THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, HYDERABAD-DECCAN versus MESSRS. VAZIR SULTAN & SONS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 March 1959 | [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 375 | 1959 INSC 23
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 March 1959
- Bench
- NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, J.L. KAPUR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 340/1957
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 375
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 23
Text of the judgment
'
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
375
executed, the amount realised by the execution by the
I959
Collector has to be taken into account. When the
Ada·r 1
Subordinate Judge, Purnea, has to decide the question Collector'. '°;:nares
whether the application for execution made to him is
v.
in continuance of an existing execution proceeding, he
Maharaj
has to recognise the proceeding before the Additional Kishore Khanna
Collector, Banares, as a proceeding in execution under
Sarkar ].
the Code for it is so under the Act. In doing this, for
the reasons earlier mentioned, he would not be giving
any extra-territorial operation _to the Act. It seems
to us therefore that the execution of the decree by the
Collector must be deemed to be execution of a decree
for all purposes and therefore an application l)'.lade to
the Subordinate Judge, Purnea, for execution of the
same decree while an execution proceeding was pendr
ing before the Collector, must be a continuation of the
oo:ecution last mentioned. No question of limitation
can arise in regard to such an application.
We think therefore that this appeal must succeed.
We set aside the order of the High Court and restore
the order of the Subordinate Judge, Purnea. The
respondent will pay the costs of the appellant in this
Court and in the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
HYDERABAD-DECCAN
v.
MESSRS. VAZIR SULTAN & SONS
(N. H. BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and
J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Income Tax-Capital or income-Compensation for termination
of agency-Agency terminable at will-Partial termination of agency
-Sterilisation of asset or loss of profit-Indian Income-tax Act, r922
(XI of r922).
In 1931 the respondent, a registered firm, was appointed the
sole selling agents and distributors for the Hyderabad State of
I959
March 20.
376
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
cigarettes manufactured by V (a limited company) under the
terms of a resolution of the Board of Directors, the agency
The Commissioner commission being a discount of 2% on the gross selling
of Income-tax,
price. In 1939 another arrangement was made whereby the
Hyderabad-Deccan respondent's agency was extended to the rest of India. By a
v.
resolution dated June 16, 1950, the agency of 1939 was terminatAfessrs. Vazir
ed on payment of Rs. 2,26,263 to the respondent by way of comSultan & Sons pensation, but the respondent continued to be distributors for
the 1-:Iyderabad State. For the assessment year 195r-52 the
Income-tax Officer included the aforesaid sum in the respondent's
total income and taXed it as a revenue receipt under the head
of "business". The respondent claimed that it did not carry on
business of acquiring and working agencies. that the agency
acquired in 1931 was a capital asset of its business of distributing
cigarettes in the Hyderabad State, that the expansion of territory outside the Hyderabad State in 1939 was an accretion to the
capital asset already acquired by it, that the resolution of 1950
was in substance a termination of the agency qua territory outside the Hyderabad State which resulted in the sterilisation of
the capital asset qua that territory, that the sum of Rs. 2,19,3~3
received by it in the year of account was by way of compensation for the termination of the agency outside Hyderabad State
and'being therefore compensation for the sterilisation pro tanto of
a capital asset of its business was a capital receipt and therefore
was not liable to tax. It was contended on behalf of the Incometax Authorities that the sole selling agency which was granted
by the company to the assessee in the year r931 was merely
expanded as regards territory in r939 and what was done in r950
was to revert to the old arrangement, that the structnre or the
profit-making apparatus of assessee's business was not affected
thereby, that the expansion as well as the restriction of the
assessee's territory were in the ordinary course of the assessee's
business and were mere accidents of the business which the
assessee carried on and that the sum of Rs. 2,19,343 received by
the assessee as and by way of compensation for the restriction of
the territory was a trading"'or an income receipt and was therefore liable to tax. It was also urged that the agency agreement
between the respondent and the company was terminable at
the will of the latter and so it could not be considered as an
enduring asset.
Held (per Bhagwati and Sinha, JJ., Kapur, J, dissenting) that
the agency agreements in question did not constitute the business
of the respondent, but· formed a capital asset, being the profitmaking apparatus of its business of distribution of the cigarettes
manufactured by the company within the respective territories,
and, consequently, any payment made by the company as compensation for terminating the agency wonld only be a capital
receipt in the hands of the respondent.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co., (1932)
L. R. 59 I. A. 206, relied on.
I959
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
377
I959
Commissioner of Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras
v. The South India Pictures Ltd., Karaikudi, [1956] S.C.R. 223
and Commissioner of Income-tax, Nagpur v. Rai Bahadur,]airam The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Valji, [1959] Supp. l S.C.R. rro, distinguished.
Hyderabad-Deccan
Case law reviewed.
v.
Held, further, that the fact that the agency agreements
Messrs, V azir
were terminable at will, or that only one of them was terminated,
would not make any difference because in either case, when the Sult an & Sons
agency was terminated and the amount. was paid as compensation for such termination it resulted in the sterilisation of the
capital asset pro tanto and it was received as a capital receipt in
the hands of the respondent.
Glenboig Union Fire-Clay Co., Ltd. v. The Commissioners of
Inland Revenne, (1922) 12 Tax Cas. 427, relied on.
Per Kapur, J.-The true effect of the facts of the present
case was that in 1939 the respondent's area of distribution was
increased from the State of Hyderabad to the whole of India
and in 1950 it was again reduced to the original area of 1931, so
that the respondent did not lose its agency. Consequently, the
termination of the agency in 1950 did not affect the trading
activities of the respondent and, therefore, viewed against the
background of the ·respondent's business organisation and profitmaking structure the compensation for the termination of the
agency was no more than that for the loss of future profit and
commission. The compensation therefore was in the nature of
surrogatum and in this view of the matter it was revenue and
not capital.
The answer to the question, as applied to agencies,
whether the compensation is capital or revenue, is that it will be
a capital receipt if it is received as the value of the agency, i. e.,
it is a price of the business as if it is brought to sale. On the
other hand it is revenue receipt if it is paid in lieu of profits or
commission.
In view of the decision The Commissioner of Income-tax v.
The South India Pictures Ltd., Karaikudi, [1956) S.C.R. 223, and
the observations of Bose, J., in the case of Raghuvanshi Mills
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1953] S.C.R. 17], the authority of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co., (1932)
L.R. 59 I.A. 206, must be taken to be considerably shaken.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 340 of 1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 29, 1954, of the Hyderabad High Court in Reference No. 234/5 of 1953-54.
f!.. N. Rajagopala Sastri, R. H. Dhebar and //.Gupta,
for the appellant.
48
378
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, P. Rama Reddy and R.
Jlfahalinga
Iyer, for the respondents.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
1959. March 20. The Judgment of Bhagwati and
Hyderabad-Deccan Sinha, JJ., was delivered by Bhagwati, J. Kapur, J.,
v.
delivered a separate Judgment.
Messrs. Vazir
Sultan<>- Sons
BHAGWATI, J.-This appeal with a certificate from
the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad raises the
Bhagwati J.
question whether the sum of Rs. 2,19,343 received by
the assessee in the year of account relevant for the
assessment year 1951-52 was a revenue receipt or a
capital receipt.
The facts leading up to this appeal may be shortly
stated:
The assessee is a registered firm consisting of five
brothers and the wife of a deceased brother having
equal shares in the profit and loss of the partnership.
The firm was appointed the sole selling agents and
sole distributors for the Hyderabad State for the cigarettes manufactured by M/s. Vazir Sultan Tobacco
Co., Ltd., under the terms of a resolution of the Board
of Directors dated January 6, 1931.
