was no bar to a claim for bonus
by Bank employees. One member of the Appellate
Tribunal, Shri D.E. Reuben, recorded a note of dissent
in which he held that by reason of s. 10 of the Bank-
ing Companies Act, 1949, as it stood at the relevant
time, the Industrial Courts could not grant bonus to
the workmen of a Bank. On behalf of the appellants
it has been contended that the view of the majority of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal with regard to s. 10 of
the Banking Companies Act, 1949, is not correot. This
is the second question for our decision. As we are not
deciding the other two questions, no useful purpose
will be served by setting out the findings of the
Tribunals below with regard to them.
We now proceed to consider the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the respondent workmen in
Civil Appeal No. 56 of 1957. Some more facts must
be stated with reference to this preliminary objection.
After the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal
and before it could be implemented, several Banks
appealed to Government to set aside the decision of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal as they felt that the
total burden imposed by it was entirely beyond their
capacity to bear. Therefore, the Reserve Bank of
India., under directions of the Central Government,
208
I959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
carried out a rapid survey of the possible effect of the
decision
of the Labour Appellate Tribunal on the
The Central Bank
working
of
a few typical banks which were parties to
qf l?Sdia
the
dispute.
On a study of the evidence so collected,
v.
Their Workmen the Central Government concluded that it was
inexpedient .on public grounds to give effect to parts of
S. K.Das ].
the decision. Consequently, tho Labour Appellate
Tribunal's decision was modified by them by an order
dated August 24, 1954. This decision was debated in
Parliament and ultimately Government announced
their. decision to appoint a Commission (known as
Bank Award Commission) to help them assess more
fully the effect of the award. The Commission submitted its report on July 25, 1955, and with regard to
the claim for bonus it said :
" In regard to the claim for bonus, no general ·
principles can be invoked and the case of each
individual bank would have to be considered on its
merits. Since this dispute has not been resolved so
far, it is likely that it may have to be dealt with in
the near future. The claim for bonus is not within
the terms of my reference and I do not wish to
trespass in the area of this dispute. I am, however,
referring incidentally to this aspect of the matter
because the fixation of a wage structure is likely to
have an effect on employees' claim for bonus." (see
paragraph 51 at page 34 of the Commission's report).
Thereafter, the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Act, 1955 (XLI of 1955) was passed to
provide for the modification of the decision of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal in accordance with the
recommendations of the Commission. This Act in so
far as it is relevant for our purpose said ins. 3 thereof
that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal
shall have effect as if the modifications recommended
ih Ch. XI of the report of the Commission dated ,July
25, 1955, had actually been made therein and the appellate decision as so modified shall be the decision of the
Appellate Tribunal within the meaning of the InrlnAtrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 and the
award shall have effect accordingly. It is clear that
the Commission did not make any recommendation in
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
209
respect of the bonus claim and the Industt·ial Disputes
1959
(Banking Companies) Decision Act, 1955, does not
affect the present appeals; that Act merely gave effect The 0~~~r~l·
Balik
11
to the modifications recommended by the Commission,
'a
but did not give the decision of the Labour Appellate Tlleir ~orkmen
Tribunal any higher sancf:.ity as a statutory enactment.
Now, the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the s. I(. Das J.
respondent workmen is that the decision of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal merely says that the
claims to bonus for the relevant years have not been.
adjudicated and therefore the terms of the reference
have not been fully worked out; it is contended that
this means that some other Tribunal will have to
decido what bonus, if any, is payable by the Banks
to their employees, and no such Tribunal having been
so long appointed, there is at the present stage no
enforceable award within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, and·the appeal accordingly is
premature and incompetent. We are unable to accept
this contention as correct. On behalf of the a ppcllant
Banks it has been submitted that tho Labour Appellate
Tribunal misconceived the scope of it-em 5 of sch. II
of the relevant notification and on that misconception
it came to the conclusion t,hat the ter.Qls of reference
had not been exhausted, a conclusion the correctness
of which t he appellants are entitled to challenge by
way of appeal or else they will be bound by the
•decision that t he reference is still pending and can be
worked out by another Tribunal. This submission we
think is correct. In the I ndustrial Disputes Act, 1947,
an 'award' 1n:eans an interin1 or final determination by
an. Industrial Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of
any question relating thereto. The dispute between
the parties in the present case related ·to bonus: on
behalf of the banks it was contended (a) that item 5
of sch. II did not include claims of bonus for particular years in respect of particular banks but related
to a general scheme of bonus including qualifications
for eligibility and method of payment, and (b) that
even a general scheme of bonus could not, be made by
reason of the provisions of s. 10 of the Banking
27
210
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
Companies Act, 1949; on bcha.lf of the Bank employe~
es it was contended that (a) item 5 included claims for
The Centml Bank
bonus for particular years in respect of particular
of India
hanks
and (b) s. lO of the Banking Companies Act,
v.
'Their Workmen 1949, did not stand in the way of such claims. These
rival contentions led to an industrial dispute which
S. K. Das ],
the Labour Appellate Tribunal determined by its
decision dated April 28, 1954. 'Ve do not see why
that decision iK not an 'award' within .the meaning of
the Industria] Disputes Act, 1947. In our opinion, in
no sense can the appeals be said to be premature or
incompetent. It is worthy of note that these appeals
have been _filed in pursuance of special leave granted
by this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. That
Article enables this Court to grant, in its discretion,
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or
matter passed or made by any C<?urt or tribunal in the
territf9ry of India. The powers of this Conrt under
the said Article are wide and are subject to such
considerations only as this Court has laid down for
itself for the exercise of its discretion. The argument
before us is not that these appeals do not come within
those considerations and special leave should not have
been granted; but the argument is that they are
incompetent for. other reasons. Even those reasons,
we think, 3re not sound. Learned counsel for the
respondent workmen has cited before us some decisions, one Australian (In re the Judiciary Act8, etc. (1 ));
and another American (David :Muskrat v. United
States (2)) in support of his contention. We consider,
however, that the point is so clear and beyond doubt
that it is unnecessary to embark on an examination
of decisions which relate to entirely difl"erent facts.
There is, in our opinion, no substance in the preliminary objection which must be overruled.
Now, we proceed to consider the true scope of item
5 of sch. 11 of the notification dated January 5, 1952.
Schedule II of the notification dated June 13, 1949,
by which a reference was made to the Sen Tribunal
contained an identical item which was item 6. That
I959
(I) (1921) 29 C.L.R. 257·
(2) (1910} 219 U.S. 346 ; 55 L. Ed. 2<j6.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
211
1
item was expressed exactly in the samu words as
959
item 5 of sch. II of the notification under our eon- 1.h c - 8
' .
The Sen T n'1mna. l uea
.J
lt Wl'th tl1e scope o f f ofnllral
s1'derat10n.
hldia an . ,
that item and said that a large number of demands
v.
had been made by the unionr:; for bonus for· particulat' Tlleir Workmen
years in respect of particular banks. The SCiu
Tribunal then said :s. K. Das J.
