PREM NATH KAUL versus THE STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 March 1959 | [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 270 | 1959 INSC 17
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 March 1959
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, S.K. DAS, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 152/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 270
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 17
Text of the judgment
270
SUPHEME COUHT REPORTS
959
PREM NATH KAUL
J'.1arch 2.
v.
1
[1959] Supp.
THE STATE OF JAMM:U & KASHMilt
(S. R. DAS, c. J., s. K. DAS, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAB,
K. N. WANCHOO and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Landed Estate, Abolition of-Validity of enactment-Legislative
Competency of Yuvaraj Karan Singh-Jamm1' and Kashmir Big
Landed Estate Abolition Act, XV II of 2007.
This appeal challenged the validity of the Jammu and
Kashmir Big Landed Estate Abolition Act, XVII of 2007 which
was enacted by Yuvaraj Karan Singh on October 17, 1950, in
exercise of the powers vested in hirn bys. 5 of the Jammu and
Kashmir Constitution Act 14 of 1996 (1930) and the final proclamation issued by Maharaja Hari Singh on June 20, 1949, by which
he entrusted all his po\vers and function to the Yuvaraj. The
object of the Act was to improve agricultural production by
abolishing big landed estates and transferring land to the actual
tillers of the soil. The suit out of which the present appeal
arises was brought by the appellant in a representative capacity
for a declaration that the Act was void, inoperative and ultra
vires and that he \Vas entitled to retain peaceful possession of
his lands. Both the trial Court.as also the High Court in appeal
found against him and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by
special leave.
The validity of the Act was challenged mainly on the
ground that Yuvaraj Karan Singh had no authority to promulgate the Act. It was contended that (r) when Maharaja Hari
Singh conveyed his powers to the Yuvaraj by his proclamation
of June 20, 1949, he was himself a constitutional monarch and
could convey no higher powers, (2) the said proclamation could
not confer on the Yuvaraj the powers ,specified therein, (3) the
powers of the Yuvaraj were substantially limited by his own
proclamation issued on November 25, 1949, by which he sought
to make applicable to his State the Constitution of India, that
was soon to be adopted by its Constituent Assembly, in so far as
it was applicable, (4) as a result of the application of certain
specified Articles, including Art. 370 of the Constitution of India
to the State of Jammu Kashmir, the Yuvaraj became a constitutional monarch without any legislative authority or powers and
(5) the decision of the Constituent Assembly of the State not to
pay compensation \Vas invalid since the Assembly itself was not
properly constituted.
Held, that Yuvaraj Karan Singh, when he promulgated
the Act, had the power to do so and its validity· was beyond
question.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'.1' REPORTS
271
It was indisputable that prior to the passing of the Independr959
ence Act, 1947, Maharaja Hari s;ngh like his predecessors, was
an absolute monarch so far as the internal administration of his Piem Nath Kaul
State was concerned. Section 3 of the Regulation l of 1991
v.
(1934) issued by the Maharaja not only preserved all his pre- Th"4State of .
existing powers but also provided that his inherent right to Jammu & Kash1mr
make any regulation, proclamation or ordinance would remain
unaffected. The Constitution Act 14 of 1996 (1939) promulgated
by him did not alter the position. Sections 4 and 5 of that Act
preserved all the powers that he had under s. 3 of the Regulation
l of 1991 and s. 72 preserved his inherent powers so that he
remained the same absolute monarch as he was before.
With the lapse of British paramountcy on the passing of the
Independence Act, 1947, the Maharaja continued to be the same
absolute monarch, subject to the agreements saved by the
proviso to s. 7 of the Act, and in the eyes of international law
could conceivably claim the status of an independent sovereign.
It was unreasonable to suggest that the provisions of the
Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja on October 25,
1947, affected his sovereignty, in view of cl. 6 thereof, which
expressly recognised its continuance in and over his State.
There was no substance in the argument that as a result of
his proclamation issued on March 5, 1948, which replaced the
emergency administration by a popular interim Government
headed by Sheik Mohammad Abdullah and constituted a Council
of Ministers who were to function as a cabinet, the Maharaja
became a constitutional monarch. The cabinet had still to function under the Constitution Act 14 of 1996 (1939) under the overriding powers of the Maharaja.
When the Maharaja on June 20, 1949, therefore, issued the
proclamation authorising the Yuvaraj to exercise all his powers,
although for a temporary period, it placed the Yuvaraj in the
same position as his father till the proclamation was revoked.
The Maharaja was himself an absolute monarch and there could
be no question as to his power of delegation.
In Re. Delhi Laws Act, r9r2, [1951] S.C.R. 747, referred to.
The proclamation issued by the Yuvaraj on November 25,
1949, did not vary the constitutional position as it stood after
the execution of the Instrument of Accession by the Maharaja
nor could it in any way affect the authority conferred on the
Yuvaraj by his father.
The contention that the application of certain specified Articles of the Indian Constitution to the State by the Constitution
(Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order (C. 0. ro) issued by
the President on January 26, 1950, affected the sovereign powers
of the Yuvaraj was not correct.
Neither the scheme of Art. 370 nor the explanation to cl. (r)
of that Article contemplated that the Maharaja was to be a constitutional ruler. The temporary provisions of that Article were
2'2
SUPRJllME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
based on the assumption that the ultimate relationship between
India and the State should be finally determined by the Consti•
Prem Nath Kaul tuent Assembly of the State itself. So, that Article could not,
v.
either expressly or by implication, be intended to limit the
The State of
plenary legislative powers of the Maharaja. Till the Constituent
j(onmu & l(ashmir Assembly of the State, therefore, made its decision, the Instrument of Accession must hold 1he field.
1959
•
The initial formal application of Art. 385, which was subsequently deleted from the list of Articles applied to the State,
could not justify the conclusion that it had adversely affected
the legislative powers of the Yuvaraj.
There was no substance in the contention that the decision
of the Constituent Assembly not to pay compensation was invalid
as the Assembly itself was not properly called or constituted.
There could be doubt that the Yuvaraj was perfectly competent
to issue the proclamation dated April 20, 1951, in variation of the
Maharaja's, under which the Assembly was ultimately constituted, and so the Assembly was properly convened.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 152 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated ·March 25, 1953, of the Jammu and
Kashmir High Court in Civil First Appeal No. 4 of
2009.
N. C. Chatterjee, Gopi Nath Kunzru and Naunit Lal,
for the appellants.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor General of India,
J aswant Singh, Advocate General for the State of Jam mu
and Kashmir, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the
respondent.
1959. March 2. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Gajendragadka. J.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special
leave arises from a suit filed by the appellant in a
representative capacity (Civil Suit No. 4 of 2008)
against the State of Jammu & Kashmir praying for a
declaration that the Jammu & Kashmir Big Landed
Estate Abolition Act, XV II of 2007 (hereinafter called
the Act) is void, inoperative and ultra vires of
Yuvaraj Karan Singh who enacted it and for a further
declaration that the appellant was entitled to retain
the peaceful possession of his lands.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS
273
It appears that the validity of the Act was similarly
z959
challenged by Maghar Singh by his suit filed on the P
N h
•
Original Side of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir rem :' Kaul
(Civil Suit No. 59 of 2007); and Mr. Justice Kilam The state of
who had heard the said suit had rejected the plainljjff's Jainmu .s. Kashmir
contentions and held that the Act was valid.
