THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD., DWARKA CEMENT WORKS, DWARKA versus ITS WORKMEN & ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 May 1959 | [1959] 1 S.C.R. 925 | 1959 INSC 57
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 May 1959
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, S.K. DAS, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 459/1957
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1959] 1 S.C.R. 925
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 57
Text of the judgment
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
925
In our opinion on the plain construction of the
words used ins. 116 of the amending Act, s. 342A is
available to the appellant. The High Court, it appears,
was misled into construing the words in clause (c) of
s. 116 i.e. "as if this Act had not been passed". The
High Court was therefore in error and the appellant is
entitled, in our view, as a competent witness for the
defence to testify in disproof of the charges made
against him or any other person charged together with
him at the same trial.
We would, therefore; allow this appeal,.set aside the
order of the courts below and hold that the application
made by the appellant to appear as a witness was
well-founded and should have been allowed.
Anant Gopal
Sheorey
v.
The State of
Bombay
Kapur].
Appeal allowed .
•
THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD.,
DWARKA CEMENT WORKS, DW ARKA
v.
ITS WORKMEN & ANOTHER
(S. R. DAS c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, s. K. DAS,
P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Bonus-Available surplus-Determination
cf-Full Bench formula-Basis-Applicability-Revision if required
-Prior Charges-Mode of calculation-Gross profits, ascertainment
cf-Rehabilitation charges, how determined-Gratuity fund, whether
can be claimed as prior charge-Distribution of surplus-Overtime
payment, if can be taken into consideration in awarding bonus.
For the year 1953-54, the employers pai"- bonus to the
workmen equal to three months' wages, but the workmen
demanded bonus equivalent to seven months and six months
basic wages with dearness allowance. The employers contended
that after making deductions for the prior charges from the
gross profits in accordance with the formula evolved by the Full
Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Mill Owners Associa- .
tion, Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, (1950) L.L.J.' •
.1247, there was no available surplus left an4 consequently the
r959
May 5.
•
926
[1959]
workmen could claim no bonus. The workmen countered that
the formula required revision as the employers were becoming
increasingly more rehabilitation conscious and their appetite
for the provision for rehabilitation was fast growing with the
result that in most cases, after allowing for rehabilitation, there
was no surplus left for the payment of bonus and the main
object of the formula was thus frustrated. The workmen further
contended that the whole of the rehabilitation expenses should
not be provided for out of trading profits and that the claim for
rehabilitation should be fixed at a reasonable amount and the
industry should be required to find the balance from other
1959
~}1~· Associated
·Cement
Companies Ltd.
.._. •. v.
Its· Workmen
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. J,'
sources :
Held, that though there may be some force in the plea
made for the revision of the Full Bench formula, the problem
raised by the said plea is of such a character that it can be
appropriately considered only by a high-powered commission
and not by this Court while hearing the present group of
appeals. Besides the Full Bench formula had on the whole
worked fairly satisfactorily in a large number of indu..tries all
over the country, and the claim for bonus should be decided by
Tribunals on the basis of this formula without attempting to
revise it. The formula was elastic enough to meet reasonably
the claims of the industry and labour for fair play and justice.
If the content of each item specified in the formula was determined objectively in the light of all relevant and material facts,
the Tribunals would generally find it possible to make reasonable adjustments between the rival claims and provide for a fair
distribution of the available surplus.
Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur,
[1955] l S.C.R. 991, Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen,
[1957]S.C.R. 33, Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen,
[1958] S.C.R. 878 and The State of Mysore v. The Workers of
Kolar Gold Mines, [1959] S.C.R. 895, referred to.
..
0
•
The formula was based on two considerations: first, that
labour was entitled to claim a share in the trading profits of the
industry, because it had partially contributed to the same; and
second, that labour was entitled to claim that the gap between
its actual wage and the living wage should, within reasonable
limits, be filled up. In dealing with the claims for· bonus. the
two-fold basis of the formula must always be kept in mind.
Further, it was•not necessary that the workmen must actually
manufacture or produce the goods before they become entitled
to claim any bonus.
Burma Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v.
Their Workmen, (r953) 2 L.L.J. 246, applied.
The working of the formula begins with the figure of gross
·profits, taken from the profit and loss account, which are arrived
at after payment Qf wages and dearness allowance to employees
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
927
and other items of admissible expenditure. It would be open to
r959
the Tribunal to examine the accounts and to disallow deliberate
and mala fide debit entries made to reduce the amount of gross The Associated
Cement ·
profits. It would likewise be open to the parties to claim the
exclusion of items, credit or debit, on the ground that they were Companies Ltd.
patently and obviously extraneous and entirely unrelated to the
v•
. trading profits of the year. But the Tribunal must resist the Its Workmtn
temptation of dissecting the balance-sheet too minutely or
attempting to reconstruct it.
]. K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd., Kanpur v. Their Workmen,
(1954) L.A.C. 716, applied.
The formula deals with the claims for bonus on the basis
that the relevant year is a self-sufficient unit and the appropriate
accounts have to be made on the notional basis in respect of the
said year. Hence, the refund of excess profits and the adjustment of the previous year's depreciation and losses cannot be
made against the bonus year's profits.
Moo/,el Mills etc. Textile Mills, Nagpur v. The Rashtriya Mills
Mazdoor Sangh, (1955) l L,.L.J. 534; Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd.
v. Their Workmen, (1955) 2 L.L.J. 60, referred to.
After ascertaining the amount of gross profits, the first item
of deduction therefrom relates to depreciation. The depreciation which has to be deducted from the gross profits should be
the notional normal depreciation as explained in the case of
Surat Electricity Co. Ltd., (1957) 2 L.L.J. 648, and should not
include the initial and additional depreciation allowable under
the Income-tax Act.
U. P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1955) 2
. L.L.J. 431; Surat Electricity Co's. Staff. Union v. Surat Electricity
Co. Ltd., (1957) 2 L.L.J. 648, referred. to.
The second item of deduction is on account of income-tax.
On the balance obtained after deducting the depreciation from
the gross profits the tribunal has to calculate the amount of
income-tax payable for the bonus year. In makirig this calculation it would not be reasonable to·allow the employer to claim
under the item of income-tax an additional amount in respect of
the two further depreciations which are expressly authorised
under s. rn(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act. Therefore the two
concessions thus given by the Income-tax Act should not be
taken into account in determining the amount" of income-tax
under the formula.
Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1958] S.C.R.
878, explained and followed.
The third item of deduction under the formula relates to
the return on paid up capital as well as working capital. The,
formula provides generally for the payment of interest at 6% •
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92S
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
per annum on the paid up capital and at 2% on working capital.
These rates are not inflexible and will vary according to the
The Associated circumstances of each case.
·Cement
Workmen of Assam Co. Ltd. v. Assam Co. Ltd., [r959] S.C.R.
Companies Ltd.
327; Ruston and Hornsby (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (r955):r
v.
L.L.J. 73, Mill Owners Association, Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill
Its Workmen
Mazdoor Sangh, (r952) r L.L.J. 5r8, Tea and Coffee Workers Union.
v. Brooke Bond (India) (Private) Ltd., (r956) r L.L.J. 645, U. P.
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (r955) 2 L.L.J. 4r3,
referred to.
The fourth item of deduction is on account of rehabilitation
which inclndes replacement and modernisation but not expansion.
Rehabilitation has to be calculated for the plant and machinery
as well as the buildings. The whole of the rehabilitation
charges have to come out of the trading profits as this guarantees
the continuance of the industry to the benefit both of the
employer and labour. The Tribunal has to .estimate the probable cost of replacement of plant and machinery at the time
when such replacement would become due. In determining such
cost, the Tribunal has to project the price level into the future,
determined not only in the light of the prices prevailing during
the bonus year, but also of subsequent price levels. The decision
on the question of the probable cost of rehabilitation is always
reached by adopting a suitable multiplier. This multiplier is
based on the ratio between the cost price of the plant and
machinery and the probable price which may have to be
paid for its rehabilitation, replacement or modernisation. As
there has been a continuous rise in the price of industrial plant
and machinery, the older the plant which needs rehabilitation,
the higher is the multiplier. If the employer has deliberately
or mala fide refrained from rehabilitating his old machinery
with a view to claim a higher multiplier, his conduct may be
taken into account in determining the multiplier and the amount
of rehabilitation payable to him. Once a proper multiplier is
adopted, the probable cost of rehabilitation can be easily determined by multiplying the original cost by the multiplier. At
this stage the divisor steps in. The total amount required for
rehabilitation has to be divided by a suitable divisor in order to
ascertain the annual requirement of the employer in that behalf
year by year.
Before awri.rding an appropriate amount in respect of
rehabilitation for the bonus year, deductions have to be made,
first on account of the break-down value of the plant and machinery which is usually calculated at the rate of 5% of the cost
price, secondly the depreciation and general liquid resources
available to the employer other than those earmarked for specific purposes, thirdly all the rehabilitation amounts which may
• have been allowed to the employers in the previous years, but
had remained un11,5ed in the meanwhile.
I959
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
I9.59
It is only after all the prior charges have thus been determined and deducted from the gross profits that the available
surplus can be ascertained for payment of bonus. The procedure The Associated
Cement
·adopted by some Tribunals of notionally working out the amount
of bonus and then giving it priority in the calculations before· Companies Ltd;
v.
the determination of the income-tax payable inevitably lessens
the amount of tax proportionately, and should be deprecated. Its Workmen
Rehabilitation cannot be given priority before the income-tax
payable is ascertained and deducted from the gross profits.
No addition should be made to the list of prior charges recognised by the formula even with respect to the employers claim
for deductions on account of gratuity fund created for the benefit of the workmen. But the Tribunal ought to, when the avail. able surplus is determined, take into account such a claim and
reasonable amount of allowance should be definitely borne in
mind in finally fixing the amount of bonus.
M/s. Metro Motors v. Their Workmen, (1952) 2 L.L.J. 205,
referred to.
Wh;n the available surplus has been ascertained, three
parties are entitled to claim shares therein: labour's claim for
bonus, the industry's claim for the purpose of expansion and ·other
needs and the share-holders' claim for additional return on the
capital invested by them. The ratio of distribution would
obviously depend on several factors: such as the gap between the
actual wages and the living wages, the setting apart of a
gratuity fund by the employer and the amount thereof, the
extent of the available surplus, the dividends actually paid
by the employer and 'those paid by comparable concerns, the
probabilities of expansion, the general financial condition of
the employer and his necessity to meet urgent liabilities.
It would be wrong on principle to take overtime payment
into account in calculating the bonus payable to each workman.
Once the total amount payable as bonus is determined on the
principles as indicated, the question of overtime payment being
taken into account can no longer be a dispute between the
employer and his workmen but one hetween the workmen
inter se.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.
459 and 460 of 1957.
•
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and
order dated the 30th November, 1956, of the Industrial
Tribunal, Bombay, in Reference I. T. Nos. 10 and 13 of
1956..
· R. H. Kolah, Dadachanji and S. N. Andley,. for the
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930
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
0. L. Dudhia and I. N. Shroff, for the respondents
in
C. A. No. 459 of 1957.
The Associated
Cemen•
• A. S. R. Chari and I. N. Shroff, for the respondents
Companies Ltd. in 0. A. No. 460 of 1957.
I959
v.
Its Workmen
Gajendragadkar ].
•
1959. May 5.
delivered by
The Judgment of the Court was
·
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-These two appeals arise out
of a demand for bonus made against the appellants by
their workmen for the year 1953-54. The Associated
Cement Companies Ltd., Bombay, the Cement Marketing Company of India Ltd., Bombay and the Concrete
Association of India, Bombay, were faced with a
demand of their workmen employed in their offices at
Bombay for bonus equivalent to seven months' basic
wages with dearness allowance. The industrial dispute arising out of this demand was referred by the
Government of Bombay for adjudication before the
Industrial Tribunal, Bomb1ty, under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and it was numbered I. T. No. 10 of
1956. The Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Dwarka Cement Works, Dwarka, was similarly faced with
a demand of its workmen for bonus equivalent to 50%
of total earnings or six months' total earnings. This
dispute was referred to the same tribunal and was
numbered I. T. No. 13of1956. By consent of parties
both the references were heard together and evidence
was recorded and documents tendBred in the first reference. By its award delivered on November 30,
1956, the tribunal directed the companies to pay their
workmen drawing a basic pay or wages up to Rs. 500
per month bonus equivalent to 1/3 of their basic wages
or pay (less bonus already paid for the year 1953-54)
subject to the conditions specified in the award. It is
against this'award that the respective companies have
preferred the two appeals by special leave. In this
judgment the said companies will hereafter be described as the appellant and their workmen as respondents.
The A. C. C. is the principal.company concerned in
the dispute.
The Cement Marketing Company of
r
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S.O.R.
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
931
India Ltd.; (hereafter called the C. M. I.) has been
x959
separately registered under the Indian Companies Act The Associated
as a Joint Stock Company; but it is a hundred
Cement
per cent. subsidiary of the A. C. C. The C. M. I. are companies Ltd.
the Sales Managers of the A. C. C. while the Concrete
v.
Association of India (hereafter called the C. A. I.) is Its Workmen
merely a department of the C. M. I. As a result of . the agreement which came into operation from Ga;endragadkar J.
August 1, 1953, all financial transactions of the C. M. I.
in relation to sales now find a place in the accounts of
the A. C. C. Similarly all of its fixed assets have been
taken over and appear in the balance-sheets of the
A. C. C. All the three concerns have a common staff
in Bombay. The A. C. C. had already paid to its employees bonus equivalent to three months' basic wages
for t.he year 1953-54 and so had the C. M. I. to its
workmen. It appears that the C. M. I., including the
0. A. I., undertakes to pay ·to its employees the same
amount of bonus as has been paid or awarded to the
employees of the A. C. C.
There is no dispute that the A. 0. C. is the biggest
amongst the companies in India which manufacture
cement. It owns 15 cement factories at different
places in India and 2 in Pakistan. Out of the total
quantity of cement despatched by all the cement
factories in India in 1953-54 the A. C. C. despatched
55·46 o/o. The A. C. C. came into existence in 1936 as
a result of the merger of four important groups of
companies engaged in the manufacture of cement.
These were F. E. Dinshaw, Tatas, Killick Nixon and
Khatau, groups. It appears that 11 companies in all
merged with the A. C. C.
Before the tribunal the case for the respondents was
that the appellant held a position of monopoly in the
cement industry and was easily in a {lOSition to pay
the bonus claimed by them. Their allegation was that
the appellant had inflated the capital invested by the
merging companies while taking them over in 1936 ; it
had set up new factories out of the profits earned by it
without raising fresh capital and thereby had used
profits for the purpose of expansion. In the year 1953- •
54 the appellant had capitalised . the full amount
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932
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
[1959]
standing to the credit of the premium-on-shares
account and had transferred a part of the reserves for
taxation to the capital account thus increasing the
aggregate capital. The emoluments of the workers
v.
were inadequate and so they were entitled to the
Its Workmen
bonus claimed by them in order to fill up the gap
. d-dk
between the actual wage paid to them and the living
Ga;en raga ar 1 .
wage d ue- toth em. Th e respondents also conten d ed
that the claim made by the appellant for rehabilitation and replacement in the dispute for the year 195152 included not only the amount required for rehabilitation and replacement but also expansion ; and so,
according to them, the appellant was not entitled to
any amount for rehabilitation purposes in the year in
dispute. They also alleged that the appellant was
not entitled to claim interest at more than 4% on
paid-up capital and 2 % on working capital. Thus the
respondents urged that if all the relevant facts are
taken into account it would be found that the claim for
bonus made by them in the two respective references
was just and proper. In support of their case the respondents filed several statements which, they claimed,
had been prepared in accordance with the Full Bench
formula, and they also cross-examined Mr. Tongaonkar
who gave evidence on behalf of the appellant.
This claim was resisted by the appellant. It was
urged on its behalf that the points raised by the
respondents in the present references had been heard
and finally decided in the previous adjudication (Ref.
. I. T. No. 115 of 1953) which dealt with their claim for
bonus for the preceding year; and it was alleged that
the respondents were barred from raising the same
questions over again in the present adjudication. The
cement machinery, though heavy, is subject to rigours
of extremely tcrngh and heavy duties and the machinery has to run ceaselessly day and night throughout
the year.
