DEEP CHAND versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 January 1959 | [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 8 | 1959 INSC 2
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 January 1959
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 380/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 8
- Neutral citation
- 1959 INSC 2
Text of the judgment
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January z5.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
DEEP CHAND
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND OTHERS
(and connected appeal)
(S. R. DAS,
c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA,
K. 8-uBBA RAO and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Transport Service-Scheme of nationalisation formulated under
State enactment of Amendment of Central Act-Ejfect-Repugnancy
-Constitutional validity of State enactment-Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act (IX of r955), s. rr(5)-Motor
Vehicles (Amendment) Act, r956 (roo of r956), Ch. IV A-General
Clauses Act, r897 (roof r897), s. 6-Constitution of India-Articles
I], JI, 245, 246, 254.
These appeals impugned the constitutionality of the Uttar
Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 (U. P. IX of
1955), passed by the State Legislature after obtaining the assent
of the President, and the validity of the scheme of na tionalisation framed and the notifications issued by the State Government
under it. The appellants as permit-holders under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, were plying buses on different 'routes in Uttar
Pradesh along with buses owned by the State Government. The
State Government issued a notification under s. 3 of the impugned Act directing that the said routes along with others should be
exclusively served by the State buses, and followed up that
notification by others under ss. 4 and 8 of the Act. The appellants moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution
challenging the validity of the said Act and the notifications
therennder. The High Court rejected their petitions and thereafter came into force the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (100
of 1956), inserting Ch. IVA into the Act, which provided for
nationalisation of transport services. The contentions raised on
behalf of the appellants were,-(1) that the passing of the
Amending Act made the impugned Act wholly void under Art.
254(1) of the Constitution, (2) that the scheme framed under the
impugned Act fell within the purview of s. 68B of the Amending
Act and ceased to be operative and (3) that even 'assuming that
the impugned Act was valid in so far as the scheme \Vas concerned, it violated Art. 31 as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955· A further contention on the basis of
the proviso to Art. 254(2) was that the impugued Act stood
wholly repealed by the Amending Act, s. 68B of the latter
excluding the operation of the General Clauses Act. It was
contended, inter alia, on behalf of .the State that the amendment
of Art. 31 by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.
having removed, before the scheme under the impugned Act had
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yet been framed, the constitutional limitation which that Article
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had imposed on the Legislature when it passed the impugned
Act, had the effect of validating that Act passed by it at a time
Dup Chand
when it was subject to the limitation.
v. '
Held, (per curiam), that the Uttar Pradesh Transport The State 0! Uttar
Service (Development) Act, 1955, did not, on the passing of the Pradesh & Othtrs
Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (mo of 1956), become
wholly void under Art. 254(1) of the Constitution but continued
to be a valid and subsisting law supporting the scheme already
framed under the U.P. Act. Even assuming that the Amending
Act had the effect, under Art. 254(2), of repealing the State Act,
such repeal could not nullify the scheme already framed under
that Act, for the provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act
would operate to save it.
Nor could it be said, having regard to the provisions of the
impugned Act and particularly s. u(5) thereof, that it offended
Art. 31 of the Constitution as it stood before the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, by failing to provide for the
payment of adequate compensation.
Per Das, C.J., and Sinha, ].-There was no reason why the
doctrine of eclipse as explained in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589, could not also apply
to a post-Constitution .law that infringed a fundamental right
conferred on citizens alone. Such a law, though shadowed and
rendered ineffective by the fundamental right so far as the
citizens were concerned, would remain effective so far as noncitizens were concerned. The moment the shadow was removed
by a constitutional amendment, the law would apply to citizens
without re-enactment.
John M. Wilkerson v. Charfrs A. Rahrer, (1891) !40 U.S. 545;
35 L. Ed. 572 and Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589, referred to.
·
The question whether a post-Constitution law that infringed
a fundamental right guaranteed to all persons, citizens or noncitizens, would be subject to that doctrine should, however, be
left open.
Held, (per Bhagwati, Subba Rao and Wanchoo, JJ,), that it
was apparent from the provisions of Arts. 254, 246 and 13 of the
Constitution, read together, that the power of Parliament and
the State Legislature to make laws with regard to any of the
matters enumerated in the relevant list in the Seventh Schedule
'\Vas subject to the provisions of the Constitution including
Art. 13. There was a clear distinction between the two clauses
of Art. 13. Under cl. (1), pre-Constitution law subsisted except
to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III
whereas under cl. (2) any post-Constitution law contravening
those provisions was a nullity from its inception to the extent of
such contravention. The words "any law" in the second line of
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cl. (2) meant an Act factually passed in spite of the prohibition
contained therein, and did not pre-suppose that the law made
Deep Chand
was not a nullity. That prohibition went to the root and limited
v.
the State's power of legislation and law made in spite of it was a
The State of Uttar still-born one.
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Pradesh G -Others
In construing the constitutional provisions relating to the
powers of the legislature embodied in Arts. 245 and 13(2) of the
Constitution, no distinction should be 1nade as bet\veen an affirn1ative and a negative provision, for both are limitations on that
power.
]{. C. Gajapati N rirayan Deo v. The Staie of Orissa, [1954]
S.C.R. 1, referred to.
A distinction, well-recognised in judicial decisions, had,
however, to be made in judging the effect of law made in transgression of the limits fixed by Arts. 245 and 13(2), between an
Act that was void from its inception and one that, though valid
\Vhen made, was rendered unconstitutional later on. On that
distinction was based the principle that an after-acquired power
could not validate a statute and a law validly made could take
effect when the obstruction was removed.
A review of the relevant authorities and judicial decisions
clearly established, (1) that affirmative conferment of power to
make laws subject-wise and the negative prohibition from
infringing any fundamental rights were but two _aspects of want
of legislative power, (2) that by expressly making the power to
legislate on the entries in the Seventh pchedule subject to other
provisions of the Constitution, that power was subjected to the
limitations laid down in Part III of the Constitution, (3) that,
therefore, a Jaw in derogation or in excess of such power would
be void ab initio either wholly or to the extent of the contravention and that (4) the doctrine of eclipse could be invoked only
in the case of a law that was valid when made but was rendered
invalid· by a supervening constitutional inconsistency.
Newberry v. United State, (1912) 265 U.S. 232; 65 L. Ed. 913;
John M. Wilkerson v. Charles A. Rohrer, (1891) 140 U.S. 545; 35
L. Ed. 572; Carter v. Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board, (1942)
66 C.L.R. 557; Kesha.van Madhava Menon v. The Staie of Bombay,
[195r] S.C.R. 228; Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of
Bombay, [1955] l S.C.R. 589; Saghir Ahmed v. The State of U. P.
[1955] l S.C.R. 707; Ram Chandra Balai v. State of Orissa, [1956]
S.C.R. 28 and Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, [1957] S.C.R.
233, referred to and discussed.
The tests of repugnancy between two statutes, one passed by
tte Parliament and the other by the State Legislature, were, (r)
whether there was a direct conflict between them, (2) whether
Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect
of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature,
and (3) whether both the laws occupied the same field.
A comparison of the provisions of the two Acts indicated
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that both were intended to operate in respect of the same subject
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matter and the same field but only in respect of the schemes
initiated after the Amending Act had come into force, the latter
Deep Chand.
Act having no retrospective effect. The State Act must, therev.
fore, yield place to the Central Act to that extent and become The State of Uttar
void only in respect of schemes framed under the Central Act. Pradesh & Others
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay, [1951]
S.C.R. 228, applied.
J •
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 380 to 389, 391 to 399, 401, 429 and 431 to 434
of 1958.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated December 19, 1956, of the Allahabad High Court in Civil
Misc. Writs Nos. 1574, 1575, 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579,
1444, 1584, 1586, 1589, 1631, 1632, 1634, 1635, 1636,
1694, 1695, 1697, 1704, 1707, 3726, 1647, 1948 and
1949 and 1956.
M. K. Nambiyar, Shyam Nath Kacker, J.B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the
appellants (in C. As. Nos. 380-385, 387-389, 391-399
and 401 of 1958).
S. N. Kacker and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 386/58).
Naunit Lal, for the appellants (in C. As. Nos. 429 &
431-434/58).
K. B. Asthana & G. N. Dikshit, for the respondents.
1959. January 15. The judgment of D11s, C. J.,
and Sinha, J., was delivered by Das, C. J. The· judgment of Bhagwati, Subba Rao and Wanchoo, JJ., was
delivered by Subba Rao, J.
DAS, C. J.-We have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by our learned Brother
Subba Rao and we agree with the order proposed by
him, namely, that all the above appeals should be dismissed with costs, although we do not subscribe to all
the reasons advanced by him.
The relevant facts and the several points raised by
learned counsel for the appellants and the petitioners
in support of the appeals have been fully set out in
the judgment which our learned Brother will presently.
deliver and it is not necessary for us to set out the
Das
c. J. -
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[1959) Supp.
same here. 'Vithout committing ourselves to all the
reasons adopted by our learned Brother, we agree with
Deep Chand
his following conclusions, namely, (1) that the Uttar
n, Stat:· of uttar Pradesh Transport Service {Development) Act, 1955
Pradesh & Others(Act IX of 1955), hereinafter referred to as the U. P.
Act, did not, on the passing of the Motor Vehicles
Das C. J.
(Amendment) Act, 1956 (100 of 1956), hereinafLer ·
referred to as the Central Act, become wholly void
under Art. 254(1) of the Constitution but continued to
be a valid and subsisting law supporting the scheme
already framed under the U. P. Act; (2) that, even if
the Central Act be construed as amounting, under
Art. 254(2), to a repeal of the U. P. Act, such repeal
did not destroy or efface the scheme already framed
under the U. P. Act, for the provisions of s. 6 of the
General Clauses Act saved the same; (3) that the U. P.
Act did not offend the provisions of Art. 31 of the
Constitution, as it stood before the Constitution (4th
Amendment) Act, 1955, for the U. P. Act and in particular s. 11(5) thereof provided for the payment of adequate compensation. These findings are quite sufficient to dispose of the points urged by Mr. Nambiyar
and Mr. Naunit Lal in support of the claims and contentions of their respective clients.
In view of the aforesaid finding that the U. P. Act
did not infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by
Art. 31, it is wholly unnecessary to discuss the following questions, namely, (a) whether t~e provisions of
Part III of the Constitution enshrining the fundamental rights are mere checks or limitations on the
legislative
competency conferred on Parliament and
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the State Legislatures by Arts. 245 and 246 read with
the relevant entries in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution or are an integral part of the
provisions defining, prescribing and conferring the
legislative competency itself and (b) whether the doctrine of eclipse is applicable only to pre-Constitution
laws or can apply also to any post-Constitution law
which falls under Art. 13(2) of the Constitution. As,
however, our learned Brother has thought fit to
· embark upon a discussion of these questions, we desire
to guard ourselves 1tgainst being understood as
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aecepting or acquiescing in the conclusion that the
1959
doctrine of eclipse cannot apply to any post-Constitution law. A post-Constitution law may infringe either n ..p Chand
a fundamental right conferred on citizens only or a Th• Stat:· of Uttar
fundamental right conferred on any person, citizen or Pradesh & others
non-citizen. In the first case the law will not stand
in the way of the exercise by the citizens of that fundaDas c. J.
mental right and, therefore, will not have any operation on the rights of the citizens, but it will be quite·
effective as regards non-citizens. In such a case the
fundamental right will, qua the citizens, throw a
shadow on tlw law which will nevertheless be on the
Statute Book as a valid law binding on non-citizens
and if the shadow is removed by a constitutional
amendment, the law will immediately be applicable
even to the citizens without being re-enacted. The
decision in John M. Wilkerson v. Charles A. Rahrer (1)
cited by our learned Brother is squarely in point. In
other words the doctri~e of eclipse as explained by
this Court in Bhilcaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh (2 ) also applies to a post-Constitution
law of this kind. Whether a post-Constitution law of
the other kind, namely, which infringes a fundamental
right guaranteed to all persons, irrespective of whether
they are citizens or not, and which, therefore, can
have no operation at all when it is enacted, is to be
regarded as a still born law as if it had not been
enacted at all and, therefore, not subject to the. doctrine of eclipse is a matter which may be open to discussion. On the findings arrived at in this case, however, a discussion of these aspects of the matter do not
call for a considered opinion and we reserve our right
to deal with the same if and when it becomes actually·
necessary to do so.
