M/S. RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. versus THE STATE OF MADRAS & OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 18 February 1959 | [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 227 | 1959 INSC 15
Key facts
- Decided
- 18 February 1959
- Bench
- SYED JAFFER IMAM*, A.K. SARKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 37/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 227
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 15
Text of the judgment
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
it may be for the benefit of the parties to the differI959
ence, must be regarded as inserted in the interest of
Waman
the public also".
Shriniwas Kini
In that case there was a provision made by the Legisv.
lature that disputes mentioned in the section of the
Ratilal
Act were to be determined by an Expert nominated by Bhagwandas & Co.
the Board of Trade and it was contended that though
Rapur J.
not in the strict technical sense estoppel, it was a
waiver of the provisions introduced into the Statute
for the benefit of private rights. No doubt that was
a case which proceeded on a question of jurisdiction
but the judgment proceeded on the principle of waiver
of a statutory provision inserted in public interest.
Thus the plea of waiver is unsustainable.
In our opinion, therefore, the judgment of the High
Court is sound and the appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
M/S. RAMAN & RAMAN LTD.
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS & OTHERS
(JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR and SuBBA RAo, JJ.)
Motor Vehicles-Legislation empowering State Government to
issue orders and directions-Interpretation-Nature of jurisdiction
conjerred-Such orders and directions, if law regulating rights of
parties-Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, z948 (XX of
I948), s. 43A.
The appellant and the fourth respondent along with others
were applicants for a stage carriage permit. The Regional
Transport Authority after hearing the applicants granted the
permit to the appellant. On appeal by the fourth respondent, the
Central Road Traffic Board set aside the order of the Regional
Transport Authority and granted the permit to the fourth respondent. The appellant moved the State Government in revision but to no effect. He thereafter moved the High Court
under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Central Road Traffic Board and the State
Government. The single Judge who heard the matter quashed
I959
February xB.
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
the said orders and directed the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which was constituted in place of the Central Road Traffic
M/s. Raman & Board, to dispose of the appeal according to law. On a Letters
Ranian Ltd.
Patent appeal by the fourth respondent, the Appellate Bench
v.
of the High Court set aside the order of the single Judge and
The Stats of
restored the order of the Central Road Traffic Board. Hence this
Madras & Others appeal by special leave. The point for determination in the
appeal was whether the order granting the permit to the appellant made by the Regional Transport Authority on the basis of
an order issued by the State Government under s. 43A of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor Vehicles
(Madras Amendment) Act, 1948, could be set aside on the basis
of another order imposing new restrictions issued thereunder
while the appeal was pending before the Central Road Traffic
Board and thus involved the question as to whether an order or
direction issued by the State Government under s. 43A of the
Act had the force of law, so as to create a vested right in the
appellant.
Held (per Jafer Imam and Subba Rao, JJ.), that s. 43A of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. as amended by the Motor Vehicles
(Madras Amendment) Act, 1948, properly construed, must be
given a restricted meaning and the jurisdiction it conferred on
the State Government must be confined to administrative funcI959
tions.
An order or direction made thereunder by the State
Government, therefore, could not have the status of law regulating rights of parties and must partake of the character of an
administrative order.
C. S.S. Motor Service, Tenkasi v. The State of Madras, I.L.R.
1953 Mad. 304 and Gopalakrishnan Motor Transport Co., Ltd. v.
Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Krishna District, V ijayawada, A.LR. (1957) A.P. 882, approved.
Consequently, in the instant case, the appellant could not be
said to have acquired a vested right that was defeated by a new
law enforced pending the appeal and the order of the Central
Road Traffic Board could not .be set aside merely on the ground
that it had decided the appeal on the basis of an order issued
subsequent to the grant of the permit if such order was otherwise
in public interest.
Per Sarkar. J.-It could hardly be said that the rule that a
court hearing an appeal from a decision should not ordinarily
take into consideratiol) a law passed subsequent to that decision
had application where a quasi-judicial tribunal heard an appeal
from another such tribunal. Consequently, in the instant case, it
could not be said that there was an error of law apparent on the
face of the record so as to attract a writ of certiorari and the
appeal must fail on that ground.
No applicant for a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act
could have a substantive right to the permit vested in him and
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
229
z959
the granting or refusal of a permit by the Regional Transport
Authority could not operate as res judicata.
M/s. Raman &
It was unnecessary for the purpose of the present case to
Raman Ltd.
decide what kind of orders could be issued by the State Governv.
ment under s. 43A of the Act, for whatever its nature, adminisThe State of
trative or otherwise, if an order under that section entitled a
person to its observance, and there was hardly any doubt as to Madras & Others
that, it would be a law a mistake of which would justify the
issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance.
The Mayor of Rochester v. The Queen, (1858) EL. BL. & E.L.
1924; 120 E.R. 791, referred to.
Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division
and Appeals, Assam, [1958] S.C.R. 1240, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 37 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 14, 1956, of the Madras High
Court in Writ Appeal No. 64 of 1956, arising out of
the judgment and order dated May 1, 1956, of the said
High Court in Writ Petition No. 852 of 1955.
G. S. Pathak, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G.. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, J.B. Dadachanji and S. N.
Andley, for respondent No. 4.
1959. February 18. The judgment of Imam and
Subba Rao, JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao, J.
Sarkar, J., delivered a separate judgment.
SuBBA RAO, J.-This appeal by Special Leave
against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature
at Madras raises the ques.J,ion of interpretation of
s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939),
as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 (Mad. XX of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act. On February 19, 1955, the Regional
Transport Authority, Tanjore, Madras State, the
second respondent herein, called for applications under
s. 57(2) of the Act for grant of a stage carriage permit
on the Saliamangalam Kodavasal route. The appellant and the fourth respondent, K. M. Shanmugam,
Proprietor, K. M. S. Transport, Ammapet, Tanjore
District, along with others, applied for the grant of
the said permit. The Regional Transport Authority
Subba Rao].
/
230
SUPREME_ COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
at its meeting held on April 19, 1955, after hearing the
representations of the applicants, granted the permit
to the appellant. The fourth respondent and two
others preferred appeals against the said order to the
Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, the third respondent herein. The Central Road Traffic Board by its
dated June 25, 1955, set aside the order of the
order
Subba Rao].
Regional Transport Authority and granted the permit
to the fourth respondent. The appellant preferred a
Revision Petition against that order to the first respondent, the State of Madras, but the first respondent
rejected the petition by its order dated October l~,
1955. Thereafter, the appellant filed a Writ Petition
(No. 852 of 1955) in the High Court of Madras under
Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the orders of the
Central Road Traffic Board and the State of Madras.
