THE LORD KRISHNA SUGAR MILLS LTD., AND ANOTHER versus THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 May 1959 | [1960] 1 S.C.R. 39 | 1959 INSC 63
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 May 1959
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM*, J.L. KAPUR, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 9/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1960] 1 S.C.R. 39
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 63
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
....
I
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
39
before the Tribunal was to produce the statements
x959
recorded by the manager during what we have called Phulbari Tea Estati
investigation. This left the matters where they were
v.
and Das had never an opport.unity of questioning the Its Workmen
witneRRes after knowing in full what they had stated
Wanchoo J.
against, him. In these circumstances we are of opinion
that the fiw.ling of t.he •rrilmnal that the enquiry i11
this case was uot proper is correct and must Htand.
'Ve therefore dismiss tlw appeal. We should,
howeYer, like to make it elear tlrnt the order of tlw
Tribunal fixing grant of compcnsa,tion till the date of
payment must be taken to be limited to the sum of
Rs. 11,125, which has been deposited in this Court in
pursuance of this Court's order of April 22, 1957 and
Das will not be entitled t.o anything more, as further
stay of payment was pursuant to the order of this
Court. In the circumstances we are of opinion that
the parties should hear their own eosts of thits Court.
Appeal dismis8ed.
THE I.ORD KRISHNA SUGAR MILV3 LTD.,
AND ANOTHER
v.
THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTH"ll~R
(and connected petition)
(B. l:'. SINHA, .J AFER IMAM, ,J. L. KAP(TR, A. K. SARKAR,
SUH"HA RAO AND M. HIDAYATULLAH, ,TJ.)
,•
Constitution--Fundami:ntal Rights-Rcsirictions on-Reasonableness, relei·anf. considerations for fudging-Enactment obliging
sugar manufacturers to s11.pply sugar for export ,,f loss-Notijicat-ion
tinder another enactment increasing price of sugar for internal sale
for recouping loss-- Whether can be tulwn into considerationDiscrimination-Sitgar Export Promotion Act, I958 (30 of I958),
ss. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9-Constifation of India, Arts. I4 and I9Essential Commodities Act, I955 (IO of I955), s. 3--Sugar (Control)
Order, I955. cl. 5·
The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Sugar
Export Promotion Act, 1958, which was enacted for the purpose
of exporting sugar with a view to earning foreign exchange. The
impugned Act imposed the following restrictions on the owners of
1959
May 6.
40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1))
factories producing sugar by the vacuum pan process: (i) it
obliged them to deliver to the export agency specified by the
The Lord E.rishna Central Government the quota of sugar allocated to them; (ii) it
Sugar Mills Ltd.• made them suffer a loss on this delivery of sugar; and (iii) it
and Another
exposed them to a penalty in case the delivery \vas short of the
v.
quota. By a notification issued under the Sugar (Control) Order,
z959
-. .
Thi! trnion of India 1955, which was made under·the Essential Commodities Act, 1955,
and Another
the Central Government increased the price of sugar for internal
sales by 50 nP. per maund to enable the owners to recoup the
loss suffered by them by the delivery of the sugar for export.
The petitioners contended that it was not permissible to take the
notification issued under another statute into consideration and
that the impugned Act offended Arts. 14 and l9(1)(f) and (g) of
the Constitution.
Held, (per Sinha, Imam, Kapur, Sobba Rao and Hidayatullah, JJ., Sarkar, J. dissenting) that the impugned Act was
constitutionally valid.
Per Sinha, Imam, Kapur and Hidayatullah, JJ. The
restrictions placed by the Act upon the fundamental rights of the
petitioners under Arts. 19(1)(0. and (g) were not unreasonable as
arrangements \Vere made to save them frotn Joss by increasing
the price of sugar for internal sales, thus passing on the loss to
the consumers in India. The reasonablrness of the restriction
and not of the law was to be determined, and if the restriction
was under one la\v but countervailing advantages were created
by another law passed as part of the same legislative plan, the
Court must take that other law into account. The reasonableness
of the restriction was to be judged at the time it was challenged
and in the context of the circumstances then existing. The
notification of the Central Government increasing the price of
sugar to enable the recoupment of the loss occasioned by the
export could be taken into consideration in judging the
reasonableness of the restrictions.
State of Madras v. V. G. Row [ro52j S.C.R. 597; Virendra v.
The Slate of Pmijab, [1958] S.C.R. 308; Aru11achalam Nadar ''·
State of Madras, 1959 S.C.J. 297; Attorney-General for Alberta v.
Attorney-General for Canada, (1939) A. C. II7; Ladore ,., Bennet,
(1939) A.C. 468 and Pillai v. Mudanayake, (1953) A. C. 514, relied
on.
The foreign export served the national interest by stabilising·
the sugar market and stabilised national economy by earning
foreign exchange. The loss, if any, was spread over many
factories and was so small as not to amount to an unreasonable
restriction.
The Act did not offend Art. r4 of the Constitution in selecting sugar produced by the vacuum pan process for export and in
leaving out sugar produced by other methods and other
commodities from the mischief of the Act. The Government was
the best judge as to which commodities were most likely to earn
.
'
·'
S.C.R.
•
.
}
I
I .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41
foreign exchange and the selection made was justifiable as a
I959
reasonable classification which was related to the object of the
Act of earning foreign exchange.
The Lord Krishna
Per Subba Rao, J. In testing the reasonableness of the Sugar Mills Ltd.,
restrictions imposed by the impugned Act it was not permissible
and Another
to take into consideration the notification under the Sugar
v.
(Control) Order, 1955, increasing the price of Sugar for internal The Union of India
sales by 50 nP. per maund. The test of reasonableness of one Act
and A11other
could be made to depend upon the impact of another Act on it
only when the earlier Act was made part of later :\ct or when
both Acts were parts of the same legislative scheme t..r plan. To
go beyond this would be to destroy the stability of legislation
and to introtluce an uncertain element. To go further and to
depend upon a notification of a transitory natui·e issued under an
unconnected Act would be to place the statute in a fluid state.
The impugned Act and the Essential Commodities Act were
enacted for different purposes.
State of Madras v. V. G. Row [1952] S.C..R. 597; AttorneyGeneral for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada (1939) A. C. u7;
Ladore v. Bennet (1939) A. C. 468 and Pillai v. Mudanaya/1e,
(1953) A. C. 514, distinguished.
The restrictions imposed by the impugned Act were not
unreasonable as the j_ct served the national interest by earning
foreign exchange for the State and building up foreign markets
for the future prosperity of the sugar industry.
Per Sarkar, J. The impugned Act which made the petitioners
suffer a loss on the sale of a part of their produce imposed
unreasonable restrictions on their fundamental right to carry on
their business and was invalid. Though in deciding the
reasonablene1>s of the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act
all the prevailing conditions and circumstances had to be
considered, the notification increasing the home price of sugar
could not be taken into consideration. The impugned Act neither
made it obligatory on, nor empowered the Government to take
any steps to recoup the loss caused to the petitioners. The
increase in the price dependetl solely on the arbitrary discretion
or generosity or sense of fair play of the Government. It would
be intolerable in any legal system that a statute should be legal
when the Government chose to do a thing and illegal when it
undid it and so on from time to time at the choice of the Government. Besides, there was nothing in the Essential Commodities
Act or the Sugar (Control) Order which authorised the Government to increase the price for the sake of recouping to the
manufacturers the loss caused to them by the impugned Act, and
the validity of the notification increasing the home price of sugar
was doubtful.
State of Madras v. V. G. Row [1952] S.C.R. 597, distinguished.
The impugned Act caused loss to the petitioners which was
not negligible and thus imposed unreasonable restrictions on
6
42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1 )]
their right to carry on their business. The restrictions could not
be fustified on tlie ground til<:it they resulted in stablising the
The Lord J<rishn(' sugar industry as the industry did not require any stabilisation.
Sugar Mills Ltd., The export \Vas not to b<· n1adc out of the excess of production
and Another
over internal consumption and in fact production in India had
v.
al\vays been less than internal consumption.
'959
The Union of Jndir'
and A notiter
0RIGINAI. ,JuRISDIC'rION: Petitions Nos. 9 and 14 of
1959.
Petitions under Article :J2 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
A. V. Viswa,'rw,thv Sastri, and G. C. "o/Iathur, for the
petitionern in Petition No. 9 of 1959.
31. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen
and R.H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 1 in both the
petitions.
J}[ .C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of Ind,ia, B. Sen
and B. P. Jlfaheshwari, for respondent No. 2 in Petition
No. 9 of 1959.
N. C. Chatterjee and G. C. jfathur for the petitioners
in Petition No. 14 of 1959.
B. Sen and B. P. Jlfahesk1m.ri, for respondent No. 2
in Petit-ion No. 14 of 1959.
1959. l\fay 6. The judgment of R P. Sinha, Jafar
Imam, J_ L. Kapur and l\L Hidayatul!ah, JJ,, was
delivered by M. Hidayatu!l,1h, .J. A. K. Sarkar, J.,
and K. Snbba Rao, J., delivered separate judgments.
Hidayatullah JHIDAYATULLAH J.-W'rit Petition No. 9 of 1959
has been filed by the Lord Krishna Sugar Mills, Ltd.,
Saharanpnr and Shri Sushi! Kumar, a Director of the
said Mills. It was heard along with "' rit Petition
No. 14 of 1959, which has been tiled by Shiva Prasad
Banarsidas Sugar Mills, Bijnor, through Seth Munnalal
and also by him in his own name. These Mills are
hereinafter referred to as the L. IC S. Mills and S. P, R
Mills, respectively. The petitions raise the same contentions, but in 'Writ Petition No. 14 of 1959, there is
one more circumstance, which will be mentioned later.
The petitions are directed against the Union of India
and the Indian Sugar M.ills Association (Export Agency
Division) Calcutta. The petitioners challenge inter alia
.'
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S.C.R.
SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS
the constitutionality of the Sugar Export Promoz959
tion Act, 1958 (30 of 1958), which shall hereafter be
"'
1 to as t Jie Act. "'h.ey quest10n
· a lso t hc 1ega ]"Ity The Lord Krishna
re1erre(
Sugar Mills Ltd.,
of certain orders passed by the second respondent and Another
purporting to be under the Act.
v.
Before describing how this matter came before the The Union °1 India
A
aud .lnnllter
·
· IS
· convenient to give
· t h e RC Jrnmo of' t I10 d.Ct
It
Court,
and to set out some of it8 provi,-;ions. On June 27, Hidayatul/ahf.
1958, the President promulgated the Snga.r Export
Promotion Ordinance, 1958, which wa.8 repealed by
and re-enacted as the Act on September 16, 1958.
The Ordinance was in the 8ame terms as the Act, and
it is not necessary to refer to the Ordinance separately.
more so because bys. 14 of the Act which repealed
the Ordinance, anything done or any action taken
under the Ordinance is rleemed to have been done or
taken under the Act, a.nd the Act itself is deemed to
have commenced on the 27th day of June, 1938.
Both the Ordinance and the Act were passed to
provide for the export of sug~ir in the pi.1blic interest.
and for t-he levy and collection in certain cirrumRtances
of an additional duty of excise on sugar prodneed in
India. To achieve this objective, the Act; :111thorises
the Centl'al Government (as did the Orcliuance previously) to specify an export agency to perform the
functions mentioned in the Ad., and the Central
Government by a not.ification issued the r-;amc day,
specified the Indian Sugar Mills Association (Export
Agency Division) Calcutta, as the export agency.
The Aet next provides that the Central Government
may by notification in the Officia.l Gazette, fix the
quantity of sugar to be . exported during any period
taking into consideration :
(a) the quantity of sugar available in the country;
(b) the quantity of sugar rec1uired for consumption in the country ; and
(c) the necessity of exporting sugar with a view to
earning foreign exchange in the public interest,
but, so as not to exceed 20 per cent. of the quantity to
be produced in India in the season eudin,g with the
month of October falling within that year. The Central
_i.
;
44
SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS
[1960(1)]
Government fixed 50,000 tons as the quantity to be
exported up to December 31, 1958, later extended to
The Lord Kriohna J
t"
1 ·
d
anJuary 31 , 19"9
n . Th"IS no ffi
1 ca Ion was a so Issue
5 ,.gar Mill' Ltd..
and Another
O!l une 27 ' 1958 ·
v.
Section 5 of the Act enables the Central Govemment
The Union of India to apportion, by order in writing, the quantity to be
and Another
exported among " owners " of factories, the word
Hidayatullah . "factory" being confined to a factory where sugar is
1
produced by the vacuum pan process. The term
"owner " is defined to include transferees, and agents
and managers under Industries (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1951. The apportionment of the
quantity of sugar to be exported is to be in proportion
to the quantity of sugar produced or likely to be
produced by the owners during the season referred to
earlier. On the communication of the m-der to an
owner, the quantity so apportioned is deemed to be
the export quota for the factory ofthat owner.