"\Ve have been unable to deal with such individual demands, except such matters as were pending
in the different States at the time of our appointment
and have been specifically referred to us under the
pl'ovisions of s. 5 of Ordinance VI of 1949 or Act
LIV of 1949. Apart ft·om the great deal of time
that we should have to spend on such questions,
had we to hear and dispose of every application for
a particular yeat' in respect of a. particular bank,
we beheve that the kind of disputes regarding bonus
that have been referred to us are disputes of a
general nature, e.g., questions regarding 'qualifications for eligibility and method of payment'."
Thus it is clear that the Sen Tribunal also understood
the item as a reference of a dispute of a wmeral nature
which did not include demands for bonus for particular years in respect of particular ba.nks. The
Central Government which made the reference to the
Sastry Tribunal by the notification dated January 5,
1952, had before it the intet·pretation which the Sen
Tribunal had made in respect of the self-same item.
Having that interpretation before it, the Central
Government used ident.ieal ]angun.ge to express the
dispute which it referred to the Sastry Tribunal in
i tern 5 of sch. II. This, in our opinion, clearly shows
that item 5 of sch. II of the notitkation relating to
the Sastry Tribunal has the Harne meaning as item 6
of sch. II of the notification relating to the Sen Tribunal as interpreted by that Tribunal. The various
items in sch. II of the relevant. notification are not
items in legislati~e lists, but are items in an administrative order and it would not be right to apply the
same canon of interpretation to the items in an administrative order as is applied to items in a legislative
list. It is worthy of note that some of the items in
k
212
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
the .Sen reference were modified when the subsequent
reference was made to Sastry Tribunal. Item 38 of
The Central Bank the Sen reference read as follows :of India
"In what manner and to what extent do the
Their ;;;~rkmen
decisions of the Tribunal require modification in the
case of employees of banks in liquidation or
S. K. Das ].
moratorium ?''
This item was dealt with by the Sen Tribunal at
pp. 157 to 160 of its award and it pointed out certain
defects in the wording of the item. When a similar
item wss referred to the Sastry Tribunal, necessary
changes were made in the wDrding of the item to
remove the defects pointed out by the Sen Tribunal
(see item II of sch. II of the notification relating to the
Sastry Tribunal). Another example of a similar character is item 5 of sch. II of the Sen reference, an item
which related to "other allowances" payable to bank
employees including conveyance allowance for clerks
for journeys to and from the clearing house. A point
taken before the Sen Tribunal was that by conveyance
allowance was meant an allowance for joyrney,s to and
from the place of work. The Sen Tribunal confineu
conveyance allowance to expenditure incurred for
going out on the Bank's work \Yhile the Bank employee was on duty. The scope of the reference was
made clearer by changing the phraseology of the 1tem
\
when the subsequent reference to the Sastry Tdlmnal
was made ; see in this connection the phraseology of
item 28 of sch. II of the notification relating to the
Sastry Tribunal. It ·would thus appeat' that we have
two kinds. of examples: (1) in some cases the phraseology of the items is changed when the , subsequent
reference is made taking into consideration the criticisms made by the Sen Tribuna-l and (2) there are
other cases where no change in phraseology i~ made
even though the Sen Tribunal has understood a
particular item in a particular sense. ,Judged in the
light of these examples, it seems to'us that the true
scope of item 5 of sch. II is what the Sastry
Tribunal understood it to be, namelv, whether bonus
was payable to Bank employees ~nd, if so, what
were the qualifications for eligibility and method of
I959
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
213
payment. The reference in item 5 of schedule II d id
1959
not include within itself claims of bonus fo r par~icular
years in respect of particular banks. The Sastry The Centml l3azlk
of / 1zdia
Tribunal further pointed out t hat t here ·wcte specific
v.
references with regard to the rlnims for bonus in Their Workmen
respect of some Banl\.s. Those refel'ences d id not,
however, come within item 5 of sc h. ll. If they did, S. 1\'. Da< ].
it was completely nnnecessn.ry to make sep::~.ra ~c and
specific refe rences with regartl to such c:ln.im~. Item 5
was not the only item which raised a g~n<." ral question.
'11here were m any other items of a simii:.H nn.ture, such
as items 3, 6, 9 etc.
The J~abour Appellate Tribunal itself rcn.lised the
difficulty of deciding under itrm 5 of sdl. II the pll.r t icula.r cla.ims for bon ns for part iru tar years. Tho Sasky
Trib1vml pointed out that thrr<' wore 129 hn.nks before
it. and no evidence was gi\en to substn.ntiatc t he claims
for bonus for particuhtl' Y~"~"l.rs in resprct ()f pn.rticnla r
banks. T he Sastry Tribuna.] sairl :"We cannot assume t hat for a.U these 129 bn.nks
before us and for all those years there were livo
disputes about t his nw.ttcr w·h i0h the Govcrnm<>.nt
ha.d consiJ.ercd tlt and vroper to he rl'fc:rred to Hs
after n.pplying th<'ir minds to the problem whether
such :.1 reference should he li Htd e to a n industrial
t ribun al. There i!:> al:::o this n.dclitional circumstance
that there ha.d ht~cn two speoia l n.nd specifi c
referenc·cs by the Go,·ernment in reln.t.ion to t.h(l
p~.t.yruent of l>onns by t.he Cc>nt m l Bank of India, t he
Alln.ha.bn.d Ra nk a.ud t lte ·u n ite<l Com m(':rcial Bank
for the ye:t.n; 1050 antl 195 !. )foreover, oven apa r't
fro~u the gont-1'<1.1 cb;wn.ct(~J· of t he v~~riom; heads of
clisputes in t.he refcn~nre to us, individua.l cn.sc.<J
pert.aining o11 ly to some b<tnks wherever the GovC'rnment want.ecl to make such a ref<'rcnce have been
particuln.ris€'d ...'tnd set out, <>.g., absorption of Bharat
Bank emplvyees-itcm 3 1 in se;hcdnle H of the
not i fication . . . . I t may be mention~d that. the claim
before ns in connection with the bonus payable
hy the Impnrial nank of India for the years 1948,
194!>, 1950 and 1951 would involve a payment of
very nearly a crore of rupees over and abo\Te the
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
payments already made for these yean;. It is not
possible for us to affirm what the attitude of the
The Ce·ntral Bank
Government would have been on the question of
of Tndia
referring a dispute of this character to us under s. 10
v.
of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7. "
Their Workmen
Faced with the difficulty referred to by the Sastry
S. K. Das ].
Tribunal, the Labour Appellate :rribunal also Raid that
it could not deal with itHlividnal claims for bonus in
the present proceedings. The Labour Appellate
Tribunal said that it would be acting in vacuo if it
attempted to decide individual elaims for bonus without having before it specific cases of bonus, particularly
when there were no materials on the record on which
the Tribunal could make a decision as to the quantum
of bonus payable by a particular bank for a particular
year. This difficulty instead of leading the Labour
Appellate Tribunal to give a proper interpretation to
the true scope of item 5 of sch. II led it to the conclusion that item 5 of sch. II embraced 'vithin itself
individual claims for bonus for particular years and
those claims must be dealt with by another tribunal
on the footing that the reference had not been completely workAd out. We consider thiR tn he a complete
non sequitur. Item 5 of sch. H must be interpreted as
an item in an order of reference in the context in
which the item has been used, the \vords in 'vhich it
-has been expressed and against the background in
which the dispute has arisen. The practical difficulty
which may arise· in deciding individual claims for
bonus in respect of particular banks is merely a
circumstance to be taken into consideration. It
cannot be decisive on the question of determining the
true scope and efl'eet of item 5 of seh. II.
