BASHESHAR NATH versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI & RAJASTHAN & ANOTHER.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 November 1958 | [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 528 | 1958 INSC 102
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 November 1958
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*, S.K. DAS, J.L. KAPUR, K. SUBBA RAO
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 208/1958
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 528
- Neutral citation
- 1958 INSC 102
Text of the judgment
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
BASHESHAR NATH
ti.
November 19.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI & RAJ ASTHAN & ANOTHER.
(S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, s. K. DAS,
J. L. KAPUR a.nd K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.)
Income-tax-Evasion of taxation-Case referred tq Investigatio11
Commission-Comme11cement of the Constitution-Settlement of case
-·-Constitutional, validity of-Waiver of fundamental right, if permissible-Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act, I947
(.JO of' I947l. s. BA-Constitution of India, Art. I4, Part III.
The two questions for determination in this appeal were, (r)
whether a settlement under s. SA of the Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (30 of 1947) made after the
commencement of the Constitution was constitutionally valid and
(2) whether the waiver of a fundamental right was permissible
under the Constitution. The appellant's case was on July 22,
194S, referred by the Central Government under s. 5(r) of the
Act to the Investigation Commission for investigation and report.
The Commission directed the authorised official under s. 6 of the
Act to examine the appellant's accounts. He submitted his final
report by the end of 1953· The Commission considered the report
heard the assessee and came to the conclusion that Rs. 4,47,915
had escaped assessment. Thereupon the appellant on May 20,
r954, applied to the Commission for a settlement of his case
under s. SA of the Act, agreeing to pay Rs. 3,50,000 by way of "'
tax and penalty at the concessional rate. The Commission reported to the Central Government approving of the settlement,
the Central Government accepted it and it was recorded by the
Commission. The Central Government directed the recovery of
the said amount under s. SA(2) of the Act. The appellant was
permitted to make payments by monthly instalments of Rs. 5,000
and the total amount thus paid up to September S, 1957, aggregated to Rs. I,2S,ooo. In the meantime the Income Tax Officer
issued a certificate and certain properties of the appellant were
attached. Relying on the decisions of this Court in Suraj Mall
Mohta and Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448 and
M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, [1955]
2 S.C.R. 1247, the appellant applied to the Commissioner of
Income-tax challenging the validity of the settlement made under
s. SA of the Act on the ground that s. 5(r) of the Act on which
it was founded had been declared void by this Court, and claimed
that his properties might be released from attachment and the
amount paid under the settlement might be refunded to him. On
January 29, 195S, the Commissioner of Income Tax sent a reply
to the appellant maintaining that the settlement was valid and
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
529
that the appellant was bound thereunder to pay up the arrears
z95a
of instalments and requesting him to continue to pay in future.
Against this decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax the Bashesha, Natlt
appellant came up to the Supreme Court by special leave. It was
v.
contended on behalf of the respondent that the Act laid down The Commissioner
two distinct and separate procedures, one for investigation and of Income-ta,,,
the other for settlement and it was the former alone and not the Delhi & Rajaslhan
latter that was affected by the decisions of this Court and that
& Another
the appellant by voluntarily entering into the settlement had
waived his fundamental right founded on Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Held (Per Curiam), that both the contentions must fail.
It was not correct to say that the Taxation of Income (Investigation Commi&sion) Act, 1947, laid down two different
procedures, one for investigation and assessment under s. 8(2) of
the Act and another for settlement under s. SA of the Act and
assessment in terms of such settlement and that while the decision of this Court in M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Incometax, Madras, declaring s. 5(1) of the Act to be discriminatory and
therefore void, affected only the former procedure and not the
latter. The Act laid down but one procedure and in entertaining
a proposal for settlement as in the investigation itself the Commission exercised the same jurisdiction, and powers and followed
the one and the same procedllre as laid down by ss. 5, 6 and 7 of
the Act. Since the settlement in the instant case was no exception to that rule, it was covered by the decision and must be held
to be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
M. Ct. Muthilllt v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras,
[1955] 2 S.C.R. 12'47• applied.
The observations made in the majority judgment of this
Court in Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad, [1953]
S.C.R. 589, must be kept strictly confined to the special facts of
that case and had no application to the facts of the present case.
Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad, [1953] S.C.R.
589, held inapplicable.
Per Das, C. J., and Kapur, }.-There could be no waiver of
the fundamental right founded on Art. 14 of the Constitution, and
it was not correct to contend that the appellant had by entering
into the settlement under s. SA of the Act, waived his fundamental right under that Article. Article 14 was founded on a
sound public policy recognised and valued all over the civilised
world, its language was the language of command and it imposed
an obligation on the State of which no person could, by his act or
conduct, relieve it. As it was not strictly necessary for the disposal of this case, the question whether any other fundamental
right could be waived need not be considered in this connection.
Laxamanappa Hanumantappa Jamkhandi v. The Union of
llldia, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 769; Dewan Bahadur Seth Gopal Das Mohta
6'/
530
SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [1959] Supp.
v. The Union of India, [1955] l S.C.R.:773; Baburao Narayanrao
Sanas v. The Union of India, [1954] 26 l.T.R. 725; Subedar v.
Basheshar Nath State, A.LR. 1957 All. 396 and Pakhar Singh v. The State, A.LR.
v.
1958 Punj. 294, distinguished and held inapplicable.
The Commissioner
p er B hagwab. and Subba Rao, JJ .-There could be no waiver
.
t
1
1
D ~h· J;,'°;'~- at~ not only of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 but i'lso
' ~ A
an of any other fundamental right guaranteed by Part III ofthe
0
"
"
Constitution. The Constitution made no distinction between
fundamental rights enacted for the benefit of the individual and
those enacted in the public interest or on grounds of the public
policy. There could, therefore, be no justification ,for importing
American notions or authority of decided cases to whittle down
the transcendental character of those rights, conceived in public
interest and subject only to such limitations as the Constitution
had itself thought fit to impose.
Article 13(2) was in terms a constitutional mandate to the
State in respect of all the fundamental rights enacted in Part III
of the Constitution and no citizen could by waiver of any one of
them relieve the State of the solemn obligation that lay on it.
The view expressed by Mahajan, C. J., in Behram Khurshed
Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay, [1955] l S.C.R. 613, correctly
laid down the law on the point. Since the arguments in the
instant case had covered the entire field of fundamental rights,
there was no reason why the answer should be confined to Art. 14
alone.
Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay, [1955] l
S.C.R. 613; State of Travancore-Cochin v. The Bombay Co., Ltd.,
[1954] S.C.R. n12 and The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, [1957] S.C.R. 874, referred to.
.
Per S. K. Das, J.-It seems clear that Art. 13 itself recognises the distinction between absence of legislative power
which will make the law made by an incompetent legislature
wholly void, and exercise of legislative power in contravention of
a restriction or check on such power, which will make the law
void to the extent of the inconsistency or contravention; therefore the mere use of the word " void " in Art. 13 does not necessarily militate against the application of the doctrine of waiver
in respect of the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution.
Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay, [1955] l
S.C.R. 613, considered.
Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,
[1955] 2 S.C.R. 589; M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of
Income-tax, Madras, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247 and The State >f Bombay
v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, [1957] S.C.R. 874, referred to.
There was nothing in the two preambles to the Indian and
the American Constitutions that could make the doctrine of waiver
applicable to the one and not to the other ; since the doctrine
z958
;i"'
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
531
applied to the constitutional rights under the American Constituz958
tion, there is no reason why it should not apply to the fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution.
Basheshar Nath
Case-law considered.
v.
.
.
The Commissioner
But 1t must be made clear that there 1s no absolute rule, or
1 1;c~m~-ta~
one formulated in the abstract, as to the applicability of that D ~,..
doctrine to fundamental rights and such applicability must de- e ~ A ~~ast a"
pend on (I) the nature of fundamental right to which it is sought
no er
to be applied and (2) the foundation on the basis of which the plea
is raised. The true test must be whether the fundamental right
is one primarily meant for the benefit of individuals or for the
benefit of the general public.
Where, ~herefore, the Constitution vested the right in the
individual, primarily intending to benefit him and such right did
not impinge on the rights of others, there could be a waiver of
such right provided it was not forbidden by law or did not contravene public policy or public morals.
As in the instant case the respondents who had raised the
plea, had failed to prove the necessary facts on which it could be
sustained, the plea of waiver must fail.
Per Subba Rao, ].-Apart from the question as to whether
there could be a waiver in respect of a fundamental right, s. 5(1)
of the Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act, r947,
having been declared void by this Court in M. Ct. Muthiah v. The
Commissio11a of focome-tax, Madras, as being violative of the
fundamental right founded on Art. I4 of the Constitution and
such decision being binding on all courts in India, the Commissioner of Income-tax had no jurisdiction to continue the proceedings against the appellant under that Act and the appellant could
not by a waiver of his right confer jurisdiction on him.
No distinction could be made under Art. r3(1) of the Constitution between the constitutional incompetency of a legislature
and constitutional limitation placed on its power of legislation,
for a statute declared void on either ground would continue to be
so, so long as the inconsistency continued. As the inconsistency
of s. 5(1) of the Act with Art. 14 continued, it must continue to
be void.
Keshav111; Madhava Mc11on v. The State of Bombay, [1951]
S.C.R. 228; Bchram Khurshed Pcsikaka v. Stlltc of Bombay, [1955]
1 S.C.R. 613 and Bhikaji Narai11 Dhakras v. Stllte of Madhya
Pradesh, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
208of1958.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated
January 29, 1958, of the Commissioner of Income-tax,
Delhi & Rajasthan at New Delhi, under s. 8A(2) of the
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act,
1947.
Basheshar Nath
v.
Harnam Singh and Sadhu Singh for the appellant.
The Commissioner
·
K
of Income-tax,
M. G. Seta.lv.ad, Attorney-Gener<!f. for India, G. .
Delhi & Rajasthan Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. Sen and R.H.
& Another
Dhebar for the respondents.
A. G. Mitra and B. P. Maheshwari, for the interveners.
1958. November 19. The Judgment of Das, C.J.,
and Kapur, J., was delivered by Das, 0. J. Bhagwati,
S. K. Das and Subba Rao, JJ., delivered separate judgments.
Das c. J.
DAS, C. J.-This appeal by special ]eave filed by
one Shri Besheshar Nath hereinafter referred to as
" the assessee " calls in question the validity of a
settlement made under s. SA of the Taxation on Income
(Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (30 of 1947),
hereinafter referred to as " the Investigation Act ".
This Act, which came into force on May 1, 1947, by a
notification issued by the Central Government under
s. (1) (3) thereof, has had a short 1,rnt chequered career,
as will appear from the facts hereinafter stated.
In order to appreciate the several questions canvassed before us it is necessary to refer to the provisions
of the impugned Act. Section 3 authorised the Central
Government to constitute an Income Tax Investigation Commission (hereinafter called the Commission)
and imposed on it the following duties :"(a) to investigate and report to the Central
Government on all matters relating to taxation on
income, with particular reference to the extent to
which the existing law relating to, and procedure for,
the assessment and collection of such taxation is adequate to prevent the evasion thereof;
(b) to investigate in accordance with the provisions of this Act any case or points in a case referred
to it under section 5 and make a report thereon (including such interim reports as the Commission may
think fit) to the Central Government in respect of all
or any of the assessments made in relation to the case
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
533
before the date of its report or interim report, as the
z95B
case may be."
Basheshar Nath
We may skip overs. 4 which dealt with the composiv.
tion of the Commission. Section 5, which is of import- The Commissioner
ance was as follows:of. Income.-tax,
Delhi & Ra;asthan
"5. (1) The Central Government may"at any time 6- Another
before the 30th day of June, 1948, refer to the Commission for investigation and report any case or points in
Das C.J.
a case in which the Central Government has prima
facie reasons for believing that a person has to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income,
together with such material as may be available in
support of such belief, and may at any time before the
30th day of June, 1948, apply to the Commission for
the withdrawal of any case. or points in a case thus
referred, and if the Commission approves of the withdrawal, no further proceedings shall thereafter be
taken by or before the Commission in respect of the
case or points so withdrawn.
(2) The Commission may, after examining the
material submitted by the Central Government with
reference to any case or points in a case and making
such investigation as it considers necessary, report to
the Central Government that in its opinion further
investigation is not likely to reveal any substantial
evasion of taxation on income and on such report
being ma.de the investigation shall be deemed to be
closed.
(3) No reference made by the Central Government
under sub-section (1), at any time before the 30th day
of June, 1948, shall be called in question, nor shall the
sufficiency of the material on which such a reference
has been ma.de be investigated in any manner hy a.riy
Court.
(4) If in the course of investigation into any case
or points in a case referred to it under sub-section (1),
the Commission has reason to believe(a.) that some person other than the person whose
case is being investigated has evaded payment of
taxation on income, or
(b) that some points other than those referred to
534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
it by the Central Government in respect of any case
also
require investigation,
Basheshar Nalh
v.
it may make a report to the Central Government
The Commissioner stating its reasons for such belief and, on receipt of
0
!. Incom'.·tax. such report, the Central Government shall, notwithDelh~ ~::,i:;•h•• st~nding anything cont~in.ed in s~b-sec~ion. (1), forthwith refer to the Comm1ss10n for mvcst1gat10n the case
Das c .J.
of such other person or such additional points as may
be indicated in that report."