Rajagopalan, J., of the said High Court by his order
dated May 1, 1956, quashed the order of the Government and directed the State Transport Appellate
Tribunal which had been constituted in place of the
Central Road Traffic Board to dispose of the appeal in
accordance with law. Against the judgment of the
learned Judge, the fourth respondent preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent and the Appellate Bench
of that High Court, consisting of Rajamannar, C. J.,
and Ramaswami, J., set aside the order of Rajagopalan, J., and restored the order of the Central Road
Traffic Board. The appellant with special leave filed
the present appeal against that judgment of the High
Court.
_
Mr. Pathak, appearing for the appellant, raised before us the following two points: (i) The appeal filed
by the fourth respondent against the order of the
Regional Transport Authority to the Central Road
Traffic Board was barred by limitation and the Board
acted illegally in disposing of the appeal without
deciding the question of limitation; and (ii) the appellant had the fundamental right to carry on the business of transport subject to reasonable restrictions
imposed by law as on the date he applied for a permit
·or at any rate when the Regional Transport Authority
issued the permit to him, and that the Central Road
x959
M/s. Raman &
Raman Ltd.
v.
The State of
Madras & Others
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
231
Traffic Board committed an error, evident on the face
r959
of the record, in disposing of the appeal in accordance
with the new restrictions imposed by law made pend- M/s. Raman &ing the appeal before it. Stated as a legal proposition, Raman Ltd.
the contention is that the appellant had acquired a The s:~te of
vested right to carry on the business of transport and Madras & Others
that the same could not be defeated by a subsequent
law made pending the appeal, which was only pro- Subba Rao J.
spective in character.
The first argument need not detain us, for the learned Counsel, in view of the finding of the High Court
that as a matter of fact the appeal to the Central
Road Traffic Board was not barred, fairly did not
press it before us. This leaves us with the second
·and the only argument in the case. To appreciate
the contention it is necessary to set out some more
relevant facts : On March 28, 1953, the Government
made an order, G. 0. Ms. No. 1037 Home, purporting
to be under s. 43A of the Act. The material part of
that order reads:
"(1) That additional buses should not be permitted to ply on existing routes unless there is a clear
need for increase in the number of buses plying on a
particular route and wasteful competition should be
discouraged but healthy competition where there is
room should be encouraged and,
(2) that the transport authorities while granting
stage carriage permits should work up to the minimum of 5 permits with a spare bus for each operator
and the issue of permits should be so regulated as not
to encourage benamidars on one hand and inefficient
operators on the other."
On November 15, 1954, in supersession of paragraph 2
of the above order, the Government issued an order,
G. 0. Ms. No. 3353 Home, to the following effect:
" The Governor of Madras hereby directs that
each viable stage carriage unit in this State shall consist of not less than 10 buses and that in the matter of
grant of stage carriage permits, other things being
equal, and with a view to build up such viable units,
the following shall be the order of preference :
232
SUPREME·COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
(1) Operators with less than 10 buses but nearer
the
mark
of 10.
M/s. Raman &
Raman Ltd.
(2) Operators with IO and more buses.
v.
(3) Others including new entrants.
The State of
The Governor also directs that in order to facili,
Madras & Others tate the amalgamation of existing small units into
viable units transfer of permits shall be allowed
Subba Rao j.
liberally."
On June 15, 1955, the Government issued .another
order, G. 0. Ms. No. 1689 Home, whereby the Central
Road Traffic Board was informed that pending further orders of Government after re-examination of the
question of formation of viable units of stage carriages,
the orders in para. (2) of G. 0. Ms. No. 1037 Home
dated 28th M;i,rch, 1953, would be in force. The effect
of this order was that the first order was restored
pending final orders.
When the Regional Transport Authority issued the
permit in favour of the appellant, G. 0. Ms. No. 3353
Home dated 15th November, 1954, was in force, and
when the Central Road Traffic Board made the order
giving the permit to the fourth respondent, G. 0. Ms.
No. 1689 Home dated 15th June, 1955, was in operation. Apart from other considerations, the Regional
Transport Authority relied upon the former G. 0. in
preferring the appellant to other applicants,· while
the Central Road Traffic Board referred to G. 0. Ms.
No. 1037 Home dated 28th March, 1953, which was
restored by the later G. 0. in preferring the fourth
respondent to the appellant. We shall give further
details of the orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal in the context of
another argument, but, for the present, the aforesaid
facts would suffice.
It would be convenient at this stage, before entering into the controversial question, to state briefly
some of the well-established principles relevant to the •
question raised : (i) A citizen has a fundamental right
to ply motor vehicles on public pathways under
Art. 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution, and any infringement
of that right by the State can be justified only if it
falls within the scope of Art. 19(6) thereof-See 0. S.S.
1959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
233
z959
Motor Service, Tenkasi v. The State of Madras (1)
and Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U. P. (2); (ii) pro- M / s. Raman &
ceedings before tribunals issuing permits are of quasi- Raman Ltd.
judicial in character-See 0. S.S. Motor Service, Tenv.
kasi v. The State of Madras (1 ) and New Prakash The State of
Transport Go. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Go. Madras & Others
Ltd. (3 ) ; (iii) a new law which takes away or impairs Subba Rao J.
vested rights acquired under existing laws must be
deemed to be intended not to have retrospective
operation, unless such law makes it retrospective expressly or by implication-See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, p. 215; Garikapatti Veeraya v.
N. Subbiah Chowdhury {4) and Seth Gulab Chand v.
Kudilal (5); and (iv) the same principle applies to a
law made pending an appeal before an appellate
Court-See P. M. Seshadri v. Province of Madras (6).
So much is not, and cannot, de disputed. We shall
assume that the said principles apply to a law made
pending an appeal against an order of a quasi-judicial
tribunal. The main controversy centres round the
fact whether the orders made and the directions issued
by the State Government under s. 43A of the Act are
"laws" as to attract the operation of the aforesaid
principles. While Mr. Pathak says that the said
directions are as much laws as those of the provisions
of a statute or rules made thereunder, Mr. A. Viswanatha Sastri contends that, having regard to the
scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act and the different
sections of the Act vesting powers in the State Government with regard to different matters dealt with by
the Act, the power conferred on the State Government
under s. 43A is a power to make orders or issue directions in respect of administrative matters regulating
the relationship between the State Government and
the Transport Authorities and that such orders do
not affect the legality or the validity of judicial acts
of the said authorities. To appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act.
(r) I.L.R. 1953 Mad. 304, 330, 334·
(3) [1957] S.C.R. 98, rr8.
(5) [1959] S.C.R. 313, 322.
30
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707, 719.