On a consideration of all relevant circumstances and
having regard to the context and the words in whir.h
item 5 of sch. II ha~ been expressed, we are of tl~c
view thn,t the Labour Appellate Tribunal was wrong
in its conclusion that the reference had not been
worked out and that individual claims for bonus in
respect of particular banks must be determined by
another tribunal on the basis of the reference made
in 1952.
I959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
215
1959
We now proceed to a con~ideration of tho more
important question, aH to the effect of 1:>. 10 of the The Cc11tral IJa11k
Banking Companies Act, 1H49. \Ve have stated earlier
£'] ]Iulie'
that s. 10 of·the Ba.nking Companies Act, 1949, hereinv.
after called the Bimking Act, wal:) amended in 1956. Th eir W orkmen
We shall first rea.d the unamended l-3CCtion, the
provisions '"hereof were in force at the time r<.>levaut.. S. 1\. Vas J.
to these appeals. \iVe shall later rca.d also the ;unended
sect.iou in connection with ttn a.rgument pre~cnted ou
behalf of the Bank employees tha.t the Banking
Companies (Amendment) Aet, 1956 (XCV of 1956) w<ts
not remedial in nature but was declaratory of the law
as it always was.
Section 10 of the Banking Act prior to its amendment in 1956, was in these terms" S. 10. (1) No banking Company(a) shall employ or be managed by a managing
agent or,
(b) shall employ any persou(i) who is or n.t any time has been adjudicated
insolvent, or has · suspended payment or ha,s
compounded with his crt\ditors, or who is or ha~
been convicted bv a criminal court of an offence
involving moral t~urpitude ; or
(ii) whose remuneration or pn.rt of wtwse remuneration ta:kes the form of commission or of a share
in the profits of the company ; or
(iii) whose remuneration is, tt<;cording to the
normal standards prevailing in banking business, on
a scale disproportionate to the resource~ of the
Company ; or
(t;} shall be UH\nctged by c:w y person:(i) who is ~1 director of any other company, not
being a subsidiary company of the banking company;
or
(ii} who i!> ongaged in any other bu:sines:s or
vocation ; or
. , (iii) who has a contract with the company for
1ts management for a period exceeding· five years at
any one time :
216
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
Provided that the said period of five years shall
in relation to contracts subsisting on the 1st day of
The Ce11tral Bank
July, 1944, be computed from that date:
of b1dia
Provided further that any contra.ct with the
v.
company for its management may be renewed or
Their Workmen
extended for a further period not exceeding five
S. K. Das ].
vears at a time if and so often as the directors so
decide.
(2) If any question arises in any particular case
whether the remuneration is, according to the
normal standards prevailing in banking business, on
a scale disproportionate to the resources of the
company for the purpose of sub-clause (iii) of
clause (b) of sub-section (I), the decision of the
Heserve Bank thereon shall be final for all
purposes. "
Before we proceed to a consideration of the construction of the section, a, little history may not be out of
place. The Companies (Amendment) Act, 1936
introduced a new Part XA in the Indian Companies
Act, 1913 (VII of 1913). Part XA conhtined certain
special provisions applicable to banking companies
only. The section with whieh we are concerned was
s. 277HH, and that scetion was introduced by an
amending Act of 1944. lt wa.s the precursor of s. 10
of the Banking Act and it may, perhaps, be advisable
to read s. 277HH in~so fitr as it is relevant for our
purpose: •
'' 277HH. No ha.nking company ...... shall, after
the expiry of two years from the commencement of
the Indian Companies (Amendment) Act, 1944,
em ploy or be managed by a mana.ging agent, or any
person whose rcmun('ration or part of whose
remuneration takes the form of commission or a
share in the profits of the company, or any person
having a contract with the company for its management for a period exceeding five years at any one
time;
Provided that the period of five years shall, for
the purposes of this section, be computed from the
date on which this section comes into force;
I959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
217
Provided further that any such contract may be
be renewed or extended for a further period not The Central Bank
ex~eeding .five years at a time if and so often as the
of India
directors think fit."
v.
Their
Worlmren
Obviously, the most undesirable feature in the structure
and management of banking C<?mpanies which the S.I\. Das ] .
section tried to remedy was the appointment of
managing directors or lll<tnagers on. long term contracts on payment of remuneration by commission or
a share in the profits. However, the section was not
confined t.o a ry~anaging agent or manager only, though
by a refe"rence to the statement of objoct,s and reasons
in relation to the amendment of 1944 it was suggested
on behalf of the respondents that the section waR so
confined. The statement of objects and reasor~s is not
admissible, however, for construing the section ; far less
can it control the actual words used. ~rhe section in
express terms said that ' uo bn,nking company . . . .
shall employ any person whose remuneration or part
of whose remuneration takes the form of . . . a sh:ue
in the profits of the company'.
Then, in 1949 came the Banking Act. As its long
title and preamble indicate, it is an Act to consolidate
and amend the law relating to banking companies.- It
repealed the whole of Part XA of the Indian Companies
Act, 1913 including s. 277HH referred to above, hut
s. 2 said:
" S. 2. The provisions of this Act shall be in
addition to, and not, save as hereinafter expressly
provided, in derogation of the Indian Companies
Act, 1913, and any other law for the time being in
force."
The Indian Companies Act, 1913 itself stood repealed
by the Inc;lian Companies Act, 1956 (I of 1956).
We now come back to s. 10, the proper interpretation
of which is the immediate problem before us. Shorn
of all such details as are unnecessary for onr purposP-,
the section says that no banking company shall employ
any llerson, whose remuneration or part of whose
remuneration takes the form of a share in the profits
of the company. The section opens with a negative,
28
218
I959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(l)J
and says that no banking company shall employ any
person ; the expression ' any person ' is followed by the
The Central Bank
adjectival
clause descriptive of the person who shall
of India
not
be
employed.
The adjectival clause says that the
v.
Their Worlimen person, who shall not be employed, is one whose remuneration or part of whose remuneration takes.the form
S.K. Das J.
of a share in the profits of the company. Two questions
at once confront us : (1) is 'bonus' remuneration; and
(2) is it a share in the profits of the company. The
argument on behalf of the appellant Banks is that
'bonus, as awarded by Industrial Courts is remuneration within the meaning of s. 10 and it is also a share
in profits; therefore~ the express provisions of s. 10
read with s. 2 of the Banking Act override the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 so far as
banking companies are concerned, and prohibit the
award of bonus to employees of Banks. On behalf of
the Bank employees the argument is that bonus as
awarded by Industrial Courts is not 'remuneration'
within the meaning of s. 10 of the Banking Act, nor iS'
it a share in profits in its true nature. The argument
on both sides hinges on the two key expressions :
'remuneration' and' share in profits'. The meaning
of these expressions we shall consider in some detail.