Section 6 then provides that on demand by the
export agency, every owner shall deliver to it from
time to time, sugar procluced in his factory in such
quantities (not exceeding in the aggregate his export
quota fixed for the factory or group of factories, as the
case may be), of such grade, in such manner, within
such time and at such place, as may be specified by the
export agency in this behalf. If the sugar is delivered
by a:-1 owner in accordance with the provisions of this
section, he retains no rights in such sugar except his
rights to receive ·payment therefor under s. 9 of the
Act.
Section 7 provides for levy of additional excise duty
on sugar despatched from the factory for consumption
in India, if the owner of a factory does not fulfil the
demands under s. 6. It provides:
"(1) Where sugar delivered ·by any owner falls
short of the export quota fixed for it by any quantity
(hereinafter referred to. as the said quantity), there
shall be levied and collected on so much of the sugar
despatched from the factory for consumption in India
as is equal to the said quantity, a duty of excise at
the rate of seventeen rupees per maund.
I959
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S.C.R.
SUPREME corRT REPORTS
45
(2) The duty of excise referred to in sub-section (1)
I959
shall be in addition to the duty of excise chargeable on
c
th .
b . . c
The Lord Krishna
sugar un d er an.y ot her 1aw ior e time emg 111 .iorce, Sugar Mills Ud.,
and shall be paid by the owner to such authority as and Another
may be specified in the notice demanding the payment
v.
of duty and within such period not exceeding ninety The Union ~1 India
days as may be specified in such notice.
and Another
(3) If any such owner does not pay the whole or Hid1iyatullah J.
any part of the duty payable by him within the period
referred to in sub-section (2), he shall be liable to pay
in respect of every period of thirty days or part thereof during which the default continues a penalty which
may extend to ten per cent. of the duty outstanding
from time to time, the penalty being adjudged in the
same manner as the penalty to which a person is liable
under the rules made under the Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944 (I of 1944), is adjudged."
By sub-s. (4) of this section, the provisions of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made
thereunder are made applicable as far as may be,
including those relating to refunds ·and exemptions
from duty in relation to the duty mentioned in this
section or any other sum due as a penalty.
Section 8 then deals with the export by the export
agency of sugar delivered to it. The section also
authorises the sale of such sugar within India under
certain circumstances. The section may be rcproducerJ
in full here, as its terms will torm the subject of consideratfon in the sequel.
8(1) "The export agency shall take all practical
measures to export sugar delivered to it under this
Act:
Provided that, if the export agency is of opinion
that having regard to the quality of the sugar delivered to it by any owner, or to the expenses involved in
transporting. the sugar from one place to another, or
to the delay likely to be involved in exporting it,.or to
the conditions prevailing in the markets for sugar,
whether in or out of India, or to any other relevant
circumstance, it is expedient so to do, the export agency
may sell the whole or any part of the sugar in India
46
SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
[1960(1)]
>md may, if it thinks fit, purchase such quantity of
sugar as it may co1'.sider necessary for export at the
TheLordf\.rishna
· t t''
•
'959
-
Sugar ,1till8 Ltd.,
<.1})J.)ro11r1a e .1n1e.
(2) l•'or the purposos of sub-section (1), the export
agency may itself sell sugar or permit the owner to sell
Tiu·""'"" of 1"'1'"the whole or >:Lny part of the export quotn. in his
aud Anolha
.· ' approve d ·1)y 1•t on cone}1t10n
' · t h a.t t h e
cus. t.o. d y a t a pnce
to it."
Hidayatullah ]. srilc-riroceeds arc' rniyable
~
Section 9 deals with payments to owners who have
delivered sugar for export. It provides n.s follows:
(l) "The export agency shn.11, at such time as it
thinks fit, make to the owners who ha.ve delivered
sugar to it urnler this Act, payments dc,tc.rmined in
accordance with the provisions hereinafter in this
section contained.
(2) From the tot.al sale-proceeds in respect of the
quantity fixed for export under sec1 ion 4 for any year,
there shall be deducted the total expenditure incurred
by tho export. agency in respect of the sugar, whether
by way of administrative expenses or otherwise, and
the balance shall be apportioned among the owners in
proportion to the quantity nf sugn.r deli\·ered by them
respectively during tlmt ye»1".
(3) In making any distribution under this section,
the export 1igency shall make such adjustments as
may he necessary having rc,gard to the grade of sugar
t!elivcred hy tiny owner, the >tdjustnwnts being made
on the basis of sugar of ISS-E-2fl grade and with
reference to the price difforential schedule for different
grades of sugar which the Central Government may,
by notification in the OJficial Gazette, publish in this
bC>half.
(4) Notwithstanding anything eontn.ined in this
section and subject to the rules which ma.y be nrnde in
this behn.lf, the export agency may make on account
payments to owners against documents of delivery of
sugar furnished by them, and such payments shall be
adjusted at the time of final payment."
In the remaining five sections, the Act provides for
aucilhtry matters, the hist (s. 14) incorporating the
repeal of the Ordinance and sa vmgs.
Section 10
and Ano""'
_ . v.
.
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SUPl~EME
COURT REPORTS
47
reserves to the Central Government the power to give
x959
directions to the export agency, and s. 11 allows the
1'
·
The Lord Krishna
ventral ('..-overnment to d elegate, su b"1ect to c011 d"1t10ns
Sugar ill ills Ltd.•
if any, its functions under the Act to an officer or and Another
authority specified by notification. It may be pointed
v.
out that the Chief Director, Directorate of Sugar and The i:nion of lndia
Vanaspati, Ministry of :Food ttnd Agriculture, was and Another
specified aH such in a notification issued on Juno 27,
c
·
1958. Section 12 provides ior
protect10n
o f' ant l10rities, llidayatullah J.
ands. 13 confers on tl].eCentral Government the power
to make rules and includes a power to make a breach
of any rule ·an offence punishable with fine extending
to five thousand rupees. All such rules must be laid
before Parliament, and may be modified by Parliament.
Xo rules, however, have been made.
We next proceed to the facts of these two cases. By
an order No. 6(53)/58-SC, dated ,June 27, 1958, the
Chief Director, Directorate of Sugar and Vanaspati,
fixed 461 ·05 and 412·04 tons of sugar as the quantities
apportioned to the L. K. S. Mills and the S. P. B. J\fills
respectively. On July 17, 1958 the export agency
wrote to the two owners informing them of the quotas
and their equivalents in bags, intimating nJ1m that the
supply would be required in Grade C-29, and/or Grade
D-29 and/or Grade E-29. Inquiry was made as to the
grades and quantities in stock with them. It was also
stated in these letters- that a further communication
would be sent in due course giving detailed despatch/
delivery/disposal instructions for the export quota.
They were also informed that the Central Board of
J{evenue had issued detailed instructions to the Collectors of Central Excise, and that it had been agreed
that the order of the Chief Director (Sugar) served on
the owners with copy to the Central Excise Officer of
the fo,ctory concerned would also be the release order
from the Sugar Directorate.
Different replies were sent by the two petitioners.
The L. K. S. Mills replied that they had only sugar of
D-28 grade, while the S. P. B. Mills replied that they
had E-29. On August 24, 1958, the export agency wrote
to them that the export quota was diverted for internal sale. They were told that they were permitted to
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
sell the "quotn, sug:tr" for iuternal consumption at the
price of Rs. 36, per maund for Grade D-29, fixed by
The LordKr;dma the Government. The export agency asked the two
5
"!:~~;:!;";:a., Mills to Jet it know by telegram the grade in which the
v.
export quota was available, so that documents could
The un;on of 1n<1;a be sent to enable (,hem to deliver sugar to their
a11d A11othcr
respective buyers. The export agency described the
documents as follows :
flidayatulla-11 J.
"(1) A delivery order authorising the Central
Excise Officer of your factory to deliver the quantity
sold.
(2) This delivery order will be sent through the
Punjab National Bank Ltd., attached to a demand
draft drawn on you for the tJ.mount of the sale proceeds
payable to us. Please pay this on presentation.
(3) The sale proceeds payable to us will be calculated as in the following examples : Rs.
Sale price itt Rs. 36 per maund
D-29
Less Excise Duty to be paid by
you
'959
-
Less 'on acco11nt' payment of
Rs. I 0 per rnaun<l
Amount for which draft will be
drawn on you
After receiYing the delivery order you will pay the
Excise duty and deliYcr the sugar to the buyer.
.
" Gmde diffomntials will be allowed as per the
Government Notification GSR. 661 d/30th July fixing
ex-factory prices.
The sale tmnsaction will be as between you and
your buyer and the Export Agency cannot take any
responsibility.
\Ve now await to hear by telegram the grade availn,ble. Please also S<iy in your telegram to which branch
of the Punjab National Bank we should send the
documents."
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
49
The facts from here progress differently with these
r959
two petit~one.rs, and they are stated separa~e~y. !he The Lord -;rishna
L.K.S. Mills mformed the export agency their mab1hty Sugar Mills Ltd.,
to sell sugar at the controlled rate fixed by the Govern- and Another
ment by its notification of July 30, 1958, as the market
v.
was very weak, and there were no purchasers of sugar The Union of India
at the controlled rate even out of the releases made by and Another
the Government for free sales. The export agency Hidayatullah J.
reminded the L.K.S. Mills that the industry had agreed
to finance the Export Agency Division by letting it
have the sale-proceeds of sugar diverted for internal
sale less Rs. 10 per maund as an "on account" payment. The export agency offered to show a concession
to the L.K.S. Mills, and asked them to sell sugar in
instalments of 1,500, 1,500 and 1,565 bags with a week's
interval between each. It asked the L.K.S. Mills to
co-operate and let the export agency send documents
for 1,500 bags at Rs. 35·69 nP. per maund ex-factory.
It appears that a mistake was made in putting down
1,000 bags, but the meaning was perfectly plain. The
L.K.S. Miils, however, insisted that they were unable
to sell sugar at the controlled rate, and that as they
were in financial difficulties, it was not possible to
honour the documents as suggested by the export
agency.
The L. K. S. Mills proving obdurate, the export
agency wrote on November 5, 1958, that it proposed to
send documents for the full quota of 4,565 bags at
Rs. 35·69 per maund. The L.K.S. Mills were requested
to retire the documents immediately, as funds were
needed urgently for purchase of additional quantities
for export to replace the quota diverted for
internal sale. It enquired the name of the bankers
to whom the documents might be sent by the agency.
The L.K.S. Mills, it appears, did not agree to any of
the courses suggested, and the export agency wrote on
November 27, 1958, that the L.K.S. Mills were requested
to remit a sum of Rs. 1,88,216·63 nP. being the amount
calculated at the rate of Rs. 35·69 nP. per maund in
respect of the total sugar quota, less excise duty to be
paid by the L.K.S. Mills and less "on account" payment
of Rs. 10 per maund as indicated in the e&rlier letters,
'(
50
'959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
It also stated that unless the remittance was received
The Lord Krishna by Decem?er 5, 1958, the permission to sell the quota
Sugar Mills Ltd., sugar for mternal consumption would be withdrawn.
aud Another
Subsequent to this too, the export agency wrote to
.v.
. the L. K. S. Mills saying that a demand draft for
The Union °1 India Rs. 61,845·57 nP. was being sent, to which was attached
and Another
th e d el"ivery ord er a dd ressed to t h e entra I E xcISe
.
c
Hidayatullah ].
Officer of the factory for releasing the first instalment
of 1,500 bags. The L.K.S. Mills were asked to pay the
excise duty and to clear the bags from bond and to
intimate to the agency that they had done so. Similar
documents were prepared for the other instalments and
forwarded through the Bank. The L.K.S. Mills, however, did not agree to this, and the export agency
thereafter on December 18, 1958, sent a telegram that
unless the drafts were retired immediately, the quota
sugar should be kept ready for despatch so that
delivery might be taken by the export agency. The
export agency also informed the L.K.S. Mills that
otherwise the name of the Mills would be communicated to the Chief Director, Sugar, as a defaulter. The
export agency also sent an order for delivery of the
quota sugar, and required the L.K.S. Mills to depatch
it by goods train, freight to pay, consigned to the
export agency. It also intimated that the Mills should
draw on the export agency for the amount of excise
duty paid by the Mills plus "on account" payment at
Rs. 10 per maund. Much was made of the error in
describing the quota as of D-29, but in view of what
· had already been understood, it cannot be suggested
that the L.K.S. Mills were in any way misled.
The L.K.S. Mills informed the export agency that
their bank position did not allow them to honour
the drafts, nor despatch the desired quantity of sugar
at the rates mentioned by the agency. They also
stated that they were not able to despatch more than
500 bags, as wagons over the Eastern Railway were
limited. The export agency, however, did not agree.
Finally, the export agency demanded remittance of
the sum of Rs. 1,88,216·63 nP. by the 25th January,
and gave the alternative to the L. K. S. Mills to
despatch the sugar by that date according to the
,
•
•
S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
despatch instructions communicated earlier. The
r959
L.K.S. Mills wired saying that the Banks were demand- Th L d K . h
ing interest and that the agency should instruct the su~a:~m;'~1';,
Banks to forego interest. The export agency on and Another
January 29, 1959, wired as follows :
v.
"Your tel. twentyninth without prejudice and to Ths Union of India
·
· t rue t•mg b ank waive
·
and _
Another
av01'd serious
compl'icat'ions we ms
interest. Regarding interest Committee will consider Hidayatullah 1 .
whose decision will be communicated in due course."