SuBBA RAO, J.-Tbese twenty-five appeals are by Suoba.Rao J.
certificate under Arts. 132 and 133 of the Constitution
granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
and raise the question of the validity of the scheme of
nationalization of State Transport Service formulated
by the State Government and the consequential orders
made by it.
(1) (1891) 140 U.S. 545; 35 L. Ed. 572.
(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589.
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The said appeals arise out Writ Petitions filed by
the appellants in the Allahabad High Court challeng-" v. ""
ing the validity of the U. P. Transport Services
Th, State of uua' (Development) Act of 1955, being U. P. Act No. IX
Prnd"h & Othm of 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the U. P. Act), and
the notifications issued· thereunder. All the appeals
Subba Rao J. were consolidated by order of the High Court.
The appellants have been carrying on business as
stage carriage operators for a considerable number of
years on different routes in Uttar Pradesh under valid
permits issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
along with buses owned by Government, The U. P.
Legislature, after obtaining the assent of the President
on April 23, 1955, passed the U. P. Act and duly
published it on April 24, 1955. Under s. 3 of the
U. P. Act, the Government issued a notification dated
May 17, 1955, whereunder it was directed that the
aforesaid routes along with others should be exclusively served by the stage carriages of the Government
and the private stage carriages should be excluded
from those routes. On November 12, 1955, the State
Government published the notification under s. 4 of
the U. P. Act formulating the scheme for the aforesaid routes among others. The appellants received
notices under s. 5 of the U. P. Act requiring them to
file objections, if any, to the said scheme; and after
the objections were received, they were informed that
they would be heard by a Board on January 2, 1956.
On that date, the objections filed by the operators
other than those of the Agra region were heard and
the inquiry in regard to the Agra region was adjourned to January 7, 1956. It appears that the operators
of the Agra region did not appear on the 7th. The
notification issued under s. 8 of the U. P. Act was published in the U. P. Gazette on June 23, 1956, and on
June 25, 1956, the Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority, Agra, sent an order purported to have
been issued by the Transport Commissioner to the
operators of the Agra region prohibiting them from
plying their stage carriages on the routes and also informing them that their permits would be transferred
to other routes. On July 7, 1956, a notice was sent to
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the other operators in similar terms. The appellants
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filed Writ Petitions in the Allahabad High Court Deep Chand
challenging the validity of the U. P. Act and the
v.
notifications issued thereunder.
The State of uttar
The facts in Civil Appeal No. 429 of 1958 are slightly Pradesh & Others
different from those in other appeals and they may be
stated : The appellant's application for renewal of his Subba Rao J.
permanent permit was rejected in 1953; but, on
appeal, the State Transport Authority Tribunal allowed his appeal OJl 1September 6, 1956, and directed his
permit to be renewed for three years beginning from
November 1, 1953. Pursuant to the order of the Tribunal, the appellant's permit was renewed with effect
from November 1, 1953, and it was made valid up to
October 31, 1956. The scheme of nationalisation was
initiated and finally approved between the date of the
rejection of the appellant's application for renewal and
the date when his appeal was allowed. The appellant
applied on October 11, 1956, for the renewal of his
permit and he was informed by the Road Transport
Authority, Allahabad, that no action on his application, under reference was possible. The appellant's
contention, among others, was that the entire proceedings were taken behind his back and therefore the
scheme was not binding on him.
The appellants in thirteen appeals, namely, Civil
Appeals Nos. 387 to .389, 391 to 394, 396 to 399 and
401 and 429 were offered alternative routes. Though
they tentatively accepted the offer, presumably on the
ground that it was the lesser of the two evils, in fact
they obtained stay as an interim arrangement and
continued to operate on the old routes.
The appellants filed applications for permission to
urge new grounds in the appeals, which were not taken
before the High Court. The said grounds read :- ·
(i) That by reason of the coming into operation of
the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, No. 100of1956,
passed by Parliament and published in the Gazette of
India Extraordinary dated 31st December, 1956, the
impugned U. P. Act No. IX. of 1955 has become void.
(ii) That by reason of Article 254 of the Constitution of India, tlie said impugned Act No. IX. of 1955,
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beiug repugnant and inconsistent with the Central Act
No. 100 of 1956, has become void since the coming
into operation of the aforesaid Act No. 100 of 1956 ".
The State of uua, The judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which is
Pradesh &. Others the subject-matter of these appeals, was delivered on
December 19, 1956. The Amending Act of 1956 was
Suiba Rao }.
published on December 31, 1956. It is therefore manifest that the appellants could not hfLve raised the
aforesaid grounds before the High Comt. ]'urther,
the grounds raise only a pure question of law not
dependent upon the elucidation of any further facts.
In the circumstances, we thought it to be a fit case for
allowing the appellants to raise the new grounds and
we accordingly gave them the permission.
Mr. M. K. Nambiar, appearing for some of the appellants, raised before us the following points: (i)
The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (100 of 1956)
passed by the Parliament is wholly repugnant to the
provisions of the U. P. Act and therefore the latter
became void under the provisions of Article 254( l) of
the Constitution; with the result that, at the present
time, there is no valid law whereunder the Government can prohibit the appellants from exercising their
fundamental right under the Constitution, namely, to
carry on their business of motor transport; (ii) the
scheme framed under the Act, being one made to operate in future and from day to sJay, is an instrument
within the meaning of s. 68B of the Amending Act.,
and therefore the provisions of the Amending Act
would prevail over those of the scheme, and after the
Amending Act came into force, it would have no
operative force; and (iii) even if the U. P. Act was
valid and continued to be in force in regard to the
scheme framed thereunder, it would offend the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution, as it was befor{I the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, as,
though the State had acquired the appellant's interest
in a commercial undertaking, no compensation for the
said interest was given, as it should be under the said
Article. The other learned Counsel, who followed
Mr. Nambiar, except Mr. Naunit Lal, adopted bis
argument. Mr. Na unit Lal, in addition to the argument
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advanced by Mr. Nambiar in regard to the first
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point, based his contention on the proviso to Art.
254(2) of the Constitution rather than on Art. 254(1). Deep Chand
He contended that by reason of the Amending Act, The Stat:· of uua
the U. P. Act was repealed in toto and, because of Pradesh & Other:
s. 68B of the Amending Act, the operation of the provisions of the General Clauses Act ,was excluded. In Subba Rao J.
addition, he contended that in Appeal No. 429 of 1958,
the scheme, in so far as it affected the appellant's route
was bad inasmuch as no notice was given to him before the scheme was approved.
We shall proceed to consider the argument advanced
by Mr. Nambiar in the order adopted by him; but
before doing so, it would be convenient to dispose of
the point raised by the learned Advocate General, for
it goes to the root of the matter, and if it is decided in
his favour, other questions do not fall for consideration. The question raised by the learned Advocate
General may be posed thus: whether the amendment
of the Constitution removing a constitutional limitation on a legislature to make a particular law has the
effect of validating the Act made by it when its power
was subject to that limitation. The present case
illustrates the problem presented by the said question.
The U. P. Legislature passed the U. P. Act on April 24,
1955, whereunder the State Government was authorized to frame a· scheme of nationalization of motor
transport. After following the procedure prescribed
therein, the State Government finally published the
scheme on June 23, 1956. The Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955, received the assent of the
President on April 27, 1955. The State Government
framed the scheme under the U. P. Act after the
passing of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act,
1955. Under the said Amendment Act, cl. (2) of Art.
31 has been amended and cl. (2A) has been inserted.
The effect of the amendment is that unless the. law
provides for the transfer of ownership or right to
possession of any property to the State or to a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be
deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or
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requisition of property within the meaning of cl. (2) of
that Article and therefore where there is no such transDeep vc an
fer, the condition imposed by cl. (2), viz., that the law
The State of Uttar should fix the amout of compensation or specify the
Pradesh & Othm principles on which and the manner in which the
compensation is to be determined and given, is not
Subba Rao J. attracted. If the amendment applies to the U. P. Act,
as there is no transfer of property to the State, no question of compensation arises. On the other hand, if
the unamended Article governs the U. P. Act, the
question of compensation ;.vill be an important factor
in deciding its validity. The answer to the problem
so presented depends upon the legal effect of a constitutional limitation of the legislative power on the law
made in derogation of that limitation. A distinction
is sought to he made by the learned Advocate General
between the law made in excess of the power conferred
on a legislature under the relevant List in the Seventh
Schedule and that made in violation of the provisions
of Part III of the Constitution. The former, it is
suggested, goes to the root of the legislative power,
whereas the latter, it is said, operates as a check on
that power, with the result that the law so made is
unenforceable, and as soon as the check is removed,
the law . is resuscitated and becomes operative from
the date the check is removed by the constitutional
amendment.
Mr. Nambiar puts before us the following two propositions in support of his contention that the law so
made in either cpntingency is void ab initio : (i) the
paramountcy of fundamental rights over all legislative
powers in respect of all the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is secured by the double process of the prohibition laid by Art. 13(2) and the restl'ictions imposed by Art. 245, unlike the mere implied prohibition implicit in the division of power under
Art. 246; and (ii) where the provisions of an enactment
passed by a legislature after January 26, 1950, in
whole or in part-subject to the doctrine of severability-are in conflict with the provisions of Part III,
the statute, in whole or in part, is void ab initio. This
question was subject~d to judicial scrutiny by this
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Court, but before we consider the relevant authorities,
it would be convenient to tel?t its validity on first Deep Chand
principles.
v.
The relevant Articles of the Constitution read as The State of U ttar
Pradesh & Others
follows:
Article 245: "(1) Subject to the provisions of
this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the Subba Rao].
whole or any part oft.he territory of India, and the
Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or
any part of the State."
Article 246: "(1) Notwithstanding anything in
clauses (2) and (3) Parliament has exclusive power to
make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution 'referred to as the "Union List").
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of
any State also, have power to make laws with respect
to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the
Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as
the "Concurrent List").
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature
of any State h.as exclusive power to make la\:vs for
such State or any part thereof with respect to any of
the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh
Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the " State
List").
(4) Parliament has power to mali.e laws with
respect to any matter for any part of the territory of
. India not included in a State notwithstanding that
such matter is a matter enumerated in the State
List."
Article 13: "(1) All laws in force in the territory
of India immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with
the provisions of this Part, shall, to th.e extent of such
inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which
takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this
Part and any law made in contravention of this
clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be
void."
20
'
959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Article 31
[1959] Supp·
(Before the Constitution (Fourth
Deep Chand
Amendment) Act, 1955):
v.
" (I) No person shall be deprived of his property
The Stale of Utta' save by authority Of law.
p,adesh "" Othm
(2) No property, movable or immovable, includSitbba Rao ] •
<
ing any interest in, or in any company owning, any
commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken
possession of or acquired for public purposes under
any law authorisiug the taking of such possession
or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or
acquired and either fixes the amouut of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the
manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given".
The combined effect of the said provisions may be
stated thus : Parliament and the Legislatures of States
have power to make laws in respect of any of the matters enumerated in the relevant lists in the Seventh
Schedule and that power to make laws is subject to
the provisions of the Constitution including Art. 13,
i.e., the power is made subject to the limitations
imposed by Part III of the Constitution. The general
power to that extent is limited. A Legislature, therefore, has no power to make any law in derogation of
the injunction contained in Art. 13. Article 13(1) deals
with laws in f9rce in the territory of India before the
commencement of the Constitution and such laws in
so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of
Part III shall, to the extent of such inconsistency be
void. The clause, therefore, recognizes the validity of
the pre-Constitution laws and only declares that the
said laws would be void thereafter to the extent of
their inconsistency with Part III ; whereas cl. (2) of
that article imposes a prohibition on the State making
laws taking away or abridging the rights conferred by
Part III and declares that laws made in contravention
of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, •
be void. There is a clear distinction between the two
clauses. Under cl. (I), a pre.Constitution law subsists
except to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III; whereas, no post-Constitution law
I
•
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
21
can be made contravening the provisions of Part III,
I)Iand
therefore the law, to that extent, though made, is
a nullity from its inception. If this clear distinction
j
I959
Deep vchana
is borne in mind, much of the cloud raised is dispelled. The State. of uttar
When cl. (2) of Art. 13 says in clear and unambiguous P.yadesh & Others
terms that no State shall make any law which takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III, it Subba Rao f.
will not avail the State to contend either that the
clause does not embody a curtailment of the power to
legislate or that it imposes only a check but not a prohibition. A constitutional prohibition against a State
making certain laws cannot be whittled down by
analogy or by drawing inspiration from decisions on
the provisions of other Constitutions ; nor can we
appreciate the argument that the words "any law"
in the second line of Art. 13(2) posits the survival of
the law made in the teeth of such prohibition. It is
said that a law can come into existence only when it is
made and therefore any law made in contravention of
.that clause presupposes that the law made is not a
nullity. This argument may be subtle but is not
sound. The words" any law" in that clause can only
· mean an Act passed or made factually, notwithstanding the prohibition. The result of such contravention
is stated in that clause. A plain reading of the clause
indicates, without any reasonable doubt, that the prohibition goes to the root of the matter and limits the
State's power to make law; the law made in spite of
the prohibition is a still-born law.