(4) [1957] S.C.R. 488, 515.
(6) A.I.R 1954 Mad. 543.
234
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
The Act, which is a Central Act, was passed in the
year 1939 and subsequently it was amended from time
M~::n~~":;d~ to time both by Parliament and also by the local
v.
legislatures. The main object of the Act is to regulate
The State of
the motor traffic in every State in the interest of the
Madras & Others public. Chapter II contains provisions relating to
licensing of drivers of motor vehicles. Chapter III
Subba Rao J. prescribes for the registration of motor vehicles.
Chapter IV provides for the control of transport
vehicles. Chapter V lays down the general provisions
regarding construction, equipment and maintenance
of motor vehicles. Chapter VI regulates the control
of traffic. Chapter VIII deals with the insurance of
motor vehicles against third party risks. Chapter IX
defines the offences, lays down the penalties and prescribes the procedure for detecting offences and enforcing penalties. Chapter X deals with miscellaneous ·
matters. Every Chapter contains a specific provision
conferring a pqwer on the State Government to make
rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of that Chapter. To carry out the objects of the
Act, the State Government is authorized to create a
hierarchy of officers such as the State Transport Authority, the Regional Transport Authority, the Registering Authority, etc. Such Authorities are entrusted
with administrative as well as quasi-judicial functions.
Chapter IV with which we are now concerned follows
the same pattern. Its general heading is "Control of
Transport Vehicles". Section 42 prohibits the owners
of transport vehicles from using them in any public
place without permits. Section 43 empowers the
State Government to control road transport. Section 44
enables the State Government to constitute Transport
Authorities to exercise and discharge the specified
powers and functions. Under s. 44(4) the State Transport Authority is authorized to issue directions to any
Regional Transport Authority and the latter shall be
guided by such directions. Sections 46, 47, 48, 57, 60
and 64 prescribe the procedure for issue of permits
and also create a hierarchy of Tribunals for hearing
of applications and disposal of appeals. The said procedure is clearly quasi- judicial in character and has
z959
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
235
I959
been held to be so by this Court. Sections 67 and 68
confer a power on the State Government to make
Mjs. Raman &
rules to regulate the operation of transport carriages Raman Ltd.
and also to make rules for the purpose of carrying into
v.
effect the provisions of this Chapter.
The State of
Under the aforesaid provisions and the rules made Madras & Others
thereunder, the State Transport Authority is made
the administrative head of all the other Transport Subba Rao].
Authorities functioning in the State, and the Central
Road Traffic Board the appellate authority in the hierarchy of Tribunals constituted under the Aet. As the
admh1istrative head the State Transport Authority is
authorized under s. 44(4) of the Act to issue directions
to any Regional Transport Authority, who shall be
guided by such directions. As an appellate tribunal
the Central Road Traffic Board is empowered to dispose of the appeals preferred against the orders made
by the subordinate authorities under the Act in respect of specified matters. But the Central Act did
not make any provision enabling the State Governments to control either the quasi-judicial or the administrative wings of the machinery provided under
the Act. While the State Transport Authority could
issue directions to other Transport Authorities constituted under the Act, a State Government could not
likewise issue any directions either to the State Transport Authority or to its subordinate authorities. So
too, while the Central .Road Traffic Board could in its
appellate jurisdiction set aside or modify the orders of
the subordinate tribunals, the State Government was
not in a position to set aside the improper orders of
the tribunals under the Act. Presumably, therefore,
to bring the said authorities under its control, both on
the judicial and the administrative wings, Motor
Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 (Mad. XX of
1948), was passed and it became law on December 21,
1948. Among other amendments, ss. 43A and 64A
were inserted in the Act. Section 43A reads:
" The State Government may issue such orders
and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary, in respect of any matter relating to
road transport, to the State Transport Authority or
236
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
a Regional Transport Authority; and such Transport Authority shall give effect to all such orders and
directions."
v.
Section 64A is to the following effect :
The State af
" The State Government may, on its own motion
Madras
·
· ca11 .or
,. the record s of
_ & Others or on app l'10a.t10n
ma d e to it,
subba Rao J.
any order passed or proceeding taken under this
Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it,
for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality,
regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding
and after examining such records, may pass such
orders in reference thereto as it thinks fit."
So far as s. 64A is concerned, in express terms it confers a judicial power on the State Government to keep
a subordinate judicial tribunal within bounds. Section 64A, along with ss. 45 to 57, 60 and 64, forms a
complete code in respect of the quasi-judicial disposals
of the issue of permits. The permits should be issued
in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the
rules framed thereundAr following the judicial procedure. The words used in s. 43A are very wide. It
says that the State Government may issue orders and
directions of a general character in respect of any
matters relating to road transport. Divorced from the
context and the setting in which the new sectiou appears, it may comprehend any orders or directions of
a general character in respect of road transport ; and,
if so construed; it would not only subvert the other
provisions of the Act but also would be vulnerable to
attack on the ground of constitutional invalidity. It
would entrust the Government with a naked arbitrary
power capable of being used to compel quasi-judicial
tribunals to dispose of cases in a particular way ; it
would enable them to couch the order in a general
way to induce a tribunal to come to a particular deoi·
sion in a given case; and it would be destructive of
the entire judicial procedure envisaged by the Act and
the rules framed thereunder in the matter of disposal
of specified questions. It would be attributing to the
legislat~re an incongruity, for the State Government
could issue .directions in respect of which it could
make rules ignoring the safeguards provided in the
r959
M /s. Raman""
Ranian Ltd.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
237
I959
making of the rules. Section 133 lays down that every
power to make rules given by the Act is subject to the M/s, Raman &
condition of the rules being made after previous publi- Raman Ltd,
v.
cation. It.also enjoins on the Central and the State
The
State
of
Governments to place the said rules for not less than
M adra• & Others
fourteen days before the appropriate legislature and
the rules so made shall be subject to such modification Subba Rao].
as the legislature may make in such session in which
they are so laid. All these salutary precautions can
be ignored if the directions given under s. 43A are
given the status of law; on the other hand, if a restrictive meaning is given as it should be in the context, there would be a happy correlation of the
functions of the various bodies under the Act, includ ing the Government. The Government's legislative
power is recognised under ss. 67 and 68 of the Act; its
judicial power is maintained under s. 64A and its
administrative power is affirmed under s. 43A. Chapter IV and the rules made thereunder confer administrative powers on the Regional Transport Authorities
and the State Transport Authority. Section 43A
enables the State Government to make orders and issue
directions of a general character in respect of those
functions to implement the provisions of the Act and
the rules made thereunder ; and the said authorities
shall give effect to all such orders and directions.