The appellant contended that, having
regard to the special features of the cement industry,
the machinery had to be kept on the highest standards of ma,intenance and needed frequent replacement
, and rehabilitation. A cement factory is a very expensive industri~l proposition. The appellant denied that
r959
The Associated
Cement
Companie.< Ltd.
f
•
S.C;R:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
a
933
it was in monopolistic position and pleaded that its
r959
object was to deliver cement as cheaply as possible The Associated
to the consumers: The respondents' allegation that
Cement
there was" puffing up of block capital at the time of Companies Ltd.
the merger in 1936" was denied by the appellant and
v.
it was not admitted that ever since its inception it had Its Workmen
steadily made huge profits. The appellant also denied G . d - d k
the allegation of the respondents that the profits a;en raga ar 1 .
coming out of the business had been used in expanding its factories. It had used all available resources
including premium on issue of shares and depreciation fund for replacement, rehabilitation and modernisation. It was not true that the appellant had built
huge reserves and that the wages paid by the appellant to its employees were inadequate; on the contrary .they compared very favourably with those in
other comparable industries. The appellant denied
the statement of the respondents that no plant
reinstatement reserve over and above the depreciation allowance was necessary in the current year and
it urged that the calculations made by the respondents alleged to be in terms of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal formula were inaccurate. In its turn the
appellant ·claimed more than 6% interest on paid-up
capital and more than 4% interest on working capital.
The appellant also emphasised that it had already
paid to the respondents bonus for three months though
the strict working out of the formula would show that
there was no available surplus for the relevant year
and so the respondents would not be. entitled to any
bonus at all.
In support of its case the appellant examined
Mr. G. R. Tongaonkar, its controller of planning and
development, and produced a statement (Ex. C-2) showing the original cost of the blocks to be •replaced and
the approximate replacement cost. It also produced
amongst other documents a statement (Ex. C-10) showing the cost of the assets of the merging companies on
July 31, 1936, as taken over by the appellant and the
statement (Ex. C-29) showing the capital expenditur(/
from 1936-37 to 1953-54 on expansion, modernisation, •
rehabilitation, replacement, simdry 'Capipal jobs, etc.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
In addition a statement was filed by the· appellant
The Associoted (Ex. C-23) showing that the calculations made under
cement
the Full Bench formula would show a substantial
Companies Ltd. deficit and that would support its case that there was
v.
no available surplus for the relevant year from which
Its Workmen
any bonus could be claimed by the respondents.
.
Ex. C-2 is a statement prepared by Mr. Tongaonkar
Ga21ndragodkar J ·showing the original cost of the block to be replaced
and the approximate replacement cost. This statement has been prepared on the basis that the approximate cost to the merging companies of their assets as
on 31-7-1936 was 5·73 crores. It is admitted that this
statement has lumped together all the properties of
the appellant including plant and machinery, as well
as buildings, roads, bridges and railway-sidings and
has classified them into four categories. The.statement contains 9 columns. The first column gives the
year or years of purchase of machinery. This column
classifies the four categories of the blocks according to
their respective years of purchase. The first category
consists of blocks purchased up to 1939, the second
purchased between 1940-44, the third purchased
between 1945-47 and the last purchased between
1949-54. Column 2 gives the original cost o"f the said
categories as on 31-7-1954. Column 3 gives particulars
of such portions of the blocks as have been discarded,
scrapped or sold. In this column the years in which
the blocks were discarded, scrapped or sold are indicated and their original cost is mentioned. Columns 4
and 5 give the present approximate cost of rehabilitation according as the machinery in question is either
purchased or made by the appellant itself. The cost
of machinery which may have to be purchased is
shown in col. 4, while the cost of machinery which
may be prodl1Ced by the appellant is shown in col. 5.
The figures in col. 4 have been arrived at by multiplying the corresponding figures in col. 2 by a ratio,
which, according to Mr. 'l'ongaonkar, supplies an
appropriate multiplier. Regarding the replacement
cost of 1939 block, the witness has applied the multi• plier 4·28, whereas in regard to the subsequent block
of 1940-44 ~e has utilised the multiplier of 2·8. The
z959
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·935
figures mentioned in col. 5 for 1939 and 1940-44 blocks
r959
. have been arrived at by reducing the corresponding The Associated
figures given in col. 4 by 20%. Column 6 gives the
Cement
approximate present life of the machinery and plant Companies Ltd.
mentioned in col. 4 ; col. 7 sets out the breakdown
v.
value of the machinery referred to in col. 4, whilst Its Workmen
col. 8 gives the approximate cost of rehabilitation ofG . _,--.-dk
.
. co.l 5 less brea kd own va l ue as
· a;enuraga
ar 1 •
mac h mery
ass h own in
·
shown in col. 7. The last column works out the
annual requirements of the appellant in respect o.f the
rehabilitation of the four categories of blocks. The
figures in this column are arrived at by dividing the
amounts mentioned in col. 8 by the respective divisors
mentioned in col. 6. The total annual requirement of
the appellant in respect of rehabilitation is shown as
of the prder of Rs. 3,29,61,752.
Ex. C-23 is a statement prepared by Mr. Tongaonkar
to show the deficiency in profits in relation to payment. of additional bonus claimed by the respondents
for the accounting year 1953-54. This statement has
been prepared alternatively on the basis of statutory
depreciation allowable by income-tax authorities and
also on the basis of straight computation at ordinary
rates. The first method results in a deficit of Rs.
107·20 lakhs, while the second in a deficit of Rs. 97·86
lakhs. In working out the provision for rehabilitation,
this statement first takes the replacement cost of
block up to 1939 as per Ex. C-2 to be Rs. 1601 ·19 lakhs.
From this amount the available reserve!:! as on
1-8-1953 which are of the order of Rs. 311 lakhs are
deducted, leaving a balance of Rs. 1290·i9 lakhs.
Then the replacement costs of the three remaining
categories of blocks are taken into account and all-the
said amounts are divided by the appropriate divisors
mentioned in col. 6 of Ex. C-2. The res~lt is the sum
of Rs. 284·48 lakhs, and that is claimed by the appellant as the pFovision for rehabilitation under the
formula.
·
·
In his evidence Mr. Tongaonkar has given reasons
in support of the respective multipliers and divisors
adopted by him in making his calculations in' Ex. C-2: •
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936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
He has also given several details on all the relevant
and material points in support of the appellant's case.
The As.sociafod
Cement
Naturally t h e respondents h ave cross-examine d him
Companfrs Ltd. at length. One of the questions in controversy between
v.
the parties in the present appeals centres round the
Its Workmen
appreciation of Mr. Tongaonkar's evidence and the
value to be attached to the statements prepared by
Gajendragadkat .J. him.
On the contentions raised by the parties before it
the tribunal framed ten issues for determination and it
has made its findings on them in the light of the
evidence adduced before it. It has held that the appellant had not inflated the capital invested by the
merging companies while taking them over in 1936.
It has allowed 6% interest on the entire paid-up
capital of Rs. 1267·59 lakhs, and 4% interes1i on the
working capital. In regard to the claim for depreciation the tribunal has held that it was normal depreciation calculated according to the straightline method
which should be allowed. On the question of incometax, the tribunal has allowed the same at 83·4 pies in
a rupee as claimed by the appellant on its net profits.
It has, however, rejected the appellant's case that the
income from investments in shares and securities
received by it should be excluded for the purpose of
bonus; while it has allowed the sum of Rs. 10 lakhs
provided by the appellant as annual contribution to
the reserve for gratuity, as also the expenditure on the
cost of dismantling buildings, prospecting expenses,
etc. It did not accept the respondents' case that the
bonus paid by the appellant to its officers should be
reduced or wholly disallowed for the purpose of
calculations under the formula; and, on the question
as to whether overtime payment should be included
in the payll1Jlnt of bonus, it has upheld the respondents' contention and allowed the inclusion of the
said payment.
.
Having disposed of these minor issues, the tribunal
examined at length the claim made by the appellant
in regard to the provision for rehabilitation, replace·ment antl modernisation. Indeed this was the most
' controversial apd the most important issue raised
r959
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
937
before it. The tribunal axamined the evidence of Mr.
r959
Tongaonkar as well as Ex. C-2 and .other documents The Associated
produced by him, and came to the conclusion that
Cement
" Ex. C-2 presents an incorrect and exaggerated Companies Ltd.
picture of the A.C.C.'s requirements of rehabilitation
v.
and replacement" and so it cannot be relied upon. Its Workmen
Aceording to the tribunal the multiplier 4·28 adopted . d-:Zk J
by Mr. Tongaonkar was itself an inflationary figure ; Ga;en rag ar •
and it thought that" the consequence of applying it not
to the original price but to its increased price paid by
the A.C.C. would be to obtain an inflationary result. It
appears that the tribunal was inclined to hold that 2·7
was a fair multiplier representing the price increase over
the pre-war base. The tribunal was also not satisfied
with Mr. Tongaonkar's evidence in regard to the life
of planJ; and machinery; and so it held that the period
of life given in col. 6 of Ex. C-2 cannot be accepted as
correct. While dealing with the question about the
rise in prices, the tribunal has held that it was usual
to take the average level of prices prevailing in a
period of about five years in preference to the prices
prevailing in a particular year as was done by Mr.
Tongaonkar. The tribunal subjected Mr. Tongaonkar's
evidence on the question of replacement, rehabilitation
and modernisation to a close examination and held
that the method adopted by Mr. Tongaonkar in
distinguishing between modernisation and expansion
was of a purely subjective estimate "which does not
bear the scrutiny of an objective test". On the whole
the tribunal was not prepared to accept Mr~ Tongaonkar's evidence at its face value and it was not
prepared to treat Ex. C-2 and consequently Ex. C-23
as reliable. It is relevant to point out at this stage
that the tribunal has not made any finding about the
life of the machinery nor has it recorded any conclusion as to a proper divisor. In fact it has completely
left out of consideration Exs. C-2 and C-23 while
determining the amount which should be allowed for
the appellant's claim for rehabilitation for the relevant
year.
The tribunal then examined the principle 'underly-· •
ing the Full Bench formula and held j;hat •it was not
•
938
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
intended to be worked out as a rigid mathematical
formula.
"We must make it", says the tribunal," as
The A ssociaJed
cement
flexible as possible so as to do justice to everybody oonCompanies Ltd. cerned in the earning of profits". The general question,
v.
which it has considered in this connection, is how far
Its Workmen
and to what extent profits of a concern should contribute
to the satisfaction of the claims of industry for replaoeGajrndragadkar .J. ment, rehabilitation and modernisation. · It was
impressed by the argument that, where the requirements under these items are so huge as to be out of
tune with the profits, it would be open to an industrial
adjudicator to allow only a reasonable provision to be
made out of the profits for the said items and leave
the industry concerned to tap other resources to make
up the balance. In support of.this conclusion it has
referred to the observations made by ]'.R.M. de. Paula
in his " Principles of Auditing ", the report of the
Taxation Enquiry Commission and of the working
party for the Cotton Textile Industry. It has also
relied on a part of the speech delivered by Mr. J. R.D.
Tata in addressing the annual general meeting of the
shareholders of the Tata Iron and Steel Company in
August 1950.
.
In this connection the tribunal has expressed its
apprehension that lf all the money required for a continuous process of modernisation and expansion is to
come out of the profits made by the concern, labour
will rarely see a day when they will enjoy bonus granted to them out of profits; though it has hastened to
add that it was far from its mind that a progressive
concern like the A.C.C. should not keep pace with time
and modernise its machinery ; but it only wished that
it should give a fair deal to the workers in the distribution of the profits. Having held that, if the claims for
rehabilitatio11 turn out to be huge and out of tune with
the profits made by the industry, it would be open to
the-tribunal to grant.the claim of the industry in that
behalf only to the extent that it deems to be reasonable
and fair, it proceeded to consider how far and to what
extent the appellant's claim should be allowed in the
·present proceedings.
•
It is necessary to mention that in dealing with this
'959
,•
"
•
S.C.R.
•.
·•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
939
question the tribunal was considerably influenced by
x959
the past conduct of the appellant . .It thought that for The Associated
rehabilitation the appellant had claimed no more than
Cement
Rs. 192 or 193 lakhs in the previous adjudication pro- companies Ltd.
ceedings where the dispute for bonus had reference to
v.
the year 1951-52. If the claim then made by the Its Workmen
appellant was no more than Rs. 192 or 193 lakhs, the . present claim for Rs. 284 lakhs, the tribunal thought, Ga;endragadkar J.
was obviously inflated and unr~al. Similarly the
tribunal emphasised the fact that the programme
earlier submitted by the appellant to the Tariff Commission was in turn more modest than the claim made
in the said adjudication proceedings. It appears that
in the said programme the appellant had made out a
case for the estimated expenditure of Rs. 18·36 crores
to be.spread over a period of ten years from 1-8-1952
to 31-7-1962 and that works out approximately at the
figure of Rs. 184 lakhs per year. It was on these
facts that the tribunal held that "if the A.C.O. estimated its annual requirements of rehabilitation, replacement and modernisation at Rs. 192 lakhs per year
during the period of ten years commencing from
1-8-1952; I do not think that it should be allowed to
depart from it now". In substance, according to the
tribunal, the present claim for rehabilitation was very
much inflated, it had no relation to realities, and so the
appellant should not be allowed to make such a claim.
That is why it did not think it necessary to record any
finding as to the proper divisor, and to determine, in
the light of Mr. Tongaonkar's evidence, what approximately would be a fair or reasonable amount for
rehabilitation under the formula.
It is thus clear that in making its final calculations
the tribunal has assumed that the claim made by the
appellant for rehabilitation, replacement and modernisation must be taken to be no more than Rs. 192 or
193 lakhs, and on that assumption it has considered
to what extent the claim should be allowed. Ultimately
the tribunal came to the conclusion that. in the
circumstances of the case it would be fair to allow the
appellant about Rs. 165 to 170 lakhs as annual provi- •
sion for the said ite.ms. In support 0,f this <;ion<;ilusion
•
940
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
the tribunal has relied on the fact that for the two
years 1952-53 and. 1953-54 the appellant had spent
about Rs. 339·76 lakhs for the purpose of rehabilitation, replacement 1and modernisation and that works
v.
at the average of Rs. 170 lakhs per year. The tribunal
Its Workmen
has then taken into account the fact that the appellan1;
. d-dk
had a plant reinstatement reserve of Rs. 235 lakhs
0
Ga;en raga
' J. and a general reserve of Rs. 76 lakhs in the beginning
of the year 1953-54. If these amounts which would be
available for rehabilitation are spread over the ten
year period of the tentative programme planned by
the appellant, the annual figure would come to Rs. 31
lakhs; and this amount would have to be deducted
from Rs. 165 lakhs which the tribunal was inclined to
grant in respect of the relevant item. That is how
the tribunal has made the appropriate calcul~tions
under the formula, and has shown that, even after the
payment of one month's additional bonus as directed
by it, the appellant would still be left with a surplus
of Rs. 23·48 lakhs. That in brief is the nature and
effect of the findings made by the tribunal.
Befo.re dealing with the merits of the points raised
in these appeals it would be convenient to refer to the
genesis and the terms of the formula which has been
evolved by the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal in the case of The Mill Owners Association,
Bornhay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh,
Bornhay (1) in 1950. It appears that from 1940 A. D.
onwards the claims for bonus made by the employees
against their employers in different industries were
dealt with on an ad-hoc basis from case to case.
Sometimes the employers voluntarily paid bonus
to their workmen; and where disputes arose they
were decided by the tribunals in the light of the
circumstances• of each case without relying on any
broad consideration of policy or without attempting to lay down any general principles. In 1948
a bonus dispute arose between the Mill Owners
Association, Bombay and its employees, and it was
referred fQr adjudication to the Industrial Court. In
• considering this dispute the Industrial Court went
r959
The Associated
Cement
companies Ltd.
(r) (1950) 1;.L.J. 1247.
..
•
S.C.R.
"
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
941 /
elaborately into the matter, laid down certain princir959
ples and awarded to the workmen "bonus equivalent in The Associated
amount to 3/8 of the total basic earnings of each workcement
man subject to certain conditions.
Companies Lii..
In the subsequent year a similar dispute arose. bev.
tween the same parties ; and it was again referred to Its Workmen
the Industrial Court for adjudication. ·The Court Gajendragadkar J.
made its award on July 7, 1950, directing 55 mills of
the Association to pay to their workmen, whether
permanent or temporary, 1/6 of the basic earnings of
each of them as bonus. This award was challenged by
the Association before the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
It was urged on behalf of the Association that the wage
structure in the textile industry had been settled by
standardisation and so bonus must be regarded as a
gratuitous payment; and it was argued that at any
rate grant of bonus cannot be made for the purpose of
making up the deficiency between the actual and
living wages. These contentions were rejected by the
Labour Appellate Tribunal and the question about the
grant of bonus was considered on general principles on
the basis of which a formula., often described as the
First Full Bench Formula, was ultimately evolved. "As
both capital and labour contribute to the earnings of
the industrial concern", observed the appellate tribunal, "it is fair that labour should derive some benefit
if there is a surplus after ·meeting prior or necessary
charges". The appellate tribunal was also of the
view that where the goal of living wages had been
attained, bonus, like profit sharing, would represent
more as the cash incentive to better efficiency and
production; but where the industry had not the capacity to pay a living wage bonus must be looked upon
as the temporary satisfaction wholly or in part of the
needs of the employee. In other words, actiording to this
decision, the award of bonus is based on a two-fold consideration. It is made in recognition of the fact that
labour has made some contribution to the profit earned
by the industry, and so it is entitled to claim a share in
it ; and it is also intended to help labour to bridge or
:narrow down the gap, as far as may be reasonably •
possible, between the living wage to whic.l;t labour is
entitled and the actual wage received by it.