But it is convenient at this stage to get rid of some
minor points.
Section 10 in its operative part says that' no banking company shall employ any person etc.' The
amendment of 1956 says that 'no banking company
shall employ or continue the employment of any person'.
The question has been mooted before us if the expression 'shall employ ' means and includes, prior to the
amendment of 1956, 'shall continue the employment
of'. We think it does ; otherwise the very purpose of
the section is defeated. Take, for example, the case of
an insolvent. The section says that no banking company shall employ any person who is or at any time
has been adjudicated insolvent. Suppose that at the
time the bank employs a person, he has not incurred
any of the disqualifications mentioned ins. 10; but
subsequently, there is an order of adjudication against
him and he is adjudicated an insolvent. The section
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
219
1959
obviously means that such a person can no longer be
employed by the bank. If subsequent disqualification The Central Bank
is not within the mischief of the section, then the very
of !tulia
purpose of the section which must be the safety and
v.
well-being of the bank will be rendered nugatory. We Their Workmen
must, therefore, hold that the expression 'shall employ
a person' ins. 10 means and includes 'shall have in S.K. DasJ.
employment' and in this respect the amendment of
1956 merely makes clear what was already mea.nt by
the section.
We may also dispose of here au argument based on
s. 2. When an industrial dispute as to bonus between
an employer and his workmen is referred to a tribunal
for adjudication, the tribunal has the power to resolve
the dispute by an award. Such an award may grant
bonus to workmen, if certain conditions are fulfilled.
The argument before us is that t he provisions of the
Banking Act are not to be interpreted in derogation of
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but
in addition thereto. This argument, however, ignores
an essential qualification embodied in s. 2-na.mely,
the qualification in the clause 'save as hereinafter expressly provided'. If s. 10 expressly provides that no
banking company shall employ a person whose remuneration or part of whose remuneration takes the form
of a share in profits, and ' b<;~nus' is both remuneration
:;tnd a share in profits, then s. 2 can be of no assistance
to the respondents. The express provisions of s. 10
must then override any other law for the time being
in force, so far as banking companies are concerned.
This brings us back to the two key expressions
'remuneration' and' share in profits'. We take the
expression ' remuneration ' first. The dictionary meaning of the word is 'reward, recompense, pay for service
rendered' (see the Concise Oxford Dictionary); and
that is the ordinary meaning of the word. The word
·Was judicially noticed in a. very early decision (R. v.
Postmaster General (1); and on appeal (9); Blackburn, J .,
said: "I think the word ' remuneration ' ......... means
a quid pro quo. If a man gives his services, whatever
consideration he gets for giving his services seems to
(t) (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 658:
(2) (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 428.
220
SUP-REME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
me a remuneration for them. Consequently, I think if
a person was in receipt of a payment, or in receipt of a
The Central Bank
percentage, or any kind of payment which would not
of India
be
an actual money payment, the amount he would
v.
Their Workmen receive annually in respect of this would be remuneration." The word was again noticed in several English
S.K. Das f.
decisions in connection with s. 13 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1906, which enacted that a workman did not include a person employed otherwise than
by way of manual labour whose " remuneration,
exceeded£ 50; and in Skiles v. Blue Anchor Line, Ltd.(l)
it was observed that remuneration was not the· ~ame
thing as salary or cash payment by the employer but
involved the same consid~rations as earnings. This
was a case in which the purser of a ship received, in
addition to his regular wages, at the end of each
voyage, at a fixed rate per month, a bonus or extra
wages ; he also made a profit by the sale on board ship
of whisky in nips. The majority of Judges held that
both the bonus and the profit on the whisky ought to
be taken into account in estimating the purser's remuneration. In an earlier decision, Penn v. Spiers and
Pond, Limited e), the gratuities and tips which the
deceased workmen, employed as a waiter on a restaurant car, received from passengers using the restaurant
car were held to be 'earnings in the employment of the
same employer'. The decision in Penn v. Spiers anV,
Pond, Limited (supra) (2) was approved by the House of
Lords in Great Western Railway v. Helps (a). In his
speech Lord Dunedin repell~d the argument addressed
for the appellants of that case that the meaning of the
expression "earnings" should be limited to what the
workman gets from direct contract from his employer
by saying that the simple answer to the argument was
that the statute did not say so; it used the general
term 'earnings' (in our case the general term 'remuneration') instead of the term "wages" or the expression" what he gets from his employer". It is. we
think, unnecessary to multiply decisions. In a recent
A1.1Stralian decision, Corutlly v. Victorian Railways
I959
(~) [I9o8] I K.H. 766.
(I} [19U] I K.B. 360,
(3) [1918] A.C. 141.
S.C.R.
SOPREME COURT REPOR1'S
221
I959
Oommissione1·s (1) the matter has been tersely put as
follows: "It (the word remlineration) should be given 1'114 Central Bauk
its natural meaning unless there is reason to do other·
of India
wise., This is a salutary rule of · construction and
v.
· should, we think, be adopted in the present case.
Their Workmen
Is there anyt.hing in the Banking Act to give the S.K.Das].
word ' remuneration , a restricted meaning? Three
meanings have been canvassed before us. The widest
meaning for which the learned Attorney-General
. appearing for some of the banks has contended is the
natural meaning of the word ' remuneration ' in the
sense of any recompense for services rendered, whether
the payment is voluntary or under ·a legal obligation.
The second meaning, which is intermediate between
the widest and the narrowest, is that it means what is
payable un~er any legal obligation, whether under a
contract, statute, or an award. The narrowest meaning
for which Shri N.C. Ch.atterjee, learned counsol.for the
respondent workmen, has canvassed is that remunera.
tion in s. 10 of the Banking Act mean.<J contractual
wages, viz., what is payable under the terms of the
contract, of employment only. He has put his argument in the following way: section 10, when it says
that' no banking company shall employ a person etc.',
refers to the contractual relationship of employer and
employee created by an ·act of parties, and its purpose
is to put a ban on one kind of employment of a person
who is to be paid a particular remuneration under the
terms of his employment. It is stated that the prohi·
bition is against any remuneration in the nature of
profit sharing being fixed under a contract of service
between the bank and its employees and it is contend.
ed that the legislature made the prohibition dependent
on the terms of employment. It is submitted that the
adjudication of an industrial tribunal in awarding
Lonus does not create any obligation by act of parties,
and even if it imports some kind of implied term, it is
dehors t he contract of employment and is the result
of a judicial verdict under t he indUI:jtriallaw.
The argument is attractive ·Lut does not in our
opinion stand the fest of closr. scrutiny. Let UR look 1'1.
(r) (1957) V.R. 466 (also 1957 Australian Law Reports 1097).
222
I959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
little more closely to s. 10 of the Banking Act. It
The Central Ba11k says inter alia that no banking company shall employ
or be managed by a managing agent or shall employ
of India
v.
a person who is or has been conv.icted by a criminal
Their Workmen court of an offence involving moral turpitude etc; see
cl. (b)(i). It is obvious that when the section says 'shall
S.l(, Das ].
employ', it means' shall have in the employment of'.