The date " 30th day of June, 1948 " appearing in
sub-ss. (1) and (3) was, by Act 49 of 1948, substituted
by the words " 1st day of September, 1948 ". Section 6
set out the various powers conferred on the Commission and s. 7 prescribed the procedure of the Commission. It is not rtece~sary to set out the various
powers and the details of the procedure in extenso and
it will suffice to say that they have been considered by
this Court and pronounced to be much more drastic
and harsh than the powers to be exercised and the
procedure to be followed by the income tax authorities
acting under the provisions of the Indian Income Tax
Act, 1922. The relevant portions of s. 8 ran as
follows:" 8. ( l) Save as otherwise provided in this Act,
the materials brought on record shall be considered by
all the three members of the Commission sitting
together and the report of the Commission shall be in
accordance with the opinion of the majority.
(2) After considering the report, the Central
Government shall by order in writing direct that such
proceedings as it thinks fit under the Indian Income
Tax Act, 1922, the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, or
any other law, shall be taken against the person to
whose case the report relates in respect of the income
of any period commencing after the 31st day of
December, 1938; and, upon such a direction being
given, such proceedings may be taken and completed
under the appropriate law notwithstanding the restrictions contained in section 34 of the Indian Income
Tax Act, 1922, or section 15 of the Excess Profits Tax
Act, 1940, or any other law and notwithstanding any
lapse of time or any decision to a different effect given
z95B
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
535
in the case by any Income tax authority or Income
Tax Appellate Tribunal.
(3)
• • • •• •• • • •• • • • •• •• • •• • • •• • •• • ••• • • •• • • •• • •• •• •• •• • •• • • •• • •• •
0
Basheshar Nath
v.
The Commission1;
(4} I;~ .~ii. ~~~~~·~~~~t· ~; •;~·-·~~~~~~~~~t P~~~~~di~g~ v:~i 1;'o;;.;::e~an
taken in pursuance of a direction under sub-section
(2), the findings recorded by the Commission on the
case or on the points referred to it shall, subject to the
provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6), be final; but no
proceedings taken in pursuance of such direction shall
be a bar to the initiation of proceedings under section
34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.
(5)
..•.••••..••.•.•••.••.••....•...•..••.••••••.•••••.•••••.•••.
.................................................... .........
(6) .............................................................
............................................................ .
(7) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in this Act or in any other law, for the time
being in force, any evidence in the case admitted
before the Commission or an authorised official shall
be admissible in evidence in any proceedings directed
to be taken under sub-section (2).
(8) .............................................................
............................... ................ ...............
Section 9 barred the jurisdiction of Courts to call in
question any a.ct or proceeding of the Commission or
any authorised official appointed under s. 6. Section 10
gave power to the Central Government to make ·rules
by notification in the official gazette.
On July 22, 1948, the case of the assessee was referred to the Commission in the following terms :" Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division}
New Delhi, the 22nd July, 1948.
Under section 5 (1) of the Taxation on Income
(Investigation Commission} Act, 1947, the cases of the
following persons are hereby referred to the Investigation Commission for investigation and report, as the
Central Government has prima facie reasons for
believing that each such person has either alone or in
combination with the other persons mentioned below,
evaded payment of taxation on income to a. substan~ial
& Another
Das C.].
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
extent. The material available in support of such
belief accompanies.
Basheshar Nath
v.
No.
Na.me
The Commissione' - - - - - - - · - - - - - of Income-tax,
EP. 829/1
Beshasha.r Na.th and Co.
Delhi & Rajasthan
829/2
Lala. Besha.sha.r Na.th.
& Another
Sd./-Pya.re La.I,
Deputy Secretary,
Das C.J.
Ministry of Finance
(Revenue Division).
The Secretary, Income-tax,
Investigation Commission,
New Delhi."
It is not necessary to set out the a.nnexures that
accompanied this order. It appears that the total
wealth statement of the a.ssessee was filed on N ovember 10, 1948, and was forwarded to the authorised
official. It also appears that from January 8, 1949, to
October 14, 1949, the authorised official was engaged in
the collection of assessment records of the assessee
from the territorial income tax offices and of materials
from the Civil Supplies Directorate regarding the
assessee. In the meantime by s. 33 of Act 67 of 1949
the following section was inserted in the Act as
s. SA:.
"SA. Settlenient i;f cases under investigation:(1) Where any person concerned in any case
referred to or pending before the Commission for
investigation applies to the Commission at any time
during such investigation to have the case or any part
thereof settled in so far as it relates to him, the Commission shall, if it is of opinion that the terms of the
settlement contained iii. the application may be
approved, refer the matter to the Central Government,
and if the Central Government accepts the terms of
such settlement, the Commission shall have the terms
thereof recorded and thereupon the investigation, in so
far as it relates to n:iatters covered by such settlement,
shall be deemed to be closed.
(2) For the purpose of enforcing the terms of any
settlement li'orrived at in pursuance of sub-section (1),
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
the Central Government may direct that such pro:c95B
ceedings as may be appropriate under the Indian Bash•;har Nath
Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), the Excess Profits
v.
Tax Act, 1940 (XV of 1940), or any other law may be The Commis;ioner
taken against the person to whom the settlement_ of lllcome-ta:r,
relates, and in particular the provisions of the second Delhi & Rajastlum
proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (5) of section 23,
&- Another
section 24B, the proviso to sub-section 2 of section
Das c.1.
25A, the proviso to sub-section 2 of section 26 and
sections 44 and 46 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
shall be applicable to the recovery of any sum specified in such settlement by the Income 'fax Officer
having jurisdiction to assess the person by whom such
sum is payable as if it were income-tax or an arrear of
income-tax within the meaning of those provisions.
(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (6) of
section 8, any settlement arrived at under this section
shall be conclusive as to the matters stated therein,
and no person whose case has been so settled be entitled
to re-open in any proceeding for the recovery of any
sum under this section or in any subsequent assessment or reassessment proceeding relating to taxation
on income or in any other proceeding before any Court
or other authority any matter which forms part of
such settlement.
(4) Where a settlement has been accepted by
Government under sub-section (1), no proceedings
under section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
{XI of 1922), or under section 15 of the Excess Profits
Tax Act, 1940 (XV of 1940), shall be initiated in respect of the items of income covered by the settlement,
unless the initiation of such proceedings is expressly
allowed by the terms of the settlement."
On July 5, 1949, the total wealth statement was
received back from the authorised official. Our Constitution ca.me into force on January 26, 1950. The
order-sheet shows that the authorised official on May
26, 1950, issued a notice to the assessee fixing the
hearing for June 10, 1950, which indicates that the
authorised official was proceeding with the investigation set in motion by the reference of the assessee's
68
538
SUPREME COURT H,EPORTS (1959] Supp.
case to the Commission. The assessee a·ppears to
have attended on June 6, 1950, with an application
Bashesha1' Nath
v.
for extension oftimc which apparently was given. On
ne commission" September 30, 1950, the assesseo Hupplicd certain state•/ Income-tax, ments of his firm. Tho entry in the order-sheet
Ddhi & Rajasthan again8t the date October 31, 1950, shows that the
"-' AMther
assessee asked for further extension of time. There
appears
to be a hiatus of
Dase.].
I J about 3 years and evident!.}
nothing was done unti une 9, 1953, when the authorised official fixed the hearing of the case on June 15,
1953. The authorised official ·submitted his interim
report to the Commission on June 9, 1953. The
assessee was examined on October 9, 10 and 13, 1953,
and the authorised official submitted his final report
on October 19, 1953. On January 30, l954, notice
was issued to the assessee to appear before the Commission on February 15, 1954: Presumably to get
ready for the hearing the assessee, on February 5,
1954, asked for inspection of certain assessment orders
concerning his case, for the return of his lease deed
filed by him and a copy of the statement of one
L. Kalidas and for production of certain documents
before the Commission. The hearing, which had been
fixed for February 15, 1954, was adjourned till March4,
1954. Witness Kalidas was examined on March 4,
1954. On March 29, 1954, the assessee asked for a
copy of the deposition given by the witness Durgadas
before the Commission. After the evidence was closed
notice was issued to the assessee on May l, 1954,
asking him to appear before the Commission on May 19,
1954. On that date the assessee attended, argu.
ments were heard and orders were reserved. Learned
counsel for the assessee states that at the close of the
arguments on May 19, 1954, the Commission announced its view that the income; profits and gains that had
escaped assessment in the hands of the assessee for
the period beginning with April I, 1939, a~d ending
March 31, 1947, were .the sum of Rs. 4,47,915, that the
Commission also threw a hint that should the assessee
accept the said finding he would be granted the bene.
fit of a settlement on the lower concessional basis of
pa.yrncnt of 75% and a small penalty of Rs. 14,064
1 958
/
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-539
and that in the ciroumstances the assessee had no
I95B
other alternative than to make the best of the bad 3'ob Basheshar Nath
by proposing a settlement under s. SA offering to pay
v.
Rs. 3,50,000 by way of ta! and penalty. This sequ- ne Commi;sionc1·
ence of events is amply borne out by paragraphs 3 of Income-lax,
and 4 of the settlement application filed by the asses'>ce Delhi & Rafastli'"'
on May 20, 1954, a copy of which has been produced
"" Another
before
us
by
the
ref!pondents
..
The
Commission
on
Ir
Das C. ].
Jhay 24, 1954, made a report under s. SA (1) to the
Central Government that it was of opinion that the
terms of settlement contained in the application might
be approved. The Central Government having accepted the proposed settlement, the Commission ha.d the
terms thereof recorded. The Central Government by
its Order C No. 74 (9-IT) 54 made on ,July 5, 1954,
under s. SA (2) of the Investigation Act directed that
demand notice in accordance with the said terms k
served immediately by the Income Tax Officer and
that all s11ch other proceedings under the Indian
Income Tax Act or other law aa may be necessary be
taken with a view to enforce the payment of the
demand and that the entire sum of Rs. 3,50,000 be
demanded in one sum. It appears, however, that the
assessee was allowed to make payments by instalments of Rs. 5,000, per month.
In the meantime on May 28, 1954, this Court delivered judgment in Suraj Mall Mohta and Co. v.
A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (1). In that case in the course
of investigation of the case of Messrs. Jute·11,nd Gunny
Brokers Ltd. which had been referred to the Commission under s. 5 (1) of the Investigation Act, it was
alleged to have been discovered by the Commission
that Suraj Mall Mohta and Co. had made large profits
which .they had not disclosed and had thus evaded
taxation. A report to that effect having been made
on August 2S, 1953, by the Commission to the Central
Government under s. 5 (4) of the Investigation Act
the Central Government on September 9, ~953, referred the case against Suraj Mall Mohta and Co. to the
Commission under the provisions of s. 5 (4). On September 15, 19"53, the Commission notified Suraj Mall
(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 448.
540
I95 8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
Mohta and Co. that their cases had been referred for
Basheshar Nath investigation and called upon them to furnish certain
. v.
materials, details of which were set out in annexure to
The Commissioner the petition. Ou April 12, 1954, Suraj Mall Mohta
of Income-tax, and Co. filed a petition under Art. 32 of the ConstituD,Jhi &- Rajasthan ti on asking for an appropriate writ restraining the
,o;. Anoth"
Comm1ss10n
· • f rom ta k"mg any action
•
on t h e groun d
that the provisions of the Investigation Act had
D as C• J •
become void being discriminatory in character. By
that judgment this Court held that both s. 34 of the
Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, as it then stood, and
sub-s. (4) of s. 5 of the Investigation Act dealt with
persons who had similar. characteristics of being persons who had not truly disclosed their income and had
evaded payment of tax on their income but that as
the procedure prescribed by the Investigation Act was
substantially more prejudicial than the procedure
under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, sub-s. (4) of
s. 5 and the procedure prescribed by the Investigation
Act., in so far as it alfec.ted persons proceeded age.inst
undt'r that sub-section was a piece of discriminatory
legislation which offended the provisions of Art. 14 of
the Constitnt.ion and was, therefore, void and unenforceable.
Sub-section (4) of s. 5 of the Investigation Act having been declared void, Parliament passed the Indian
Income Tax Amendment Act (33 of 1954) amending
s. 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. Paradoidcal
as it may seem, the result of this amendment was that
persons who originally fell only within the ambit of
s. 5 (1) of the Investigation Act and formed a distinct
class of substantial tax evaders also came within the
amended s. 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. The
position after the amendment, therefore, was that the
Income Tax Officers could pick out some of these persons and refer their cases under s. 5 (1) of the Investigation Act and thereby subject them to the drastic and
harsh procedure of that Act, w bile they could deal
with other persons similarly situate under s. 34 as
amended and apply to t.hem the comparatively more
beneficial procedure laid down in the Indian Income
Tax Act, 1922. Promptly several applications were
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
made under Art. 32 of the Constitution complaining
r958
that after the amendment of s. 34 of the Indian Income Bashesha. Nath
Tax Act, s. 5 (1) of the Investigation Act became disv.
criminatory in that the persons falling within it could The comtnissioner
be dealt with under the drastic, prejudicial and harsh of Income-tax,
procedure pt·escribed by the Investigation Act, while Delhi & Rajasthan
other persons similarly situate and belonging to the & Another
same category cou]d at the whim or pleasure of the
- C. ].