When the appellant' suit came for trial before the Gajendragadkar f.
District Court it was conceded on his behalf that the
points raised by him against the validity of the Act
had been decided by Mr. Justice Kilam and that, in
view of the said decision, the appellant could not usefully urge anything more before the District Court.
The learned District Judge who was bound by the
decision of Mr. Justice Kilam applied it to the suit
before him and held that the Act was valid and that
the appellant was not entitled to the two declarations
claimed by him. In the result the appellant's suit
was dismissed.
Against this decree the appellant preferred an appeal in the High Court of Jam mu & Kashmir (Civil
Appeal No. 4 of 2009). Maghar Singh whose suit had
been dismissed by Mr. Justice Kilam had also preferred an appeal (No. 29 of 2008) before the High Court.
The two appeals were heard together by a Division
Bench of the High Court which held that the Act was
valid and that the appellants were not entitled to any
declaration claimed by them. Both the appeals were
accordingly dismissed.
Against the decree passed by the High Court dismissing his appeal the appellant applied to the High
Court for leave to appeal to this Court. The said
application was, however, dismissed. Thereupon the
appellant applied for, and obtained, special leave to
appeal to this Court.
In dealing with this appeal it is necessary to narrate in some detail t.he events which took place in
Kashmir and the constitutional changes which followed them in order to appreciate fully the background of
the impugned legislation. A clear understanding of
this background will help us to deal with the appellant's case in its proper perspective. In 1925 Maharaja
35
274
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Hari Singh succeeded Maharaja Pratap Singh as the
Ruler of Kashmir. It appears that for some time
Prem Nath Kaul
v.
prior to 1934 there was public agitation in Kashmir
n, state of for the establishment of responsible government.
Jammu & l<ashmfr Presumably as a sequel to the said agitation Maharaja
. Hari Singh issued Regulation 1 of 1991 (1934). The
Ga;•ndragadhar J. Regulation began with the statement of policy that it
was the declared intention of the Maharaja to provide
for the association of his subjects in the matter of
legislation and the administration of the State and
that it was in pursuance of the said intention that the
Regulation was being promulgated. This Regulation
consisted of 46 sections which dealt with the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the Maharaja
himself, referred to the subjects which should be reserved from the operation of the Regulation, made provision for the constitution of the Legislature of the
State, conferred authority on the Council to make
rules for specified purposes and referred to other
relevant and material topics. It is relevant to refer
to only two sections of this Regulation. Section 3
provides that all powers legislative, executive and
judicial in relation to the State and its government
are hereby declared to be, and to have been always,
inherent in and possessed and retained by His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir and nothing
contained in the Regulation shall affect or be deemed
to have affected the right and prerogative of His
Highness to make and pass regulations, proclamations
and ordinances by virtue of his inherent power.
Section 30 lays down that no measure shall be deemed
to have been passed by the Praja Sabha until and
unless His Highness has signified his assent thereto.
The Regulation leaves it to the absolute discretion of
His Highness whether to assent to such a measure
or not.
Five years later the Maharaja promulgated the
Jammu & Kashmir Constitution Act 14of1996(1939).
From the preamble to this Constitution it appears
that, before its promulgation, the Maharaja had issued
a proclamation on February 11, 1939, in which he
had announced his decision as to the further steps to
'959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
275
be taken to enable his subjects to make orderly pror959
g ress in the direction of attaining the ideal of active Prem Nath Kaul
co-operation between the executive and the Legislav.
ture of the State in ministering to the maximum hap- The State of
piness of the people. In accordance with this desire Jammu & J(ashmir
the text of the Constitution contained in Regulation 1
of 1991 was thoroughly overhauled and an attempt Gajendragadlwr J.
was made to bring the amended text into line with
that of similar Constitutions of its type. This Constitution is divided into six parts and includes 78
sections. Part 1 is introductory. Part 2 deals with
the executive; Part 3 with the Legislature; Part 4
with the Judicature; Part 5 contains miscellaneous
provisions; and Part 6 provides for repeal and saving
and includes transitional provisions. It is significant
that s. 5 of this Act, like s. 3 of the earlier Regulation,
recognises and preserves all the inherent powers of
His Highness, while s. 4 provides that the State was
to be governed by and in the name of His Highness,
and all rights, authority and jurisdiction which appertain or are incidental to the government of the State
are exercisable by His Highness except in so far as
may be otherwise provided by or under the Act or as
may be otherwise directed by His Highness. The
other provisions of the Act are all subject to the overriding powers of His Highness specifically preserved
by s. 5. As we will point out later on, in substance
the Constitutional powers of the Maharaja under the
present Act were exactly the same as those under the
earlier Act.
·while the State of Jammu & Kashmir was being
governed by the Maharaja and the second Constitution as amended from time to time was in operation,
political events were moving very fast in India and
they culminated in the passing of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Under s. 7 (1) (b) of this Act the
suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapsed
and with it lapsed all treaties and agreements in force
at the date of the passing of the Act between His
Majesty and the Rulers of the Indian States, all obli-
gations of His Majesty existing at that date towards
Indian States or the Rulers thereof, and all powers,
276
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His
Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indi~n States
v.
by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise. The
The state of
proviso to the said section, however, prescribed that,
Jammu & Kashmfr notwithstanding anything in para. (b), effect shall, as
. nearly as may be, continue to be given to the proviGaJendragadkar f. sions of any such agreement as therein referred to in
relation to the subjects enumerated in the proviso or
other like matters until the provisions in question are
denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State on the
one hand or by the Dominion or Province concerned
on the other hand, or are superseded by subsequent
agreements. Thus, with the lapse of British paramountcy the State of Jammu & Kashmir, like the
other Indian States; was theoretically free from the
limitations imposed by the said paramountcy subject
to the provisions of the proviso just mentioned.
On October 22, 1947, the tribal raiders invaded the
territory of the State; and this invasion presented a
problem of unprecedented gravity before the Maharaja.
With the progress of the invading raiders the safety
of the State was itself in grave jeopardy and it appeared that, if the march of the invaders was not successfully resisted, they would soon knock at the doors of
Srinagar itself. This act of aggression set in motion a
chain of political events which ultimately changed the
history and political constitution of Kashmir with unexpected speed.
On October 25, 1947, the Maharaja signed an Instrument of Accession with India which had then become
an Independent Dominion. By the First Clause of
the Instrument the Maharaja declared that he had
acceded to the Dominion of India with the intent that
the Governor-General of India, the Dominion, Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion Authority established for the purpose of the Dominion
shall, by virtue of the Instrument of Accession, subject always to the terms thereof and for the purposes
only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the
State of Jammu & Kashmir such functions as may be
vested in them by or under the Government of India
Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India on
August 15, 1947.