It is not suggested that the disqualifications mentioned
in cl. (b} (i) refer only to the contract of employment.
If that were so, the section would hardly serve the
purpose for which it must have been meant. We may
take another example which brings out the meaning
of the section even more clearly. Let us suppose that
the Bank employs a manager on a contract of service
which makes no mention of bonus or commission. On
the argument of learned counsel for the respondents,
s. 10 does not stand in the way of the bank to pay
voluntarily and ex gratia any amount to the manager
by way of commission or bonus, as long as the
contract of service docs not contain any term as to
such payment. This, in our opinion, makes nonsense
of the section. Learned counsel for the respondents
had himself suggested in the course of his arguments
that having regard to the legislative history of the
enactment, the section was intended to prevent banks
from having managers, by whatever name they might
be called, who were paid by commission or a share in
the profits; and yet the Bank can make such payment
if it adopts the subterfuge of not saying anything
about such payment in the contract of service. "
There are, in our view, clear indications in the section itself that the word 'remuneration' has been
used in the widest sense. Firstly, cl. (b) (iii) also uses
the word remuneration. It says-" whose remunera·
tion is, according to normal standards prevailing in
banking business, on a scale disproportionate to the
resources of the company ". Sub-section (2)-unamended-sta'tes inte1· alia that if any question arises
in any particular case whethel' the remuneration is
according to the normal standards prevailing in banking
business on a scale disproportionate to the resources of
the company etc., ~the decision of the Reserve Bank
S.C.R.
SUPREME COUitT REPORTS
223
I959
shall be final. It is clear that incl. (b) (iii) of sub-s. (1)
and a\so in sub-s. (2), the word remuneration has been The CenJya.l Bank
used in the widest sense. We may invite attention
of India
v.
in this connection to r. 5 of the Banking Companies
Rules, 1949 (which are statutory rules) which requires Their Workmen
a banking company to send periodically to the prin- S.K. Das ].
cipal office of the Reserve Bank a statement in E'orm I
showing the remuneration paid during the previous
calendar year to officers of the company etc. Form I
has a footnote which says : " Remuneration includes
salary, house allowance, dearness allowance, . . . .
bonus . . . fees and allowances to directors etc." We
do not say that a statutory rule can enlarge the meaning of s. 10; if a rule goes beyond what the section
contemplates, the rule must yield to the statute. We
have, however, pointed out earlier that s.lO itself uses
the word' remuneration' in the widest sense, and r. 5
and E'orm I are to that extent in consonance with the
section.
Shri Phadke appearing for some of the respondents
has urged a ::;omewhat different contention. He has
argued that assuming that the word ' remuneration '
has been used in the· widest sense in s. 10 and therefore includes bonus, r. 5 and Form I, show that payment of bonus is permissible: this is intelligible only on
the footing that the provisions of s. 10 are restricted in
their application to such employees of a ban~ing
company as are employed in a managerial or administrative capacity; they do not apply to 'workmen ' as
defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We find
it difficult to accept this argument. The section says
that 'no banking company shall employ any person',
and we do not see how the expression ' any person '
can be restricted to those on the managerial or
administrative staff only. We cannot arbitrarily cut
down the amplitude of an expression used by the
legislature.
It is necessary to refer here to the decision in
Wmttesley v. Regent St?'ee.t Flo1'ida Restaurant (1) on
which learned counsel for the respondent workmen has
placed great reliance. It is necessary to refer to the
(I) {J95ll2 K.B. 277·
224
.1959
The c tral Bank
otinaia
v.
Their worhmen
s.K. Das!].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
facts of the case, which are stated in the headnote.
The waiters employed at an unlicensed restaurant, by
an oral agreement ap:10ngst themselves and between
them and their employers, paid into a pool all the tips
received l}y them during the course of their employment. The tips were placed in a locked box, and the
contents were distributed weekly in shares calculated
in accordance with the agreement. The total weekly
sum received by each waiter including the share of the
tips exceeded, but- the weekly wage paid by the
employers was itself less than, the minimum wage
prescribed by the Wages Regulations (Unlicensed
Place of Refreshment) Order, 1949. The proprietors
of the restaurant were prosecuted for failing to pay the
minimum wage. It was held that the sums paid from
the pool were not remuneratioiJ., and the earlier decisions relating to the calculation of the earnings of a
waiter in connection with the Workmen's Compensation Acts were distinguished. Lord Goddard, C.J.,
thus explained the distinction:
"The amount of a man's earnings in an employment and the amount of remuneration which his
employer pays to him are not necessarily the same
thing. The section cr~ating the offence, and under
which the proceedings are taken, is s. 9, sub-s. 2, of
the Catering Wages Act, 1943. That section provides
that, if an employer fails to pay to a worker to
whom a wages regulation order applies remuneration
not less than-the statutory minimum remuneration
clear of all deductions, he shall be guilty of an
offence. Section 10 contains somewhat elaborate
provisions for the computation of remuneration.
Not only the short title but the structure of the Act
-setting up a wages commission, permitting the
establishment of wages boards, and providing for
wage regulation orders-clearly indicates that it is
with wages that the Act is intended to deal. The
use of the word "remuneration" in both s. 9 and s.
10 and, indeed, in other sections, is probably because
there are certain deductions from wages which are
authorized by s. 10, so that remuneration is an apt
word to indicate the net payment.
S.O.R.
SUPREME QOURT REPORTS
225
1 959
What we have to decide is whether, when a
waiter, receives a payment from the tronc in Tu cn~t al Bank
the manner found in th~ case, that sum can be
of I:dia
regarded as remuneration paid to him by, or as
v.
remuneration obtained by him in cash from, his Thti, Workmen
employer. In our opinion, when a customer gives a
tip to a waiter the money becomes the property of 5 · K. Da.~ f.
the latter."
We think that the decision itself shows that the word
'remuneration' must be given its meaning with reference to the context in which the word occurs in the
statute. In the context of the Catering Wages Act,
1943, it meant the net payment after certain deductions
from wages paid by the employer; and in the Workmen's Compensation Acts, it meant the amount of a
man's earnings in an employment. We have pointed
out that in the Banking Act with which we are concerned, the word ' remtmeration ' has been used in the
widest sense. In that sense, it undoubtedly includes
bonus.
We proceed now to a consideration of the second
key expression for our purpose, viz., 'takes the form
of a share in the profits of the company '. The conception of industrial bonus (that is, profit bonus claimed by employees and granted amicably, through
conciliation or as a result of an industrial award) has
had a chequered development. In some of the earlier
Bombay decisions of Industrial Adjudicators, it was
held that the grant of bonus was entirely a matter of
grace and not of right; some decisions characterized
bonus· as a gift, a sort of bakshis or pour-boire (see
D. G. Damle's Labour Adjudications in India. p. 408).
By 1948, however, the conception had crystallised, and
it was judicially recognised that the claim of profit
bonus could not any longer be regarded a.s a.n ex gratia
payment. In _Millowner'.-; Association, Bombay v.
Rashtriya Mill Mazdo01· 8angh Bombay (1) the Full
Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal evolved the
formula. for determining the quantum of bonus, and
the general principles governing the claim of bonus
were &lso laid down. These are: (1) aB both capital
(I) 1950 L.L.j. u1.