•
942
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
...•
[1959]
Dealing with the problem from this point of view
the
appellate tribunal conceded that investment necesThe Associated
Cement
sarily implies the legitimate expectation of the investor
Companies Ltd. to secure recurring returns on the money invested by
v.
him in the industrial undertaking, and so it held that
Its Workmen
it was essential that the plant and machinery should
be kept continuously in good working order for the
Gajendragadka. j.
·
·
.
purpose of ensurmg
t h at return. Suc h mamtenance
of the plant and machinery would necessarily be to
the advantage of labour because the better the machinery the larger the earnings and the brighter the
chance of securing a good bonus. On this consideration it was held that the amount of money that would
be necessary for rehabilitation, replacement and
modernisation of the machinery would be a prior
charge on the gross profits of the year. Sin1Je the
depreciation allowed by the income-tax authorities is
only a percentage on the written-down value. the
depreciation fund set apart on that basis would not be
sufficient for the purposes of rehabilitation and an
extra amount would have to be annually set apart
notionally under the heading of' reserves' to make up
the deficit. This position was apparently not disputed
by the employees.
The claim made by the industry that a fair return
on the paid-up capital must be secured and that ordinarily it should be paid at the rate of 6% per annum
was also not disputed. The employees, however,
challenged the claim of the industry that reserves
employed as working capital should carry any interest;
but their objection was overruled and it was held that
working capital also would be entitled to interest
though at a much lower rate than that on the paid-up
capital. Then the question of taxes was considered
and it was agf:eed that a provision had to be made
for taxes which would be payable on the amount
determined after deducting depreciation from the gross
profits less any bonus which may be awarded. In the
result the appellate tribunal laid down the manner
and method in which the available surplus should be
• determined. The notional accounting for this purpose
starts with the figure of the gross profits which ·are
r959
•
-
:,
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
943
arrived at after payment of wages and dearness
x959
allowance to the employees and other relevant items The Associated
of expenditure. .Then a deduction for depreciation is
Cement
made, and on the notional balance thus derived a pro- companies Ltd.
vision for taxes payable is allowed. Then follow the
v.
provisions for reserves for rehabilitation, return on Its Workmen
paid-up capital and return on reserves employed as .
working capital. That gives the amount of surplus ifGa;endragadkar J.
any. Whenever the working of this formula leaves
an amount of available surplus, labour was held
entitled to claim a reasonable share in this amount by
way of bonus for the current year. This formula is
based on considerations of social justice and is intended to satisfy the legitimate claims of both capital and
labour in respect of the profits made by the industry
in a pa'l'ticular year. It takes the particular year as a
unit and makes all its notional calculations on the
basis of the gross profits usually taken from the profit
and loss account; in this particular case the available
surplus determined by the application of the formula
was found to be 2·61 crores; and out of this surplus
0·30 crores were awarded as bonus to clerks and other
staff and 1·86 crores was awarded as bonus to the
employees leaving a net notional balance of 0·45
crores.
This Court had occasion to consider the said formula
in Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union,
Kanpur (1 ). The judgment in that case indicates that
without committing itself to the acceptance of the
formula in its entirety, this Court in general accepted
a,s sound the view that since labour and capital both
contribute to the earnings of the industrial concern,
it is fair that labour should derive some benefit if
there is a surplus after meeting the four prior or
necessary charges specified in the formulf1. It is relevant to add that in dealing with the concept of bonus
this Court ruled that bonus is neither a gratuitous
payment made by the employer to his workmen nor
can it be regarded as a deferred wage. According to
this decision, where wages fall short of the living,
(t) [1955] I S.C.R. 991.
•
120
'
'
.
•
•
944
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
standard and the industry makes profit part of which
is due to the contPibution of labour, a claim for bonus
The Associated
cement
can be legitimately made. However neither the proCompanies Ltd. priety nor the order of priority as· between the four
v.
prior charges and their relative importance nor their
Its WMkmen
content was examined by this Court in that case;
G . d-dk
and though the formula has subsequently been gene•J•• rnga ar J. rally accepted by this Court in several reported decisions (Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen (1 ),
Bree Meenakshi Mills, Ltd. v. Their Workmen(') and
The State of Mysore v. The Workers of Kolar Gold
Mines(')), the question about the adequacy, propriety,
or validity of its provisions has not been examined nor
has the general problem as to whether the formula
needs any variation, change or addition been argued
and considered. It is for the first time since 1950
that, in the present appeals, we are called upon to
examine the formula carefully and express our decision on the merits of its specific provisions. As we
have already indicated, in dealing with the present
dispute the tribunal has held that, in working out the
formula, it could relax its provisions even though the
proposed relaxation may mean a material variation
of the formula itself. On behalf of the appellant
Mr. Kolah has taken strong exception to this approach.
He has argued that, in the last eight years and more,
on the whole the formula has ·worked fairly well in
the interest of both capital and labour, and so the
tribunal was not justified in departing from it in the
present case. This argument undoubtedly raises a
question of considerable importance.
Before examining this argument, however, it is
necessary to consider one preliminary point: Was the
tribunal justified in holding that the appellant could
not be allow'!ld to add to its previous claim for rehabilitation ? The decision of the tribunal on this point
seems to indicate that the tribunal thought that the
appellant was estopped from making any such claim;
and the correctness of this conclusion is challenged by
.the appellant.
'959
•
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 33, 39.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 878, 884.
(3) [1959] S.C.R. 895.
•
S.C.R.
'·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
945
r959
It is true that, in the report submitted by the appellant before the Tariff Commisson 'in April 1953, it The Associated
had set out the details of its ten year programme which
Cement
included, besides replacement, rehabilitation, modern- Companies Ltd.'
isation and expansion, mechanisation of quarries as
v.
well as construction and improvement of houses for its Its Workmen
labour staff. The report of the Tariff Commission
.
(p. 30) shows that the cost of the programme was Gajendragadkar f.
estimated at Rs. 18·36 crores, excluding the cost of a
new plant at Sindri, or about Rs.184 lakhs per annum.
Subsequently in January 1954, when Mr. Tongaonkar
gave evidence in the previous adjudication proceedings, he produced a statement (Ex. U-8) according to
which the appellant's annual requirements for rehabilitation would be of the order of Rs. 192 or 193
lakhs, "whereas in the present proceedings the said
claim is made at Rs. 284 lakhs. A bare statement of
these facts prima facie suggests that the appellant's
present claim for rehabilitation has been growing from
stage to stage, and in its present form it is very much
inflated; and that is what the tribunal has also assumed. In our opinion this assumption is not wholly
correct. Mr. Tongaonkar's evidence shows that in
the report of the jobs submitted tq_ the Tariff Commission the appellant had not included all relevant items
of rehabilitation, replacement and modernisation.
The report merely gave a list of the jobs which the
appellant had proposed to undertake during the ten
year period ending July 31, 1962. It was in no sense
an exhaustive statement about the appellant's requirement:> in regard to the rehabilitation of all its blocks.
In fact, having regard to the nature and scope of the
enquiry before the Tariff Commission, the report made
by the appellant had to be restricted to the urgent
jobs which it wanted to undertake during the execution of its ten year programme ; and so it would not be
reasonable to hold that the figure of annual rehabilitation expenses which can be deduced ·from the said
report has any relation to the claim for rehabilitation
made by the appellant in terms of the workillg of the.
•
formula.
Then again the appellant's claim for re:Rabilitation
•
946
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
in the earlier proceedings has also been satisfactorily
explained by Mr. Tongaonkar. The respondents
The Associated
Cement
have placed considerable reliance on the statement
Companies Lid. filed by Mr. Tongaonkar in the said proceedings
v.
(Ex. U-8). This document has been produced by the
Its Workmen
respondents in support of their contention that it
•
k
purports to make a claim for Rs. 192 lakhs per year
Ga;endragad ar ]. for rehabilitation.
That no doubt is true ; but in
terms the document purports to show the estimated
expenditure required during the ten year period there
specified; and as Mr. Tongaonkar has stated, it does
not include a full statement of the claim in regard to
the rehabilitation of all the blocks belonging to the
appellant. In considering the respondents' argument
on this point, it is necessary to bear in mind that in
the earlier proceedings the appellant had filed a
separate statement showing the amount to which it
was entitled by way of rehabilitation under the
formula ; this statement was Ex. C-3 and it has been
produced in the present case and exhibited as U-5. It
appears that in the earlier proceedings the tribunal
did not attach any importance to the said document
and virtually ignored it because, like the present tribunal, it held that " it does not appear to be necessary
to plan further ahead than ten years and it is desirable
to base calculations of rehabilitation on realities "( 1 ).
Even so the Labour Appellate Tribunal found that
the appellant's contention that its workmen were not
entitled to any additional bonus was not well-founded
even if its claim for rehabilitation was confined to
Rs. 192 or Rs. 193 lakhs. Besides, Mr. Tongaonkar
has stated on oath that Ex. U-8 was not among the
documents originally submitted by the appellant to
the tribunal in 1954. It was in fact prepared and
submitted at a later stage at the instance of the
tribunal itself. . It is, therefore, clear that Ex. U-8
was not intended to, and did not supply, the basis of
the appellant's claim in the earlier proceedings in
accordance with the formula.
A study of the items contained in Ex. U-8 also sup• ports the same conclusion. Mr. Tongaonkar has
'959
(1) (1955) 1 L.L.j. 588, 592.
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
947
stated that the total amount of the estimated exx959
penditure shown in this documeh.t included only a The .Associated
small portion of the expenditure required for rehab iCement
litation of the post-1944 block. It is true that Mr. Companies Ltd.
Tongaonkar's statement that in the said total amount
v.
nearly Rs. 50 lakhs represent the amount for replace- Its Workmen
ment or rehabilitation of post-1944 block is inaccurate. The Ohaibasa Cement Factory and the Sevalia Gajendragadkar f.
Cement Factory for the rehabilitation of which
Rs. 64·98 and 85·15 lakhs have been claimed in
Ex. U-8 are undoubtedly parts of the post-1944
block and the amounts claimed for. them are very
much more than Rs. 50 lakhs. It is nevertheless
clear that the items in Ex. U-8 do not include a
claim for rehabilitation for all the blocks of the
appellant, and it is not surprising either, because a
claim for the rehabilitation of all the blocks had been
separately made by the appellant in the earlier proceedings under Ex. 0-3. Thus there can be no doubt
that neither the report submitted by the appellant
before the Tariff Commission nor the estimate given
by Ex. U -8 was prepared under the formula ; and so
any disparity in the amounts claimed in the two
earlier documents cannot be seriously pressed into
service against the appellant when it seeks to make a
claim for rehabilitation strictly in accordance with the
formula. We must, therefore, hold that the tribunal
was in error in coming to the conclusion that by
reason of its previous conduct the appellant could not
be allowed to ·place its claim for rehabilitation at a
figure higher than Rs. 192 lakhs in the relevant year.
In this connection it would be pertinent to remember
that in dealing with the employer's claim for rehabilitation the tribunal is called upon to assess respective values of the relevant factors on h.}'pothetical and
empirical considerations, and so it may generally
not be useful or wise to take recourse to strict legalistic
principles like estoppel in deciding this question and
indeed all material questions in industrial adjudicati9ns.
.
.
Does the formula need to be revised, and should it •
1be revised and reconstructed ? Thin is. the question
•
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
which we must now consider. It appears that some
Th• Associated tribunals have tak~ the view that the r'igid working
cement
of the formula may defeat its object of recognising
Companies Ltd. the social justice of labour's claim for bonus and so
v.
they have made suitable adjustments in its operation.
Its wo,km'"
It is this approach which has raised the larger issue
of principle in the group of appeals which have
. Ga;endrngadkar 1 ·been placed for disposal before the Constitution
Bench. So we must examine this question in its
broad aspects and if we decide not to change the
formula we must state what, in our opinion is the
content of the different items mentioned in the
formula and how they should be calculated and
mutually adjusted.
Let us first set out the case as it has been made for
changing the formula. It is u_rged that though the
formula purports to recognise the principle of social
justice on which labour's claim for bonus is based, it
does not accord to the said claim the high priority it
deserves. Social justice has been given a place of
pride in the preamble to the Constitution and it has
been enshrined in the Directive Principles under
Arts. 38 and 43. Since 1950, ideas about social and
economic justice have made an appreciable progress
and they require the readjustment of priorities prescribed by the formula in favour of the claim for
bonus.
It is also contended that experience in industrial
adjudication during the last eight years and more
shows that employers are becoming increasingly more
rehabilitation-conscious and their appetite for the
provision of rehabilitation is fast growing from year
to year. In the present case, for instance, though the
appellant occuries a dominant position in its line of
trade and though it makes large profits, it has made
such a tall claim for rehabilitation that if the said
claim is allowed the working of the formula leaves no
available surplus from which bonus can be granted to
labour. The appellant has no. doubt paid bonus for
three monilhs and it is unlikely that the appellant
• would depart from its practice of paying the said
bonus even Jn future ; but that does not affect the
r959
•
•
•
,.
S.C.R.
~.
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
949
I959
position that in the light of the a:ruiellant's claim for
rehabilitation the working of the formula would not The Associated
justify the grant of any bonus to labour. This shows
Cement
that the notional claim for rehabilitation which an Companies Ltd.
employer can make under the formula tends to be
v.
completely divorced from the reality or actuality of Its Workmen
the need of rehabilitation; and that needs to be
.
Gajendragadkar ].
correc t ed .
Besides, it is said, that the theory that the trading
profits of the industry must provide for the whole of
the rehabilitation expenses is not universally accepted
by enlightened and progressive businessmen and economists. In this connection reliance is placed on the
observations of F. R. M. de Paula in his "Principles of
Auditing " that " the object of depreciation is the replacement of original investment capital and that an
increase in replacement. cost is an important matter
and means that additional capital is required in
order to maintain the original earning capacity". It
is also pointed out that the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales, in its recommendations made in 1949 under the heading " Rising price
levels in relation to accounts" has pointed out that
"the gap between historical and replacement costs
might be too big to be bridged by a provision made
for replacement spread over a period of years either
. by way of supplementing the depreciation charges or
by setting up in lieu of depreciation a provision for
renewals based on estimated replacement costs". It
is therefore suggested that in revising the formula the
claims for rehabilitation should be fixed at a reasonable amount and industry should be required to find
the balance from other sources and if necessary from
its share in the available surplus.
•
In this connection it is pointed out that when the
Labour Appellate Tribunal evolved the formula it was
dealing directly with the needs of the textile industry
and there was no dispute that the plant and machinery of the textile industry had become old and obsolescent and needed immediate replacement, rehabilita·tion and modernisation. It is doubtful whether, in •
giving priority to the claim for rehabiliiation in the
•
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
context of the need; of the textile industry with which
the appellate tribunal was concerned, it really intended that rehabilitation should be claimed by every
industry on theoretical considerations whether or not
the said claim was justified by its actual or practical
need for rehabilitation.
. d
dk
In substance
Bench
Ga;en raga ar 1 . f
b
Athe argument
, is that the Full
.
o the La our ppellate Tribunal evolved its formula
in order that labour may get a reasonable share in
the available surplus and may thereby receive assistance in filling up the gap between its actual wage and
the living wage which it looks forward to receive in
due course ; and if it is found that, in working out the
items which are treated as prior charges, in a majority
of cases the formula leaves no available surplus, then
its main object is frustrated and that is the justification for revising it and readjusting its priorities.
"
In support of this view reliance has also been
placed on the recommendations of the Committee on
'Profit-sharing'. This Committee had been appointed
in 1948 to advise the Government of India "on the
principles to be followed for the determination of (a)
fair wages to labour, (b) fair return to capital employed in the industry, (c) reasonable reserves for the
maintenance and expansion of the undertaking, and
(d) labour's share of the surplus profits, calculated on
a sliding scale normally varying with production,
after provision has been made for (b) and (c) above".
The Committee viewed its problem from three important angles, viz., " profit-sharing as an incentive to
production, profit-sharing as a method of securing
industrial peace, and profit-sharing as a step in the
participation of labour in management". The Committee recog11ised that putting back profits into the
industry is one of the most useful forms of capital
investment and this should be encouraged and it
recommended that a figure of 20% for reserves should
be generally aimed at, though it considered that, as a
first char~e, 10% of the net profits should be compul• sorily set aside for reserves, leaving it to the good sense
of the managerqent to allocate the balance or more
out of their -own share of surplus profits. In regard
'959
The Associated
Cement
Companie.< Ltd.
v.