Das
Income Tax authorities be proceeded against under
the more beneficial procedure prescribed under the
Indian Income Tax Act. All tftose applications were
disposed of by a common judgment reported as Shree
Meenakshi Milla Ltd,. v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Saatri (1)
This Court held that s. 34 of the Income Tax Act, as
amended by the Indian Income Tax Amendment Act,
1954 (33 of 1954), operated on the same field ass. 5 (1)
of the Investigation Act, and, therefore, s. 5 (1) had
become void and unenforceable as the pr-0cedure
applied to persons dealt with thereunder became discriminatory in character. It should be noted that in
none of those petitions disposed of by that judgment
had any assessment been made under the Investigation Act and this Court only prohibited further proceedings before the Commission under the Investigation Act. The assessee appellant now before us who
had entered into a settlement under s. 8 of the Investigation Act and had been assessed in accordance with
the terms of the settlement continued to pay the tax
by monthly instalments of Rs. 5,000 as before.
Finally on December 20, 1955, came the decision
of this Court in M. OT. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras (2). In that case
the Central Government had under s. 5 (1) of the
Investigation Act referred the case to the Commission.
The Commission after holding an enquiry recorded its
findings and held that an aggregate sum of
Rs. 10,07,322-4-3 represented the undisclosed income
during the period under investigation. The Commission having submitted its report to the Central Government, the latter acting under s. 8 (2) of the Investigation Act directed that appropriate action under the
(I) [1955] I 5, C. R. 787.
(2) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 1247.
542
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, be taken against that
assessee with a view to assess or re-assess the income
Bas/..,ha• Nath which had escaped assessment for the period 1940-41
Th' Cm:,;,ission" to 1948-49. The Income. Tax Officer accordingly
of 1""me-tax. issued notices and made the re-assessment for the
Delhi & Ilajaslhan years 1940-41, 1941-42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49 based
& Anoth"
upon the finding of the Commission, which was treated
as final and conclusive. These assessment orders wore
Das c. ].
served on that assessee. There was, however, no reassessment order for the year 1942-43. In regard to
the assessment orde&> which had been served the
assesseo concerned applied to the Commissioner of
Income Tax under s. 8 (5) of the Investigation Act for
·reference to the High .Court on questions of law arising
out of those re-assessment orders. During the pendency· of those proceedings the assessee, in that case on
December 6, 1954, filed a petition contending that the
provisions of the Investigation Act were illegal, ultra
vires and unconstitutional. The majority of this Court
held that different persons, though falling under the
same class or category of substantial evaders of incometax, were being subjected to different procedures, oue
a summary and drastic procedure and the other the
normal procedure which gave to the assessees various
rights which were denied to those who were specially
treated under the procedure prescribed by the Investigation Act and, therefore, the assessments made under
s. 8 (2) were void and unenforceable. That was a case
of assessment under s. 8 (2) in invitum after an
investigation under the Investigation Act. The
assessee appellant before us, who had at the end of
the investigation entered into a settlement and been
assessed in accordance with the terms of such settlement, however, went on making payments in discharge
of the balance due under the terms of settlement right
up to September 8, 1957, when he made the last payment of Rs. 8,000 bringing the aggregate payment up
to Rs. 1,28,000.
In the meantime the Income Tax Officer had sent a
certificate requesting the Collector of Delhi for the
recovery of the balance due by the assessee under the
settlement. In execution of that certificate some of
tl) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
543
the properties belonging to the assessee situate in
i958
Dharamsalla and Hissar were attached. On Decem- Basheshar N alh
ber 27, 1957, the assessee made an application to the
v.
Income Tax Commissioner. After pointing out that The Commissioner
between July 5, 1954, and December 27, 1957, the of Inconie-ta:e,
petitioner had paid in all Rs. 1,28,000 towards the Delhi &- Rajasthan
discharge of his liability under the settlement and
&- Another
referring to the decisions of this Court in Suraj Mall
- C. ].
Das
Mohta's case (1) and Muthiah's case (2 )the assessee submitted that the settlement under s. 8A of the Investigation Act had no force and did not bind the petitioner and that the settlement had been made under the
pressure of the situation and in view of the coercive
machinery of the Investigation Act and that from
either point of view the settlement was not binding.
His contention was that when s. 5(1) of the Investigation Act had been held unconstitutional the settlement
under s. 8A could not be enforced, for the foundation
of the proceedings under s. 8A was the reference under
s. 5(1) and the foundation having crumbled down the
superstructure must fall with it. Under the circumstances the assessee submitted that the attached properties be released aud the amount already recovered
under the settlement be refunded. On January 29,
1958, the Income Tax Commissioner sent the following
communication to the assessee :No. L-228(1)/54-55/17590
Office of the Commissioner of Income Tax,
Delhi and Hajasthan, New Delhi.
Dated, New Delhi the 29th January, 1958.
Shri Besheshar Nath,
9, Barakhamba Road,
New Delhi.
Dear Sir,
Sub :-Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947-0rder u/s 8A(2)-Your petition
dated 27th December, 1957.
With reference to your petition dated 27th
December, 1957, regarding the settlement arrived at
(1) (1955).1 S.C.R. 418.
(2) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 12.17.
544
'95 8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
under section 8A(2) of the Ta.xa.tion on Income (InvesB•sh"""' Nath tiga.tion Commission) Act, 1947, I a.m to inform you
v.
that the settlement is vs.lid a.nd binding on you.
Tho Commissioner
2. You a.re, therefore, requested to ma.ke good
01. 1..,,._.,•.,
a.rrea.rs of insta.lments which you have not pa.id re.
Delho 6- Ra1asthan cently by 5th Februa.ry, 1958, a.nd a.lso to continue
6- Another
· a.ccord a.nee wit
· h t he msta.
·
l·
ma.k"mg t h e pa.yments m
Dos c. J.
ments scheme a.greed to, fa.iling which the recovery
proceedings will be vigorously pursued through the
usual recovery cha.nnels.
Your's fa.ithfully,
Sd./· S. K. Gupta.,
Commissioner of Income-tax,
Delhi & Ra.jasthan, New Delhi.
Being aggrieved by the above decision the a.ssessee
thereupon moved this Court and obtained specie.I
leave to appeal against tha.t order. The appeal ha.s
now come up for final disposal before us.
It may be mentioned here that as the respqndents
are anxious to have the matters of controversy raised
in this appea.l decided and set at rest by a decision of
this Court, the respondents, for the purposes of this
a.ppeal, have not insisted on their objection that an
appea.l does not lie under Art. 136 of the Constitution
against an order of the Commissioner of Income Ta.x.
Learned counsel for the a.ssessee a.Iso has not -pressed
his claim for refund of the a.mounts already paid a.nd
has pressed the appeal regarding the balance that
remains to be pa.id under the settlement which is characterised as invalid. Model Knitting Industries Ltd.
which has a case pending in the High Court of Ca.lout.
ta where the same questions a.a a.re in issue in the
appeal before us, a.re also in issue has been permitted
to intervene· and we have heard counsel a.ppea.ring for
tha.t intervener.
In view of the three decisions referred to a.hove
learned Attorney General does not seriously contend
that the powers conferred on the Commission by s. 6
and the procedure la.id down by s. 7 of the Investiga.
tion Act are not discriminatory, but wha.t he urges is
that none of the said decisions has held that s. 5(1) ill
(I) S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
wholly void and inoperative. He says that s. 5(1) only
1958
authorises the Centre.I Government to refer certain 8 , • N •
. .
U pon sue h a re fierence two asnesnar
at,.
cases to t he, Comm1ss1on.
v.
lines of procedure are clearly indicated by the Investi- The commissioner
gation Act, namely, (I) that an investigation may be of Income-tax,
held in invitum following the procedure prescribed Delhi & Rajasthan
and exercising the powers conferred by the Investiga. & Another
tion Act and (2) that a settlement may be made under
s. 8A. If the first procedure is followed and an assessDas c. J.
ment is made under s. 8(2) such assessment will undoubtedly be invalid as has been held in Muthiah's
case (1), but if on a case being referred the settlement
procedure is followed then the consequential order of
assessment under s. 8A cannot be questioned. We are
unable to accept this line of argument as permissible
in view of the provisions of the Investigation Act. It
will be recalled that when the case of the assessee was
referred to the Commission under s. 5( I) on July 22,
1948, there was no provision for settlement in the Act
at all. Therefore, that reference, when it was made,
consigned the assessee to the only procedure of investigation that was then prescribed by the Act. In the
next place it should be remembered that after s. 8A
was added in the Investigation Act by s. 33 of Act 67
of 1949 an authorised official was appointed under
s. 6(3) to investigate the affairs of the assessee and to
examine the books and to interrogate any person or
obtain any statement from any person and under
sub-s. (4) the authorised official was empowered to
exercise the same powers as had been vested in the
Commission under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 6. :Further,
by its own terms s. 8A made it clear that the person
concerned in any case referred to the Commission for
investigation might apply to the Commission at any
time during such investigation to have the case settled.
Therefore this provision for settlement was an integral
part of the entire investigation procedure. It was not
a separate or independent procedure apart from the
investigation procedure. It is true that there was
nothing to prevent the assessee from straightaway
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247.
69
546
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
making a proposal for settlement before any actual
step towards investigation was taken by the Income
Bash.,ha, Nath T ax au th or1"t'1es, b u t b eiore
"
th e Comm1ss10n
. . cou ld ref er
The c 0 :;.ission" the proposal for settlement to the Central Government
of Income-ta., it had to be satisfied that the terms of settlement conDelhi & Rajasthan tained in the application were such as might be
& Anoth"
approved. For the purpose of satisfying itself the
Das c. J.
Commission had obviously to go into the facts either
by itself or through an authorised official and to consider the materials collected by the authorised official
and in the process of doing so had to hold an investigation of some sort and that investigation had necessarily to be made in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Investigation Act itself. It is,
therefore, not correct to say that there could be a proceeding for settlement without any investigation at all.
In our opinion s. SA did not provide. for a separate
procedure at all. When a case was referred under
s. 5(1) it was really for investigation and a settlement
was something which could crop up in the process of
that investigation just as in the course of a suit parties
may arrive at some compromise. In recording the
compromise and passing a judgment in accordance
with the compromise thereof, the court exercises the
same jurisdiction as it exercises in entertaining and
disposing of the suit itself. Likewise in entertaining a
proposal for settlement the Commission exercised its
jurisdiction of investigation under s. 5, followed the
procedure prescribed by s. 7 and exercised all its
powers under s. 6. As already stated the language of
s. SA itself shows that a settlement can be proposed
only during such investigation. In our judgment,
therefore, the contention of the learned Attorney General that the Investigation Act prescribed two procedures is not well-founded.
Learned Attorney General then points out that the
Investigation Act was a pre-Constitution Act and that
before the commencement of the Constitution when
there was no such thing as a fundamental right, its
provisions could not be questioned however discriminatory the procedure may have been. He urges that
after the commencement of the Constitution the
1958
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
547
1
8
9'
assessee has not been subjected to the coercive procedure laid down by the Investigation Act, but Basheshar Nath
voluntarily proposed a settlement which was accepted
v.
by the Central Government on the recommendation of The Commissioner
the Commission. In that situation he was in the same of Income-tax,
position as Qasim Razvi had been in and the observa- Delhi & Rajasthan
tions to be found in the judgment of Mukherjea, J., & ~ther
who delivered the majority judgment in Syed Qasim
Das c. J.
Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad (1) applied to the
present appeal. We do not think it is necessary, for
the purpose of this appeal, to go minutely into the
facts of Qasim Razvi's case (1) with reference to whioh
the observations relied on had been made, or to analyse
the correctness of the reasoning adopted in that case,
for that can only be done by a larger Bench. We are
definitely of opinion, however, that the observations
made in the majority judgment should not be extended
but must be kept strictly confined to the special facts
of that case. In our judgment those observations have
no application to the facts of the present appeal before
us, for here even after the commencement of the Constitution, the process of investigation continued in that
the authorised official went on collecting materials by
following the procedure prescribed by s. 7 and exercising the powers conferred on him by s. 6 of the
Investigation Act.
The last argument advanced by the learned Attorney
General is that if there had been a breach of the
assessee's fundamental right by subjecting him to a
discriminatory procedure laid down in the Investigation Act, the assessee, by voluntarily entering into a
settlement, must be taken to have waived such breach
and cannot now be permitted to set up his fundamental right. Immediately two questions arise for
consideration, namely; (1) whether the assessee could
waive the breach of the fundamental right in question
and (2) whether in the facts and circumstances of this
case he had actually done so.
Re. (1): In Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of
Bombay (2) there was a general discussion whether a
(1) (1953] S.C.R. 589.
(2) (1955] 1 S.C.R. 613.
548
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
fundamental right could be waived. At page 638
Venkatarama Aiyar, J., observed:v.
" The question is, what is the legal effect of a
Th• Commi"io"" statute being declared unconstitutional. The answer
of. Incom~-tux, to it depends on two considerations,-firstly, does the
Delhi b Ra1asthan constitutional prohibition which fias been infringed
b Anolher
sr
· I ature to enact t h e
auect
t he competence of t he Leg1s
Das c. J.
law or does it merely operate as a check on the exercise
of a power which is within its competence; and
secondly, if it is merely a check, whether it is enacted
for the benefit of individuals or whether it is imposed
for the benefit of the general public on grounds of
public policy. If the statute is beyond the competence
of the Legislature, as for example, when a State enacts
a law which is within the exclusive competence of the
Union, it would be a nullity. That would also be the
position when a limitation is imposed on the legislative
power in the interests of the public, as, for instance,
the provisions in Chapter XIII of the Constitution
relating to inter-State trade and commerce. But when
the law is within the competence of the Legislature
and the unconstitutionality arises by reason of its
repugnancy to provisions enacted for the benefit of
individuals, it is not a nullity but is merely unenforceable. Such an unconstitutionality can be waived and
in that case the law becomes enforceable. In America
this principle is well settled. (Vide Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, Volume I, pages 368 to 371; Willis
on Constitutional Law at pages 524, 531, 542 and 558;
Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law at pages 28 and
29-30)."