" Mr. Baker reported that an arrangement had
been come to for the time being whereby the firm of
Vazir Sultan & Sons, were given the distributorship of
" Charminar " Cigarettes within the H. E. H. the
Nizam's Dominions and that they were allowed a discount of 2% on the gross selling price."
No written agreement was entered into between the
Company and the assessee in respect of the above
mentioned arrangement nor was there any correspondence exchanged between them in this behalf. In 1939
another arrangement was arrived at between the
assessee and the company whereby the assessee
was given a discount of 2% not only on the
goods sold in the Hyderabad State but on all the goods
sold in the Hyderabad State and outside Hyderabad
State. It does not appear that the Board of Directors passed any resolution in support of this new
arrangement nor was any agreement drawn up
between.the parties incorporating the said new arrangement.
•959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
379
I959
On June 16, 1950, the Board of Directors passed
the following resolution reverting to the old arrange- The Commissioner
ment embodied in the resolu~ion dated January 6, of Income-tax,
1931:•
Hyderabad-Deccan
v.
"The Chairman, having referred to resolution
No. 24 passed at the board meeting held on 6-1-31 and Messrs. Vazir
having reported that Vazir Sultan & Sons had agreed Sultan & Sons
to revert to the arrangement outlined in that resolution Bhagwati ].
with effect from 1-6-50, it was on tb,.e proposition of
Mr. S. N. Bilgrami, seconded by Mr. N. B. Chenoy resolved that payment of the sum of O.S. Rs. 2,26,263
be made to Vazir Sultan & Sons by way of compensation, Vazir Sultan & Sons, to pay D. B. Akki & Co.,
out of that amount the sum of 0. S. Rs. 6,920 also by
way of compensation. Mr. Mohd. Sultan & Mr.
Hameed Sultan stated that, as partners in the firm of
Vazir Sultan & Sons, they did not take part in this
resolution, although they had accepted on behalf of
Vazir Sultan & Sons, the terms thereof."
The sum of Rs. 2,19,343 was accordingly received
by the assessee in the year of account 1359 F.
The Income-tax Officer included this sum in the
assessee's total income and taxed it as a revenue
receipt. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the sum of Rs. 2,19,343 was
not a revenue receipt but a capital receipt being
compensation for the loss of the agency and as such
not liable to tax. The Income-tax Officer (C Ward)
Hyderabad thereupon preferred an appeal to the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, which held
that the said sum received by the assessee was a revenue receipt and liable to tax. The assessee then applied to the Appellate Tribunal for a reference to the
High Court under sec. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act and
the Tribunal accordingly referred the following question of law to the High Court:" Whether the sum of 0. S. Rs. 2,19,343 received
by the assessee Firm from Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co.,
• Ltd., is a revenue receipt or a capital receipt ?"
The High Court answered the question in favour
of the assessee stating the question in a different
form, viz.,
.
380
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
"Whether the sum of 0. S. Rs. 2,19,343 received
by
the
firm from Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co.,
T he Commissioner
d . assessee
.
of Income-tax
Lt ., IS liable to be taxed under the Indian Incomez959
-.
.
Hyderabad-Decc~n tax: Act?"
v.
Messrs. Vazir
Sultan'"' Sons
Bhogwati J.
,
The appellant thereafter applied to the High Court
for a certificate of fitness which was granted by
the High Court on February 21, 1955, and hence
this appeal.
The question. that falls to be determined is whether the sum which was in express terms of the
resolution mentioned by way of "compensation "
for the loss of the agency was a revenue receipt (trading receipt or an income receipt) as contended by the
Revenue or a capital receipt as contended by the
assessee.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the
sole selling agency which was granted by the Company to the assessce in the year 1931 was merely expanded as regards territory in 1939 and what was
done in 1951 was to revert to the old arrangement,
and the structure or the profit-making apparatus of
the assessee's business was not affected thereby. The
expansion as well as the restriction of the assessee's
territory were in the ordinary course of the assessee's
business and were mere accidents of the business
which the assessee carried on and the sum of
Rs. 2,19,343 received by the assessee as and by way
of compensation for the restriction of the territory
was a trading or an income receipt and was therefore
liable to tax.
It was, on the other hand, contended on behalf of
the assessee that it did not carry on business of acquiring and working agencies, that the agency acquired
in 1931 was a capital asset of the assessee's business
of distributing Charminar cigarettes in the Hyderabad State, that the expansion of territory outside the
Hyderabad State in 1939 was an accretion to the capital asset already acquired by the assessee, that the
resolution of 1950 was in substance a termination or•
cancellation of the agency qua territory outside the
Hyderabad State and resulted in the sterilisation of
the capital asset qua that territory, that the sum of
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
381
Rs. 2,19,343 received by the assessee in the year of
I959
account was by way of compensation for the termina- Th c--. .
. or cancellat10n
. of t h e agency outs1'de H y d era b a d ofe Income
ommissioner
t10n
tax
State and being therefore compensation for the sterili- Hyderabad-Dec;an
sation pro tanto of a capital asset of the assessee's
v.
business was a capital receipt and was therefore not Messrs. Vazir
liable to tax.
Sultan & Sons
The question whether a particular receipt is a reve- Bhagwati 1 .
nue receipt or a capital receipt or a particular expenditure is a capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure is beset with considerable difficulty and one finds
the Revenue and the assessee ranged on different sides
taking up alternate contentions as it suits their purposes. As was observed by Lord Macmillan in Van
Den Berghs, Limited v. Clark (1) : " The reported cases fall into two categories,
those in which the subject is found claiming that an
item of receipt ought not to be included in computing
his profits and those in which the subject is found
claiming that an item of disbursement ought to be
included among the admissible deductions in computing his profits. In the former case the Crown is found
maintaining that the item is an item of income; in
the latter, that it is a capital item. Consequently the
argumentative position alternates according as it is
an item of receipt or an item of disbursement that is
in question, and the taxpayer and the Crown are
found alternately arguing for the restriction or the
expansion of the conception of income. "
The question has therefore to be dealt with irrespective of the one stand or the other which is taken by
the Revenue or the assessee and the Court has got to
determine what is the true character of the receipt or
the expenditure.
In the case of the Commissioner of Income-tax and
Excess Profits Tax, Madras v. 1.1he South India Pictures Ltd., Karaikudi (2 ) this Court endorsed the following statement of Lord Macmillan in Ven Den Berghs,
Ltd. v. Clark (1):
"That though in general the distinction between
an income and a capital receipt was well recognised
{1) (1935) 19 Tax Gas. 390, 429.
{2) [1956]
S.C.R. 223, 228.
382
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
and easily applied, cases did arise where the item lay
on the border line and the problem had to be solved
The Co1nmissioner
of Income-tax,
o~ t~e particular facts of each case. No infallible
Hyderabad-Deccan cnter10n or test can be or has been laid down and the
v.
decided cases are only helpful in that they indicate
Mesm. Vazir
the kind of consideration which may relevantly be
Sultan & Sons borne in mind in approaching the problem.
The
character
of
the
payment
received
may
vary
accordBhagwati ].
ing to the circumstances. Thus the amount received
as consideration for the sale of a plot of land may
ordinarily be a capital receipt but if the business of
the recipient is to buy and sell lands, it may well be
his income. "
While considering the case law it is necessary to
bear in mind that the Indian Income-tax Act is not
in pari materia with the British Income Tax statutes,
it is less elaborate in many ways, subject to fewer
refinements and in arrangement and language it differs
greatly ·from the provisions with which the courts
in England have had to deal. Little help can therefore ·be gained by attempting to construe the Indian
Income-tax Act in the light of decisions bearing upon
the meaning of the Income-tax legislation in England.