The petition (No. 9 of 1959) was, however, filed on
January 27, 1959, that is to say, two days earlier.
The facts relating to the S.P.B. Mills are as follows:
After the letter of August 24, 1958 was sent, nothing
appears to have been heard by the export agency.
On November 27, 1958, the export agency asked the
S. P. B. Mills to remit to it by December 15, 1959,
Rs. 1,69,524. 77 nP. being the amount calculated in
the same way as for the L.K.S. Mills. On December 14,
1958, in continuation of this letter a despatch order
for the entire quota was sent in the same terms as in
the other case. In reply, the S.P.B. Mills pointed out
that they were working the Mills as short-term lessees,
having obtained the lease from the High Court of
Allahabad on payment of Rs. 6,10,000 as lease money
and Rs. 1,00,000 as security on August 6, 1956. They
also pointed out that they were required to purchase
additional machinery, stores etc., for a sum of Rs. 5
lakhs, and that a sum of Rs. 3,43,500 was spent in
connection with the repairs to the factory and wages
for the period during which the factory was re-started.
They further pointed out that they had suffered a loss
of Rs. 2,40,000 in the last season and another loss of
Rs. 50,000 on account of the strike of cane-growers in
March, 1958; that all their sugar stock was pledged
with the Punjab National Bank, Bijnor, against an
advance of 75 per cent. of the price; and that there
were arrears of cess amounting to about Rs. 5,50,000
and that the lease money amounting to Rs. 6,10,000
for the next season was also due. They therefore,
expressed their inability to send any sugar: They also
stated that if they redeemed the pledged sugar even
after paying the "on account" money to the Bank,
52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1))
the Bank would be receiving Rs. 15-2-0 per maund
less than the controlled price· of sugar. They further
Ts"' LoMrd Ku,.,L·htdna stated that it was not possible for them to sell sugar
ugar ' s
.,
. fi xed by t h e Drrectorate
.
and Another
at the contro1led pnce
and
v.
ended by saying that they were not in a position to
The Union of India despatch sugar, pointing out at the same time that
and Another
the Act was unconstitutional and not binding on them.
The export agency, however, was not agreeable, and
Hidayotullah ],
it asked the S.P.B. Mills either to deliver the export
quota or pay the net sale-proceeds for the same,
pointing out that the Mills ran the risk of liability for
the additional excise duty of Rs.17 per maund.
While matters stood at this stage ~nd the S. P. B.
Mills had neither paid the amount demanded nor
agreed to despatch the sugar, a petition was filed in
this Court and a temporary stay was obtained.
The questions that have been raised in these petitions are many, but they can be grouped under two
heads, viz., the vires of the legislation and the propriety
of the action taken under it. The argument about
the vires challenges the Act as a whole and also clause
by clause. In regard to the vires of the Act, the petitioners draw attention to the statement of objects and
reasons, incorporated in one of the affidavits in the
case. According to them, the declared object of the
Act is to earn foreign exchange. They contend that
if foreign exchange is so urgently needed, there should
have been uniform legislation compelling other sugar
manufacturers, who do not manufacture by the vacuum
pan process, also to export sugar. This argument is
based on alleged discrimination and on Art. 14 of the
Constitution. The petitioners further contend that
manufacturers of commodities other than sugar are
not compelled to export in a like manner, and thus
there is further discrimination.
In our opinion, this argument is without substance.
The power of Parliament to make laws in relation to
foreign exchange is manifest. Entry No. 36 of the
Union List specifically confers jurisdiction on Parliament to legislate in relation to foreign exchange. That
Entry, if interpreted widely, would embrace within
z959
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
53
itself not only laws relating to the control of foreign
I959
exchange but also to its acquisition to better the n L --;;~ . h
economic stability of the country. The need for s~~ar ~1;u;~,;.:
foreign exchange to finance the various development and Another
schemes was, very properly, not disputed. It is thus
v.
plain. that the object of the Act is in the public interest. The Union of India
If we are to exist as a progressive nation, it is very and Another
necessary that we carve out a place for ourselves in Hidayat,.llah J.
the International market. The beginning has to be
made, and many a time, it is at a great loss. That the
Central Government has selected the sugar industry
for an export programme does not mean that it cannot
make a classification of the commodities, bearing in
mind which commodity will have an easy market
abroad for the purpose of earning foreign exchange.
During the Suez crisis, sugar was exported in large
quantities from this country, and earned 12·4 crores
as foreign exchange. There is nothing on the record
to show that export of other commodities was not also
undertaken, though it was pointed out in arguments
that manganese ore was also exported in a similar
manner to earn foreign exchange. It is quite obvious
that the Central Government cannot order the export
of all and sundry manufactured commodities from the
country, without being assured of a market in foreign
countries. Necessarily, the Government can only
embark upon an export policy in relation to these
products, for which there is an easy and readily
available market abroad. For this reason also, sugar
produced by the vacuum pan process may have been
selected, because such sugar is perhaps in demand
abroad and not.sugar produced by any other process.
It must be realised that goods manufactured in our
country have to stand heavy competition from goods
produced abroad, and even this export can only be
made at great sacrifice, and is made only to earn
foreign exchange, which would not, otherwise, be
available.
In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that
there is discrimination in so far as sugar manufacturers
by the vacuum pan process are concerned. Government is the best judge as to which commodities are
0
J
54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1))
most likely to earn foreign exchange, and the selection
thus made is justifiable as a reasonable classification
TheLordKrishna
• h ·
1
h b"
f h A ct, name1y, t h e
Sugar Mills Ltd., wh1c is re ated tot e o iect o t e
and Another
earning of foreign exchange.
v.
The next contention is under Arts. 19(1) (f) and (g)
The Union of India and also 31 of the Constitution.
The petitioners
and Another
contend that the whole export programme in respect
of sugar amounts to an infringement of their fundHidayatullah ].
amental rights under Arts. 19(1) (f) and (g), and
amounts also to a compulsory acquisition of their property without payment of compensation. The petitioners analyse the scheme of the Act, and state that
it amounts to taking sugar from owners for sale abroad
at such price as it may fetch, the owners being paid
when such money is received, after deducting the
expenses of the export agency and the cost of export.
They state that the owners stand to lose, because,
admittedly, sugar is going to be exported at a loss,
and the loss is to fall on the owners of factories. They
further state that if the necessity for foreign exchange
was felt, the loss entailed in the earning of foreign
exchange should be borne by Government or be distributed among all industries, or at least among all the
sugar producers in the country. It is urged that the
Act is an unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental rights to hold, acquire, and dispose of property and to carry on occupation, trade or business.
In reply, the learned Attorney-General on behalf
of the Union as well as the Directorate of Sugar refers
to the negotiations which took place between the
Government and the sugar industry and the arrangements which were made to save owners of factories
from the loss which is inevitable as a result of this
export programme. We were taken through the
various Control Orders which were passed by Government under the Essential Commodities Act about this
time, fixing the. price of sugar for internal consumption. In particular, referenee is made to the Sugar
(Control) Order, 1955, Notification No. G. S. R. 661/
ESS. Com/Sugar dated July 30, 1958. It is pointed
out that by that Notification the price of sugar was
increased by 50 nP. per maund on all internal sales
z959
-
.
..
S.C.R.
,
.
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
55
to enable the factories giving their export quota to
z959
recoup themselves for the loss, which might be entail- The Lord :.rishna
ed. It was anticipated that the loss would be recouped sugar Mills Ltd.,
if there was an increase of 50 nP. per maund in and Another
the price of sugar for internal consumption and the
v.
export quota was fixed at 2i per cent. of •the total The Union of India
production of a factory for 1957 -58. The loss, it was and Anoth.,
expected, would be more than set off by the excess Hidayatullah J.
price which the producers would be able to get for
every 20 maunds sold for internal consumption. It
is also pointed out that Government at that time did
not wish to take over the work of export on itself
and specified as the export agency, the Indian Sugar
Mills Association, a body composed of 95 per cent. of
the sugar mills in the country. The learned AttorneyGeneral also points out that more than 95 per cent.
of the mills have stood by this arrangement, and did
either supply their quota of sugar or sold it in the
internal market and made available the money for
purchase of sugar for export. Only a few mills in the
country resorted to these devices to get out of the
commitment which the industry as a whole had
entered into. The learned Attorney-General also
contends that the petitioners had obtained favourable
prices for sale of sugar in the country but were not
willing to honour their other commitments which,
after the agreement of the sugar industry, were given
legislative form.
Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that
the vires of the Act should be considered without
reference to other circumstances such as the agreements, price adjustments and price control, as they
have no bearing upon the resonableness of the legislation. In State of Madras v. V. G. Row (1), this Court
laid down that in judging the resonableness of a
restriction upon fundamental rights, the surrounding
circumstances can be looked into. Patanjali Sastri,
C.J., observed as follows :
" It is important in this context to bear in mind
that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed,
should be applied to each individual statute impugned,
(1) [1952J
s.c.R. 597, 607.
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.
su~a:':ti~;·1;~~ The nature of the right alleged to have been infringand Another ' ed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imv.
posed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be
The Union of India remedied •thereby, the disproportion of the imposition,
and Another the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter
Hidayatullah J. into the judicial verdict.
In evaluating such elusive
factors and forming their own conception of what is
reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case,
it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the
scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to
their interference with legislative judgment in such
cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection
that the Constitution is meant not only for people of
their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have,
in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable."
In Virendra v. The State of Punjab (1 ), S. R. Das,
C.J., again reaffirmed this approach. See also Arunacha'la Nadar v. State of Madras(').
It is, however, contended that though one can look
at the surrounding circumstances, .it is not open to
the Court to examine other laws on the subject, unless
those laws be incorporated by reference. In our
opinion, this i.s a fallacious argument. The Court in
judging the reasonableness of a law, will necessarily
see, not only the surrounding circumstances but all
contemporaneous legislation passed as part of a single
scheme. The reasonableness of the restriction and not
of the law has to be found out, and if restriction is
under one law but countervailing advantages are
created by another law passed as part of the same
legislative plan, the Court should not refuse to take
that other law into account.
The existence of such other law is not difficult to
establish. The Courts can take judicial notice of it. As
was laid down by the Privy Council in Attorney-General
'959
Th L
.
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 308, 318.
(2) 1959 S.C.J. 297, 299-301,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
57
for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada (1 ), the
z959
Courts
in
determining
the
effect
of
legislation,
do
take
Th L. dK . h
•
•
eor nsu
into account,
Sugar Mills Ltd.,
"any public general knowledge of which the andAnot/ur
Court would take judicial notice, and may in a proper
.v.
.
case require to be informed by evidence as to what The U~·~· 0{h India
the effect of the legislation will be. Clearly, the Acts an no er
passed by the Provincial Legislature may be conside- Hidayatullah J.
red, for it is often impossible to determine the effect
of the Act under examination without taking into
account any other Act operating, or intended to operate, or recently operating in the Province."
No doubt, this was laid down in a case falling within
ss. 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, but
the general proposition is equally applicable where the
effect of the legislation on those governed by it has to
be measured. In the same connection, their Lordships looked into the historical background of legii;ilation to find out the materials which were coni?idered
before the legislation was promoted in the legislature.
See also Ladore v. Bennett (2). This Court also in
Arunacluila Nadar v. State of Madras( 8 ), examined the
' historical background ' and discovered the object of
the Act, "from the circumstances under which it was
passed."
That other oontemporaneous legislation passed as
part of a legislative plan can be ex11-mined was clearly
laid down by the Privy Council in Pillai v. Mudanayake ('). In that case, the question was whether
the Ceylon Citizenship Act (18 of 1948) and the
Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment Act
(48 of 1949) were valid, or were ultra vires the
Ceylon Parliament, being void under s. 29(2) of the
Ceylon (Constitution and Independence) Order-inCouncil, 1946 (as amended). Under the first two Acts,
the Indian Tamils were denied as a community, the
right of franchise unless they came within the terms
of the first Act. They were thus subjected to disabilities and restrictions which were prohibited by
(1) (1939) A.C. u7, 130.
(2) (1939) A.C. 468, 477.
8
(3) ~959 S.C.J. 297, 299-301.
(4) (1953) A.C. 514.
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960(1)]
s. 29(2) of the Order-in-Council. During the course of
arguments, their Lordships' attention was drawn to a.
,.~.:~m;•;_,;~
later
Act, intituled the Indian and Pakistani Residents
5
and Another
(Citizenship) Act (3 of 1949), under which the Indian
v.
Tamils and others were entitled to get themselves
The Union °! India registered a.s the citizens of Cey Ion on proof of
anti Another
sufficient connection with Ceylon. It was argued by
Hidayati<llah
Mr.