Its Wo,kmea
!
'
..
•
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
to the labour's share in the surplus profits, the Comr959
mittee stated that, having due regai.V to the conditions
Asscciated
P revailing in the industry selected for an experiment The Cement
in profit-sharing, it had come to the conclusion that Companies Ltd.
labour's share ·should be 50% of the surplus profits of
v.
the undertakings. It is a matter of common know- Its Workmen
ledge that so far Government have not thought it . desirable, expediept or possible to legislate in this Ga;endragadkar J.
matter in the light of the recommendations made by
this Committee ; but it is suggested that these recommendations afford a rational basis for reconstructing
the formula.
It may be conceded that there is some force in some
of the arguments urged in support of the plea that the
formula should be revised and its priorities should be
readju:ated and redefined ; but, on the other hand, we
cannot ignore the fact that on the whole the formula
has worked satisfactorily in a large number of industries all over the country. Except for a few cases,
particularly in Bombay, where some of the tribunals
have taken the view that, in its rigid form, the
formula has become unworkable from the point of
view of labour, in a majority of cases industrial disputes arising between employers and their workmen
in regard to bonus have been settled by tribunals on
the basis of this formula; and it would not be unreasonable or inaccurate to say that by and large labour's
claim for bonus has been fairly and satisfactorily dealt
with. The main Bource of contest in the working of
the formula centres round the industry's claim for
rehabilitation; but, as we shall presently point out, if
this claim is carefully scrutinised and examined in the
light of evidence which the employer has to produce
in support of his claim, even the settlement of this
item would, as it is intended to, invest. the tribunal
with sufficient. discretion to make the working of the
formula elastic enough to meet its two-fold object of
doing justice both to industry and labour.
It is true that in the working of the formula employers sometimes make an attempt to add ite!lls to the
list of prior claims. In The State of Mysore v. The •
•
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
..
\
[1959]
Workers of Kolar Gold Mines (1 ), it was urged before
The Associated this Court by t~e industry that it was a wasting
Cement
industry and as such it needed special consideration.
Companies Ltd. The contention was that for the prosperity and longev.
vity of the ind ustry a special provision for the proIts Workmen
specting of new ore has to be made and that should be
added as an additional item in the list of prior charges.
. Ga;endragadkar J. This argument was, however, rejected and it was held
that the special features of the industry would be
taken into account in determining the amount which
could be reasonably claimed under rehabilitation. This
decision shows the reluctance of this court to vary or
add to the formula which on the whole has so far
worked fairly satisfactorily.
The theory that the whole of the rehabilitation
charges need not come out of the trading profits of the
industry does not appear to be generally accepted. As
has been observed by Paula himself: "In the past the
accepted principle has been that the main object of
providing for the depreciation of wasting assets is to
recoup the original capital invested in the purchase of
such assets. As part of the ca pita! of the concern has
been invested in the purchase of these assets, therefore, when their working life comes to an end, the
earning capacity of these assets ceases. Thus they will
become valueless for the purposes of the business, and
the original capital sunk in their acquisition, less any
scrap value, will have been lost. Hence, in order to
keep the original capital of a business intact, if any
part thereof is invested in the purchase of wasting
assets, revenue must be held back by means of depreciation charges to profit and loss account, in order to
replace the capital that is being lost by reason of the
fact that it is represented by assets that are being- consumed or exb,austed in the course of trading or seeking
to earn income " (2 ). It is also stated by the same
author that" in all cases where one of the direct causes
of earning revenue is gradually to consume fixed assets
of wasting nature, the depreciation of such assets
should be provided for out of ;revenue" (3). It is true
r959
•
(1) [19yj] S.C.R. 895.
(2) F.R.!II. de Paula's• Principles of Auditing', 1957, p. 136.
(3) Ibid, p. 138.
,
•
•
S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
953
I959
that the author -recognises that "owing to the very
considerable increa.se in the pric<'l\ level since the
• d
d
The Associated
termination of t h e 1939
' .45 war, m ustry is fin ing its
Cement
original money capital insufficient for its needs. Thus companies Ltd.
the cost of replacement of fixed assets has greatly
v.
increased and in addition, further working capital is Its Workmen
required to finance a given volume of production. . · t s, m
· dus t ria
· 1.ist s, an d accountan t s con- Ga;endragadkar J ·
M any econom1s
tend that provision should be made, in arriving at
profits, for this increased capital requirement".
Having noticed this view the author adds that "at
the time of writing this matter is still being debated
and final decisions have not yet been reached ", and
he concludes that " until a final solution of this complex
problem is reached it would be inadvisable for the
auditor j;o act on any principle other than that recom.
mended by the Institute "( 1 ); and that principle
appears to be that ;depreciation should be provided for
out of revenue. Besides, it must be borne in mind
that, in adjusting the claims of industry and labour to
share in the profits on a notional basis, it would be
difficult to repel the claim of the industry that a
provision should be made for the rehabilitation of its
plant and machinery from the trading profits. On
principle the guaranteed continuance of the industry
is as much for the benefit of the employer as for that of
labour; and so reasonable provision made in that
behalf must be ·regarded as justified.
The recommendations made by the Committee on
'Profit-sharing' cannot be of much assistance because
they raise questions of policy and principle which
Legislature can more appropriately consider. If the
Legislature feels that the claims for social and
economic justice made by labour should be redefined
on a clearer basis it can step in and legislate in that
behalf. It may also be possible to have the question
comprehensively considered by a high-powered commission which may be asked to examine the pros and cons
of the -problem in all its aspects by taking evidence
from all industries and all bodies cif workmeq. The
plea for the revision of the formula raises an issue
•
(r) F.R.M. de Paula's• Principles of Auditing', I957.'P· So.
•
,.
95~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
which affects all industries; and before any change is
made in it, all in~stries and their workmen would
The Associated.
cement
have to be heard and their pleas carefully considered.
Companies Ltd. It is obvious that while dealing with the present group
v.
of appeals it would be difficult, unrea.sonable and
Its Workmen
inexpedient to attempt such a task. That is why we
G . d -dh
think that labour's claim for bonus should be decided
aJen raga ar 1 ·by tribunals on the basis of the formula without
attempting to revise it.
Whilst we are not prepared to accede to the argument that the formula should be revised, we wish to
emphasise that the formula is elastic enough to meet
reasonably the claims of the industry and labour for
£airplay and justice. In its broad features it recognises
the claims of the industry and tabulates them under
different items as prior charges, and then proviQ.es for
the distribution of available surplus between the
labour, the industry and the shareholders. The items
specified in the formula have to be worked out notionally on theoretical grounds; in determining the content
of each one of the items it is therefore essential to
scrutinise and weigh carefully all the relevant and
material facts. If the content of each item is determined objectively in the light of all relevant and material
facts, the tribunals would generally find it possible to
make reasonable adjustments between the rival claims
and provide for a fair distribution of the available
surplus. In this sense it is necessary to· treat the formula as elastic and not rigid in working out detailed
calculations under it.
We have no doubt that if the industry and labour
genuinely desire to settle the disputes as to bonus
without the intervention of the conciliator or the
adjudicator, the formula would help them to arrive at
a reasonable• settlement. If . the employer does not
make an unduly inflated claim under the items which
safeguard industry's interests, and if workmen do not
make an exaggerated demand for bonus, it would
normally not be beyond the co~operative effort of the
parties .to arrive at a reasonable figure which should
• ·be paid to labour by way of bonus from year to year.
It is unne~essa.ry to emphasise that industrial disputes
'959
'
•
•
S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
955
settled amicably are in the interest of both capital and
I959
labour. Amicable settlements of ~ch disputes lead to The Associated.
peace, harmony and co-operation between capital
Cement
and labour and that invariably helps more production companies Ltd.
which is a matter of great national importance at
v ..
present.
Its Workmen
But unfortunately, in many cases, both the industry . ...
and labour do not appear to be too keen on settlingGa1endragadkar f.
these disputes amicably, with the result that claims
for bonus give rise to disputes year after year and
inevitably the machinery under the Industrial Disputes
Act is set in motion. Conciliation efforts are made but
they do not succeed ; then reference is made under
s. 10 of the Act and the dispute is taken before the
tribunal ; since both the parties are not in a mood to
co-op_!3rate with each other, over-statements are made
on both sides, allegations are met by counter-allegations and they are sought to be supported by evidence.
In such a case the tribunals must examine the rival
contentions and scrutinise the evidence adduced by the
parties objectively and in a judicial manner. If proper
evidence is led and it is judicially weighed, the tribunals would be able to work the formula in a reasonable
manner and arrive at a result which would be substant;ially in conformity with the object underlying the
formula. It is obvious that, in making the relevant
calculations under the items of prior charges specified
in the formula, the tribunals should have a clear idea
as to the content of each one of the said prior charges;
and so it is necessary to examine carefully this aspect
of the matter.
We have already noticed that the formula for
awarding bonus to workmen is based on two considerations; first that labour is entitled to claim a share in
the trading profits of the industry pecause it ha.s
. partially contributed to the same ; and second that
labour is entitled to claim that the gap between its
actual wage and the living wage should within reasonable limits be filled up. The concept of labour's
contribution to the profits of the industry has reference
to the contribution made by the employer and the
workmen taken together as a class ; .and so it would •
•
•
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
not be relevant to inquire which section of labour has
The Associated contributed to what,_share of the profits. The broad
cement
idea underlying this concept is that the capital investCompanies Ltd. ed by the employer and labour contributed by workv.
men jointly produce the profits of an industry. This
Its Workmsn
does not necessarily mean that, in the industry in
question, labour must actually manufacture or produce
. d -dk
Ga;en raga ar 1 .
. the case of manufacture and producgoo ds, t h ough, rn
tion of goods contribution of labour is patent and
. obvious. In the Burma-Shell Oil Storage anil Distributing Co. of India, Ltd. v. Their Workmen(') the
Labour Appellate Tribunal rejected the employers'
claim that, since workmen employed by them did not
manufacture or produce any goods but merely assisted
them in the distribution of oil, they were not entitled
to claim any bonus under the formula. " It is wrong
to say", observed the Labour Appellate Tribunal,
"that because the employees of these oil companies
merely market the oil they have not earned the right
to any bonus ". It was also pointed out, that " the
workmen had to perform duties of various intensity
for marketing an article of public utility, and in that
sense they contribute to production according to the
concept of economists". So were the clerks held
entitled to · bonus for their duties in the general business of the concern though they had nothing to do
with the physical act of marketing the commodity.
It was also emphasised that the other object of granting the bonus was to help the workmen to fill up the
gap between their actual wages and the living wage.
Thus in dealing with the claim for bonus made by
workmen the two-fold basis of the formula must
always be kept in mind.
The working of the formula begins with the figure
of gross profits taken from the profit and loss account
which are arrived at after payment of wages and dearness allowance to the employees and other items of
expenditure. As a general rule the amount of gross
profits thus ascertained is accepted without submitting the statement of the profit and loss account
to. a close· scrutiny. If, however, it appears that
• (r) (1953) II L.L.J. 24.6.
x959
•
S.C.R.
·'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
entries have been made on the debit side deliberately
r959
and mala fide to reduce the amou~t of gross profits, it The Associated
would be open to the tribunal to examine the question
cement
and if it is satisfied that the impugned entries have Companies Ltd.
been made mala fide it may disallow them. This
v.
principle has been recognised by the Labour Appellate Its Workmen
Tribunal when it observed, for instance, in M/s. J. K. G . - k
Cotton Manufacturers Ltd., Kanpur v. Their Work- a;endragatl. ar J.
men (1) that "if managing agents deliberately divert
profits to the selling agents with a view to deprive
labour of their bonus and pay commission to the selling agents at high rates then certainly the matter
must be taken into consideration in the determination
of available surplus balance". It would likewise be
open to the parties to claim the exclusion of items
eithei;: on the credit or on the debit side on the ground
that the impugned items are wholly extraneous and
entirely unrelated to the trading profits of the year.
In considering such a plea the tribunal must resist the
temptation of dissecting the balance-sheet too minutely
or of attempting to reconstruct it in any manner. It
is only glaring cases where the impugned item may
be patently and obviously extraneous that a plea for
its exclusion should be entertained. Where the employer makes profits in the course of carrying on his
trade or business, it would be unreasonable to inquire
whether each one of the items of the said profit is
related to the contribution made by labour. In such
matters the tribunal must take an overall, practical
and commonsense view. Thus it may be stated that
as a rule the gross profits appearing at the foot of the
statement of the profit and loss account should be
taken as the basic figure while working out the
formula.
In working out the formula the oiher important
fact which should not be ignored is that the formula
proceeds to deal with the labour's claim for bonus on
the basis that the relevant year for which bonus is
claimed is a self-sufficient unit and the appropriate
accounts have to be made on the notiorn;i.l basis in
respect of the said 'year. It is substantially because •
(r) [1954] L.A.C. 716, 745· (Also vide [1952] L.A.C. 420, 421.)
•
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1959]
of this basic assumption that if an employer receives
during
the bonus'Year a refund with respect to the
The Associated
Cement
excess profits tax paid by him in a previous year the
Companies Ltd. amount of refund is not included on the credit side.
v.
In Model Mills etc. Textile .Mills, Nagpur v. The
Its Wo•kmen
Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (1 ) the Labour Appellate Tribunal observed that according to the formula,
.Gajendrngadkar ]. th e mcome·
't ax rs
· t o b e d educ t ed as a pr10r
· c h arge on
trading results of the year just as much as the bonus
is to be ascertained upon the trading results of the
year. The concession made by the income-tax authorities in making a refund of the excess profits tax
already paid by the employer is intended to aid a
concern on account of past losses and so it has nothing to do with the formula. The same principle
governs cases where owing to a loss incurred ip the
previous year or years the· employer is entitled to
claim allowance for adjustment under s. 24 (2) of the
Income-tax Act during the bonus year; and so it is
held that the allowance for adjustment which the
employer claims cannot be taken into account in
determining the amount of income-tax payable on the
profits of the bonus year under the formula. In
Bennett Coleman and Co., Ltd. v. Their Workmen (2 )
the Labour Appellate Tribunal rej9cted the contention
raised by labour that since under s. 24 (2) the employer would not be liable to pay tax during the bonus
year no provision for payment of tax should be made
in working out the formula. The Labour Appellate
Tribunal pointed out that the fact that the employer
was not required to pay tax during the bonus year
was the result of the adjustment of the previous year's
unabsorbed depreciation and losses against current
year's profit, and that had no relevance in determining
the available• surplus from the trading profits of
the bonus year. The same view has been taken in
several other decisions to which the Labour Appellate
Tribunal. has referred. In our opinion, once it is
realised that in working out the formula the bonus
year is t;Lken as a unit self-sufficient by itself, the
• decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in regard
(2) (1955) II L. L. J. 60.
(1) (1955) I 1:-· L. J• 534, 540.
1959
\
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
to the refund of excess profits tax and the adjustment
of the previous year's depreciation '\nd losses against
the bonus year's profits must be treated as logical and
The Associated
Cement
00~
~~~~
r959
Having ascertained the amount of gross profits, the
v.
first item of deduction relates to depreciation. The Its Workmen
propriety of this deduction was not questioned before . - k
the Labour Appellate Tribunal which evolved the Ga;endragad ar f.
formula ; but the content of the item of depreciation
became a matter of controversy subsequent to 1950.
After 1948, s. 10 (2) (vi) of the Income-tax Act has
provided for initial and additional depreciation besides
the statutory depreciation which was already admissible. In other words, depreciation allowed under the
Income-tax Act now consists of what may be called
the statutory normal depreciation calculated under
r. 8 as well as initial depreciation and additional depreciation.
The allowance of these. depreciations is an exception to the general rule that .
the income has to be taxed without reference to the
diminution in the value of the capital. Under the
amended provision of s. 10 (2) (vi) of the Income-tax
Act the employers began to claim that from the gross
profits all the depreciations admissible under the
Income-tax Act should be debited; and this claim
was upheld by some tribunals and rejected by otters.
This conflict of decisions led to confusion ; and so a
Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was
constituted to decide this and other points in the case
of the U. P. Electric Supply Co., Ltd., etc. Electricity
Supply Undertakings v. Their Workmen (1 ). The
Full Bench held that" the depreciation which should
be deducted from the gross profits in working the
formula is annual depreciation allowable under the
provisions of the Income-tax Act including the multiple shift depreciation; it also held that the initial
depreciation and additional depreciation which were
also allowed under the Income-tax Act are abnormal
additions to the income-tax depreciation designed to
meet particular contingencies and for a limited period ?
(1) (1955) II L. L. J. 431.
