COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL versus CALCUTTA NATIONAL BANK LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 April 1959 | [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 660 | 1959 INSC 38
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 April 1959
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, J.L. KAPUR*, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4/1956
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 660
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 38
Text of the judgment
660
r959
Ap,.il 20.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST
BENGAL
v.
CALCUTTA NATIONAL BANK LIMITED
(IN LIQUIDATION)
(B. P. SINHA, J. L. KAPUR and
M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Excess Profits Tax-Rental income-Banking Company letting
out a part of its own premises-Liability-Excess Profits Tax Act,
I940 (XV of I940), s. 2(5). Sch. I, r. 4(4).
The respondent was a banking company and the question
was whether it was liable to pay excess profits tax on a sum of
Rs. 86,ooo received by it as rent in respect of the major part of
a six-storeyed building owned and constructed by it, which it
had let out, the rest being occupied by its headquarters in Calcutta. The Department and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
found against the respondent but the High Court, on a reference
under s. 66(r) of the Income Tax Act, reversed their decision.
The Memorandum of Association of the Company provided as
one of its objects as follows," (e) To purchase, take on lease or in exchange or otherwise acquire any moveable or iinmoveable property, .............. .
which the company may think necessary or convenient for the
purpose of its business, and to construct, maintain and alter any
buildings or works necessary or convenient for the purpose
of the Company."
The question referred to the High Court for decision was
\vhether the said income was part of the business income taxable
under s. 2(5) read with r. 4(4) of the Sch. I to the Excess Profits
Tax Act, 1940. The High Court held that although the income
was derived from the holding of property, since the functions of
the assessee company did not consist wholly or mainly in the
holding of investments or other rroperty as required by the first
proviso to s. 2(5) of the Act, no question of the application of
r. 4(4) could arise.
Held, (Per Sinha and Hidayatullah, JJ., Kapur, J., dissenting), that the question must be answered in the affirmative.
Per SINHA, J.-The High Court was fundamentally in error
in overlooking the main provision of s. 2(5) of the Act, for even
though the first proviso might not apply, that by itself would
not render the main provision of the definition, which was wider
than that under the Indian Income-tax Act inapplicable.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Desoutter Bros. Ltd.,
(r945) 29 T. C. r58, applied.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
The term 'business' was of wide import and each case had
I959
to be determined with reference to the particular kind of activity or occupation of the person concerned. Though ordinarily Commissioner of
Income-tax~
it implied a continuous activity in carrying on a particular trade
or avocation, it might also include an activity which might be West Bengal
v.
called 'quiescent•.
Calcutta
National
The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. The South Behar
Railway Co., Ltd., (1923) 12 T. C. 687 and Commissioners of In- Bank Limited
land Revenue v. The Korean Syndicate, Ltd., (1921) 12 T. C. 181, (In Liquidation)
referred to.
The Memorandum of Association of a company provided the
key to its business objects and the relevant clause in the instant
case clearly showed that the managing of property and realisation of rents therefrom were within the objects of the company,
and, therefore, such rents musf be included in calculating its profits under r. 4(4) of the Sch. I to the Act.
It was not correct to suggest that the rule, in substituting,
the word "partly" for "mainly" occurring in the first proviso to
s. 2(5) exceeded the provisions of the statute. Rule 4(4) did not
derive its operative force from that proviso, limited to an incorporated body of a particular type, and was of wider application
as evident from its own terms as also from the second proviso to
s. 2(5) of the Act.
Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Punjab, (1940) A.C. 1055; [1940] 8 I.T.R. 636 and Sardar Indra
Singh and Sons, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal,
[1954] S.C.R. 167, referred to.
It was not correct to say that if rental income were to be
covered by the main clause of s. 2(5), the first proviso to that
section would become redundant.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. The Tyre Investment
Trust, Ltd., (1924) 12 T. C. 646, ·referred to.
Nor was it correct to say that "business" could not be said
to include-rental income.
The United Commercial Bank Ltd., Calcutta v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, [1958] S.C.R. 79, held inapplicable.
Per KAPUR, J.-The word 'business' could: either mean
what was contained in the main provision of s. 2(5) or have the
extended meaning given by the first proviso to that section. In
either case it was inapplicable to the case of the respondent
whose essential function was to deal in money and credit, letting out of property being neither wholly or even partly its business. The income received by the respondent, therefore, by way
of rent, did not fall within the definition of the word 'profits'
contained in s. 2(19) of ,the Act and was not chargeable to excess
profits tax under s. 4 of the Act.
Salisbury House Estate Ltd. v. Fry, (1930) 15 T. C. 266 1
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
Mellows v. Buxton Palace Hotel Ltd., (1943) 25 T.C. 507 and Commissioners of Inland Rcvenite v. Buxton Palace Hotel Ltd. (1948) 29
Connnissioner of T.C. 329, referred to.
Income-tax,
In construing the first proviso, effect must be given to every
West Bengal
word used. If the mere owning of immoveable property and the
v.
letting out of what was not needed for its own use by a company
Calcutta Jl ational was intended to be covered by the definition, the use of the words
Bank Limited
"wholly" or "mainly" would be wholly redundant.
(In Liquidation)
Rule 4(4) of the first Schedule to the Act did not modify the
definition of 'business' so far as it related to holding of property
and before it could apply, the functions of the company, which
meant the activities apprnpriate to its business, must fall within
the definition of 'business' as given in the Act.
Per HrnAYATULLAH, J.-The rents realised by the respondent
must be regarded as profits from property held as investment
and included in the computation of profits under r. 4(4) of the
first schedule.
There was undeniably a difference between the wording of
the schedule and the Act and the tendency of the schedule was
to widen the definition of business so as to include letting of property for earning rents. It could not, therefore, be said that the
definition contained in the Act, wholly controlled the Schedule
and r. 4(4) must be given effect to.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Gittus, (1920) r K. B. 563,
applied.
Gittus v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (1921) 2 A.C. Sr,
referred to.
1959
Sinha].
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
4 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 10, 1953, of the Calcutta High Court
in Income-tax Reference No. 39 of 1952.
K. N. Rajagopal Sastri, R. H. Dhebar and D. Gupta,
for the appellant.
B. Sen, P. K. Ghosh and P. ](, Bose, for the respondent.
1959. April 20. The following Judgments were
delivered
SINHA, J.-The question for determination in this
appeal by special leave, is whether the assessee, the
Calcutta National Bank Ltd. (in liquidation), is liable
to Excess Profits Tax in respect of Rs, 86,000/-, which
it realised by way of rent of the building at its head9uarters in Calcutta, during the accounting period
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
663
ending March 31, 1946. The Department and the
r959
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal answered the question
in the affirmative. On a statement of the case to the Commissioner
of
I nconie-tax~
High Court under s. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, a West Bengal
Bench of the Calcutta High Court (Chakravartti, 0. J.,
v.
and Lahiri, J.) answered it in the negative, reversing Calcutta National
the orders of the Department and the Tribunal. As Bank Limited
the Bench refused to grant the necessary certificate (In Liquidation)
of fitness, the appellant applied for, and obtained,
Sinha .
1
special leave to appeal, by an order of this Court dated
September 27, 1954.