Pritt, Q.C., before the Privy Council that the later
1
Act could not be read to justify the earlier Act, because
if the impugned Citizenship Act were bad when it was
passed, it could not be 'brought back to light' by the
enactment of the subsequent Act. Their Lordships
did not accept this argument and read the later Act
with the previous. They observed :
" It was argued that sections 4 and 5 of the
Citizenship Act made it impossible that the descendants, however remote, of a person who was unable to
attain citizenship himself. could ever be able to attain
citizenship in Ceylon no matter how long they resided
there, but their Lordships' attention was subsequently
drawn to the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizen.ship) Act, No. 3 of 1949, by which an Indian Ta.mil
could by an application obtain citizenship by registration and thus protect his descendants, provided he had
a certain residental qualification. It was suggested
on behalf of tho appellant that this Act might itself
be ultra vires as conferring a privilege upon Indian
Tamils within s. 29(2)(c) of the Constitution Order-in
Council, and that i herefore it was inadmissible to
rebut the inference that the legislature had intended
by the Citizenship and Franchise Acts to make Indian
Tamils liable to dis>il>ilities within the meaning of
s. 29(2)(b), but their Lordships cannot accept this
argument. If there was a legislative plan the plan
must be looked at as a whole, and when so looked at
it is evident, in their Lordships' opinion, that the
legislature did not intend to prevent Indian Ta.mils
from attaining citizenship provided that they were
sufficiently connected with the island. "
It is not necessary to speculate as to the remedies of
the sugar dealers if the Sugar Control Order, or the
notification were varied or abrogated in future. The
'959
Th L d K . h
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
59
reasonableness of the restriction is to be judged today
z959
and in the context of the circumstances now existing. The Lord Krishna
It cannot but be accepted that the Government sugar Mills Ltd.,
made adequate arrangements to recoup the sugar and Another
industry for the loss which it might suffer in giving
.y.
.
the export quota. For that purpose though the The Union °1 Ind"'
export quota was fi xe d at 2 21 per cent.' of t h e. total and Another
quantity produced by a factory, the loss which was Hidayatullah J.
expected to be Rs. 10 per maund was spread over the
remaining sugar to be sold in the country and was
recouped at 50 nP. per maund. We are unable to
accept th~ plea that the petitioners were not able to
sell sugar at the controlled price, because the price was
fixed too high. Learned counsel for the petitioners
contend that by fixing a ceiling there is no guarantee
that the commodity will be sold at the ceiling price
and not at a lower rate. It is a well-known proposition that when commodities are controlled by fixation
of price, the commodities sell only at the controlled
price and not less. Economists have complained that
the worst fault of price control is that the price does
not fall below the controlled rate. There is nothing
in the record of the case to show that the Mills were
not able to sell their sugar at the controlled price.
We are satisfied that the object of the Act does not
infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners. To
prevent any loss to the petitioners, countervailing
additional prices were allowed on sales of sugar for
internal consumption. The petitioners did not stand
to lose ultimately. The quota was fixed at 2! per cent.
of their total production, and it is inconceivable that
they are unable to sell sugar in the open home market.
This suggestion of the petitioners that they are unable
to sell sugar at the controlled price has not been
substantiated by the production of a single document
to show what they held in stock and what they had
sold. The balance sheet produced by the S. P. B. Mills
shows that they were able to sell more than a lakh of
bags in eight months, as against the quantity of 4,079
bags for export.
It is obvious that the plea that the Mills are unable
to sell sugar at the controlled price is a mere sham.
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
Indeed, an examination of the correspondence in the
first case clearly demonstrates that the Mills were
The Lord K rislina
devising one excuse or another to a void the liability
Sugar Ii-fills Ltd.,
andAnother
to supply the quota of sugar. ]'irst, they raised the
v.
contention that they did not have the requisite grade.
The Union of !>ldia Then they raised the contention that they could not
and Another
sell sugar. Thereafter they asked for supply in instalHidayatullah J. ments, and when instalments were fixed, they put
forth the excuse of there being no wagons available.
They next urged that the Bank was charging interest,
and that interest should be waived before the documents would be retired. When interest was waived,
they filed the petition iu this CouJ.lt. In these
circumstances, in our opinion, there can be no ground
for holding that there has been an infringement of the
fund,imental rights of the petitioners. The restriction
was not unreasonable, because arrangement was made
to save the owners of the factories from loss, and the
loss entailed by the export of sugar was to be borne
by the consumers in India and not by the producers.
There is oue more circumstance which may be
considerecl. The foreign export served the national
interest by staqilising the sugar market so that the
production of sugarcane niay be maintained at a
rea,;onable level. It also stabilised national economy
by earning foreign exchange. The loss, if any, was
comparatively small and was spread over many
factories. Apart from the very real possibility of its
being recouped by sales in the country, the loss itself
was so small as not to amount to an unreasonable
restriction.
The petitioners next challenge the Act in its parts
to show that there is infringement of fundamental
rights or, in the alternative, compulsory acquisition of
their property without compensation. In this connection, ss. 5 to 9 are challenged. Section 5 only permits
the Central Government to fix the quota leviable from
different factories. If the object and purpose of the
Act is valid and also is in the public interest, there
being no disadvantage to the owners ultimately, s. 5
which fixes the quota for export from sugar produced
by a. factory cannot be challenged sepa.ra.tely•.
r959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
61
Section 6 makes it incumbent on the owner to supply
z959
that! sugar on demand and further provides that after Th L d K . 11
deli~ery of sugar, the owner retains no rig~t exc~pt ~o su;a, ~;11;:_,;;:
receive payment therefor under s. 9. This sect10n is andAnother
criticised on the ground that delivery of goods and
v.
paym.ent of the price should be concurrent conditions, The Union of India
that is to say, that the buyer should be ready and andAnother
willing to pay the price in exchange for possession of Hidayatullah 1.
the goods. If the Government w~s buying sugar, the
provisions of s. 32 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act,
which is apparently relied upon here, might have been
invoked. The object and purpose of the Act is to
export sugar and to divide the receipts less expenses,
among the owners who supply sugar for export. The
argument over16oks the scheme that export is made
by a Central Agency for the industry as a whole, and
the prices obtained abroad are payable, and they are
less than those at which sugar of various grades sells
within the country. The section does not suffer from
any infirmity, if the object and purpose of the Act is,
as has been found above, valid and constitutional. It
must not be forgotten that during the time payment
was due, the owners were getting an additional 50 nP.
on every maund sold by them in the country. Deferred
payment is not deprivation of property, nor an encroachment upon fundamental rights. The affidavits
show that the entire quota of 50,000 tons has been
exported, that it has earned Rs. 2·4 crores in. foreign
exchange, and that the exporters have been paid
except for a small balance.
Section 7 is the penalty section. We heard considerable argument as to whether the section would
apply to a case where no delivery was at all made, in
view of the words :
"where sugar delivered by any owner falls short
of the export quota."
No action has yet been taken against the Mills under
the section ; nor has any penalty been imposed. The
question whether the section is ultra vires the legislature need not be considered here.
Section 8 deals with export of sugar or its sale by
the owner or the export agency. It is stated that the
0
62
z959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
section deals with sugar delivered to the export agency,
T1"LordKrishna and.here.there ~as no sugar delivered. The first otidbSugar Mills Ltd.. section <1eals with export, and the export agency can
.,.d Another
only export sugar delivered to it. The second sub-
. v.
. section
authorises the export agency to sell the sugar
Th• Umon °! Ind•a for reasons given in the first sub-section. It also
and Another
authorises the export agency to permit the owner to
Hidayatullah 1 .
sell sugar in his custody. In the present cases, there
was a demand for delivery of the sugar of the quota,
and that has not been met. Whether the petitioners
have exposed themselves to any penalty can only be
considered when penalty is actually imposed on them.
The condition that the sale-proceeds are payable to
the export agency is perfectly valid, regard being had
to the scheme of the export and the advantage allowed
on all sales in India. The owners having obtained that
advantage cannot claim to keep the proceeds of such
sales, by which the export policy is to be run. Out of
the 50,000 tons, about half was sold in India, and with
the sale-proceeds other sugar was bought and exported,
and this would not be possible if the export agency
were required to make a spot cash payment.
Section 9 provides how payments to owners are to
be made. Since the export was by a non-profit-making
agency composed of the sugar industry, it is obvious
that the payments could not be made forthwith. As
explained already, the owners received payment after
the sale prices were received from abroad. Necessary
deductions of expenses have to be made, and the
proceeds are then distributed. No doubt, such payment
is likely to be somewhat delayed but looking to the
small quantity involved (i.e. not more than 20 per cent.
under the Act and in actuality, only 2i per cent.) it was
not likely to make it very hard for the owners, who
were in the meantime breaking this loss at the rate of
50 nP. for every maund of sugar sold in India. In our
opinion, none of the sections considered here, even
viewed separately, is ultra vires.
The petitioners did not cliallenge the action taken
by the export agency as being contrary to the Act. No
argument can be considered in view of the want of a
plea to this effect in the two petitions. In the petition
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
63
by the S. P. B. Mills, the petitioner did not invite any
r959
decision on the correctness of the demand for the The Lord Krishna
additional excise duty, because no such duty has, in Sugar Mills Ltd.,
fact, been demanded. The main contention of the and Another
Mills was that all sugar was pledged with banks. The
."·
.
pleadings on this part of the case are far from clear or The Union of India
·
Th
c
· to a letter, w h.IC J1 1s
•
and Another
suffi 01ent.
. e on1y re~erence
is
insufficient. ·However, in view of the fact that learned
counsel reserved this point to be raised for exemption
from payment of additional duty, we say nothing
about it.
The result is that both the petitions fail, and are
dismissed with costs.
SARKAR J.-I think these two applications should
Sarkar].
succeed. They raise the question whether the Sugar
Export Promotion Act, 1958 is invalid as imposing
an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' right to
carry on their trade.
Some of the petitioners are owners of factories
manufacturing sugar by a process called the vacuum
pan process and they carry on business as manufacturers of and dealers in sugar. For the purposes of
this judgment these persons may be taken to be the
petitioners. The principal respondent in these applications is the Government of India. The other respondent is the Indian Sugar Mills Association, an association of manufacturers of sugar by the vacuum pan
process.
On June 27, 1958, the Government had promulgated
an Ordinance. The impugned Act was passed on
September 16, 1958 repealing the Ordinance and reenacting its provisions and also providing that anything
done under the Ordinance would be deemed to have
been done under the Act as if it had come into force
when the Ordinance had been promulgated.
As appears from its preamble, the Act was intended
to provide for the export of sugar in public interest
and it set up a machinery for that purpose. I will
summarise here the main provisions of the Act. Section 3 empowers the Central Government to specify a
company or other body corporate as the export agency
to perform the functions of that agency under the Act.
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
The respondent Indian Sugar Mills Association was
specified as the export agency under this section.
sugar Mill., Ltd., Section 4 authorises the Central Government to fix the
and Anotha
quantity of sugar that may be exported during any
. v.
. period, but the quantity so fixed for a year is not to
The Umon of India exceed twenty per cent. of the quantity of sugar
and Another
produced in India upto the month of October in that
Sa>kar 1 .
year. 8eotion 4 also provides that. "in fixing such
quantity the Central Government shall have regard to
-(a) the quantity of sugar available in India, (b) the
the quantity of sugar which, in its opinion, would be
reasonably required for consumption in India, (c) the
necessity for exporting sugar with a view to earning
foreign exchange in the public interest." Section 5
requires the Central Government to apportion the
quantity fixed under s. 4 among the owners of factories
producing sugar by the vacuum pan process in proportion to the quantity produced or likely to be
produced by them respectively, during the season. The
quantity so apportioned to each factory is called its
export quot:t. Section 6 provides that every owner of
a factory shall, on demand by the export agency
deliver to it sugar upto its export quota and on delivery
" the owner shall retain no rights in respect of such
sugar except his right to receive payment therefor
under section 9." Section 7 makes provision for an
additional excise duty being levied in certain circumstances on the quantity of sugar by which the sugar
delivered by the owner of a factory falls short of its
export quota. Section 8 states that the export agency
shall export the sugar delivered to it, provided that in
certain circumstances specified, the export agency may
sell that sugar in India and may if it thinks fit pur- ·
chase other sugar for export and for this purpose permit
the owner to sell the whole or part of its export .quota
at a price approved, on condition t.hat the sale proceeds
are paid to it. The provisions of s. 9 are important
and will be set out later. It is not necessary to refer
to the other provisions of the Act.
Soon after the Ordinance had been promulgated the
Government started taking action under it. By a
notification dated June 27, 1958, 50,000 tons of sugar
r959
The Lord Kdsh"a
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65
1 959
was fixed under s. 4 as the total quantity for export
for the period ending
October 31, 1958. Export quotas The Lord /{rish11a
~
were duly fixed for all factories including those of the suxar Mills Ltd.,
petitioners. The petitioners were thereafter asked by and Another
the export agency to sell the sugar and pay the salev.
proceeds to it.. This they failed to do. It is said by Thr Uuion °! India
the respondents that the petitioners were also asked to and~tlier
deliver the sugar and this also they failed to do. The
Sarkar].
petitioners spt, up various reasons justifying their failure
to sell or deliver the requisite quantities of sugar. rt
is unnecessary to refer to theRe reasons for if thn Act
is invalid, as 'the petitioners contend the orders could
not be made and no question would arise as to whether
the petitioners had valid reasons for not carrying them
out. It appears that t.l1e export agency felt that the
petitioners were neither going to sell the sugar and pay
the sale proceeds nor to deliver the sugar and it thereupon pointed out to the petitioners that they were hy
their conduct exposing themRelves to the risk of
having to pay the additional excise duty under s. 7. It
was then that the present applicationR for appropriate
writs restraining the respondents from taking steps
under the Act were launched by the petitioners on the
ground inter alia that the Act was invalid as it
unreaRonably restricted the petitionerR' right to carry
on their trade. I now proceed to examine the ,-alidity
of this contention.