But on analogous provisions, fundamental concepts
and general principles unaffected by the specialities of
the English Income-tax statutes, English authorities
may be useful guides. ' (Vide the observations of the
Privy Council in the Commissioner of Income-tax v.
Shaw Wallace & Co. (1); Gopal Saran Narain Singh v.
Commissioner of Income-tax (2 ); Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Presideney and Aden v. Ohunnilal B.
Mehta(') and Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh
of Ramgarh v. 0.1. T., Bihar & Orissa (').
Before embarking upon a discussion of the principles emerging from the various decisions bearing upon
this question, it is necessary to advert to an argument
which was addressed to us by the learned counsel for
the appellant in connection with the Privy Council
decision in the Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw
Wallace & Go. (1 ). That case was relied upon by the
r959
(1) (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 206, 212.
(3) (1938) L.R. 65 I.A. 332. 349·
(2) (1935) L.R. 62 I.A. 207, 214.
(4) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 180, t88.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
1 959
Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the High Court
as determinative
of the question in favour of the Tl1e c-·
.·
•
ommissioneY
assessee and it was strenuously urged before us on of Income-tax
behalf of the Revenue that the authority of that deci- Hyderabad-Dec:an
· sion was considerably shaken not only by the later
v.
Privy Council decision in Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Mems. Vazir
Narain Singh v. C. I. T., Bihar and Orissa (1) but also Sultan & Sons
by a decision of this Court in Raghuvansi Mills Ltd. v. Bhagwati J.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City( 2 ).
It may be remembered that the term "income"
was understood by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Shaw Wallace's Case (3) to connote a periodical
monetary return coming in with some sort of regularity or expected regularity from definite sources. The
source may not necessarily be one which is expected
to be continuously productive, but it must be one
whose object is the production of a definite return
excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall.
Income was thus likened pictorially to the fruit of a
tree or the crop of a field (Ibid p. 212). This concept
of " income " was adopted and in substance repeated
by the Privy Council in Gopal Saran Narain Singh's
Case (4 ) at p. 213, though Lord Russell of Killowen
pronouncing the opinion of the Privy Council pithily
remarked that anything which can properly be described as income is taxable under the Act unless
properly exempted. The case of Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh (1) struck a discordant note and
Lord Wright delivering the opinion of the Board
observed at p. 192 that it was not in their Lordships'
opinion correct to regard as an essential element in
any of these or like definitions a reference to the analogy of fruit or increase or sowing or reaping or periodical harvests and that such picturesque similes
cannot be used to limit the true character of income
in general. Lord Wright further observed at p. 194 :"Its applicability may in particular cases differ
because the circumstances, though similar in some
respects, may be different in others. Thus the profit
realised on a sale of shares may be capital if the seller
(1) (1943) L.R: 70 I.A. 180, 188.
(3) (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 206, 212.
(2) [1953} S.C.R. lJ7.
(4) (1935) L.R. 62 I.A. 207, 214,
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
is an ordinary investor changing his securities, but in
some
instances, at any rate, it may be income if the
The Commissioner
seller of the shares is an investment or an insurance
of Income-tax,
Hyderqbad-Deccan company. Income is not necessarily the recurrent
v.
return from a definite source, though it is generally of
Messrs. Vazir that character. Income, again, may consist of a
Sultan &. Sons
series of separate receipts, as it gencmlly does in the
case of professional ~arnings. The multiplicity of
Bhagwati ].
forms which "income " may assume is beyond enumeration. Generally, however, the mere fact that the
income flows from some capital assets, of which the
simplest illustration is the purchase of an annuity for
a lump sum, does not prevent it from being income,
though in some analogous cases the true view may be
that the payments, though spread over a period, are
not income, but instalments payable at specified future
dates of a purchase price." (Vide Secretary of State
for India v. Scoble) {1).
This Court in Raghuvansi Mill's Case {2 ) also observed that· the definition of" income" in Shaw Wallace's
Case (') as a periodical monetary return coming in
with some sort of regularity or expected regularity
from definite-sources must be read with reference to
tbe particular facts of that case.
It was therefore urged on behalf of the Revenue that
periodicity or recurring nature of the receipt was not
a necessary ingredient of" income " nor was the existence of a material external source capable of producing a recurrent return necessary before a receipt could
be treated as income chargeable to tax.
We are not unmindful of this criticism of the definition of " income " adopted by the Privy Council in
Shaw Wallace & Co.'s Case(') and the concept of
"income" may have to be thus revised. But even
granting the proposition that is contended for by the
Revenue the result is no different in the present case
because the head of income under which the assessee
before us has been assessed to Income-tax is "business " a definite source from which the income in
question sought to be assessed is alleged to have been
r959
(1) [1903] A.c. 299.
(2) [1953] s.c.R. 177·
(3) (1932)'L.R. 59 I.A. 206, 212.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
385
r959
derived and whether it is of a recurring or non-recurring nature therefore does not enter into the picture. The Commissioner
The exemption from liability in regard to that income of Income-tax,
is claimed by the assessee, not on the ground of the Hyderabad-Deccan
applicability of s. 4(3)(vii) of the Income-tax Act but
v.
on the ground that it is not a revenue receipt but a 1\!lessrs. V azir
capital receipt, being compensation paid by the Com- Sultan 0- Sans
pany to the assessee for the termination or cancella- Bhagwati ].
tion of the agency qua territory outside Hyderabad
State, a capital asset of the assessee's business.
What then are the considerations which have to be
borne in mind in determining these vexed questions?
The distinction between a capital expenditure and a
revenue expenditure came up for consideration before
this Court in Assam Bengal Cement Co., Ltd. v. The
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal (1) and this
Court laid down certain criteria for the determination
as to whether a particular expenditure incurred by
the assessee was a capital expenditure or a revenue
expenditure. We need not therefore discuss that problem any 'further.
As to whether a particular receipt in the hands
of an assessee is a capital receipt, or a revenue receipt,
we had occasion to consider the same in the Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras v.
The South India Pictures Ltd., Karaikudi (2 ). The
assessee there carried on the business of distribution
of films. In some instances the assessee used to produce or purchase films and then distribute the same
for exhibition in different cinema halls and in other
cases used to advance monies to producers of films
produced with the help of monies so advanced. In the
course of such business it advanced monies to the
Jupiter Pictures for the production of these films and
acquired the rights of distribution of the three films
under three agreements in writing dated September,
1941, July 1942 and May 1943. In the accounting
year ending March 31, 1946, and in the previous years
the assessee had exploited its rights of distribution
of the three pictures. On October 31, 1945, the
(r) [1955] I S.C.R. 972.
49
(2) [1956] S.C.R. 223, 228.
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
I959
assessee and the Jupiter Pictures entered into an
agreement cancelling the three agreements relating to
The Commissioner
the distribution rights in respect of the three films and
of Income-ta~.
JJyderabad.,.-Deccan in consideration of such cancellation the assessee was
v.
paid Rs. 26,000 in all by the Jupiter Pictures as comMessrs. Vazir pensation.
It was held by the Majority of this Court
Sultan & Sons
that the sum received by the assessee was a revenue
receipt (and not a capital receipt) assessable under the
Bhagwati ].
Indian Income-tax Act inasmuch as:(1) the sum paid to the assessee was not truly compensation for not carrying on its business but was a
sum paid in the ordinary course of business to adjust
the relation between the assessee and the producers of
the films;
(2) the agreements which were cancelled were by no
means agreements on which the whole trade of the
assllssee had for all practical purposes been built and
the payment received by the assessee was not for the
loss of such a fundamental asset as was the ship
managership of the assessee. in Barr Crombie & Co.,
Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1) and
(3) one could not say that the cancelled agreements
constituted the framework or whole structure of the
assessee's profit.making IJ<pparatus in the same sense
as the agreement between the two margarine. dealers
in Van Den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark(') was.
