ATMA RAM versus THE STATE OP PUNJAB AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 8 December 1958 | [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 748 | 1958 INSC 111
Key facts
- Decided
- 8 December 1958
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 176/1956
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 748
- Neutral citation
- 1958 INSC 111
Text of the judgment
748
SUPREME COURT REIOR'IS ll9fi9] Eupp.
ATMA RAM
December 8.
v.
THE STATE OP PUNJAB AND OTHERS
(and connected petition)
(S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA,
K. SuBBA RAo and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Land Tenure-Modification of landlord's rights in land-Enactment-Con1pctc11cc of State Legislature-Constitutional validityPunjab Security of Land Tenure Act (Punj. X of I95J), as amended by Act XI of I955. s. I8-Co11stit11tion of India, Arts. I4, I9,
JI, JIA, 246(3), Entry IS, List II, Seventh Sched11le-P11njab Land
Revcn11e Act (P1tnj. XV II of I887), ss. J(I), J(J).
The point in controversy in these petitions was the constitutional validity of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act
(Punj. X of 1953). as amended by Act XI of 1955. which sought
to "provide for the security of land-tenure and other incidental
matters". The impugned Act which admittedly dealt with
holdings as defined by the Punjab Land-Revenue Act, 1887,
limited the area which might be held by a land-owner for the
purpose of self-cultivation and thereby released surplus area to
be utilised for resettling ejected tenants; and by s. 18 conferred
upon the tenants the right to purchase from the land-owners the
lands held by them and thus themselves to become the landowners on prices which would be below the market value. It
was contended on behalf of the petitioners, who were landowners ,affected by the impugned Act, that under Entry 18 in
List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State
Legislature was incompetent to enact a law limiting the extent
of the land to be held by a land-owner and that the provisions
of the impugned Act contravened the petitioners' fundamental
rights under Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution.
Held, that the contentions must fail.
The words "rights in or over land" and "land tenures"
occurring in 'Entry 18 in List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution \Vere sufficiently comprehensive to include measures of
land-tenure reforms, such as the impugned Act, that sought to
limit the extent of land in cultivating possession of the landov:ner in order to release larger areas of land to be made
available for cultivation by tenants and that Entry read with
Art. 246(3) of the Constitution gave the State Legislature
exclusive po\\·er to enact such measures.
Such determination of the relation of landlord and tenant
as was contemplated by s. rS and other provisions of the
itnpugned ~\ct, vvhich sought to convert a tenant into a landowner, was well within the ambit of Entry 18.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT$
749
The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum, [1940) F'.C,.R. IIO
:1958
and Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhi, (1946) L.R. 74 I.A. 12, refetred to.
It was beyond doubt that the impugned Act subst<i.ntially
Alma Ram
modified the land-owner's rights to hold and dispose of his
v.
property in any estate or portion thereof and thus fell within
Thi S1a11 of
the purview of Art. 31A{1){a) of the Constitution and was Punjab and Others
immune from any attack on the ground that it contraveMd Arts.
14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
The observations made by this Court in Thakur Rpighubir
Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, [1953] S.C.R. 1049, in conhection
with another Act, with absolutely different provisions, must be
limited to the facts of that case and were wholly inappliQable.
Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, [1953]
S.C.\R. 1049, distinguished and held inapplicable.
The words "any estate or of any rights therein" octurringin Art. 3rA(1)(a) read in the light of Art. 3rA(2) included any
kinds of rights either quantitative or qualitative in the area
encompassed by an estate or any portion of it and thus included
holdings as defined by the Punjab Land-Revenue Act, 18~7, and
any shares or portions thereof.
Regard being had to the legal maxim that the greater must
include the less, it was inappropriate to suggest that the Constitution should have specifically mentioned "portion of an estate"
ii: Art. 31A if .it intended to give that Article such a com~rehen
s1ve construction.
Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State of Punjab, A.LR. 1954 Pun.
167, approved.
State of Punjab v. S. Kehar Singh, (1958) 60 P.L.R. 461, disapproved.
Ram Narain M~dhi v. The State of Bombay, [1959] Stjr.pp. (1)
S.C.R. 489, applied.
Hukam Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1955) 57 P.L.R. 359,
refe~d~
·
1
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 176, 177
and 253 of 1956; 34, 35, 51-53, 69, 70, 75, 94 & l37 of
1957; 34, 58, 72, 90, 92, 106, 109 & ll5 of 1958.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitutfon of
India. for enforcement of Fundamental rights.
0. B. Aggarwal and Naunit Lal, for the peti~ioner
(In Petition No. 176 of 1956).
Achhru Ram and Na unit Lal, for the petition¢r (In
Petition No. 177 of 56).
Naunit Lal, for the petitioner (In Petitions No11. 253/
56; 34, 35, 51-53, 69, 70, 75, 94 and 137/57; 34, 58, 92,
106, 109 & ll5/58).
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Rrul,hey Lal Aggarwal and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
Atma Ram . petitioner (In Petition No. 90/58).
v.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
The State of
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Punjab,
P 4 njab and Others Gopal Singh and T. M. Sen, for respondent No. 1
(In Petition No. 176/56).
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Pun.iab,
aud T. M. Sen, for re~pondent No. 1 (In Petitions Nos.