From the provisions of the Act earlier set out, it is
quite clear that it requires the owner of .a sugar factory
to part with a portion of the produce of his factory in
exchange for an amount to he fixed under the provisions of s. 9. The Act therefore restricts his freedom
of trade; it takes away his right to trade with the
whole of his merchandise in any manner he likes. The
question is, is such restriction reasonable ? .
It is necessary now to set out the terms of s. 9 of
the Act which fixes the amount which a manufacturer
of sugar in entitled to receive in respect of the sugar
delivered by him. Only sub-ss. (1) and (2) of this section need' be set out and they are as follows :
Section 9.-(l) The export agency shall, at such
time as it thinks fit, make to the owners who have
9
66
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1))
delivered sugar to it under this Act, payments determined in accordance with the provisions hereinafter in
th'
.
. d
IS sect10n contame .
and Anothtr
(2) From the total sale-proceeds in respect of the
. v.
. quantity fixed for export under section 4 for any year,
Th•a~'';n1,~;ut,. there shall be deducte~ the total expenditure incurred
by the export agency m respect of the sugar, whether
Sarkar J.
by way of administrative expenses or otherwise, and
the balance shall be appportioned among the owners
in proportion to the quantity of sugar delivered by
then respectively during that year.
The substance of the matter then is that an owner
of a sugar factory gets in exchange for the sugar delivered by him under the Act, a proportionate share of
the sale-proceeds less the Pxpenses. He has no hand
in deciding at what price the goods would he sold by
the export agency. If they are sold for a very low
p;ice, he has no right to complain. Neither has he any
power to control the expenses. The exchange value
that a sugar manufacturer is entitled to get under the
Act for sugar delivered by him, therefore, depends
entirely on the export agency. Again, under subsec. (1) of s. 9, the export agency need pay the manufacturer only at such times as it thinks fit. It may he
difficult to say that all these terms are reasonable.
However that may be, there is another aspect of the
question which in my view decides it. It is quite plain
that as things are, sugar can be sold abroad only at a
loss. That clearly appears from the materials on the
record and is not indeed disputed. I think it enough to
refer to the Objocts and Reasons of the Act and to a
statement in the affidavit of Shri K. P. Jain, Chief
Director, Directorate of Sugar, affirmed on February 13,
1959 and filed on behalf of the Government, to show
that the Act contemplated that the export of sugar
made under it would result in a loss. In the Objects
& Reasons of the Act it is stated,
"With a view to earning foreign exchange it is
necessary to promote export of sugar. The export of
sugar, however, involves a loss, even if excise duty
and cane cess are remitted."
'959
'· L dK. h
T ,~
or
ris Ha
Sugar Mills Ltd.,
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
67
In paragraph 22 of Shri Jain's said affidavit it is
z959
stated,
T'
.
"Ifurth er Ray t h at... the ent'ire sch eme envisage
.
d sugar
iieLordKf<shM
Mills Ltd.
in the Act depends on the pooling of the losses on and Another '
export by all sugar factories in India, in proportion to
v.
their export quota.''
The Union of India
We then get to this that on the respondents' own and Another
case the exports under the Act can he made only at a· Sakrar J.
loss. The result therefore is that the Act compels the
p()titioners to part with a portion of their merchandise
at' a loss. Can the restrictions so put on the petitioners'
trade by the Act then be said to be reasonable ? I
conceive it is impossible to do so. It is said that the
Act was passed with a view to earn foreign exchange
by export of sugar. Indeed so it appears from the
Objects & Reasons of the Act earlier set out and the
provisions of s. 4 earlier quoted. I will agree that
earning of foreign exchange is essential for the country.
But I do not see that that justifies the enactment of a
legislation which imposes a loss on a sugar manufacturer. It is not as if foreign exchange could not be
earned without inflicting loss on the manufacturers of
sugar. That indeed is not the respondents' case. The
loss might have been avoided if for example, the
exports were made by the grant of a subsidy, a course
in fact adopted by the Government in the year 1951-52.
It.has not been said that there was any diffieulty in
granting the subsidy for the exports under the Act. A
reasonable restriction on a citizen's right to carry on
his trade which alone is permitted by Art. 19(6) of the
Constitution, must be, as Mahajan, J., said in Chintaman
Rao v. The State of Jl;Jadhya Pradesh( 1), a restriction
"which reason dictates", which "unlei;s it strikes a
proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in
article 19(1) (g) and the social control permitted by
clause (6) of article 19, must be held to be wanting in
that quality." Here I do not find the balance struck
nor the infliction of the loss a course which reason
dictates. The loss which the restrictions imposed by
the Act on the petitioners' trade caused to them, was
by no means such as could only have been avoided by
incurring a greater loss.
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 759, 763.
68
SUPREME COURT REPOH.TS
[1960(1))
I also think it clear that an object however laudable,
cannot
by itself and without more, make a restriction
The Lord Krishna
S«gar Mills Ltd .. put on a citizen's right to carry on a trade for attainand Another
ing that.object, reasonable. A restriction on a perv.
son's right to carry on his trade does not become
The Unio11 of Indio reasonable, simply because it had been imposed on
and Another
him to achieve an object of great necessity and un.
doubted merit. The reasonablent>SS has to be judged
Sarkar].
in ;111 the circumstances of the case and the object to
be attained is only one of such circumstances. This,
in my view, is too clear to require elaboration.
It is not neeessary for me to pursue the matter
further for it is not the respondents' contention that
the 1·estrictio11s are reasonable notwithstanding that
they <'anse loss. On the other hand, the contention of
the respondents is for reasons to be presently stated that
the Act really caused no loss and that being so the
restrictions imposed by it cannot he said to be unrea.sonable. I proceed now to consider t.he respondents'
rea.son for saying that the Act imposes 110 loss on the
sugar manufacturers including the petitioners.
It is fi1·st s;1id that though the exports result in n
loss now, it may in future bring in profits. That hope
is dearly only a pious hope. Aud whaf" is more, it is
not a hope which has even been expressed in the
nffidavits filed. on behalf of the respondents. On the
contrary, these affidavits make it perfectly plain that
in the foreseeable future there is no hope of export of
sugar being made at a profit. Indeed, it is said in
these affidavits that the scheme of the Act is bnsed on
the pooling of the losses caused by the exports made
under it. It is hardly neeessary to point out that if
the exports con kl be expected t.o prnduce a profit in
in the near future, the nocrcivc machinery of the Act
for making the exports would he unnecessary. There
is no bn,is whntcver for snying that in some years the
export may result in a profit. Indeed on the respondents' own affidavits it is not open to them to say
that they hope that it may be possible in future to
make a profit oil export of sugar.
Then it is said that the export quota. fixed for
1957-58 is only 2! per cent. of the production of each
'959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
factory. The point sought to be made is that, thereI9.S9
fore, the amount of the loss would be very small. Now The Lord Krishna
2l per cent. of the produrtion of the factory of the Sugar Mills Ltd.,
petitioners in Writ Petiti 1n No. 9 of 1959 is 12,533 and Another
maunds. It is stated by t.he respondents in the supv.
plementary affidavit of Shri Jain affirmed on March 11, The Union of India
1959, that on the export the loss will be in the region and Another
of Rs. 10 per maund. On this basis the loss to the
Sarkar J.
petitioners in that petition would be Rs. 1,25,530.
The loss to the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 14 of
1959 would be slightlY. less. I for myself would hesitate
to say that losses in such amounts are negligible. The
export quota for 1958-59 has been fixed at 5 }Jer cent.
of the production. Naturally, the loss would be much
larger. The Government have the right under the
Act to increase the quota upto 20 per cent. The loss
if the quota i;:; increased to the utmost would be formidable. In the cases of factories with larger production the losses would be much larger than the petitioners losses. And of course the reasonableness of
the restrictions imposed by the Act has to be tested
generally and without reference to any particular sugar
mannfacturer. I am also unable to agree to the
proposition that the reasonableness of a restriction
depends on the quantum of the loss it produces. Even
a small loss may conceivably make a restriction causing it, unreasonable. The quantum of the loss cannot
by itself decide the reasonableness of the restriction.
Does reason dictate that a small loss shall be inflicted?
Nothing that has been said in this case leads me to
hold that.
It is then said that the loss caused by the Act was
recouped by an order made by the Government increasing the home price of the sugar and therefore in
fact the manufacturers suffered no loss. The process
of recoupment was thus stated in paragraph 14 of the
said main affidavit of Shri Jain:
" The incidence of loss on the first quota of 50,000
tons fixed by the Government was assessed and when
the Central Government fixed the price of sugar for
internal consumption under the provisions of the
Essential Commodities Act and the Sugar (Control)
0
70
f;UPREME <'OORT HEPOHTS
[i!l60(1)]
Order, 1955, they gave adjustment in price by adding
50
nP. per nrnuud in the ex-factory prices of sugar for
The Lord Krishna
internal
s:iles."
Sugar J.1.,Jills Ltd.,
and Anoth"
It is said that the increase so made in the home price
v.
of sugar would completely wipe out the loss incurred
The Union vf In.i;a on the export under the Act of 2~ per cent.. of thl'
and Anothu
produce of a factory. I will accept this as a correct
estimate.
I will also ignore the petitioners' contention
S1irkar J.
that they had not been able to Hell the sugar in the
home m,trket at t,hc incre•tsed price.
·
The argument then is that though the impugned
Act produces a loss, that loss can he ignored because
the Government has taken steps under another Aut to
recoup the loss so occasioned. It is s1tid that in the
circumstances that prevail, namely, the increase in the
homo price, the restrictions imposed by the impugned
.\ct cannot he said to be unreasonable, for on the whole
they occasion no loss. This is indeed the principal
contention of the respondents to establi"h tfoit t.lie
restrictions are not unreasonable.
Now a reference to the Essential Commodities Act
under which t,he home price was increased ha" to be
made, Jt. wa" passed in Hie year 1955. It was not
intended to ont·n foreign exchange; indeed it had
nothing to do with foreign exchange or with helping
the sugar industry. Section 3 of this Act provides:
"Section 3. (l) If the Central Government is uf
opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for
maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential
commodity or for securing their equitable distribution
and availability at fair prices, it may, by order, provide
for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply
and distribution thereof and trade ,i,nd commerce
therein.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the
powers conferred by sub-section (l), an order made
thereunder may provide
I959
(c) for controlling the price at which any essential
commodity may be bought or sold."
Sugar is an essential commodity within the meaning
of that term in the Act. Under the powers conferred
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
71
by the section quoted above, on August 27, 1955,. the
z959
Government passed an ordf;lr called the Sugar (Control) The Lord Krishna
Order, 1955. Clause 5 of that order provides that,
Sugar Mills Ltd.,
"(1) The Central Government may from time to and Another
time, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix the
.v.
.
price or the maximum price at which
any
sugar
may
The UdniAon °1hlndsa
. .
,.
annner
1
uc price or maximum price
be so Id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sh
shall be fixe<l with due regard to the price or minimum
Sarkar J.
price fixed for sugar cane, manufacturing cost, taxes,
reasonable margin of profit for producer and/or trade,
and any incidental charges.
(2} Where the price or the maximum price has
been so fixed no person shall sell or purchase ........... .
any sugar at a price in excess of that fixed under subclause (l)."
It was under this Order that the Government issued a
Notification on July 30, 1958, enhancing the home
price of sugar by 50 nP. per maund which it is said
wipes out the loss caused by the impugned Act.
I will assume that the Notification increasing the
price was issued with the object of recouping the loss
caused by the impugned Act as stated in the affidavit
of Shri ,Jain, though the Notification itself does not
say so. The question then is, is the increase in the
home price of sugar made by the Government by a
Notification issued under the powers given to it by
another Act which has the effect of wiping out the loss
inflicted by the impugned Act, a circumstance which
makes the restrictions imposed by the latter Act
reasonable?
It is said that this is so ; that in judging the reasonableness of the restriction imposed by one Act, it is
permissible to consider an order made by the executive
Government under another Act. We were referred to
the observations of Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in State of
Madras v. V. G. Rao (1). The learned Chief Justice
there stated at p. 607:
"The nature of the right alleged to have been
infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions
imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought
to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the
(1) (1952) S.C.R. 597·
72
'9 59
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should
TlieLm·d lfri.<lmn all enter into the judicial verdict."
SuKar Mill.< Ud.,
I respectfully agree with all that the learned Chief
and A.wt'"'
Justice sairl, but 1 am unable to see that this advances
. the present contPution of the respondents.
W'hat is
. v.
Tl1e U 11u111 o 111u11a
II
.