After referring to three decisions of the American
Supreme Court which a.re also now relied on by the
learned Attorney General, the learned Judge concluded
as follows :-" The position must be the same under our Constitution when a Jaw contravenes a. prescription intended for the benefit of individuals. The rights guaranteed
under Art. 19 (1) (f) a.re enacted for the benefit of
owners of properties and when a law is found to
infringe that provision, it is open to any person whose
rights have been infringed to waive it and when there
z95B
B•sheshar Nalh
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
549
is waiver there is no legal impediment to the enforcCli958
ment of the law. It would be otherwise if the statute 8 h h N h
was a nullity; in which case it can neither be waived as esv~' at
nor enforced. If then the law is merely unenforceable The commissioner
and can take effect when waived it cannot be treated of Income-ta:.,
as non est a.nd as effaced out of the statute book. It is Delhi & Rajasthan
scarcely necessary to add that the question of waiver
is relevant to the present controversy not as bearing
Das C.}.
on any issue of fact a.rising for determination in this
case but as showing the nature of the right declared
under Art. 19 (1) (f) and the effect in law ofa statute
contravening it."
When the case came up before the court on review
Mahajan, C. J., with the concurrence of Mukherjea.,
Vivian Bose, and Ghula.m Hassan, JJ., said at page
653:" In our opinion, the doctrine of waiver enunciated by some American Judges in construing the American Constitution cannot be introduced in our Constitution without a fuller discussion -of the matter. No
_inference in deciding the case should have been raised
on the basis of such a theory. The learned Attorney
General when questioned about the doctrine did not
seem to be very enthusiastic about it. Without finally
expressing an opinion on this question we are not for
the moment convinced that this theory has any
relevancy in construing the fundamental rights conferred by Pa.rt III of our Constitution. We think that
the rights described as fundamental rights are a necessary consequence of the declaration in the preamble
that the people of India have solemnly resolved to
constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic
and to secure to all its citizens justice, social, economic
and political ; liberty of thought, expression, belief,
faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity. These fundamental rights have not been put
in the Constitution merely for individual benefit,
though ultimately they come into operation in considering individual rights. They have been put there
as a matter of public policy and the doctrine of waiver
can have no application to provisions of law which
have been enacted as a matter of constitutional policy.
550
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
8
'9'
Reference to some of the Articles, inter alia, Arts. 15
Basheshar Nath (1), 20, 21, makes the proposition quite plain. A citizen
v.
cannot get discrimination by telling the State " You
The Commissioner can discriminate '', or get convicted by waiving the
of Income-tu, protection given under Arts. 20 and 21."
Delhi & Rajasthan O
. one of us pre1erre
"
d not to express any
c;. Anothe
n t hat occasion
'
Da_s c. J.
opinion on this subject and said at page 670 :"In coming to the conclusion that I have, I have
in a large measure found myself in agreement with the
views of Venkatarama Aiyar, J., on that part of the
case. I, however, desire to guard myself against being
understood to agree with the rest of the observations
to be found in his judgment, particularly those relating
to waiver of unconstitutionality, the fundamental
rights being a mere check on legislative power or the
effect of the declaration under Art. 13(1) being "relatively void". On those topics I prefer to express no
opinion on this occasion."
It will, however, be noticed that the observations of
the learned judges tnade in that case did not relate to
the waiver of a breach of the fundamental right under
Art. 14.
The fundamental right, the breach whereof is complained of by the assessee, is founded on Art. 14 of the
Constitution. The problem, therefore, before us is
whether a breach of the fundamental right flowing
from Art. 14 can be waived. For disposing of this
appeal it is not necessary for us to consider whether
any of the other fundamental rights enshrined in
Part III of our Constitution can or cannot be waived.
We take the view that this court should not make any
pronouncement on any question which is not strictly
necessary for the disposal of the particular case before
it. We, therefore, confine our a tten ti on to Art. 14 and
proceed to discuss the question on that footing.
Article 14 runs as follows:" The State shall not deny to any person equality
before the law or the equal protection of the laws
within the territory of India."
It is the first of the five Articles grouped together
under the heading " Right to Equality". The underlying object of this Article is undoubtedly to secure to
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,,
551
all persons, citizens or non-citizens, the equality of
x95B
status and of opi;artunity referred to in the glorious Basheshar Nath
preamble of our Constibution. It combines the English
v.
doctrine of the rule of law and the equal protection The Commissioner
clause of the 14th Amendment to the American Fede- of I11cotne-1ax,
ral Constitution which enjoins that no State shall Delhi & Rajasthan
-"deny t o any person wit
. h"m 1"ts JUr1s
. . d'1ct"10n th e equaI
& _
Another
protection of the laws ". There can, therefore, be no
Das c. 1.
doubt or dispute that this Article is founded on a
sound public palicy recognised and valued in all civilised States. Coming then to the language of the Article it must be noted, first and foremost that this Article is, in form, an admonition addressed to the State
and does not directly purport to confer any right on
any person as some of the other Articles_ e.g., Art. 19,
do. The obligation thus imposed on the State, no
doubt, enures for the benefit of all persons, for, as a
necessary result of the operation of this Article, they
all enjoy equality before the law. That is, however,
the indirect, though necessary and inevitable, result of
the mandate. The command of the Article is directed
to the State and the reality of the obligation thus imposed on the Stat-e is the measure of the fundamental
right which every person within the territory of India
is to enjoy. 'fhe next thing to notice is that the benefit of this Article is not limited to citizens, but is available to any person within the territory of India. In
the third place it is to be observed that, by virtue of
Art. 12, "the State" which is, by Art. 14, forbidden
to discriminate between persons includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government
and the legislature of each of the States and all local
or other authorities within the territory of India or
under the control of the Government of India. Article 14, therefore, is an injunction to both the legislative as well as the executive organs of the State and
the other subordinate authorities. As regards the
legislative organ of the State, the fundamental right is
further consolidated and protected by the provisions
of Art. 13. Clause (1) of that Article provides that all
laws in force in the territories of India immediately
before the commencement of the Constitution, in so
552
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
far as ·they are inconsistent with the provisions of
Part III shall, to the extent of the inconsistency be
void. Likewise cl. (2) of this Article prohibits the
Th• Commission" State from making any law which takes a.way or
. •! Income-I•"· abridges the rights conferred by the same Pa.rt and
Delhi & Rajastha• follows it up by saying that any law made in contra& Another
vention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. It will be observed that, so far
Das C.J.
as this Article is concerned, there is no relaxation of
the restriction imposed by it such as there are in some
of the other Articles, e.g., Art. 19, els. (2) t.o (6). Our
right to equality before the law is thus completely
and without any exception secured from all legislative
discrimination. It is not necessary, for the purpose of
this appeal to consider whether an executive order is
a " law " within the meaning of Art. 13, for even without the aid of Art. l3 our right to the equal protection
of the law is protected against the vagaries, if any, of
the executive Government also. In this connection
the observations of Lord Atkin in Eahugbayi Eleko v.
Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria (') are
apposite. Said his Lordship at page 670 that in
accordance with British jurisprudence no member of
the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except when he can support the
legality of his act before a. court of justice. That
apart, the very language of Art. 14 of the Constitution
expressly directs that "the State", which by Art. 12
includes the executive organ, shall not deny to any
person equality before the law or the equal protection
of the law. Thus Art. 14 protects us from both legislative and executive tyranny by way of discrimination.
Such being the true intent and effect of Art. 14 the
question arises, can a breach of the obligation imposed
on the State be waived by any person ? In the face
of such an unequivocal admonition administered by
the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land,
is it open to the State to disobey the constitutional
mandate merely because a person tells the State that
it may do so ? If the Constitution asks the State as
z958
Basheshar Nath
v.
. (1) L.R. [1931] A.C. 662.
.,
.4
.,
'
';
I
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
553
to why the State did not carry out its behest, will it
be any answer for the State to make that " true, you Basheshar Nath
directe d me not to deny any person equality before
the law, but this person said that I could do so, for he The co.::.~issioner
had no objection to my doing it." I do not think the of Income-tax,
State will be in any better position than the position Delhi & Rajasthan
in which Adam found himself when God asked him as & Another
to why he had eaten the forbidden fruit and the State's
Das C. ],
above answer will be as futile as was that of Adam
who pleaded that the woman had tempted him and
so he ate the forbidden fruit. It seems to us absolutely
clear, on the language of Art. 14 that it is a command issued by the Constitution to the State as a
matter of public policy with a view to implement its
object of ensuring the equality of status and opportunity which every welfare State, such as India, is by
her Constitution expected to do and no person can, by
any act or conduct, relieve the State of the solemn
obligation imposed on it by the Constitution. Whatever breach of other fundamental right a person or a
citizen may or may not waive, he cannot certainly
give up or waive a breach of the fundamental right
that is indirectly conf~rred on him by this constitutional mandate directed to the State.
The learned Attorney General has relied on various
passages in text-books written by well-known·aud eminent writers, e.g., Cooley, Willoughby, Willis and
Rottschaefer and on eight American decisions. In
considering the statements of law made by American
writers and judges the following observations of
Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in The State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. The Bombay Co. Ltd. (1 ) should constantly be borne in mind :" These clauses a.re widely different in language,
scope and purpose, and a varying body of doctrines
and tests have grown around them interpreting, extending or restricting, from time to time, their operation and application in the context of the expanding
American commerce and industry, and we are of
opinion that not much help can be derived from them
(I) [1952] S.C.R. III2, II20, II2I.
70
554
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
'95 8
in the solution of the problems arising under Art. 286
of
the Indian Constitution."
Basheshar Nath
v.
(See also The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. OhamarbaugTlie Commission" wala (1 ) ). The American authorities cited by the
01 Income-tax,
Attorney General relate to waiver of obligations under
Delh~ ~ R;{•sthan a contract, of the deprivation of right to property
..:'.. "
without due process of law or of the constitutional
Das c. J.
right to trial by jury and the like. They have no
bearing on the question of the waiver of the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment which, like
our Art. 14, is a mandate to the State. It is significant that no American decision is forthcoming which
upholds the waiver of the breach of that clause.
When a case of breach of any of the fundamental
rights akin to what are dealt with in the American
authorities will come before us it will, then, be the
time for us to discuss those authorities and to consider
their applicability in the matter of the interpretation
of the corresponding provisions of our Constitution.
For the moment we prefer to confine our observations
to a consideration of waiver of the breach of the
fundamental right under Art. 14.
Learned Attorney General has relied on three decisions of this Court: (1) Laxmanappa Hanumantappa
Jamkhandi v. The Union of India('), (2) Dewan Bahadur Seth Gopal Das Mohta v. The Union of India(')
and (3) Baburao Narayanrao Banas v. The Union of
India(') in support of his thesis that a breach of
Art. 14 may well be waived by a person. In ndne of
those cases, all of which were disposed of on the same
day (October 21, 1954) was the question of waiver
specifically or seriously discussed. As learned counsel
appearing for the intervener points out, the first of the
above mentioned cases proceeded on the footing that
as ~rt. 265 was not a fundamental right conferred by
Part III, it could not be enforced under Art. 32.
Learned counsel for the intervener further submitted
that the decision in the 2nd case mentioned above
could also be explained on that basis and on the further ground that proceeding under Art. 32 was not
(I) [I957) S.C.R. 874. 918.
(3) (t955) 1 S.C.R. 773.
(2) [1955) I S.C.R. 769.
(4) [1954) 26 I.T.R. 725.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
555
intended to be' used for obtaining relief against the
:r958
voluntary action of a. person and that
h h N h
The B asesar
at
. aappropriate
.
remedy for recovery of money lay m
suit.
v.
decision in the 3rd case proceeded on the same basis The commissioner
and did not carry the matter any further. It is of Income-tax,
impossible to treat any of those decisions as represent- Delhi 6- Rajasthan
ing the considered opinion of this Court on the question 6- Another
of waiver of a breach of the fundamental right under
Art. 14 of the Constitution. Reference was also made
Das c. J.
by the learned Attorney General to the decision of a
Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Subedar
v. State (1) where it was held that Art. 20(3) conferred
merely a privilege and that such privilege could always
be waived. It was overlooked that if a person voluntarily answered any question then there was no breach
of his fundamental right at all, for the fundamental
right is that a person shall not be compelled to incriminate himself. That case, therefore, is not a case of
waiver at all. The case of Pakhar Singh v. The State (2 )
is also, for the same reason, not a case of waiver.
Re. (2) : The answer to this question depends upon
facts which have not been properly investigated. The
appeal is against the order of the income tax authorities which order makes no reference to the plea of
waiver. Further the filing of the statements of caMe
having been dispensed with, we have not had the
benefit of the statement of facts on which this plea is
said to be founded. The view taken on question (1),
however, relieves us of the necessity of going into this
question.
On a consideration of the nature of the fundamental
right flowing from Art. 14, we have no doubt in our
mind that it is not for a citizen or any other person
who benefits by reason of its provisons to waive any
breach of the obligation on the part of the State. We
are, therefore, of the opinion that this appeal should
be accepted, the order of the Income Tax Commissioner,
Delhi, dated January 29, 1958, should be set aside and
all proceedings now pending for implementation of the
order of the Union Government dated July 5, 1954,
(1) A. I. R. 1957 All. 396.