Cooley in his book " Constitutional Limitations"
(Eighth Edition, Volume I}, states at page 379:
"From what examination has been given to this
subject, it appears that whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power; that is, a
question whether the legislature in the particulir case,
in respect to the subject-matter of the act, the manner
in which its object is to be accomplished, and the
mode of enacting it, has kept within the constitutional
limits and observed the constitutional conditions."
The Judicial Committee in The Queen v. Burak (1)
•
observed at page 193 as under :
(r) (1878) L.R. 5 I. A. 178.
22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
"The established courts of Justice, when a question
arises
whether the prescribed limits have been exceed.
Deep Chand
v.
ed, must of necessity determine that question ; and
The State of uuar the only way in which they can properly do so, is by
Pradesh & Oth'Js looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by
Subba Rao f.
which, negatively, they are restricted."
The Judicial Committee again in Attorney-General for
Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada(') crisply stated
the legal position at page 583 as follows:" .............. .if the text is explicit the text. is conclusive, alike in what it directs and what" it forbids."
• The same idea is lucidly expressed by Mukherjea, J.,
as he then was, in K. G. Gajapati Narayan Deo v.
The State of Orissa ('). It is stated at page 11 as
follows:"If the Constitution of a State distributes the
legislative powers amongst different bodies, which
have to act within their respective spheres marked
out by specific legislative entries, or if there are limitations on the legislative authority in the shape of
fundamental rights, questions do arise as to whether
the legislature in a particular case has or has not, in
respect to the subject-matter of the statute or in the
method of enacting it, transgressed the limits of its
constitutional powers."
The learned Judge in the aforesaid passage clearly
accepts the doctrine that both the transgression of the
ambit of the entry or of the limitation provided by
the fundamental rights are equally transgressions of
the limits of the State's constitutional powers.
It is, therefore, manifest that in the construction of
the constitutional provisions dealing with the powers
of the legislature, a distinction cannot be made between• an affirmative provision and a negative provision; for, both are limitations on the power. The
Constitution affirmatively confers a power on the legislature to make laws within the ambit of the relevant
entries in the lists and negatively prohibits it from
making laws infringing the fundamental rights. It
r959
(1) (1912) A.C. 571.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. r.
'
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
)
-
23
goes further and makes the legislative power subject
'959
to the prohibition under Art. 13(2). Apparent wide
Deep Chand
power is, therefore, reduce d to t h e extent of t h e prov,
hibition.
The State of Uttar
If Arts. 245 and 13(2) define the ambit of the power Pradesh & Others
to legislate, what is the effect of a law made in excess
of that power? The American Law gives a direct and Subba ·Rao J.
definite answer to this question. Cooley in his " Constitutional Limitations" (Eighth Edition, Volume I) at
page 382 under the heading " Consequences if a statute
is void" says:" When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it had never been. . .............. And
what is true of an act void in toto iR true also as to
any part of an act which is found to be unconstitutional, and which, consequently, is to be regarded as
having never, at any time, been possessed of any legal
force."
In llottschaefer on Constitutional Law, much to the
same effect is stated at page 34:
"The legal status of a legislative provision in so
far as its application involves violation of constitutional provisions, must however be determined in the
light of the theory on which Courts ignore it as law in
the decision of cases in which its application produces.
unconstitutional results. That theory implies that the
legislative provisions never had legal force as applied to
cases within that clause."
In "Willis on Constitutional Law", at page 89:
"A judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality
of a statute neither annuls nor repeals the statute but
has the effect of ignoring or disregarding it so far as
the deter~ination of the rights of private parties is
concerned. The Courts generally say that the effect
of an unconstitutional statute is nothing. It is as
though it had never been passed ...................... "
"Willoughby on Constitution of the United States'',
Second Edition, Volume I, page 10:
"The Court does not annul or repeal the statute
if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it, and determines the rights of
24
r959
Deep Chand
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
• had no application .
the parties just as if such statute
..............................
The validity of a statute is to be tested by the
The Stat;· of Uitar constitutional power of a legislature at the time of its
Pradesh c;. Others enactment by that legislature, and, if thus tested, it is
Subba Rao J.
beyond the legislative power, it is not rendered valid,
without re-enactment, if- later, by constitutional
amendment, the necessary legislative power is granted.
' An after-acquired power cannot, ex proprio vigore,
validate a statute void when enacted '.
"However, it has been held that where an act is
within the general legislative power of the enacting
body, but is rendered unconstitutional by reason of
some adventitious circumstance, as, for example, when
a State legislature is prevented from regulating a
matter by reason of the fact that the Federal Congress
has already legislated upon that matter, or by reason
of its silence is to be construed as indicating that
there should be no regulation, the act does not need
to be re-enacted in order to be.enforced, if this cause
of its unconstitutionality is removed. "
For the former propositi01i, the decision in Newberry
v. United States (1 ) and for the latter proposition the
decision in John M. Wilkerson v. Charles A. Rahrer (')
are cited. In N ewberry's Gase the validity of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1910, as amended by
the Act of 1911, fixing the maximum sum which a
candidate might spend to procure his nomination at a
primary election or convention was challenged. At the
time of the enactment, the Congress had no power to
make that law, but subsequent.ly, by adoption of the
17th Amendment, it acquired the said power. The
question was whether an after-acquired power could
validate a statute which was void when enacted. Mr.
Justice McReynolds delivering the opinion of the court
states the principle at page 920 :
"Moreover, the criminal statute now relied upon
ante-dates the 17th Amendment, and must be tested
by powers possessed at time of its enactment. An
(1) (1921) 256 U.S. 232; 65 L. Ed. 913.
(2) (1891) 140 U.S. 545; 35 L. Ed. 572.
'
-
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
after-acquired power cannot, ex proprio vigore,:valiz959
date a statute void when enacted."
Deep Chand
In Wilkerson's Gase (1 ) the facts were thatin June 1890,
v.
the petitioner, a citizen of the United States and an The State of Utta•
agent of Maynard, Hopkins & Co., received from his Pradesh & Others
Principal intoxicating liquor in packages. The pack- Subba- Rao].
ages were shipped from the State of Missouri to various
points in the State of Kansas and other States. On
August 9, 1890, the petitioner offered for sale and sold
two packages in the State of Kansas. The packages
sold were a portion of the liquor shipped by Maynard,
Hopkins & Co. It was sold in the same packages in
which it was received. The petitioner was prosecuted
for violating the Prohibitory Liquor Law of the State
of Kansas; for, under the said law, "any person or
persons who shall manufacture, sell or barter any intoxicating liquors, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor".
On August 8, 1890, an Act of Congress was passed to
the effect that intoxicating liquors transported into
any State should upon arrival in such State be subject
to the operation and effect of the laws of such State.
It will be seen from the aforesaid facts that at the
time the State Laws were made, they were valid, but
they did not operate upon packages of liquors imported into the Kansas State in the course of inter-State
commerce, for the regulation of inter-State commerce
was within the powers of the Congress; and that before the two sales in the Kansas State, the Congres~
made an Act making intoxicating liquors transported
into a State subject to the laws of that State, with the
result that from that date the State Laws operated on
the liquors so transported. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court of the United States held:
"It was not necessary, after the passage of the
Act of Congress of August 8, 1890, to re-enact the Law
of Kansas of 1899, forbidding the sale of intoxicating
liquors in that State, in order to make such State Law
operative on the sale of imported liquors."
The reason for the decision is found at page 578:
(1) (1891) 140 U.S. 545; 35 L. Ed. 572.
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
" This is not the case of a law enacted, in the unauthorized exercise of a power exclusively confided to
Deep Chand
Congress, but of a law which it was competent for the
n, stat;·.1 uuar State to pass, l;mt which could not operate upon artiPrad"h & othm cles occupying a certain situation until the passage of
the Act of Congress. That Act in terms removed the
Subba Rao f.
obstacle, ·and we perceive no adequate ground for
adjudging that a re-enactment of the State Law was
required before it could have the effect upon imported
which it had always had upon domestic property. "
A reference to these decisions brings out in bold relief
the distinction between the two classes of cases referred to therein. It will be seen from the two decisions
that in the former the Act was void from its inception
and in the latter it was valid when made but it could
not operate on certain articles imported in the course
of inter-State trade. On that distinction is based the
principle that an after-acquired power cannot, ex
proprio vigore, validate a statute in one case, and in
the other, a law validly made would take effect when
the obstruction is removed.
The same principle is enunciated in Garter v. Egg
and Egg Pulp Marketing Board('). Under s. 109 of
the Australian Constitution " when a law of a State is
inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the
latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent
of the inconsistency, be invalid. " Commenting on
that section, Latham, C. J., observed at page 573:
"This section applies only in cases where, apart
from the operation of the section, both the Commonwealth and the State Laws which are in question
would be valid. If either is invalid ab initio by reason of lack of power, no question can arise under the
section. The word " invalid" in this section cannot
be interpreted as meaning that a State law which is
affected by the section becomes ultra vires in whole or
in part. If the Commonwealth law were repealed the
State law would again become operative. "
We shall now proceed to consider the decisions of
this Court to ascertain whether the said principles are
r959
(1) (1942) 66 C.L.R. 557·
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f
27
accepted or departed from. The earliest case is Keshaz959
van Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay (1). There Deep Chand
the question was whether a prosecution launched
"·
under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, The State of Uttar
before the Constitution could be continued after the Pradesh & Others
Constitution was passed. The objection taken was
that the said law was inconsistent with fundamental Subba Rao J.
rights and therefore was void. In the context of the
question raised, it became necessary for the Court to
consider the impact of Art. 13(1) on the laws made before the Constitution. The-Court, by a majority, held
that Art. 13(1) of the Indian Constitution did not
make existing laws which were inconsistent with
fundamental rights void ab initio, but only rendered
such laws ineffectual and void with respect to the
exercise of the fundamental rights on and after the
date of the commencement of the Constitution and
that it had no retrospective effect. Das, J., as he then
was, observed at page 233:
"It will be noticed that all that this clause declares is that all existing laws, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the
extent of such inconsistency, be void. Every statute is
prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by
necessary implications made to have retrospective
operation. "
At page 234, the learned Judge proceeded to state:
"They are not void for all purposes but they are
void only to the extent they come into conflict with
the fundamental rights. In other words, on and after
the commencement of the Constitution no existing law
will be permitted to stand in the way of the exercise
of any of the fundamental rights. Therefore, the voidness of the existing law is limited to the future exercise of the fundamental rights .................. Such laws
exist for all past transactions and for enforcing all
rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the
Constitution. "
At page 235, the same idea is put in different words
thus:" ............ Article 13(1) only has the effect of
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 228.
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
nullifying or rendering all inconsistent existing
laws ineffectual or nugatory and devoid of any legal
Deep Chand
force or binding effect only with respect to the exercise
The stat:· of UttarOf fundamental rights on and after the date of the
Pradesh & Others commencement of the Constitution."
At page 236, the learned Judge concludes:
Subba Rao ].
" So far as the past acts are concerned the law
exists, notwithstanding that it does not exist with
respect to the future exercise of fundamental rights."
Mahajan, J., as he then was, who delivered a separate
judgment, put the same view in different phraseology
at page 251:
"The effect of Article 13(1) is only prospective
and it operates in respect to the freedoms \I hich are
infringed by the State subsequent to the coming into
force of the Constitution but the past acts of a person
which came within the mischief of the law then in
force are not affected by Part III of the Constitution."