'959
p,,m Nath J(aul
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
277
959
I
We may usefully refer to some other relevant clauses of this Instrument. By cl. 3 the Maharaja agreed Prem Nath Kaul
that the matters specified in the Schedule attached to
v.
the Instrument of Accession were the matters with The State of
respect to which the Dominion Legislature may makefammu & Kashmir
laws for this State. Clause 5 provides that the Instru- G . d - d k
.
by any amen dment of t he a;en raga ar 1 .
ment shall not be vaned
Government of India Act, 1935, or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by the Maharaja by an Instrument supplementary
to the original Instrument of Accession. By cl. 7 it
was agreed that the 1\!Iaharaja would not be deemed
to be committed to the acceptance of any future Constitution of India nor would his discretion be fettered
to enter into agreements with the Government of
India under any such future Constitution. Clause 8
is very important. It says that nothing in the Instrument affects the continuance of the Maharaja's sovereignty in and over his State, or, save as provided by or
under the Instrument, the exercise of any powers,
authority and rights then enjoyed by him as Ruler of
the State, or the validity of any law then in force in
the State. The Schedule attached to the Instrument
refers to four topics, defence, external affairs, communications and ancillary, and under these topics twenty
matters have been serially enumerated as those in
respect of which the Dominion Legislature had the
power to make laws for the State. Thus, by the Instrument of Accession, the Maharaja took the very important step of recognising the fact that his State was
a part of the Dominion of India.
Meanwhile, the invasion of the State had created
tremendous popular fervour and patriotic feelings in
resisting the act of aggression and this popular feeling
inevitably tended to exercise pressure on the Maharaja
for introducing responsible and popular government in
the State. The Maharaja tried to pacify the popular
demand by issuing a proclamation on March 5, 1948.
By this proclamation he stated that in accordance
with the traditions of his dynasty he had from time to
time provided for increasing association of his people
with the administration of the State with the object of
278
P
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
'959
realising the goal of full responsible government at as
-;;-,
early
a date as possible, and he added that he had
1
1
rnn ; • Kau noted with gratification and pride the progr.ess made
The Stale of
so far aud the legitimate desire of his people for the
Jammu & I<ashmir.immediate establishment of a folly democratic consti. tution based on adult franchise with a hereditary
Ga;endrngadka. f. Ruler from his dynasty as the constitutional head of
an executive responsible to the Legislature. It appears that before this proclamation was issued the Maharaja had already appointed Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah who was then the popular leader of the people as the
head of the emergency administration. By the proclamation the Maharaja replaced the emergency administration by a popular interim government and provided for its powers, duties and functions pending the
formation of a fully democratic constitution. Clause 1
of the proclamation provides for the composition of the
Ministry, whereas by cl. 2 the Prime Minister and
other ministers are required to function as a cabinet
and act on the principle of joint responsibility. A
Dewan appointed by the Maharaja is to be a member
of the Cabinet. Clause 4 provides that the Council of
Ministers shall take appropriate steps, as soon as restoration of normal conditions has been completed, to
convene a N atioual Assembly based on adult franchise
having due regard to the principle that the number of
representatives from each voting area should, as far as
practicable, be proportionate to the population of that
area. Clause 5 then lays down that the Constitution
to be framed by the National Assembly shall provide
adequate safeguards for the minorities and contain
appropriate provisions guaranteeing freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.
Clause 6 states that when the work of framing the
Constitution is completed by the National Assembly
the Constitution would be submitted through the
Council of Ministers to the Maharaja for his acceptance. The proclamation ended with the expression of
hope that the formation of a popular interim government and the inauguration in the near future of a fully
democratic Constitution would ensure the contentment,
happiness and the moral and material advancement
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
279
of the people of the State. Though under this
r959
roclamation
a
popular
interim
government
was
set
P
Prem N alh Kaul
up, the constitutional position still was that the popuv.
lar government had theoretically to function under The state of
the Constitution of 1939. It appears that before the Jammu & Kashmir
popular government was thus installed in office the . Maharaja had deputed four representatives of the Ga;endragadkar f.
State to represent the State in the Constituent Assembly called in the Dominion of India to frame the Constitution of India.
After the popular interim government began to
function the political events in the State gathered
momentum and the public began to clamour for the
framing of a democratic Constitution at an early date.
When the atmosphere in the State was thus surcharged, the Maharaja issued his final proclamation on
June 20, 1949, by which he entrusted to Yuvaraj
Karan Singh Bahadur all his powers and functions in
regard to the government of the State because he had
decided for reasons of health to leave the State for a
temporary period. "Now therefore I hereby direct
and declare", says the proclamation, "all powers and
functions whether legislative, executive or judicial
which are exercisable by me in relation to the State
and its government including in particular my right
and prerogative of making laws, of issuing proclamations, orders and ordinances, or remitting, commuting
or reducing sentences and of pardoning offenders,
shall, during the period of my absence from the State,
be exercisable by Yuvaraj Karan Singh Bahadur ".
As subsequent events show this was the last official
act of the Maharaja before he left the State.
After Yuvaraj Karan Singh took the Maharaja's
place and began to function under the powers assigned
to him by the said proclamation, the interim popular
government installed earlier was functioning as before. On November 25, 19.49, Yuvaraj Karan Singh
issued a proclamation by which he declared and directed that the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall, in so
far as it is applicable to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, govern the constitutional relationship between
280
SUPRE:ME: COURT R:mPORTS [1959] Supp.
the State and the contemplated Union of India and
shall
be enforced in the State by him, his heirs and
1
"m ~~ Kaul successorR in accordance with the tenor of its proviThe sta" of
sions. He also declared that the provisions of the said
Jammu & J(ashmfr Constitution shall, as from the date of its commence. ment, supersede and abrogate all other constitutional
Ga1endrngadkar J. provisions inconsistent therewith which were then in
force in the State. The preamble to this proclamation shows that it was based on the conviction that
the best interests of the State required that the constitutional relationship established between the State
and the Dominion of India should be continued as between the State and the contemplated Union of India;
and it refers to the fact that the Constituent Assembly
of India which had framed the Constitution of India
included the duly appointed representatives of the
State and that the said Constitution provided a suitable basis to continue the constitutional relationship
between the State and the contemplated Union of
.India. On January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India
came into force.
This proclamation was followed by the Constitution
(Application to Jammu & Kashmir) Order, 1950
(C. 0. 10) which was issued on January 26, 1950, by
the President in consultation with the Government of
Jammu & Kashmir and in exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (1) of Art. 370 of the Constitution. It
came into force at once. Clause (2) of this order provides that for the purposes of sub-cl. (i) of Art. 370 of
the Constitution, the matters specified in the First
Schedule to the Order correspond to matters specified
in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State of Jammu & Kashmir to the Dominion of India as the matters with regard to which the
Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State;
and accordingly the power of Parliament to make
laws for that State shall be limited to the matters specified in the said First Schedule. Clause (3) provides
that, in addition to the provisions of Art. 1 and Art.
370 of the Constitution the only other provisions of
the Constitution which shall apply to the State of
Jammu & Kashmir shall be those specified in the
P
t959
-h
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT R~POR'rS
281
Sedond Schedule to the Order and shall so apply subz959
ject to the exceptions and modifications specified in
the said Schedule. The First Schedule to the Order Prem Nath
Kaul
v.
specified 96 items occurring in the Union List; while Th• State of
the Second Schedule set out the Articles of the Consti- Jammu & Kashmir
tution made applicable to the State together with the
exceptions and modifications. Later on we will haveGajendragadkar J.
occasion to refer to some of these Articles on which
the appellant has relied.