(2) A. I. R. 1958 Punj. 294.
556
Basheshar Nath
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
should be quashed and that the assessee appellant
should get the costs of this appeal.
v.
The Commissioner
BHAGWATI, J.-I agree with the reasoning adopted
of. Incomc_-ta•, and the conclusion reached in the judgments prepared
Delhi & Ra;a;than by Mv Lord the Chief Justice and my brother S. K.
& Another
•
·
Das, JJ ., rn
rega rd to t h e u1tra v1res
character 'of t he
Bhagwali 1.
proceedings adopted under s. 8-A of the Taxation on
Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (30 of
1947), and the void character of the settlement reached
thereunder. As regards the parts of the judgments
which deal with the question whether a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution can be waived at
all, I find myself in agreement with the judgment
prepared by my brother, Subba Rao, J., and am of the
opinion that it is not open to a citizen to waive the
fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution.
The question of waiver came to be argued before us
in this way. If the proceedings and the settlement
under section 8-A of the Act were void as aforesaid,
the respondent contended that the appellant had
waived the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 of
the Constitution and was therefore not. entitled to
challenge the settlement. This was only by way of
reply to the contention of the appellant and was not
set out in proper details in any affidavit filed on behalf
of the respondent. The learned Attorney-General,
however, relied upon the application made by the
appellant before the Investigation Commission and
the contents thereof as also the payments made by the
appellant from time to time both before and after the
pronouncement of our decision in M. Gt. Muthiah v.
The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1 ) in order to
support this plea of waiver and the arguments before
us proceeded on that basis. No objection was taken
by either of the parties before us to the issue of waiver
being decided on such materials and the question was
argued at considerable length before us. The arguments moreover extended to the whole field of fundamental rights and were not confined to Art. 14 only.
(1) [1955] 2 s. c. R. 1247.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
557
We, therefore, see no reason why vre should refrain
Ig58
from pronouncing our opinion on that question.
B
. .
A
d h
asheshar Nath
The , pream ble to our Const1tut10n, rt. 13 an t e
language in which the fundamental rights have been The co,;;~issioner
enacted lead to one conclusion and one conclusion of Income-tax,
only that whatever be the position in America, no Delhi s. Rajasthan
distinction can be drawn here, as has been attempted s. Anoth•r
in the United States of America, between the funda- Bhagwati ]. ·
mental rights which may be said to have been enacted
for the benefit of the individual and those enacted in
public interest or on grounds of public policy. Ours is
a nascent democracy and situated as we are, socially,
economically, educationally and politically, it is the
sacred duty of the Supreme Court to safeguard the
fundamental rights which have been for the first time
enacted in Part III of our Constitution. The limitations on those rights have been enacted in the Constitution itself, e.g., in Arts. 19, 33 and 34. But unless
and until we find the limitations on such fundamental
rights enacted in the very provisions of the Constitution, there is no justification whatever for importing
any notions from the United States of America or the
authority of cases decided by the Supreme Court there
in order to whittle down the plenitude of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of our Constitution.
The genesis of the declaration of fundamental rights
in our Constitution can be traced to the following
passage from the Report of the Nehru Committee
(1928):" Canada, Australia and South Africa ba ve no
declaration of rights in their Constitutions but there
are various articles to be found in the Constitution of
the Irish Free State which may properly be grouped
under the general head "fundamental rights". The
reason for this is not far to seek. Ireland is the only
country where the conditions obtaining before the
treaty were the nearest approach to those we have in
India. The first concern of the people of Ireland was,
as indeed it is of the people of India to-day, to secure
fundamental rights that have been denied to them.
The other dominions had their rise from earlier British
558
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
settlements which were supposed to have carried the
Ba,heshar Nath law of Englanhd wit h thfeEm. l Iredland. wash taken a~d
v.
kept under t e ru1e o ng an agamst er own will
The Commi<Sioner and the acquisition of dominion status by her became
of Income-tax. a matter of treaty between the two nations.
We con.
Delhi & Raja,than ceive that the constitutional position in India is very
& Another
much the same. That India is a dependency of Great
Britain cannot be denied. That position can be altered
Bhagwali ].
in one of two ways-force or mutual consent. It is
the latter in furtherance of which we are called upon
to recommend the principles of a constitution for
India. In doing so it is obvious that our first care
should be to have our fundamental rights guaranteed
in a manner which will not permit their withdrawal
.
under any circumstances."
At the Round Table Conference that preceded the
making of the Government of India Act, 1935, therefore, the Indian leaders pressed for a Bill of Rights in
the proposed Constitution Act, in order to bind the
administration with certain ·declarations of individual
rights. This was, however, rejected by the Simon
Commission with these observations :
"We are aware that such provisions have been
inserted in many Constitutions, notably in those of the
European States formed after the War. Experience,
however,. has not shown them to be of any great practical value. Abstract declarations are useless unless
there exist the will and means to make them effective."
The framers of our Constitution however followed
the American view represented by the famous words
of Jefferson in preference to that expressed by tho
Simon Commission : "The inconveniences of the declaration are, that
it may cramp government in its useful exertions. But
the evil of this is short-lived, moderate and reparable.
The inconveniences of the want of a declaration are
permanent, aftiictive and irreparable. They are in
constant progression from bad to worse. The executive
in our governments is not the sole, it is scarcely the
principal object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the
legislatures is the most formidable dread .................. "
z958
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
559
(Vide Ba.su's Commentary on the Constitution of India,
z958
Vol. 1, p. 74).
Basheshar Nath
and incorporated the fundamental rights in Part III
v.
of our Constitution.
The Commissioner
The object sought to be achieved was as the pre- of. Incom•.-ta"·
amble to the Constitution states " to secure to all its Delln & Ra;asthan
' l, economic
' an d pol"t'
c1"t'izens : JUSTICE , soma
i ical ; & Another
LIBERTY .of status and of opportunity; . and to Bhagwati J
promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the
dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation":
and Art. 13 provided :" 13. (1) All laws in force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such
inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and
any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to
the extent of the contravention, be void ......... "
"Laws in force" were defined in Art. 13(3) to
include:
"Laws passed or made by a Legislature or other
competent authority in the territory of India before
the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law
or any part thereof may not be then in operation either
at all or in particular areas·"
and they were declared void, in so far as they were
inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, to the
extent of such inconsistency. As regards laws to be
enacted after the commencement of the Constitution,
the State, in the wider significance of the term as
including " the Government and Parliament of India
and the Government and the legislature of each of the
States and all local or other authorities within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India " (Vide Art. 12) was enjoined not to
make any law which takes away or abridges the rights
conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause was to the extent of the
560
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
contravention declared void. It will be seen that the
prohibition was thus effeotive both against past laws
as well as future laws and both were equally void in
Th• commission., so far as they were " inconsistent with " or "in derogao/ Ineome-tax, tion of " the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III
Delhi & Rajasthanof the Constitution. No distinction was made between
& Another
the past laws and future laws in this respect and they
Bhagwati J.
were declared void to the extent of the inconsistency
or the extent of the contravention aR the case may be,
leaving the unoffending parts thereof untouched.
It will be also seen that under Art. 13(2) an admonition was administered to the State not to enact any
law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred
by this Part and the obligation thus imposed on the
State enured for the benefit of all citizens of Bharat
alike in respect of all the fundamental rights enacted
in Part III of the Constitution. No distinction was
made in terms between the fundamental rights said to
have been enacted for the benefit of the individual and
those enacted in the public interest or on grounds of
public policy.
The question then arises whether a breach of the
obligation thus imposed on the State can be waived by
a citizen. To borrow the words of My Lord the Chief
Justice "In the face of such unequivocal admonition
administered by the Constitution, which is the supreme
law of the land, is it open to the State to disobey the
Constitutional mandate merely because a citizen told
the State that it may do so ? If the Constitution asks
the State as to why the State did not carry out its
behest, will it be any answer for the State to make
that "True, you directed me not to take away or
a.bridge the rights conferred by this Part, but this
citizen said that I could do so, for he had no objection
to.my doing so." I do not think the State will be in
any better position than the position in which Ad~m
found himself when God asked him as to why he had
eaten the forbidden fruit and the State's above answer
will be as futile as that of Adam who pleaded that the
woman had tempted him and so he ate the forbidden
fruit." It is absolutely clear on a perusal of Art. 13(2)
of the Constitution that it is a constitutional mandate
z95a
Basheshar Nath
v.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
561
to the State and no citizen can by any act or conduct
r95B
relieve the State of the solemn obligation imposed Basheshar Nath
on it by Art. 13(2) and no distinction can be made at
v.
all between the fundamental rights enacted for the The Commissioner
benefit of the illdividual and those enacted in the of Income-tax,
·public interest or on grounds of public policy.
Delhi & llajasthan
W~at then is the basis of this distinction which has
.;;. Another
been strenuoiwly urged before us that there are certain Bhagwati 1 .
fundamental rights which are enacted only for the
private benefit of a citizen, e.g., rights of property,
which can be waived by him and there are other
fundamental rights enacted for the public good or as a
matter of public policy which it would not be open to
a citizen to waive even though he were affected by the
breach thereof. Reliance is placed in this behalf on
certain decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States of America, passages from Willoughby, Willis
and Rottschaeffer quoted in the judgment ofT. L.
Venkatararna Aiyar, J., in Behram Khurshed Pesikalca
v. The State of Bombay (1) and the observations of the
said learned Judge in that case adopting the said
distinction. (Vide pp. 638-643 of the Report). I am
afraid this distinction cannot be accepted. There is
nothing in the terms of the various a.rticles embodying
the fundamental rights in Part III of our Constitution
which warrants such a distinction. The fundamental
rights are enacted with all precision and wherever
limitations on their exercise are thought of they are
also similarly enacted. Such constitutional limitations
are to be found within the terms of the articles themselves and there is no justification for reading in the
terms of the articles anything more than what is
expressly stated therein. There is further this distinction between the American Constitution and ours that
whereas the American Constitution was merely enacted in order to form a more perfect union, establish
justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for
common defence, promote the general welfare and
secure the blessings of liberty and was an outline of
government and nothing more, our Constitution was
(r) (1955] r S.C.R. 613.
71
562
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
enacted to secure to all citizens, Justice, Liberty,
Equality and Fraternity and laid emphasis on the
Bashesh(Jr Nath
v.
welfare state and contained more detailed provisions,
The Commission" defining the rights and also laying «;fown restrictions
of Income·tax. thereupon in the interest of the general welfare, etc.
Delhi & Rajasthan As observed by Willis in his Constitutional Law at
& Anoth"
p. 477 : Bl•agwati J.
"The conflict between man and the state is as
old as human history. F'or this reason some compromise must be struck between private liberty and
pnblic authority. There is some need of protecting
personal liberty against governmental power and also
some need of limiting personal liberty by governmental power. The ideal situation is a 11rntter of
balancing one against the other, or adjusting conflicting interests."
"In the United States Constitution an attempt
has been made to strike a proper balance between
personal liberty and social control through express
limitations written into the Constitution and interpreted by the Supreme Court, by implied limitations
created by the Supreme Court, ana by the development of the governmental powers of regulation, taxation, and eminent domain by the Supreme Court."
(Ibid pp. 4 77-4 78),
whereas our Constitution has expressly sought to strike
the bahuice between a written guarantee of individual
rights and the collective interests of the community by
making express provisions in that behalf in Part III
of the Constitution. (Vide Gopalan v. State of
Madras)(').
Moreover in the matter of considering the statements of law made by the text book writers in
America and the dicta of the judges of the Supreme
Court there in the various decisions cited before us,
we must bear in mind the following admonition of
Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in the State of 1'ravancore-Cochin
v. The Bombay Co., Ltd. (').
"These clauses are widely different in language,
scope and purpose, and a varying body of doctrines
1958
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
(2)
[1952] S.C.R. IJ12, 1120.
t
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
563
a.nd tests have grown a.round them interpreting, extend1958
ing or restricting, from time to time, their operation 8 , " N •
. t'ion m
.
an d a pp1ica
t h e con t ex t of th e expand'mg as,ies v.ar aln
American commerce and industry, and we are of The commission•r
opinion that not much help can be derived from them of Income-tax,
in the solution of the problems arising under Art. 286 D1lm ,i;. Rajas1Aat1
of the Indian Constitution "
.s. Ano1h..
or for the matter of that, articles embodying the BhaKVJ41i 1.
fundamental rights in Part III of our Constitution
(See also The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Ohamarbau,gwal.a) (1).
The rights conferred on citizens may be thus classified: (i) statutory rights; (ii) constitutional rights;
and (iii) fundamental rights. One need not consider
the statutory rights in this context but the constitutional rights are those created and conferred by the
Constitution. They may or may not be waived by
a citizen, as stated in the text books and the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States of America
above referred to. But when the rights conferred are put
on a high pedestal and are given the status of fundamental rights, which though embodied in the Constitution itself are in express terms distinguished from the
other constitutional rights (e.g., fundamental rights
which are enshrined in Part III of the Constitution
and are enacted as immune from any legislation inconsistent with or derogatory thereto and other constitutional rights which are enacted in other provisions,
for instance in Arts. 265 and 286 and in Part XIII of
the Constitution), they are absolutely inviolable save
as expressly enacted in the Constitution and cannot be
waived by a citizen. The Constitution adopted by
our founding fathers is sacrosanct and it is not permissible to tinker with those fundamental rights by
any ratiocination or analogy of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States of America. The
only manner in which that can be done is by appropriate amendment of the Constitution and in no other
manner whatever.