The facts of this case are short and simple. The
assessee was a banking company in a large way of
business. It owns a six-storeyed building where its
offices are located on the ground floor and a part of
the 6th floor, while the rest of the building is let out to
tenants. The annual rental income derived from the
portion let out, is about Rs. 86,000/-. The Tribunal
found that the portion let out is about four to five
times the floor area of the portion of the building
occupied by the assessee for the purposes of its own
business. By an order dated March 31, 1949, the
•
Excess Profits Tax Officer assessed the respondent on
the said rental income in respect of the accounting
period ending March 31, 1946, under sub-r. (4) of r. 4
of Schedule I to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940
(XV of 1940) (which hereinafter will be referred to as
the Act). On appeal by the respondent, the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner, by his order dated January 3,
1950, upheld the assessment on the basis of sub-r. (2)
of r. 4 of Schedule I to the Act. He pointed out that
the assessee carries on banking business which includes holding investments, and thus, the rental income in respect of its investments in immovable property, is included in its business income, even though
it was not chargeable to income-tax under s. 10 of the
Income-tax Act. Income from securities, like shares
and properties, is chargeable to income-tax under
ss. 8, 9 and 12 of the Act; but that head of income is
chargeable under the Act as business profits. He also
pointed out that the assessee had itself included the
value of these assets in the computation of its capital,
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
for claiming standard profits. This had been done in
Commisoioner of the previous years, and the assessee bank had acceptIncome-tax.
ed the basis and the computation of capital assets
west Bengal
during the previous years. On a further appeal by
v.
the respondent to the Appellate Tribunal, the TribuCalcutta National nal held that there was no doubt that the premises
Bank. Limit'.d were built with a view partly to housing the head
(In Liquidation) office of the company, and partly for the purpose of
being let out to tenants, and that it was an investSinha ] .
ment by the Bank in immovable property. The Tribunal also found that this was within the terms of the
Memorandum of Association of the respondent company. Hence, by its order,dated March 22, 1951, the
Tribunal held that the letting out of so much of the
building as was not occupied by the company itself
for its own business, was a part of its business, and
the rental income was, thus, liable to tax under the
Act. It made a particular reference to sub-r. (4) of
r. 4 of Sch. I to the Act, though the Department
appears to have also relied upon sub-r. (2) of r. 4,
aforesaid. Thereupon, the respondent got the Tribu•
nal to. state the case to the High Court, and the following question was accordingly referred to the High
Court under s. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act:"Whether in this case the rental income from
immovable property is part of the business income
taxable under section 2(5) read with rule 4(4) of Schedule I attached to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940."
The matter was heard by the High Court with the
result indicated above. Hence, this appeal by special
leave.
There is no doubt that excess profits are not chargeable under the Act unless the income falls within the
ambit of business profits. Section 2(5) of the Act defines " business " as under : " 'business ' includes any trade, commerce or
manufacture or any adventure in the nature of trade,
commerce or manufacture or any profession or vocation, but does not include a profession carried on by
an individual or by individuals in partnership if the
profits of the profession depend wholly or mainly on his
or their personal qualifications unless such profession
i959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
consists wholly or mainly in the making of conz959
tracts on behalf of other persons or the giving to other c
-.-.
.
f
. I
.
omm1ssioner of
persons of a d vice o a commercia nature m connec- Income-tax
tion with the making of contracts:
West Beng~l
Provided that where the functions of a company
v.
or of a society incorporated by or under any enact- Calcutta Na'.ional
ment consist wholly or mainly in the
(IBanLk. L•.mdit~d)
. holding of invest.
n
iqui ation
ments or ot h er property, the holdmg of the rnvest_
ment· or property shall be deemed for the purpose of
Sinha J.
this definition to be a business carried on by such company or society:
Provided further that all businesses to which
this Act applies carried on by the same person shall
be treated as one business for the purposes of this
Act;".
The definition of " business " under the Act, is wider
than the definition of that term under the Income-tax
Act (s. 2(4)). Section 2 (19) of the Act defines "profits " as follows :" ' profits ' means profits as determined in accordance with the First Schedule."
Section 2 (20) defines " standard profits " as follo"4S :"Standard profits means standard profits as computed in accordance with the provisions of Section 6".
And the charging section, s. 4 of the Act, provides
that in respect of any business to which the Act
applies, excess profits, that is, profits during any
chargeable accounting period, exceeding the standard
profits, shall be charged, levied and paid. Section 5
of the Act provides as follows:"This Act shall apply to every business of which
any part of the profits made during the chargeable
accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by
virtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or sub.clause
(ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or of clause (c) of that
sub-section :
Provided that this Act shall not apply to any
business the whole of the profits· of which accrue or
arise without British India where such business is
carried on by or on behalf of a person who is resident
84
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
but not ordinarily resident in British India unless the
business is controlled in India ;
Commissioner of
Provided further that where the profits of a part
Income·tax,
west Bengal
only of a business carried on by a person who is not
v.
resident in British I!1dia or not ordinarily so resident
Calcutta National accrue or arise in British India or are deemed under
BonLk. Lfrdnited l the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, so to accrue or arise,
(I niqmatwnh
here thb"
_
t en, excep t w
e usmess b"
emg t hb"
e usmess of a
Sinha J.
person who is resident but not ordinarily resident in
British India is controlled in India, this Act shall
apply only to such part of the business, and such part
shall for all the purposes of this Act be deemed to be
a separate business ;
Provided further that this Act shall not apply to
any business the whole of the profits of which accrue
or arise in an Indian State; and where the profits of a
part of a business accrue or arise in an Indian State,
such part shall, for the purposes of this provision, be
deemed to be a separate business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State, and
the other part of the business shall, for all the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a separate business."
The First Schedule, which contains the rules for computation of profits, provides, in sub-r. 4 of r. 4, as
follows:" (4) In the case of a business which consists
wholly or partly in the letting out of property on hire,
the income from the property shall be included in the
profits of the business whether or not it has been
charged to income-tax under Section 9 of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, or under any other section of
that Act."
Having set out the relevant ·provisions of the Act,
the first question that arises for consideration, is whether the letting out of the premises in question can be
said to be a business of the assessee bank. The definition of " business " is only an inclusive one, and
includes any sort of trade, commerce or manufacture.
Can it be said that realization of income from its
investments which may be either in shares, securities
or in immovable properties, is not a part of the business of a banking corpora tion ? In my opinion, it will
z959
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
667
be taking a very narrow view of the functions of a
x959
bank to hold that such activities are not within the c
.-.
•
of
am bI't of t h e b usmess
ac t'iv1't'ies of a b an k . I n th e ommissioner
Income-tax
Memorandull1 of Association of the assessee bank, the west Beng;l
objects of the company are stated to be:
v.
"(a) To carry on all kinds of banking business Calcutta National
that are generally carried on by Joint Stock Banks ... " Bank. Limited
" (b) T o carry on t he busmess
·
· a 11 I'ts (In Liquidation)
of ban k'mg m
branches and departments, including borrowing, raisSinha 1 .
ing or taking up money, the lending or advancing
money, securities or properties ; ......... the acquiring,
holding, issuing and dealing with ... investment of all
kinds; ......... the managing of properties ......... "
"(c) To purchase, take on lease or in exchange or
otherwise acquire any moveable or immoveable property,. ........ which the Company may think necessary
or convenient for the purpose of its business, and to
construct, maintain and alter any buildings or works
necessary or convenient for the purpose of the·company."
Apparently, the bank constructed the six-storeyed
building not only for its own use and occupation, but
also, according to the finding of the Appellate Tribunal, for the major part, for the purpose of realising
rent from tenants. Where land in a big city, like
Calcutta, is taken for building purposes, it is common
' knowledge that erecting a multi-storeyed building, is
by itself an investment, besides affording accommodation for the bank to carry on and advertise its business, and house its head-office and records.
The High Court answered the question referred to,
in the negative on the ground that though the income
was derived from the holding of property, the functions of the assessee-company did not consist wholly
or mainly in the holding of in vestments or other property, as required by the proviso to s. 2(5) of the Act.
Since the requirement of the first proviso to s. 2(5) of
the Act, was not satisfied, no question of the application of sub-r. (4) of r. 4, could arise; and even if such
a question could arise, the word " business " in that
sub-rule, must take its colour from the main provisions of the section. This conclusion was reached by
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
the learned Chief Justice, who delivered the opinion
the Court, by starting with the premise that for
the nature of the income of the company,
determining
Income-tax,
west Bengal
it was not necessary to consider the provisions of the
v.
definition of " business '', contained in the main clause
Calcutta National of s. 2(5), which was also assumed to be parallel to the
Bank Limited connotation of the term " business " under the Indian
(In Liquidation) I
.