•
122
•
960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
[1959]
and so it would not be fair to the workmen that these
two depreciations ~hould be rated as prior charges
before the available surplus is ascertained". Apparently some doubt arose as to what exactly was allowed to be deducted under this Full Bench decision ; and
two of the members of the Full Bench took occasion
G •
k
to clarify the position in Surat Electricitv Co.'s Staff
•1endragad ar J. Union v. Surat Electricity Co., Ltd. (1 ). This decision
shows that what the Full Bench intended to treat as
depreciation for the purpose of the formula was a
notional amount of normal depreciation ; in order to
avoid any future doubt or confusion, the judgment in
the case has set out the manner in which this notional
normal depreciation has to be worked out. Since this
decision was pronounced it is the notional normal
depreciation that is deducted from the gross prnfits in
working the formula. It seems to us that the view
taken by the Full Bench is wholly consistent with the
basic idea of social justice on which the original
·formula is founded. The relevant provisions of the
Income-tax Act allowing further depreciation are
based on considerations which have no relevance to
the original formula ; indeed, as the Full Bench has
pointed out, if the said two items of depreciations are
allowed to be deducted from the gross profits it would
in a majority of cases defeat the object of the formula
itself. We would accordingly hold that the depreciation which has to be deducted from tho gross profits
should be the notional normal depreciation as explained in the case of Surat Electric Co., Ltd. (1).
The balance obtained after deducting depreciation
from the gross profits is then takerr as the amount on
which calculations have to be made about the incometax payable for the bonus year. This item gives rise
to a controve!'sy between the parties. It is urged for
the employers that in determining the amount payable
by way of income-tax on this balance the tribunal
should not take into consideration allowances which
are made under the relevant provisions of the Incometax Act~ There is no doubt that in taxing the
, employer for the bonus year the Income-tax Act would
(1) (1957) II.L. L. •J. 648.
'959.
The Associated
Cement
Companies Ltd.
v.
Its Workmen
·'
,
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
961
make allowance not only for the normal depreciation
r959
but also for the initial and addit~nal depreciations; The Associated
but the argument is that the income- tax should be
Cement
determined notionally without reference to the said Companies Ltd..
allowances. In support of this argument it is further
v.
urged that though the employer may obtain credit for Its Workmen
the two further depreciations for some years, later on G . d -dk
the said allowances will not be made and his liability a;en raga ar f.
to pay tax would be correspondingly increased. It is
but fair, so the argument runs, that the employer
should be allowed to create a fund of income-tax
reserve from which he would be able to bear his
tax liability in future as and when it is bound to
increase.
On the other hand it is contended on behalf of workmen tliat while determining the amount of tax payable for the bonus year the tribunal cannot ignore the
concession given to the employer by the Income-tax
Act by making the allowance of two further depreciations. What the employer claims is not the amount of
tax payable during the bonus year but much more in
additfon in order to build up a reserve and thi.s notion
of building up a tax reserve for meeting future, though
certain, increased tax liability is foreign to the basic
idea of the formula. For making calculations under
the formula the bonus year is taken as a unit ·and all
items specified in the formula should be worked out on
that basis. That is why the refund of the excess profits tax received in the bonus year is excluded from
consideration and the right of the employer to adjust
his previous year's losses and depreciation against the
trading profits of the bonus year is likewise ignored.
So too the fact that the employer may have to pay
increased taxes in future years must be treated as
irrelevant. That in brief is the case for workmen.
In our opinion, having regard to the basis of the
formula and the manner in which the other items of
the formula are required to be worked out, it would
not be reasonable to allow the employer to claim under
the item of income-tax an additional amount.is respect
of the two further depreciations which are expressly •
,allowed to him under s.10(2)(vi) of .the Income-tax
•
962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
[1959]
Act. It is clear that the amount determined under
this item would no1rrepresent the actual tax which the
income-tax department will recover from the employer.
In that sense it would always be a notional amount ;
but in calculating even this notional amount it would
be unfair and unjust to ignore the concessions allowed
G . d-dk
to the employer by s. 10(2)(vi). The creation of a fund
1
a;en raga ar ·of income-tax reserve may conceivably lead to unnecessary complications. Besides, if on principle the
further depreciations allowed by the Income-tax Act
are treated as inadmissible under the formula and so
are excluded from consideration, it would be substantially inconsistent with the object of such exclusion to
allow the employer to claim tax in respect of the said
amounts of the two depreciations. It is clear that
even if the amount of income-tax is determined after
taking into account the concession given to the
employer by s. 10(2)(vi) it would work no hardship to
the employer, for the simple reason that in future
years when these concessions cease to be operative and
his liability to pay the tax correspondingly increases,
he would be entitled to claim the amount of incometax which would then be payable by him. This
method of calculating income-tax is thus fair to both
the parties and it has besides the merit of being consistent with the basic character of the formula. It
would be relevant in this connection to remember that,
though in most of the industries workmen continue to
be employed from year to year, notionally and on
principle, the claim for bonus for a particular year is
made on behalf of workmen employed during the said
year; and in that sense, the relevant calculations have
to be made with the bonus year as a unit. That is
why considerations of future tax liability of the
employer are{oreign to the calculation under the formula. We would, therefore, hold that in calculating
the amount of tax payable for the bonus year the
tribunals should not take into account the concessions given by the Income-tax Act to the employers
under the two more depreciations allowed under
10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act.
This poii:t has been c;onsidered by this Court in
'959
The Associated
cement
companies Ltd.
v.
Its Workmen
..
-
, s.
'·
•
s:c.R:
/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
963
Sree MeenaksM, Mills, Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1) where
x959
it has upheld the view taken by' the Full Bench of The Associated
the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of the U. P.
cement
Electric Co., Ltd., etc., Electricity Supply Undertak- Companies Lid.
ings (2 ) and has directed that in determining the
v.
amount of income-tax payable during the bonus year, Its Workmen
the further depreciations pe~missible under the In- Gajendragadkar 1 .
come-tax Act should be taken mto account. We would
only like to add that in that case this Court had no
occasion to say what exactly the normal depreciation
meant; but it is clear that the normal depreciation
mentioned in the judgment was not intended to mean
anything other than the notional normal depreciation
as explained by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the
case of the Su,rat Electric Co., Ltd. (3 ). The amount of
income-tax thus determined has then to be deducted
as a prior charge.
The next step in the working of the formula relates
to the deduction of an appropriate amount in respect
of the return on paid-up capital as well as working
capital. We have already noticed that the formula
provides generally for the payment of interest at 6%
per annum on the paid-up capital and at 2% on working capital. Subsequent decisions show that the
tribunals do not regard the said rates as inflexible and
they have suitably modified them in the light of ~he
relevant circumstances in each case. We think that
this is a correct approach and that it is necessary to
fix the rates of interest on the two items of paid-up
capital and working capital according to the circumstances of each case. In this connection it may be
added that ordinarily industrial tribunals award
interest at the rate of 6% per annum on paid-up
capital.
In Workmen of Assam Co., Ltd. v. As~am Co., Ltd.(')
this Court held that interest allowed by the tribunal at
7% on paid-up capital and confirmed by the Labour
Appellate Tribunal was justified because" an industry
connected with agriculture like the tea industry is
exposed to greater risks than any other indllstry suc.h
(1)
(3)
[1958] S.C.R. 878.
(1957) II L.L.J. 648.
(2) (1955) II L.L,J. 431.
(4) [1959].S.C,R. 327 .
.
•
•
964
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
as weather, pests in the plants and gradual deteriora-
x959
Th• Associated tion of the so~l ". <'fn the <;>ther hand, in Ruston and
Cement
·Hornsby (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen(') the Labour
Companies Ltd. Appellate Tribunal allowed only 4% return on the
v.
part of paid-up capital represented by bonus shares
ns:workmen
for the year in which such shares were issued and
.
-
observed that "for subsequent years no · distinction
other paid-up capital represented by
paid-up shares should be made". Similarly, in regard
to reserves or depreciation used as working capital
interest has been allowed either at 4% or at 3% or
even at 2% according to the relevant circumstances.
In the Mill Owners Association, Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh(') the Labour Appellate
Tribunal has observed that "as we have said before,
there is no fixed rule as to the rates of such return (on
ca pita!) and each case must depend on its individual
facts. We have in appropriate cases given as high as
4% but in case of the mills the Full Bench has considered that the equivalent of 2% would be reasonable
and we propose to retain it at that level for the present". In Tea and Coffee Workers Union v. Brooke
Bond (India) (Private) Ltd. (3) the Industrial Tribunal
· has considered the previous decisions on the question
of the return on working capital and held that, in the
case before it, it would be an adequate return on the
working capital if 3% interest is allowed because there
were no special reasons existing for allowing a higher
rate.
In dealing with this aspect of the matter it is relevant to point out that no distinction has been made
by tribunals between reserves used as working capital
and depreciation fund similarly used. In the Mill
Owners Association, Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill
Mazdoor Sangh(') (page 523) when labour objected to
the depreciation fund earning any return even if it
was utilised in or about the business of the year, the
Labour Appellate Tribunal overruled the objection
and observed that " no essential difference could be
rµade between the depreciation fund and any other
Ga;endragadkar J. between it and
•
(r) (1955) I L.L.J. 73.
(2) (r952) I L.L.J. 5r8, 522.
(3) (1958) I L.L.J. 645.
l
\
•
· s.c;R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
965
fund belonging to the company w~ich could be investx959
ed so as to earn a return". It is thus clear that what is The A ssociatcd
material is not the origin of the fund. . It is the fact
Cement
that the fund in the hands of the concern has been Companies Ltd.
used as working capital that justifies the claim for
v.
an adequate return on it. We think it is common- Its Workmen
sense that if the concern utilises liquid funds available G . d-dk
in its hands for the purpose of meeting its working a;en raga ar 1.•
expenses rather than borrow the necessary amount.s it
is entitled to claim some reasonable return on the
funds thus used. It is of course necessary that the
employer must show that the amount under the depreciation fund was in fact available and that it has
actually been used as working capital during the relevant year. What return should be allowed on such
funds ·must inevitably be a question of fact to be
decided by the tribunal in its discretion in each case
in the light.of the relevant circumstances. It would
thus be noticed that in working out these two items
under the formula there is no fixed or rigid rule about
the rate of interest which can be claimed and awarded. It is also clear that if any fund is used by the
employer for the purpose of expanding his business he
is not entitled to claim any return on such fund under
those items. In the case of the U. P. Electric Supply
Co., Ltd. etc. Electricity Supply Undertakings (1) the
. Full Bench ·of the Labour Appellate Tribunal held
that "considering all the factors presented to them
they did not think that a case had been made out for
giving a special prior charge in the shape of return on
. the reserves utilised· for expansion ". When the
amounts awardable to the employer under these two
items are determined they have to be treated as prior
charges in the calculation of available surplus under
the formula.
•
The original formula referred to replacement, rehabilitation and modernisation of the plant and machinery. Soon after the formula was evolved a dispute
arose as to whether the industry was entitled to claim
re~abilitation for its buildings as well and it• was held
that "a claim for rehabilitation for buildings had to •
(1) (1955) II L.L.J. 431.
•
•
966
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
be treated as a prior charge just like the claim for the
rehabilitation of pltnt and machinery" (1). ,This posiThe Associated tion is not disputed before us, and we think rightly.
CMnent
That takes us to the item of rehabilitation and it is
Co1npanie.<o Ltd.
v.
this item which poses a very difficult problem. We
Its wo,kmen
have already noticed that the object of providing
. depreciation of wasting assets in commercial accountGaJendragadkar l· ing is to recoup the original capital invested in the
purchase of such assets; but the amount of depreciation which is allowed under the formula can hardly
cover the probable cost of replacement. That is why
the formula has recognised the industry's claim for
rehabilitation in addition to the admissible depreciation. Since the Second World War prices of industrial
plant and machinery have registered a continuous
upward rise and its inevitable consequence has been a
proportiono.te rise in the claim for rehabilitation. In
considering the claim for rehabilitation it is first necessary to divide the blocks into plant and machinery on
the one hand and other assets like buildings, roads,
railway-sidings, etc., on the other. Then the cost of
these separate blocks has to be ascertained and their
probable future life has to be estimated. Once this
estimate is made it becomes possible to anticipate
approximately the year when the plant or machinery
would need replacement; and it is the probable price
of such replacement on a future date that ultimately
decides the amount to which the employer is entitled
by way of replacement cost. 'Ihis problem can be
considered itemwise where the industry does not own
too many factories and itemwise study of the plant
and machinery is reasonably possible; but if the
industry owns several factories and the number of
plants and machines is very large it would be difficult
to make a study of the replacement costs itemwise,
and in such a case the study has to be blockwise. In
either case what the tribunal has to estimate is the
probable cost of replacement of plant and machinery
at the time when such replacement would become due.
It would •be clear that the decision of this question
• would inevitably depend upon several uncertain
'959
(1)
(195?,) I L.LJ. 518, 522.
'
1
\'
•
SUPREME COtrB.T REPORTS
•
•
961
factots. The estimate about the probable life of the
1959
plant and machinery is itself to son1'8 extent a matter The AssociaM4
of guess work and any anticipation, however intelliCement·
gently made, about the probable trend of prices during Companies Lt&:
the intervening period would be nothing but a guess.
v.
That is how, in the determination of this problem; Its Workmen
several imponderables face the tribunals.
· t s wh'
·
· tt..
Gajendtagadkat J.·
· w h- raises
a con troversy :m
i±lS·
0 ne of· the porn
connection is : What level of prices should- the tribu::hal consider in making its calculations about the
ptobable cost 0£ replacement ? Would it be the price·
level prevailing during th-e bonus year or that pievaif-.
ing at the time when the tribunal holds its ·enquiry?Prima facie it may appear that it is the price level
prevailing in the bonus year that should be treated as
relevant; but if the relevance of the evidence about
th:e price level is limited only to the bonus year~ it
may hinder rather than help the process of a satisfac•
tory determination of the probable cost of replacement,
What the tribunal has to do in determining such cost
is to project the price level into the future and this
can be more satisfactorily done if the price level whfoh:
has to be projected into the future is determined not
only in the light- of the prices prevailing during- the
bonus year but also in the light of subsequent pri'ce
levels. It seems to us that in: order to enable the tri•
bunal to make an estimate in this matter as· near
actualities or realities as possible it is aecessary that
the tribunal should be given fuU discretion to adm'it
all relevant evidence about the tren<l- in price 1-evels.
The prfoe level during the bonus year would no dottht
be admissible ; but that alone should not be taken as
the basis for decision. That is the view which· the
tribunals have taken in a majority of caise_s in dealing
with· the question of reh!!!bilitrution· rund we do :oot
think that there is any justifieation for disturbing the
usua~ practice in that behalf.
.
The problem of determining the' probruhle cost 0f
replacement itself is very difficult;- but- th€'. difficulty
is immeasutably increased,~ when it, is· remembered- thai.t
the cfa~m for rehabilitation. covers not only cases of · •
1"23·
•
968
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
replacement pure and simple but of rehabilitation and
modernisation. I11 the context rehabilitation is distinThe Associated
· h d f
Cement
gms
e rom ord inary repairs wh ich go into the
companies Lid. working expenses of the industry. It is also distinv.
guished from replacement. It is quite conceivable
Its Workmen
that certain parts of machines which constitute a
block may need rehabilitation though the block itself
Gajendragadhar f. can carry on for a number of years ; and this process
of rehabilitation is in a sense a continual process. Unlike replacement, its date cannot always be fixed or
anticipated. So with modernisation ; and all these
three items are included in the claim for rehabilitation.
That is why we think it is necessary that the tribunals
should exercise their discretion in admitting a.II relevant evidence which would enable them to determine
this vexed question satisfactorily.
At this stage it is relevant to remember that the
claim under this item is confined to rehabilitation,
replacement and modernisation. It is common ground
that expansion of the plant and machinery is not
included in this item ; but in several cases it is not
easy to ·distinguish between modernisation of the
plant and machinery and its expansion. It is urged that
an expert can, if he so chooses, make an attempt to
include expansion within what he may describe as
modernisation by clever use of technical words and
details, and that it is precisely this aspect of the
matter which has to be carefully examined by the
tribunal. The industry sometimes claims that a plant
may become obsolescent because it has become out of
date and has to be substituted by a new mo,flern plant.