There is no difficulty whatever in working out this
position and to my mind the difficulties pointed out
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 874, 918.
564
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
are more imaginary than real. If a citizen wanted to
Basheshar Nath assert his fundamental right under the circumstances
v.
envisaged for instance in the judgment of my brother
The Commi,,ioner S. K. Das, J., and made an application for a writ under
of Income-tax. Art. 32 or Art. 226 of the Constitution he would be
Delhi&· Rajasthunpromptly confronted with the argument that the Court
&- Another
. th e exermse
. of its
. a·1soret10u
. re f use h"im t he
s h on Id m
Bhagwati 1,
relief prayed for. The remedy is purely discretionary
and no Court in those circumstances would exercise its
discretion in his favour (Vide Dewan Bahadur Seth
Gopal Das Mohta v. Union of India (1 ), Baburao
Narayan Savas v. Union of lndia( 2 ) and Laxmanappa
Hoonmantappa Janakhandi v. Union of India (3).
Even then he might merely obtain a relief declaring
the legislation ultra vires the Constitution and the Court
would not grant him any consequential relief. For
that relief he would have to approach the regular
courts of law, when all questions of law, apart from
the mere constitutionality of the provision would be
considered by the Court on a contest between the parties, e.g., estoppel, acquiescence, limitation and the like
(Compare our observations in Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanayalal Mukundlal Saraf(')). The only thing
which parties would be concluded by would be the
adjudication as to the u.ltra vires character of the
measure in question and the citizen would not be entitled to the relief claimed merely for the asking. These
considerations, therefore, do not militate against the
position that a citizen cannot waive the fundamental
rights conferred upon him by Part III of the Constitution.
I fully endorse the opinion expressed by Mahajan,
C. J., in Behram Khursheed Pesikaka v. The State of
Bombay(') at page 653 :.
"'\Ve think that the rights described as fundamental rights are a necessary consequence of the
declaration in the preamble that the people of India
have solemnly resolved to constitute lndia into a
r95B
(') [1955] l S.C.R. 773·
(3) [r955J I S.C.R. 769.
(2) [1954] 26 l.T.R. 725.
(4) Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1957 decided on September 23, 1958.
(5) [1955] I S. C. R. 613.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
565
959
sovereign democratic republic and to secure to all its
r
citizens justice, social, economic and political; liberty Basheshar Nath
of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship ;
v.
equality of status and of opportunity. These funda- The Commissioner
mental rights have not been put in the Constitution of Income-tax.
merely for individual benefit, though ultimately they Delh~ ~ R~{asthan
come into operation in considering individual rights.
no er
They have been put there as a matter of public policy Bhagwari J.
and the doctrine of waiver can have no application to
provisions of law which have been enacted as a matter of constitutional policy."
This, in my opinion, is the true position and it
cannot therefore be urged that it is open to a citizen
to waive his fundamental rights conferred by Part III
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court is the bulwark of the fundamental rights which have been for
the first time enacted in the Constitution and it would
be a sacrilege to whittle· down those rights in the manner attempted to be done.
The result is however the same and I agree with the
order proposed by My Lord the Chief Justice.
S. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal by special leave
from an order dated January 29, 1958, passed by the
Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, respondent no. l
before us, in circumstances which are somewhat unusual and out of the ordinary. We shall presently
relate those circumstances; but at the very outset it
may be stated that two questions of far-reaching
importance fall for consideration in this appeal. One
is the validity of a settlement made under s. SA of the
Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act,
1947 (30 of 1947) hereinafter referred to as the Act,
after the coming into force of the Constitution on
January 26, 1950, and the second is if a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution can be said to
have been waived by the appellant in the circumstances of this case.
The appellant before us is Basheshar Nath, whom
we shall hereafter call the assessee. As we have
already stated, the Commissioner of Income-tax,
Delhi, is the first respondent. The second respondent
S. K. Das].
566
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
is the Union of India. We also allowed the Model
Knitting Industries, a limited liability Company with
Bas hes hv.ar Nath 1•ts reg1stere
·
d offi ce m
· Ca 1cutta, to mtervene
·
· t he
m
T~e Commissioner appeal, on the ground that the intervening Company
of Income·tax, has a case pending in the High Court of Calcutta
Delhi & Rajasthanwhere the same questions are in issue.
We have also
& Another
heard the intervener in support of the appeal.
J.
On behalf of the appellant it has been contended
that the Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, is a
tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution and exercised judicial functions when it passed the impugned order of January 29, 1958. The
respondents pointed out, however, that the so-called
order was nothing but a reply which respondent no. 1
gave to a communication received from the assessee.
However, the respondents have waived any preliminary objection to the maintainability oft.he present
appeal, and the learned Attorney General appearing
for the respondents has frankly stated before us that
he is raising no such preliminary objection, as the
Union Government is equally anxious to have a
decision on the question, very important from its point
of view and with far-reaching financial consequences,
as to whether a settlement made under s. SA of the
Act after January 26, 1950, and the orders passed
thereon by the Union Government are valid. We
have, therefore, proceeded on the footing that the
present appeal is competent, and have considered it
unnecessary to decide in the abstract the more general
question as to the circumstances in which an order
made by a revenue authority like the Commissioner of
Income-tax partakes of the character of a judicial or
quasi-judicial order.
•
Now, for the facts and circumstances which have
led up to this appeal. The Act received the assent
of the Governor-General on April 18, 1947, and came
into force on May 1, 1947. On July 22, l!J48, the
case of the assessee was referred to the Investigation
Commission, constitued under s. 3 of the Act. The
reference was made under s. 5(1) of the Act, and it
stated that the Central Government had prima f acie
reasons for believing that the assessee either alone or
r95s
s. ic-:;;,,
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
567
8
in combination with other persons evaded p11.yment
Z9$
of taxation on income to a substantial extent, and Bashesllar Na11i
therefore the case of the assessee was sent to the
v.
Investigation Commission for investigation and report. Tlte Cort1missioner
The period of investigation was from April 1, 1939 to of_ 1ncome_-1a,.,
March 31, 1947. The report of the Investigation Com- Dil.11~ ~ 110:iasi1u...
mission which has been made available to us shows
" er
that the ca.se against the assessee was that he carried s. K. Das J.
on a. business of supplying tents, executing contract
works, and commission agency for some textile mills
on a fairly extensive sea.le, both individually and in
partnership wit,h his brother. It appears that the
total wealth statement of the assessee was filed on
November 10, 1948, and was forwarded to an authorised official appointed under s. 6(3) of the Act. From
January 8, 1949 to October 14, 1949 the authorized
official was engaged in the collection of assessment
records of the assessee from the income-t&x authorities and of materials from the Civil Supplies Directorate. On July 5, 1949, the total wealth statement
was received back from the assessee and the ordersheet shows that on May 26, 1950, (that is, after the
coming into force of the Constitution) the authorised
official issued a notice to the assessee fixing the hearing for June 10, 1950. The assessee then asked for
time, and it appears that for a period of a.bout three
years till June, 1953, nothing was done. Thereafter,
the authorised official held a preliminary investigation
and computed intially that the undisclosed income
of the assessee for the period in question was
Rs. 12,07,000; on further scrutiny and examination
of accounts and after hearing the assessee's explanation, the authorised official reduced the amount in his
final report, submitted sometime towards the end of
1953, to Rs. 9,56,345. The Investigation Commission
considered the report of the authorised official, heard.
the assessee, and came to the conclusion that the total
amount to be assessed in the hands of the assessee
was Rs. 4,47,915. In their report dated May 24, 1954
the Investigation Commission said :
" During the course of the hearing before us,
the assessee as well as his Auditors applied for a.
568
•958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
settlement after admitting liability for the aforesaid
Bashesha• Nath sum. In the circumstances, we consider it proper to
v.
allow the assessee the benefit of a settlement on the
The Commissfone. lower concessional basis of 75% of evaded income
of I-come-tax, payable by way of tax and a moderate penalty of Rs.
Delhi & Rajasthan 14,064....... The assessee accepting our findings .both as
& Another
regards the amount of income that escaped assesss. I<. Das J. ment and the amount of tax and penalty payable,
offered a settlement. In the circumstances, we recommend the acceptance by the Government of the
assessee's offer of a settlement."
The Central Government, accepted the settlement
under s. SA of the Act and on July 5, 1954, passed an
order under s. 8A(2) directing the issue of a demand
notice by the Income-tax Officer concerned for a sum
of Rs. 3,50,000 (including the penalty of Rs. 14,064)
on the assessee and further directing that "all such
other proceedings under the Indian Income-tax Act
or under any other law, as may be necessary, should
be taken with a view to enforcing the payment of the
demand and the terms and conditions of settlement."
Though under the terms of settlement no instalments
were given, it appears that the assessee was allowed
to pay the amount at the rate of Rs. 5,000 per
month. · It further appears that up to and including September 8, 1957, the assessee had paid in all
a sum of Rs. 1,28,000 towards the demand. In
December, 1955 was given the decision of this Court
in M. GT. Muthiah v. The' Commissioner of Incometax, Madras ('), in which the majority of Judges
held that s. 5(1) of the Act was ultra vires the Constitution, as it was discriminatory and ·violative of
the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 of the
·Constitution by reason of two amendments which
were made in s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922-one in 1948 by the enactment of the Incometax and Business Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948
(48 of 1948) and the other in 1954 by the enactment
of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1954
(33 of 1954). Sometime earlier than the aforesaid decision, the Income-tax Officer concerned had sent a
<•> [1955] 2 s.c.R. 1247.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
569
recovery certificate to the Collector, New Delhi, and
rgj8
the assessee stated that in execution of the said certi· proper t'1es s1'tua t ed · m
· Dh aramsa 1a and Beuheshar Nal11
fi ca t e h lS
Hissar were attached. On December 27, 1957, the The c0 :;,,,ssiot1u
assessee filed a petition to the Income-tax Commis- of Income-ta1,
sioner, Delhi, in which after stating the relevant Delhi 6- Rajasthan
facts, the assessee claimed that, after the decision in
6- Another
Muthiah's case (1), the settlement made under s. SA
of the Act had no force and was not binding on him : s. K. Das J.
the assessee then prayed that the attached properties
should be released from attachment and the amounts
recovered under the terms of settlement refunded to
him. On January 29, 1958, the Commissioner of
Income-tax sent the following reply" With reference to your petition dated 27th
December 1957 regarding the settlement arrived at
under section 8A{2) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, I am to inform
you that the settlement is valid and binding on you;
2. You are, therefore, requested to make good
the arrears of instalments which you have not paid
recently by 5th :February, 1958 and also to continue
making the payments in accordance with the instalments' scheme agreed to, failing which the recovery
proceedings will be vigorously pursued through the
usual recovery channels."
The assessee asked for and obtained special leave
from this Court on February 17, 1958, to appeal from
the aforesaid order. In the appeal as orginally filed
in pursuance of the special leave granted to the
assessee, the prayer portion was inadvertently left
out. Subsequently, the assessee prayed that-(a) the
report of the Investigation Commission dated May 24,
1954, be quashed, (b) the settlement made on the basis
of the report and the directions given by the Central
Government in pursuance thereof and the proceedings
for recovery of arrears of tax be all quashed, and (c)
the amounts already recovered may be ordered to be
refunded. With regard to the last prayer, we may
state here that it was not pressed before us and we
!lore relieved from the task, at least in this appeal, of
(1) (1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247.
I
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
deciding in what circumstances and on what considerations a refund of tax voluntarily paid can be
Bash.,har Nath claimed.
v.
The Commission"
Therefore, the first and foremost question before us
of Income-tax. is the validity of the settlement made under s. 8A of
Delhi &- Rajastha• the Act. On behalf of the. assessee the main arguo;. Another
ment is thats. 5(1) of the Act having been hel.d ultra
s. K--:;;,,, J. vires the Constitution, the very foundation for the
report of the Investigation Commission has disappeared
and a settlement based thereon is ne\ther valid, nor can
it be enforced. On behalf of the respondents, the
learned Attorney General has contended that there
is no decision of this Court which has held thats. 5(1)
of the Act is wholly void and on a proper construction of the various sections of the Act, it will be found
that there are two separate and distinct procedures
or jurisdictions which the Investigation Commission
may follow or exercise: one is investigation and the
other relates to settlement. He h::is submitted that
the jurisdiction conferred on the Investigation Commission under s. SA, which was inserted in the Act
in 1949 by s. 33 of Act 67 of 1949, is not affected by
the decision in Muthiah's case ('), and if the Investigation Commission had jurisdiction to entertain an
application from the a.ssessee for settlement, approve
of the same, and refer it to the Central Government,
the latter had also jurisdiction to accept it under subs. (l) and make necessary orders under sub-s. (2) of
s. SA. In short, the argument of the learned Attorney
General is that there is nothing in Muthiah's decision ('), which renders s. SA constitutionally invalid.
It is necessary to read at this stage the relevant
provisions of the Act in so far as they bear upon the
problems before us. 'Ve have said that the Act came
into force on May 1, 1947. This was before the coming into force of the Constitution of India, .and no
question of the violation of any fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution arose on that date.
Section 3 of the Act empowers the Central Government (now Union Government) to constitute a Commission to be called the Income-tax Investigation
z95B.
(1) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 1247.