It appears that, after the interim popular Government took office, the Revenue Minister made a statement of policy at a meeting of the special staff of
revenue officers held in the Govi:irnor's office on August
13, 1950. The Minister stated that whatever the
difficulties, the Cabinet was determined to go ahead
and transfer the proprietorship of the land to the tiller.
The main idea underlying the proposed agricultural
reform was that a landlord shall not possess more
than 20 acres of agricultural land. In addition he
would be allowed 8 kanals for his use and Sagzar and
4 kanals for his second house if in existence, and 10
kanals for Bedzar or Safedzar. It was contemplated
that a committee would be appointed to settle the
details and other matters incidental to the said agricultural plan.
It was presumably in pursuance of this plan adopted by the interim Cabinet that the Act was promulgated by Yuvaraj Karan Singh on October 17, 1950.
The preamble to the Act shows that it was promulgated because no lasting improvem.ent in agricultural
production and efficiency was possible without the
removal of the intermediaries between the tiller of
the soil and the State, and so, for the purpose
of improving agricultural production, it was expedient
to provide for the abolition of such proprietors as own
big landed estates and to transfer the land held by
them to the actual tiller. The Yuvaraj enacted the
law in exercise of the powers vested in him under s. 5
of the Constitution Act of 1996 and the proclamation
issued by Maharaja Hari Singh on June 20, 1949. The
Act consists of 47 sections and purports to carry out its
36
282
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
policy of improving the agricultural production of the
State
by providing for the extinction of the proprietors'
P1em Nath J(aul
v.
titles and the transfer oi the lands to the tillers, and
The state of
by setting up a self-contained machinery for the carryJaminu e;. Kashmir ing out of the scheme of the Act and for settlement of
. all incidental disputes arising thereunder.
Go;endrngadka, 1 ·
For the purpose of this appeal, however, it is necessary to refer to a few reievant sections which deal
with the broad features of the extinction of the proprietors' rights and the transfer of lands to the tillers.
S. 2 of the Act inter alia defines land, proprietor and
tiller, while s. 3 excludes certain specified lands from
the operation of the Act. Section 4, sub-s. (1) provides for the extinction of the right of ownership in certain lands and it lay.s down that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in
force, the right of ownership held by a proprietor in
land other than the land mentioned in sub-s. (2) shall,
subject to the other provisions of the Act, extinguish
and cease to vest in him from the date the Act comes
into force. Sub-section (2) of s. 4 enumerates lands
which are excluded from the operation of sub-s. (1).
They are (a) units of land not exceeding 182 kanals
including residential sites, Bedzars and Safedzars, (b)
Kahikrishmi areas, Araks, Kaps and unculturable
wastes including those used for raising fuel or fodder,
and (c) orchards. The proviso to sub-s. (2) gives
government the power to dispose of lands mentioned
in cl. (b) in such a manner as may be recommended
by the committee to be set up for that purpose. Section
26 of the Act deals with the question of payment to the
proprietors. It provides that there shall, until the
Constituent Assembly of the State settles the question
of compensation, with respect to the land expropriated
under this Act, be paid by the government to every
proprietor who has been expropriated, an annuity in
the manner indicated in the section. In other words,
subject to the final decision of the Constituent Assembly, s. 26 contemplates the payment of annuity to the
expropriated proprietors according to the scale prescribed in the section. With the rest of the sections
we are not concerned in the present appeal.
t959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
283
'959
After the Act was enacted by the Yuvaraj he issued
a proclamation on April 20, 1951, directing that a P
N h
· · of represen t.a t'ives of rein v.at Katti
Const1'tuent Assembly cons1stmg
the people elected on the basis of adult franchise shall The State of
be constitnted forthwith for the purpose of framing a Jamm11 & Kashmir
Constitution for the State of J ammu & Kashmir. The
proclamation sets out the manner in which members Gajendragadkar J.
of the said Constituent Assembly would be elected and
makes provisions for the holding of the said elections.
It also authorised the Constituent Assembly to frame
its own agenda and make rules for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business. The preamble
to this proclamation shows that the Yuvaraj was satisfied that it was the general desire of the people that a
Constituent Assembly should be brought into being
for the purpose of framing a Constitution for the State
and that it was commonly felt that the convening of
the said Assembly could no longer be delayed without
detriment to the future well.being of the State. The
Yuvaraj also felt no doubt that the proclamation
issued by the Maharaja on March 5, 1948, in regard to
the convening of the national assembly as per els. 4 to
6 no longer met the requirements of the situation in
the State. Thus this proclamation was intended to
meet expeditiously the popular demand for the framing of a democratic constitution ; and it indicates that
a decisive stage had been reached in the political history of the State.
In accordance with this proclamation a Constituent
Assembly was elected and it framed the Constitution
for the State. By the Constitution thus framed the
hereditary rule of the State was abolished, and a provision was made for the election of a Sadar-i-Riyasat
to be at the head of the State. On November 13, 1952,
the Yuvaraj was elected to the office of the Sadar-iRiyasat and with his election the dynastic rule of
Maharaja Hari Singh came to an end.
On November 15, 1952, the Constitution (Application to Jammu & Kashmir) Second Amendment Order,
1952 (C. 0. 43) was issued; and it came into force on
November 17, 1952. By this Order the earlier Order of
1950 was amended as a result of which all references
284
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
in the said Order to the Rajpramukh shall be construed as references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu
1
Prem al
au & Kashmir. Similarly in the Second Schedule to the
v.
The s1a1e of
said Order some amendments were made. On the
Jammu & KashmiY same day a Declaration (C. 0. 44) was made by the
President under Art. 370, sub-art. (3) of the ConstituGajendragadkar f. tion that from November 17, 1952, the said Art. 370
shall be operative with the modification that for the
explanation in cl. (I) thereof the new explanation shall
be substituted. The effect of this new explanation was
that the government of the State meant the person for
the time being recognised by the President, on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the
State, as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu & Kashmir
acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the
State for the time being in force. On November 18,
1952, Yuvaraj Karan Singh was recognised as the
Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu & Kashmir.
·
On May 14, 1954, another Constitution (Application
to Jammu & Kashmir) Order (C. 0. 48) was made by
the President which inter alia applied Art. 31A and
31B to the State with certain modifications and included the Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. The last two Orders were issued subsequent to
the enactment of the Act and so they would have no
bearing on the decision of the points raised before us.
We have briefly referred to them for the sake of completing the narrative of the material events.
The validity of the Act is impeached mainly on the
ground that Yuvaraj Karan Singh had no authority to
promulgate the said Act. It is this argument which
has been urged before us by Mr. Chatterjee in different
and alternative forms that needs careful examination.
The first attack against the competence of Yuvaraj
Karan Singh proceeds on the assumption that at the
time when Maharaja Hari Singh conveyed his powers
to Yuvaraj Karan Singh by his proclamation of June
20, 1949, he was himself no more than a constitutional monarch and as such he could convey to Yuvaraj Karan Singh no higher powers. Let us first deal
with this argument. Prior to the passing of the
Independence Act, 1947, the sovereignty of Maharaja
r959
N
h K
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
285
Hari Singh over the State of J ammu & Kashmir was
I959
subject to such limitations as were constitutionally Prem Nath l\aul
imposed on it by the paramountcy of the British
v.