.
.
.
and Auniher
rea Y re 1w1l upon 18 that port10n of the learned Cluef
Justice's obs<'rvation where he snid tha.t the pre\•ailing
Sarlw J.
conditions nt the time should be taken in into account.
Ruppnrt. is sought a.lso from a.noth0r observation of
the learnPd Chi<'f .Tnstice at t.\w snme pagP which 1
lrn ve not quotPd, to the effect t !mt. reasonableness has
to be decided in all the circumstances of a givPn case.
It is said that the prm·ailing conditions anrl the circumstances of the case would inclrnfo 1-hc orrler increasing the home price of sugar made under the Essential
Commorlit.ies Act. 1 am entirely unable to 11grec that
suuh n thing was in the contemplation of the learned
Chief ,Jnsticn. The case before him was uomplctely
different. He <.'as not co!lsidning the reasomtbleness
of one Ad. bv refrrPnce to an order made hr the
Govcl'nment u;1der another. The learned Chief lustiee
was considering whether a certain Act had placed unreasonable restrictious on the firnrlamental right to
form associations. The Act had given t.hc C:.overnment
the right to dechirl' an association an unlawful association on cprt>tin specified grounds. In holdi11g the
restrictimrn imposed by the Act nmmsona.hle, the
learned Chief .J m<tice observed 11t p. 608, "The formula
of snbjPC'tive ~>ttisfad.ion of the Covernnwnt or of its
officers, with an Ad \'isory Board thro\Yll in to review
the materials on which the Government sePks to override a bnsic freedom !!Uaranteed to the citizen, may he
viewt'd as reasonable only in very exceptional circumstances and within the narrowest limits and cannot
receive judicial approval as a general pattern of
reasonable restrictions on fundamental rights." I do not
at all set' that the respondents can derive any support
for their present contention from anything that
Patanjali Sastri, C.J., said.
I entirely agree that in deciding the reasonableness
of the restrictions imposed by a statute, all the prevailing conditions and all the circumstances of the case
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
73
have to be considered. But I am wholly unable to see
r959
that the conditions or circumstances, which seem to
-K. h
ris na
.
. lu.d e t h at wh"ICh TheLord
me to mean the same t h m_g,
can .me
Sugar Mills Ltd.
depends solely on the arbitrary discretion or generos- and Another
ity or the sense of fair play of another. That, in my
v.
view, is not permissible. That is not a reasonable The Union of India
test. It is not reasonable to say that the validity of a and Another
statute would depend on something which the executSarkar].
ive Government may do or undo at any time. The
statute imposing the restrictions does not give any
right that the Government would do something to
make the restrictions reasonable. How can such a restriction be reasonable? How can an Act which is
prima facie unreasonable-and it is on that basis that
the present argument arises-be held to be reasonable
because of something to which it gives no right and
the existence of which depends entirely on the choice
of the executive Government ? Is it to be said that the
restrictions imposed by a statute are reasonable
because the Government has, when the question cropped up, done something which makes the restrictions
reasonable though it was not bound to do that and
though it is free to undo that which it has done ? To
say that would be to say that the Act is valid because
the Government has for the time being chosen to
make it so. This seems to me to be against all known
principles of law.
Furthermore, if the respondents' contention was
right a statute would then be legal when the Government chooses to do a thing and illegal when it undoes
it and so on from time to time at the choice of the
Government. That would be intolerable in any legal
system. It was said that this is unavoidable and may
happen in many cases. The following illustration was
given. Suppose in famine conditions a statute was
passed controlling free sale of foodstuff. Assume that
the prevailing conditions made the restrictions put on
free sale reasonable. Later. normal conditions returned
which made the control of sales of foodstuff unnecessary and therefore unreasonable. The Act would
thereupon become invalid. But further suppose that
after sometime the famine conditions returned. The
IO
74
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1))
'959
validity of the Act would then be restored. Hence, it
is
said that there would be nothing unusual in the Act
T '"Lord Krishna b .
rd an d mva.
.
]"d
Sugar Mills Ltd., emg va 1
1 . f rom t"1me t o t"1me. B u t. l•t
and Another
seems to me that thIS IS no analogy. The famme
v.
conditions imagined do not depend on the choice of
The Union of India the Government. So, assuming that the appearance
and Another
and disappearance of famine conditions from time to
time made the Act o~ce valid and again invalid-as to
Sarkar].
which I do not feel c lled upon to say anything nowthat does not justify' the adoption of a rule which
would make the validity of an Act depend on the
choice of the Government. If fluctuating validity is
the result in one case, it does not follow that the same
consequence would occur in another and a totally
different case.
Again the validity of the Notification enhancing the
home price seems to me to admit of grave doubt. I
find nothing in the Essential Commodities Act nor
naturally in the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955, which
would authorise the Government to increase the
price simply for the sake of recouping to the manufacturers the loss caused to them by the impugned
Act. I have earlier set out the relevant provisions of
the Essential Commodities Act. The power to fix
the prir ~ of sugar given thereby can be exercised " for
maintaining or increasing the supplies of any essential
commodity or for securing their equitable distribution
and availability at fair prices". That power cannot
therefore be exercised for recouping loss caused to a
manufacturer by another Act, the object of which is to
earn foreign exchange. If it is said that the Notification was issued for the purposes mentioned in the
Essential Commodities Act, it becomes at once apparent,
that the price fixed under it has no relation to the
impugned Act and may have to be altered irrespective
of the latter Act. I find it impossible to say that a
Notification fixing the price of sugar on different conditions can be taken into account in deciding the
reasonableness of the impugned Act which is entirely
unconnected with these considerations.
For all these reasons I am unable to agree that the
Notification increasing the home price can be taken
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
75
into consideration in deciding the reasonableness of the
z959 ..
restrictions imposed by the impugned Act. It follows The Lord Kmr.na
. .
d o cause loss t o tllC sugar St<gar
Mills Ltd.,
th a t these rest notions
and Anothtr
manufacturers and there is nothing to show that the
v.
restrictions are even so reasonable.
The Union of India
Then it is said that the Indian ~ugar Mills Associa- and •1 " 01ner
tion of which the petitioners <1l'e Raid to be members,
Sarkar J.
wanted that arrangements for export. of sugar abroad
be made and it was for that reason that the impugned
Act was passed. It was suggested that the Association
agreed to the Act being passed. It is therefore contended that the restrictions imposed by the Act must be
presumed to be reasonable and the petitioners cannot
be heard to say that they are not. Now the request
by or the agreement of the Association is of course
not the request by or the agreement ofthe petitioners.
The Association has no authority to bind the petitioners by any request or agreement. The fact that
the petitioners were members of the Association if
that were so, does not give the Association the
authority. There is no evidence that the petitioners
had assented to the Association making the request or
the agreement. l!'or all that is known the petitioners
may have been agaim;t the As::;ociation making any
request to the Government to take steps for export or
agreeing to the passing of the Act. Therefore, it
seems to me that the petitioners' rights are not affected
by anything which the Associctt.ion might have done.
I think it/right also to say that there
no material
on the record whatever to lmtd to the conclusion that
the Association had agreed to the Act being passed in
the form in which it stands. And of course it is only the
Act with which we arc concerned. It is true that the
Association had suggested that the Government should
take steps for export of sugar. That would a.ppra.r
from the minutes of various meetings annexed to thl'
affidavits used on behalf of the Government. But there
is nothing in these minutes nor anywhere else in the
records which would indicate tlrnt the Association
wanted that sugar should be exported though that
might put the manufacturers to a loss. The position
appears to have been this. In the yaar 1951-52 the
is
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
sugar manufacturers were placed in a difficult position
The Lo"l Krishna because of competition from khandsari and gur
sugar Mills Lid.. manufacturers, who could buy sugar cane for their
and Another
manufactures at a low price in the open market, while
v.
the sugar manufacturers were compelled to buy cane at
The Union °! India prices fixed by the Government which were high. So
and Another
some of them, as appears from Annexure "A" to
Sarkar J.
Shri Jain's said affidavit, made the following suggestions to the Government in March 1952 to give them
relief:
" (a) The price of cane be reduced to Re. 1 per
maund.
(b) The sugar manufactured from the lower priced
cane be 'frozen' and kept as a national Reserve for
Export or for such other purposes as the Government
may consider desirable.
(c) To reduce the accumulation of stocks in the
factories and to make room for further storage, and to
liquidate the stocks into cash, serious efforts be made
either from Government to Government or through
trade channels to export out at least 2 lakh tons: Alternatively, the State Governments be asked to take
delivery of the quantities from the factories and store
them in their own godowns.
(d) If there is any 'profit' in the export of such
quantities the same may be utilised either for giving a.
'bonus' to the cane growers or in lowering the price of
sugar for home consumption."
It is clear from the suggestions thus made by the
manufacturers that they wanted the burden on them
to be relieved and export at Government's cost. In
that year the Government in fact permitted an export
of 10,000 tons and gave a subsidy of Rs. 2 per maund
to cover the loss on the export. Later in the same
year tho Government reduced the price at which the
sugar manufacturers could purchase the cane.
In the years 1952-53 to 1955-56 India imported large
quantities of sugar and did not export sugar at all.
It also appears that during these years the consumpt.ion
of sugar in India was much more than the production.
Hence, obviously the need for the import. So clearly
in these years the sugar manufacturers did not need to
'959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77
export their sugar. The respondents do not say that
x959
during these years the sugar m~nufacturers had asked Tlie Lord Krishna
for arrangements for export bemg made. 1956-57 was S1t•ar Mills Ltd.,
the year of the Suez crisis. In this year a substantial :nd Another
quantity was exported and large profits could be made
. v.
.
because price of sugar in some of the markets abroad Tho Umon °1 India
. . caused by the •:iuez
~
h a d gone up d ue to th e crisis
s1•t ua- 1md_Another
tion. The proposition then is that between 1952-53
Sarkar J.
and 1956-57 the industry was doing very well and had
no need to ask for Government's intercession to enable
it to export.
There is no evidence that in 1957 -58 there was. any
over-production. The figures for this year in tons are
production-19,75,000, consumption-20,14,000 and
export-50,000, the figure for export being that fixed
under the Act. It appears however that various
representatives of the Government and the sugar
manufacturers met and decided upon the idea of exporting sugar for earning foreign exchange in Government's
inkrest and getting a foothold in the world market in
the int~rests of the manufacfurers. It was realised
that the export would result in a loss but the manufacturers agreed to export provided they were allowed
to make up the loss from the internal market. For
this purpose the imggestion made as appears from
annexute "D" to the affidavit of Shri Jain, was as
follows:
"The internal market will be Jen free as at present.
However to provide an element of stability to the
market releases for internal sale shall be regulated by
Government of India in active consultation with the
industry."
So what the trade had agreed to was that they
would be prepared to export sugar provided they were
left free to recoup from the internal sales the loss
caused by the export. This is very different from
agreeing to the Act which made no provision for
recouping the loss from the internal sales. The sugar
manufacturers did not approve of the Act, being content to depend on the Government's sense of fair play
to relieve the hardship caused by it.
78
SUPltEME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
'959
There remains one other contention to deal with.
Th< Lord
Krishna
It 1s
· sa1'd th
· t'1011s are reason a ble smce
'
.
Lid
· a t· th e restrw
t h ey
M
5
11
"!:i A:o;h., · result in stabilising the sugar industry. Apart from
v.
saying that the Act would stabilise the sugar industry,
The Union of India the affidavits used on behalf of the respondents do not
and .1no1hu
show how that would be done or that there was any
Sarkar].
need for it. From what I have earlier stated it does
not appear to me that the industry needed any stabilisation. The figures given earlier show that production has always been less than internal eonsumption,
excepting for the year 1951-52. But it appears from
one of the annexurcs to the affidavit of Shri Jain that
even 'then the difficulty was only temporary. It is
there stated :
"Again in 1952-53 it was decided to export upto
2 lakh tons. But only about 10,000 tons could be
exported as in the meantime there was an appreciable
rise in the sugar prices and the surplus stock was
consumed in the home m>trket."
The estimated figures for th11 Y'"" 19:38-59 in tons
appear to be as follows: production-· 19,00,000 consumption-21,00,000, export-1,00,000. It would thus
appear that the sugar industry in India has always
been stable and did not require any export to make it
stable.
What I think however puts the matter beyond
tlou bt is s. 4 of the Act. Under that section, in fixing
the total quantity of wgar to be exported in any
season regard is to be had only to the quantity available in India, the quantity required for consumption
in India and the necessity of earning foreign exchange.
l:;o in deciding the quantity to be exported no question
of stabilising the industry or prices arises. Again, it
is not out of the excess of the production over the
internal consumption alone that the exports are to be
made. In fact there has never really been any excess
of production over consumption requirements. Indeed
it is plain that if sufficient sugar were left to meet the
home consumption, then the. increased price would not
help the industry to recoup the loss. If supplies were
adequate to meet the demand the price cannot be
forced up.
'
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
79
959
I therefore come to the conclusion that the Act
I
which makes the petitioners suffer a loss on the sale The Lord Krishna
of a part of their produce imposes a restriction on Sugar Mills Ltd.,
their right to carry on their business which cannot in and Another
the circumstances of this case he said to be reasonable
v.