\
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
571
Commission, whose duties shall be (to quote the words
z95B
of the section)Basheshar Nath
"(a) to investigate a.nd report to the Central
v.
Government on all matters relating to taxation on The Commissioner
income, with particular reference to th':l extent to which of In&ome-ta,,,
the existing law relating to, and procedure for, the Delhi & Rajasthan
. o f sueh t axa t"ion is
. d
6- Another
assessmen t au d co11ect1on
a equa t e
to prevent the evasion thereof;
•
s. K. Das J.
(b) to investigate in accordance with the provisions of this Act any case or point in a case referred to
itunder section 5 and make a report thereon (including
such interim reports as the Commission may think
fit) to the Central Government in respect of all or any
of the assessments made in relation to the case before
the date of its report or interim report, as the case may
be."
We are concerned in this appeal with the duty of the
Commission referred to ins. 3(b) above. Section 4 deals
with the composition of the Commission, details
whereof are unnecessary for our purpose. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of s. 5 a.re relevant to the problems
before us and must be read :
"5(1). The Central Government may at any time
before the lst day of September 1948 refe1· to the Commission for investigation and report any case or points
in a case in which the Central Government has prima
facie reasons for believing that a. person has to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income,
together with such material as may be available in
support of such belief, and may at any time before the
1st day of September, 1948 apply to the Commission
for the withdrawal of any case or points in a case thus
referred, and if the Commission approves of the withdrawal, no further proceedings shall thereafter be
taken by or before the Commission in respect of the
case or points so withdrawn.
(2) The Commission may, after examining the
material submitted by the Central Government with
reference to any case or points in a case and making
such investigation as it considers necessary, report to
the Ccntrai Government that in its opinion further
investigation is not likely to reveal a.ny substantial
572
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959) Supp.
evasion of taxation on income and on such report
B•shesh•r Nalh being made the investigation shall be deemed to be
closed.
v.
The Commissione,.
(3) .............................................................. .
0
Rm~-•· "h·
(4) If in the course of investigation into any case
Delofh.1:'
~ •J•S 1 an
'
'
,.
d to 1t
' und er su b -sect10n
· ( l) ,
cl> ·Anoth"
or pomts
m
a case re1erre
1
S. J(. Das ].
the Commission has reason to believe• (a) that some person other than the person whose
case is being investigated has evaded payment of
taxation on income, or
(b) that some points other than those referred to
it by the Central Government in respect of any case
also require investigation,
it may ·make a report to the Central Government
stating its reasons for such belief and, on receipt of
such report, the Central Government shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (I), forthwith refer to the Commission for investigation the case
of such other person or such additional points as may
be indicated in that report."
Section 5 as originally enacted mentioned the date
30th of June, 1948, but by Act 49 of 1948 the date
substituted was "lst day of September, 1948 ". Section 6 states the powers of the Commission, and they
may be summarised thus:
(a) the Commission has power to require any person or banking or other Company to give information
on relevant points;
(b) it has power to administer oaths and all the
powers of a civil court to take evidence, enforce the
attendance of witnesses etc;
(c) it has power to impound and retain a document in its custody;
(d) it has power to ask an authorised official to
examine accounts ancl interroga:te any person ;
(e) it has power to give directions to an authori8ed official ;
(f) it has power to close the investigation ancl
make a best of judgment assessment in respect of a
person who refuses or fails to attend in person, to give
evidence or p~oduce documents etc ; and
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
(g) it has power of seizure, search etc. in certain
z958
specified circumstances.
Basheshar Nath
Sections 6A and 6B deal with the power of the Comv.
mission to tender immunity from, prosecution and to The Commissioner
withdraw such tender. Section 7 states the procedure of Income-tax,
to be followed bv the Commission, sub-ss. (2), (4) and Delhi & Rajasthat1
& Another
(6) whereof nee d• onl y b e re£erred to h ere:
"7(2) In making an investigation under clause (b) s. K. Das J.
of section 3, the Commission shall act in accordance
with the principles of natural justice, shall follow as
far as practicable the principles of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 (I of 1872), and shall give the person whose
case is being investigated a reasonable opportunity of
rebutting any evidence adduced against him ; 1 and the
power of the Commission to compel production of
documents shall not be subject to the limitation imposed by section 130 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I
of 1872}, and the Commission shall be deemed to be a
court and its proceedings legal proceedings for the
purpose of sections 5 and 6 of the Bankers' Books Evidence A~it, 1891 (XVIII of 1891).
(3) .............................................................. .
(4) No person shall be entitled to inspect, ca.ll for,
or obtain copies of, any documents, statements or
papers or materials furnished to, obtained by or produced before the Commission or any authorised offieial
in any proceedings under this Act; but the Commission, and after the Commission has ceased to exist such
authority as the Central Government may in this
behalf appoint, may, in its discretion, allow such inspection and furnish such copies to any person :
Pl'ovided that, for the purpose of enabling the
person whose case or points in whose case is or arc
being investigated to rebut any evidence brought on
the record against him, he shall, on application ma.de
in this behalf and on payment of such fees as may be
prescribed by Rules made under this Act, be furnished
with certified copies of documents, statements, papers
a~1d materials brought on the record by the Commis-
s10n.
(5) ............................................................. .
574
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
(6) In any proceedings under this Act, the Commission may, in its discretion, admit in evidence and
Bashedar Nalh
· hat&nd mg
·
th a t 1"t 1s
· not
v.
adct upon apedny d ocmn~nt nedot,":'it
n. c0 ,..,,,;,,;0 . , , u1y stam
or reg\ster .
of INco ..e-lu, Section 8 states in effect what the Commission shall do
D1IM cS- Rajaslha" on the conclusion of the investigation : it states that
.s- ..boiher the materials brought on the record shall be considers, K. n., 1. ed by all the members, and the report shall be in
accordance with the opinion of the majority. Subsection (2) of s. 8 gives the Central Government power
to direct reopening of asseBSment proceedings on the
report of the Commission. Sub-section (4) states that
in the assessment or reassessment proceedings in
pursuance of a direction given under sub-1. (2), the
findings recorded by the Commission shall be final,
subject to the provisions of sub-ss. (5) and (6). Then
comes s. 8A which must be quoted in full:
"S. SA(l) Where any person concerned in any
case referred to or pending before the Com~ission for
investigation applies to the Commission at any time
during such investigation to have the case or any part
thereof settled in so far as it relates to him, the Commission shall, if it is of opinion that the terms of the
settlement contained in the application may be approved, refer the matter to the Central Government, and
if the Central Government accepts the terms of such
settlement, the Commission shall have the terms the roof recorded and thereupon the investigation, in so far
as it relates to matters covered by such settlement,
shall be deemed to be closed.
(2) For the purpose of enforcing the terms of
any settlement arrived at in pursuance of sub-section
(1), the Central Government may direct 'that such
proceedings as may be appropriate under the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), the Excess Profits
Tax Act, 19.0 (XV of 1940) or any other law may be
taken against the person to whom the settlement relates, and, in particular, the provisions of the second
proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (5) of section 23,
section 24B, the proviso to sub:section (2) of section
25A, the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 26 and
sections 44 and 46 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
1958
{I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
shall be applicable to the recovery of any sum speci'"'
tied in such settlement by the Income-tax Officer 8 • .,.,.,.,,, Naill
having jurisdiction to assess the person by whom such
v.
sum is pa.ya.hie as if it were income-tax or an arrear T/11 co,,,,,,;,.;011•r
of income-t.a.x within the meaning of those provisions. of 1..c0Me-1as,
1
(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (6)D'111~ ~ R~~·s
11a,.
0
of section 8, any settlement arrived at under this
" "
section shall be conclusive as to the matters stated s. K. D•s J.
therein, and no person wbo11e cue ha.a been 80 aettled
!!!hall be entitled to reopen in any proceeding for the
recovery of any sum under this aection or in any
subsequent assesssment or reasse88ment proceeding
relating to taxa.t.ion on income or in any other proceeding before any court or other authority any matter
which forms part of such settlement.
(4) Where a settlement has been accepted by
Government under sub-section (1), no proceedings
under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
(XI of 1922), or under section 15 of the Excess Profits
Tax Act, 1940 (XV of 1940), shall be initiated in respect of the items of income covered by the settlement
unless the initiation of such proceedings is expressly
allowed by the terms of the settlement."
Section 9 bars the jurisdiction of courts, but it is not
disputed that if any of the provisions of the Act are
ultra vires the Constitution, s. 9 will neither cure the
defect nor stand in the way of the asse88ee. Section 10,
the la!lt section, gives the Central Government power
to make rules.
The above recital gives a brief conspectus of the
main provisions of the Act. It is necessary now to
refer to a few earlier decisions of this Court with regard
to some of these provisions. The earliest in point of
time is the decision .in Suraj Mall Mohta and Go. v.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri (1 ), where sub-s. (4) of s. 5 of
the Act and the procedure prescribed by the Act in 80
far as it affected the persons proceeded against under
that sub-section, were held to be discriminatory and
therefore void and unenforceable. No opinion wa.s,
however, expressed on the validity of 8. 5(1) of the Act.
(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 448.
576
•958
SUPREJIIE COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
In Skree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. Sri A. V.
Basheshar Nath Viswanatha Sastri {'),it was held that after the coming
v.
into force on July 17, 1954, of the Indian Income-tax
The Commission" (Amendment) Act, 1954, (33 of 1954) which operated
of Income-ta~. on the same field ass. 5(1) of the Act, the provisions
Delhi & Rajasthanof s. 5 (l) became void and unenforceable as being
& Another
discriminatory in character. It was further held that
S. !(,Das J ,
when an Act was valid in its entirety before the date
of the Constitution, that part of the proceedings regulated by the special procedure and taken during the
pre-Constitution period could not be questioned however discriminatory it might have been, but the discriminatory procedure could not be continued after
the coming into force of the Constitution. In that case
(Meenakshi Mills' case (1) ) the Investigation Commission had not even commenced the proceedings though
a period of seven yea.rs had elapsed and the investigation was pending when the writ petitions were filed.
In those circumstances it was held that the ·proceedings before the Investigation Commission which had
become discriminatory could no longer be continued.
Then came the decision in M. OT. Muthiah v. The
Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (2 ). The facts
relevant to that decision were that the Investigation
Commission held an enquiry into three cases and
submitted a report on August 26, 1952, finding a
particular sum to be the undisclosed income during
the investigation period. The Central Government
accepted the report and passed an order. under s. 8(2)
of the Act on September 16, 1952. Notices under
s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act were then issued
and reassessments except for one year were ma.de on
the findings of the Commission, which were treated as
final and conclusive. The re-assessment orders were
served on the assessees in February and May 1954.
On December 6, 1954, the assessees filed their writ
petitions challenging the constitutionality of s. 5 (l)
of the Act. It was held by the majority that s. 5 (I)
was discriminatory and violative of the fundamental
right guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution,
because s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 as
(1) [195.1] 1 S.C:R. 787.
(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
577
amended in 1948 operated on the same field and
1958
from and after January 26, 1950, it included the strip Basheshar Nat'ft
of territory which was also occupied by s. 5 (1) and
v.
two substantially different laws of procedure, one more The commissioner
prejudicial to the assessee than the other, could not of Income-tax,
be allowed to operate on the same field in view of the Delhi &- Rajasthan
guarantee of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In the result
& Another
it was held that barring those caseshwhich were already S. K. Das 1•
concluded by reports made by t e Commission and
directions given by Government before January 26,
1950, the cases which were pending before the commission for investigation as also assessment or reassessment proceedings which were pending on January 26, 1950, were hit by Art. 14. The assessment
orders were accordingly quashed as being unconstitutional.
Now, we come back to the problems before us: (1)
what is the effect of l\iuthia's decision (1) in the present
case, and (2) does the Act contemplate two separate
and distinct, but severable, procedures or jurisdictions
-one relating to investigation and the other to settlement, so that the vice of discrimination (if any) attaches to the investigation procedure only and not to
the other?
We do not sec how the learned Attorney General
can escape from the position that Muthia's decision(')
holds in express terms that s. 5 (1) of the Act was hit
by Art. 14 of the Constitution on and after January
26, 1950. The ratio of the decision was thus explained in the majority judgment at page 1260, 1261 :"After the 8th September, 1948, there were two
procedures simultaneously in operation, the one under
Act XXX of 1947 and the other under the Indian
Income tax Act with reference to persons who fell
within the same class or category, viz., that of the
substantial evaders of income-tax.
After the 8th
September, 1948, therefore, some persons who foll
within the class of substantial evaders of income-tax
were dealt with under the drastic and summary procedure prescribed under Act XXX of 1947, while other
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247.
73
5~8
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1959] Supp.
persons who fell within the same class of substantial
evaders of income-tax could be dealt with under the
v. .
procedure prescribed in the Indian Income-tax Act
TA• co,.missi°"" after service of notice upon them under the amended
0
1
section 34 (1) of the Act. Different persons, though
D 11~.••ci;. ~·:••Rm~-t•'::
•J•Stnan f a 11'mg un d er t h e same cl ass or category of su b stant1al
•
Another
evaders of income-tax, would, therefore, be subject to
s. K. Das J. different procedures, one a summary and drastic procedure and the other a normal procedure which gave
to the assessees various rights which were denied to
those who were specially treated under the procedure
prescribed in Act XXX of 1947.
The legislative competence being there, these provisions, though discriminatory, could not have been
challenged before the advent of the Constitution.