Crown and by the treaties and agreements entered The state of
into between the Rulers of the State and the BritishJammu& Kash111ir
Government. It cannot be disputed that so far as . the internal administration and governance of the Ga;eudragadkar f.
State were concerned Maharaja Hari Singh, like his
predecessors, was an absolute monarch; and that all
powers legislative, executive and judicial in relation
to his State and its governance inherently vested in
him. This position has been emphatically brought
'
out by s. 3 of Regulation 1 of 1991 (1934). 'Though by
this Regulation Maharaja Hari Singh gave effect
to his intention to provide for the association of his
subjects in the matter of legislation and administration of the State, by s. 3 he fully preserved in himself
all of his pre-existing legislative, executive and judicial
powers. Section 3 not only preserves the said powers
but expressly provides that nothing contained in the
Regulation shall affect or be deemed to have ,affected
the right and prerogative of His Highness to make
and pass regulations, proclamations and ordinances
by virtue of his inherent authority. It is thus clear
that the rest of the provisions of the Regulation were
subject to the overriding powers preserved by His
Highness.
It is, however, urged that this constitutional position was substantially altered by the subsequent Constitution Act of 1996 (14 of 1996). We are unable to
accept this argument. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act
in terms continue to preserve all the powers legislative, executive and judicial as well as the right and
prerogative of His Highness just as much a.s s. 3 of
Regulation 1 of 1991. It is significant that the provisions of Pt. II which deals with the executive, like
those of Pt. III which deals with the Legislature,
begin with the express provision that they are subject
to the provisions of ss. 4 and 5. In other words, the
powers conferred on the executive and the Legislature,
limited and qualified as they are, are made expressly
subject to the overriding powers of His Highness.
286
'959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Besides, there are specific provisions in the Act which
Prem Nath l(aul clearly emphasise the preservation of the said powers.
v.
Section 24 which enumerates the reserved matters
The State of
over which the Praja Sabha had no authority to legisJammu &- J(ashmir late provides by cl. (i) that the provisions of the Act
Gajendrngadka'
and the rules made thereunder and their repeal or
matters. Besides
cl. (j) confers on His Highness the authority to add
other specified matters to the list of reserved matters
from time to time. These provisions make it clear that
his Highness could enlarge the list of reserved matters
thereby limiting the jurisdiction of the Praja Sabha.
Similarly the legislative procedure prescribed by s. 31,
sub-ss. (2) and (3) clearly shows that it is only such
bills as received the assent of His Highness that became law, His Highness's power to assent or not to
assent to the bills submitted to him being absolutely
unfettered. The ordinances issned by His Highness
under s. 38 cannot be repealed or altered by the Praja
Sabha by virtue of s. 39; and lastly s. 72 expressly
preserves the inherent power and prerogative of His
Highness. Thus there can be no doubt that though
this Act marked the second step taken by His Highness in actively associating his subjects with the administration of the State, it did not constitute even a
partial surrender by His Highness of his sovereign
rights in favour of the Praja Sabha. So far as the
said powers are concerned, the constitntional position
under this Act is substantially the same as under the
earlier Act.
It is contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the prerogative rights which are preserved by ss. 5 and 72 of this
Act represent only such rights as had not been entrusted to the Praja Sabha ; and in support of this
contention he referred us to the observation made by
Dicey that "the discretionary authority of the Crown
originates generally not in Act of Parliament, but in
the prerogative-a term which has caused more perplexity to students than any other expression referring to the constitution. The prerogative appears to be
both historically and as a matter of actual fact nothing else than the residue of discretionary or arbitrary
J. modifications constitute reserved
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
287
authority, which at any given time is legally left
1959
in the hands of the Crown" (1). This observation
· h approva l b y t he H ouse of L ords Prem Nath I<aul
h as been cited wit
in the case of Attorney-General v. IJ_e Key8er's Royal The ~~te of
0
Hotel Ltd. (·).
We do not see how this statement can Jammu &- Kashmir
assist us in determining the constitutional status, and
the extent of the powers, of Maharaja Hari Singh in Gajendragadkar ].
relation to the governance of the State. The said
discussion in Dicey's treatise has reference to the
special features of the history of English constitutional
development; and it would naturally be of no relevance in dealing with the effect of the Constitution of
1996 with which we are concerned. As we have just
indicated this Constitution emphatically brings out
the fact that the Maharaja was an absolute monarch
and in him vested all the legislative, executive and
judicial powers along with the prerogative rights mentioned in ss. 5 and 72.
Whilst this was the true constitutional position the
Independence Act, 1947, was passed by the British
Parliament; and with the lapse of the British paramountcy the Rulers of Indian States were released
from the limitations imposed on their sovereignty by
the said paramountcy of the British Crown and by
the treaties in force between the British Government
and the States; this was, however, subject to the proviso prescribed by s. 7 of the Independence Act under
which effect had to be given to the provisions of the
agreements specified in the proviso, until they were
denounced by the Rulers of the States or were superseded by subsequent agreements. In the result, subject
to t.he agreements saved by the proviso, Maharaja
Hari Singh continued to be an absolute monarch of the
State, and in the eyes of international law he might
conceivably have claimed the status of a sovereign
and independent State. But it is urged that the
sovereignty of the Maharaja was considerably affected
by the provisions of the Instrument of Accession
which he signed on Octobe1· 25, 1947. This argument
is clearly untenable. It is true that by cl. l of the
(r) Dicey on" Law of the Constitution", 9th Ed., p. 424,
(2) [1920] A.C. 508, 526.
28S
SUPREME COURT R~FORTS [i959] Supp.
Instrument of Accession His Highness conceded to the
authorities mentioned in the said clause the right to
nem al
au 1
.
.
. to h.1s Sta t e sue h f unct10ns
.
v.
exercise
m
relat10n
as may
The seaee of
be vested in them by or under the Government of India
Jammu 0 Rashmfr Act, 1935, as in force in the said Dominion on August
. 15, 1947, but this was subject to the other terms of the
Ga;endrngadka• J. Instrument of Accession itself; and cl. 6 of the Instrument clearly and expressly recognised the continuance
of the sovereignty of His Highness in and over his
State. We must, therefore, reject the argument that the
execution of the Instrument of Accession affected in
any manner the legislative, executive and judicial
powers in regard to the government of the State
which then vested in the Ruler of the State.
There is one more argument which has been urged
before us on the question of Maharaja Hari Singh's
powers. It is said that when Maharaja Bari Singh
issued his proclamation on March 5, 1948, replacing
the emergency administration by a popular interim
government headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah
and constituting a Council of Ministers who were to
function as a Cabinet and act on the principle of joint
responsibility, he virtually introduced a popular
democratic government in the State, surrendered his
sovereign rights, and became a constitutional monarch. There is no substance in this argument. The
proclamation merely shows that, under pressure of
public opinion and as a result of the difficult and delicate problem raised by the tribal raid, the Maharaja
very wisely chose to entrust the actual administration
of the government to the charge of a popular Cabinet;
but the description of the Cabinet as a popular interim government did not make the said Cabinet a
popular Cabinet in the true constitutional sense of the
expression. The Cabinet had still to function under
the Constitution Act 14 of 1996 (1939) and whatever
policies it pursued, it had to act under the overriding
powers of His Highness. It is thus clear that until
the Maharaj a issued his proclamation on June 20,
1949, all his powers legislative, executive and judicial
as well as his right and prerogative vested in him as
before. That is why the argument that Maharaja
!959
"
N-h l(
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~so
Hari Singh had surrendered his sovereign powers in
r959
favour of the Praja Sabha and the popular interim
N h ,
. Prem at } au 1
.
government, there b y acceptmg
t h e status of a const1v.
tutional monarch cannot be upheld.