. hout
ncome-tax Act. H avmg,
t h us, exc1ud ed , wit
Sinha J.
giving any reasons why they had to be excluded, the
provisions of the main clause of the definition of
"business", as contained in the Act, the learned Chief
Justice addressed himself to the question whether the
first proviso to the definition clause, which was in the
nature of an additional provision, could govern the
facts of the case, and bring it within the ambit of that
kind of business ·to which the Act applied. The
learned Chief Justice rightly pointed out that the first
proviso is limited to incorporated bodies and had no
reference to individuals. Then, the learned Chief
Justice observed : " It is to be noticed that in the
contemplation of this proviso, property is something
different from investments, for it speaks of' investments or other propert.y '. It is also to be noticed
that if the requirements of the proviso are satisfied,
the holding of investments or other property shall be
' deemed to be a business ', which implies that it is not
really a business and, but for the special provisions
made by proviso, would not be . within the general
definition contained in the main clause ". It is doubtful whether these observations are entirely correct,
but, as will presently appear, we are not so much
concerned with the proviso as with the main provisions
of the definition clause (s. 2(5) ). The conclusion of
the learned Chief Justice may better be stated in his
own words, as follows :"It appears to me that the first matter to which
we must address ourselves in answering the question
before us is : are the functions of· the assessee company such that the holding of the building in question
or buildings or other property &nd investments in
general must be deemed to be its business for the pur·poses of the Excess Profits Tax Act under the first
1 959
Commission" of of
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
669
proviso to section 2(5) ? In order that that question
1959
may be answered in favour of the Revenue, it is Conzmissioner of
necessary that the holding of investments or other Inconze-tax,
property should be the only or the principal function West Bengal
of the assessee company. As I have said, the assessee
v.
company is a banking company in a large way of Calcutta Natfonal
business. It is hardly disputable and indeed it was Banh Limited
£
• of mvestmen
·
t s (In Liquidation)
.
d beiore
not d ispute
us, t h at t b e b oJd' rng
Sinha 1.
or other property was not its sole or primary occupation, much less the holding of the particular building
in question".
In my opinion, the aforesaid conclusion of the High
Court suffers from two fundamental errors, namely,
(1) that the main clause of the definition section is
out of the way in determining the present controversy,
and (2) that it was the proviso only which had to be
considered in order to answer the question referred.
In the first instance, the learned Chief Justice is not
entirely correct in observing that the definition of the
term "business" follows the definition of the same
term in the Indian Income-tax Act. As already
observed, the definition under the Act, is wider than
that under the Income-tax Act, in so far ·as it includes
certain types of profession or vocation. The scheme of
the Act, as compared to that of the Income-tax Act,
will have to be considered presently, but it is enough
to point out that the connotation of the term "business" under the Act, is wider than that of the same
term under the. Income-tax Act. The learned Chief
Justice set aside, from his consideration, the provisions of the main clause of s. 2(5), and did not indicate
his reasons for doing so. Ordinarily, the Court has
first to consider whether the main clause of the definition Of the term " business ", would govern the facts of
the case. The question of the application of the first
proviso, which, it is common ground, is in the nature
of an additional provision which brings within its
ambit certain types of income (to use a neutral term)
which would not otherwise have come within the
terms of the main clause of the definition, can arise
only if the Court first comes to the conclusion that the
main clause of the definition is out of the way. I will
670
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
assume that the holding of investments or other proCommission" of property, is not the whole or main business of the
Income-tax.
Respondent Company. That assumption will put
w,,1 Bengal
aside the first proviso aforesaid, but that does not by
v.
itself lead to the inference that the main provision of
Calcutta National the definition clause, cannot be applied to the responBank Limited dent.
An argument on these lines was advanced; and
(Tn Liquidation)
was repe J] ed by L ord Greene, M. R., in the case of
Sinha J.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Desoutter Bros.,
Ltd. (1). In that case, sub-s. (4) of s. 12 of the Finance
(No. 2) Act, 1939, which deals with Excess Profits
Tax, was under consideration by the Court of Appeal.
The learned Master of Rolls considered the question,
and made the following observations which apply
with full force to the arguments which found favour
in the High Court:.
"The first argument is based on the language of
Section 12(4) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1939, which
deals with Excess Profits Tax. The first Sub-section
speaks of the profits 'arising in any chargeable
accounting period from any trade or business to which
this section applies'. It is in respect of those profits
that the tax is exigible. It will be observed that the
language only extends to the profits arising from ' any
trade or business'. Sub-section (4) says 'Where the
functions of a company or society incorporated by or
. under any enactment consist wholly or mainly in the
holding of investments or other property, the holding
of the investments or property shall be deemed for the
purpose of this section to be a business carried on by
the company or society'."
" I should have thought that the objects of that
Sub-section were manifest. In my view it was intended, and quite clearly intended, to bring into the net a
type of corporation which otherwise would or might
have escaped it. The commonest type of corporation
with which the Sub-section is <lea.ling is what may be
called a trust investment company, whose business is
the holding of investments and deriving income from
them. Such a corporation would not be said to be carrying on a 'trade or business' within the meaning of
z959
(r) (1945) 29 T.C. 155, 160.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
671
Sub-section (1). Anyhow, if it were not absolutely
z959
clear, Sub-section (4) makes it quite certain that that
.-.
. is
. t o be me
. lud ed , an d 1"t s operations
.
Commissioner of
t Yp e of corpora t ion
1
1ax#
are to be regarded as the carrying on of a trade or west Bengal
business. That seems to me to be the real and sole
v.
object of Sub-section (4)."
Calcutta National
"The argument really amounted to this: by impli- •. Bank. Limit~d
cation the profits from investments or property held (In Liquidation)
by any other type of corporation is excluded. I cannot
Sinha 1 .
begin to see the shadow of a foundation for any such
argument. In my opinion it breaks down completely
once the real significance of Sub-section (4) is appreciated."
I respectfully adopt the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeal, extracted above.
It follows that the first proviso to s. 2(5) does not determine the controversy arising in this case. This conclusion completely displaces the ratio of the opinion of
the High Court, but it does not answer the question
referred to it. It has, therefore, to be considered whether the main definition clause ins. 2(5) can come into
play in giving the answer to the question referred for
the opinion of the High Court. The term "business "
is a word of very wide, though by no means determinate, scope. It has rightly been observed in judicial
decisions of high authority that it is neither practicable
nor desirable to make any attempt at de-limiting the
ambit of its connotation. Each case has to be determined with reference to the particular kind of activity
and occupation of the person concerned. Though
ordinarily "business" implies a continuous activity in
carrying on a particular trade or avocation, it may
also include an activity which may be called
'quiescent'. This is illustrated by the case which
went up to the House of Lords in The Commissioners
of Inland Revenue v. The South Behar Railway Go.,
Ltd. {1). In that case, the facts were these. Down to
1906, the South Behar Railway was held by the Respondent Company and worked by another Company
on behalf of the Secretary of State for India, the
Respondent Company being entitled to a share in the
ncome~
(1) (1923) 12 T. C. 657.
672
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1959] Supp.
profits in consideration of its having supplied funds
and materials for the construction of the Rail way.
Commissioner of In 1906, the Respondent Company relinquished possesIncome-tax,
West Bmgal
sion of the Railway to the Secretary of State, on the
v.
stipulation that until the option to purchase was
Calcntta National exercised, a fixed annuity of£ 30,000 should be paid to
Ban~ Limit'.d :the Company in lieu of the share of profits so far paid.