The context in which and the setting wherein the
section is inserted also lend support to the said conclusion. Section 42 describes the necessity for permits
and s. 43 confers specific powers on the Government
to control road transport. Section 43A coming ther~
after and before the sections conferring quasi-judicial
powers on tribunals is indicative of the fact that the
jurisdiction conferred under s. 43A is confined to
administrative functions of the Government and the
tribunals rather than to their judicial functions; for,
if the section was intended to confer .l~gislative power,
it should have found its place aft~r- ~-, 64A or somewhere near the end of the Chapter. Though it is not
a conclusive test, t}le pla.cing of the proyisions of
ss. 43A and Q4A,. which were ipserted by ~he same
Amending Act is also a point~r to the intentjdn of the
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
I959
legislature, namely, that s. 43A was intended to
M/s. Ranian &- govern administrative functions of the tribunals.
The terms of the section and the manner of issuing
Raman Ltd.
orders and directions thereunder also support the
v.
The State of
same conclusion. The legislature used two words in
Madras & Others
the section : (i) order and (ii) directions. Whenever it
intended to affect the rights of parties, it used the
Subba Rao ].
word " rules ", but in this section it designedly used
the words appropriate to the control of admiuisLrative
machinery. The words " directions and order" are
defined in one of the Law Lexicons thus: "Direction
contains most of instruction in it; order most of
authority. Directions should be followed; orders
obeyed. It is necessary to direct those who are unable
to act for themselves; it is necessary to order those
whose business it is to execute the orders. " The said
meaning of the words is more appropriate to administrative control rather than to rules of law affecting
rights of parties. Further, the declaration in the section that the orders and the directions under the
section shall be binding on the authorities concerned
is indicative of the fact that they are not laws, for if
they are laws, no such declaration is necessary. What
is more, they need not even be published and may, if
the Government so desires, take the form of secret
communication to the authorities concerned. Nor is
there any basis for the argument that as the directions are issued under a statutory power, they are
"laws". The source of the power does not affect the
character of the things done in exercise of that power.
Whether it is a law or an administrative direction
depends upon the character or nature of the orders or
directions authorized to be issued in exercise of the
power conferred. That should be determined on other
considerations adverted to by us already. Our view
is in accord with that expressed by a Division Bench
of the Madras High Court in C. S.S. Motor Service,
Tenkasi v. The State of Madras (1 ). There the constitutional validity of ss. 42, 43A, 4 7, 48 and 64A of the
Act was questioned. In dealing withs. 43A, Venkatarama Ayyar, J., who delivered the judgment of the
Court, observed at p. 335 thus :
(1) l.L.R. 1953 Mad. 304. 330, 334.
...-•
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
239
r959
"Coming next to section 43A, it is argued that it
confers on the Provincial Government wide and unlimited powers to issue all such orders and directions·of M~~ ....
a general character as they may consider necessary,
v.
that the transport authorities are bound under that The State of
section to give effect to such orders and directions, Madras & Others
that there is nothing to prevent the Government
from even issuing directions with reference to the Subba Rao].
judicial functions which those authorities have to discharge under the Act, that it could not be expected
that such directions would be disregarded by those
authorities and that in practice the provisions of section 47 could be evaded. Reference is also made to
the fact that this section was introduced for nullifying·
the effect of the decision in Sri Rama Vilas Service
Ltd: v. The Road Traffic Board, Madras (1) where it
was held that the transport authorities had failed in
the discharge of their judicial function in meekly
giving effect to an order of the Government which
was opposed to the provisions of the Act. Section
43-A appears to be intended to clothe the Government
with authority to issue directions of an administrative
character and in that view it would be valid. No
specific order or direction of the Government is attacked in these proceedings as invalid and the discussion
is largely academic. The section must itself be held
to be valid though particular orders passed thereunder
might be open to challenge as unconstitutional."
From the aforesaid observations, it is manifest that
the learned Judge construed s. 43A as conferring a
power on the State Government to issue directions of
an administrative character. If the construction was
otherwise, the learned Judge would have held that
the section was constitutionally. bad as he had held
in regard to other sections. The High Court of
Andhra Pradesh in Gopalakrishna Motor Transport Co.
Ltd. v. Secretary, Regional 'l.'ransport Authority, Krishna District, Vijayawada (2 ) had also considered the
scope of the provisions of s. 43A. There, the State
Government issued an order under s. 43A of the Act
prescribing the manner of checking a bus for over-
::m:;/''
(1) (1948) l M.L.J. 85.
(2) A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 882.
240
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
loading. The procedure prescribed was not followed
M/s. Raman & by the Regional Transport :Authority, which was emRaman Ltd.
powered to suspend the permit on the ground of overv.
loading under s.· 60 of the Act. One of the contentions
The State of
raised was that as the mandatory direction given by
Madras & Others the State Government under s. 43A was not followed,
the Regional Trarisport Authority in exercising its
Subba Rao ].
powers under s. 60 should have held that there was no
over-loading. In rejecting this plea, the High Court
observed at p. 885 thus:
" Government has power to frame rules and also
to issue administrative directions of a general character under Section 43-A of the Act. . ........... In so far
as the order was couched in mandatory terms, it is
incumbent upon the officers concerned to comply with
it.
r959
Any instruction given under Section 43-A cannot
override the discretionary power conferred upon the
Transport Authority under section 60.
. ..... We,
therefore, hold that the order of the Government contained only administrative instructions issued under
Section 43-A. It is true that some of the ad ministrative instructions impose a mandatory duty on the
officers concerned and if they do not discharge their
duty, Government may take disciplinary action
against them. But, in our view, non-compliance with
those directions cannot affect the finding the Au thority arrived at on other material on the question of
over-loading."
In the present case, the learned Chief Justice, who
was a party to the decision in 0. S. S. Motor Service
v. The State of Madras (1 ), presumably on the basis of
that judgment observed thus:
"In our opinion, these Government orders, which
are in the nature of general administrative directions
to the transport authorities, do not vest any rights,
indefeasible rights-in any applicant for a stage carriage permit ".
The result of the discussion may be summarised
thus: The appellant had a fundamental right to carry
(1) l.L.R. 1953 Mad. 304. 330, 334·
'
(2) S.C.R.
SUPR:gME COURT REPORTS
241
on his motor transport business subject to reasonable
r959
restrictions imposed upon that right by law. Some of
the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act contain M /s. Raman""
Rarnan Ltd.
reasonable restrictions on the said right. He was given
v
a permit on the basis of the law imposing the said The st~te of
restrictions on his right. The orders made and the Madras & Others
directions issued under s. 43A could cover only the
administrative field of the officers concerned and Subba Rao J.
therefore any direction issued thereunder was not law
regulating the rights of the parties. The order made
and the directions issued under s. 43A of the Act cannot obviously add to the considerations prescribed
under s. 47 on the basis of which the tribunal is empowered to issue or refuse permit, as the case may be.