177 & 253/56; 34, 35, 51-53, 69, 70, 75, 94 & 137/57;
34, 58, 72, 90, 92, 106, 109 & 115/58).
R. S. Gheba, for respondent No. 3 (In Petition No.
' 90/58).
Dipak Dutta Chowdhury, for respondent No. 3 (In_
Petition No. 176/56).
Udai Bhan Chowdhury, for respondent No. 7 (In
Petition No. 59/57) and respondent No. 3 (In Petition
No. 70/57).
Harnam Singh and Sadhu Singh, for the Interveners
(In Petition No. 176/56).
1958. December 8. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Sinha J.
SINHA, J.-These petitions under Art. 32 of the
Constitution impugn the· constitutionality of th!)
Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act (Punj. X of
1953) (which will be referred to hereinafter as the Act),
as a.mended by Act XI of 1955. The petitioners are
land-owners of the lands affected by the provisions of
the impugned Act. The State of Punjab and its
officers, besides persons claiming benefits under the
Act, are the respondents in these several petitions.
The impugned Act has a history which may shortly
be set out. With a view to providing for the security
of tenure to tenants, the Punjab Tenants (Security of
Tenure) Ordinance IV of 1950, was promulgated with
effect from May 13, 1950. That Ordinance was replaced by the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act
XII of 1950, which came into force on November 6,
1950, on the date on which it was first published in
the Punjab Government Gazette. The Act prescribed
a limit of one hundred standard acres of land (equivalent to two hundred ordinary acres) which could be
f95B
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
751
held by a land-owner for his "self-cultivation"; a.nd it
z958
was termed " permissible limit "-(s. 2(3) ). l\.ny landAlma Ram
owner having land in excess of t he" permissible li\llit ",
v.
was authorized by s. 3 to select for" self-cultivation", The Slate of
land out of the entire area held by him in the St11>te of Punjab and Others
Punjab, as land-owner, and reserve it for his owl). use
to the extent of the " permissible limit". This ",right
Sinha J.
of reservation " had to be exercised, first, in respect
of land in his self-cultivation; and if the extent of, such
land fell short of the " permissible limit ", he could,
under s. 4, make up the deficiency by ejecting tefilants
under him in respect of such lands as fell within his
reserved area. Section 5 fixed the minimum period of
tenancy as four years, subject to certain exceptions set
out in s. 6. These were some of the salient featu11es of
the Act of 1950, which itself was amended by the
Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act. (Punj.'V of
1951), which came into force on December 24, 1951.
By the amending Act, the " permissible limit " ' was
reduced to 50 standard acres equivalent to 100 ordinary
acres, and the minimum period of tenancy was raised
to five years. It also made provisions for preferential
right of pre-emption-(s. 12A), and conferred a right
of purchase on the tenant in respect of land ill his
possession~(s. 12B), subject to certain exceptions(s. 120). Another legislation in this series was the
Prevention of Ejectment (Temporary Powers) Ordinance No. 1 of 1952, which came into force on June 11,
1952. Then, came the Punjab Security of Tiand
Tenure Act (Punj. X of 1953), now impugned, which
repealed the aforesaid Acts XII of 1950 and V of 1951.
It came into force on April 15, 1953. This Act itself
was amended by Act LVII of 1953 and Act XI of
1955. Though this Act has undergone subsequent
amendments in 1957 and 1958, we are not concetned
with those amendments, because they came ~nto
existence after this Court was moved under Art. 32 of
the Constitution. We are concerned with the stat~ of
the law as it stood after the amendment of 1~55,
aforesaid.
Before dealing with the grounds of attack u~ged
against the impugned Act, it is convenient to set out,
1
752
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
in a nut-shell, the salient provisions of the Act, which
ha.ve given rise to the present controversy, a.nd which
Atma Ram
v.
give a.n idea. of the scope .a.nd na.ture of the Jegisla.tion
The State of
now under examination. The Act ha.s a. short Prea.mPunjab and Othm hie, namely, "to provide for the security of la.nd tenure
and other incidental matters ". The Act further
Sinha ].
reduces the "permissible a.res." (s. 2(3) ) in relation to
a. Ja.ndlord or a. tena.nt, to 30 sta.nda.rd acres equivalent
to 60 ordinary acres, thus, releasing a larger a.rea for
re-settlement of tenants ejected or to be ejected Qnder
the provisions of the Act. So to. say, it creates a. pool
of "surplus a.res." (s. 2(5-a.) ), meaning thereby the
area other than the " reserved a.res. " in excess of the
." permissible area. ", a.s aforesaid. " Reserved area."
means the area Ja.wfully reserved by the landlord
under the provisions of the two Acts aforesaid, which
were repealed by the Act-(s. 2(4) ). The definition of
a tenant under the Act, includes a. sub.tenant a.nd a.