226
SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS [1960(1)]
and labour contribute to the earnings of the industrial
concern, it is fair that labour should derive some
The Cetztral Bank
benefit, if there is a surplus after meeting prior or
of India
necessary charges ; (2) the claim of bonus would only
v.
Their Workmen arise if there should be a residue after making provision for (a) prior charges and (b) a fair return on paid
S. K. Das].
up capital and on reserves employed as working
capital; and (3) bor,us is a temporary satisfaction,
wholly or in part, of the needs of the employee where
the capacity of the industry varies or is expected to
vary from year to year, so that the industry cannot
afford to pay 'living wages'. The Labour Appellate
Tribunal recognised that where the goal of living wages
had been attained, bonus like profit sharing in the
technical, narrow sense would represent more the cash
incentive to greater efficiency and production. The
conception of the living wage itself is a growing con.
ception, and the goal has been reached in very few
industries, if any, in this conntry. The general principles laid down by the aforesaid Full Bench decision of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal were generally approv.
ed by this Court in Muir Mills Go. Ltd. v. Suti MiU8
Mazdoor Union, Kanpur· (1), and have been fully
considered again and approved in Civil Appeals
Nos. 459 and 460 of 1957 (Associated Cements) in which
judgment was delivered on May 5, 1959.
We have to consider the expression 'takes the form
of a share in the profits of the company ' in the context
of the meaning of the word 'bonus' as explained above.
It is necessary t.o state that we are not considering
here the question of production bonus or Puja bonus,
which may not necessarily come out of profits and
these stand on a different footing. There can be now
no doubt, however, that profit bonus, in the industrial
sense in which we now understand it, is a share in the
profits of the company ; it is labour's share of the
contribution which it has made in the earning of the
profits. The two grounds on which it has been con.
ten4ed that bonus is not a. share in the profits are (1)
that it is not a fixed or certain percentage of the
available surplus of profits and (2) it partakes of the
I959
(1) ~195~] I S.C.R. 991,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
nature of a contingent, supplem~ntary wage. These
I959
two grounds weighed considerably with the majority Th c - l B k
of members of the Labour Appellate Tribunal who e 0j~;::ua an
expressed the view that s. 10 of the Banking Act did
v.
not stand in the way of granting bonus to bank Their Workmen
employees, because bonus according to them was not
a share in the profits of the company. We do ,not s. K.Das f.
think that either of these two grounds is valid. The
first ground arises out of a confusion between the
expression ' takes the form of a share in profits ' and
the expression ' profit sharing ' used in a. narrow,
technicar sense. It is undoubtedly true that the bonus
formula. does not la.y down any fixed percentage which
should go to labour out of the availa.ble surplus. The
share of labour will depend on a number of circum~
stances; but once the amount which should go to labour
has been determined, it is easy enough to calculate
what proportion it bears to the whole amount of
available' surplus of profits. There is thus no difficulty
in identifying bonus as a share 'in the profits of the
company. It is true that the International Congress
on Profit~sharing held in Paris in 1889 adopted the
definition of 'profit sharing' in the technical, nartow
sense. That definition said that profit sharing was
"an agreement (formal or informal) freely entered
into, by which· the employees receive a share, fixed in
advance, of the profits " (see EQ.oyclopa.edia of the
Social Sciences, Seligman and Johnson, Vol. XII, p.487).
But that is not the sense in which bonus has been
understood in our industrial law, and it is worthy of
note that s. 10 of the Banking Act does not use the
technical expression ' profit-sharing ' but the more
general expression ' takes the form of a share in the
profits etc.'. We are unable to hold that this general
expression has a technical meaning in the sense that
the share in profits must be fixed in advance, as in
technical profit-sharing; such a meaning would, without sufficient reason, exclude from its purview
schemes under which the workers are granted regularly
a share in the net profits of industry, but iri which the
share to be distributed among the workers is not fixed
in advance but is decided from time to time on ad 1wc
22i
HUPH.EME COURT REPOitTS LW60(1)]
basis by an independent authority :mch as an industrial
court or tribunal.
1'11c Ce11tral Bar1k
The s~cond ground also appears to us to be equally
of India
untenable. Bonus in the industrial sense as underv.
Their W orkme11 stood in our country does come out of the available
surplus of profits, and when paid, it fills the gap,
S. J(. Das J.
wholly or in part, between the living wage and the
actual wage. It is an addition to the wage in that
sense, whether it be called contingent and SUJJplementary. None the less, it is labour's share in the
profits, a.nd as it i~ a, remuneration which t.akes the
form of a share in profits, it comes within the mischief
of s. 10 of the Banking Act. It may be asked why
should the legislature seek to deprive bank employees,
who are not on the managerial or administrative staff,
of their industrial claim to bonus when they contribute
to the prosperity of the banks? This really is a question of policy on which we are not permitted to specula.te. On the one side there is the necessity for safeguarding the integrity and stability of the banking
industry, and on the other side there is the claim of
employees for a share in the profits. Which claim has
a greater urgency at a particular time is really a
matter for the legislature to say. We may refer here
by way of contrast to s. 31A of the Insurance Act.
1938. That section is in terms similar to s. 10 of the
Banking Act, but has some marked differences. :Firstly,
it specifically m~ntions bonus, along with a share in
profits, in cis. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (l); secondly, it has
a proviso which says inter alia that nothing in sub~. (1) shall prohibit the payment of bonus in any year
on a uniform basis to all salaried employees etc., or
such bonus which in the opinion of the Central
Government is reasonable having regard to the cireumstances of the ease. This merely sho,Ys that it i8 for
the legislature to decide how to adjnst the claim of
employees with the safety and security of the busineRs
in which the employees are in employment.
The learned Attorney-General has relied on a number
of decisions in support of his contention that bonus
comes within the expression 'takes the form of a share
in profits'. In re Young, Ex Parte Jones C) it was held
1959
(1) [t896] :z Q.B. 484.
S.C.R.
~UPREME COURT REPORTS
229
I959
that a contract that a person shall receive a fixed sum
" out of the profits" of a business was equivalent to The Central Bank
a contract that he shall receive "a share of the profits"
of India
within the meaning of sub-s. 3(d) of s. 2 of the Partnerv.
ship Act, 1890. A similar question arose in Admiml Their Workmen
Fishing Company v. Robinson in connection with s. 7,
sub-s. 2, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 S. J(. Das j ,
which said: "This Act shall not apply to such members of the cr~w as are remunerated by shares in the
profits or gross earnings of the working of such vessel."
The claimant who was the engineer of a fishing smack
was entitled to one share of the net profits of the
working of the vessel on the particular voyage. The
question was-was he remunerated by shares in the·
profits? The answer given was that he qlearly was
so remunerated. In Costello v. Owners of Ship Pigeon (i)
the claimant was employed as a. boatswain on a steam
fishing trawler and was remunerated by wages;
maintenance, and poundage dependent on the profits
of the fishing expedition. The House of Lords decided
by a majority that the claimant was remunerated
by a share in profits within the meaning of s. 7, subs. 2, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906.