The State of
The next point which calls for our decision is:Jammu&Kashmir
What was the effect of the proclamation issued by
Maharaja Hari Singh in favour of Yuvaraj Karan Gajendragadkar J.
Singh on June 20, 1949 ? The terms of this proclamation have already been set out by us. There is no
doubt that, during the temporary period that the
Maharaja wanted to leave the State for reasons of
health, he conferred on Yuvaraj Karan Singh all his
powers and functions in regard to the government of
the State. Since the Maharaja was himself an absolute monarch, there was no fetter or limitation on his
power to appoint somebody else to exercise all or any
of his powers. There was no authority or tribunal in
the Sta.te which could question his right or power to
adopt such a course. As Chief Justice Kania has
observed in Re: Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1) " A legislative body which is sovereign like an autocratic Ruler
has power to do anything. It may, like a Ruler, by
an individual decision, direct that a certain person
may be put to death or a certain property may be
taken over by the State. A body of such character
may have power to nominate someone who can exercise all its powers and make all its decisions. This is
possible to be done because there is no authority or
t.ribunal which can question the right or power of the
authority to do so". Similarly, Mahajan, J., has
observed in the same case that " The Parliament being
a legal omnipotent despot, apart from being a legislature simpliciter, it can in exercise of its sovereign
power delegate its legislative functions or even create
new bodies conferring on them power to make laws";
and the learned Judge added that "whether it exercises its power of delegation of legislative power in its
capacity as a mere legislature or in its capacity as an
omnipotent despot, it is not possible to test it on the
touchstone of judicial precedent or judicial scrutiny
as courts of justice in England cannot inquire into it".
In his judgment Mukherjea, J., has also made similar
(1) (1951] S.C.R. 747, 765, 766, 889, 969.
~1
290
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
observations after quoting the words of Sir Ed ward
;- K
Coke in regard to the " transcendent and absolute
1
11
p,,m v~ ' au power and jurisdiction of Parliament". What is true
The state of
of the British Parliament would be truer about an
Jammu & Kashmir absolute and despotic monarch, the exercise of whose
paramount power as a sovereign is not subject to any
. Ga1endragadkar f. popular and legislative control. If that be the true
position, the proclamation issued by Maharaja Hari
Singh authorising Yuvaraj Karan Singh to exercise
all his powers would clothe him with all such powers
and he would be in the same position as his father so
long as the proclamation stood.
Besides, it would be permissible to observe that
though the proclamation purports to have been issued
on the ground that l\faharaja Hari Singh was leaving
the State for a temporary period for reasons of health,
it was clear even then that the temporary departure
of the Maharaja really meant his permanent retirement from the State. It was realised by him as much
as by his subjects that to face the stress and strain
caused by the unusual problems raised by the act of
aggression against the State, it was necessary that he
should quit and young Yuvaraj Karan Singh should
take his place. Thus considered the proclamation
really amounted to his abdication and installation by
him of Yuvaraj Karan Singh as the Ruler of the State.
It is, however, not necessary to consider any further
this aspect of the matter in dealing with the authority of Yuvaraj Karan Singh, because, as we have
just held, .Maharaja Hari Singh was competent to
delegate his powers to Yuvaraj Karan Singh for a
temporary period as his proclamation purported to
do; and by virtue of such delegation, Y uvaraj Karan
Singh was clothed with all the authority which his
father possessed as the Ruler of the State until the
proclamation was revoked. Therefore the argument
that Maharaja Hari Singh's proclamation issued on
June 20, 1949, did not confer on Yuvaraj Karan
Singh the specified powers cannot be accepted.
The next contention is that the powers of Yuvaraj
Karan Singh were substantially limited by the proclamation issued by him on November 25, 1949. We
are not impressed even by this argument. By this
1 959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
291
proclamation Yuvaraj Karan Singh purported to
x959
make applicable to his State the Constitution of India
·
. h was sh ort1y gowg
wh 10
to b e a d op t ed b y th e Con- Prem Nath Kaul
stituent Assembly of India in so far as was applic- Tho s~~te of
able; in other words, this proclamation did not carry Jammu & Kashmir
the constitutional position any further than where it
stood after and as a result of the execution of the Gajendragadkar J.
Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh. It
is thus clear that the proclamation did not affect
Yuvaraj Karan Singh's authority and powers as the
Ruler of the State which had been conferred on him
by the proclamation of hi:::; father issued in that behalf.
Mr. Chatterjee, however, has very seriously pressed
before us his contention that, as a result of the application of certain specified articles of the Constitution
to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, all vestiges of
sovereignty which Yuvaraj Karan Singh could have
claimed had vanished ; and in consequence he had
become merely a constitutional monarch of the State
without any legislative authority or powers. Indeed
it is this part of the case on which Mr. Chatterjee
placed considerable emphasis. In this connection, it
would be relevant to recall that by the Constitution
Order 10, in addition to the provisions of Art. 1 and
Art. 370, certain other provisions of the Constitution
were made applicable to the State with exceptions
and modifications as specified in the Second Schedule.
Articles 245, 254 and 255 as well as Art. 246 as modified from Pt. XI of the Constitution were applied
to the State. Similarly from Pt. XIX Art. 366 was
applied, and from Pt. XXI Arts. 370 and 385 were
applied. In this connection it is also necessary to
bear in mind that Pt. VI which deals with the States
in Pt. A of the First Schedule has not been applied,
nor has Pt. VII which consisted of Art. 238 been
applied. Art. 238 provides for the application of provisions of Pt. VI to States in Pt. B of the First Schedule. Schedule Seven which consists of the three
Legislative Lists has also not been applied. It is thus
clear that though by the application of Art. 1 the
State beca.me a part of the territory of India and constituted a State under Part B, the provisions of
292
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Pt. VI and Pt. VII did not apply to it nor did the
Schedule prescribing the three Legislative Lists. This
Prem Nath I<aul .act
c
• of cons1·d era bl e 1mpor
·
t ance an d s1gm
· ·ficanco
1s
Th• s~~ 1 , of
in dealing with the appellant's contention.