(In Liquidation) After that arrangement in 1906, the Company did
Sinha J.
nothing but receive and distribute the said annuity to
its share-holders. It ,was held by the House of Lords
that the Company was carrying on a trade or business,
and was, therefore, liable to Corporation Profits Tax.
The House of Lords, while affirming the decision of the
Court of Appeal, observed that the finding of the Commissioners, which was reversed by the Court of Appeal,
was not a finding of pure fact, but was an inference of
law, derived from the specific facts found in the case,
and that, consequently, the decision was open to
review. The House of Lords, in upholding the decision of the. Court of Appeal, observed that by the
agreement of 1906, the Company's income, which previoµsly was a fluctuating income derived from the
share of the profits, had been converted into a fixed
annuity irrespective of the earnings of the Railway ;
and that the new arrangement did not materially
affect the position of the Company as a business concern. The House of Lords approved of the decision in
the case of the Commissioners of ln/,and Revenue
v. The Korean Syndicate, Ltd.('). In that case, a
Syndicate was registered in 1905 as a Company for
the purposes of acquiring and working concessions
and turning them to account, and of investing and
dealing with any moneys not immediately required.
In 1905, the Syndicate acquired part of a right to a
concession in Korea, which included a gold mine, but
in 1908, it assigned its rights to another Company
under an agreement of lease in consideration of certain royalties, but which were really a percentage of
the profits in working the prope_rty. In 191l, the
Syndicate placed in deposit at a bank, certain sums of
money received from the sale of shates which had
z959
(1) (1921) 12 T.C. 181.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
I959
been obtained by the Syndicate in exchange for other
shares. During the relevant period, the Syndicate's
· · b k .
d Commissioner of
activities were con fi ne d to rece1v111g an mterest an
Income-tax,
royalties and distributing that income amongst its west Bengal,
shareholders. Rowlatt, J. held, that the Company
v.
was not carrying on a business. On appeal, it was Calcutta National
held that the Syndicate was carrying on a business Bank Limited
and that the profits derived therefrom, were liable t~ (In Liquidation)
Excess Profits Tax. In order to ascertain the business
Sinha ].
of a Company, its Memorandum has to be looked into.
The Memorandum provides the key to what the business objects of the Company are, and it has further to
be ascertained whether those objects are still being
pursued. In the present case, the relevant clauses of
the Memorandum of Association, have been set out,
and there cannot be the least doubt that the managing of property and realisation of rents therefrom, was
within the objects of the Company, if it found it
necessary and convenient for carrying on its business.
It may be that this line of business activity may not
be the main part of its business, but even so, if realisation of rent is one of the sources of business income
to the Company, it has got to be included in the computation of its profits for the purposes of the Act.
This becomes clear on a reference to sub-r. (4) of r. 4,
quoted above. But it has been contended that the
words" wholly or partly" in the Rule, are in excess of
the provisions of s. 2(5), where, in the first proviso, the
words are " wholly or mainly ". The suggestion is
that the rule, in so far as it substituted " partly " for
"mainly ", is in excess of the provisions of the statute.
In my opinion, this argument is based on an assumption which is not well-founded. As will presently
appear from an examination and comparison of the
provisions of the Act and the Income-tax Act, r. 4(4)
does not n\lcessarily derive its operative force from
the first proviso to the main clause Of the definition in
s. 2(5). The proviso, as already observed, is limited
to an incorporated body of a particular type, and has
reference to the " holding of investments or other property". Rule 4(4) is of a more general application to
674
'959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
a "business which consists wholly or partly in the
Commissioner of letting out of property on hire ". In the rule, a referIncome-tax,
ence to s. 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act, also makes
West Bengal
it clear that the rule is concerned with "property ''.
v.
.
It is also clear that the basis for taxation of property
Calcutta National under s. 9 of the Income-tax Act, is different from the
Bank Limited b •
·
(In Liquidation)
as1s oft axa t'10n un d er th e A ct! ' respec~ of mcome
I?
from property, and the latter 1s 1rrespecjave of wheSinha J.
ther income from property has been the subject-matter
of charge under the Income-tax Act. In this connection, a reference to the second proviso is also relevant
in so far as it implies that a person may carry on
businesses of differ!mt kinds, and all those different
lines of business have, for the purposes of the Act, to
be treated as one business. Thus, the Bank may be
carrying on the business of holding deposits, securities
and property, as also lending money on different kinds
of securities. Its income from all those activities,
would have to be taken into account in order to determine its total business profits. A similar question
arose in the case of Punjab Co-operative Bank, Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab('), which went
up to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
In that case, the question arose whether the realisation of higher values by sale and purchase of shares
and securities by the Bank, could be said to be business profits, and thus, taxable, under the Indian Income-tax Act. On behalf of the Bank, it had been
contended throughout, without success, that the realisation of higher values by the sale of shares and
securities, was not a separate business of the Bank,
but was in the way of its business as a banking corporation which had to deal with money and credit, and
that the Bank had always to have in its hands, cash
and easily realisable securities to meet any probable
demands by its depositors. But it had been found as
a fact that the Bank had been selling shares and securities not only for the purpose aforesaid, but also for
augmenting its reserve funds. It was held by the
Judicial Committee that it had been rightly decided
·by the Department and by the High Court, on a
(1) (1940) AC. 1055; [1940] 8 I.T.R 635.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT R.EPOI~TS
675
1 959
reference, that the purchase and sale of shares and
securities were a part of the banking business of the
· I
I
Commissioner of
Company, and t h e pro fi ts, t h us, rea ised were iable to Income-tax,
income-tax. Their Lordships of the Judicial Com- west Bengal
mittee also observed that it was not necessary to estav.
blish that the Bank had been carrying on a separate Calcutta National.
business of buying and selling shares and investments Bank Limited
in order to make profits thus made taxable. On<re it (Tn Liquidation)
is found that such transactions were entered into by
Sinha ].
the Bank not merely with a view to realisation or
change of investments, but with a view to carrying
on a business in the sense of earning profits, the Bank
was really carrying on a business within the meaning
of the Income- tax· Act.
,
Following this decision of the Privy Council, this
Court decided in the case of Sardar Indra Singh and
Sons Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West
Bengal (1) that the question whether a certain income
is profit from business and not an appreciation of
capital arising from a change of investment, depends
upon the answer to the further question whether that
income was so connected with the carrying on of the
assessee's business that it could fairly be said that it
is the profits and gains of the business in its normal
working. It was not necessary further to _show that
the income had resulted from a course of dealing
which, by itself, would amount to the carrying on of a
business. In that case, the assessee company had, as
one of its objects to carry on the business of financiers,
and to purchase and sell stock, shares, business concerns and other undertakings. In carrying out that
objective, the company held a large number of shares
in other companies, and was realising its holdings and
acquiring new shares. In the background of those
facts, it was held by a Bench of five Judges of this
Court, that the profits made from the sale of investments and the making of fresh investments, were
assessable to income-tax. In the course of his judgment, Patanjali Sastri, C. J., speaking for the Court,
made the following very pertinent observations:"The principle applicable in all such cases is well
1
(1) [1954] S.C.R.,167, 170, 171,
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
settled and the question always is whether the sales
which produced the surplus were so connected with
Co1ninissioner of
the
carruing
on of the. assessce's business that it could
Income-lax,
.J
west Dengal
fairly be said that the surplus is the profits and gains
v.
of such business. It is·not necessary that the surplus
Calcutta Natfonal should have resulted from such a course of dealing in
Banh L•m•ud securities as by itself would amount to the carrying on
(In Liquidahon)
•
· an d selJ'mg securities.