There was, therefore, no change in the law pending
the appeal so as to affect the appellant's vested right.
In this view, the appellant cannot question the validity of the order of the Central Road Traffic Board on
the ground that it decided the appeal on a law that
was made subsequent to the issue of the permit to him.
The same result could be arrived at by different
process of reasoning. The appellant had a fundamental right to carry on the business of motor transport subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law
under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution. The Act imposed
reasonable restrictions on the said right. One such
restriction was that the State Government may issue
such orders and directions of a general character as it
may consider necessary in respect of any matter relating to road transport to the State Transport Authority.
When the appellant applied for a permit, he must be
deemed to have had the knowledge of the fact that
his application would be disposed of by the State
Transport Authority in accordance with orders and
directions of a general character issued by the State
Government. The directions were not new law that
came into existence pending the appeal, but only
issued under a law that was in existence even at the
time he applied for a permit. The law was that embodied in s. 43A of the Act, namely, that the Government could issue directions binding on the authorities
31
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
concerned and that law was a pre-existing one and
the application had to be disposed of subject to that
M/s. Raman & law till it was finally terminated by an order: of the
Raman Ltd.
v.
highest tribunal in the hierarchy. In this view also
The State of
there are no merits in the appellant's contention.
Madrns & Othm
Now coming to the merits of the case, the contentions of the parties may be stated thus : The learned
Subb:i Rao ].
Counsel for the respondents contends that there is no
material difference between G. 0. Ms. No. 1037 and
G. 0. Ms. No. 3353, except in regard to one circumstance, which is not material for the present purpose:
while in the former G. 0., the argument proceeds, the
transport authority is directed to work up to a minimum of five units with a spare bns, under the latter
G. 0., the viable unit fixed is not less than ten buses
and the authority concerned is directed to work up to
that limit. It is pointed out that the only difference
is in the measure of a viable unit and that the fourth
respondent's case falls squarely within the first category in the order of preference prescribed in G. 0. Ms.
No. 3353of1954. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the order of preference is based upon
the achievement of the object, namely, building up of
viable units of ten permits and that the appellant
admittedly had only four permits and, therefore, far
below the viable unit and he could not be given preference in a competition between him and the appellant, who had more than thirty permits. The problem
presented can only be solved by a reasonable interpretation of the plain words used in G. 0. Ms. No. 3353
of 1954 read along with the expressed object sought to
be achieved thereby. It will be convenient at this
stage to read the said order omitting the unnecessary
words:
G. 0. Ms. No. 3353 Home dated 15th November, 1954.
"The Planning Commission has made the following recommendation in respect of Road Transport
service:
'It is desirable for the existing private operators'
units to amalgamate, wherever possible, into big viable
units to enable them to achieve better returns and
maintain better standards of operation '.
I959
·1,
'
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
243
I959
The Government considered that it will be in the M /s. Rama"&·
interests of the public if road transport services are Haman Ltd.
conducted by operators having at least ten stage
v.
carriaaes
and
they
have
therefore
decided
that
each
The
State
of
b
•
viable unit should consist of at least ten stage car- Madras & Others
riages.
Subb;;ao ].
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 43-A
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of
1939), and in supersession of the orders issued in paragraph (ii) of G. 0. Ms. 1037, Home dated 28th March,
1953, the Governor of Madras hereby directs that each
viable stage carriage unit in this State shall consist of
not less than IO buses and that in the matter of grant
of stage carriage permits, other things being equal,
and that with a view to build up such viable units, the
following shall be the order of preference :
I. Operators with less than 10 buses, I.mt nearer
the mark of ten.
2~ Operators with 10 and more buses.
3. Others including new entrants.
The Governor also directs that in order to facilitate the amalgamation of existing small units into
viable units transfer of permits shall be allowed liberally."
The G. 0., was issued to achieve the object of inducing
the operators to amalgamate wherever possible, into
big viable units to enable them to achieve better
returns and maintain better standards of operation.
The Government decided that a unit of at least ten
buses would be necessary to achieve that object. To
implement that policy, it directed that each viable
stage carriage unit should consist of not less than ten
buses and with a view to build up such viable units,
it directed that, other things being equal, the order of
preference contained therein should be followed. The
order of preference contained three categories, one excluding the other. They did not provide for any rules
of preference inter se of operators coming within each
one of the categories. Presumably, that was left to be
decided by the transport authorities, having regard to
the considerations mentioned in s. 47. The argument
244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
of the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent is
based upon the first category, which reads:
M/s. li'a1nan 6'
"Operators with less than 10 buses but nearer the
Haman Ltd.
mark of IO". He contends that, having regard to the
v.
The State of
object of the G. 0., namely, to build up a viable stage
Madras & Others .carriage unit of ten, in the absence of an operator
with stage carriages nearer to the mark of ten than
Subba Rao J.
the fourth respondent, he is entitled to a permit in
preference to the appellant provided other things are
equal between them. In respect of this argument,
emphasis is laid upon the word "nearer" and it is
said that the said word indicates a rule of preference
between operators coming within that category,
namely, that an operator like the fourth respondent is
to be preferred, if there is no other operator nearer
than him to the mark of ten. This argument is attractive, but, in our view, it is inconsistent with the
scheme of the order. It is true that the phraseology
of category (I) has not been happily worded and perhaps grammatically not correct. But the intention is
fairly obvious. For one thing the rule of preference is
based upon the achievement of the object, i.e., the
building up of a viable unit of ten permits, for the
other, the rule of preference is only to govern the throe
categories mentioned therein and not inter se between
those falling in each category. The word "others"
in category (3) becomes meaningless, if operatoi:s far
below the mark of ten permits fall within the first
category. The more reasonable interpretation and
that is in accord with the intention of the State
Government is that other things being equal, in a
competition between the three categories of operators mentioned in the order, operators nearer the mark
of ten shall be preferred. In the absence of any such
operator, operators with ten or more buses should be
given the second preference. In the absence of such
operators, others, i. e., operators who are not nearer the
mark of ten and new entrants, will have to be preferred.