Is the introduction of the new modern plant in such
circumstances an item of expansion or mere modernisation? It is difficult to lay down any general tests
which woulcf govern the decision of this question. If
jt appears fairly on the evidence that the introduction
of the modern plant or. machine is in substance an
item of expansion of the industry, expenses incurred
in that behalf have to be excluded. On the other
hand, if the employer had to introduce the new plant
· !)ssentia':lly becl).use the use o,f the old plant-though
'
capable of givi_ng service-was uneconomic and otherI959
•
$.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
I959
wise wholly inexpedient, it may be a case of modern"
isation. Similarly, if by the introd'ltction of a. modern The Associated
plant or machine the production capacity of the
Cement
industry has appreciably increased, it would be rele" Companies Ltd.
vant for the tribunal to consider in an appropriate
v.
case whether it would be possible to apportion ex- Its Workme~
penses on the basis that it is a case of partial modern-isation and partial expansion. If, however, the Gajendragadkar J.
increased production is not of a significant order it
may be regarded as incidental to replacement or
modernisation and the question of apportionment may
not arise. We have set out these considerations in
order to emphasise the fact that in dealing with the
problem of rehabilitation the tribunal must carefully
examine the evidence and consider the employer's
clairri in all its aspects before determining the
amount which should be allowed by way of rehabilitation as a prior charge in the relevant year.
The decision on the question of the probable cost of
rehabilitation is always reached by adopting a
suitable multiplier. 'fhis multiplier is based on the
ratio between the cost price of the plant and machinery
and the probable price which may have to be paid for
its rehabilitation, replacement or modernisation.
Since there has been a continuous rise in the prices of
industrial plant and machinery the older the plant
which needs rehabilitation the higher is the multiplier,
That is why there is always a competition between
industry and workmen on this point. Industry is
sometimes tempted to keep its old pre-1939 block alive
with a vie~ to claim a higher multiplier which gives
it a larger amount of rehabilitation expenditure;
whereas workmen urge that the old pre-1939 block has
been nominally kept alive as a device and so press for
a lower multiplier which would reduce the claim· for
rehabilitation. Once a proper multiplier is adopted in
respect of each one of the blocks the first step in determining the probable cost of rehabilitation can be easily
taken. It then becomes a. matter of mere arit_hmetical
cal cu la tion.
. _
,
. At this stage the_divi139r &teps in .. The total amount
•
required for rehabilitation whichi~ dl:lteJ!IDin~d ~y:~he
•
970
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
application of a suitable multiplier in respect of each
block has to be dfVided by a suitable divisor in respect
Ths Associated
Cement
of each block in order to ascertain the annual requireCompanies Ltd. ment of the employer in that behalf year by year.
"'·
In the case of the divisor the employer seeks for a
lls Workmen
lower divisor whereas workmen claim a higher divisor
and this contest has to be decided by the tribunal by
Gajendragadkar ]. reac h"
· cone1usron
·
,.
. mg a £air
on th e ev1"d ence beiore
1"t
about the probable future life of the block in question.
It would thus be noticed that the adoption of a
suitable multiplier and divisor plays a very important
part in the decision of the vexed question about the
employer's rehabilitation claim.
Before actually awarding an appropriate amount
in respect of rehabilitation for the bonus year certain
deductions have to be made. The first deduction is
made on account of the breakdown value of the plant
and machinery which is usually calculated at the rate
of 5% of the cost price of the block in question. Then
the depreciation and general liquid reserves available
to the employer are deducted. The reserves which
have already been reasonably earmarked for specific
purposes of the industry are, however, not taken into
account in this connection. Last of all the rehabilitation amount which may have been allowed to the
employer in previous years would also have to be
deducted ifit appears that the amount was available
at the time when it was awarded in the past and that
it had not been used for rehabilitation purposes in the
meanwhile. These are the broad features of the steps
which have to be taken in deciding the· employer's
claim for rehabilitation under the working of the
formula.
It would thus be clear that the decision of this
major item• in the working of the formula presents
many difficulties; and in the last analysis its decision
depends upon several hypothetical and empirical
cimsiderations. It is, therefore, not surprising that in
the case of Metal Box Co. of India, Ltd. v. Its
Workmen (1 ) the Labour Appellate Tribunal has
observed that " It is unfortunately too true that all
•
t959
(1).[1952} L.A.C. 315, 321.
...
•
s.c.R.
SU:PEE~E COURT REPORTS
our calculations as to rehabilitation may be dispro¥ed
.r959
by subsequent events; it is imp~ssible to say what the The A ssociq.t~d
·trend of world prices wou ld be in t he next fifteen
Cement
years or which circumstances will intervene before Companies Ltfi.
:that period to upset such calculations one way or the
v.
other, and no calculations of this kind are capable of Its Workmev
mathematical accuracy. We have to take a common- . .~ ka
sense view of these matters and make an allowance Ga;en<lragad ' J.
for rehabilitation to the best of our ability and in
accordance with our formula ". It has also been
observed by the Labour Appellate Tribu.nal that if an
appropriate multiplier and divisor are determined
" they are generally used because the tribunals ta.Ire
the view that the reconsideration of the said multiplier and divisor should not be hastily undertaken
and could be justified only on the basis of a substantial
change of a stable character extending or likely to
extend over a sufficient number of years so as to
make a definite and appreciable difference in the cost
of replacement". (Vide: The Mill Owners Association
Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (1) ).
In dealing with the employer's claim for rehabilitation tribunals have always placed the onus of proof
on the employer. He has to prove the price of the
plant and machinery, its age, the period during which
it requires replacement, the cost of replacement, the
amount standing in the depreciation and reserve fund,
and to what extent the funds at his disposal would
meet the cost of replacement. If the employer fails
to lead satisfactory evidence on these points tribunals
have OJ.il occasions totally rejected his claim for rehabilitation. (Vide: Ganesh Flour Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur
v. Ganesh Flour Mills Staff Union, Kanpur(2) ·
Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (3); Dharan:
gadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. Its WPJrkmen (4) ). If
the tribunals are satisfied that the employer is deliberately and wit~~ut a sufficient cause not taking any
steps to rehabilitate, replace or modernise his machinery even though an appropriate allowance is made in
that behalf from year to year, they may take ioto
(I) {1952) I L.L.J. 5t8.
(3) (1955) II L.L.J. 15'~·
(2) [1952] L n.C. 172.j
('!) (1?e~) l J,,.L.J. 475·
•
•
972
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
account this conduct j.n determining the extent of such
The Associa"d allowance in the bonus year in question. Similarly if it
Cement
appears that the employer has deliberately or mala
Companies Ltd. fide refrained from rehabilitating or replacing his old
v.
machinery with a view to claim a higher multiplier in
Its Workmen
calculating the rehabilitating amount, the tribunals
G . d -dk
may
take his conduct into account in determining the
0
1
1 ·actual allowance of rehabilitation to him.
" '" raga
.'
The main difficulty in deciding questions about reha.
bilitation arises from the fact that satisfactory
evidence is not always placed before the tribunals and
it is urged that the evidence given by the employers'
experts is interested and the workmen with their
limited resources are not able to test the said evidence
by adequate. or effective cross-examination. In such
a case the tribunal may, if it so desires and if it is
possible, secure the assistance of assessors (vide s. 38
of the Industrial Disputes Act). It is therefore necesBary that the tribunal should require the employer to
give clear and satisfactory evidence about all the
. rel.evant facts on which it can make the requisite
estimate. The questions which the tribunal has to
consider under this item are Assentially questions of
fact and its final decision on them is bound to be hypothetical, since it would be based on a fair evaluation
of several circumstances which are by no means certain and which cannot be predicated with any amount
of precision or even definiteness. That is why it is of
the utmost importance that all relevant and material
evidence should be adduced by the employer and it
should be properly tested by cross-examination. When
that is done the tribunal must do its best to consider
the said evidence objectively and reach its final decision in a judicial manner.
Once the amdunt of rehabilitation is thus determined the available surplus for the bonus year is ascertained and the final stage is reached when the tribunal
has to give directions for the distribution of the said
available surplus. It is not seriously disputed that
three parties are entitled to claim a share in this avail•ablc surplus ; labour claims boµus from it, the
industry claims a share for the purpose of its expansion
'959
•
•
RC.R.
!...+.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
and other needs, and share-holders claim a share by
I959
way of additional return on .the capital invested
by them. In the case of the Mill Owners Association, The Associated
Cement
Bombay (1) where the formula was evolved, out of the Companies.Lid·;
available surpliis of Rs. 2·61 crores 2·16 crores was
vi
distributed by way of bonus leaving a balance of 0·45 Its Workmen
crores with the industry. In the Trichinopoly Mills
Ltd. v. National Cotton Mills Workers' Union (2 ) theGaj•ndragadkar J.
available surplus was found to be Rs. 34,660 and out
of it Rs. 30,000 was ordered to be distributed as bonus
to the workmen. These two and other similar instances, however, cannot be pressed into.service for the
purpose of evolving any general rule as to the ratio or
proportion in which the available surplus should be
distributed. The ratio of distribution would obviously
depend upon several facts : What are the wages paid
to the workmen and what is the extent of the gap
between the same and a living· wage ? Has the
employer set apart any gratuity fund? If yes, what
is the amount that should be allowed for the bonus
year? What is the extent of the available surplus?
What are the. dividends actually paid by the employer and what are the probabilities of the industry entering upon an immediate programme of ex·pansion? What dividends are usually paid by compar~ble concerns ? What is the general financial position
of the employer ? Has the employer to meet any
urgent liability such as redemption of debenture
bonds? These and similar considerations will naturally determine the actual mode of distribution of the
available surplus. In this connection labour's claim
to fill up the gap between the wage actually paid to
it and. the living wage has an important bearing on
the decision of this point. Industry's claim for paying
additional return on capital and for making add~tional
provision for expansion would also have to be considered. The fact that the employer would be entitled
to a rebate of income-tax on the amount of bonus
paid to his workmen has to be taken into ac~ount and
in many cases it plays a significant part in the final
distribution. Therefore, in our opinion,· once the
. (!). (195.2) I L.L). 518.
(2) (1?5~ IIL·b·J ~?z·.
.j•
•
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
5
'9 9
available surplus is determined, the tribunal should,
in the light of all refevant circumstances, proceed to
make an award directing the payment of a fair and
just amount to labour by way of bonus. If the formula
v.
is thus worked reasonably it would in a large majority
Its Workmen
of cases succeed in achieving its principal object of
.
,
justi-0e both to labour and industry.
G•J•••r•c~••r 1· doing
B eiore
,.. we part w1'th th e questrnn
·
of work'mg th·e
formula it is necessary to observe that the practice
adopted by some tribunals in giving the amount of
bonus a priority in the calculations is not justified.
Logically it is only after all the prior charges have
been determined and deducted from the gross profits
that available surplus can be ascertained; and it is
only after the available surplus is ascertained that the
question of awarding bonus can be considered. Some
tribunals seem to work out notionally the amount of
bonus which they think can be awarded and place
that amount higher up in the process of making calculations before the income-tax payable is determined.
The inevitable consequence of this procedure is to
make the amount of tax proportionately less. We
wish to make it clear that this procedure should not
be followed. As we have already pointed out, in
directing the distribution of the available surplus the
tribunal has to take into account the rebate of incometa:it to which the employer is entitled on the amount
of bonus paid to his workmen but that on principle
is different from placing the amount of bonus immediately· after depreciation in the working of the
formula.
,
:ft has been urged before us by the respondents that
the amount of rehabilitation as well as the amount of
depreciation should be deducted from the gross profits
before income.tax payable is ascertained. In this
connection reliance is· placed on the fact that in its
judgment which evolved the formula the Labour
Appellate Tribunal has at one place described rehabilitation as the first charge in priorities. Having regard
to the context in whfoh the said statement is made it
, is clear that all that the Labour Appellate Tribunal
wanted to ~mphasise was that the textile industry
Tl>e Associated
Cemen•
Companies Ltd.
--:=
•
•
S.C.R.
-
.
975
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
with which it was directly concerned in the said case
r 959
needed rehabilitation very urgently:' The final cal cu- The Associated
lations made in the judgment give a clear indication as
cement
to how the formula has to be worked out. We are, Companies Ltd.
therefore, satisfied that rehabilitation cannot be given
v.
the high priority claimed· for it by the respondents. Its: Workmen
We must now consider whether the tribunal wasG . d-dk .
. ht rn
. d"irectrng
.
·rig
t h at over t•ime payment shouId be a;en raga ar J.
included in the calculation of the bonus which it has
directed the appellant to pay. Mr. Kolah contends
that the direction to include overtime wages is contrary
to the usual practice followed by industrial tribunals
and it is also unsound on principle. This dispute
arises between the employer and the workmen in this
acute form because the total amount of bonus is not
determined logically after ascertaining the available
surplus. If the said amount is logically determined as
indicated by us, then the question as to whether overtime wage& should be included or not would really be
a matter of dispute between workmen inter se ; because
- once the amount of bonus is determined, how it should
be distributed between workmen inter se would cease
to be a matter of direct concern to the employer.
Therefore we think that there would be no occasion for
such a dispute between the employer and his work~ men if the tribunals follow the logical method of
determining the amount of bonus in the manner indicated by us.
On principle we do not think it would be fair to the
workmen as a whole that overtime should be included
in calculating the bonus which each workman should
receive. Workmen who do overtime get additional
payment for such overwork. If in addition to sucli
payment they are allowed to include the said payment
in their wages in calculating bonus to which they are
entitled, obviously the gap between their actual wage
and ~he living wage would be filled up to a larger
extent than in the case of other workmen who do not
·receive such.additional overtime payment. Besides, if
the payment of bonus proceeds on the broad consideration that it is due to the workmen for their contri•
bution to the profits it would be unreasonable to
. make
124
.
•
•
976
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
a distinction between workmen and workmen on the
ground that some"'have contributed more to the profit
than others; and that is exactly what would follow if
overtime workers are allowed to claim a larger
amount of bonus than their other colleagues. That
is why we think that the tribunal was not justified
• d
dk
in directing that the calculations of bonus should be
GaJe• raga ar 1·made on the basis that overtime payments constituted
a part of the basic wages of the employees.
The next point to consider relates to the return on
paid-up capital to which the appellant is entitled. The
tribunal has awarded to the appellant return at the
rate;of6% on paid-up capital and at 4% on the working
capital. The appellant claims a return at a higher
rate on paid-up capital whereas the respondents contend that the return should be paid on the paid-up
capital at a lower rate. In support of its claim for a
higher return the appellant has relied on the fact that
it has consistently paid dividends at a reasonably low
rate and it did not seek to make undue profits even
during the years of war. In this connection Mr. Kolah •
has invited our attention to a statement, Ex. C-1,
showing the percentage of dividend to paid-up capital
and invested capital for the eighteen financial years
1936-37 to 1953-54 and he has asked us to contrast
the low rates of dividend evidenced by it with dividends paid by other companies as shown by another
document Ex. C-12. He has also asked us to take
into account the highest and the lowest quotation for
the company's shares in the Bombay Stock Exchange
during the period 1949-55. On the othei:- hand Mr.
Dudhia has urged that during the relevant year the
appellant has capitalised Rs. 35·85 lakhs from the
reserve fund and 175·45 lakhs from Premium-onShares Acoount by issuing one bonus share for every
five shares held by the shareholders; and he argues that
the tribunal was in error in allowing 6% on the paidup capital during the bonus year. Incidentally Mr.
Dudhia also relied, though half-heartedly, on the finding of.the tribunal that the appellant had paid an
inflated price for the pre-1939 block. It is true that
•
in one pl!l'ce the tribunal has made an observation to
z959
The Associated
Cement
Compan;es Ltd.
v.
Its W°'kmen
•
•
.
RC.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
977
r959
this effect ; but it is clear that the said observation is
inconsistent with its definite finding recorded earlier
•
Associated
in the course of its Judgment
t hat it was not prepare d The Cement
to hold that the A. C. C. had inflated the capital companies Ltd•
. invested by the merging companies by taking them
v.
over in 1936. Therefore this part of Mr. Dudhia's Its Workmen
argument is invalid. In our opinion, the question as . to what return should be allowed to paid-up capital in Ga;endragadkar J.
a given case must be left to be determined by the
tribunal in its discretion having regard to all the relevant facts ; and if the tribunal has in its discretion
awarded 6% interest on the paid-up capital we see no
reason to interfere with its decision. It is clear that
no question. of principle or law is involved in the
matter.
There is one more point which we must consider
before we proceed to deal with the facts in the present
case. This point relates to the employer's claim to
treat the amount in the gratuity fund as a prior
charge ; and this claim has been allowed by the tribu- nal. It appears that in M/S. Metro Motors v. Their
Workmen (3) the Labour Appellate Tribunal observed
that it was desirable in all cases to create a separate
reserve fund for the payment of gratuity and it directed that the modest fund claimed by the employer for
the year in question was a proper deduction from its
profits. The question which we have to decide is
whether the allowance on this account should be
treated as a prior charge in making the calculations
under the formula. There can be no doubt that, in a
sense, the gratuity fund is created for the benefit of
workmen and there should be no difficulty in recognising the appellant's claim for the deduction of an
appropriate amount on this account; but we think on
principle it is desirable that no addition- should be
made to the list of prior charges recognised by the
formula. Even so when the available surplus is
determined the tribunal ought to take into account the
employer's elaim on aeeount of the gratuity fund
created for the benefit of his workmen and the amount
which the tribunal may regard as a reasonable
•
(1) (1952) II L.L.J. 205,
•
978
SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS
..