Shri N! C. Chatterjee has invited our attention to
Newstead v. Owners of Steam Trawler Labrador (3). That
was a case of a claim for compensation by the widow of
a member of the crew of a fishing vessel, which was
lost with all hands. The claim was resisted by the
owners on the ground that the deceased was remunerated by a share in the profits or gross earnings of
the vessel within s. 7, sub-s. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, and therefore that the Act-did not
apply to him. He was ~mployed as chief engineer on
board a steam trawler at a fixed weekly wage of £ 2. 5s.
It was the custom of the owners when the gross earnings of the boat exceeded£ 100 for any one trip (each
trip being usually of about a week's duration) to allow
a sum of£ 2 by way of bonus, of which £ I went to the
captain and 2s. 6d. to each of the remaining. eight
members of. the crew. If the gross earnings of the
e)
(r) [1910) t K .B. 540.
(2) [1913) A.C. 407·
(3) [1916) I K . B. 166.
230
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
boat exceeded £ 125 the bonus was proportionately
increased and so on~ but it was not further increased
The Central. Bank if the gross earnings realised more than £ 175. The
of ~~ta
decision proceeded on the footing that the bonus in that
Their Workmen case was not a share in profits but an additional sum
for wages determined by the amount of the gross earns. I<. Das f. ings. Lord Cozens Hardy~ M. R.~ expounded the
ratio of the decision in the following words : "The question is whether~ having regard to the
circumstances~ that. can be said in the present case.
It seems that by the custom of this firm and by the
understanding and arrangement between the parties,
if the vessel made£ 100 the skipper was entitled to
£ 1, and in that particular case each member of the
crew was entitled to half a crown. If the vessel
made more the skipper and crew . were entitled to
larger sums. Now what was the effect of that?
The bonus was not, as it seems to me any part of the
p~ofits, nor was it a share in the gross earnings of the
vessel. There was an obligation on the part of the
owners ofthe trawler to pay the half a. crown (to
take that as one instance) in a certain event, which
event was to be determined by the gross earnings of
the vessel. I see no ground for holding that it was
in any sense of the word a share of the gross earnings of the working of the vessel any more than the
actual wages which were payable to the seamen
could be treated as being a share of the gross earnings of the vessel, although the bonus as well as the
wages would figure in the ship's accounts as against
the receipts ou the other side.''
It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision does
not apply here. The bonus we are dealing with here
is not additional wage determined by the amount of
profits; it is really part of the availiable surplus of
profits distributed to labour for its contribution to the
earnings. It does not arise out of any contract to -pay~
though the olaim is recognised as one based on social
justice.
·
·
Shri Phadke has relied on the decision In ·re The
I959
Spanish Prospecting Company Li-m.ited
(1) [1911] I Ch. 92·
C).
That
S.C.R. ·
SUPREl\IE COURT El~l'ORTt-; ·
231
decision proceeded on the meaning of the word 'profits',
I959
of which a classic definition was ·given by Fletcher Th c 1 alB 11
l\Ioulton, L. J. In view of the decisions of this Court e o7r:aia ~n
referred to earlier, it is now beyond dispute that bonus
v.
in the industrial sense comes out of profits.. If it does, Their. Workmen
we do not seehow it can be held that it is not a share
in profits. Shri Pha4ke suggested that the concept of 5 • K. Das f.
a share in profits· pre-supposes . the idea of either a
definite amount or a definite proportion determined in
· advance. This submission we have dealt. with at an
earlier stage and no useful purpose will be served :by
repeating what we have said already~ _
\Ve must now notice two other arguments advanced
o~ behalf of the respondent workmen.
These arguments are based on .the amendments made in 1956.
Section 10 as amended by the· Banking Companies
(Amendment) Act, 1956 (XCV of 1956) reads, .in so far
as it is relevent for our purpose" S. 10. No Banking Company_
(a) shall employ or be managed by a managing
agent; or
(b) shall employ or continue the employment.
of any person.
. . _
(i) who is, or at any time has been, · adjudicated
insolvent or has suspended payment. or has com~
pounded with his creditors, or who is, or has been,
convicted by a criminal Court of an offence involving
moral turpitude; or
·
·
(ii) whose remuneration or part of whose remuneration takes the. form of commission or of a share
in the profits of the company :
Provided that nothing contained in this clause
shall apply to the· payment of any bonus by any
banking company in pursua.n'ce of a settlement or
award arrived at or made under any la~. relating to
industrial disputes or in accordance with any scheme
· framed by such banking company or in accordance
with the usual practice prevailing-· in ba:nking business; or
(iii) whose remuneration is, in the opinion of the
Reserve Bank, ·excessive; or·
(c)
·••!>!'!"!!·
~·· ! • · ! •• , , ··~· .. , ... , , •• , •• ,. ... ,.-., ... , , • · ' •• • •• , •• , • . , . ,
232
SUPHEME COUHT HEPORTS [1060(1)]
Explanation.- For the purpose of sub-clause (iii)
of clause (b), the expression "remuneration''; in
The Central Bank
to a person employed or continued in
relation
of India
employment, shall include salary, fees and perquisites
v.
Their Workmen
but shall not include any allowances or other amounts
paid to him for the purpose of- reimbursing him in
s_ J(.Das ],
respec~ of the expenses actually incurred by him in
the performance of his duties.
·,' (2) i ... :........................ .
. (3) If any question arises in' any particular case
wither the. remuneration is excessive within the
meaning of sub-clause '(iii) of clause (b) of sub. section (1), the decision of the Reserve Bank thereon
· ·· ·
shall be final for all purposes."
It will be noticed that the amended sectiori ha~ a
proviso which - makes it clear that ·nothing in. the
relevent clause in subs-s. (I) shall apply to the payment
of any bonus by any banking company in pursuance
of a settlement or award arrived at or made under
any law· relating to industrial disputes or in accordance
with any scheme framed by such banking company or
in accordance •with · the usual practice prevailing in
· banking business. It is clear that the amended section
does not stand in the way of the grant of industrial
bonus. It was, however, not in force . at the time
relevent in these appeals, and there is nothing in the
Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, ·t956, which
_would make it retrospective in operation. Shri N. C.
Chatterjee has, however, contended that the amending
Act is declaratory of the law as it always· was~ and
Shri Phadke has contended that the amending Act is
parliamentary exposition of the true meaning of s. 10
of the Banking Act. .\Ve are unable to accept any of
these two contentions. The amending Act states in
its long title that it is an Act to amend the Banking
Companies Act, 1949. Section 2 states: "Por section
10 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, the following
section shall be substituted." There is nothing in the
amending Act to indicate that it was enacted to remove
any doubt, explain any former statute, or correct any
omission or error. \Vhat is a decl~uatory Act? The
I959
S.C.R.
SUPREME OOUHT REPORTS
233
following observations in Craies on Statute Law, Fifth
I959
editionF, pp. 56d-57 are apposited: I
A
b The Central Batik
" or mo ern purposes a ec aratory ct may e
d.
011 14
defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the
v~
common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute. Their workman
Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The
usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set s. K . Das J.
aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial
error, whether in the statement of the common law or
in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not in~
variably, such an Act contains a preamble, and also
the word "declared, as well as the word 'enacted'."