The learned Judge, when American law was pressed
on him in support of the contention that even the preConstitution law was void, observed thus, at page 256:
"It is obvious that if a statute has been enacted
and is repugnant to the Constitution, the statute is
void since its very birth and anything done under it
is also void and illegal. ··The courts in America have
followed the logical result of this rule and even convictions made under such an unconstitutional statute
have been set aside by issuing appropriate writs. If
a statute is void from its very birth then anything
done under it, whether closed, completed, or inchoate,
will be wholly illegal and relief in one shape or another
has to be given to the person affected by such an
unconstitutional law. This rule, however, is not applicable in regard to laws which were existing and were
constitutional according to the Government of India
Act, 1935. Of course, if any law is made after the
25th January, 1950, which is repugnant to the Constitution, then the same rule will have to be followed
by courts in India as is followed in America and even
convictions made under such an unconstitutional law
'959
(2) S.C.Hi.
•
j
SUPHEME COUH,T H,EPOH,TS
29
will have to be set aside by resort to exercise of powers
i959
given to this court by the Constitution."
Deep Chand
Mukherjea, J., as he then was, in Behram Khurshed
v.
Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay (1) says at page 652 The State of Uttar
much to the same effect:
Pradesh & Others
" We think that it is not a correct proposition Subbu Rao J.
that constitutional provisions in Part III of our Constitution merely operate.as a check on the exercise of
legislative power. It is axiomatic that when the lawmaking power of a State is restricted by a written
fundamental law, then any law enacted and opposed
to the fundamental law is in excess of the legislative
authority and is thus a nullity. Both these declarations of unconstitutionality go to the root of the power
itself and there is no real distinction between them.
They represent but two aspects of want of legislative
power. The legislative power of Parliament and the
State Legislatures as conferred by articles 245 and
246 of the Constitution stands curtailed by the fundamental rights chapter of Constitution. A mere reference to the provisions of article 13(2) and articles 245
and 246 is sufficient to indicate that there is no competency in Parliament or a State Legislature to make
a law which comes into clash with Part III of the
Constitution after the coming into force of the Constitution."
The effect of the decision may be stated thus: The
learned judges did not finally decide the effect of Art.
13(2) of the Constitution on post-Constitution laws for
the simple reason that the impugned law was a preConstitution one. Art. 13(1) was held to be prospective in operation and therefore did not affect the preexisting laws in respect of things done prior to-the
Constitution. As regards the post-Constitution period,
Art. 13(1) nullified or rendered all inconsistent existing
laws ineffectual, nugatory or devoid of any legal force
or binding effect with respect to the exercise of the
fundamental rights. So far as the past acts were
concerned, the law existed, notwithstanding that it
did not exist with respect to the future exercise of the
said rights. As regards the pre-Constitution laws,
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 613.
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
this decision contains the seed of the doctrine of
D P Cl d
eclipse developed by my Lord the Chief Justice in
" v. •an
Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya PraThe State of u11ardesh (')where it was held that as the pre-Constitution
Pradesh e> Othm law was validly made, it existed for certain purposes
even during the post-Constitution period. This prinoiSubba Rao f. pie has no application to post-Constitution laws infringing the fundamental rights as they would be
ab initio void in toto or to the extent of their contravention of the fundamental rights.
The observations of the learned judges made in the
decision cited above bring out the distinction between
pre and post-Constitution laws which are repugnant
to the Constitution and the impac't of Art. 13 on the
s11id laws.
In Behram Khurshed Pesikaka's Gase (2 ), this Court
considered the legal effect of the declaration made in
the case of The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (')
that clause (b) of s. 13 of the Bombay Prohibition Act
(Born. XXV of 1949) is void under Art. 13(1) of the
Constitution in so far as it affects the consumption or
use of liquid medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol and held that it was to render part of s. 13(b)
of the Bombay Prohibition Act inoperative, ineffective
and ineffectual and thus unenforceable. Bhagwati, J.,
at page 620, cited all the relevant passages from textbooks on Constitutional Law and, presumably, accepted the view laid down therein to the effect that an
unconstitutional Act in legal contemplation is as
though it h~.d never been passed. Jagannadhadas, J.,
at page 629, noticed the distinction between the scope
of els. (l) and (2) of Art. 13 of the Constitution. After
citing a passage from "Willoughby on Constitution of
the United States", the learned Judge observed :
" This and other similar passages from other
treatises relate, however, to cases where the entire
legislation is uncq_nstitutional from the very commencement of the Act, a situation which falls within
the scope of article 13(2) of our Constitution. They
do not directly cover a situation which falls within
'959
(I) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589.
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 613.
(3). [1951] S.C.R. 682.
•
'
..
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
31
article 13(1). . ........... The question is what is the
r959
effect of article 13(1) on a pre-existing valid statut'e,
. hm
, respec t of a severa bl'e par t t h ereof v10
, la t es Deep vChand
w h 10
fundamental rights. Under article 13(1) such part is The stat; of Uttar ·
"void " from the date of the commencement of the Pradesh &- Others
Constitution, while the other part continues to be
valid. Two views of the result brought about by this Subba Rao J.
voidness are possible, viz., (1) the said severable part
becomes unenforceable, while it remains part of the
Act, or (2) the said part goes out of the Act and the
Act stands appropriately amended pro tanto: The first
is the view which appears to have been adopted by
my learned brother, Justice Venkatarama Aiyar, on
the basis of certain American decisions. I feel.inclined
to agree with it. This aspect, however, was not fully
presented by either side and was only suggested from
the Bench in the course of arguments. We have not
had the benefit of all the relevant material being
placed before us by the learned advocates on either
side. The second view was the basis of the arguments
before us. It is, therefore, necessary and desirable to
deal with this case on that assumption."
This passage shows that his opinion-though a tentative one-was that the severable part became unenforceable while it remained part of the Act. But
the learned Judge made an incidental observation
that the American view applied to cases that fall
within the scope of Art. 13(2) of the Constitution, i.e.,
the entire legislation would be unconstitutional from
the very commencement of the Act. Venkatarama
Aiya.r, J., founded his decision on a broader basis. At
page 639, the learned Judge observed : .
" Another point of distinction noticed by American jurists between unconstitutionality arising by
reason of lack of legislative competence and that
arising by reason of a check imposed on a competent
Legislature may also be mentioned. While a statute
passed by a Legislature which had no competence
cannot acquire validity when the Legislature subsequently acquires competence, a statute which was
within the competence of the Legislature at the time
of its enactment but which infringes a constitutional
I./
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
prohibition could be enforced proprio vigore when
once the prohibition is removed."
Deep Chand
v.
On the basis of this distinction, the learned Judge held
The State of uua, that Art. 13(1) of the Constitution only placed a check
Prad"h & Othm on a competent legislature and therefore the word
" void " in that article meant "relatively void", i.e.,
Subba Rao J. t h e l aw onl y con d emned t h e Act as wrong to individuals and refused to enforce it against them. In support
of the said conclusion the learned Judge cited a pas-·
sage from " Willoughby on the Constitution of the
United States". A comparison of the passage cited
with that in the text book discloses that one important
sentence which makes all the difference to the legal
posit.ion is omitted by mistake and that sentence is
J " An after-acquired power cannot ex proprio vigore
validate a statute void when enacted ". The second
paragraph in the extract on which the learned Judge
placed reliance and also the decision relied upon by
him did not support his conclusion. As already stated,
the decision and the passage dealt not with a case
where the State had no power to make the law, but
with a case where the law lay dormant till a law of
the Federal Congress removed the conflict between the
State Law and the Federal Law. That case may by
analogy be applied to Art. 13(1) in respect of laws
validly made before the Constitution but cannot be invoked in the ca2e of a statute which was void when
enacted. By a subsequent order, this Court granted the
review and reopened the case to enable the 'Bench to
obtain the opinion of a larger Bench on the Constitutional points raised in the judgment delivered by the
learned Judges. That matter came up before a Constitutional Bench, and Mahajan, C. J., who was a party
to the decision in K eshavan M adhava Menon' s Case (1 )
explained the majority view therein on the meaning of
the word "void" in Art. 13(1) thus, at page 651 : "The majority however held that the word "void"
in article 13(1), so far as existing laws were concerned,
could not be held to obliterate them from the statute
book, and could not make such laws void altogether,
because in its opinion,article 13 had not been given any
r959
J
(1) (1951] S.C. R. 228.
,
-
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33
retrospective effect. The majority however held that
z959
after the coming into force of the Constitution the Deep Chand
effect of article 13(1) on such repugnant laws was that
v.
it nullified them, and made them ineffectual and nuga- The State of uttar
tory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect. It Pradesh & Others
was further pointed out in one of the judgments representing the majority view, that the American rule Subba Rao f.
that if a statute is repugnant to the Constitution the
statute is void from its birth, has no application to
cases concerning obligations incurred or rights accrued
in accordance with an existing law that was constitutional in its inception, but that if any law was made
after the 26th January, 1950, which was repugnant to
the Constitution, then the same rule shall have to be
followed in India as followed in America. The result
therefore of this pronouncement is that the part of the
section of an existing law which is unconstitutional is
not law, and is null and void. Fcir determining the
rights and obligations of citizens the part declared
void should be notionally taken to be obliterated from
the section for all intents and purposes, though it may
remain written on the statute book and be a good law
when a question arises for determination of rights and
obligations incurred prior to 26th January, 1950, and
also for the determination of rights of persons who
have not been given fundamental rights by the Constitution. Thus, in this situation, there is no scope for
introducing terms like "relatively void " coined by
American Judges in construing a Constitution which
is not drawn up in similar language and the implications of which are not quite familiar in this country."
The learned Judge, as we have already pointed out,
rejected the distinction made by Venkatarama
Aiyar, J., between lack of legislative power and the
abridgment of the fundamental rights. Though tha~
question did not directly arise, the learned Judge
expressed his view on the scope of Art. 13(2) at page
653 thus:
"The authority thus conferred by Articles 245
and 246 to make laws subjectwise in the different
Legislatures is qualified by the declaration made in
5
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
article 13(2). That power can only be exercised
subject to the prohibition contained in article 13(2). On
•
v.
the construction of article 13(2) there was no divergenThe State of Uttar ce of opinion between the majority and the minority
Pradesh & Othmin Keshava Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay
(supra). It was only on the construction of article 13(1)
Subba Rao J. that the difference arose because it was felt that that
article could not retrospectively invalidate laws which
when made were constitutional according to the Constitution then in force."
Das, J., as he then was, in his dissenting judgment
differed from the majority on other points but does not
appear to have differed from the aforesaid views expressed by Mahajan, C. J., as regards the scope of
K eshava M adhava Menon' s Gase on the meaning of the
word "void " in Art. 13(1). This judgment is therefore an authority on two points and contains a weighty observation on the third : (i) when the law-making
power of a State is restricted by written fundamental
law, then any law opposed to the fundamental law is
in excess of the legislative authority and is thus a
nullity; (ii) even in the case of a statute to which
Art. l?(l) applies, though the law is on the statute
book and be a good law, when a question arises for
determination of rights and obligations incurred prior
to January 26, l!l50, the part declared void should be
notionally taken to be obliterated from the section for
all intents and purposes ; and (iii) on the construction
of Art. 13(2), the law made in contravention of that
clause is a nullity from its incep.tion.
The next case is a direct one on the point and that
is Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U. P. ('). There, the
U. P. Road Transport Act (II of 1951) was passed
enabling the State to run stage carriage service on a
.route or routes to the exclusion of others. Under that
Act, the State Government made a declaration extending the Act to a particular area and issued a notification setting out what purported to be a scheme for the
opetation of the stage carriage service on certain
routes. At the time the said Act was passed, the
State had no such power to deprive a citizen of his
'959
Deep Chand
(r) [1955] I S.C.R. 7""1·
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
1 959
right to carry on his transport service. But after the
Act, Art. 19(1) was amended by the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1951, enabling the ~tate to carry on Deepv~hand •
any trade or business either by itself or through cor- 1 he state of Uttar
porations owned or controlled by the State to the Pradesh & Others
exclusion of private citizens wholly or in par1;. One of
the questions raised was whether the amendment of the Subba Rao J.
Cons1;itution could be invoked to validate the earlier
legislation. The Court held that the Act when passed
was unconstitutional and therefore it was still-born and
could not be vitalised by the subsequent amendment of
the Constitution removing the constitutional objections
but must be re-enacted. At page 728, Mukherjea, J.,
as he then was, who delivered the judgment of the
Court, has given the reasons for the said view :"As Professor Cooley has stated in his work on ,
Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, page 304 note.) "a j
statute void for unconstitutionality is dead and cannot
be vitalised by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution removing the constitutional objection but must
be re-enacted". We think that this is sound law and
our conclusion is that the legislation in question which
violates the fundamental right of the appellants under
article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and is not shown
to be protected by clause (6) of the article, as it stood
at the time of the enactment, must be held to be void
under article 13(2) of the Constitution."