' ·
I t wou Jd
of 'll. JJusmess
of b uymg
Sinha ; .
be enough if such sales were effected in the usual
course of carrying on the business or, in the words used
by the Privy Council in Punjab Go-operative Bank Ltd.
v. Income Tax Commissioner, Lahore (1), if the realisation of securities is a normal step in carrying on the
assessee's businef!s. Though that case arose out of the
assessment of a banking business, the test is one
of general application in determining whether the
surplus arising out of such transactions is a capital
receipt or a trading profit."
But the learned counsel for the Respondent Bank
argued that in the present case, the earning of rental
income by the Bank could not come within s. IO of
the Income-tax Act, and the definition of "business"
in the Act and in the Income-tax Act, in so far as they
are relevant to the present case, must be the same. In
other words, it was contended that as realisation of
rents from·. house property of the Bank, could not come
within the purview of s. IO of the Income-tax Act, it
could not also come within the purview of the Act we
are now concerned with. In my opinion, there is a
fallacy in this argument. The scheme of the two Acts
is not the same. The Income-tax Act has brought
within its taxing ambit, not only income from what is
ordinarily called business, but income from several
other sources. Sections 3 and 4 of the Income-tax Act
render liable to tax "all income, profits and gains from
whatever source derived'', and s. 6 of the Income-tax
Act, classifies the different heads of income, profits
and gains into (I) salaries, and the manner of charging
the same is laid down in s. 7 ; (2) interest on securities,
and the manner of charging the tax is laid down
in s. 8; (3) income from property, to be taxed in
'959
·(r) (1940) A. C. 1055; [1940] 8 I. T. R. 635.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
accordanc~ with the provisions of s. 9; and (4) profits
r959
and gains from business, profession or avocation, to be C01nm4ss-ioner of
taxed in accordance with the provisions of s. 10. The Income-tax,
fifth and the sixth heads of income may be omitted west Bengal
from the present discussion. On the other hand, under
v.
the Act in question, only tax on excess profits, arising Calcutta N_atfonal
out of certain businesses, has been imposed. The Act Bank_ Li_mit~d
is not concerned with all kinds of income, but only (In Liquidation)
with profits if made beyond a certain standard laid
Sinha .
1
down under the Act, from business described in s. 5.
Under the Act, the ambit of the term "business"
covers the fourth head, though not the whol~ of it, as
also thll second and the third heads, set out above,
again though not, perhaps, the whole of them. It is
not, therefore, correct to say that what would not come
within the ambit of s. IO of the Income-tax Act, would
also not come within the ambit of the Act. On a
proper construction of the provisions of the Act, it has
got to be held that what has been covered by ss. 8, 9
and 10, at least in parts, of the Income-tax Act, comes
within the purview of the Act. This is not intended
to be a complete statement of the comparative am bits
of the two Acts, but it" is enough to dispose of the
argument that business, as understood under the Act,
is completely covered by the provisions of s. 10 of the
Income-tax Act .
In this connection, another argument advanced by
the learned counsel for the respondent, as an additional reason for not treating rental income as coming
within the purview of the Act, may now be considered.
It was argued that the first proviso to s. 2(5), set out
above, would become redundant if rental income were
to be covered by the main clause of the definition.
'This argument again ignores some of the crucial words
of the proviso. It speaks only of" holding of investments or other property '', which is not the same thing
as dealing with shares, investments or other property.
This proviso was, perhaps, inserted out of abundant
caution to repel arguments, like those advanced in the
case of The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. 1'he
Tyre Investment Trust Ltd. (1). In that case, the l{espondent Company was incorporated in 1917, with the
(1) [1924] 12 T.C. 646.
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
main objects of acquiring and holding shares, etc., and
CommissiJ!n" of was formed mainly with a view to acquiring shares in
Income-tax.
two foreign companies and selling them to an English
West Hengal
Company which was likely to be interested in them.
v.
After the Respondent Company had purchased the
Calcutta National shares it took an active interest in the affairs of those
HanLk. Lindcited two c~mpanies, and in 1920, negotiations were proceed(/ n
1qui ation) .
i:mg ior the sale of those shares. The Company was
Sinha J.
assessed to Excess Profits Duty. On appeal, the
Special Commissioners accepted the argument on
behalf of the Company that it was not carrying on a
trade or _!:Jusiness within the meaning of the taxing
statute, and that it was only a holding company and
stood in the same position as an individual who had
acquired and held investments. On appeal by the
Revenue, it was held in the King's Bench Division that
the principal business of the Company consisted of
making investments, and was, therefore, liable to
Excess Profits Duty.
In support of the second branch of his argument
that rental income was not included in "business ",
the learned counsel for the respondent called our
attention to the decision of tliis Court in The United
Commercial Banlc Ltd., Calcutta v. '!'he Commissioner
of Income-tax, West Bengal, (1) with special reference to
the observations at p. 97 to the effect that various
heads of income, profits and gains, under the lncometax Act, must be held to be mutually exclusive, each
head having been meant to cover income from a particular source. The case before their Lordships was
concerned with the question of set-off of the carried.
over Joss of the previous year. That case was not in
any way concerned with the provisions of the statute
now before_ us. It was concerned only with the scheme
of the Income-tax Act, with particular reference to the
classification of income into different heads. That case
does not throw any light on the interpretation of the
term " business ".
·
In view of the considerations set forth above, it must
be held that the realisation of rental income by the
assessee Bank, was in the course of its business in
'959
(1) (1958] S.C.R. 79.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
I959
prosecution of one of the objects in its Memorandum ;
it was, therefore, liable to be included in its business Commission~r of
profits, and thus, was assessable to Excess Profits Tax. lnconu-tax,
The appeal must, therefore, be allowed with costs here IV est Beng~l
v.
and below.
KAPUR, J.-I have read the judgment prepared by
my learned brother Sinha, J., but I respectfully disagree
with it and my reasons are these :
The sole question for decision is whether a sum of
Rs. 86,000/- received by the respondent during the
chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1946,
as rent of its building at Calcutta can be included in
the profits of its business for the purposes of Excess
Profits Tax. The respondent-the assessee-was a
banking company which at one time did considerable
banking business but it has gone into liquidation. It
owned a six storeyed building in a commercial locality
of Calcutta. During the relevant period it was occupying the ground floor arid a portion of the sixth floor and
had let out the rest to tenants for which it received the
sum of Rs. 86,000/- as rent, which is the amount now
in controversy.
The liatbility of this sum to Excess Profits Tax depends upon the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act (Act XV of 1940)
(which for the sake of brevity will hereinafter be termed the Act). The object of the Act was to impose a
tax on excess profits which as the very ,name implies
must have reference to and be the result of a business
activity. Such profits for the purposes of the Act were
to be computed in the manner provided by the Act.
The scheme of the Act is as follows :Section 2 is the definition section ; s. 4 the charging
section and s. 5 deals with the application of the Act.
Section 6 is a provision for determining standard profits and their computation. Excess Profits Tax was
chargeable on the excess of profits during the chargeable accounting period over the standard profits, i.e.,
profits during the standard period. Section 5 of the
Act provides :- ·
"This Act shall apply to every business of which
Calcutta National
Bank Limited
(In Liquidation)
Kapur].
680
I959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
any part of the profits made during the chargeable
accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by
virtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or sub-clause
Incoine~tax,
West Bengal
(ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (I) of section 4 of the
v.
Indian Income.tax Act 1922 .................. "
Calcutta 1'. ational
The charging section under the Act is s. 4, the relevant
Bank Limited
(In Liquidation) portion of whie h is :
"Charge of tax: (I) Subject to the provisions of this
Kapur).