A remedial Act, on the contrary, is not necessarily
retrospective; it may be either enlarging or restraining
and it takes effect prospectively, unless it has retrospective affect by express terms or necessary intendment. We are of the view that the amending Act of
1956 is not a declaratory Act, and except in the small
mat~r of the expression 'shall continue to employ' in
sub-s. (1), it does not purport to explain any former law
or declare what the law has always been. It is an ordinary remedial piece of legislation which came into
effect from January 14, 1957. For the period relating
to the appeals before us, the amended section was not
in force.
This brings us to an end of the two questions, (1)
and (2), which directly fall for decision in these seven
appeals. Contrary to the findings of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal, we have come to the conclusion
that (1) the scope of item 5 of sch. II of the relevant
notification is not what the Labour Appellate Tribunal
thought it to be and the reference of 1952 is not pending for · determining the quantum of bonus for the
relevant years in respect of particular banks and (2)
in any event, s. 10 of the Banking Act, prior to the
amendment of 1956, prohibited the grant of industrial
bonus to bank employees inasmuch as such bonus is
remuneration which takes the form of a share in the
profits of the banking company.
We do not think that the other two questions, (3)
and (4), require any decision at this stage. It is to be
remembered that we are exercising our appellate
~0
234
~UPREME
COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
jurisdiction in these seven appeals and not our advisory
jurisdiction. These seven appeals stand comThe Central Bank
pletely
disposed of on the findings w bich we have
of India
given on the two questions already discusserl. On our
v.
Their Worhmen findings the dispute as to bonus referred to the Industrial Tribunal in 1952 has come to an end. The
S. K. Das ].
reference is no longer pending and in the view which
we have expressed as respects the interpretation of
unamended section 10 of the Banking Act no claim
for bonus can be adjudicated on for the past relevant
years. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to decide
hypothetical questions which may arise in any future
reference that may be made under the amended
section. In the exercise of its appellate powers this
Court does not give speculative opinions on hypothetical questions. It would be contrary to principle, inconvenient and inexpedient that opinion should be given
on such questions. If and when, they arise, they
must arise in concrete cases and to use the words of
the Earl of Halsbury, L. C., in Attorney General of
Ontario v. Hamilton Street Railway (t) : "It would be extremely unwise for any judicial
Tribunal to attempt beforehand to exhaust all possible cases and facts which might occur to qualify,
cut down, and override the operation of the particular words when the concrete case is not before it."
It is also to be remembered that no evidence was
allowed to be given either by the banks or the bank
employees as to the claims for bonus for particular
years in respect of particular banks. The dispute was
treated, rightly in our opinion, as a dispute relating
to the general question of bonus. That general question is now dispm~ed of on the findings which we have
already given. -'Ve are aware that if and when a
future reference as to an industrial dispute relating to
bonus is made by the appropriate Government and
the amended section falls for consideration, questions
(3) and (4) may fall for decision. It would be time
enough to decide those questions when they actually
arise in concrete cases and we consider that it is not
only unwise but inexpedient that we should forestall
questions which may arise in future cases and decide
I959
(1) [1903] A.C-~24, 529,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COlJR'r REPORTS
235
them more oe less in vacuo and in the absence of
I959
necessary materials for the decision
of
those
questions.
Th C-aJB k
•
•
e et1lr
an
'rhese are our reasons for holdmg that questions (3)
of India
and (4) should not now be decided. It is necessary to
v.
state, however, that any observations which the Their Wdrkmen
Tribunals below may have made with regard toquestions (3) and (4) would be in the nature of obiter dicta 5 · K. Das f.
and it would be open to both parties to canvass those
questions if and when they arise in any concreic case
in future. Therefore, we have not considered it necessary to state in detail the contentions raised before us
on behalf of the parties concerned with regard to
questions (3} and (4).
A few words regarding Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1957
before we conclude. Besides the question of bonus two
other questions were raised in this appeal: (1) whether
the Labour Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to
order cancellation and refund of cash deposits and (2)
whether the Tribunals below were wrong in holding
that the taking of cash deposits etc., should be restricted to workmen of three categories only. When it
was pointed out that the cash deposits had already
been refunded in accordance with the decision of the
L~.bour Appellate Tribunal the learned Attorney\Jeneral who appeared for the appellant in Civil
Appeal No. 62 of 1957 (The Punjab National Bank,
Limited) did not press those points. Therefore, in
Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1957 also the only surviving
question is the question of bonus on which we have
already given our decision.
Shri Sadhan Chandra Gupta. appeared on behalf of
tho respo~dents in Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1957 and
made his 'submissions on the question of bonus. He
has taken a stand on s. 2 of the Banking Act and has
contended that even if bonus is remuneration which
takes the form of a. share in profits, s. 2 saves the
power of industrial tribunals to award such bonus
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and such
award, if made, wiJl impose an obligation on banks to
pay the bonus awarded and would not make them
liable
1
to penalty under s. 46 of the Banking Act. We have
dealt with this argument at an earlier stage and have
pointed out that ·s. 2 is a. saving provision with regard
2~6
SUPREM.E COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
to any other law for the time being in force, provided
there
is no express provision to the contrary in the
The Centr11l Bank
Banking
Act. If, as we hold. unamended s. 10 of the
of India
Banking Act expressly prohibits the employment of
v.
Their WorktiZeJJ any person by a bank whose remuneration takes the
form of a share in the profits of the compa~y, then s. 2
S.K. Das J.
of the Banking Act is of no help and cannot permit
something which i~ expressly prohibited by s. 10.
For the reasons given above, we allow these seven
appeals to the extent already indicated, namely, (1)
the reference of 1952 is not now pending for determin~
ing the question of bonus for the relevant years in
respect of particular banks and (2) section 10 of the
Banking Act prior to the amendment of 1956 pro~
hib~ts the grant of industrial bonus to bank employees
when such bonus is remuneration which takes the form
of a share in the profits of the banking company. In
the circumstances of these cases and in view of the
long drawn out nature of the dispute, we make no
direction as to costs.
Appeal.s aUCYWed in part.
1959
I9S9
SHlU JAGDISH MILLS LTD.
May u.
v.
THE COMMISSIONEH OE, INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY
NORTH, KUTCH AND SAURASHTRA,
AHMEDABAD
(S. R. l>As, C.•J., N.H. BHAGWATT, and
M. HIDAYA'l'ULLAH, JJ.)
Income~tctx-Assessee company manufacturing and supplying
goods from outside British India-Stipulation for payment by cheque
-Cheques remitted by post from British India-Post Office, if ccn
agent of the assessee-Income, if received in taxable territoriesIndiat' Imome~tax Act (XI of I922), s. 4(1)(a).
The appellant company, carrying on business in manufactur~
ing and st:lling textiles at Baroda, received in the assessment
years 1942-43 and 1943~44 payments in cheques from the Government of India for the supply of such goods on bills submitted, as
agreed upon in prescribed printed forms which provided that the
Government should pay the amount due to the appellant by
cheque. The appellant, however, did not request or write to the
Government indicating in what way the payment by cheque was
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