This is a direct authority on the point, without a dissenting voice, and we are bound by it.
'l'he decision given in Bhikaji Narain's Case (1) is
strongly relied upon by the learned Advocate General
in support of his contention. Shortly stated, the facts
in that case were: Before the Constitution, the C. P.
& Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 19·!7 (C. P.
III of 1948) amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(Central Act IV of 1939) and conferred extensive
powers on the Provincial Government including the
power to create a monopoly of the motor transport
business in its favour to the exclusion of all motor
transport operators. It was contended by the affected
parties that by reason ·of Art. 13(1) of the Constitution,
(r) [19j5] 2 S.C.R. 589.
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
the Act became void. On behalf of the State, it was
argued that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,
Deep Chand
v.
1951, and the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act,
Th, state of· uua, 1955, had the effect of removing the inconsistency and
P.adesh & Others the Amendment Act III of 1948 became operative
again. This Court unanimously accepted the contenSubba Rao J.
tion of the State. This decision is one given on a construction of Art. 13(1) of the Constitution and it is no
authority on the construction and scope of Art. 13(2)
of the Constitution. The reason for the decision is
found in the following passages in the judgment, at
page 598:
" ........................ on and after the commencement. of the Constitution the existing law, as a result
of its becoming inconsistent with the provisions of
article 19(1)(g) read with clause (6) as it then stood,
could not be permitted to stand in the way of the
exercise of that fundamental right. Article 13(1) by
reason of its language cannot be read as having obliterated the entire operation of the inconsistent law
or having wiped it out altogether from the statute book
............... In short, article 13(1) had the effect of nullifying or rendering the existing law which had become
inconsistent with a.rt.icle 19(1) (g) read with clause (6) as
it then stood ineffectual, nugatory and devoid of any
legal force or binding effect only with respect to the
exercise of the fundamental right on and after the date
of the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore,
between the 26th January, 1950, and 18th June, 1951,
the impugned Act could not stand in the way of the
exercise of the fundamental right of a citizen under
Article 19(l)(g). The true position is that the impugn-·
ed law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being,
by the fundamental right. . ............................... .
The American authorities refer only to post-Constitution laws which were inconsistent with the provisions
of the Constitution. Such laws never came to life but
were still-born as it were. . .................................. .
Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They
existed for the purposes of pre-Constitution rights and
liabilities and they remained operative, even after the
Constitution, as against non-citizens. It is only as
'959
(2) s.9.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT'S
I
37
against the citizens that they remained in a dormant
r959
or moribund condition."
Deep Chand
The aforesaid. passages are only the restatement of the
v.
law as enunciated in Keshavan Madhava Menon's The State of Uttar
Case (1) reaffirmed in Pesikaka' s Case (2) and an exten- Pradesh & Others
sion of the same to meet a different situation. A preSubba Rao].
Constitution 1aw, stating inth e wor d s of D aos, J ., as hc
then was, exists notwithstanding that it does not exist
with respect to the future exercise of the fundamental
rights. That principle has been extended in this
decision, by invoking the doctrine of eclipse. As the law
existed on the statute book to support pre-Constitution
acts, the Court held that the said law was eclipsed for
the time being by one or other of the fundamental
rights and when the shadow was removed by the
amendment of the Constitution, the impugned Act
became free from all blemish or infirmity. The Legislature was competent to make the law with which
Pesikaka's CaBe (2 ) was· concerned at the time it was
made. It was not a case of want of legislative power
at the time the Act was passed, but one where in the
case of a valid law supervening circumstances cast a
cloud. To the other class of cases to which Art. 13 (2)
will apply, the views expressed by the American
authorities, by Mahajan, J., as he then was, in
Pesikaka's Case, and by Mukherjea, J., as he then was,
in Saghir Ahmad's Case (3 ) directly apply. To the facts
in Bhikaji Narain's Case, (4) the principle laid down in
Keshavan Madhava Menon's Case is attracted. But it
is said that the observations of the learned ,Judges are
wide enough to cover the case falling under Art. 13 (2)
of the Constitution and further that a logical extension
of the principle laid down would take in also a case
falling under Art. 13(2). The first contention is based
upon the following passage :But apart from this distinction between preConstitution and post-Constitution laws, on which how·
ever we need not.rest our decision, it must be held
that these American authorities could have no application to our Constitution. All laws existing or future
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 228.
(3) [1955] l S.C.R. 707.
(2) [1955] l S.C.R. 613·
(4) [1955] 2'S.C.R. 589.
...
' .
-
-- ·,
\
38
·1959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
_ which are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III
of our Constitution, are by express provisions of article
13 rendered void to the extent of such inconsistency.
The state ·of UttarSuch- laws were not dead for all purposes.
They
PradeSh & Others existed for the purposes of pre-Constitution rights and
- liabilities and they remained operative, even after the
Subba Raa J. __ Constitution, as against non-citizens. It is only as
- - · against the citizens that they remained in a dormant
or moribund condition."
The first part of the said observation states nothing
more than the plain import of the provisions of
Art. 13(1) and (2), namely, that they render laws void
only 'to the extent' of snch inconsistency. The second
part of the observation directly applies only to a case
covered by Art. 13(1), for the learned Judges say that
the laws exist for the purposes of pre-Constitution
rights and liabilities and they remain operative even
after the Constitution as against non-citizens. The
said observation could not obviously apply to post.
Constitution laws. Even so, it is said that by a parity of
reasoning the post-Constitution laws are also void- to
the extent of their repugnancy and therefore the law
in respect of non-citizens will be on the statute book
and by the application of the doctrine of eclipse, the
same result should flow in its case also. · There is some plausibility in this argument, but it ignores one vital
principle, viz., the existence or the non-existence of
legislative power or competency, at the time the law
is made governs the situation. There is no scope for
applying the doctrine of eclipse to a case where the
law is void ab initio in whole or in part. That apart,
in the present case-we do not base our decision on
that-Art. 31(1) infringed by tho Act, applies to all
persons irrespective of whether they are citizens or
non-citizens, and therefore. the entire law was void
ab initio. . That judgment, therefore, does not support
the respondent as it has bearing only on the construe·
tion of Art. 13(1) of the Constitution.
.
In Ram Chandra Palai. v. State of Orissa ('), this
Court followed the decision in Bhikaji Narain's Case(')
in the case of a pre-Constitution Act. In Pannalal
C! d
Deep v. •••
(1) [1956] S.C.R. 28•
•
(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589.
,
(2} S.C.R. ··SUI'REJ\IE COURT REPORTS
39
Binjraj v. Union of India('), Bhagwatl, J.; quoted
r959
with approval the extract from ·Keshavan JJ!adhava D Ch d
Menon's Case('), wherein it was held that .. Art. 13(1)
eep v. an
has ouly the effect of nullifying or rendering all incon- The State of uuar
sistent existing laws ineffectual or nugatory or devoid Pradesh & Others
of any legal force or binding effect only with respect
to the fundamental rights on or after the commence- Subba Rao J.
ment of the Con.stittition. The learned Advocate General relied upon certain
decisions in support of his contention that the
word " void" in Arts. 13(1) and 13 (2) means only
" unenforceable" · against persons claiming fundamerital rights, and the law continues to .be inthe
statute book irrespective of the fact that it was made in infringement of the fundamental rights. The obser- vations of J\Iukherjea, J., as he then was, in Chiranjit
Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India(') are relied on
and they are :
"Article 32; as its provisions show, is not directly
concerned with the determination of constitutional
validity of -particular legislative enactments. What
it aims at is the enforcing of fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, no matter whether the
necessity for such enforcement arises out of an action
of the executive or of the legislature. . ................ ; .. .
The rights that could be enforced under article 32
must ordinarily be the rights of the petitioner himself
who complains of infraction of such rights and approaches the court for relief."
He also relies upon the decision of Das, J ., as he
then was, in The State of JJ!adras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan ('), wherein the learned Judge states
thus, at page 531 :
"The directive principles of the State Policy,
which by article 37 are expressly made unenforceable
by a Court; cannot override the provisions found in
Part III which, notwithstanding other provisions, are
expressly made enforceable by appropriate· \Vrits,
Orders or directions under article 32."
Basing his argument on the aforesaid two observatio~s,
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 233.
(3) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 899.
(2) [1951] S C.R. 228. ·
(4) [1951] S.C.R. 525,
•
40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
it is contended that in the case of both the directive
principles and the fundamental rights, it must be held
Deep Chand
that the infringement of either does not invalidate the
The Stat;· of Uttar law, but only makes the law unenforceable. This arguPrndesh & Others ment, if we may say so, mixes up the Constitutional
-invalidi~ of a . statute with the procedure to be
Subba Rao J. followed to enforce the fundamental rights of an individual. The Constitutional validity of a statute
depends upon the existence of legislative power in
the State and the right of a person to approach the
Supreme Court depends upon his possessing the
fundamental right, i.e., he cannot apply for the enforcement of his right unless it is infringed by any law.
The cases already considered supra clearly establish
that a law, whether pre-Constitution or post.Constitution, would be void and nugatory in so far as it
infringed the fundamental rights. We do not see any
relevancy in the reference to the directive principles;
for, the legislative power of a State is only guided
by the directive principles of State Policy. The
directions, even if disobeyed by the State, cannot
affect the legislative power of the State, as they are
only directory in scope and operation. The result of
the aforesaid discussion may be summarized in the
following propositions : (i) whether the Constitution
affirmatively confers power on the legislature to make
laws subject-wise or negatively prohibits it from infringing any fundamental right, they represent only
two aspects of want of legislative power; (ii) the Constitution in express· terms m~kes the power of a legislature to make laws in regard to the entries in the
Lists of the Seventh Schedule subject to the other
provisions of the Constitu Hon and thereby circumcribes or reduces the said power by the limitations
laid down in Part III of the Constitution; (iii) it
follows from the premises that a law made in derogation or in excess of that power would be ab initio
void wholly or to the extent of the contravention as
the case may be; and (iv) the doctrine of eclipse can
be invoked only in the case of a law valid when made,
but a shadow is cast ,on it by supervening constitutional ipconsistency or supervening existing statutory
z959
)
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41
inconsistency ; when the shadow is removed, the im·
z959
pugned Act is freed from all blemish or infirmity.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, Deep ~hand
we hold that the validity of the Act could not be test- The Stat; ' 01 Uttar
ed on the basis of the Constitution (Fourth Amend- Pradesh c;. Others
ment) Act, 1955, but only on the terms of the relevant
Articles as they existed prior to the Amendment.
Subba Rao J.
We shall now proceed to consider the first contention of Mr. Nambiar. He contends that the Motor
Vehicles (Amendment) Ac.t (100 of 1956) passed by
Parliament was wholly repugnant to the provisi9ns
of the U. P. Act and therefore the law became void
under the provisions of Art. 254(1) of the Constitution,
with the result that at the present time there is no
valid law whereunder the State can prohibit the
appellants exercising their fundamental right under
the Constitution, namely, carrying on the business of
motor transport.
Mr. Naunit Lal bases his case on the proviso to
Art. 254(2) of the Constitution rather than on cl. (1)
thereof. He contends that by reason of the Amending
Act, the U. P. Act was repealed in toto; and because
of Section 68B, the operation of the provisions of the
General Clauses Act saving things done under the
repealed Act was excluded. The learned Advocate
General attempted to meet the double attack by pressing on us to hold that there was no repugnancy at all
between the provisions of the Central Act and the
U. P. Act and therefore the U. P. Act had neither
become void nor was repealed by necessary implication by the Central Act. We shall now examine the
provisions of Art. 254(1) and 254(2).
Article 254:
"(1) If any provisions of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law
made by Parliament which Parliament is competent
to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with
respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause
(2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed
before or after the law made by the Legislitture of
6
42
'959
Deep v~hand
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law,
shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of
th~ State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be
The State of Uttar VOid.
Pradesh &- Others
(2)
Subba Rao J.
[1959] Supp.
Where a law made by the Legislature of a
State with respect to one of the matters enumerated
in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by
Parliament or an existing law with respect to that
matter, then, the law so made by the' Legislature of
such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State.