Jammu & Kashmfr
Since Mr. Chatterjee has strongly relied on the
-application of Art. 370 of the Constitution to the State
Gajendragadkar l·in support of his argument that the Yuvaraj bad
ceased to hold the plenary legislative powers, it is
necessary to examine the provisions of this Article
and their effect. This Article was intended to make
temporary provisions with respect to the State of
Jammu & Kashmir. It rea<;ls thus:
"Art. 370: (I) Notwithstanding anything in this
Constitution,(a) the provisions of article 238 shall not apply
in relation to the State of J ammu & Kashmir;
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the
said State shall be limited to(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to
correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of
Accession governing the accession of the State to the
Dominion of India as the matters with respect to
which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for
that State; and
(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with
the concurrence of the Government of the State, the
President may by order specify.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this article, the
Government of the State means the person for the
time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of
the Council of Ministers for the time being in office
under the Maharaja's Proclamation dated the fifth day
of March, 1948;
(c) the provisions of article I and of this article
shall apply in relation to that State;
(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to
such exceptions and modifications as the President
may by order specify;
1959
-
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
293
I959
Provided that no such order which relates to the
matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the P
;-;h K 1
State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) '""' :
au
shall be issued except in consultation with the Govern- The state of
ment of the State:
Jammu & Kashmir
Provided further that no such order which relates
to matters other than those referred to in the last Gajendragadkar f.
preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.
(2) If the concurrence of the Government of the
State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of
clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of
that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly
for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the
State is convened, it shall be placed before such
Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing
provisions of this article, the President may, by public
notification, declare that this article shall cease to be
operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may
specify:
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2)
shall be necessary before the President issues such a
notification."
Clause (1) (b) of this Article deals with the legislative
power of the Parliament to make laws for the State;
and it prescribes limitation in that behalf. Under paragraph (1) of sub-cl. (b) of cl. (1) Parliament has power
to make laws for the State in respect of matters in the
Union List and the Concurrent List which the President in consultation with the Government of the State
declares to correspond to matters specified in the
Instrument of Accession; whereas in regard to other
matters in the said Lists Parliament may, under
paragraph (ii), have power to legislate for the State
after such other matters have been specified by his
order by the President with the concurrence of the
Government of the State. It is significant that paragraph (i) refers to consultation with the Government of
the State while paragraph (ii) requires its concurrence.
294
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
Having thus provided for cousultation with, and
the concurrence
of, the Government of the State, the
.
P rem N at h K au I
v.
explanat10n shows what the Government of the State
The state of
means in this context. It means according to the
Jammu & Kashmfr appellant, not the Maharaja acting by himself in his
own discretion, but the person who is recognised as
. Ga1e•d•agadk•• J. the Maharaja by the President acting on the advice of
the· Council of Ministers for the time being in office.
It is on this explanation that the appellant has placed
considerable reliance.
Sub-clauses (c) and (d) of cl. (1) of the Article provide respectively that the provisions of Art. 1 and of
the present Article shall apply in relation to the State;
and that the other provisions of the Constitution shall
apply in relation to it subject to exceptions and modifications specified by the Presidential order. These
provisions are likewise made subject to consultation
with, or concurrence of, the Government of the State
respectively.
Having provided for the legislative power of the
Parliament· and for the application of the Articles of
the Constitution to the State, Art. 370, cl. (2) prescribes that if the concurrence of the Government of the
State required by the relevant sub-els. of cl. (1) has
been given before the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir
has been convened, such concurrence shall be placed
before such Assembly for such decision as it may take
thereon. This clause shows that the Constitutionmakers attached great importance to the final decision
of the Constituent Assembly, and the continuance of
the exercise of powers conferred on the Parliament
and the President by the relevant temporary provisions of Art. 370(1) is made conditional on the final
approval by the said Constituent Assembly in the said
matters.
Cl. (3) authorises the President to declare by public
notification that this article shall cease to be operative
or shall be operative only with specified exceptions or
modifications; but this power can be exercised by the
President only if the Constituent Assembly of the
State makes recommendation in that behalf. Thus
the proviso to cl. (3) also emphasises the importance
'959
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT R~POR'rS
29~
which was attached to the final decision of the Constit959
tuent Assembly of Kashi;nir in regard to the relevant Prem Nath Kaul
matters covered by Art. 370.
. v.
The appellant contends that the scheme of this The State of
Article clearly shows that the person who would be Jammu & Kashmir
recognised by the President as the Maharaja of . Jammu & Kashmir was treated as no more than aGa;endragadkar f.
constitutional Ruler of the State. In regard to matters
covered by this Article he could not function or
decide by himself and in his own discretion. The consultation contemplated by this Article had to be with
the Maharaja acting on the advice of the Council of
Ministers and the concurrence prescribed by it had to
be similarly obtained and given, and that brings out
the limitations on the powers of the Maharaja. It is
also urged that the final decision in these matters has
been deliberately left to the Constituent Assembly
which was going to be convened for the framing of the
Constitution of the State, and that again emphasises
the limitations imposed on the powers of the Maharaja.
This argument assumes that under the explanation
to Art. 370(1) it is the person recognised by the President as the Maharaja who has to act on the advice of
the Council of Ministers in relation to matters covered
by Art. 370. But, it is possible to take the view that
the said clause really indicates that in recognising
any person as the Maharaja of the State the President
has to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers
for the time being in office under the Maharaja's proclamation dated March 5, 1948. If that be the true
construction of the explanation, then the argument
that, before the Maharaja is consulted or his concurrence is obtained, he must act on the advice of his Ministers would not be valid. We would, however, like to
deal with the argument even on the assumption that
the construction put by the appellant on the explanation is right.
On the said construction the question which falls to
be determined is: Do the provisions of Art. 370(1)
affect the plenary powers of the Maharaja in the matter of the governance of the State ? The effect of the
application of the present Article has to be judged in
296
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp;
the light of its object and its terms considered in the
P"m Nath Kaul context of the special features of the constitutional rev.
lationship between the State and India. The ConstituThe State~!
tion-makers were obviously anxious that the said relaJammu & [{as1'mir tionship should be finally determined by the Constituent
.
-dk
Assembly of the State itself; that is the main basis
Ga;endraga ar 1 •,.
· ·
ior, an d purpor t of , th e temporary prov1s10ns
ma d e
by the present Article; and so the effect of its provisions must be confined to its subject-matter. It would
not be permissible or legitimate to hold that, by implication, this Article sought to impose limitations on the
plenary legislative powers of the Maharaja. These
powers had been recognised and specifically provided
by the Constitution Act of the State itself; and it was
not, and could not have been, within the contemplation, or competence of the Constitution-makers to impinge even indirectly on the said powers. It would be
recalled that by the Instrument of Accession these powers have been expressly recognised and preserved and
neither the subsequent proclamation issued by Yuva.raj Ka.ran Singh adopting, as far as it was applicable,
the proposed Constitution of India, nor the Constitution Order subsequently issued by the President, purported to impose any limitations on the said legislative
powers of the riuler. What form of government the
State should adopt was a matter which had to be, and
naturally was left to be, decided by the Constituent
Assembly of the State. Until the Constituent Assembly
reached its decision in that behalf, the constitutional
relationship between the State and India continued to
be governed basically by the Instrument of Accession.
It would therefore be unreasonable to assume that the
application of Art. 370 could have affected, or was
intended to affect, the plenary powers of the Ma.haraja
in the matter of the governance of the State. In our
opinion, the appellant's contention based on this Article must therefore be rejected.