This rule of preference was not expected to cause any
injustice as the restriction on the transfer of permits
was removed and the small operators were permitted
to amalgamate the existing units into viable units,
1959
{2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
245
'959
This policy did not achieve the expected results, but
encouraged monopolies; with the result that the M/s. Raman &
Government had to cancel the order of June 15, 1955, Rama1' Ltd.
v.
within about six months from the making of it; but
that circumstance does not affect the construction of The State of
the clause. We, therefore, hold that on a strict inter- Madras & Others
pretation of the G. 0. Ms. No. 3353of1954, the fourth Subba Rao j.
respondent would not have been entitled to the permit.
But as we have held tha.t the said order was not law
but was only an administrative direction, it could not
affect the validity of the order of the Central Road
Traffic Board, if it made the order, having regard to
the consideration laid down ins. 47 of the Act. The
main consideration under s. 4 7 of the Act is that the
Regional Transport Authority shall, in deciding whether to grant or refuse such carriage permit, have
regard to the interest of the public generally. The
Central l{oad Traffic Board, after having found that
the appellant had other advantages such as he operated a three-route permit touching the route under
appeal, that his record was satisfactory and that he
was not inefficient, came to the conclusion that by
giving the permit to the fourth respondent, it would
be encouraging not only healthy competition but also
would be enabling him to work out to the minimum
of five permits. It is true that if the 1954 order should
govern the selection, the main reason given by the
Board would be wrong. Whether a small unit or a
large unit would be viable or would be in the
interest of the public is always a debatable point
and it is possible to take conflicting views on the
question. One view is that an operator who is described as fleet-owner will have considerable experience in
the business and will be in a position to keep a workshop and additional buses to meet any emergency and
therefore he would be in a better position to operate
the service without break and keep up the timings in
the interest of the public than a stray bus operator.
The alternative view is that encouragement of large
viable units will tend to monopoly and the freedom
from competition will bring about deterioration in service. On the other hand, new entrants and operators
246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
owning a few buses will liave incentive to bestow greater
attention to the public needs, particularly in view
M /s. Raman &
Raman Ltd.
of the competition from others in the same field. That
v.
both views are possible is evident from the fact that
The State of
the State Government has been changing its views so
Mad,as & Others often on the subject; and indeed the cancellation of
G. 0. Ms. No. 3353 of 1954, within six months from
Subba Rao ].
t h e date of its issue, presumably on the basis of the
experience gained during that period, is a clear indi,
cation that in the opinion of the Government, encouragement of large units was not in the interest of public. If that be so, one ca1mot say that the Central
Road Traffic Board acted without jurisdiction when it
accepted the view that the smaller units would be
more in the interest of the public rather than larger
units; nor the fact that it accepted the prevailing view
of the Government on the subject would make it any
the less an order within its jurisdiction, provided the
said view was germane to one or other matters stated
in s. 4 7 of the Act. As pointed out by us, both the
views are possible and the Board was well within its
rights in holding that the public interest would be
served if the permit was given to the fourth respondent, in the circumstances of the case.
In this view, no other question arises for consideration. The order of the Madras High Court is correct
and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
r959
Sarkar ].
SARKAR, J.-The appellant before us is a company
operating public motor bus services in the State of
Madras. Its grievance is that it has been wrongly
refused a permit to run a bus.
Motor bus services transporting passengers on the
public highways for consideration, called stage carriage services, are controlled by ss. 42 to 68 contained in
Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Act
provides that no vehicle can be used as a stage carriage save in accordance with a permit granted by a regional Transport Authority set up by the State Government. Section 4 7 of the Act lays down certain matters to which a Regional Transport Authority shall
have regard in deciding whether to grant or refuse a
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
247
r959
stage carriage permit, one of which is the interest of
the public generally. Section 68 of the Act authorises Mis. Raman &
the State Government to make rules for the purpose of Raman Ltd.
v.
carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV. The
The
State
of
rules framed under this section do not contain anyMadras & Others
thing to guide the Regional Transport Authority in the
matter of granting the permits save that r. 150 proSarkar ].
vides that it "shall in all matters be subject to the
orders of the Government and s)lall give effect to all
orders passed by the Government whether on appeal
or otherwise." Section 43-A of the Act however gives
the State Government power to issue orders and directions to the Regional Transport Authority. That section is in these terms :
"The State Government may issue such, orders
and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary, in respect of any matter relating to
road transport,, to the State Transport Authority or a
Regional Transport Authority ; and such Transport
Authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions."
We are not concerned with the State Transport Authority in this case. The Act is a Central Act and s. 43-A
was introduced into it by an amendment made by the
legislature of the Province of Madras. The Government of Madras from time to time issued orders under
this section providing certain considerations for the
guidance of the Regional Transport Authorities in deciding applications for the grant of permits for stage
carriages. The appellant's contention is that the permit was refused to it by applying one of these orders
which was not applicable to its case. Section 64 of the
Act permits an appeal to an appellate authority from
an order of a Regional Transport Authority refusing
to grant a permit. This appellate authority in the
State of Madras is called the Central Iioad Traffic
Board. Section 64-A which again was introduced into the Act by an amendment of the legislature of the
Province of Madras, empowers the Government to
look into the records of any case concerning the grant
of a permit and pass such order as it thought fit.
Now as to the facts of this case, on March 28, 1953,
248
I959
Stft>:RE!M~ COURT RE!PORTS
[1959j Supp.
the Government issued an order under s. 43-A marked
G.
0. Ms. No. 1037 laying down certain considerations
M/s. Raman &
to
be
observed in granting permits. On November 15,
Raman Ltd.
1954, the Government issued a11other order marked
v.
The State of
G. 0. Ms. No. 3353 superseding the second parngraph
Madras & Others of G. 0. Ms. No. 1037 and sullstituting fresh provisions
in its place. As I do not consider it necessary to disSarkar ].
cuss the terms of these orders, it will tend to clarity to
proceed on the basis t:\S if G. 0. Ms. No. 3353 superseded G. 0. Ms. No. 1037 wholly.
The appellant, the respondent No. 4 and eight, other
persons had applied for the· permit for a route for
which applications had been invited. It does not
appear from the record when these applications had
been mjtde, but it appears that on April 9, 1955, the
Regional Transport Authority after hearing all the
competing applicants granted the permit to the appellant applying G. 0. Ms. No. 3353, this being the order
then in force. Soon thereafter, namely, on May 20,
1955, the Government passed under the same section a
fresh order being G. 0. Ms. No. 1403 cancelling G. 0.