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent
Parliament from enacting at any time any law with
respect to the same matter including a law adding to,
amending, varying or repealing the law so made by
the Legislature of the State."
Article 254(1) lays down a general rule. Clause (2)
is an exception to that Article and the proviso qualifies the exception. If there is repugnancy between the
law made by the State and that made by Parliament
with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the
Concurrent List, the law made by Parliament shall
prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the law
made by the State shall, to the extent of such repug- ·
nancy, be void. Under cl. (2), if the Legislature of a
State makes a provision repugnant to the provisions
of the law made by Parliament, it would prevail if the
legislation of the State received the assent of the
President. Even in such a case, Parliament may
subsequently either amend,. vary or repeal the law
made by the Legislature of a State. In the present
case, the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly, after
obta,ining the assent of the President on April 23,
1955, pf,\,Sse~. the U. P. Act. Parliament subsequently
passed the ~fo~or Vehicles (Amendment) Act (100 of
1956). Therefore, both the clauses of Art. 254 would
apply to the situation. ~ The first question i~ whether
the provisions of the Union law, i.e., the Motor
Vehicles (Amendment) Act (100 of 1956), are repugnant to the· provisions of the U. P. Act and if so to
(
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
43
what extent. Before we proceed to examine the proI959
visions of the two Acts, it may be convenient to notice Deep Chand
the law pertaining to the rule of repugnancy.
v.
Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd Edition, The State of Uttar
page 303, refers to three tests of inconsistency or Pradesh & Others
repugnancy :Subba Rao ].
"(1) There may be inconsistency in the actual
terms of the competing statutes ;
(2) Though there may be no direct conflict, a
State law may be inoperative because the Commonwealth law, or the award of the Commonwealth Court,
is intended to be a complete exhaustive code; and
(3) Even in the absence of intention, a conflict
. may arise when both State and Commonwealth seek to
exercise their powers over the same subject matter."
This Court in Oh. 'l.'ika Ramji v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh (1) accepted the said three rules, among
others, as useful guides to test the question of repugnancy. In Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of
Bombay (2 ), this Court laid down a similar test. At
page 807, it is stated:
" The principle embodied in section 107(2) and
Article 254(2) is that when there is legislation covering the same ground both by the centre and by the
. Province, both of them being competent to enact the
same, the law of the Centre should prevail over that
of the State."
Repugnancy between two statutes may thus be· ascertained on the basis of the following three principles:
(1) Whether there is direct conflict between the
two provisions ;
(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an
exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and
(3) Whether the law made by Parliament and
the law made by the State Legislature occupy the
same field.
We shall now examine the provisions of both the
Acts in some detail in order to ascertain the extent
of the repugnancy between them. The Scheme of
(1) [1956] S.C.R. 393.
(2) [1955) l S.C.R. 799.
44
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
the U. P. Act may be summarized thus: Under the
U. P. Act "State Road Transport Service" is defined
Deep vchand
to mean transport service by a public service vehicle
Th' stat' of uttar owned by the State Government.
Under s. 3 :
Prnd"h & Othm
"Where the State Government is of the opinion
that it is necessary in the interests of the general pubSubba Rao J.
lie and for subserving the common good, or for maintaining and developing efficient road transport system
so to direct, it may, by notification in the official
Gazette declare that the road transport services in
general, or any particular class of such service on any
route or portion thereof as may be specified, shall be
run and operated exclusively by the State Government, or by the State Government in conjunction with
railways or be run and operated partly. by the State
Government and partly by others under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act".
After the publication of the notification under s. 3, the
State Government or, if the State Government so
directs, the Transport Co.mmissioner publishes in such
manner as may be specified a scheme as to the State
Road Transport Service providing for all or any of the
matters enumerated in cl. (2) of s. 4. Clause (2) of s. 4
directs that, among others, the scheme should provide
the particulars of the routes or portions thereof over
which and the date on which the State Transport
Service will commence to operate, the roads in regard
to whi.ch private persons may be allowed to operate
upon, the routes that will be served by the State
Government in conjunction with railways, the curtailment of the routes covered by the existing permits or
transfer of the permits to other route or routes. Section 5 enjoins the Transport Commissioner to give
notice to the permit-holder requiring him to lodge a
statement in writing whether he agrees to the transfer
of the permit and in cl. (2) thereof, it is prescribed
that in case he accepts the transfer, he is not entitled
to any compensation, but if he does not agree to the
transfer, .his permit will be cancelled subject to his right
to get compensation under the Act. Under s. 6 any
person whose interests are affected may within 30
days from the publication of the scheme, file objections
r959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
45
on it before the Transport Commissioner who shall
r959
forward them to the Board constituted u1t1der s. 7, Deep Chand
consist.ing of the Commissioner of a Division, Secretary
v.
to GoverQment in the Transport Department; and the The State of Utta•
Transport Commissioner. The Board shall consider Pradesh & Others
the objections, if any, forwarded under s. 6 and may
either confirm, ·modify or alter the scheme. The Subba Rao J.
Scheme so confirmed or modified or altered under s. 7
shall be published in the Official Gazette. Any scheme
published under s. 8 may at· any time be cancelled or
modified or altered by the State Government. Section 10 gives the consequences of the publicat:lon under
s. 8. Section 11 provides compensation for premature
cancellation of permits or curtailment of route or
routes, as may be determined in accorda.nce with the
principles specified in Schedule I. In Schedule I,
compensation is payable as fol4iws:
"(1) For every complete month or Rupees one
part of a month exceeding fifteen days of hundred.
the unexpired period of the permit.
(2) For part of a month not exceedRupees
ing fifteen days of the unexpired period
fifty.
of a permit.
Provided always that the amount of compensation
shall in no case be less than rupees two hundred."
Section 12 authorises the State Government, in a ca~e
where the permit has been cancelled, to purchase the
motor vehicle covered by it if the holder of the permit
offers to sell, upon terms and conditions laid down in
Schedule II provided the vehicle is of the type of
manufacture and model notified by the State Government and provided secondly that the vehicle is mechanically in a sound condition or otherwise declared fit by
the Transport Commissioner or his nominee. Sections
13 to 18 provide for a State Machinery for tho development of motor transport industry. Sections 19 to 22 are
provisions which are consequential in nature. Shortly
stated, under the U. P. Act the State Government
initiate a scheme providing for the nationalization of the
road transport in whole or in part; the objections filed
by the persons affected by the scheme are heard by a
46
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Board of three officers appointed by the State Govern.
'959
Deep Chand
ment ; the Board after hearing the objections may
v.
confirm, modify or alter the scheme ; the scheme so
The Sta" of uuar confirmed may be cancelled, modified or altered by
Pmdesh & Othmthe State Government by following the same proceSubba Rao
f.
dure adopted for framing the original scheme; and
the holders of permits cancelled may be given new
permits if they choose to accept and if not they will
be paid such compensation as prescribed under the
Act. Under the Amendment Act 100 of 1956, whereby a new chapter was inserted in the Motor Vehicles
Act of 1939, the procedure prescribed is -different.
Under s. 68-A of that Act, 'State Transport Undertaking' is defined to mean any undertaking providing road transport service, where such undertaking is
carried on by,-(i) the Central Government or a State
Government ; (ii) an~ Road Transport Corporation
established under s. 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (iii) the Delhi Transport Authority
established under s. 3 of the Delhi Road Transport
Authority Act, · 1950; and (iv) any municipality or
any corporation or company owned or controlled by
the State Government. Under s. 68C, the State Transport Undertaking initiates a scheme if it is of opinion
that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate,
economical and properly co-ordinated road transport
stirvice, it is necessary in the public interest that road
transport service in general, or any· particular class of
such service in relation to any area or route or portion
thereof should be run and operated by the State Transport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion complete
or partial, of other persons or otherwise. Section 68D
says that any person affected by the Scheme may fl.le
objections to the said Scheme before the State Government; the State Government may, after considering
the objections and after giving an opportunity to the
objectors or their representatives and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking to be heard
in the matter, approve or modify the Scheme. Any
Sche.me published may at any time be cancelled or
modified by the State Transport Undertaking following
the same procedure; for the purpose of giving effect
•
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RllJPORTS
47
to the Scheme, the Regional Transport Authority,
r959
inter alia, may cancel the existing permits or modify Deep Chand
the terms of ·the existing permits. Section 138G lays
v.
down. the principles and method of determination of The state of Uttar
compensation. Under that section compem;ation isPradesh & Others
payable for every completed month or part ofa month
exceeding fifteen days of the unexpired period of the Subba Rao f.
permits at Rs. 200 and for part of a month not exceed.ing fifteen days of the unexpired period of the permit
·at Rs. 100. Under the Amending Act, the gist of the
provisions is that the Scheme is initiated by the State
Transport Undertaking carried on by any of the four
institutions mentioned in s. 68A, including the State
Government ; objections are filed by the affected parties to the Scheme, the affected parties and the Undertaking are heard by the State Government, which,
after hearing the objections, approves or modifies the
Scheme. There is no provision for transfer of permits
to some other routes, or for the purchase of the buses
by the State Government. Compensation payable is
twice that fixed under the U. P. Act. One important
thing to be noticed is that the U. P. Act is prospective,
i.e., comes into force only from the date of the passing
of the Amending Act and the procedure prescribed
applies only to schemes that are initiated under the
provisions of the U. P. Act.
A comparison of the aforesaid provisions of the
U. P. Act and the Amending Act indicates tha.t both
the Acts are intended to operate in respect of the same
subject matter in the same field. The unamended
Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 did not make any provision for the nationalization of transport services, but
the States introduced amendments to implement the
scheme of nationalization of road transport. P:resumably, Parliament with a view to introduce a uniform
law throughout the country avoiding defects founa in
practice passed the Amending Act inserting Chapter
IV-A in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This object
would be frustrated if the argument that bo1~h the
U. P. Act and the Amending Act should co-exist in
respect of schemes to be framed after the Amending
Act, is accepted. Further the authority to initiate
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
[1959] Supp.
the scheme, the manner of doing it, the authority to
hear the objections, the principles regarding payment
Deep Chand
£C
v.
of compensation un d er t h e two Acts d iuer
in importTh' Stat' of uua. ant details from one another.
While in the U. P. Act
Prad"k & Othm the scheme is initiated by the State Government, in the
Amendment Act, it is proposed by the State TransSubba Rao f. port Undertaking.
The fact that a particular undertaking may be carried on by the State Government
also cannot be a reason to equate the undertaking
with the State Government; for under s. 68A the
undertaking may be carried on not only by the State
Government but by five other different institutions.
The undertaking is made a statutory authority under
the Amending Act with a right to initiate the scheme
and to be heard by the State Government in regard to
objections filed by the persons affected by the scheme.
While in the U. P. Act a Board hears the objections,
under the Amending Act the .State Government decides the disputes. The provisions of the scheme, the
principles of compensation and the manner of its payment also differ in the two Acts. It is therefore
manifest that the Amending Act occupies the same
field in respect of the schemes initiated after the
Amending Act and therefore to that extent the State
Act must yield its place to the Central Act. But the
same cannot be said of the schemes framed under the
U. P. Act before the Amending Act came into force.
Under Art. 254(1) "the law made by Parliament,
whether passed before or after the law made by the
Legislature of such State ............ shall prevail and the
law made by the legislature of the State shall, to the
extent of the repugnancy, be void."
• Mr. Nambiar contends that, as the U. P. Act and
the Amending Act operate in the same field in respect
of the same subject-matter, i.e., the nationalization of
bus.transport, the U. P. Act becomes void under Art.
254(1) of the Constitutfon. This argument ignores
the crucial words "to the extent of the repugnancy "
in the said clause. What is void is not the entire Act
but only to the extent of its repugnancy with the law
made by Parliament. The identity of the field may
relate to the pith and substance of the subject-matter
1 959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
49
and also the period of its operation. ·when both
r959
coincide, the repugnancy is complete and the whole of n . Ch
the State Act becomes void. The operation of the
eepv. and
Union Law may be entirely prospective leaving the the State of Uttar
State Law to be effective in regard to thing already Pradesh & Others
done. Sections 68C, 68D and 68E, inserted by the Amending Act, clearly show that those sections are e:oncern- Subba Rao f.
ed only with a scheme initiated after the Amending
Act came into force. None of the sections, either expressly or by necessary implication, indicates that the
schemes already finalised should be reopened and
fresh schemes be framed pursuant to the procedure
prescribed thereunder. Therefore, under Art. 254(1),
the law under the U. P. Act subsists to support the
schemes framed thereunder and it becomes void only
in respect of schemes framed under the Central Act. A
similar question arose in the context of the application
of Art. 13(1) to a pre-Constitution law yhich infringed the fundamental rights given under the Constitution.