The criteria laid down by the majority judgment
for determining whether the particular payment
received by the assessee was income or was to be
regarded as a capital receipt were:
(i) whether the agreements in question were entered into by the assessee in the course of carrying on its
business of distribution of films, and
(ii) whether the termination of the agreements in
question could be said to have been brought about in
the ordinary course of business ;
so that money received by the assessee as a result
of or in connection with such (.:rmination of agreements could be regarded as having been received in
the ordinary course of its business and therefore a
trading receipt.
(1) (1945) 26 Tax Cas. 406. ·
(2) (1935) 19 Tax Cas. 390, 429.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
387
r959
A similar question arose in Commissioner of Incometax, Nagpur v. Rai Bahadur J airam V azji (1) where The Commissioner
this Court followed the same line of reasoning. The of Income-tax,
question there related to a sum of Rs. 2,50,000 received Hyderabad-Deccan
v.
by the assessee as damages or compensation for the
Messrs.
V azir
premature termination of a contract dated May 9,
Sultan & Sons
1940. The High Court on a reference under s. 66(1)
of the Income-tax Act had held that the sum was a Bhagwati ].
capital receipt in the hands of the assessee, and as
such not liable to be taxed. It was contended on
behalf of the Revenue that the contract dated May 9,
1940, was one entered into by the assessce in the
ordinary course of his business, that the sum of
Rs. 2,50,000 was paid admittedly as solatium for the
cancellation of that contract, and that it was therefore a revenue receipt. The assessee on the other hand
contended that the contract dated May 9, 1940, was for
a period of 25 years of which more than 23 years had
still to run at the time of the settlement, and it was
therefore capital in character. Moreover, the true
·character of the agreement was that it brought into
existence an arrangement which would enable him to
carry on a business and was not itself any business
and any payment made for the termination of such an
agreement was a capital receipt.
This Court on the facts and circumstances of the
case came to the conclusion that the contract in question was entered into by the assessee in the ordinary
course of business and- was one entered into in the
carrying on of that business. The arrangement ultimately entered into between the parties in regard to
the payment of the said sum of Rs. 2,50,000 was
accordingly treated as an adjustment made in the
ordinary course of business and the receipt was therefore held to be an amount paid as solatium for the
cancellation of a contract entered into by a person in
the ordinary course of business.
In the course of the discussion reference was made
to agency agreements and this Court observed :"In an agency contract, the actu.!tl business con-
sists in the de.alings between the principal and his
(1) (1959] Supp. r S.C.R. uo; 35 I.T.R. 148, 163.
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
I959
customers, and the work of the agent is only to bring
about that business. In other words, what he does is
The Commissioner
not
the business itself but something which is inti- ,
of Income-tax,
Hyderabad-Deccan mately and directly linked up with it. It is therefore
v.
possible to view the agency as the apparatus which
Messrs. Vazir leads to business rather than as the business itself on
Sultan & Sons
the analogy of the agreements in Van Den Berghs
Ltd.
v. Clark('). Considered in this light, the agency
Bhagwati ].
right can be held to be of the nature of a capital asset
invested in business. But this cannot be said of a
contract entered into in the ordinary course of business. Such a contract is part of the business itself,
not anything outside it as is the agency, and any
receipt on account of such a contract can only be a
trading receipt."
This Court further emphasised the distinction between an agency agreement and a contract.made in
the usual course of business and pointed out that the
agreement could in any event be regarded as a capital
asset of the agent which would be saleable. Such a
concept would certainly be out of place with reference·
to a contract entered into in the course of business and
any payment made for the non-performance or cancellation of such a contract could only be da.mages or
compensation and could not, in law or fact, be regarded as an assignment of the rights under the contract.
Once it was found that the contract was entered into
in the ordinary course of business, any compensation
received for its termination would be a revenue
receipt, irrespective of whether its performance was
to consist of a single act or a series of acts spread over
a period.
While thus indicating that an agency could be treated as a capital asset of the business this Court guarded
itself against its being understood as deciding that the
compensation paid for cancellation of an agency contract must always and as a matter of law be held to
be a ca pita! receipt and it made the following pertinent
observations : "Such a conclusion will be directly opposed to
the decision in Kelsall's case(') and the Commissioner
(1) [1935] 19 Tax Cas, 390, 429,
(2) (1938) 21 Tax Cas. 608.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
I959
of Income-tax and Excess. Pro.fits Tax, Madras v. '1.'he
South India Pictures Ltd., Karaikudi (1). The fact is
The Comniissioner
tha~ an agen~y contract which has the character of a of Income-tax,
capital asset m the hands of one person may assume Hyderabad-Deccan
the character of a trading receipt in the hands of
v.
another, as for example, when the agent is found to Messrs. Vazir
make a trade of acquiring agencies and dealing with Sultan &- Sons
them. · The principle was thus stated by Romer, L. J., Bhagwati ].
in Golden Horse Shoe (New) Ltd. v. Thurgoo d (2 ) :
' The determining factor must be the nature of the
trade in which the asset is employed. The land upon
which a manufacturer carries on his business is part
of his fixed capital. The land with which a dealer in
real estate carries on his business is part of his circulating capital. The machinery with which a manufacturer makes the articles that he sells is part of his
. fixed capital. The machinery that a dealer in machinery buys and sells is part of his circulating capital,
as is the coal that a coal merchant buys and sells in
the course of his trade. So, too, is the coal that a
manufacturer of gas buys and from which he extracts
his gas.' Therefore when a question arises whether a
payment of compensation for termination of an agency
is a capital or a revenue receipt, it would have to be
considered whether the agency was in the nature of
capital asset in the hands of the assessee, or whether
it was only part of his stock-in-trade. Thus in Barr
Crombie & Sons Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland
Revenue (3 ), the agency was found to be practically
the sole business of the assessee, and the receipt of
compensation on account of it was accordingly held
to be a capital receipt, while in Kelsall's case the
agency which was terminated was one of several
agencies held by the assessee and the compensation
amount received therefor was held to be a revenue
receipt, and that was also the case in the Commis•
sioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, .Madras
v. The South India Pictures Ltd., Karaikudi (1).''
We may in this context also note the further observations made by this Court :(1) (1956] S.C.R 223 228.
(2) (1933) 18 Tax Cas. 280, 300.
(3) (1945) 26 Tax Cas. 406.
390
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
1959
"But apart from these and similar instances, it
might,
in general, be stated that payments made
Thn Com111issioner
in settlement of rights under a trading contract
of Inconie-ta.:i:,
l!yderabad-Dcccan are trading receipts and are assessable to revenue.
v.
But where a person who is carrying on business is
Messrs. Vazi'T
prevented from doing so by an external authority in
Sultan 6- Sons
the exercise of a paramount power and is awarded
compensation therefor, whether that receipt is capiBhagwati ].
tal receipt or a revenue receipt will depend upon
w bother it is compensation for injury inflicted on a
capital asset or on a stock-in-trade. The decision in
the Glenboig Union Fireclay Co., Ltd. v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue (') applies to this category
of cases. There, the assessee was carrying on business in the manufacture of fire-clay goods and had,
for the performance of that business, acquired a fire
clay field on lease. The Caledonian Railway which.
passed over the field prohibited the assessee from excavating the field within a certain distance of the
rails, and paid compensation therefor in accordance
with the provisions of a statute. It was held by
the House of Lords that this was a capital receipt and
was not taxable on the ground that the compensation
was really the price paid " for sterilising the asset
from which otherwise profit might have been optained." That is to say, the fire clay field was a capital
asset which was to be utilised for the carl'ying on of
the business of manufacturing fire clay goods and
when the assessee was prohibited from exploiting the
field, it was an injury inflicted on his capital asset.