Ms. No. 3353 and on June 15, 1955, it passed another
order being G. 0. Ms. No. 1689 which, for the purpose
of this case it may be said, had the effect of restoring
G. 0. Ms. No. 1037.
On or about June 23, 1955, the respondent No. 4,
who will be referred to as the respondent as he is the
only contesting respondent, preferred an appeal to the
Central Road Traffic Board against the decision of the
Regional Transport Authority. It may be that some
of the other disappointed applicants for the permit
also preferred similar appeals but with them we are
not concerned. The Board considered the representations of all the parties before it and made an order on
June 25, 1955, setting aside the decision of the Regional Transport Authority and granting the permit to
the respondent. According to the appellant, in making
this order the Board followed G. 0. Ms. No. 1037. The
complaint of the appellant is that the Board went
wrong in doing so as G. 0. Ms. No. 1037 was not in
force when the appellant's application was considered
by the l~egional Transport Authority but had been
'
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
249
brought into force subsequently, and as the Board was
r959
only hearing an appeal from the Regional Transport
. it
. was b ound to d em'd e t h e case accor d'mg Mfs.Raman&
Aut h onty
Raman Ltd.
to the order in force when the Regional Transport
v.
Authority made its decision and was not entitled to The State of
decide it according to an order which came into exist- Madras & Others
ence subsequently. The appellant took the matter
up to the Government under s. 64-A of the Act but
Sarkar J.
the Government refused to interfere.
The appellant then moved the High Court at Madras
for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the
Board granting the permit to the respondent and of
the Government refusing to interfere. Rajagopalan, J.,
who heard the application, thought that the Government had failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not
deciding a point raised before it, namely, whether the
appeal to the Board had been made within the prescribed time. He, therefore, set aside the order of the
Government and sent the case back for reconsideration.
The respondent went up in appeal from the order of
Rajagopalan, J. The appeal was heard by a bench of
the same High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C. J.,
and Ramaswami, J., and was allowed. The learned
Chief Justice who delivered the judgment of the court,
held that Rajagopalan, J., was not right in thinking
that the Government had failed to decide whether the
appeal to the Board had been filed by the respondent
within the prescribed time. He rejected the contention of the appellant that the order of the Board was
liable to be set aside inasmuch as it had been made
pursuant to G. 0. Ms. No. 1037 which was not the
order in force when the Regional Transport Authority
heard the matter. He observed, "these Government
orders, which are in the nature of general administrative directions to the transport authorities, do not vest
any rights, indefeasible rights-in any applicant for
a stage carriage permit". He also held, "It cannot
be said that because on the date of the disposal of the
application by the Regional Transport Authority a
particular G. 0. was in force, any one had a vested
32
,
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
right conferred on him by that G. 0. 'Ve think that
it was permissible to the Central Road Traffic Board
A~~n~:m~;/" to decide between the claimants on the basis of the
v.
G. 0. which was in force at the time the appeal was
The State of
being heard." The appellant has now come to this
Madras & Others Court by special leave in appeal against this judgmont.
Sarkar ].
Only one point has been argued by Mr. Pathak appearing in support of the appeal. He said that the
Board was a quasi-judicial tribunal and an order
made by it is therefore liable to be quashed by a writ
of certiorari if that order discloses an error apparent
on the face of it. He then said that the order of the
Board of June 25, 1955, was erroneous in law as it
decided the case by the terms of G. 0. Ms. No. 1037,
which was brought into force after the date of the
decision of the Regional Transport Authority and bad
not been given a retrospective operation, and the
Board which was hearing an appeal from the Regional Transport Authority, could only decide whether
that Authority had gone wrong in the application of
the provisions in force at the time of the hearing before it, namely, the provisions contained in G. 0. Ms.
No. 3353. He also said that such error was apparent
on the face of the record as the Board in its decision
stated that it was deciding the case by G. 0. Ms.
No. 1037.
It has not been contended before us that the Board
is not a quasi-judicial Tribunal. It clearly is so. In
view of the many decisions of this Court in similar
matters it would be impossible to take a contrary
view. Then again it is a principle firmly established
and accepted by this Court that a writ of certiorari
can issue where the decision of a tribunal discloses an
error of law apparent on its face. I am also clear in
my mind that if it was an error for the Board to
have followed G. 0. Ms. No. 1037, such error appeared
on the face of its decisions for it expressly purported
to be guided by G. 0. Ms. No. 1037. The only questions that remain are whether this was an error and
an apparent error. These I now proceed to discuss.
It is true that G. O. Ms. No. 1037 which had been
r959
(2) S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
251
superseded by G. 0. Ms. No. 3353 on November 15,
r959
1954, was revived by G. 0. Ms. No. 1689 issued on
June 15, 1955, i.e., after the date of the decision of the M/s. Raman &
Raman Ltd.
l~egional Transport Authority given on April 9, 1955,
v.
when G. 0. Ms. No. 3353 prevailed. I will assume The state of
now that G. 0. Ms. No. 1689 did not bring back G. 0. Madras & Others
Ms. No. 1037 with retrospective force. Was the
Board then wrong in applying G. 0. Ms. No. 1037
Sarkar J.
when it decided the appeal from the Regional Transport Authority's decision? I do not think so.
It may be that when one regular and ordinary court
hears an appeal from the decision of another such
court, it cannot, generally speaking, take into consideration a law which has been passed since that decision.
But it is far from clear that the same rule applies
when an appeal from the order of a quasi-judicial
tribunal is heard by another such tribunal, as is the
case here. No authority to warrant such a proposition was cited and as at present advised, I am not
prepared to assent to it. In any case, it can safely be
said, and it is enough for the purpose of this case to
do so, that it is far from clear that a quasi-judicial
tribunal like the one before us is not entitled in hearing appeal from another such tribunal to apply a rule
which has come into existence since the decision under
appeal. If it is not so clear there of course is no error
apparent on the face of the record.
It cannot be overlooked that such a tribunal is not
enforcing a vested right which one party has against
another or others. The tribunal is to choose from
amongst a number of persons the fittest to be granted
a permit. The overriding interest in the selection is
of one who is not a party to the proceedings, namely,
the travelling public. The lower tribunal is entitled
to be heard on an appeal under s. 64, a procedure
which is wholly inapplicable in appeals from the
decisions of what are called courts of law. As a general rule, a court gives effect at the t.ria,l to the substantive rights of the parties existing at the date of the
writ and it is for this reason that a change in the law
cannot ordinarily be taken into account in appeals.
Now such a consideration does not prevail in the
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
present case. It is not said that a person when he
makes an application for a permit acquires a right to
have his application decided by the order under tho
v.
section then in force. All that is said is that the
The State of
Transport Authority must consider the applications
Madras & Others according to the order in force at the time it hears
them. If this is so, as I think it is, then the basis for
Sa'fhaY ].
saying that the appellate authority cannot consider a
Government order issued since the order under appeal
was made, completely disappears. Another reason
given for the view that a court of appeal cannot take
into consideration a new law is that, "a matter of
substantive right which has become res judicata cannot be upset by a subsequent general change of the law":
see Re a Debtor, Ex parte Debtor('). Now it does not
seem to me possible to say that an applicant for a
permit has a substantive right to the permit vested in
him. Nor is it possible to conceive of the decision of
a Regional Transport Authority in granting or refusing to grant a permit as having any operation by way
of res judicata. It therefore seems to me that there is
no warrant for applying the general rule applicable to
a court of law hearing an appeal from a similar
subordinate court which prevents it from taking notice
of a new law, to tribunals such as those with which
this case is concerned.