self-cultiva.ting lessee-(s. 2(6) ). As a.lrea.dy indicated,
a tenant also may be liable to be ejected from a.ny
a.rea which he holds in a.ny capacity whatever in
excess of the "permissible area.". Section 10-A
authorizes the Sta.te Government or any officer
empowered by it in this behalf, to utilize a.ny "surplus
area " for re-settlement of tenants ejected or to be
ejected under the provisions of s. 9(i). But a. tenant
inducted on to such :"surplus a.rea ",holds the Ia.nd
under the land-owner, who, thus, becomes entitled to
receipt of rent from the tenant. Section 12 la.ys down
the maximum rent payable by a. tenant. Section 17
recognizes the rights of certain tenants to pre-empt
sales or fore-closure of la.nd. Section 18, which formed
the subject-matter of the most vehement a.tta.ck on
behalf of the petitioners, confers upon the tenants of
the description given in the severe.I clauses of the Aot,
the right to purchase from the land-owner the la.nd
held by them, subject to certs.in exceptions, a.nd
subject to the payment in a. lump sum or in six
monthly insta.lments not exceeding ten, ~f the
purchase-price to be determined i.n a.coorda.nce with
ols. (2) a.nd (3) of s. 18. Section 23 inva.lida.t.es any
decree or order of a.ny court or authority, or a. notice
(1) S.C.R. SUPltEME COURT REPORTS
753
of ejectment, which is not consistent with the provir958
sions of the Act. Thus, the Act seeks to limit th~ area.
~
which may be held by a. Iand-owner ior
the purpose of Almav. Ram
self-cultivation, thereby, releasing "surplus a.rea." n. stat• of
which ma.y be utilized for the purpose of resettling Punjab and Others
ejected tenants, a.nd affording an opportunity ~o the
tenant to become the land-owner himself on payment
Sinha /.
of the purchase-price which, if anything, would be less
than the market value. It, thus, aims at cr~ating
what it calls a. class of" sma.ll la.nd-owners ", me~ning
thereby, holders of land not exceeding the " permissible area. "--(s. 2(2) ). The utmost emphasis ha.a been
laid on self-cultivation which means" cultivation by a.
land-owner either persona.Uy or through his wife or
children, or through such of his relations as may be
prescribed, or under his supervision "-(s. 2(9) ).
The arguments a.t the Ba.r, on behalf of the' petitioners ma.y be put under three ma.in heads, nMnely,
(1) that the Legislature ha.d no legislative competence
to enact the Act, (2) that the provisions of the Act
contravene the petitioners' fundamental rights enshrined in Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) a.nd 31 of the Constitution, and
(3) that certain specified provisions of the Act amount
to unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners' rights
to hold a.nd dispose of property.
.
At the outset, it is necessary to deal with the question of legislative competence, which was raised on
behalf of some of the petitioners, though not on b,half
of all of them. This argument of want of legislative
competence goes to the root of the impugned Act,, and
if it is well-founded, no other question need be gone
into. It has been argued that Entry 18 in List lI of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, should, not
be read as authorizing the State Legislature to enact a
law limiting the extent of the land to be held py a.
proprietor or a. landowner. Entry 18 is in these
words:" 18. Land, that is to sa.y, rights in or over l~nd,
land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, a.nd the collection of rents ; transfer and alien8'tion
of agricultural land; land improvement and ~gri
cultura.l loans; colonization."
9$
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
It will be noticed that the Entry read along with Art.
246(3) of the Constitution, has vested exclusive power
Atma Ram
· t h e State to make laws wit h respect to " rig h ts in or
m
n. ;,~,. of over land, land tenures including the relation of
Punjab and Others landlord and tenant ...... " The provisions of the Act
set out above, deal with the landlord's rights in land
Sinha J.
in relation to his tenant, so as to modify the landlord's
rights in land, and correspondingly, to expand the
tenant's rights therein. Ea.ch_ of the expressions
"rights in or over land " and "lallet-tenures ", is comprehensive enough to take in measures of reforms of
land tenures, limiting the extent of land in cultivating
possession of the land-owner, and thus, releasing larger
areas of land to·be made available for cultivation by
tenants.
Counsel for some of the petitioners who challenged
the legislative competence of the State Legislature,
were hard put to it to enunciate any easily appreciable grounds of attack against Entry 18 in List II of
the Seventh Schedule. It was baldly argued that
Entry 18 aforesaid, was not intended to authorize
legislation which had the effect of limiting the area of
land which could be directly held by a proprietor or a
land-owner. It is difficult to see why the amplitude
of the words "rights in or over land " should be cut
down in the way suggested in this argument. A similar
argument was advanced in the case of The United
Provinces v. M st. Atiqa Begum (' ). In that case, the
United Provinces Regularization of Remissions Act,
1938 (U. P. XIV of 1938), was challenged. One of the
main provisions of that Act had validated remission of
rent. It had been argued thatthe United Provinces
Legislature was not competent to legislate a.bout the
remission of rent, when the relevant words in Entry
21, relating to land in the Provincial List of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935, were
"collection of rents". Entry 21 relating to" land"
had added certain words by way of explanation and
illustration of the intention of the Constitution-makers,
so as to indicate that the word " land " was meant to
be used in its widest connotation. A member of the
z958
(1) [1940] F.C.R. no.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in his )udgz958
ment which was the subject-matter of the appeal to
the Federal Court, had come to the conclusion ·that
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Item No. 21 aforesaid, including the words" collection The :i~,. of
of rents", had not authorized the Provincial Legisla- Punjab and Others
ture to validate remission of rent. That conclusion
Sinha J.
was not upheld by the Federal Court which held ·that
remission of rent was a matter covered by Item. No.