In Keshavan Madhava Menon's Gase (1), which we
have referred to in a different context the question
was whether Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act,
1931, was void as infringing the provisions of Art.
13(1) of the Constitution; and the Court held that the
said Act was valid and would continue to be in force
to sustain a prosecution launched for an act done be
fore the Constitution. In the words of Das, J .., as he
then was:
"Such laws exist for all past transactions and
for enforcing all rights and liabilities accrued before
the date of the Constitution." (p. 234).
"So far as the past acts are concerned the law ·
exists, notwithstanding that it does not exist with
r~,spect to the future exe:ccise of fundamental rights."
(pp. 235-236).
Article 13(1), so far as it is relevarit to the present inquiry, is pari materia with the provisions of Art. 254(1)
of the Constitution. While under Art. 13(1) all the
pre-Constitution laws, to the extent of their inconsistency with the provisions of Part III, are void, under
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 228.
7
50
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Art. 254(1) the State Law to the extent of its repugnancy
to the law made by Parliament is void. If the
Deep Chand
v.
pre-Constitution law exists for the post-Constitution
Th• stati of utta' period for all the past transactions, by the same
Pradesh & Others parity of reasoning, the State law subsists after the
making of the law by Parliament, for past transacSubba Rao J. tions. In this view, both the laws can co-exist to
operate during different periods.
The same decision also affords a solution to the
question mooted, namely, whether if the law was void
all the completed transactions fall with it. Mahajan, J.,
as he then was, draws a distinction between a void
Act and a repealed Act vis-a-vis their impact on.past
transactions. At page 251, the learned Judge says:
" The expression " void " has no larger effect on
the statute so declared than the word "repeal". The
expression " repeal " according to common law rule
obliterates a statute completely as if it·had never been
passed and thus operates retrospectively on past transactions in the absence of a saving clause or in the
absence of provisions such as are contained in the
Interpretation Act, 1889, or in the General Clauses
Act, 1897, while a provision in a statute that with
effect from a particular date an existing law would be
void to the extent of the repugnancy has no such
retrospective operation and cannot affect pending prosecutions or actions taken under such laws. There is
in such a situation no necessity of introducing a
saving clause and it does not need the aid of a legislative provision of the nature contained in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act. To hold that
a.prospective declaration that a statute is void affects
pending cases is to give it indirectly retrospective
operation and that result. is repugnant to the clear
phraseology employed in the various articles in
Part III of the Constitution."
The said observation directly applies to a situation
created by Art. 254(1). As the U. P. Act was void
from the date of the Amending Act, actions taken before that date cannot be affected. In whichever way
it is looked at, we are satisfied that in the present
case, the scheme already framed subsists and the
'959
{
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
State law exists to sustain it even after the Parliax959
ment made the law. In this view we reJ·ect the con- Deep Chand
tention of Mr. Nambiar based on Art. 254(1) of the
v.
Constitution.
The State of Uttar
The alternative argument advanced by Mr. Naunit Pradesh & Others
Lal may now be considered. It is not disputed that
under the proviso to Art. 254(2), the. Parliament can Subba Rao f.
repeal the law made by the Legislature of a St11te and
that Parliament can repeal the repugnant St2,te law.
whether directly or by necessary implication. Assuming that Parliament in the present case by enacting
the Amending Act repugnant to the State law with
respect to the same subject-matter i. e., nationalization of road transport, impliedly repealed the State
law, would it have the effect of effacing the scheme
already made ? If there was a repeal, the provisions
of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897 are directly
attracted. The relevant part of s. 6 of the General
Clauses Act reads :
" Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals
any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made,
then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal
shall not(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the
time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment
so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder."
The express words used in clause (b) certainly take in
the scheme framed under the repealed Act. It was a
thing duly done under the repealed Act. But it is
said that a comparison of the provisions of s. 6 with
those of s. 24 would indicate that anything duly done
excludes the scheme. Section 24 deals with the continuation of orders, schemes, rules, forms or bye-laws,
made or issued under the repealed Act. But that
section applies only to the repeal of a Central Act but
not a State Act. But the exclusion of the scheme is
sought to be supported on the basis of the argument
that in the case of a repeal of a Central Act, both the
sections apply and, in that context, a reawnable
52
'959
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
interpretation would be to exclude what is specifically
D"P Chand
provided for from the general words used in s. 6.
v.
Whatever justification there may be in that context,
The State of Uttar there is none when we are concerned with the repeal
Pradesh & Others of a State Act to which s. 24 does not apply.
In that
Subba Rao ].
•
situation, we have to look to the plain words of s. 6
an d ascertain whet her t h ose words are comprehensive
enough to take in a scheme already framed. We have
. no doubt that a scheme framed is a thing done under
the repealed Act.
A further contention is raised on the basis of the
provisions of s. 68B to achieve the same result, namely,
that the said section indicates a different intention
within the meaning of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act.
Section 68B reads :
" The provisions of this Chapter and rules and
orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
Chapter IV of this Act or in any other law for the
time bei11g in force or in any instrument having effect
by virtue of any such law."
This section embodies nothing more than the b:ue
statement that the provisions of this Act should prevail notwithstanding the fact that they are inconsistent with any other law. We have expressed our view
that the provisions of this Act are prospective in operatipn and, therefore, nothing in those sections, which
we have already analysed, is inconsistent with the
provisions of the State law in regard to its operation
with respect to transactions completed thereunder.
Assuming without deciding that the word 'instrument' in s. 68B includes a scheme, we do not see any
provisions in the Act which are inconsistent with the
scheme framed under the State Act. The provisions
starting from s. 68C only contemplate a scheme initiated after the Amending Act came into force and therefore they cannot obviously be inconsistent with a
scheme already framed under the State Act before the
Amending Act came into force. We, therefore, hold
that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act saves the scheme
framed under the U. P. Act.
The next contention of the learned Counsel Mr.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
53
N ambiar, namely, that the scheme being a prescrip'959
tion for the future, it has a continuous operation even Deep Chand
after the Amending Act became law, with the result
v.
that after the Amending Act, there was no va,lid law to The State of Uttar
sustain it, need not detain us ; for, we have held that Pradesh & Others
the State law subsists even after the Amending Act
to sustain the things done under the former Act.
Subba Rao f.
This leads us to the contention of the learci!ed Advocate General that even if the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955, could not be relied on to sustain the validity of the U. P. Act, there was no deprivation of property of the appellants within the meaning of the decisions of this Court in The State of West
Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1); Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving
Go. Ltd. (2) and Saghir Ahmad's Gase (3). Those cases
have held that els. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 relate to
· the same subject matter and that, though there is
no actual transfer of property to the State, if by
the Act of the State, an individual has been substantially dispossessed or where his right to use and
enjoy his property has been seriously impaired or
the value of the property has been materially reduced, it would be acquisition or taking possession within the meaning of cl. (2) of the said Article. After a 1
faint attempt to raise this question, the learned Advocate General conoe_ded that in view of the decision in
Saghir Ahmad's Gase he could not support his argument
to the effect that the State did not deprive the petitioners
of their interest in a commercial undertaking. In the
said case, this Court held in express terms tha.t U. P.
Transport Act, 1951, which in effect prohibited .the
petitioners therein from doing their motor transport
business deprived them of their property or i.l:tterest in
a commercial undertaking within the meaning of Art.
31(2) of the Constitution. Mukherjea J., as he th.en
was, observed at page 728 :
" It is not seriously disputed on behalf- of the respondents that the appellants' right to ply motor
vehicles for gain is, in any event, an interest in a
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 587.
(2) [r954] S.C.R. 674.
(3) [1955] I S.C.R. 707.
54
SUPREM;E COURT REPORTS
[1959] 'Supp.
commercial undertaking. There is no doubt also that
the appellants have been deprived of this interest."
Deep Chand
v.
The learned Judge proceeded to state at page 729 :
The State of Utta'
"In view of that majority decision it must be
hadesh & Othm taken to be settled now that clauses (1) arid (2) of article 31 are not mutually exclusive in scope but should
Subba Rao J. be read together as dealing with the same subject,
namely, the protection of the right to property by
means of limitations on the State's powers, the depri•
vation contemplated in clause (1) being no other than
acquisition or taking possession of the property referred to in clause (2). The learned Advocate General
conceded this to be the true legal position after the
pronouncements of this Court referred to above. The
fact that the buses belonging to the appellants have
not been acquired by the Government is also not
material. The property of a business may be both
tangible and intangible. Under the statute the Government may not deprive the appellants of their buses or
any other tangible property but they are depriving
them of the business of running buses on hire on public roads. We think therefore that in these circmnstances the legislation does conflict with the provisions
of article 31(2) of the Constitution and as the requirements of that clause have not been complied with, it
should be held to be invalid on that ground."
The above observations are clear and unambiguous
and they do not give scope for further argument on the
subject. It follows that if the Act does not provide
for compensation, the Act would be invalid being in
conflict with the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the Coustitution.
The next question is whether in fact the provisions
of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, were complied
with. Under Art. 31(2) no property shall be taken
possession of or acquired save for a public purpose
and save by authority of law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned
and either fixes the amount of the compensation or
specifies the principles on which, and the manner
in which, the compensation is to be determined and
I959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
55
In The State of West Bengal v. JYJrs. Bela
Baner<iee
(1 ), Patanjali Sastri, C. J., has defined the
J
given.
z959
Deep Chand
meaning of the word 'compensation ' at page 563, as
v.
under :
The State of Uttar
"While it is true that the legislature is given the Pradesh & Others
discretionary power oflaying down the princip1es which
should govern the determination of the amount . to be Subba Rao f.
given to the owner for the property appropriated,
such principles must ensure that what is determined
as payable must be compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. Within
the limits of this basic requirement of full indemnification of the expropriated owner, the Constitution
allows free play to the legislative judgment a:> to what
principles should guide the determination of the
amount payable. Whether such principles take into
account all the elements which make up the true
value of the property appropriated and exclude matters which are to be neglected, is a justiciable issue to
be adjudicated by the Court. This, indeed, was not
disputed. "
On the basis of the aforesaid principle, Mr. Nambiar
contends that the U. P. Act does not provide for compensation in the sense of giving the operator deprived
of his interest a just equivalent of what he has been
deprived of, or fix any principles to guide the determination of the amount payable. The U.P. Act, the argument proceeds, does not provide at l!-11 for compensation
payable in respect of the interest of the opera.tor in a
commercial undertaking, but only gives compensation
for the unexpired period of the permit. On the other
hand, the learned Advocate General contends that the
appellants would be entitled only to just equivalent of
the interest that they are deprived of, namely, the
interest in a commercial undertaking and that the
cumulative effect of the provisions of the U. P. Act is
that just equivalent of the said interest is given. As
it is common case that what the Act should give is
just compensation for the interest of the operator in
a commercial undertaking, we shall now exa.mine the
provisions of the U. P. Act to ascertain whether it
(I) [1954] S.C.R. 558.
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
provides a quid pro quo for the interest the operator is
deprived
of.
·
Deep Chand
v.
The provisions of the U. P. Act relating to compenThe state of Utta, sation may usefully be read at this stage:
Prndesh & Othm
Section 5 : " ( l) Where the scheme published under
section 4 provides for cancellation of any existing per1100
subba
.f. mit granted under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939, or for the transfer of such permit to any
other route or routes the Transport Commissioner
shall cause notice thereof to be served on the permitholder concerned and on any other persons to whom
in his opinion special notice should be given. The
notice shall also require the permit-holder to lodge a
statement in writing within the period to be specified
therein whether he agrees to the transfer of the permit.
(2) If the permit-holder agrees to the transfer of
his permit, he shall, provided the permit is actually so
transferred ultimately, be not entitled to claim compensation under section 11 but the transference of the
permit shall be deemed to be in lieu of compensation
and complete discharge therefor of the State Government. Where, however, the permit-holder does uot
agree to the transfer, the permit shall, without prejudice to the right of the permit-holder to get compensation under the said section be liable to be cancelled."