•
I wish to add one thing more on this subject. Even
in the case of a ppoals strictly so called, the court
hearing the appeal may take cognisance of new laws
which are made applicable to pending cases: see
Quilter v. Mapleson (2 ). I have so long been proceeding on the assumption that G. 0. Ms. No. 1689 bad no
retrospective effect at all. Now it seems to me that
there is at least grave doubt if G. 0. Ms. No. 1689
which revived G. 0. Ms. No. 1037, was not intended
to be applied to pending appeals. It was directed
only to the Central Road Traffic Board which heard
appeals, and this would indicate that it was intended
that the Board would follow it in deciding the appeals
that were then pending before it. It is not therefore
clear that G. 0. Ms. No. 1689 was not intended to
'959
M/s. Raman &
Raman Ltd.
(r) [1936J Ch. 237, 2n
(2) (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 672.
(2) S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
253
have at least this retrospective effect. If it did, which
r959
on the form of the order it, may well be said to have l\Ifs. Rama" &
done, then that would be another reason for saying Raman Ltd.
that it is not clear that the Board was in error in
v.
applying it.
The State of
In my view therefore it has not been shown that Madras & Others
the Board committed an error apparent on the face
Sarhar ].
of its decision in applying G. 0. Ms. No. 1037 to the
appellant's case. This appeal must therefore fail.
Before leaving the case I wish to express my opinion on a matter which was pressed on behalf of the
respondent. It was said that · only administrative
orders could be made under s. 43-A which orders were
not laws, and therefore an error with regard to them
would not be an error of law which would warrant the
issue of a certiorari. I am unable to assent to this
contention. To my mind the question is not solved
by describing the orders as administrative orders, a
term as to the meaning of which, I confess, I am not
clear. So it does not seem to me to be necessary to
enquire what kind of orders could be issued under
s. 43-A. In my view if an order under the section is one
to the observance of which a person is entitled, that
would be a law, a mistake of which would justify the
issue of the writ at his instance. The whole justification for a writ of certiorari is to prevent, where no
other remedy is available, a patent injustice being
allowed to stand. It would be strange if a person
was entitled to the observance of a rule and was held
not to have a remedy for its breach. It can make no
difference by what name that rule is called. I wish
to read here as a salutary advice to follow, what Pollock 0. B. and Martin B. sttid in The Mayor of Rochester v. The Queen (1) regarding the writ, " Instead of
being astute to discover reasons for not applying this
great constitutional remedy for error and mis-government, we think it our duty to be vigilant to apply it
in every case to which, by any reasonable construction, it can be made applicable."
The real question thus is whether the applicants for
permits were entitled to the observance of the orders
(r)
(1858) EL. BL. & EL. 1024, 1033; 120 E.R. 791.
254
SUPl{E:M:E COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
with which we are dealing. I think they clearly were.
The orders were made under a statutory provision.
111 /s, Ranzan Qi..
That
itself would make them binding. Further, the
Rantan Ltd.
statute expressly says that the "Transport Authority
v.
The State of
shall give effect to all such orders and directions ".
1\1 adras Qi.. Others The statute applies to all; every one is entitled to the
benefit of it. Any person interested has therefore a
Sarkar ].
right to claim that an order passed under the section
shall be observed by the Transport Authorities. The
respondent himself made such a claim and has got tho
benefit of one of these orders.
It was however said that it is true that the Transport Authorit.ies owed a duty to observe the orders
but that was a duty they owed to the Government
alone and that a breach of this duty only exposed
them to disciplinary action by the Government but
did not vitiate their decisions. I find no words in the
section so to limit the scope of the duty imposed by it
on the Transport Authorities. The nature of the
orders makes it impossible to think that it was intended to visit a breach by disciplinary action only. These
orders lay down principles to be applied in deciding
whether a person should or should not be given a permit. They affect persons materially; they affect persons' living. I find it very difficult to think that the
only sanction for such rules can be disciplinary action.
It seems to me abhorrent that judicial bodies should
in the discharge of their functions be subjected to
disciplinary action. Then I think it would certainly
be a very unusual statute which sets up quasi-judicial
tribunals with power to affect people materially and
binds the tribunals on pain of disciplinary action
only to proceed according to rules made under its
authority but gives the persons deeply affected by
the tribunal's decision no right to claim that the
rules should be observed. I am unable to hold that
the Motor Vehicles Act is a statute of this kind.
I ought to refer to the case of N agendra Nath Bora
v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals,
Assam('). That was a case concerning a licensing
authority for liquor shops. It was there said that a
r959
{I)
[1958] S.C.R. 1240,
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
255
I959
breach of certain executive instructions issued to the
licensing authority did not amount to error of law. I M /s. Raman &·
think that case is clearly distinguishable. It dealt Raman Ltd.
with executive instructions and therefore not such as
v.
were issued under a statutory power. There is nothing The State of
to show that it was the bounden duty of the tribunal, Madras & Others
the licensing authority, to obey these instructions.
Sarkar ].
Had it not been that a hierachy of appeals had been
provided for, it would perhaps have been held in that
case that the authority was not a quasi-judicial authority at all. Furthermore, it was held there that no
one had an inherent right to a settlement of a liquor
shop. Therefore it seems to me that that case does
not help in deciding the effect of the orders issued
under s. 43-A. It is interesting to note that it was
said in that case referring to the writ of certiorari at
p. 412 that, "its purpose is only to determine, on an
examination of the record, whet.her the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded
in accordance with the essential requirements of law
which it was meant to administer." The words" law
which it was meant to administer" are very significant. The Transport Authorities in the present case
were certainly meant to administer the orders issued
under s. 43-A.
There is one thing more that I wish to observe
in this connection. It may be that an order which it
is the bounden duty of the Transport Authority to
obey may give it a certain amount of discretion, but
that in my view would not make the order any the
less a law. If the discretion has been duly exercised,
there would be no error of law for the law itself gives
the discretion. It would be the bounden duty of the
tribunal to observe that law and so if necessary to
exercise the discretion given by it.
For the reasons earlier mentioned, however, I agree
that the appeal should be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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