[1959]
allowance in that behalf should be definitely borne in
mind in finally dtCiding the amount which should be
The Associated
Cemen•
paid to the workmen by way of bonus. This method
Companies Ltd. will meet the employer's claim adequately without
v.
making any addition to the list of priorities specified
lls Workmen
in the formula. Mr. Dudhia contended that the
. d- k
tribunal should not have allowed R.s. 10 lakhs under
Ga1en ragad or 1 ·this item but we do not think there is any substance
in this contention.
Incidentally Mr. Dridhia has pointed out that in
dealing with the appellant's claim for a return on
working capital the tribunal has made a mistake by
including a further sum of 0·66 lakhs as return on
investments. Mr. Kolah has conceded that this is a
mistake and so the return on the working capital
would stand at 26·10 lakhs only.
It is now necessary to consider the evidence of
Mr. Tongaonkar and decide the most controversial
point of fact in dispute between the parties about the
appellant's requirements for rehabilitation. Mr. Tongaonkar holds the Degree of Bachelor of Science of •
the London University, and he is also a Member of
the Institution of Electrical Engineers, London. He
joined the appellant in November 1934, but before that
he had nearly three years' practica-1 experience in
England in various engineering firms ; and on his
return to India, he had joined the Dinshaw group of
cement factories. He continued to work with the said
group until its merger with the appellant in 1936,
when he was appointed by the appellant. Mr. Tongaonkar is in charge of the department •which deals
with the construction of new cement factories, modernisation and extension of the existing cement factories,
design and manufacture of cement machinery for
A. C. C., an<l major engineering problems of the A.C.C.
Since April 1956 he has been appointed the Controller
·of Planning and Development of the A. C. C. He
visits the A. C. C. factories very frequently and claims
to be acquainted with the oonditioll" of the plant and
machrnery at all the A. C. C. factories. There is no
doubt that Mr. Tongaonkar is qualified to give evi•
dence on the. technical points which are relevant in
I959
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
979
dealing with the question of reb._abilitation. Even so,
z959
in appreciating his evidence, it would not be unreason- The Associated
able to bear in mind the fact that he is an officer
Cement
employed by the appellant, and as such he is likely to Companies Lid.
be interested in supporting the claim for rehabilitation
v.
which the appellant has decided to make.
Its Workmen
According to Mr. Tongaonkar, the average future G . d-dk
life of the plant and machinery existing in 1939 would a;en raga ar_ 1
be approximately seven years from 1-8-1954. Similarly,
the approximate future life of the three other categories of blocks would be 13, 15 and 20 years respectively. He has stated that in calculating the life of
machinery, it is n~cessary to take into consideration,
first the mechanical condition of the machinery, second
whether it is efficient or has been rendered obsolete
because new machinery of modern design with a considerably better efficiency has come into the market.
In other words, the probable useful life of the machinery may be prematurely determined by the emergence
of more efficient machinery. In support of this statement he has given some instances where the appellant's plant or machinery had to be changed mainly
for the reason that a new corresponding plant or
machinery was more efficient and gave more satisfactory results. However, stated generally, . in the opinion
of the witness, the average life of a cement plant taken
as a whole would be 25 years if it is properly maintained.
Mr. Tongaonkar then gave evidence about the rise
in prices of plant and machinery and he produced Ex.
0-36 which is a statement showing the progressive
increase in prices from pre-war days up to 1955-56 of
major items of machinery, gear boxes, motors and
power plant used in cement factories. He has stated
that the said statement had been prepared on the
basis of actual quotations which he had in his possession. His evidence shows that between 1951-54 there
has been a rise ofll %, whereas between 1954-56 there
has been a rise of 7% in the prices of the relevant
items of machinery. He then sought to ·corroborate
his evidence on this point by the expenditure actually
incurred by the appellant while putting into commission
•
980
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
'95 9
a new cement factoi;.v at Sindri in about 1955.
Ths Associated The calculations made by him in this behalf show that
Cement
the cost of construction of a new factory is approxiCompanies Ltd. mately 4·3 times the cost of construction of similar
v.
factory in 1939.
Its Wo>kmen
In regard to the life of buildings, Mr. Tongaonkar
• . d-dk
stated
that first-class buildings lived approximately
0
01
1• c
'
'
' " •aga
·
' d
1or 40 years prov1'ded th ey are proper1y mamtame
and provided they are not in earthquake zone; but he
added, that for the main unit of the cement plant it is
usual to take the life of buildings at 25 years. He also
stated that in many cases the existing buildings have
got to be either demolished or considerably modified
when the main machinery whose life is 25 years has
to be replaced by modern machinery which is of a.
different design and which would require buildings and
foundations of different size and type. Thus, for this
special circumstance also, he was not prepared to give
the buildings of the appellant an average life longer
than 25 years.
In regard to the increase in the cost of constructing
buildings, he produced two statements, C-6 and C-14.
Ex. C-6 shows the increase in prices of building
materials since 1938-1954, whereas Ex. C-14 shows
the continually increasing amount of expenditure
incurred by the appellant for construction of labour
quarters, etc.
It is on this evidence that Mr. Tongaonkar has
adopted the respective multipliers and divisors in
arriving at the figure of the amount required for
rehabilitation. As we have already pointed out, for
the pre-1939 block he has taken 4'28 as the multiplier,
whereas for the block purchased between 1940-44: he
has taken 2·8 as the multiplier. He has explained that
the multiplier <1f 4·28 is really made up of two multipliers. Certain portion of the plant and equipment
which is obtained from abroad is estimated at 60% of
the total cost and the expenditure on the remaining
items is estimated at 40% of the total cost. The
m11ltipliers of these two groups are estimated at 4·8 and
-3·5 respectively, and by calculations it has been noticed that the ayerage ratio comes to 4·28. This is the
•
•
S.C.R.
•
-··
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
981
r959
genesis of, and the justification for, the adoption of
4"28 as the multiplier. He ha!!' also added that the The Associated
proportion of 60% and 40% which he had mentioned
cement
was based on his experience of building a number Companies Ltd.
of cement factories and of carrying out extension
v.
and modernisation of existing cement factories. The Its Workmen
multiplier was based, said the witness, on the state Gajendragadkar 1
of comparative quotations of plant, and machinery
received in 1939 and quotations received of similar
machinery recently. It would thus be clear that in
devising the multiplier and divisor, Mr. Tongaonkar
has drawn very largely on his experience and has
drawn inferences which he thought were reasonable.
Besides in making the relevant calculations he has
not dealt with the plant and machinery and the buildings and other assets separately, but has lumped them
together under the respective blocks.
The approximate cost of the merging companies of
their a.ssets as on July 31, 1936, was 5·73 crores of
rupees. Ex. C-3 which is a certificate issued by the
Chartered Accountants shows that "according to the
blocks, the original cost of the block of fixed assets
excluding good will and purchase of rights and land as
at 31st July, 1954, of the appellant under the groups of
years of acquisition'', amounted to Rs .. 19,41,38,100.
Similarly, Ex. C-28 which is also a certificate issued by
the Chartered Accountants, shows that the original
cost of such portion of fixed assets excluding goodwill
and purchase of rights and lands as have been discarded, scrapped or sold as on July 31, 1954, of the appellant cQmpanies under the groups of years of acquisition noted in the certificate, amounted to Rs. 1,70,91,
296. The figures supplied by these two certificates are
mentioned in cols. 2 and 3 respectively in Ex. C-2.
Under the method adopted by Mr. Tongaonkar the
cost of discards is shown in the respective years when
the portions of blocks were discarded; and the
amounts spent on rehabilitation from year to year
have gone with the blocks of the said respective years
shown in col. 2. The amount of rehabilitation has
thus been calculated by the adoption of the multiplie~
and divisor selected by Mr. Tongaoqkar. The question
..
.
•
982
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1959]
which calls for our decision is whether the multipliers
and divisors adopted 1"' Mr. Tongaonkar can be said
to be appropriate. As we have already mentioned, it
is the multipliers and divisors that play a decisive part
v.
in the determination of the employer's claim for
lts Workmen
rehabilitation in all bonus proceedings.
~ . d gad'a· J.
Mr. Tongaonkar's evidence has been severely criti;a;en '°
" ' cised by the respond ents and- m
· f act, t h e trib una l d oes
not appear to have been favourably impressed by it.
Before dealing with the criticism made against his
evidence, it would be pertinent to observe that the
witness has given exhaustive details on the points put
to him in examination-in-chief, and his evidence, read
as a whole, does make an imposing reading. But
sometimes the wealth of details given by experts is
apt to complicate the narrow points of dispute between
the parties and to create doubt and confusion ; the
large number of technical details expressed in technical language may, in some cases, tend to cloud rather
than clarify the points which the tribunal has to consider. We feel inclined to hold that that is what has
happened to some extent in the present case. But that
by itself cannot obviously be said to introduce any
infirmity in the evidence given by the expert or affect
its credibility. It only means the tribunal has to
analyse his statements, examine them carefully in the
light of his cross-examination and decide how far it
would be justified in acting on them.
It has been urged before us by the respondents that
the claim made by Mr. Tongaonkar in regard to the
rehabilitation of the pre-1939 block should be i;ejected.
The contention is that this block must have been
.completely replaced before 1953 and no claim for its
rehabilitation can be entertained. This argument was
based substanti~lly on the ·assumption that a part of
Rs. 997-42 lakhs must have been utilised for the purpose of replacing the said block. Mr. Tongaonkar has
stated that prior to 1-8-1954 the total amount spent
on modernisation, replacement and rehabilitation
and othe:i; sundry jobs, but excluding expan.sic:in, was approximately Rs. 9·97 crores, and in
support of this ~tatement he produced Ex. C-29,
'959
The Associated
Cement
companies Ltd.
··-
•
•
•
S.C.R.
-.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
z959
which shows the said expendit~e year by year.
According to this statement 78 lakhs had been. spent The Asscciated
on the construction of Rohri Works and Kistna Works,
Cement
and Rs. 622·13 lakhs had been spent on the expansion companies Ltd.
during the post.war period. This gives the figure of
v.
Rs. 700•13 lakhs. Deducting this amount from the Its Workmen
total expenditure of Rs. 1697·55 lakhs, the balance of G . Rs. 997•42 lakhs is shown as expenditure on modern- a;endragadkar f.
isation, rehabilitation, replacement and other sundry
capital jobs. It is in respect of' this amount of
Rs. 997·42 lakhs that Mr. Tongaonkar was severely
cross-examined. In cross-examination he stated that
he was not in a position to say whether out of the
total expenditure of Rs. 997·42 lakhs shown in Ex.
0-29 a major portion had been spent on rehabilitation
and replacement of the pre-1939 block and 1940-44
block. He admitted that the figures in Ex. C-29 had
been prepared by the Accounts Department from the
:Financial Books so far as year to year total expenditure was concerned and he also stated that it was
-n.ot possible for him to give details about the said
expenditure. These answers indicated that the amount
of Rs. 997·42 lakhs had been ascertained mechanically
by deducting from the total expenditure of Rs. 1697·55
lakhs incurred on all jobs up to 31-7-1954 the estimated
expenditure of Rs. 700·13 lakhs which was treated as
expenditure for expansion during the said period. It
is on these statements that the respondents placed
reliance in support of their argument that the amount
of Rs. 997·42 lakhs must have been utilised for completely repla.cing the pre-1939 block. Thus presented,
the argument no doubt appeared very plausible, and
so we asked Mr. Kolah to give us a satisfactory
explanation about the items of this expenditure.
Accordingly Mr. Kolah has filed a state:dl.ent, Ex. I
which gives a rough classification of the total capital
expenditure of about Rs. 997 lakhs incurred up to
31-7-1954 on modernisation, replacement, rehabilitation and other sundry and miscellaneous jobs. The
several items of this expenditure are broadly indicated
under eight heads, the last of which covering an
•
125
•
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
amount of Rs. 160 jakhs has in its turn been split up
into five separate items by the statement I(a). There
The Associated
b
Cement
was some dispute before us a out the admissibility of
Compani" Ltd. some of the said items under cl. 5 of this document
v.
I(a). But Mr. Kolah contends, and it is not disputed
Its Workmen
by the respondents either, that even if the whole of the
disputed item 5 is excluded, the remaining items on
Gajendragadkar J. Ex. I give a fairly satisfactory explanation about the
work of rehabilitation, replacement and modernisation
on which the bulk of Rs .. 997·42 lakhs must have been
spent. In view of this statement we must hold that
the assumption made by the respondents that the said
amount of Rs. 997·42 lakhs must have been utilised
for replacing the pre.1939 block is not well-founded.
It is then contended that there is no justification for
keeping the pre.1939 block still alive in view of the
estimate made by Mr. Tongaonkar about the life of
the cement plant and machinery. The suggestion is
that the oldest block is deliberately kept alive in order
to enable the appellant to claim a higher multiplier in
calculating the rehabilitation amount. It cannot be-said that there is no force at all in this criticism. In
fact Mr. Tongaonkar himself has admitted that a
given portion of this block could have been discarded
earlier, but he added, that a part. of it had been
rehabilitated as a temporary measure in order to carry
on. That is why that particular portion of the block
had not been discarded so far. According to him the
pre-1939 block contains a portion whose useful life is
already over, but the appellant would have to carry
on with it until finances could be found for" modernisation or reconstruction or entire replacement of the
said block. In our opinion, this explanation cannot
be said to be wholly satisfactory. If the useful life of
the whole •block had really expired, the appellant
would have easily found it possible to replace the said
block in due time having regard to its general financial
position.
The next criticism made against Mr. Tongaonkar's
evidence is that admittedly he has not calculated the
•
average life of the said block. He stated that he had
•
assessed the pre-1939 block by his personal visits to
I959
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
985
the factory by observing to what extent it had been
I959
rehabilitated as a temporary measure and by consider- T he Associated
ing what its present condition was. It is possible that
Cement
with his knowledge and experience Mr. Tongaonkar Companies Ltd.
may be able to form a proper assessment about the
v.
life of the machinery in the manner deposed to by Its Workmen
him. But unfortunately, effective cross-examination . ·
t
h
b
t"fl
d
t
t
t
b
Ga;endragadkar
].
•
·
on t h1s porn
as een s 1 e .o some ex en ecause
we find that on some material points questions put to
the witness were objected to by Mr. Kolah and the
objection was upheld by the tribunal. The witness
was asked whether he could tell the tribunal with his
wide experience, how many years on the average 1939
block had spent prior to 1939. This question was
clearly relevant and from the respondents' point of
view it was important. If the witness was able to
predicate about the future useful life of the machinery
from his examination of the plant, it was suggested to
him that it should be possible for him to give an estimate about the life already spent by it by the same
-process. The object of this question obviously was to
show that the machinery in question had lived much
longer than its estimated life as deposed to by the witness. This question having been disallowed, any
further cross-examination to test the claim of the
witness that from the inspection and examination of
the mauhinery he can predicate the period of its future
useful life became impossible. The witness was further
asked to state whether it would be correct to assume
that the said pre-1939 block had on an average spent
more than i5 years of its life. This question also was
disallowed, and the respondents naturally make a
serious grievance that they were not given an opportunity to show that Mr. Tongaonkar's estimate about
the life of the plant and machinery was a -gross understatement.
The respondents have then objected to the inclusion
of several items in the approximate cost of rehabilitation mentioned in col. 8 of Ex. C-2. The new
additional packing machine in regard to the fadory at .
Banmore as well as the crane storage are, it is urged,
•
not items of rehabilitation, but of expaHsioq. · .Similar
•
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
criticism is made in regard to the dust-collector plants,
coal-handling plants, items in regard to the fluidificaThe Associated
Cement
tion system, diesel engine shunting locomotive and
Companies Ltd. similar other items.
The respondents' grievance is
v.
that by including these items which are really matters
Its Wo•kmen
of expansion, the amount of approximate cost of rehak
bilitation has been unduly increased. We are unable
.
. JUS
. t'fi
d
·Gajendragad ar ]. t o say i"f th e grievance
is
i e .
In regard to the multiplier adopted by Mr. Tongaonkar, the criticism is that it is based on hypothetical
considerations determined by him in a subjective
manner. It is also pointed out that the failure of the
witness to take out the present day replacement cost
of individual items of the pre-1939 block has introduced an additional element of uncertainty in the final
calculations made by him in regard to the multiplier.