\Vhere, however, the compensation is referable to injury inflicted on the stock-in-trade, it would be a
revenue receipt. (Vide the Commissioners of Inland
Revenue v: Newcastle Breweries Ltd. (')."
It is no doubt true that this Court was not concerned with any agency agreement in the last mentioned
•
case and the observations made by this Court there
were by way of obiter dicta. The obiter dicta of this
Court, however, are entitled to considerable weight and
we on our part fully endorse the same. The earlier case
of Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax,
a
{r) (1922) 12 Tax Cas. 427.
(2) (1927) 12 Tax Cas. 927.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
I959
Madras v. The South India Pictures Ltd. (1) was indeed a case where the assessee had entered into agency The Commissioner
agreements for the exploitation of the three films in of Income-tax,
question, but in that case the conclusion was reached Hyderabad-Deccan
that entering into such agency agreements for acquiring
v.
the films was a part of the assessee's business and the Messrs. Vazir
agreements in question having been entered into by the Sultan b· Sons
assessee in the ordinary course of business the cancella- Bhagwati ].
tion of those agreements was also a part of the assessee's business and was resorted to in order to adjust
the relation between the assessee and the producer
of those films.
It would not be profitable to review the various
English decisions bearing on this question as they
have been exhaustively reviewed in the above decisions of this Court. The position as it emerges on a
consideration of these authorities may now be summarised. The first question to consider would
be whether the agency agreement in question for
•
cancellation of which the payment was received by
the assessee was a capital asset of the assessee's business, constituted its profit making apparatus and
was in the nature of its fixed capital or was a trading
asset or circulating capital or stock-in-trade of his
business. If it was the former the payment received
would be undoubtedly a capital receipt; if, however,
the same was entered into by the assessee in the ordinary course of business and for the purpose of carrying on that business, it would fall into the latter category and the compensation or payment received for
its cancellation would merely be an adjustment made
in the ordinary course of business of the relation between the parties and would constitute a trading or a
revenue receipt and not a capital receipt.
vVe may perhaps appropriately refer at this stage
to an aspect of this question which was canvassed
before us with some force and it was that there was
no enforceable agreement as between the assessee and
the Company which could be made the subject-matter
of a legal claim for damages or compensation at his
instance in the event of its termination or cancellation by the Company. The agency agreement was
(1) [1956J S.C.R. 223, 2i8.
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
z959
terminable at the will of the Company and if the
Company
chose to do so the assessee had no remedy
The Cotnmissioner
at law in regard to the same. It is, however, to be
of Income-tax,
Hyderabad-Deccan remembered that in all these cases one has really got
v.
to look to the nature of the receipt in the hands of the
Messrs. Vazir assessee irrespective of any consideration as to what
Sultan &- Sons
was actuating the mind of the other party. As Rowlatt,
J., observed in the case of Chibbett v. Joseph
Bhagwnti ].
Robinson & Sons('):"As Sir Richard Henn Collins said, you must not
look at the point of view of the person who pays and
see whether he is compellable to pay or not; you have
to look at the point of view of the person who receives, to see whether he receives it in respect of his
services, if it is a question of an office and in respect
of his trade, if it is a question of trade and so on. You
have to look at his point of view to see whether he
receives it in respect of those considerations. This is
perfectly true. But when you look at that question
•
from what is described as the point of view of the
recipient, that sends you back again, looking, for that
purpose, to the point of view of the payer; not from
the point of view of compellability or liability, but
from the point of view of a person inquiring what is
this payment for; and you have to see whether the
maker of the payment makes it for the services and
the receiver receives it for the services."
The learned Judge further observed at p. 61 : " But at any rate it does seem to me that compensation for loss of an employment which need not
'
continue, but which was likely to continue, is not an
annual profit within the scope of the Income-tax at
all." (See also W. A. Guff v. Commissioner of Incometax, Bombay City) (') where the question whether the
amount paid was compensation for which the employer was liable or was a payment made ex-gratia was
considered immaterial for the purpose of the decision
in that case).
It was also urged that the agency in question before
us was not an enduring asset of the assessee's business as in its. very nature it was terminable at will,
(1) (1924) 9 Tax Cas. 48, 60.
(2) [1957] 31 I.T.R. 826.
-
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
£959
there being no agreement or arrangement for a fixed
-·
term between the assessee and the Company. On the The Commissioner
analogy of the test laid down by this Court in Assam of Income-tax,
Bengal Cement Co., Ltd. v. The Commissioner of In- Hyderabad-Deccan
v.
come-tax, West Bengal (1) while considering the distinction between a capital expenditure and a revenue ex- Messts. Vazir
penditure, it was argued that the agency agreement Sultan &- Sons
in question could not be a capital asset of the asses- Bhagwati j.
see's business in so far as it was not of an enduring
character and the compensation paid for its termination could not therefore be a capital receipt in the
hands of the assessee. Whatever be the position, however, in the case of the acquisition of an asset by
the assessee by making a disbursement for the purchase of the same, similar considerations would not
necessarily operate when the amount is received by
the assessee for the termination or cancellation of an
asset of his business. The character of such a receipt
would indeed have to be determined having regard to
the fact whether the asset in question was a capital
asset of the business or a trading asset thereof. For
this purpose it will be immaterial whether that asset
was of an enduring character or was one which was
terminable at will.
We have therefore got to determine whether the
agency in question before us was a capital asset of the
assessee's business. One of the relevant considerations
in the matter of such determination has been whether
the asset was in the nature of fixed capital or constituted the circulating capital or stock-in-trade of the
assessee's business. This question was thus dealt
with by Viscount Haldane in John Smith & Sons v.
Moore (2 ) : "But what was the nature of what the Appellant
here had to deal with? He had bought as part of the
capital of the business his father's contracts. These
enabled him to purchase coal from the colliery owners
at what we were told was a very advantageous price,
about fourteen shillings per ton. He was able to buy
at this price because the right to do so was part of the
(l) [1955] l S.C.R. 972.
50
(2) (1921) 12 Tax Cas. 266, 282.
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
assets of the business. Was it circulating capital?
My Lords, it is not necessary to draw an exact line of
The Commissioner
demarcation
between fixed and circulating capital.
of Inco1ne-tax,
Smith
drew the distinction in the Second
Since
Adam
Hyderabad-Deccan
Book of his" Wealth of Nations'', which appears in
v.
Messrs. Vazir
the chapter on the Division of Stock, a distinction
Sultan & Sons
which has since become classical, economists have
never
been able to define much more precisely what
Bhagwati ].
the line of demarcation is. Adam Smith described
fixed capital as what the owner turns to profit by
keeping it in his own possession, circulating capital as
what he makes profit of by parting with it and letting
it change masters. The latter capital circulates in
this sense. My Lords, in the case before us the Appellant, of course, made profit with circulating capital, by
buying coal under the contracts he had acquired from
his father's estate at the stipulated price of fourteen
shillings and reselling it for more, but he was able
to do this simply because he had acquired, among
other assets of his business, including the goodwill, the contracts in question. It was not by selling
these contracts, of limited duration though they were,
it was not by parting with them to other masters, but
by retaining them, that he was able to employ his circulating capital in buying under them. I am accordingly of opinion that though they may have been of
short duration, they were none the less part of his
fixed capital''.
.