Act, there shall, in respect of any business to which
this Act applies, be charged, levied and paid on the
amount by which the profits during any chargeable .
accounting period exceed the standard profits.......... "
Thus the Act applies to every business, any part of
the profits of which are chargeable to income-tax (s. 5)
and in respect of any business to which the Act is
applicable, excess profits tax shall be chargeable on
the amount by which the profits during the chargeable accounting period exceed the profits during the
standard period (s. 4). It is in respect of those profits
that the tax is exigible. In order te> determine whether
income received during a chargeable accounting period
is for the purposes of the Act "profits" arising out of
"Business" or not it becomes necessary to examine
what these words, i.e., "Business" and "•profits"
mean. Section 2( 5) of the Act defined " Business " as
follows:" ' Business ' includes any trade, . commerce or
manufacture or any adventure in the nature of trade,
commerce or manufacture or any profession or vocation, but does not include a profession carried on by
an individual or by individuals in partnership if the
profits of the profession depend wholly or mainly on
his or their personal qualifications unless such profession consists wholly or mainly in the making of contracts on behalf of other persons or the giving to other
persons of advice of a commercial nature in connection
with the making of contracts :
Provided that where the functions of a company or
of a society incorporated by or under any enactment
consists wholly or mainly in the holding of investments .or other property, the holding of the investments or property shall be deemed for the purpose of
Comrnissioner of
1
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
this definition to be a business carried on by such
z959
company or society :
Commissioner 01
Provided further that all business to which this Act Income-tax,
applies carried on by the same person shall be treated West Bengal
as one business for the purposes of this Act".
v.
The definition of "business" in the main section, Calcutta NaNonal
·
2(5) ·
·
" Banh Limited
1.e.,
~. is an(a 1ogofus to t h e d efi Tm•t•101A1 of "b
b tusmes~
(In Liquidation)
as given m s. 2 4) o the 1ncome ax ct ; u proviso
(1) to s. 2(5) of the Act enlarges the scope of the word
Kapur J.
"business" in the case of companies and societies
incorporated under any enactment. The words
"deemed to be" make something" business" which
otherwise it would not have been. In the case of an
incorporated company therefore business under the
Act is not merely any trade, commerce or manufacture or any ad venture in the nature of trade, commerce
or manufacture but also that which is deemed to be
business under proviso (1) which makes the holding of
investments or other property by an incorporated
Society or company business if one of the following
two conditions is fulfilled, e.g.,
(1) If its functions consist wholly or mainly in the
holding of investments; or
(2) If its functions consist wholly or mainly in the
holding of other property.
It is manifest from this that in the absence of the
proviso (1) to s. 2(5) of the Act the word "business"
would comprise no function beyond what it comprises
under the Income Tax Act and such functions as the
holding of investments or the holding of other property would escape the operation of the Act. The
heads of income falling under s. 6 (ii), 6 (iii) and 6 (v)
of the Income Tax Act, i.e., of interest on securities,
and income from property and income from other
sources are not business in the Income- tax Act and
would not be business within the Act. This Court in
Tlnited Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax (1) held that the heads of income mentioned in s. 6 of the Income-tax Act are mutually
exclusive, each head being specific to cover the item
(1) [r95SJ S.C.R. 79.
86
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
arising from a particular source and therefore even if
are held as trading assets or dealt with in
the
course
of a business by a banker or a dealer in
I11oome-tax.
west Bengal
securities the interest must be charged and computed
v.
under the head " Interest on securities" under s. 8 of
Calcutta National the Income-tax Act and not as business profits under
Bank Limited s. 10 of that Act. This wider connotation of the word
(In Liqnid,tion) " business" in the Act was clearly intended to bring
Kapi1r J.
within its net those incorporated societies and companies which otherwise would or might have escaped
it. One such company would be a trust investment
company whose business is the holding of investments
and getting profit therefrom. Such a company cannot
be said to be carrying on business, i.e., any trade, commerce or manufacture within the meaning of the main
provision, i.e., s. 2(5) but it is the proviso which makes
it clear that that type of a company is included and
its operations are to be regarded as carrying on of a
" business ". See also Commissioners of I n/,and Revenue
v. Desoutter Bros., Ltd. (1). Another such company or
society would be a housing society or company which
owns houses for the purpose of letting on rent. Such
a company or society also cannot be said to be carrying on business within the definition in. the main
sub.s. (5) of s. 2. Under proviso (1) however that class
of company or society would also be deemed to be
carrying on "business". In both these cases their
profits would be chargeable to excess profits tax.
The word " profits " in s. 2(19) of the Act means
"profits as determined in accordance with the First
Sched.ule" which provides the method of computation
of" profits". Rule 4 of this Schedule deals with
income from investments and is as follows:
"(SEE SECTION 2(19))
"Rules for the computation of profits for purposes
of Excess Profits Tax
r959
Commissioner of securities
1. ............................................................. ..
2 ............................................................... .
3 ............................................................... .
4. (1) "Income received from investments shall
be included in the profits in the cases and to the
(1) (1945) ,29 T.C. 155, 160.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
I959
extent provided in sub-rules (2), (2A) and (4) of this
rule and not otherwise.
Commissioner of
4(2). In the case of the business of a building Incmnc-tax,
society, or of a money-lending business, banking busi- West Bengal
v.
ness, insurance business or business consisting wholly
Calcutta National
or mainly in the dealing in or holding of investments, Bank Limited
the profits shall include all income received from in- (In Liquidation)
vestments, whether or not such income is included in
the profits charged under section 10 of the Indian
Kapur].
Income Tax Act, 1922, or is charged under any other
section of that Act, or has been subjected to deduction of tax at source or is free of or exempt from
income-tax ".
(2A). In the case of a business part of which consists in banking, insurance or dealing in investments,
not being a business to which sub. rule (2) of this rule
applies, the profits shall include all income received
from investments held for the purpose of that part of
the business, being income to which the persons carrying on the business are beneficially entitled".
Sub-rule (1) deals with business which consists wholly
or mainly in the dealing in or holding of investments
in the case of various kinds of companies mentioned
and sub-rule (2A) deals inter alia with banking business. The respondent being a banking co.mpany its
business essentially consists in dealing with money
and credit. Such a ~mmpany has always to keep cash
or realisable securities and other realisable investments
in order to meet withdrawals by depositors and the
holding of such securities and other investments
would be the holding of" investments" and that is its
normal and main activity. Punjab Co-operative Bank
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab (1). ·See
also s. 277F of the Indian Companies Act which is
now a part of the Banking Companies Act. Therefore
the respondent qua the holding of investments of this
kind, was carrying on business under proviso (1) to
s. 2(5) of the Act but it is not that kind of business
which is the subject matter of controversy in this
appeal. What we have to decide is was the income
received as rents from the portion of the respondents'
(r) [1940] 8 I.T.R. 635 (P.C.).
684
•959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Calcutta buildiug which was not required by the res.
Commissioner
pondent for its own purposes and let out on hire pro01
Income-tax,
fit within s. 2(19) and chargeable under B. 4 of the
Act.
Two arguments were addressed in favour of the
Calcutta National contention that such income was profits of business
Bank Limited
within the Act: (1) that the laying out of money in a
(In Liquidatiun)
multi-storeyed building was itself an investment and
(2) that even if the business consisted partly in letting
out of property the income from that property was
profit within the Act.
In support of the first submission it was argued that
one of the objects in Memorandum of Association
was the acquisition of immoveable property which the
company may think convenient for the purpose of its
business and therefore the construction of a multistoreyed building would itself be an investment.
Reference was made to cl. (e) of the Memorandum of
Association which relates to acquisition of moveable
and immoveable property. This clause is as follows:" (e) To purchase, take on lease or in exchange or
otherwise acquire any moveable or immoveable property ..................... which the Company may think
necessary or convenient for the purpose of its business,
and to construct, maintain and alter any building or
works necessary or convenient for the purpose of the
Company".
Now this argument loses sight of the fact that the
Legislature has chosen to use two words "investments" and "other property" with a disjunctive
" or " in between. To both these words a meaning
must be assigned because it cannot be said that one
or the other of them is redundant or they mean the
same thing. " Investments " has been defined thus :
"something acquired as a result of laying out money
is an investment: Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.