-~·
'
th
"
'
l'd
The Union o1 lnuia
d
an IS · ereiore inva 1 •
and Another
I may also mention that the learned counsel for
the petitioners had taken certain other objections to
thP validity of the Act but in the view that I have
earlier indicated I do not. consider it necessary to
discuss the other objections.
I would allow the petitions with costs.
SuBBA RAO J.-J have had the advantage of
perusing the judgment prepared by my learned
brother, Hidayatullah, J. I agree with his conclusion
but would prefer to give my own reasons. The only
justification for me to write a separate judgment is my
inability to persuade myself to agree with one of the
reasons given by Hiday~tullah, J., for his conclusion.
That reason involves a principle of far-reaching
importance, namely, whether, in ascertaining the
reasonableness of restrictions imposed by a statute on
a fundamental right, it is permissible to rely upon a
notification issued by Government in exercise of power
conferred on it by another Act unconnected with the
impugned one. ·
Before I embark upon the merits of the case it would
be convenient at the outset to clear the ground by
expressing my view on the said question. The facts
of the case have been fully stated by my learned
brother in his judgment, and I need not restate them
except to notice a few relevant and material facts. The
Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955), was
enacted for the purpose mentioned in the preamble to
that Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 3
of the said Act, the Central Government issued an
order dated August 27, 1955, called the Sugar(Control)
Order, 1955. Under r. 5 of the said order, the Central
Government is empowered, inter alia, to fix the price
or the maximum price at which any sugar may be sold
or delivered, having regard to the price or minimum
SubbaRaof.
80
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
' 959
price fixed for sugar.cane, manufacturing cost, taxes,
The Lord Kri>hna reasonable margin of profit for producer and/or trade,
Sugar Mills Ltd., and any incidental charges. In exercise of powers conand Anothn
ferred on the Central Government under s. 3 of the
he
. v.
Ind. said Act and cl. 5 of the said order, the Central
T a~;·~;:,~'"' '"Government issued a notification dated July 30, 1958,
fixing the ex-factory price for Indian sugar Standard
subba Rao J.
(ISS) D-29 grade. A few days before the said order
was issued i.e., on .June 27, 1958, the Central Government promulgated an Ordinance called the Sugar
Export Promotion Ordinance, and it was subsequently
converted into an Act (30 of 1958), which received the
assent of the President on September 16, 1958. It is
said that the Central Government in fixing the price
for sugar produced during the season 1957-58, in
vacuum pan sugar factories situate in the areas specified in the order had taken into account the possible
loss the exporters might incur by reason of the application of the provisions of the impugned Act. Shri
K. P. Jain, Chief Director in the Directorate of Sugar&
Vanaspati, Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Department of Food), in his affidavit says that the ex-factory
price of sugar per maund fixed by the said order was
made up of the following items:
Average cost of production
Rs. 22·91
including margin of profit.
Rs. 10·70
Excise duty.
Rs. 1·89
Cane cess.
Rs. 0·50
Loss on exports.
Total
Rs. 36·00
It is explained therein that the factories are expected
to realise actually on their internal sales Rs. 22·91 as
their cost of production including margin of profit and
Rs. 0·50 to cover losses of export which work out to
approximately Rs. 10, per maund of sugar exported.
For every one maund of sugar exported, the factories
have for sale in the internal market 20 maunds of
sugar, and on this, on account of the price fixed, they
would realise 0·50 nP. per maund i.e., on 20 maunds
Rs. 10, which covers the export loss. The effect of the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
81
said order is that the possible loss to the sugar exportz959
ers is off-set by the fact that they can recoup their
· t h eir
· mterna
·
1 t ra de.
The Lord Krishna
l oss m
i s Ltd.,
5 ugar M'll
The learned Attorney-General sought to justify the and Another
restrictions imposed by the impugned Act ,on the
v.
ground, among others, that the Court should rely upon The ,union °! India
the said order in determining whether the restrictions and Another
imposed by the impugned Act are reasonable within Subba Rao 1.
the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution. In support
of this contention, he relied upon the decision of this
Qourt in State of Madras v. V. G. Row (1 ). That decision
was concerned with the question whether s. 15(2)(b) of
the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (14 of
1908), as amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, was unconstitutional and
void. It was contended in that case that the said
provision fell within the limits of constitutionally
permissible legislative abridgement of the fundamental
right conferred on the citizens under Art. 19(l)(c) of
the Constitution. The said limits are defined in cl. 4
of the said article whereunder:
"Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall
affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the States from making any law
imposing, in the interests of public order or morality,
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub-clause."
In discussing the said question, Patanjali Sastri, C.J.,
observed at p. 607 :
" It is important in this context to bear in mind that
the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should
be applied to each individual statute impugned, and
no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonl:!obleness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The
nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the
underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the
extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied
thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the
judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors
(I) {1952]S.C.R. 597,
II
82
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1))
and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in n,ll the circunrntn,nces of n, given case, it is
The Lo•d J{,;sr.na .
. lI
h
1
. I I "l
1
d I
I f
Sug"' Mills Lid., 111ev1ta ' e t '1t ~ ie socm )J u osop iy. an . t 1e sea. e. o
and Anvlher
values Of the ]Udges partw1p1ttillg Ill tne deern1011
v.
should play an important part, mid the limit to their
The Unfon of India interference with legislative judgment in such cases
and Another
can only be dictat.ed by their sense of responsibility
and self-restraint 1tnd the sobering reflection that the
Sublia Rao j.
Constitution is meant not only for p<>ople of their way
of thinking but for all, and that the mnjority of the
elected representatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them
to be reasonable."
If I may say so with respect, this passage summarizes
the law on the subject folly and precisely. "Vhat is
reasonable in a pnrticular set-up may be unreasonable
in a society with a different background. The learned
Counsel relying upon the words "prevailing conditions"
and the subsequent words "in all the circumstances of
a given case" contai1rnd in the above observation of
Patanjali Sastri, C. J., contended that the said words
were comprehensive enough to take in notifications
issued by the Government., and, therefore, the said
order of the Central Government fixing the rate would
be one of the elements to be taken into consideration
in testing the reasmmbleness of the impugnl'd Act. I
find it difficult to accept this <ugmnent. The learned
Attorney-General has not been itble to place before us
any decision which "·ent to the length of holding that
such notifications could enter the judicial verdict. It
is truii that the prevailing conditions at the time the
Act was nmde should be taken into considt,ration, for
the effectiveness of <1 restriction imposed for a particuhu purpose depends upon the said conditions. In a
society addicted to opium, the legislature has to make
a law imposing severe restrictions on the right to
conwme the same. In a society where a particular
vice i8 rampant, any restriction imposed to eradicate
that Yi<>e has to be moulded in accordance with the
needs of the time. During times of stress and strain,
such as war or pestilence, greater restrictions may be
imposed on a fundamental right to do business in
'959
-
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
83
public interest. But the same restriction may be
I959
unreasonable in norm&l times. Even in normal times, The T.ord !( ri.>/ma
the urgency of a social or economic reform, having sugar .lli!ls Ltd••
regard to the sub-normal stancfards of human existence, and Another
may demand more stringent restrictions on fundav.
mental rights than during times of prosperity. The The U i 1 India
· f J ustice,
· t }iere f"ore, m
· l11s
• grap Juc
· •t lescrip·
a ud ·~ not/1•r
·
learnc d Clue
tion of the test of reasonablenefi!s, in my view, was suhl>a Rao 1 .
not stating any thing more than the obvious, for the
standard of reasonableness is inextricably conditioned
by the state of society and the urgency for eradicating
the evil sought. to be remedied. But I am clear in my
mind that·the validity of an Act shall not be made to
depend upon another Act unconnected with the
impugned Act or power conferred thereunder, which
.might, if properly exercised, off.set the evil tendency
or the vice of the impugned Act. If the validity of
an Act is made to depend upon such a foundation, a
super-structure will have been built on shifting sands.
To do that is to destroy the stability of legislation and
to introduce an uncertain element therein. If two or
more Acts were parts of the same scheme or plan, to
implement the same or common objective, or if the
impugned Act, though it was not originally conceived
at the time when the earlier Act was passed, was only
an extension or a further step by legislature for
implementing the object of the earlier Act or if the
legislature by express reference incorporated in the
impugned Act the provisions of the earlier Act, it
would be permissible to rely upon the said provisions
of the earlier Act, not because they formed part of the
prevailing ·conditions but because either the earlier
Act formed part of the impugned Act by reference or
both of them formed part of the same legislative plan.
The illustrations are not exhaustive, but they all fall
under one or other of the following two categories :
(i) an earlier Act is made part of a new Act; and (ii) both
Acts are parts of a legislative scheme or plan where
both of them were conceived at the inception but
passed in stages, or conceived at different times on the
basis of experience gained but passed in furtherance
of the same scheme. In such cases, the test of
11 011
0
84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
reasonableness in regard to one Act may be made to
depend upon the impact of the other on it. But to go
0
~~;;, ~,~;~:;.~ beyond_ this is to destroy t~e stability of legislation
and Another
and to mtroduce an uncertam element. To go further
v.
and to depend upon a notification of a transitory
The Union of India nature issued under an unconnected Act is to place
and Another
the statute in a fluid state. In such a situation its
validity would depend . upon a statutory order of
1
Subba Rao ·
temporary duration; 4t would change colour with the
changing attitudes of an authority empowered to issue
the order. It would also mean that a Court will have
to embark upon a roving search of all Acts and
notifications which may, by design or accident,
alleviate or mollify the evil consequences of an
impugned Act. Such a result cannot be contemplated.
The learned Attorney-General has not placed before us
any decision in support of his broad propositian; but
I find in the judgment of my learned brother,
Hidayatullah, J., a few decisions which, it is said, go to
the full length of supporting the argument of the
learned Attorney-General. I have carefully perused
the said decisions and I do not find anything said gr
implied therein to support the said contention. The
decision in Attorney-General for Alberta v. AttorneyGeneral for Ca:nada (1) was concerned with a conflict
between the jurisdictions of the Dominion and Provincial Legislatures under ss. 91 and 92 of the British
North America Act, 1867, The Legislative Assembly
of the Province of Alberta passed an Act respecting
the taxation of banks' and imposed thereunder on
every corporation or joint stock company other than
the Bank of Canada, incorporated for the purpose of
doing banking or savings bank business in the
Province, an annual tax, in addition to any tax
payable under any other Act. Defaulters of payment
of tax were to be visited with penalties, and the
payment of either tax or penalty could be enforced
by distress and sale of goods and chattels, or by
action for civil debt. It was contended before
the Privy Council that the proposed taxation was
not in its true sense taxation in order to the raising
'959
(I) (1939) A.C. II7.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
85
of a revenue for Provincial purposes so as to be within
r959
the exclusive legislative competence of the Provipcial
Legislature, but was merely part of a legislative plan The Lord Krishna
Sugar Mills Ltd.,
to prevent the operation within the Province of those and Another
banking institutions which had been called into existv.
ence and given the necessary powers there to conduct The Union of India
their business by the only proper authority, the and Another
Parliament of the Dominion, under s. 91 of the British Subba Rao].
North America Act, and the Bill was therefore ultra
vires the Provincial Legislature. The Privy Council
accepted the contention. :For the purpose of ascertaining the true plan underlying the bill, the Judicial
Committee compared the relative legislative lists, took
judicial notice of other Acts and the object and purpose
of the Act in question. Having regard to the said
consideration, it came to the conclusion that it was
a colourable legislation aimed at to prevent the
operation within the province of the aforesaid banking
institutions. When a statute is attacked on the ground
that it is a colourable legislation, i.e., it assumed a
form apparently faliing within the legislative competence of the legislature but in effect and substance
intended to reach institutions beyond its legislative
competence, it is obvious that all the surrounding
circumstances, including other acts operating in the
Province, have to be scrutinized to unravel the fraud
on power. This decision, in my view, cannot be
invoked to serve the present purpose. Nor does the
decision of the Judicial Committee in Lad,ore v.
Bennett (1) carry the matter further. The question
in that case was whether the Provincial legislation in
question did not encroach upon the exclusive legislative power of the Dominion Parliament in relation
to bankruptcy and insolvency, interest or priv ate rights
outside the Province. For ascertaining the pith. and
substance of the impugned statutes, the Judicial
Committee relied upon th.e report of the Royal
Commission appointed to enquire into municipal and
other affairs of the four municipalities in question. At
p. 477, it is observed:
" Their Lordships do not cite this report as
evidence of the facts there found, but as indieating the
(1) (1939) A.C. i68.
86
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
materials which the (~overnment of the Province had
before them before promot.ing in the Legislature the
~Jte f.Ol'(i_.]\ nsJina ~t.atllte 110'-"' itll pugned."
5,, ..,,, M.tl.< Ud., Tl .
d
.
.
h
l' l
and Aavtlwr
118 Cai"\C Of"S 11ot, Ill ll1,V VJe\Y, t TO\Y R.11}' tg 1t Oil
v.
question raised in the present case. The decision of
The i·uio11 of India the Privy Council in Pillrti v. J.lfudanayake( 1 ) is also
""a Auntl•n not. of much relevance to the present case. The
constitutional validity
S11h!m Rao J.