21, and. it was, therefore, within the competence o:ll' the
Provincial Legislature to enact the impugned Act; ,and
Gwyer, C. J., in the course of his judgment obse11ved
that the Items in the several lists of the Seventh
Schedule, should not be read in a narrow or restricted
sense, and that each general word should be hel4 to
extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which
could fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.
The same Item 21 in List II (Provincial List) of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 19~5,
came up for consideration before the Judicial Comm it tee of the Privy Council on appeal from the Federal Court of India in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhi (1),
affirming the judgment of the Lahore High Court. In
that case, the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands
Act (Punj. IV of 1938) had been challenged as ultra
vires. By that Act, the Legislature had provided for
redemption of mortgages on terms much less onerous
than the terms of the mortgage-deeds. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy CouncJI
repelled the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the words of Item No. 21, were not wide
enough to comprehend the relationship of mortgagol!
and mortgagee in respect of agricultural land. Their
Lordships observed that. Item 21 aforesaid, forming llo
part, as it did, of the Constitution, should, on ordinary
principles, receive the widest construction, unless, for
some reasons, it is cut down either by the terms of
that item itself, or by other parts of the Constitution~
which have, naturally, to be read as a whole; and.
then proceeded to make the following very significant•
·
observations :(1) (1946) L.R. 74 I.A. 12.
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
8
"As to item 21, "land", the governing word, is
followed by the rest of the item, which goes on to say,
v.
'that is to say '. These· words introduce the most
The State of
general concept-• rights in or over land '. ' Rights
Punjab ••d Others in land' must include general rights like full ownership or leasehold or all such rights. ' Rights over
Sinha J.
land' would include easements ·or other collateral
rights, whatever form they might take. Then follow
words which a.re nqt words of limitation but of explanation or illustration, giving instances which may furnish a clue for particular matters: thus there a.re the
words 'relation of landlord and tenant, and collection '
of rents".
Thus, their Lordships concluded that the Item 21
relating to land, would include mortgages as an incidental and ancillary subject.
Another branch of the same argument was that
Entry 18 could not cover the determination of the
relation of landlord and tenant, which is envisaged by
some of the provisions of the Act, particularly s. 18,
which has the effect of converting the tenant into a
land-owner himself, by virtue of the purchase. This
argument is also disposed of by the judgment of the
Federal Court in United ProviMe& v. Atiqa Begum(').
It was next C()ntended that Entry 18 has got to be
read with Art. 19(5), in order to determine the legislative competence in enacting the impugned statute. In
other words, it was contended that cl. (5) of Art. 19 of
the Constitution, is in the nature of a proviso to the.
Entry ; and that the Entry so read a.long with
Art. 19(5), lays down the test of the legislative competenoo. This argument is easily disposed of with reference to the provisions of Art. 31-A of the Constitution.
If it is held that the provisions of the impugned
statute lay down the law for the modification of rights
in estates, as defined in sub-Art. (2) of Art. 31A, none
of the grounds of attack founded on any of the provisions of Arts. 14, 19 or 31, can ave.ii the petitioners.
As will presently appear, the Act lays down provisions
which are in the nature of modifications of rights in
estates within the meaning of Art. 31A(l). That being
'95
Atm• Ram
(1) (1940) F.C.R. no.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
' 757
so, Art. 19(5) is wholly out of the way in this case. In
I95 8
view of all these considerations, it must be held that
Atma Ram
there is no legal foundation for the contention that the
v.
impugned Act is beyond the legislative competenpe of The state of
the State Legislature.
Punjab and Others
Having dealt with the question of legislative ~ompetence, we have to deal with the several contentions
Sinha J.
raised on behalf of the petitioners, with referen~e to
the provisions of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. On this part of the case, it has rightly peen
conceded on behalf of the petitioners that if the impugned Act comes within the purview of any o{ the
clauses of Art. 31A, the law will be immune £rom
attack on any of the grounds based on the provisions
of Arts. 14, 19 and 31. But it has been argued that
the provisions of Art. 31A(l)(a), which are admitt¢dly
the only portions of the Article, which are relevant to
the present inquiry, are not attracted to the impugned
Act. It has been conceded on behalf of the respondents that the Act does not provide for the acquisition
by the State of any estate or of any rights in any
estate. Hence, the crucial words which must goviern
this part of the controversy, are the words "the extinguishment or modification of any such rights "; that
is to say, we have to determine whether or not the
impugned. Act provides for the extinguishment' or
modification of any rights in "estates". Art. 3IA(2)
defines what the expression" estate" used in Art. :HA
means. According to that definition, " the expression
"estate" shall, in relation to any local area, have ~he
same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in
force in that area, and shall also include any jaqir,
inam or Muaji or other similar grant and in the Sta.tes
of Madras and Kera.la, any janmam right". It is
common ground that we have to turn. to the definition
of an estate, as contained in the Punjab Land-Revenue Act XVII of 1887. Section 3(1) of that Act has
the following definition :" (1) "estate" means any area(a) for which a separate record-of-rights has been
made; or
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I959] Supp..
(b) which has been separately assessed to land
revenue,
or would have been so assessed if the land
Atma Ram
v.
revenue had not been released, compounded for or
• The Stat• of
redeemed ; or
Punjab and Others
(c) which the (State) Government may, by genera.I rule or special order, declare to be an estate".
Sinha].