In the case before us the agency agreement in respect of territory outside the Hyderabad State was as
much an asset of the assessee's business as the agency
agreement within the Hyderabad State and though
expansion of the territory of the agency in 1939 and
the restriction thereof in 1950 could very well be treated as grant of additional territory in 1939 and the
withdrawal thereof in 1950, both these agency agreements constituted but one employment of the assessee
as the sole selling agents of the Company. There is
nothing on the record to show that the acquisition of
such agencies constituted the assessee's business or
that these agency agreements were entered into by
the assessee in the carrying on of any such business.
I959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
The agency agreements in fact formed a capital asset
z959
of the assessee's business worked or exploited by the Th c - . .
"
f
e ommiss1oner
. .
assessee by entermg mto contracts 1or the sale o the of Income-tax
" charminar " cigarettes manufactured by the Com- Hyderabad-Decc~n
pany to the various customers and dealers in the resv.
pective territories. This asset really formed part of Messrs. Vazir
the fixed capital of the assessee's business. It did Sultan & Sons
not constitute the business of the assessee but was the Bhagwati ].
means by which the assessee entered into the business transactions by way of distributing those
cigarettes within the respective territories. It really
formed the profit-making apparatus of the assessee's business of distribution of the cigarettes manufactured by the Company. If it was thus neither circulating capital nor stock-in-trade of the business carried
on by the assessee it could certainly not be anything
but a capital asset of its business and any payment
made by the Company as and by way of compensation
for terminating or cancelling the same would only be
a capital receipt in the hands of the assessee.
It would not make the slightest difference for this
purpose whether either one or both of the agency
agreements were terminated or cancelled by the Company. The position would be the same in either event.
As was observed by Lord Wrenbury in the Glenboig
Union Fire-Cl.ay Co., Ltd. v. The Commissioners of
Inl.and Revenne (1) at p. 465 :"The matter may be regarded from another point
of view; the right to work the area in which the working was to be abandoned was part of the capital asset
consisting of the right to work the whole area demised. Had the abandonment extended to the whole
area all subsequent profit by working would, of course
have been impossible but it would be impossible to
contend that the compensation would be other than
capital. It was the price paid for sterilising the asset
from which otherwise profit might have been obtained.
What is true of the whole must be equally true of part."
If both the agency agreements, viz., one for the
territory within the Hyderabad State and the other
for the territory outside Hyderabad State had been
(1) (1922) 12 Tax Cas. 427.
396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
terminated or cancelled on payment of compensation,
the whole profit-making structure of the assessee's
The Commissioner
business would have been destroyed. Even if one of
of Income-tax,
Hyderabad-Deccan these agency agreements was thus terminated, it
v.
would result in the destruction of the profit-making
111 essrs. Jiazir
apparatus or sterilisation of the capital asset pro tanto
Sultan & Sons
and if in the former case the receipt in the hands of
the assessee would only be a capital receipt, equally
Bhagwati j.
would it be a capital receipt if compensation was obtained by the assessee for the termination or cancellation of one of these agency agreements which formed
a capital asset of the assessee's business.
The facts of the present case are closely similar to
those which obtained in the Commissioner of Incometax v. Shaw Wallace & Co. (1 ). In that case also the
assessees had for a number of years prior to 1928 acted
as distributing agents in India of the Burma Oil Company, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, but had
no formal agreement with either Company. In or
about the year 1927 the two companies combined
and decided to make other arrangements for the
distribution of their products. The assessee's agency
of the Burma Company was accordingly terminated on December 31, 1927, and that of the Anglo·
Persian Company on June 30, following. Some time
in the early part of 1928 the Burma Company paid to
the assessee a sum of Rs. 12,00,000 " as full compensation for cessation of the agency" and in August of
the same year the Anglo-Persian Company paid them
another sum of Rs. 3,25,000 as " compensation for the
loss of your office as agents to the company". On the
facts and circumstances of the case the Privy Council
came to the conclusion that the sums could only be
taxable if they were the produce, or the result of, carrying on the agencies of the oil companies in the year in
which they were received by the assessees. But when
once it was admitted that they were sums received,
not for carrying on that business, but as some sort of
solatium for its compulsory cessation, the answer seemed fairly plain. Whatever be the criticism in regard
to the concept of income adopted in this case noted
z959
(I) (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 206, 212.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
r959
earlier in this judgment, the decision could just as well
be supported
on
the
grounds
which
we
have
hereinTh c
..
•
•
e ommiss1oner
before discussed and was gmte correct, the payments of Income-tax.
having been received by the assessees as and by way Hyderabad-Deccan
of compensation for the termination or cancellation of
v.
the agency agreements in question which were in fact Messi·s. Vazir
the capital assets of the assessee's business.
Sultan & Sons
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as Bhagwati 1.
the High Court were thus justified in the conclusion to
which they came, viz., that the sum of Rs. 2,19,343
received by the assessee from the Company was a
capital receipt.
The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and
will stand dismissed with costs throughout.
J.-I have had the advantage of perusing
the judgment prepared by my learned brother Bhagwati, J., but with great respect I am unable to agree
and my reasons are these.
The sole question for determination in this case is
as to whether a sum of Rs. 2,26,263 received by the
assessees from Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. as compensation for the termination of their agency for the
distribution of ' charminar' cigarettes in areas of
India other than Hyderabad State is or is not taxable
in the hands of the assessees. The answer to this
question depends on whether the amount has been
received by the assessees as a capital or a revenue
receipt. In 1931 the assessees were appointed distributing agents for Hyderabad State only and for the
rest of India in 1939, the agency commission in each
case being a discount of 2% on the gross selling price.
The agency of 1939 was terminated by a resolution
dated June 16, 1950, on payment of the compensation
amount already mentioned but the assessees continued
to be distributors for Hyderabad State. It must here
be mentioned that the agency in question was terminable at will, and that any compensation paid for it
would prima facie be revenue.
During the accounting year the amount of income,
profits and gains of the assessees from the cigarette
distribution business and from another source, i. e.,
KAPUR,
Kapur f.
398
r959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Acid Factory within the State of Hyderabad was
The Commission" Rs. 4,53,159.
The order of the Income-tax Officer or
of Income-tax, the Appellate Tribunal does not show how much of
Hyderabad-Deccan this sum was attributable to the Cigarette distribu-
tion business and how much to the other source.
There is no finding as to how and to what extent, if
Sultan & Sons
any, the business of the assessees was affected by the
cesser of distribution business outside that State.
Kapur j.
The question now arises did the assessees receive
the compensation in lieu of the commission they otherwise might or would have earned ifthe agreement had
continued or did they receive it as compensation for
the destruction of a profit-making asset. The answer
to this question would again be dependent upon w hether the receipt in question is attributable to a fixed
capital asset or to circulating capital. These two
terms have been used in a number of cases but as
applied to agencies compensation will be a capital
receipt if it is received as the value of the agency, i.e.,
it is a price of the business as if it is brought to sale.
On the other hand it is revenue receipt if it is paid in
lieu of profits or commission. In Van Den Berghs Ltd.
v. Clark (1) Lord Macmillan described circulating capital as "capital which is turned over and in the process of being turned over yields profit or loss. Fixed
capital is not involved directly in that process and
remains uilaffected by it". As was said by Lord
Macmillan in the same case, it is not possible to lay
down any single test as infallible or any single criterion as decisive in the determination of the question.
Ultimately it must depend upon the facts of a particular case.
The assessees rested their case on the decision of the
Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw
Wallace & Co. (2 ) on which the High Court has mainly
relied. In that case the assessees carried on business
in India as merchants and agents for various companies. They were distributing agents for two oil companies. These two agencies were terminated and a
sum of Rs. 12,00,000 was paid as compensation for
the loss of these agency rights and the question was
v.
Mews. Vazfr
(1) (1935) 19 Tax Cas. 390.