Section 11: "(1) Where in pursuance of-the Scheme
published under section 8 any existing permit granted
under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is
or is deemed to have been cancelled or the route or
routes covered by it are curtailed or are deemed to
have been curtailed, the permit-holder shall, except in
cases where transfer of the permit has been agreed to
under sub-section (2) of section 5, be entitled to receive
and be paid such compensation by the State Government for and in respect of the premature cancellation
of the permit or, as the case may be, for curtailment
of the route or routes covered by the permit as may
be determined in accordance with the principles specified in Schedule I.
(2) The compensation payable under this section
shall be due as from the date of order of cancellation
r959
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
57
of the permit or curtailment of the route covered by
z959
the permit.
Deep Chand
(3) There shall be paid by the State Government
v.
on the amount of compensation determined under sub- The State of Uttar
section (1) interest at the rate of two and one-half Pradesh & Others
per cent. from the date of order of cancellation or
curtailment of route to the date of determination of Subba Rao f.
compensation as aforesaid.
(4) The compensation payable under this Bection
shall be given in cash.
(5) The amount of compensation to be given in
accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) shall
be determined by the Transport Commissioner and
shall be offered to the permit-holder in full satisfaction of the compensation payable under this Act and
if the amount so offered is not acceptable to the
permit-holder, the Transport Commissioner may within such time and in such manner as may be prewribed
refer the matter to the District Judge whose decision
in the matter shall be final and shall not be called in
question in any Court. "
Section 12 : " Where a permit granted under
Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, haB been
cancelled or the route to which the permit relates has
been curtailed in pursuance of the scheme published
under section 8, the State Government may if the
holder of the permit offers to sell, choose to purchase
the motor vehicles covered by the permit upon terms
and conditions laid down in Schedule II :
Provided, firstly, that the vehicle is of a type,
manufacture and model notified by the State Government; and
Provided, secondly, that the vehicle is in a mechanically sound condition and is otherwise declared fit
by the Transport Commissioner or his nominee. "
SCHEDULE I.
" Paragraph 1 : The compensation payable under
section 11 of the Act for cancellation of a contract
carriage or stage carriage or public carrier's permit
under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the
8
58
'9:i9
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Act shall be computed for every vehicle covered by
Deep Chand
the permit as follows, namely :
v.
(1) For every complete month or part
The State of Uttar of a month exceeding fifteen days of
Pradesh o;. Others the unexpired period of the permit.
Subba Rao J.
Rupees
one
hundred
Rupees
fifty
(2) For part of a month not exceeding
fifteen days of the unexpired period of
a permit.
Provided always that the amount of compensation shall in no case be less than rupees two hundred.
Paragraph 2: The compensation payable under
section 11 for curtailment of the route or routes covered
by a stage carriage or public carrier permit under
clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Act
shall be an amount computed in accordance with the
following formula :
YxA
R
In this formulay means the length in mile by which the route is
curtailed.
A means the amount computed in accordance
with paragraph 1 above.
R means the total length in miles of the route
covered by the permit."
The aforesaid provisions constitute an integrated
scheme for paying compensation to the person whose
permit is cancelled. The gist of the provisions may
be stated thus: The scheme made by the State
Government may provide for the cancellation of a
permit, for curtailment of the route or routes or for
transfer of the permit to other routes. Where a
transfer of the permit is accepted by the operator, he
will not be entitled to any compensation ; if he does
not accept, compensation will be paid to him with
interest in respect of the premature cancellation of the
permit, or as the case may be for the curtailment of
the route or routes covered by the permit. The
amount of compensation to be given shall be determined by the Transport Commissioner in accordance
with the provisions of the Act, and if the amount so
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
59
z959
offered is not acceptable to the permit-holder, the
Transport Commissioner may, within such time and Deep Chand
in such manner as may be prescribed, refer the matter
'"
to the District Judge whose decision in the matter Th• State of Uttar
shall he final. There is also a provision enabling the Pradesh &- Others
Government to purchase the motor vehiclee. covered
by the permit, if the holder of the permit offers to sell Subba Rao f.
and if the vehicles satisfy the specifications laid down
in the Act. The question is whether these provisions
offer a quid pro quo for the interest of the petitioners
in the commercial undertaking i.e., business in motor
transport. Let us examine the question from the
standpoint of a business deal. If the trans,port business is sold, the seller gets his value for the assets
minus the liabilities and for his good-will. In the case
of a scheme framed under the Act, the assets are left
with the holder of the permit and under ce:rtain conditions the State purchases them. As the scheme is a
phased one, it cannot be said, though there will be
difficulties, that the assets cannot be sold to other
operators. If a permit is not cancelled but o:nly transferred to another route, it may· be assumed that if the
transfer is voluntarily accepted by the permit-holder,
he is satisfied that the route given to him ii> as good
as that on which he was doing his business. On the
other hand, if he chooses to reject the transfer of his
permit to another route and takes compensation, the
question is whether the compensation provided by
s. 11 is anything like an equivalent or quid pro quo
for the interest in the commercial undertaking
acquired by the State. If cl. (5) of s. 11 had not been
there, we would have had no hesitation to hold that
a fl.at rate of Rs. 100 or less irrespective of the
real loss to the holder would not be compensation
within the meaning of Art. 31(2). But, in our
view, s. 11(5) gives a different complexion to the
entire question of compensation. Under that clause, a
permit-holder aggrieved by the amount of compensation given by the Transport Commissioner may ask
for referring the matter to the District Judge for his
decision in regard to the adequacy of the compensation.
This clause is susceptible of both a strict· a8 well as a
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
liberal interpretation. If it is strictly construed, it
may be held that what the District Judge can give as
Deep Chand.
compensation is only that which the Transport ComTh 5 ,.,:·
uu.,missioner
can, under the provisionsofs. 11(1) i.e., at
01
p,:aesh o;, Othm the rates mentioned in the Schedule.
But a liberal
interpretation, as contended by the learned Advocate
Subba Roo J. General, can be given to that clause without doing
violence to the language used therein and that interpretation will carry out the intention of the legislature.
If the jurisdiction of the District Judge relates only to
the calculation of figures, the said clause becomes
meaningless in the present context. Section II read
with the Schedule gives the rate of compensation, the
rate of interest, the dates from which and up to which
the said compensation is to be paid with interest. The
duty of calculating the said amount is entrusted to
the Transport Commissioner who will be a fairly senior
officer of the Government. If he made any mistake
in mere calculations, he would certainly correct it if
the permit-holder pointed out the mistake to him. In
the circumstances, is it reasonable to assume that 'the
legislature gave a remedy for the permit-holder to
approach the District Judge for the mere correction
of the calculated figures ? It is more reasonable to
assume that the intention of the legislature was to
provide prima f acie for compensation at fiat rate and
realising the inadequacy of the rule of thumb to meet
varying situations, it entrusted the duty of the final
determination of compensation to a judicial officer of
the rank of a District Judge. The provisions of s.11(5),
in our view, are certainly susceptible of such an interpretation as to carry out the intention of the legislature indicated by the general scheme of the provisions.
The crucial words are "if the amount so offered is not
acceptable to the permit-holder". The amount offered
is no doubt the amount calculated in accordance with
s. 11(1). But a duty is cast on the Transport Commissioner to refer the matter to the District Judge if the
amount offered is not acceptable to the permit-holder.
The word " acceptable" is of very wide connotation
and it does not limit the objection only to the wrong
calculation under s. 11(1). The permit-holder may
r959
~
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
61
1
not accept the amount on the ground that compensa959
tion offered is inadequate and is not a qui:d pro quo Deep Chand
for the interest of which he is deprived. It is therefore
v.
for the District Judge, on the evidence adduced by The state of uuar
both the parties, to decide the proper compensation to Pradesh & Others
be paid to him in respect of the right of which he is
deprived by the cancellation of the permit. The lang- Subba Rao J.
uage of s. 11(5) not only bears the aforesaid construction but also carries out the intention of the legislature, for it cannot be imputed to the legislature that it
intended to deprive a valuable interest by giving a
nominal amount to the permit-holder.
Section 11(5) speaks of the time limit within which
such reference may be made to the District J"udge, but
no such rule has been brought to our notice. We hope
and trust that, without standing on any such technicality, the Transport Commissioner, if so required,
will refer the matter of compensation to the District
Judge. Having regard to the entire scheme of compensation provided by the Act, we hold tha1; the Act
provided for adequate compensation for the interest
acquired within the meaning of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution.
It is said that out of the twenty five appeals appellants in thirteen appeals had accepted to take a transfer of the permits to different routes; but on behalf of
the appellants it is denied that the acceptance was
unequivocal and final. They say that it was conditional and that, as a matter of fact, they have not
been plying the buses on the transferred routes and
indeed have been operating them only on the old
routes. In these circumstances, we cannot hold that
the said appellants accepted the alternative routes. If
they or some of them choose to accept any alternative
routes, they are at liberty to do so, in which event
they will not be entitled to any compensation.
Lastly, the learned Counsel for the appellants contends that cl. (2) of s. 3 of the U. P. Act infringes their
fundamental rights under Art. 31(2) inasmuch as it
prevents them from questioning the validity of the
scheme on the ground that it is not for public purpose.
Section 3 reads :
62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"(1)
r959
[1959] Supp.
Where the State Government is of the opi-
D"p Chand
nion that it is necessary in the interest of the general
v.
public and for subserving the common good, or for
The stat• of Uttar maintaining and developing efficient road transport
Pradesh & Others system so to direct, it may, by notification in the offiSubba Rao
f.
cial Gazette declare that the road transport services
in general, or any particular class of such service on
any route or portion thereof as may be specified, shall
be run and operated exclusively by the State Government, or by the State Government in conjunction
with railways or be run and operated partly by the
State Government and partly by others under and in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) The notification under sub-section (1) shall be
conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. "
The argument of the learned Counsel on the interpretation of this section appears to be an after-thought; for
the records do not disclose that the appellants attempted to question the said fact before the Government
and they were precluded from doing so on the basis of
cl. (2) of s. (3). We are not, therefore, prepared to
allow the appellants to raise the contention for the
first time before us.
The last contention, which is special to Civil Appeal
No. 429 of 1958, is that during the crucial period when
the scheme of nationalization was put through, the
appellant had no permit, it having been cancelled by
the order of the appropriate tribunal; but subsequently, after the scheme was finalised, the said order was
set aside by the Appellate Tribunal retrospectively
and therefore the order of the State Government made
behind the back of the appellant does not bind him.
The appellant's permit was not renewed by the Regional Transport Authority. Against the said order, he
preferred an appeal to the State Transport Tribunal,
which by an order dated September 6, 1956, allowed
the appeal and directed that the appellant's permit be
renewed for three years beginning from November 1,
1953. In disposing of the appeal the State Transport
Tribunal observed :
"We are told that in the meantime this route has
been notified and the Government buses are plying
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
63
on it. The effect of this order will be that the appelz959
lant shall be deemed to be in possession of a valid permit and he shall have to be displaced a f ter r10llowing Deep v.Chand
the usual procedure prescribed by the U. P. Road The State of uttar
Transport Services (Development) Act."
Pradesh & Others
Pursuant to their order, it appears that the Regional
Transport Authority renewed his permit on October 11, Subba Rao J.
1956 with effect from November 1, 1953 to October 31,
1956. In the circumstances, as the petitioner was not
a permit-holder when the Government made the order,
no relief can be given to him in this appeal. This
order will not preclude the appellant in Civil Appeal
No. 429 of 1958, if he has any righl, to take appropriate proceedings against the State Government.
In the result, all the appeals are dismissed with one
set of costs to the State ofUttar Pradesh.
Appeals dism:~ssed.
THE WESTERN INDIA THEATRES LTD.
I959
v.
January r6.
THE CANTONMENT BOARD, POON A,
CANTONMENT
(S. R. DAS, c. J., s. K. DAS, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. 'vVANCHOO and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Entertainment Tax-Imposition on cinema show--ValidityCantonments Act, I924 (Act II of I924), s. 60-Bombay Municipal
Boroughs Act, I925 (Bom. XV III of I925), s. 73-Go·vernment of
India Act, I9J5, s. IOO, Sch. VII, Entry 50.
The appellant, a public limited company, was the lessee of
wo cinema houses, " West End" and" Capitol" situated within the Poona cantonment area. By a notification dated June 17,
1948, the Bombay Government with the sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council imposed certain taxes in the cantonment
of Poona including an entertainment tax of Rs. IO per show on
the appellant's cinema houses and Rs. 5 per show on others.
The appellant, who paid the tax under protest, brought the suit,
out of which the present appeal arose, for a declaration that the
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