No doubt, the witness has stated that he has used the
multiplier of 4·8 on a comparative study of the quotations received between 1939 and the present day, but
dealing with the machinery blockwise is not a very
satisfactory way of determining such a multiplier. Insupport of this argument, reference is made to the
statements made by the witness to the cost of 180-tonper-day kiln, if manufactured by the appellant, would
be lower than that of a 300-ton-a-day kiln. The
witness then added that the appellant does not manufacture a 180-ton-a-day kiln, and if such a kiln is
imported from abroad its cost would be somewhat
higher than that of a 300-ton-a-day kiln manufactured
by the appellant under present day conditions. He
was then asked whether he had got a qu~tation of a
180-ton-a-day kiln, and he admitted that he had none,
and that he had estimated it approximately at Rs. lli
lakhs. The respondents urged that this estimate about
the cost of Qll imported 180-ton-a-day kiln is purely
notional and is not based on any material at all. This
part of the criticism is justified.
The next argument urged against the statements
prepared by Mr. Tongaonkar is that he appears to
have taken into account the prices prevailing in 1956
• ' and has completely ignored the prices as they obtained
in the preyious years. We have already observed that
1 959
•
s.c.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
987
in deciding the amount of rehabilitation by the adopz959
tion of an appropriate multiplier~ the tribunal should The Associated
take into account all relevant facts and these would
Cement
not be confined to the price level prevailing in any Companies Ltd.
one particular year. When deciding the hypothetical
v.
question as to what would be the price in future when Its Workmen
the plant and machinery would have to be replaced or
rehabilitated, the tribunal has to take an overall Gajendragadkar f.
picture of prices into account, and the argument is
that concentration on the price level of 1956 alone has
introduced an infirmity in the calculations made by
the witness.
There is another infirmity in these calculations
which has been criticised by the respondents. Mr. Tongaonkar has lumped together the plant and machinery
as well as buildings and other properties belonging to
the appellant in col. 2 of Ex. 0-2. The more scientific
and satisfactory method of dealing with the question
of rehabilitation is to treat the plant and machinery
separately from the buildings and other assets that
need rehabilitation. In fact we asked Mr. Kolah to
give us a statement showing the cost of the plant and
machinery and the buildings and other assets separately in order to enable us to have a clearer picture
about the extent of the rehabilitation needs of the
appellant. He has acP-ordingly filed a statement,
Ex. F(a).
There is yet another point on which Mr. Tongaonkar's evidence has been criticised by the respondents.
It is argued that this evidence shows that under his
concept'Of modernisation several items of expansion
can be included. Mr. Tongaonkar has stated that by
'modernisation' he meant 'a composite scheme comprising replacement of the part af the old machinery
by new machinery, installation ofadditivnal machinery
because the layout of the composite modernisation
scheme is different from the previous layout and rehabilitation of the remaining machinery as a short term
measure'. By ' rehabilitatfon' he meant' alterations to
a machine or machinery, installation for·improvii;ig
its mechanical performance, its technical efficiency or •
to extend its life by a further span '. . Th.is would also
•
988
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
include what he corgpendiously describes as the removal of weak links. According to him expansion
can be divided into two groups, viz., Group No. -1
construction of the completely new factory solely for
obtaining additional production; and Group No. 2
would cover the specific additional machines which
G • d-dk
are installed not for modernisation purposes as such,
1
a;en raga "' ·but with the primary object of obtaining additional
production. He concedes that in the 'modernisation
of an existing factory ' expansion is only a part of the
scheme. This means that in the 'modernisation
scheme' there would be an element of' expansion'. It
would thus be clear that the very broad and wide
description of 'modernisation' given by the witness
would justifiably give rise to an apprehension in the
minds of workmen that under the heading of 'modernisation' items of 'expansion ' pure and ·simple are
likely to creep in. That is why evidence given by
experts in such proceedings needs to be scrutinised carefully, with a view to exclude items of' expansion'
properly so. called from the relevant calculations.
Mr. Tongaonkar. has stated that when plant or
machinery is rehabilitated or replaced it may lead to
increase in production. But such an increase is purely
incidental. But what would be the position where,
for instance, a 180-ton-a-day kiln is substituted by a
300-ton-a-day kiln by way of rehabilitation or replacement ? The employer is entitled to say
that the first category of kilns is not available
in the market or that the later category of kilns is
more profitable and economically more useful. That
being so, if the first kiln is discarded and is substituted by the latter, that is an item of rehabilitation or
replacement and not of expansion. On the other hand,
by the substitation ·of the latter kiln there would be
such an appreciable increase in production that the
worknien may be entitled to contend that some apportionment should be made and the rehabilitation part
of the machinery should be separated from the
e4pansion part which has crept into the transaction .
• We confess that it would be very difficult to undertake the tas.k of making any such apportionment.
x959
The A<sociated
cement
Companies Ltd.
v.
Its Workmen
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
989
Even so, tribunals may have ~o consider the workz959
men's plea if'they are satisfied that the steps taken The Associated
by the employer by way of rehabilitation have led to
Cement
a very large increase in production. In this connec- Companies Ltd.
tion the respondents have relied on Ex. H. 0. C-2
v.
which, according to them, shows considerable increase Its Workinen
in production, and that, it is urged, is the result of . · an d no t of re h a b'lit
Ga;endragadkar j.
expans10n
I
a t'10n.
Mr. Tongaonkar has suggested in his evidence that
it is the intention of the employer that decides the
character of the transaction. If the employer wants to
instal new machinery solely with the object of expanding his business, that is expansion ; but if he purchases new machinery for business reasons and not
for the purposes of expansion, it would be rehabilitation notwithstanding the fact that the new machinery
gives rise to increased production. This approach, in
our opinion, gives undue importance to the intention
of the employer and we think that, on a proper occasion, the question may have to be considered by the
- - application of some objective tests. In this connection it would be relevant to bear in mind the fact that
the steps taken by the appellant for rehabilitating,
replacing or modernising its machinery are a part of
its plan of expanding its business so as to meet the
growing demand for cement in our country.
In deciding the question as to whether the claim as
disclosed by the statements prepared by Mr. Tongaon·
kar is inflated or not, the respondents have asked us
to consider the estimate made by the appellant's
Chairm~n in that behalf. In his speech delivered on
January 24, 1951, at the Fourteenth Annual General
Meeting of the appellant company, the Chairman
stated that most of the company's pre-war plant
would be due for replacement in the cw.rse of the next
ten years and he added that '' at the present price
levels, replacement will cost on an average 2! times
the original cost. This will involve an expenditure of
about Rs. 8 crores over and above the provision
already made for depreciation". The contention .is
that, considered in the light of this estimate, the pre-.
sent claim for rehabilitation is very ip.uch inflated.
•
990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
When Mr. Tongaonkai; was asked about this estimate
he
stated that the Chairman had not consulted him
The Associated
Cement
while drafting the annual report or while drafting the
Companies Ltd. portion of the speech in regard to ' rehabilitation ' and
v.
he also added that he did not agree with the figures
Its Workmen
given by the Chairman regarding the replacement
. d-dk
cost of plant and machinery in his report dated
Ga1en rnga ar 1 'J
.
anuary 24 , 195 1. Th'is exp1anat10n
may not be
very satisfactory. But we cannot ignore the fact
that when the Chairman made his statement he did
not purport to calculate the claim for rehabilitation in
•
terms of the formula and so it would not be fair to
test the evidence of the witness in the light of the
estimate given by the Chairman in his speech.
\Ve have so far considered the broad arguments
urged against Mr. Tongaonkar's evidence. U nfortunately, the tribunal has contented itself merely with
the observation that the multiplier of 2·7 would be
adeqnate; and it has given no finding as to the suitable divisor. That is why we mnst now proceed to
adopt a suitable multiplier and divisor for deciding - the question of rehabilitation. We have already stated
our conclusions in regard to some of the infirmities in
the evidence of Mr. Tongaonkar and the statements
prepared by him. He has lumped together all assets
of the appellant that need rehabilitation. He has
taken into account the prices prevailing only in 1956,
and in the selection of an average multiplier he has
probably been slightly generous to the appellant. His
estimate about the life of the plant and machinery has
not been allowed to be sufficiently tested in crossexamination and, on the whole, it appears to err a
little too much on the side of a conservative estimate;
and if that is so his divisor may need revision ; it is
also probable that in the items included by him under
rehabilitation may have been included some which are
more of the character of expansion than rehabilitation,
replacement or modernisation. Besides, it is not unlikely that the steps taken by the appellant ostensibly
for rehabilitation, replacement and modernisation of
•the machinery have appreciably increased its production, and that. may partly be due to the fact that the
'959
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
991
1 959
general plan of expansion ado~ted by the appellant
. has been in operation for some time past. It is in the The Associated
light of these facts that we have to examine the appelCement
lant's claim for rehabilitation. In doing so, we have Companies Ltd.
taken Ex. C-2, Ex. C-23 and Ex. F (a) as a basis for
v.
Our calculations. It is somewhat unfortunate that in Its Workmen
making its claim for rehabilitation Mr. Tongaonkar
· respec t o fGajendragadkar ].
d1"d no t mak e ca1cu1a t"10ns separa t e1y m
plant and machinery as distinct from buildings, roads,
bridges and railway sidings. It is true that at our
instance a statement Ex. F (a) has been filed before
us; but if such a statement had been filed before the
tribunal, the respondents would have had a better
opportunity of testing the accuracy of the calculations
made in it and the basis on which the respective
multipliers and divisors are sought to be deduced
from it. We would, therefore, like to make it clear
that the calculations which we now propose to make
in regard to the item of rehabilitation should not be
taken to be binding on the parties in subsequent years.
--ff, in the light of our decision on the principal points
raised before us in the present appeals, the parties
decide to settle their disputes about bonus for subsequent years there would be no occasion for the
tribunal to deal with ·~hem on the merits. If, however,
these disputes have to be settled by the tribunal, it
would be open to the parties to lead evidence in support
of their respective contentions. The tribunal also
would be at liberty to consider the matter afresh and
come to its own conclusion on the merits.
Let us now proceed to make the relevant calculations. 'rhe first step to take is to correct the figures
in Ex. C-2 by excluding the cost of buildings, roads,
bridges !!-nd railway-sidings from the total cost mentioned in it against the several blocks. ~his cost has
been supplied to us by the appellant in Ex. F (a).
This is how the corrections work out. In our calcula~
tions all figures are expressed in 'lakhs ' :
126
•
•
992
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I959
Chart I .
•
Original cost Less cost of
Balance
of block
buildings etc.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
v.
Its Workmen
486•89
132•98
Up to 1939
353·91
59•91
22•38
1940-44
37·53
Gajendragadkai ].
208·93
68•15
1945-47
140·78
1948-54
1144•81
333·47
811•34
In Ex. F (a) the appellant h_as shown the respective
average ratios in col. 5 in regard to items of property
mentioned in col. 2. We think, in making our calculations, it would ou the whole be fair to adopt 3·5 as a
suitable multiplier up to 1939, 2 from 1940-47 and 1
from 1948-54 (as in C-2) for replacement by part
A.C.C. machinery. We have not disturbed the divisors taken by C-2 though we feel inclined to hold that
Mr. Tongaonkar has underestimated the probable life
of machinery. The amount of yearly requirement for
rehabilitation for the total block minus buildings, etc.,
would then work out at Rs. 229·39. This does not-take into account the available reserves; that aspect
is considered later on:
The Associated
Cement
Companies Ltd.
Period
[1959]
Chart II.
Period
Original
cost of
Multiplier
Total
Less
Balance
Life
Yearly
of requireroachiment
nery
(in Yrs.)
(6)
(8)
(7)
(approx.)
1172·76
167·54
70·40
13
5·41
18·02
270·37
15
768·50
20
break·
down as
in Ex. C.2
(1)
Up to 1939
1940-44
_1945-47
1948-54
(2)
353·91
37'53
140·78
811·34
(3)
x 3•5
x 2
x 2
x I
(4)
(5)
1238·68 65·92
75·06
4·66
28r56 Il"I9
81r34 42·84
"
Total
38·42
229'39
Then we would deal with the buildings, roads,
bridges and railway-sidings. These may be given an
average life of 30 years for all blocks in order to
compensate for cases where they have to be demolished
.on account of modernisation. According to the
• previous statements of the appellant the life of
factory buildings was about 35 years and residential
•·
..
993
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
I959
areas 50 years. Even so we propose to take the
average life of 30 years in malting our calculations The Associated
in respect of these blocks. The multipliers may be
Cement
taken as 2·25 for pre-1939 blocks, 1·5 for 1940-47 Companies Ltd.
v.
· blocks, 1 for 1948-54 blocks. The Bombay block has
Its Workmen
been taken as in Ex. C-2 :
Chart III.
Gaj endragadkar J.
Period
Cost
Multiplier
(1)
(2)
(3)
Up to r939 r32·98 x 2·2s
r940-44
22·38 X I'S
r94s-47
68·1s x r·s
r948-S4
333'47 X I
Bombay}
Office
40·83
block
Total
Less
Balance life
breakdown
valued at s%
of cost
(6)
(4)
(5)
(7)
20
6•65
299·20
292·s5
I'IZ
33'S7
32·4s
2s
98·82
102·22
2s
3·40
r6·67
316·80
30
333"47
so·28
·73
Yearly
requirement
(8)
r4·63
I'29
3'9S
ro·s6
69
'7I
Total ...
31·14
49'SS
Thus the total yearly requirement for rehabilitation
of this block would come to 31·l4 lakhs.
The appellant's claim for rehabilitation can now be
~alculated on the basis of Ex. C-23 as corrected in
the light of the three charts prepared by us. As the
calculations in the chart show, we would hold that the
appellant is entitled to an allowance of 216·10 lakhs
for rehabilitation in the relevant year:
.
.
Chart IV.
Replacement of pre-1939 block:
Cost of machinery
(Chart II)
1172·76
Deduct reserves
311·00
Balance
861·76 divided by 7:
123·11
Add for buildings
14•63
(Chart III)
Total• ...
Replacement cost of 1940-44 block
Including buildings etc. (5·41 plus l ·29) .. .
do
for 1945-47 (18·02 plus 3·95) .. .
do
for 1948-54 (38·42 plus 10·56) .. .
do
for Bombay Office
Tot~l
137•74
6·70
21•97
48·98
•71
216•10
•
•
994
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
Having decided that the total claim for rehabilitation admissible to th~ appellant is 216·10 lakhs for the
The Associated
Cement
relevant year, we must now proceed to determine
companies Ltd. whether on the working of the formula any surplus
v.
profit is available. We have made the following
Its Workmen
calculations in the light of the principles laid down by
us in this judgment:
Gajendragadkar ].
Chart V.
I959
Total profit excluding Bhupendra
factory
Less notional normal depreciation
(p. 428, Pt. I)
Less income-tax payable @
7 as. in the Rupee as per
Note A below
Less 6% on paid-up capital
Less 4% on working capital
428•71
100·22
115•16
76•06
26•10
317·54
Total
...
Balance
Less provision for rehabilitation
·
317·54
111·17 115·88**
Balance
(-)
4·71
This is how we have calculated the income-tax payable for the relevant year :
Note A.
428•71
Gross profits
Less statutory
165•49
depreciation
Balance
Income-tax @ 7 as.
in the Rupee
263·22
115•16
**Provision for rehabilitation (vi de Chart V) :
Total from Chart IV
216·10
Less notional normal
depreciation
100·22
•
Balance
**115•88
..
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
995
We ought to add that in our calq,ulations we have not
I959
taken into account the Bhupendra Factory because The Associated,:
the relevant material for working out the figures in
Cement
regard to this factory is not adequate or satisfactory. companies Ltd.
However from such material as is available it appears
v.
that if the profits made by the said factory are Its Workmen
included in the calculations and rehabilitation required
by it is worked out, it would not materially affeet the Gajendragadkar f.
figure of rehabilitation amount determined by us.
The result is that there is no available surplus from
which the respondents can claim any bonus for the
relevant year. It is true that the appellant has
already paid the respondents 20·65 lakhs as bonus for
the relevant year, and it is likely that it may continue
to do so in future; but that is a matter which is not
governed by the formula.
In view of the fact that the working of the formula
leaves no available surplus the appeal must be allowed
and the award made by the tribunal set aside. Since
the appellant had come to this Court for the decision
--o""f the larger and more important question about the
revision of the formula, we would direct that there
should be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
IN RE THE KERALA EDUCATION BILL, 1957.
REFERENCE UNDER ARTICLE 143(1) OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
(S. R ..DAS c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AIYAR,
B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, s. K. DhS and J. L.
May :n.
KAPUR JJ.)
President's Reference-Kerala Education Bill, r957-Constitutional validity-Advisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, scope of
-Cultural and educational rights of minorities-Constitution of
India, Arts. r43(I), I4, 29, 30 and 226.
•
•
This was a reference under Art. 143(1) of the Constitution
made by the Presid,ent of -India for obtaining the opinion of the
-
-
.
•
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org