The application of Arts. 245, 254 and 255, and of
Art. 246 as modified, does not seem to have any bearing
on the question of the authority and powers of the
Ruler of the State. Their application merely serves
to provide for the legislative powers of the Parlian:ient
'959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
297
to make laws in respect of matters covered by Art.
z959
370. Incidentally we may point out that the applica- Prem Nath Kaul
tion of Arts. 246 and 254 as provided by the Constiv
tution Order 10 of 1950 has been subsequently The s;ate of
modified by the Constitution Order 48 of 1954. Simi- Jammu &- Kashmir
larly Art. 255 which was originally applied by the . first Order has been deleted by the latter Order. This Gayendragadkar J.
shows that it was subsequently realised that the original application of the said Articles prescribed by the
earlier Order was more anticipatory and notional and
required either suitable modification or cancellation.
The appellant has then relied upon the provisions of
Art. 385. It provides :
"Art. 385.-Until the House or Houses of the
Legislature of a State specified in Part B of the First
Schedule has or have been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the body or authority
functioning immediately before the commencement
of this Constitution as the Legislature of the corresponding Indian State shall exercise the powers and
perform the duties conferred by provisions of this
Constitution on the Honse or Houses of the Legislature
of the State so specified."
It is difficult to see how this Article supports the
appellant's contention. In fact it is not easy to appre·
ciate what the application of this Article to the State
really meant. As we have already pointed out the
application of the specified Articles to the State was
not intended to affect, and constitutionally could not
have affected, the form of the government prevailing
in the State and the plenary legislative powers of the
Maharaja in regard to the government of the State.
As in regard to the application of Arts. 245, 254 and
255, so in regard to this Article as well, it was subsequently realised that the application of the Article
was purely notional and could serve no purpose. That
is why by C. 0. 48 of 1954 this Article has been deleted
from the list of Articles applied to the State. It seems
to us that the initial formal application of this Article
cannot justify the appellant's case that the plenary
legislative powers vesting in the Ruler of the State
38
29S
' 959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
were not only affected but, as the appellant contends,
Prem Nath Kaul completely extinguished. The constitutional position
v.
in regard to the government of the State continued to
The State of
be the same despite the application of this Article. In
Jammu & Kashmir dealing with the application of this Article and Arts.
Gajend,agadk"'
245, 254 and 255, it would be permissible to rely on
·the rule of construction set out in Maxwell that " a
thing which is within the letter of a statute is generally to be considered as not within the statute unless it
is also the real intention of the Legislature" (1). It is
evident that the Constitution-makers have treated the
problem of Kashmir on a special basis and that though
the association of Kashmir with India which began
with the Instrument of Accession has been steadily
and gradually growing closer and closer on a democratic basis, it still presents features not common to any
other State included in the Union of India. We have
no doubt that at the time when the Act was passed
the plenary legislative powers of the Yuvaraj had not
been affected in any manner. The result is that
Yuvaraj Karan Singh was competent to enact the Act
in 1950 and so the challenge to the validity of the Act
on the ground that he did not possess legislative competence in that behalf cannot succeed.
It is clear that the validity of the Act cannot be challenged on the ground that the Act did not provide for
the payment of compensation. For one thing s. 26 of
the Act did contemplate the payment of compensation.
Besides, as the law of the State then stood, there was
no limitation on the legislative power of the Ruler such
as is prescribed by Art. 31 of the Constitution ; and
Art. 31 had not been then applied to the State. Subsequently when Art. 31(2} was extended to the State the
Act no doubt became the existing law and it :Ii.as been
saved by the new and modified cl. (5) of the said Article.
There is another aspect of the matter to which
reference· must be made. Section 26 of the Act
had left the final decision on the question of the payment of compensation to the Constituent Assembly
of the State; and it is common ground that the Constituent Assembly has decided not to pay any compensation. Mr. Chatterjee contends that this decision is
1
(1) Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statutes", 10th Ed., p. I7•
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
invalid because the Constituent Assembly itself was
r959
not properly called and constituted. There is no sub. t h"is argument. Aft er y uvaraJ. K aran s·mg h 'Prem Nath Kaul
stance m
was put in charge of the duties of governing the State The ;;ate of
by Maharaja Hari Singh by his proclamation issued Jammu & Kashmi•
on June 20, 1949, he began to function as a Ruler and
was entitled to exercise all his powers in that behalf. Gajendragadkar J.
He realised that the original plan of Maharaja Hari
Singh to call a national assembly which he announced
on March 5, 1948, would not meet the requirements of
the situation which had radically changed; and the
Yuvaraj thought that a Constituent Assembly on a
broader basis should be called and should be entrusted
with the task of framing a Constitution witbout any
delay. It is idle to suggest that the Yuvaraj was
bound to convene the national assembly on the same
lines as were laid down by Maharaja Hari Singh in his
proclamation and with the same object, for the same
purpose, and subject to the same conditions. It was for
the Yuvaraj to consider the situation which confronted him and it was within his competence to decide
what solution would satisfactorily meet the requirements of the situation. We have no doubt that the
Yuvaraj was perfectly competent to issue the proclamation on April 20, 1951, under which the Constituent
Assembly ultimately came to be elected and convened.
If the Constituent Assembly was properly constituted
and it decided not to pay any compensation to the
landlords it is difficult to understand how the validity
of this decision can be effectively challenged.
That leaves only one question to be considered. It
is contended that the Act is invalid under Art. 254 of
the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the two
earlier Acts, No. IO of 1990 and No. 4 of 1977. It is
unnecessary to enquire whether there is any repugnancy between the Act and the earlier Acts to which
the appellant refers. In our opinion the argument
based on the provisions of Art. 254 must be rejected
on the preliminary ground that it is impossible to
invoke the assistance of this Article effectively because
in terms the essential conditions for its application are
absent in the present case. This argument assumes
that under Art. 254(1) if there is repugnancy between
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a
State and any provision of an existing law with resPrem N at h K au l
· t h e Concurpect to one ofh
t e matters enumerated m
The
of
rent List, then subject to the provisions of cl. (2), the
Jammu o;. Kashmir law made by the Legislature of the State was to the
extent of the repugnancy void. The appellant concedes
Gajendragadkar .J. that there is no scope for applying the provisions of
cl. (2) of Art. 254 which deals with cases where the subsequent law has been reserved for the consideration and
assent of the President ;.but this aspect of the matter
itself shows that the whole Article would in substance
be inapplicable to the State. Clause (2) of Art. 254,
which is its integral and important part, postulates
that the µegislature of the State, in enacting a law on
the relevant matter may reserve it for consideration
of the President and his assent, and thereby save the
consequences of cl. (1); and cl. (2) was clearly inapplicable to the State. Besides, it is clear that the essential condition for the application of Art. 254(1) is that
the existing law must be with respect to one of the
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List; in other
words, unless it is shown that the repugnancy is
between the provisions of a subsequent law and those
of an existing law in respect of the specified matters,
the Article would be inapplicable; and, as we have
already pointed out, Schedule Seven which contains
the three Legislative Lists was not then extended to
the State; and it is, therefore, impossible to predicate
that the matter covered by the prior law is one of
the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. That
is why Art. 254 cannot be invoked by the appellant.
On this view, it is not necessary to consider whether
the construction sought to be placed by the appellant
on this Article is otherwise correct or not.
The result is that all the grounds urged by the
appellant against the validity of the Act fail, and so
it must be held that the High Court was right in
taking the view that the plaintiff had not shown that
the Act was ultra vires. The appeal accordingly fails
and is dismissed with costs.
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;;at,
Appeal dismissed.
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