- of the citizenshiJJ. Act, 1948, of
Ceylon, was questioned in tlrnt case. It was contended
therein that the main object of that Act was to prevent
the Indian Tamils from obtaining citize1rnhip of Ceylon
am! that the Act was part. of a plan to effect indirectly
something \\·hich the legislature had no power to
achit>\'e directly. The Judicial Committee pointed out,
at p. 528:
"It. must be shown ~iffirmatively by the party
challenging a statute which is upon its face intra vires
that it was e.nacted as part of phtn to effect indirectly
something which the legislature had no power to
achieve directlv."
TJ1e Judicial Committee relied upon the Inclian and
Pakistani R(•sidPnts (Citizenship) Act, Xo. 3 of 1949,
by which an Indian Tamil would b.'' an application
obtain citizenship by registration and thus protect his
descendante, provided lH• lmd a eertain residential
qualification. \Ylwn objection \\·as taken against the
Court rel.ving upon the stiic! Act, their Lordships
disallowed the objection \\·ith the following remarks,
at p. 529:
"If there was a legislati,-e plan the plan must be
looked at as a whole, and when so looked at it is
evident, in their Lordships, opinion, tlrnt. the legislature did not intend to prevent Indian Tamils from
attaining citizenship provided that they \\·ere suffidently connected with the island."
In this case also the reliance on a subsequent Act
was only to unravel the pl\in attributed to the Legisla.
ture of Ceylon to deprive the Indian Tamils of citizen.
ship by passing the impugned Act. The said three
decisions, therefore, are not, and cannot be, authorities
for the proposition now contended. To unravel a plan
'959
--_ .
(1) (1953) A.C. 514.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
87
of fraud on powern, it would he necessary to scrutinize
r959
all the documents, whether legislative or otherwise,
1.
T!te Lord I<ris!tna
which hel1) to ascertain the truth. It may a 1so ue Sugar ;lfilts Ltd.,
necessary to look into another Act to ascertain the etnd Another
pith and imbstance of an impugned Act. But the same
v.
principle cannot be invoked for a,scertaining the The Union of India
reasonablenoHs of legislative restl'idiom; on fundarnenand .luot!tcr
tal rights.
subba Rao J.
Now t·oming to the factR of the present case, it is not
suggrRtcd that the Es;;;ential Commoditi~;;; Aet, 1955,
and t.lw impugned Act form part of one scheme of
legislation. Indeml the E;;;sential Commodities Act waH
enacted to provide in the i11tore:-1t of the gen<:'ml publie
for control of production, :rnpply and di:;trihution of,
and trade and commerec in, certain commodities. The
provisions of the Act di,;clo;;c that tho ohjcct of the
Aet was to nrninta.in or to inerca,;e :mpplies of essential
commoditir's and to secure their equitable di;;tribution
and availability at fair prices. It was not one of itH
objAct;;; to stimnlate foreign trarle or to earn foreign
exchange. It is said that the notification issued by
the Central Government under s. 3 of that Act and r. 5
of the Order made thereunder was to off-;;et the loss
expected to be incurred under the Ordinance, and
therefore, the Act whi('h supplanted the Ordinance,
must be deemed to have been pn,ssed on the basis of
that notification. To put it in other words, though
the impugned Aet docs not confer any power or imposn
a duty on the Uoveriiment to off-set tlte·loss by fixing
the rates of sugar, having regn,rd to the expected losR,
the mere fact that it could fix the rn.tes mHkr Home
other Act would make the Act good though otherwi;;;o
bad. If this argument be accepted a:; correct., even if
the notifioation was not issued, the existence of such a
power under some other Act would be enough to
validate the impugned Act, for, thongh the notifimttion was not issued, it may be issued at n. laier siltgP.
'l'his argmncnt, if accepted, would leave the im pngnl.'d
statut.e .in it tl uid state, its validity or ot horwise
depending upon the changing attitude of the authority
concerned. I cannot, therefore, accept this rnntention.
88
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
Let me now consider the reasonableness of the
restrictions imposed by the Act, excluding the notificaThe Lord Ifrishna t'
.
d b y t h e G'' overnmen.t. I t .is
. . enacte d to
Sugar Mills Ltd., 10n .issue
and Another
provide for the export of sugar m pubhc mterest, and
v.
for the levy and collection, in certain circumstances,
The Union of India of an additional duty of excise on sugar produced in
and Another
India. Section 4 enables the Central Government, by
notification in the Official Gazette to fix from time to
Subb,-i Rao].
time the quantity of sugar which may be exported
during any period, and, in fixing such quantity, the
Central Government should have regard to the
quantity of sugar available in India, the quantity of
sugar which, in its opinion, would be reasonably
required for consumption in India, and the necessity
for exporting sugar with a view to earning foreign
excl;iange in the public interest. In exercise of that
power, the Central Government should not fix the
quantity of sugar for export as to exceed in any year
in the aggregate twenty per cent. of the quantity of
sugar prorlnced in India in the season ending wit.h the
month of October falling within that year. Under s. 5,
the Central Government is empowered to apportion
the quantity of sugar fixed from time to time for.
purposes of export under s. 4 among the owners in
proportion to the quantity of sugar produced, or likely
to be produced, by them respectively during the season
referred to above. :'-iection 6 enjoins on the owners of
sugar factories to deliver to the export agency,
appointed under the Act, the sugar produced in their
factories in such quiintities, of such grade, in such
manner, within such time and iit such place, as may
be specified hy the export agency in that behalf.
When such delivery is made, the owner ceases to have
any more right over the sugar except to receive
payment ·therefor. Section 8 empowers the export
agency, after taking delivery, to export the sugar or
permit the owner to sell the whole or any part of the
export quota in his custody at a price approved by it
on condition that the sale-proceeds are payable to it.
Section 9 directs the export agency to make payments
to the owners, who had delivered sugar to it, in the
manner prescribed by the section. Out of the total
'959
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89
sale-proceeds, the total expenditure incurred by the
z959
export agency in respect of the sugar exported should
-· d The, Lord
Krisllna
l b a 1ance sh ould b e apport1one
be d ed ucted an d tie
M'lt
5 "~ar ' s Ltd.,
.
•
h
t"
f
among t he owners m proportion to t e quan 1ty o
and Another
sugar delivered by them for export during the year.
v.
It also enables the export agency to make payments TkUnion of India
to owners on account against documents of delivery of and Another
sugar furnished by them, and to adjust such payments Sub;;;: Rao J.
at the time of final payment. Section 10 confers
power on the Central Government to give directions
to the export agency in discharge of its functions
under the Act. Section 7 deals with a situation when
the ~ugar is not delivered, and it reads:
"S. 7(1): Where sugar delivered by any owner
falls short of the export quota fixed for it by any
quantity (hereinafter referred to as the said quantity),
there shall be levied and collected on so much of the
sugar despatched from the factory for consumption in
India as is equal to the said quantity, a duty of excise
at the rate of seventeen rupees per maund."
Sub-ss. 2, 3 and 4 provide for a machinery for
imposing the penal duty and collecting the same from
the defaulting owners of sugar. The scheme of the
Act, therefore, is a self.contained one. The object is
to provide for the export of sugar in the interest of
public and that object is sought to be achieved by
fixing the quota of sugar for export and distributing
the same among the owners of factories; subject to the
condition that in no case it should exceed twenty per
cent. of the quantity of sugar produced in India in a
particular season. The quantity is also fixed \vit.hout
detriment to the requirements for internal consumption. The apportionment of the quota among the
various factories is objectively and impartially made.
The quota delivered, or in case the owner is allowed to
sell the sugar himself, the sugar purchased from the
sale- proceeds, is· exported, and the nett sale-proceeds
are distributed among the owners in proportion to the
quantity of sugar delivered by them for export. The
Act enables the Government to make payments on
account. The Government also retains an over-all
12
90
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
control presumably to see that no injustiee is done to the
parties concerned. The short question is whether the
Th• Lord Krishna said restrictions on the freedom of the petitioners to
Sngar Milts Ltd .• acquire, hold and dispose of property, and carry on
and Anoth.e1
v.
trade or business, are reasonable within the meaning of
Th• Unfon of India clauses (5) and (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.
The
and Anoth<r
restrictions must have a reasonable relation to the
object which the legislature seeks to achieve and must
Subba Rao f.
not go in excess of that object. What is the object of
the legislature ? The object of the legislature is to
provide for the export of sugar in public interest. It
cannot be, and indeed it is not, denied that at the
time the Act was passed there was a sincere and serious
national effort to industrialize our country with the
avowed object of raising the economic standards of
our people. One of. the necessary conditions for
industrializing our eountry is to start heavy industries,
and that cannot be done unless the country earn8
foreign exchange to enable it to import plants for
starting the same. It is also self-evident that it would
be in the interests of sugar industry to build up a
foreign market for that commodity. The object of the
Act was, therefore, demorrntrably to serve the national
interest and the scheme evolved certainly had relation
to the object sought to he achieved, for all the provisions of the Act were conceived in :t glmuine attempt
to induce foreign export in sugar by co-operative effort.
If so, the only ohjcetion to t.he rnstrictions imposed
can be on the basis that the fr••edom w11,s abridged or
curtailed unduly or arhitmrily. But for the Act, the
petitioners could have Kold their sugar in the open
market without exceeding the rnkK fix.,d under the
Essential Commodities Act, l!.J!i5. The correspondence
filed in the case, marked '" 1tn11exures A, H and C,
clearly demonstrates that both the irnlustry :i.s well as
the 8tate were equally interested to stimulate foreign
trade and build up a foreign market. Under the
scheme embodied in the Act, three restrictions are
imposed on the owners of factories: (i) They must
contribute to the stock for export,. not exceeding
twenty per cent. of the quantity produced in their
factories; (ii) they are paid only their proportionate
, 959
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
share of the nett sale-proceeds realised in the foreign
r959
market; and (iii) a penal cess is imposed on those
.
who make default in supplying the goods. When once The Lord Krishna
. is
. conce ded t h a t t h e Act serves
. t he nat10na
,
l ·.m t erest, Sugar
Mills Ltd.,
it
and Another
I find it not possible to hold that the restrictions
v.
are unreasonable or excessive. The three restrictions The Union of India
are really the props of the scheme. If there was no and Another
statutory compulsion on the owners of factories to
· of th e sugar prod uce d m
.
Subbn Rao],
suppl y a reasona ble f ract1on
their factories, the export agency would not get the
requisite quantity of sugar for export. If there was
no provision imposing a penal cess on defaulters,
there would be no sanction to compel them to deliver
their quota of sugar. Though the final payment was
deferred till the nett sale- proceeds were realised, they
would be paid the price for the sugar supplied, at the
rates fetched in the foreign market. It is common
case that at present the export trade in sugar ends in
loss; but it cannot be predicated that it will be a
chronic feature and there will not come a time. when
the export trade in sugar will earn profits. It may be
that a better scheme migl).t have been evolved by the
legislature or it might be more beneficial from the
standpoint of owners of factories if t.he State purchased the exportable <1uantity for ready cash and exported
the same on its own account. But it is not for this
Court to evaluate the comparative merits of different
schemes so long it is satisfied that the scheme actually evolved stands the test of reasonabless. The
correspondence between the State and the industry
shows that the industry as a whole co-operated with
the State in evolving the scheme, which culminated in
the passing of the Act. The State as well as the
industry are equally interested to stimulate foreign
trade and build up foreign market. To capture foreign
market or to have a substantive share therein is not
an easy task, as it depends upon many imponderables,
namely, the availability of sugar, its demand, its
comparative ID;erit,s with the sugar produced in other
markets, transport facilities, mutual agreement requift
ments, international affiliations etc.
Initial loss
must have to be borne to get a ~oothold and the clear
92
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
objective will have to be pursued purposrifully and tenaciously. To achieve the said objective, with the consent
The Lord Krishna of the industry and on the basis of past experience,
S<1gar
Ltd•• the A ct was passe d by th e p ar l"1ament . Th e benefi ma
. 1
and Mills
Another
v.
results flowing from the Act are significant. The
The Union of India State earns foreigu exchange, and a foreign market is
and Another
gradually built up for the future prosperity of the
sugar
industry.
Subba Rao].
In the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents
an attempt was made to support the Act on the
ground that it was intended to serve a dual purpose
of stablising the internal market and earn foreign
exchange for the country. An attempt was also
made to link the one with the other, but the learned
Attorney-General did not pursue that line in his
argument, and I have, therefore, considered the question only from the st.andpoint of the compelling need
of the State to earn foreign exchange, and the long
range aim of the industry to build up a foreign market.
I therefore, hold that the restrictions imposed by the
statute on the furnlamental rights of the petitioners
are not arbitrary, and .are reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution.
I agree with my learned brother, Hidayatullah, J.,
on the other questions raised in this case. In the
result, the petitions are dismissed with costs.
z959
-
.
ORDER.
In view of the opinion of the majority these petitions are dismissed with costs.
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