Clause (c) of the definition is out of the way, because
it has not been claimed that the State Government
bas made any declaration within the meaning of that
clause. Estate, therefore, for the purposes of the present controversy, means any area for which a. separate
record-of-rights has been made, or which has been
separately assessed to land revenue (omitting the unnecessary words). In this connection, it is also necessary to refer to the definition of a holding in s. S(S) in
the following terms :" (S) " holding " means a. share or portion of an
estate held by one landowner or jointly by two or
more landowners ".
It was not controverted at the Bar that in Punjab,
there a.re very few estates as defined ins. S(l), quoted
above, in the sense that one single land-owner is seized
and possessed of an entire estate which is equated
with a whole village. In other words, in Punjab, an
estate and a village a.re inter-changeable terms, and
almost all villages are owned in pa.reels, as holdings
by co-sharers, most lik,ely, descendants of the holder
of a whole village which ca.me to be divided .amongst
the co-sharers, as a. result of devolution of interest,
The parties were also agreed that the impugned Act
deals with holdings, as defined in the Land-Revenue
Act, or shares or portions thereof. The argument on
behalf of the petitioners to get over the provisions of
Art. SIA, is that the Act does not deal with any estate
or any rights therein, but only with holdings or shares
or portions thereof. . This argument proceeds on the
assumption that holdings are not any rights in an
estate. If the petitioners a.re right in their contention
that the immunity granted by Art. SIA of the Gonstitu\ion, is a va.ilable oply ·in respeot of entire estates
and not portions of estates, then the argument on
behalf of the respondents that ·the Act is saved by the
(1) S.C.R. SUPREM.E COURT REPORTS
' 759
provisions of that Article fails in Zimine. If, bn the
I95B
other hand, it is held that Art. 31A applies not only Atma Ram
to entire estates or any rights therein, but a.lso to
v.
shares or portions of an estate or rights therein, then The state of
all the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitio- Punjab and Others
ners, founded on the provisions of Arts 14, 19 and 31,
.- .
are thrown overboard. Therefore, it becomes necesSinha J.
sary to consider the amplitude of the expression " any
estate or of any rights therein" in Art. 31.A.(l)(a).
Rights in an estate may be either quantitati,ve or
qualitative. That is to say, rights in an ~state
may be held by persons having different qualities of
rights in lands constituting an estate, as a result of
sub-infeudation. Generally speaking and omitting
all references to different kinds of land tenures
prevailing in different parts of India, it may be said
that at the apex of the pyramid, stands the State.
Under the State, a large number of persons variously
called proprietors, zamindars, malguzars, inamdarn and
jagirdars, etc., hold parcels of land, subject to the payment ofland revenue designated as peshkash, quit-rent
or malguzari, etc., representing the Government
demands by way of land-tax out of the usufruct of the
land constituting an estate, except where Gover:Qment
demands had been excused in whole or in pa.rt by way
of reward for service rendered to the State in the pa.st,
or to be rendered in the future. An estate, thus, is an
area of land which is a unit of revenue assessment,
and which is separately entered in the. Land Re~enue
Collector's register of revenue-paying or revenue-free
estates. A single estate, unless governed by the 'Rule
of Primogeniture, would, in course of time, be held by
a number of persons in the same rights ll>S co-sharers
in the estate. Those several co-sharers are all jointly
an~ severally liable for the payment of the Government demands, if any, though, by an arrangement
with the Revenue Department, they may have bad a
distribution made of the total Government demands
as payable in respect of aliquot portions of the e~tate.
Generally speaking, in the first instance, each sharer
in an estate is liable to pay his portion of the landrevenue, but if, for any reasons, the Government
760
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp .
demands cannot be realized from any defaulting share
primarily liable for them, the entire estate, including
Atma Ram
the shares of those who may not be the defaulting
The s:~,. of
proprietors, is liable to be sold or otherwise dealt with
Punjab and 0111.,, for the realization of those demands.
Thus, the unity
of assessment of land revenue in respect of the entire
· Sinha J.
estate remains intact. In actual practice, the holder
of each specified portion or share of an estate, holds
his portion for his own exclusive use and occupation.
Such a sharer in an estate in Punjab is known as the
land-owner of a ".holding". But such a holding still
continues to be a portion or a share of the estate out
of which it has been carved. Such a division of an
estate is quantitative or a vertical division of an
estate. But there may also be a horizontal or qualitative division of the lands in an estate, effected by the
process of sub-infeudation. Continuing the illustration of the pyramid, generally speaking, the lands in
an estate may in their entirety or in portions, be let
out to what, in Eastern India, a.re known as tenureholders, for example, patnidars, in areas covered by
the Permanent Settlement. Tenure-holders were persons who took lands of an estate not necessarily for
the purpose of self-cultivation, but also for settling
tenants on the land, and realizing rents· from them.