Rolls Royce Ltd. (1) but this general test as a test was
not accepted in a later case, Commissioners of Inland
Revenue v. Desoutter Bros. Ltd.(') at p. 161 where
Lord Greene said:"Speaking for myself, I am always disinclined to
West Bengal
v.
(1) (1941) 29 T. C. 14.
(2) (1945) 29 T. C. 155, 160.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
accept any general definition or test for the purpose of
I959
sol.,ring this type of question. The question whether Commissioner of
or not a particular piece of income is income received Income-tax,
from an investment must, in my view, be decided on west Bengal
the facts of the case".
v.
In every case the facts have to be ascertained and Calcutta National
• can be d etermme
· d w h et h er t h e pro- (IBank
Limited
t hen t h e questron
L' ·a . l
.
.
f
. l
f
.
b
.
n tqut a1ion
fi ts ansrng rom a part1cu ar unct10n are usmess
Kapur J.
profits within the Act or not. As above stated the
essential function of a banking company consists in
money and credit and to carry on such functions it
has to hold investments which under the Incometax Act would fall under ss. 8 and 12. See also
s. 277F of the Companies Act of 1913 which is now
incorporated in the Banking Companies Act. Property is a word of wide connotation and includes
moveable and immoveable properties, all interests
therein and even investments would fall within that
word but in the context it would not comprise" investments".
If a Banking Company as in the present case constructs a multi-storeyed building used a part of it and
lets out the rest it cannot be said to carry on " business" unless its main function is the holding of property and we have.already seen that the main function of a Banking Company is dealing in money or
credit and for that purpose it holds investments in the
form of easily realisable securities. Merely because
for the carrying out of its functions a Banking Company constructs a building its functions will not
change from that of a Banking Company into one of
a company engaged in the letting out of property on
hire.
As the Excess Profits Tax is a taxing measure and
the object of the Act also is to tax excess profits it is
reasonable to say that the words " inyestment " and
"property" as used in the case of a Banking Company
are used·in the same sense as they are used in the
Income-tax Act but if their holding by the company
is its sole or main function then they will be deemed to
be business so as to make the income derived therefrom
chargeable to excess profits tax even if otherwise they
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
would not have been so chargeable. The two enactments
are in pari materia and are intended to charge
Co111m1·ssioner of
Income-tax,
tax on income, profits and gains only the Act is conWest Bengal
fined to "profits " of "business" as therein defined
v.
and income-tax is chargeable on all incomes, profits
Calcutta Nai.icnal and gains. If the mere owning of immoveable proHank Limited
perty and letting out that portion which was not
(In Liquidaticn)
.c
•
·
d ed to
its
own use b y a company was mten
nee d ed ior
Kafl.11 r J.
be covered by the definition then the use of the word
wholly or mainly would be wholly redundant. In construing the proviso effect has to be given to every
word used.
The word "functions " is defined in the dictionary
to mean " activities appropriate to any business " and
if that is substituted in the proviso to s. 2(5) it would
read "where the activities appropriate to any·business ......... consist wholly or mainly in the holding of
investments or other property". So read, can it be
said that the activities appropriate to the business of a
banking company consists wholly or mainly in the
holding of a multi-storeyed building or such other property for the purpose of letting out the unused portion
on hire. Obvious answer to this question would be in
the negative. It is manifest that rents received from
the multi-storeyed property are not income received
from a "business " within the Act. • It is not a trading
receipt in the case of banking company. Under the
Income-tax Act it falls under s. 9 and there is nothing
to indicate in the definition of the word " business" as
given in the main portion of s. 2(5) of the Act that it
has a different complexion there. In the case of hotel
proprietors it has been held that compensation paid
by the Crown for requisitioning, during the war, of
hotel premises is not its trading profits. Salisbury
House Estate Ltd. v. Fry (1); Mellows v. Buxton
Palace Hotel Ltd.('). Even under the enactment imposing Profits Tax corresponding to our Excess Profits
Tax it was held not to be income receivable from
"investments or other property ". Commissioners of
Inland Revenue v. Buxton Palace Hotel Ltd. (').
1 959
(1) (1930) 15 T.C. 266.
(2) (<9~3) 25 T.C. 507.
(3) (1948) 29 T.C. 329, 333·
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
6S7
But it was urged that sub-r. (4) of r. 4 of Schedule I
x959
lays down a different method of computation and Commissioner of
q ualifies the qualities of a business when it relates to I nconie-tax~
holding of property. Sub-rule (4) of r. 4 is as fol- West Bengal
lows:v.
"In the case of a business which consists wholly Calcutta National
or partly in the letting out of property on hire, the Bank Lhnited
income from the property shall be included in the (In Liquidation)
profits of the business whether or not it has been
Kapur 1 .
charged to income-tax under section 9 of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, or under any other. section of
that Act".
But before this rule becomes applicable the functions
of the company have to fall within the definition of
"Business" as given in the Act. The definition
Schedule I is confined to computing of profits and has
relation to s. 2(19) wherein it is mentioned. It cannot
be used to affect the quality of the word "business"
as used in the Act. It only means that when the functions of a company, i.e.," the activities appropriate to
any business" consist wholly or mainly in the holding
of " other property " then in the case of that portion
of the business which wholly or partly consists in the
letting of property for hire the income from the property shall be included in " profits " in spite of the fact
that the income has been· assessed under s. 9 of the
Income Tax Act. It is a far step from saying that the
definition of" busmess" has been modified by sub-r. (4)
of r. 4. It relates to a business of letting out of
property. The word" business" can either mean what
is contained in the main provision in s. 2 (5) or the
extended meaning given by the first proviso of that
section. In either case it is inapplicable to the case of
the respondent. It cannot be said that letting out of
property is either wholly or even partly " business"
of the respondent.
In my view the income received from rents of the
portion of the building let out on hire, i.e., Rs. 86,000/does not fall within the word "profits " as used in the
Act and is not chargeable to Excess Profits Tax. The
judgment of the High Court is therefore sound and I
would dismiss this appeal .with costs.
688
I959
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-I have had the advantage
Commission" of of reading the judgments of my learned brothers,
Income-tax.
Sinha and Kapur, JJ. I agree with Sinha, J., that
Bengal
the appeal must be allowed with costs here and below.
v_
_
The question which was referred for the opinion of
Calcutta Na'.'onal the Calcutta High Court was whether in this case renBank Limit_ed
tal income from immovable property was part of the
(In Liquidation) b
·
·
· h r. 4 (4)
taxa bl e un d er s. 2(5) rea d· wit
nsmess
mcome
w"'
Hidavatullail ;.
of Sch. I attached to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940.
In my opinion, the question must be answered in the
affirmative for the following reasons.
The Calcutta National Bank, Ltd. (in liquidation)
hereinafter called the Bank, was doing business as a
bank prior to going into liquidation. Its income, it
appears, was also subject to excess profits tax in the
past, and we are concerned in the present case with
the chargeable accounting period ending March 31,
1946. The Bank had constructed a six-storeyed building, of which it occupied the ground and the top floors.
The rest of it was rented out, and in the chargeable
accounting period, rents totalling Rs. 86,000/- were
received by the Bank. The question was, as already
stated, whether this rental income was chargeable to
excess profits tax under the Act. According to
Kapur, J. the renting out of a building was not the
business of the Bank within the definition of ' business' in the Act. This income, therefore, was not
properly assessable to excess profit's tax. Sinha, J.
bolds the contrary view.