(2) (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 206.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
whether this was a capital payment. It was held to
I959
be a capital and not a revenue receipt because the
' d
h
1 f
·
h The Commissioner
sum ~ece1ve w.as not t .e re~u t o carrymg. on t e of Income-tax,
agencies of the 011 companies, m other words, it could Hyderabad-Deccan
not be regarded as profits or gains from carrying on
v.
the business but was received in the nature of a solat- Messrs. Vazir
ium for cessation. The case was decided on the inter- Sultan & Sons
pretation of the word 'business' as defined in s. 2(4) of
Kapur].
the Income-tax Act, under which it "includes any
trade, commerce or manufacture, or any adventure
or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture". These words, it was held, were wide "but
underlying each of them is the fundamental idea of
the continuous exercise of an activity which was also
the idea underlying the relevant words of s. 10(1) of
the Act, "in respect of the profits or gains of any
business carried on by him ", i. e., it is to be the profit
earned by a process of production. The test of income
was its periodicity because it connotes a periodical
monetary return. This test of periodicity was not
accepted by the Privy Council itself in Raja Bahadur
Kamakshya Narain Singh's case (1). Lord Wright
there said" income is not necessarily the recurrent
return from a definite source, though it is generally
so ". The test of periodicity was rejected by this
Court in Raghuvanshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax (2 ) where Bose, J., said that the remarks of
periodical monetary return must be confined to the
facts of that case and it was held that money received
from an insurance company for insurance against
losses was income representing loss of profits as opposed to loss of capital. In a later case The Commissioner
of Income-tax v. The South India Pictures Ltd. (3 ) it
was said that if Shaw·Wallace & Co. had other agencies similar to those of the two oil companies it would
be difficult to reconcile the decision in that case with
the later decisions in Kelsall Parsons & Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (4) and other cases (Per
Das, 0. J.). In view of the decision in the South India
Pictures' case and the observations of Bose, J., in the
(1) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 180.
(3) [1956] S.C.R. 223, 232.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. 177, 183.
(4) (1938) 21 Tax Cas. 608.
400
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Mills Ltd. (1 ) the authority of
case {2) must be taken to be
W e h ave t h en to see h ow t h e
Hydernbad-Deccan question has t_o be determined.
v.
Various tests have been laid down in decided cases.
Messrs. Vazfr
According to Lord Cave, L. 0., an expenditure made
Sultan & Sons not only once and for all but with a view to bringing
into existence an asset or an advantage for the endurKapur f ·
ing benefit of a trade has been treated as properly attributable to capital and not to revenue. (British Insul,ated Gables(') ). According to Lord Atkinson the word
" asset " need not be confined to "something material"
and Romer, L. J., has added that the advantage paid
for need not be "of a positive character " and may
consist in the getting rid of an item of fixed capital
that is of an onerous character (Anglo-Persian Oil
Go. v. Dale(') ). If t~e receipt represents the aggregate of profits which an assessee would otherwise have
received over a series of years the lump sum might be
regarded as of the same nature as the ingredients of
which it was composed (19 Tax Cas. 390 at p. 431) (')
but it is not necessarily in itself an item of income
{per Lord Buckmaster in Glenboig Union Firecl,ay
Go. (') ).
In Van Den Berghs' case (') there were three agreements between a British and a Dutch company operative till 1940 making it possible for them to carry on
their business 'in friendly alliance ' and providing for
the sharing of profits in certain proportions. The
agreements were terminated in 1927 and the Dutch company paid the English company a sum of£ 450,000
as compensation. The question was the .character of the receipt-whether capital or revenue. It was
held by the House of Lords that it was the former
because the agreements were not "ordinary commercial contracts in the course of carrying on their trade ;
they were not contracts for the disposal of their employees or for the engagement of agents or other employees
r959
case of Raghuvanshi
-. .
Shaw Wallace & Go.'s
Th e C ommMS<On"
of Jncome-tax, cons1"d erabl y sh a k en.
(<) [1953] S.C.R. 177, 183.
(2) (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 206.
(3) (1926] A.C. 205, 213, 222.
(4) [1932] 1 K. B. 124, 146.
(5) Van Den Berghs Ltd. v. CJark.
(6) (1922) 12 Tax Gas. 427, 464.
(7) (1935) rg Tax Gas. 390.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
I959
for the conduct of their business nor were they merely
agreements as to how their trading profits when earn- The C01nmissioner
ed should be distributed as between the contracting of Income-tax,
parties .. On the contrary the agreements related to the Hyderabad-Deccan
v.
whole structure of the recipient's profit making apparatus. They regulated its activities, defined what it Messrs. Vazir
might or it might not do and affected the whole con- Sultan & Sons
duct of its business". According to Lord Macmillan /Jhagwati ].
if the agreements formed the fixed framework within
which the circulating capital operated, then they are
not incidental to the working of its profit.making
machine but were essential parts of the mechanism
itself and therefore they would result in a capital
receipt and not revenue receipt. Thus the agreements
were designed to ensure that the businees was carried
on to the best advantage but they did not themselves
form part of the business. They were not agreements
which must be regarded as pertinent to trading activities which yielded profits. As such the totality of
payments on account of those agreements were held
to be a capital receipt.
The various decided cases demarcate the areas on
the two sides of the line in which a receipt may lie and
in every case it has to be determined as to whether it
falls on one side or the other. The simplest case is of
income from property or business as distinct from
something received in lieu of property or business itself. One illustration of this is insurance against fire,
destruction or damage and insurance against loss of
profit, the former would bring in compensation in the
nature of a capital. Another instance is where the
whole business is bought over and the receipt is the
price of the business itself as opposed to a lump sum
payment for the loss of profit calculated on a proper
basis. The test of income, i. e., periodicity or recurrence
at fixed intervals has been doubted in this Court.
Raghuvanshi Mills (1 ).
Another test is afforded by cases of tangible immoveable property. If an owner of such property is paid
compensation for not working a part of his property,
(r) [r953J S C.R. r77, r83.
5r .
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
e.g., a part of the demised premises the compensation is
not
profit because it is payment for sterilising that part
The Com1nissioner
of
the
asset from which otherwise profit might have
of Income-tax,
(Glenboig Union Fireclay case (1 ) at
flyderabad-Deccan been obtained.
p. 464). There is no difference in cases of this kind
v.
Messrs. Vazir whether the abandonment extends to the whole area
Sultan &- Sons or is circumscribed to a part because in either case it
is sterilising an asset from which otherwise profit
Bhagwati ].
might have been obtained. "It makes no difference
whether it may be regarded as a sale of the asset out
and out or it be treated merely as a means of preventing the acquisition of profit that would otherwise be
gained. In either case the asset of the company to
that extent has been sterilised or destroyed ".
Another test is whether the agreement related to
the whole structure of recipient's profit-making apparatus and affected the whole conduct of his business or
was the loss of a part of the fixed framework of the
business. If it is, it is capital (Van Den Berg h's case (2 ) ).
But compensation for temporary and variable elements
of the recipient's profit-making apparatus would be
revenue (MacDonald's case('))- If the agreement
affects the whole structure and character of the recipient's business then it is capital but not if the structure
of the business is so designed as to absorb the shocks
as by the cancellation of one agency (Kelsall Parson's
case(')). In B1tsh Beach and Gent Ltd. v. Road
again the test of how the cancellation of the agreement
affected the recipient's business was applied. Barr
Orombie's case(~) is a case of capital asset as there the
recipient lost his entire business which resulted in
reduction of staff, salaries and even in office accommodation. The result was the cesser of its trading
existence. The transaction took the form of a transfer
for a price from one party to another of something
that formed part of the enduring asset of one of them.