These patnidars may have darpatnidars under them,
and darpatnidars, sepatnidars, and in this way, the
sub-infeudation went on. All these classes are included
within the terms "tenure-holders"," sub-proprietors"
or " under-proprietors ". The persons who are inducted
on to the land for bringing it under their direct cultivation, are generally known in Eastern India as
raiyats with i:ights of occupancy in the land held by
them. But raiyats, in their turn, may have inducted
tenants under them in respect of the whole or a portion of their holding. The tenant holding under a
raiyat is known as an under-raiyat, and an underraiyat may induct a tenant under himself, and he will
be an under-raiyat of the second degree. Thus, in
each grade of holders of land, in the process of subinfeudation described above, the holder is a tenant
under his superior holder, the landlord, and also the
. z95a
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
' 761
landlord of the holder directly holding under him.
x95a
Thus, in Eastern India, the interest of intermediaries Atma Ram
between the proprietor of an " estate " at the top and
v.
the actual tiller of the soil at the bottom, is kno"fn as The State of
that of a "tenure-holder", and the interest of tenants Punjab and Others
other than tenure-holders, is given the generic name
Sinha],
of a. " holding ". A holding in Ea.stern · India., thus,
indicates the interest of the actual tiller of the soilraiyat or under-raiyat-unlike the " holding " in ;pun.
jab where, as indicated above, its signifies the interest
of the holder of a share in an estate. Thus, holdings
in Punjab are vertical djvisions of an estate; whereas
in Eastern India, they represent a horizontal division,
connoting a lesser quality of an estate in land than
the interest of a tenure-holder in his tenure, or of a
land-owner in his estate or portion of an estate. [t is
not necessarily true that there should be intermediaries in every estate or a. portion of an estate. Very
often,· the holder of an estate may be holding his
entire estate directly in his possession by way of hhudkasht, zeerat, kamath or neezjote, or it may be that the
proprietor has only raiyats under him without, the
intermediation of tenure-holders, and the raiyats may
not have any under-raiyats under them. The process
of sub-infeudation described above, naturally, varies
with the size of the estate. It appears to be common
ground in this case that in Punjab, an estate means
the whole village, whereas in Eastern India, an estate
may comprise a whole district or only a. cluster of
villages, or a single village, or even a pa.rt of a. village.
The larger the size of a.n estate, the greater the process
of sub-infeudation and vice versa. In Punjab, as there
was no permanent settlement of Revenue as in Bengal,
Bihar, Orissa and other parts of Eastern India~ the
unit of revenue assessment has been the village. T,hus,
a holding in Punjab means a portion of a. village either
big or small. That portion may be in the direct possession of the land-owner himself, or he may have
inducted tenants on a portion or the whole of his
holding. The interest of the tenant in Punjab, app~ars
to have been a precarious tenure, even _more precarious than that of an under raiyat in Eastern India.. The
96
762
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Punjab Legislature, realising that the interest of a
tenant was much too precarious for him to invest his
Atma Ram
available la.hour and capita.I to the fullest extent so a.s
Tl,. ;,~ 1, of
to raise the maximum quality and quantity of money
Punjab and Others crops or other crops, naturally, in the interest of the
community a.s a. whole, and in implementation of the
Sinha J.
Directive Principles of State Policy, thought of granting longer tenures, and as we have seen a.hove, the
period has been progr~ssively increased until we arrive
a.t the stage of the legislation now impugned, which
proposes to create a large body of small land-owners
who have a comparatively larger stake in the land,
and consequently, have greater impetus to invest their
Ia.hour and capital with a. view to raising the maximum usufruct out of the land in their possession.
Keeping in view the background of the summary of
land tenures in Punjab and elsewhere, we have to
construe the amplitude of the crucial words "any
estate or of any rights therein" in Art. 3IA (I) (a).
Soon after the coming into effect of the Constitution,
the different States in India embarked upon a scheme
of legislatiOn for reforming the system ofland-holding,
so a.s (l) to eliminate the intermediaries, that is to say,
those who hold interest in land in between the State
a.t the apex and the actual tillers of the soil-in other
words, to abolish the class of rent-receivers, and (2) to
create a large body of small land-holders who have a
permanent stake in the land, and who are, therefore,
interested in ma.king the best use of it. As the connotation of the term "estate" was different in different
parts of the country, the expression " estate " described in cl. (2) of Art. 31A, has been so broadly defined as
to cover a.II estates in the country, · and to cover all
possible kinds of rights in estates, a.s shown by sub-cl.
(b) of cl. (2) of Art. 31A, which is in these terms:." (b) the expression "rights'', in relation to estate,
shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, subproprietor, under proprietor, tenure-holder (raiyat,
under-raiyat) or other intermediary and any rights or
privileges in respect of land revenue."
The expression " rights " in relation to an estate has
been given an all inclusive meaning, comprising both
r9JI
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
763
what we ha.ve ca.lled, for the sa.ke of brevity, the
" horizonta.l" a.nd " vertical " divisions of a.n esta.te. A Atma Ran1
proprietor in a.n estate ma.y be the proprietor holding
v.
the entire interest in a. single estate, or only a. co-$ha.rer P T~ab SI«~
proprietor. The provisions a.foresa.id of Art.I 31A, unJa _:.. 1
bearing on the construction of the expression " estate "
Sida J.
or "rights " in a.n estate, have been deliberately ma.de
a.a wide a.s they could be, in order to ta.ke in all kinds
of rights-quantitative a.nd qualitative-in a.n area
co-extensive with an esta.te or only a portion thereof.