Under the Act, the charge of tax is laid on any
business to which the Act applies. The Act does not
define 'business' exhaustively, but shows what may
be included in it. The definition follows to a point the
definition given in the Indian Income-tax Act, but by
a proviso which enlarges its scope, provides as follows:
" Provided that where the functions of a company or of a society incorporated by or under any
enactment consist wholly or mainly in the holding of
investments or other property, the holding of the investments or property shall be deemed for the purpose of this definition to be a business carried on by
such company or society."
(2) s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
The charging section is s. 4, and it, shortly, provides
x959
that the
charge is laid on the. amount
by which the c ommissioner
..
•
.
of
profits m a chargeable accountmg period exceed the Income-tax
standard profits of a business. According to another west Beng~l
definition, "profits" mean profits as determined in
v.
accordance with the First Schedule-of the Act. In the Calcutta National
schedule which is enacted as part of the Act r. 4 (4) Bank_ Li_mited
· h re1erence
£
· the quest10n,
'
. ' (In L1qu1dat1on)
to wh1c
has b een made m
_
reads as follows :
Hidayatullah J.
"In the case of a business which consists wholly
or partly in the letting out of property on hire, the
income from the property shall be included in the profits of the business whether or not it has been charged
to income-tax under section 9 of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, or under any other section of that Act."
The difference between the definition of ' business '
and the rule above quoted is that while the former
mentions that the business must be wholly or mainly
holding of investments or other property, the rule
says that if the business consists wholly or partly of
letting out of property, the income of the property
shall be included in the profits.
Kapur, J., is of the opinion that the business of the
Bank being quite different, the rule cannot be made
applicable, because the definition requires that the
assessee's business should be wholly or mainly the
holding of investments or other property. He al:so
thinks that there is neither holding of an investment
nor of property as investment.
·
The definition of the term' business ' in the Act is
helpful where it applies, but not being an exhaustive
one, it cannot shut out something which can be appropriately described as a business. Even the opening
words of the definition show that it is meant to cover
most of the activities designed to produce income or
profits or gain. Under the Memorandum of Association, the Bank can acquire property, just as it acquires
investments for purposes of its business and even
otherwise. Clause (e) enables the Bank to purchase,
take on lease or in exchange or otherwise acquire any
moveable or immoveable property, which the Bank
a;
690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
may consider necessary or convenient for the purpose
'959
Commission" of of its business and to construct, maintain and alter
Inco'."e-tax.
any buildings or works necessary or convenient for
West Bengal
the purpose of the Bank. The acquisition of a sixv.
.
storeyed building was, therefore, within the terms of
Calcutta Natwnal the Memorandum, and the only question is whether
Bank L•mited
th e mcome
,
f rom sue h b m'Id,mg, I'f rente d ou t , can b e
(In Liquidation)
taken as profits of the Bank for purposes of excess
profits tax.
The definition mentions the holding of investments
or other property, and the words " other property "
must necessarily take their colour from what precedes,
that is to say," investments". The holding of other
property must itself be investment for earning profits;
otherwise, the definition does not apply. The word ' investments' is a word of large import. In one sense,
every mode of application of one's money intended to
yield a return by way of interest, income or profit is
investment. When the Bank builds a building more
than necessary to house itself and with a desire to
earning rents from it, it cannot but be stated that the
building was constructed as an investment, or in other
words, the Bank was holding "other property "within
the meaning of the definition, in addition to the investments which it is the normal business of the Bank to
hold. In my opinion, the income from the property
would be regarded as profits from property held as
• investment, and the profits will have to be calculated,
.as laid down in Sch. I, r. 4( 4).
The only difficulty is in the change of language between the definition and the rule, inasmuch as the
former speaks of the business which is wholly or
mainly the holding of investments or other property,
and the latter speaks of a part of the business being
the letting out of property. Kapur, J., is of the view
that the section defining the word 'business' must
prevail, because the Schedule is enacted only for the
purpose of computing the profits, as laid down in the
definition and as the heading of the Schedule shows.
That there is a difference between the Schedule and
the Act is not to be denied, and the question that
naturally falls for \lOnsideration is whether the
Hidayatullah J.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
Schedule should be given effect to independently in the
r959
circumstances of the case. The Schedule really tends c
..
c
h
f
11
·
"d
h
d
fi
.
.
ommissioner of
ior t e purposes o co ect10n, to WI en t e e mt10n Income-tax
of a business to include any letting of property for west Bengd1 •
earning rents. The rule to be applied was stated by
v.
Lord Sterndale, M. R., in Inland Revenue Oommis- Calcutta National
sioners v. Gittus (1) in the following words :
Bank Limited
.
.
(In Liquidation)
" It seems to me there are two prmc1ples or rules
of interpretation which ought to be applied to the Hidayatullah f.
combination of Act and schedule. If the Act says
that the schedule is to be used for a certain purpe5se
and the heading of the part of the schedule in question shows that it is prima facie at any rate devoted
to that purpose, then you must read the Act and the
schedule as though the schedule. were operating for
that purpose, and if you can satisfy the language of
the section without extending it beyond that purpose
you ought to do it. But if in spite of that you find in
the language of the schedule words and terms that go
clearly outside that purpose, then you must give
effect to them and you must not consider them as
limited by the heading of that part of the schedule or
by the purpose mentioned in the Act for which the
schedule is prima facie to be used. You cannpt
refuse to give effect to clear words simply because
prima facie they seem to be limited by the heading of
the schedule and the definition of the purpose of the
schedule contained in the Act. "
In my opinion, the second of the two propositions laid
down by Lord Sterndale, M. R., applies to the exposition of the Schedule, with which we are concerned. It
may be pointed out that the decision of Lord Sterndale, M. R., was accepted by the House of Lords without question in Gittus v. Commissioners of Inland
Revenue (2) in an appeal from the decision of the Court
of Appeal in the earlier case.
Though the heading of the Schedule and the definition of the word ' profits ' show that the Schedule is
designed to assist· in the computation of profits, the
mention of other kinds of businesses in r. 4, taken with
an incomplete definition of the term in the Act, clearly
(r) (1930) l K.B. 563, 576.
(2) (1921) 2 A. C. Sr.
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
shows that the legislature was defining the term
'
business ' as and when necessary, as it laid down the
Co1nmissioncr of
rules
for calculation of profits of a business. It was
Inconie-ta~;
•West Bengal
including different kinds of businesses within the Act
v.
and indicating how in those cases the profits had to
Calcutta National be calculated. I do not think that the definition
<Ba~~ Limit'.d given in the Act can be said to control everything in
In
quidation) the Schedule, in spite of the definition of ' profits ' and
Hidayatullah J. the heading given to the Schedule.
As I have said
' above, the second of the two alternatives is really
applicable to the present case.
For these reasons and those given by my brother,
Sinha, J., I hold that this appeal should be allowed
with costs here and below.
BY THE CoURT.-In accordance with the judgment
of the majority, the decision under appeal is set aside
and the appeal is allowed with costs here and below.
r959
I959
April 2I.
RAM GOPAL
v.
AN ANT PRASAD AND ANOTHER
(S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and K. SuBBA RAO, JJ.)
Appeal-Maintainability-Permit to run stage carriage-Application for renewal-New applicant's application for permit-Order
by State Transport Authority renewing permit but no order passed on
new applicant's application-Appeal to Appellate Tribunal against
order granting renewal-Whether appeal competent-Motor Vehicles
Act, r939 (4 of r939), ss. 47, 57,. 58, 64.
The appellant who was the holder of a permit to run a stage
carriage, which was about to expire, rna<le an application to the
State Transport Authority for its renewal for a further period.
The respondent made a representation against the renewal of the
appellant's permit and also applied for the grant of the permit
to himself. The State Transport Authority made an order in
the terms "Renewed for three years" in respect of the appellant's permit but no express order was made on the respondent's
application for the grant of the permit to him. On appeal by
the respondent, the Appellate Tribunal cancelled the appellant's
permit and granted the permit to the respondent. The appellant
then moved the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, for a
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