Compensation for the loss of an agency would be for
the loss of a ca pita! asset if the termination of the
I959
el
(r) (1922) 12 Tax Cas. 427, 464.
(3) (1955) 36 Tax Cas. 388.
(5) (1939) 22 Tax Cas. 519.
(2) (1935) 19 Tax Cas. 390.
(4) (1938} 21 Tax Cas. 608.
(6) (1945) 26 Tax Cas. 406.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
agency was a damage to the recipient's business strucc959
tllre such as to destroy or materially cripple the whole The Commission.,
structure involving serious dislocation of the normal of Income-tax,
commercial organisation but if it was merely com pen- Hyderabad-Decrnn
sation for the loss of trading profit, i. e., in respect of
v.
commissions or it took the place of commission that Messrs. Vazir
would have been earned if the engagement had conti- Sultan & Sons
nued then it is revenue (Wiseburg v. Domville) (1). So Bhagwati J.
that the decision as to whether compensation was
capital or revenue would depend upon whether the
cessation of the agency destroys or materially cripples
the whole structure of the recipient's profit making
apparatus or whether the loss is of the whole or part
of the framework of business.
If we apply these tests to the agreement which has
been terminated in the present case, it does not fall in
any of the class of cases of destruction of a capital
asset.
.
For the appellant reliance was placed on the observations of Venkatarama Aiyar, J., in Commissioner of
Income-tax v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji (2) where it
was pointed out that in an agency contract the actual
business consists in the dealings between the principal
and his customers and the work of the agent is only to
bring about that business. In other words what the
agent does is not business itself but, something which
is intimately and directly linked with it. But an
examination of the context shows that that is not
what these observations mean. The point that was to
be decided in that case was whether a payment of
compensation for the cancellation of a trading contract was a capital or revenue receipt, and dealing with
decisions relating to the cancellation of agency contracts which were quoted in support of the contention·
that they were capital, the learned Judges observed
that considerations applicable to agency contracts were
inapplicable to trading contracts, because the twcr
classes of contracts, were essentially different, and
these differences were there pointed out. The purpose
of these observations was to show that receipts from
(r) (1956) 36 Tax Cas. 527.
(2) [1959) Supp. I S.C.R. 110; [1959) 35 I.T.R. 148, 16r, 163.
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
trading contracts were revenue and not that receipts
from agency contracts are capital. That that is the
The Commissioner
f h
b
·
·
f
of Income-tax,
true s.cope o t ese o servat10ns IS clear rom the
Hyde.abad-Deccan followmg passage :
v.
"In hold.ing that compensation paid on the cancellMessrs. Vazir ation of a trading contract differs in character from
Sultan & Sons
compensation paid for cancellation of an agency conBhagwati J.
tract, we should not be understood as deciding that the
latter must always, and as a matter of law be held to
be a capital receipt. Such a conclusion will be directly
opposed to the decisions in Kelsall's case (1) and Commissioner of Income.tax v. South India Pictures Ltd(').
The fact is that an agency contract which has the
character of a capital asset in the hands of one person
may assume the character of a trading receipt in the
hands of another, as, for example, when the agent
is found to make a trade of acquiring agencies and
dealing with them".
The Court there observed that when the assessee holds
a number of agencies, the compensation paid for
cancellation of any of them could be regarded as
revenue receipt. This is inconsistent with the conclusion that an agency contract must always be regarded
as a capital asset. The learned Judges further observed
that they were not elaborating this part as they were
there concerned with a trading contract and therefore
the statement as to when receipts from agency contracts could be regarded as revenue receipts cannot be
read as exhausting the circumstances under which
they could be held to be revenue.
As a matter of fact there are three kinds of cases of
agencies shown by the decided cases: (1) Kelsall Parsons' case(') where the recipient was carrying on
several agencies and the test laid down was whether
the business structure could absorb a shock of the
termination of one. (2) The other is where the compensation is for a temporary and variable element of
assessee's profit making apparatus; MacDonald's
case ('). (3) The third class of cases is represented by
I959
-
(1) (1938) 21 Tax Gas. 608.
(2) [r956] S.C.R. 223, 232.
(3) (r955) 36 Tax Cas. 388.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
I959
Fleming & Co.'s case (1) where the rights and advantages surrendered were such as to destroy or materially The Commissioner
cripple the whole structure of the profit making of Income-tax,
Hyderabad-Deccan
apparatus.
v.
The agencies themselves are of different kinds:
(1) where the agent himself carries on the business Messrs. Vazir
and sells the product of the principal and gets com- Sultan &· Sons
mission for it; (2) where the agent's function is con- Bhagwati ].
fined to bringing the principal and the customer together and he gets agency commission for the performance of only that service; (3) where the agent is a
distributor and distributes the products of the principal through his sub-agents and charges commission
for the distribution work. Cases (1) and (3) would not
strictly fall within the scope of the observations in
Commissioner of' Income-tax v. R. B. Jairam Valji (2)
and case (2) would fall within the• second class of
agreements mentioned in Van Den Bergh's case (3 ).
The agreement which is now before us and which
was surrendered was terminable at will. The amount
of profit which the assessee made from working the
agency contract in Hyderabad State alone was much
more than the amount which the assessees received
for the termination of the whole of their agency outside the State. Thus it is clear that the termination
did not affect the trading activities of the assessees
and therefore the termination of the contract viewed
against the background of the assessee's business
organisation and profit-making structure appears to
be no more than compensation for the loss of future
profit and commission. The true effect of the facts of
this case appears to be this that in 1939 the assessee's
area of distribution was increased from the State of
Hyderabad to the whole of India and in 1950 it was
again reduced to the original area of 1931. The asses.
sees never lost their agency. As a result of this contraction of area they at the most have lost some
agency commission. The compensation therefore was
in the nature of surrogatum and in this view of the
matter it is revenue and not capital.
(1) (1951) 33 Tax Cas. 57.
(2) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. uo; [1959] 35 I.T.R. 148, 161, 163.
(3) (1935) 19 Tax Cas. 390.
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
r959
I would therefore allow this appeal with costs
throughout.
The Cominissioncr
By COURT: In accordance with the majority judgof Income-tax,
llydcrabad- Deccan ment of the Court, the appeal is dismissed with costs
v.
throughout.
Jt1essrs. Vazir
Sultan & Sous
Appeal dismissed.
Bhagwati ] .
r959
GHERULAL PARAKH
March 26.
v.
MAHADEODAS MAIYA AND OTHERS
(JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR and
K. SuBBA RAO, JJ.)
Wager-Collateral contract-Agreement of partnership to enter
into wagering transactions-Legality-Indian Contract Act, r872
(9 of I872), SS. 23, 30.
The question for determination in this appeal V11as \Vhether an agreement of partnership ¥.•ith the object of entering into
vvagering transactions was illegal within the meaning of s. 23 of
the Indian Contract Act. The appellant and the respondent
No. I entered into a partnership with the object of entering into
forward contracts for the purchase and sale of wheat with two
other firms and the agreement between them was that the respondent would enter into the contracts on behalf of the partnership and the profit or loss would be shared by the parties equally.
The transactions resulted in loss and the respondent paid the
entire amount due to the third parties. On the appellant denying his liability for the half of the loss, the respondent sued him
for the recovery of the same and his defence, inter alia, was that
the agreement to enter into the wagering contracts \Vas unlawful
under s. 23 of the Contract Act. The trial Court dismissed the
suit. The High Court on appeal held that though the wagering
contracts \Vere void under s. 30 of the Indian Contract Act, the
object of the partnership was not unlawful within the meaning of
the Act and decreed the suit. It was contended on behalf of
the appellant (r) that a wagering contract being void under
s. 30 of the Contract Act, was also forbidden by law within the
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