But it has been suggested that the several interests
indicated in sub-cl. (b), quoted a.hove, have been used
with reference to the area. of a.n entire esta.te, but
knowing as we do, tha.t a raiyat's or a.n under-raiyat's
holding genera.Hy is not co-extensive with the a~ea. of
a.n entire estate but only small portions thereof, it
would, in our opinion, be unreasonable to hold that the
makers of9 the Constitution were using the expression
"estate " or "rights" in a.n estate, in such a. restdcted
sense. Keeping in view the fa.ct that Art. 31A w~s enacted by two successive amendments-one in 1951 (First
Amendment), and the second in 1955 (Fourth Amendment)-with retrospective effect, in order to save legislation effecting agrarian reforms, we ha. ve every rea.son
ti' hold tha.t those expressions have been used i~ their
widest amplitude, consistent with the purpose ijehind
those a.mendments. A piece of validating enactment
purposely introduced into the Constitution with a view
to saving that kind of legislation from attacks on the
ground of constitutional invalidity, based on Ar~s. 14,
19 and 31, should not be construed in a. narrow 'sense.
On the other ha.nd, such a. constitutional enactment
should be given its fullest and widest effect,' ponsistently with the purpose behind the enactment,! .provided,
however, that such a construction does ntit' ii:ivolve
any violence to the language actually used.
·
Another branch of the same argument was that if
the makers of the Constitution inteaded to include
within the purview of Art. 31A, not only entire estates
but also portions thereof, nothing would have been
easier than to sa.y so in terms, and that in the absence
of any specific mention of "portions of a.n estate",
o"tr
•
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
we should not read that article as covering " portions
of an estate " also. In our opinion, there· is no subAtma Ram
stance in t h'is contention, b~cause t hey must be attri-'
The ;;at• of
buted full knowledge of. the legal maxim that "the
Punjab and othm greater contains the less "--Omne M ajUB continet in ae
minUB. In this connection, our attention was invited
Sinha J.
to the decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab High
Court in the case of State of Punjab v. S. Kehar
Singh ('), to the effect that a holding being a part of
an estate, was not within the purview of A·rt. 31A of
the Constitution. In this connection, it is necessary
to state the conflict of views in that High Court itself.
In the case of Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State of Punjab (0), the validity of the very Act impugned before
us, was challenged on grounds based upon Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The learned
Judges constituting the Full Bench, unanimously held
that the impugned Act did not infringe th11se provisions of the Constitution, and the restrictions on the
right of land-holding, imposed by the Act, were
reasonable, and that the classification did not exceed
the permissible limit. But they also held that the Act
was saved by Art. 3IA of the Constitution, which
a. pplied equally to a.n entire estate or to a. portion
thereof. Besides giving other reasons, which may not
bear close scrutiny, they ma.de specific reference to the
doctrine that the whole includes the part. Thus, the
Full Bench specifically held that Art .. 31A of the Constitution applied equally to portions of estates also.
This decision of the Full Bench was followed by a.
Division Bench of the same High Court, consisting
of Bhandari, C. J., and Dulat, J., in the case of
Hukam Singh v. The State of Punjab (3). That Bench
was concerned with the provisions of another ActPunja.b Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954.
In that case, the Division Bench, naturally, followed
the decision of the Full Bench in so far as it had ruled
that the 'whole' includes the part, and that where an
Act provides for rights in an estate, it provides for
rights in a pa.rt of an estate also. The later l!'ull
1958
(1) (1958) 6o P.L.R· 461.
(2) A.I.R. 1954 Pun. 167.
(3) (1955) 57 P.L.R. 359·
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
765
'
Bench case referred to above, was decided by three
z95a
Judges, including Bhandari, C. J ., who a.greed with the
Atma Ram
judgment of the Court delivered by Grover, J. Perv.
haps, the better course would have been to constitute The State of
a. larger Bench, when it was found that a Full . Bench Punjab and Othm
of three Judges, was inclined to take a view contrary to
Sinha ].
that of another Full Bench of equal strength. fluch a
course becomes necessary in view of the fact that
otherwise the subordinate courts a.re placed under the
embarrassment of preferring one view toa.nothet, both
equally binding upon them. In our opinion, the view
taken by the earlier Full Bench is the correct one.
The learned Chief Justice who was a party to bQth the
conflicting views on the same question, has not indicated his own reasons for changing his view. The Full
Bench has accepted the force of the legal maxim that
the greater contains the less, referred to a.bovie, but
has not, it must be said with all respect, given any
good reasons for departing from that well-esta.~lished
maxim. The judgment of the Full Bench on this part
of the case is based entirely upon the definition· of an
estate, as contained in the Punjab Land Revenu~ Act,
set out a.hove. It has not stopped to consider the
further question why a holding, which is a shalJe or a
portion of an estate, as defined in the Punjap Act,
should not partake of the characteristics of an estate.
Keeping in view the background of the legislat_j.ve
history and the objective· of the legislation, is ·there
any rational reason for holding that the rira.kers of the
Constitution thought of abolishing only intermediaries
in respect of a.n area constituting one entire estate but
not of a portion thereof? On the other hand, as. indicated above, they have used the expression "estate"
in an all-inclusive sense. They have not stopped at
that; they have also added the words "or any tights
therein". The expression "rights" in relation to an
estate again has been used in a ver-, comprehensive
sense of including not only the interests of propr~etors
or sub-proprietors but also of lower grade tenants,
like raiyats or under-raiyats, and then they added, bf
way of further emphasizing their intention, the expres- ·.
sion " other intermediary ", thus, clearly showing that
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
the enumeration of intermediaries was only illustrative
and not exhaustive. If the makers of the Constitution
v.
have, thus, shown their intention of saving a.II laws of
The State of
agrarian reform, dealing with the rights of intermediaP""J•b ""d Others ries, whatever their denomination may be, in our opiSinh• J.
nion, no good reasons have been adduced in support of
the view that portions or shares in an estate a.re not
within the sweep of the expression "or a.ny rights
therein ". A recent decision of this Court in the case
of Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay (1 ) dealt
with the constitutionality of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956, which
contains similar provisions with a view to doing a.way
with intermediaries, and establishing direct relationship between the State and tillers of the soil. In that
case also, the contention had been raised that the
expression " estate " had reference to only alienated
lands and not to unalienated lands, and this Cou.rt was
invited to limit the meaning of the expression in the
narrower sense. This Court repelled that contention
in these words :"If the definition of the expression " estate " in
the context of the Code is thus clear and unambiguous
as comprising both the types of lands, there is no
reason why a narrower construction as suggested by
the petitioners should be put upon the expression
"estate" ................. Even if there was any ambiguity
in the expression, the wider significance should be
adopted in the context of the objectives of the Act as
stated above."
These observations apply with full force to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in the present
cases also.
Another branch of ·the same argument as to why
the provisions of Art. 31A do not 'tpply to the Act, is
that the Act did not have the effect of either extinguishing or modifying any rights in any estate, assuming that the expression " estate " includes reference
also to parts of an estate. In this connection, it is
contended that the provisions of the Act impugned in
these cases, did not amount to the extinguishment of
Atman.,,.
(1) (1959) Supp. (1) S.C.R. 489.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
767
the interest of the land-owners in estates or portions
x95a
thereof, and that what the Act did was to transfer some
of the rights of the land-owners to their tenants. In
Atma Ram
this connection, reliance was pla.ced on the observa- The ;,~te of
tions of this Court in the case of Thakur Ragkubir Punjab a"d Others
Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer (1), where Mahajan, J.
(as he then was), speaking for the Court, observed that
Sinha J.
the expressions " extinguishment " and " modification " used in Art. 31A of the Constitution, meant
extinguishment or modification respectively of a. proprietary right in an estate, and should not include,
within their ambit, a mere suspension of the right of
management of an estate for a time definite or indefinite. Those observations must be strictly limited to
the facts of that case, and cannot possibly be extended
to the provisions of Acts wholly dissimilar to th_pse of
the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, XLII of
1950, which was the subject-matter of the challe~ge in
the case then before this Court. This Court held, on
a construction of the provisions of that Act, that they
only suspended the right of management but diO not
amount to any extinguishment or modification o{ any
proprietary rights in an estate. The provisions df the
Act then under consideration of this Court, have absolutely no resemblance to those of the Act now before
us, and it is impossible to put a. similar interpretation
on these provisions. In the recent decision of1 this
Court (not yet reported•), this Court bad been invited
to apply the observations of this Court referred to
above, to the provisions of the Bombay Act. ltJ was
pointed out in that case that those observatiohs of
Mahajan, J. (as he then was), must be read as limited
to an Act which only brings about a suspension of the
right of management of an estate, and could not be
extended to the provisions of an Act which either
extinguishes or modifies certain rights of a proprietor
,
in an estate or a portion thereof.
In this connection, it was further argued that extinguishment of a right, does not mean su,bstitution of
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049, 1055, 1056.
• Since reported as Sri Rant Narain Med/Ii v. The Stale of Bombay,
[1959] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 489.
768
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
•958
another person in that right, but total annihilation of
that right. In our opinion, it is not necessary to discuss
this rather metaphysical argument, because, in our
The state of
opinion, it is enough for the purpose of this case to
Punjab and Others hold that the provisions of the Act, amount to modification of the landowner's rights in the lands comprisSinha j.
ed in his "estate " or " holding ". The Act modifies
the land-owner's substantive rights, particularly, in
three respects, as indicated above, namely, (1) it modifies his right of settling his lands on any terms and to
any one he chooses ; (2) it modifies, if it does not
altogether extinguish, his right to cultivate the " surplus area " as understood under the Act ; and (3) it
modifies his right of transfer in so far as it obliges him
to sell lands not at his own price but at a price fixed
under the statute, and not to any one but to specified
persons, in accordance with the provisions of the Act,
set out above. Thus, there cannot be the least doubt
that the provisions of the Act, very substantially
modify the land-owner's rights to hold and dispose of
his property in any estate or a portion thereof. It is,
therefore, clear that the provisions of Art. 31A save
the impugned Act from any attack based on the pro-.
visions of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
That being so, it is not necessary to consider the
specific provisions of the Act, which, it was contended,
were unreasonable restrictions on the land-owner's
rights to enjoy his property, or whether he had been
unduly discriminated against, or whether the compensation, if any, provided for under the Act, was illusory
or, at any rate, inadequate. Those grounds of attack
are not available to the petitioners. In the result, all
these petitions are dismissed with costs, the State of
Punjab and its officers being entitled to only one set of
hearing fees in all the petitions.
Atma Ram
v.
Petitions dismissed.
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