When, however, the Constitution came into force on
the 26th January, 1950, the citizens obtained the
fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution including the right to equality of laws and
equal protect.ion of laws enacted in article 14 thereof,
and whatever may have been the position before
January 26, 1950, it was open to the persons alleged
to belong to the class. of substantial evaders thereafter
to ask as to why some of them were subjected to the
summary and drastic procedure prescribed in Act
XXX of 1947 a.nd others were subjected to the
normal procedure prescribed in section 34 and the
cognate sections of the Indian Income-tax Act, the
procedure prescribed in Act XXX of 1947 being obviously discriminatory and, therefore, violative of the
fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the
Constitution."
That ratio is equally applicable in the present case,
and ifs. 5(1) of the Act is unenforceable after January
26, 1950, the reference made thereunder against the
assessee must also fall after that date and with it must
go overboard all that was done under the drastic and
summary procedure prescribed under the Act after
January 26, 1950. Two possible arguments that (1) substantial evaders whose cases were referred by the Central Government for investigation by the Commission
BiuhesAar Natl
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
before September 1, 1948, formed a class by them1958
selves and. (2) that proceedings having started before Bashcshar Nath
the Commission under a. reference valid at the time
v.
when it was made cannot be affected by any subse- Tiie Commissio"er
quent amendment of the Income-tax Act, 1922, were of Incomc-lllx,
raised, but not accepted in Suraj Mall l\fohta's, Delhi & Rajastlla•
Meena.kshi Mills' or Muthia's case (1) (~)(3). There has
& Another
been some argument before us as to how the two S. K.- Dai].
procedures-one prescribed under the Income-tax Act,
1922, and the other under the Act-compare and contrast with each other; but this is a point which was
canvassed at great length in each of the three cases
mentioned above. This Court found in unequivocal
terms that the procedure prescribed under the Act
was more summary and drastic, and in Suraj Mall
Mohta's case the substantial differences between the
two procedures were summarised at pp. 463-466 of the
repo1·t. \Ve do not propose to coyer the same ground
again, but content ourseh-es with drawing attention to
what was pointedly said in Suraj Mall l\lohta's case (1 ),
namely, that it was conceded on behalf of Gonrnment
th:it the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act in
ss. 6 and 7, which we have read earlier, was more
drastic than the procedure prescribed in ss. 37 and
38 of the Indian Income-tax Act.. It was stated
tlwrein that though in the first stages of investigation
there was some similarity bctwten the two proccdurns,
the overall picture was not the same.
The leamed Attorney General has not seriously
contested the correctness of this position, but has
argued that wlrnt we are concerned with in the present
case is not the mere possibility of a differential treatment., but what actually was done by the Commission
in the case of the present assessee after January 26,
1950. He has submitted that the assessee was not
subjected to any differential treatment in fact, and has
invoked to his aid the ratio of our decision in Syed
Qasim Raz1:i v. The State of Hyderabad (1 ), where the
majority judgment laid down the following tests : in a
case where part of the trial cannot be challenged as
(1) (1955] 1 S.C.R. HS.
(2) (1955] I S.C.R. i87.
(3) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247·
{4) [1953] S.C.R. 589.
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
bad, it is incumbent on the court to consider, first,
whether
the discriminatory provisions of the law can
B
"""' v:• "''' be separated from the rest and even without them a
The commission" fair measure of equality in the matter of procedure
of Iucome-tux, can be secured, and secondly, whether the procedure
Delhi .s- 11ajastha11 actually followed did or did not proceed upon the
<S- Anothe>
discriminatory provisions and it was' stated that a
s. K-:-;;_s J. mere threat or possibility of unequal treatment was
not sufficient to invalidate the subsequent proceedings.
A reference was there made to the earlier decisions of
this Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State
of Bombay('), and Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v.
The State of Bombay (2), and the decision in Lachmandas's case (supra), again a majority decision, was distinguished on two grounds : first, the question as' to
whether after eliminating the discriminatory provisions
it was still possible to secure a fair measure of equality
with the normal procedure was neither raised nor considered; secondly, it was assumed that it was not
possible to proceed with the trial without following the
discriminatory procedure and as that procedure became
void on the coming into force of the Constitution, the
jurisdiction to proceed under that procedure came to
an end. Applying the tests laid down in the majority
\lecision of Syed Qasim Razvi's case (8), the learned
Attorney General has contended that in the present
case the discriminatory provisions can be separated
from the rest of the Act, and the assessee was not in
fact subjected to any discriminatory procedure. l{e
has sought to distinguish Muthia's case on the same
ground, viz., that the re-assessments made-in that case
were actually based on a discriminatory procedure.
In our view the ratio of the majority decision in
Syed Qasim Razvi's case (3 ) has no application in the
case under our consideration, and the principle which
applies is what was laid down in Lachmandas's case(').
The majority decision is Syed Qasim Razvi's J:;ase proceeded on the finding (to quote the words of Mukherjea,
J., who delivered the majority judgment) that "although there were deviations in certain particulars,
z958
,
h
N
,
(1) [1951] S. C. R. 228,
(2) [1952] S. C.R. 710.
(3) [1953] S. C. R. 589.
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
1 8
the accused had substantially the benefit of a normal
95
trial". The minority judgments, however, very perti- Basheshar Nat"li
nently pointed out that the discriminatory provisions
v.
were an integral part of the Regulation under which The CommissiotUr
the accused person in that case was tried and in fact of Ineomi•taN,
· · · t ory prov1s10ns
· ·
th e d1scrimma
were app l'1e d . Bose, J . Dellli.s. 0-A Rajaslllan
111
(as he then was) expressed the view (at p. 618) " that
"" "
in testing the validity of a law, it is irrelevant to con- s. K. Dt.,. J.
sider what has been done under it, for a law is either
constitutional or not and the validity or otherwise
cannot depend upon what has been accomplished
under its provisions."
It is, we think, unnecessary to go into the controversy which arises out of the two views expressed
above. For the present case, it is sufficient to say
that (1) the discriminatory provisions are an integral
part of the procedure prescribed under the Act which
cannot be separated from the rest ; and (2) we are
satisfied that the report which led to the settlement
was made by the Investigation Commission in pursuance of and as a direct result of the discriminatory
procedure which it followed. Indeed, the Investigation
Commission followed the only procedure of investigation prescribed under the Act, which was a drastic and
summary procedure, and if that procedure became
void on the coming into force of the Constitution, the
jurisdiction of the Investigation Commission practically came to an end (see Lachmandas's case, supra).
It is necessary to explain here why we cannot
accept the contention of the learned Attorney General
that there are two procedures or two jurisdictions
under the Act. What in substance is the effect of the
provisions of the Act, in so far as they relate to the
Commission's duty under s. 3 (b)? The Commission
receives a reference under s. 5 (1) if it does not proceed
under s. 5 (2), it exercises such of its powers under s. 6
as it considers necessary. It then follows the procedure
laid down in s. 7 a.nd submits its report under s. 8. On
that report, the Central Government takes action
under s. 8 (2). If, however, the assessee applies for
settlement, even then the Commission has the duty to
report to Government if the terms Qf settlement are
5S2
19Ja
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
approved by it.
To fulfil this duty, the Commission
Basheshar Nalh must get the materials by exercising its powers
v.
under s. 6 and by following the procedure laid down
Th• Commissioner in s. 7. That is exactly what was done in the present
of Income-tu, case. An authorised official was asked to examine the
Delhi & Rajasth•• accounts etc. under s. 6 (3).
.s- A•other
s. K. v,., J.
He examined the accounts
and submitted an interim report in 1953. He followed
the procedure laid down in the Act with regard to
inspection of documents, examination of witnesses etc.
He then submiticd a final report. The Commission
then heard the assessee on May 19, 1954, and reserved
orders. On May 20, 1954, after the assessee knew
what the final finding of the Commission was going to
be, he filed an application for settlement. The Commission made its final report four days after. It is
difficult to underste.nd how in the circumstances stated
above, it can be said that the Commission followed a
non-discriminatory procedure or that it had two jurisdictions-one relating to invest.igation and the other
to settlement. The jurisdiction was really one, and
the procedure followed also the same. It is not as
though the Act provided a separate procedure for purposes of effecting a settlement; nor is this a case
where a. settlement has been made without applying
any of the provisions relating to investigat-ion. A full
investigation was made, and after the assessee had
been subjected to the drastic and sum_mary procedure
under the Act, he was told what the result of the
investigation was. Then, he made an application for
settlement, whioh was approved by the Commission
under s. SA.
We a.re accordingly of the view that the learned
Attorney General has failed to make out his case that
(l) Muthia's decision{') docs not apply and (2) the
settlement under s. SA of the Act is a legally valid
settlement by reason of the severability or non-application of the discriminatory procedure tinder the Act
in the case of the assessee.
This brings me to the second question, that of waiver
of a fundamental right, which is as important as it is
complex. It is a. question on which unfortunately we
(1) [1955] • S.C.R. 1247.
(1) S.C.R.
-t
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
583
have not been able to achieve unanimity. It is beset
with this initial difficulty that the present appeal is Basheshar Nath
not from a judgment or order rendered after the trial
v.
of properly framed issues ; it is from an order which The Commissioner
merely rejected the prayer of the assessee that his pro- of Income-tax,
· a t tac l1e d m
· execu t"ion o f th e recovery cer t"fi
t Delhi.;. 6-Anoth
Rajasthan
perties
1 ca e
should be released and the amounts paid under the
"
terms of the settlement refunded. The question of s. I<. Das J.
waiver was neither raised, nor tried; and the necessary
facts were not ascertained or determined by the revenue
authority concerned. Unfortunately, the filing of a
statement of their case by the parties was also dispensed with, the result whereof has been that the question
of waiver has been urged for the first time in the
course of arguments here. We have, however, heard
full arguments on it, and I proceed to consider it oh
snch materials as have been placed before us. It is
necessary to make one point clear. The respondents
have raised the plea of waiver, and the onus lies
heavily on them to establish the essential requirements
in support of·the plea.
Two points arise in this connection: (1) have the
respondents established, on the materials before us,
the necessary facts on which a plea of waiver can b!3
founded ; and (2) if so, can a. fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution be waived at all. If
the first point is answered in the negative, the second
point need not be answered in the abstract. On behalf
of the respondents, it has been submitted that asimming (without conceding) that the discriminatory provisions of the Act were applied in the case of the
assessee before he asked for a settlement, the materials
on record show that he never objected to the procedure
adopted, voluntarily asked for a settlement, got by the
settlement the benefit of reducing his liability for both
tax and penalty, and paid without demur the following instalments (some even after Muthia's decision (1) )(I) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 124;.
584
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
z958
Payments made up to April 55
10- 5-55
il•sheshar Nath Payment mitde on
19- 6-55
v.
"
r•e Commissioner
7- 7-55
"
of Inco1ne-tox,
13- 8.55
Delhi & Rajasthan
"
7- 9-55
& Another
"
15-10-55
"
10-11-55
S. K. Das].
"
15-12-55
"
8- 2-56
"
13- 2-56
"
7- 3-56
"
14- 5-56
"
19- 5-56
"
13- 6-56
"
6- 8-56
"
7- 9-56
"
9-10-56
"
10-11-56
"
23-12-56
"
14- 1-57
"
29- 3-57
"
4- 6-57
"
8- 9.57
"
[1959] Supp.
10,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
8,000
--1,28,000
------
The learned Attorney General has in this connection
referred us to the application for settlement which the
assessee had made to the Commission, wherein the
following statements were made :" In view of the fact that though no disclosure
statement had been made before the submission of his
reports by the authorised official, still during the
enquiry before the Commission, the assessee and his
auditors admitted their liability to tax in respect of
the aforesaid sum of Rs. 4,47,915, the Commission was
of the opinion that the assessee should be granted the
benefit of a settlement on the lower concessional basis
of payment of 75 per cent. of the undisclosed· income
by way of tax. The Commission was also of the
opinion that the assessee should pay by way of penalty
a sum of Rs. 14,064.
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
585
The assessee accepts the conclusions of the Commisr95J
sion as regards the amount of income that escaped Basheshar N arh
assessment, the tax payable thereon and the penalty
v.
payable as aforesaid."
Th• Commissioner
On the basis of these statements, the learned Attorney of 1..come-tnx.
General has argued that there is no foundation for the Delhi & Rajas11ia,.
4 01
suggestion made on behalf of the assessee that the
& • " h"
application for sett.lement was made " under the S. K.- Das }.
pressure of circumstances and in view of the coercive
machinerv of the Act." He has submitted that the
necessary. facts on which the plea of waiver is founded
have been established, and he has relied on three cases
decided by this Court, where according to him the
effect of the decisions was to accept snch a plea in
circumstances very similar : Dewan Baha.dur Seth Gopal
Das M.ohta v. The Union of India (1 ); Baburao
Namyanrao Sanas v. The Union of India (2); and
Laxmanappa Hawu11uU1tappa Jamkliandi v. The Union
of India (3). On behalf of the assesscr, it is contended
on the contrary that the necessary facts to found a
plea of waiver are totally absent. in the present case,
and none of the aforesaid three decisions which were
all prono1111ct>d on the same day proceed on a plea of
waiver.
Two ofthe three decisions referred to above relate
to a settlement made under s. SA and the third to an
order made under s. S(2) of the Act. All tho three
decisions were pronounced on applications made under
Art. 32 of the Constitution, and not on any appeal
from an order of the revenue authority. In Gopal
Das l\Iohta's case (1) the argument. urged was, inter
alia, that ss. 5, 6, 7 a.nd S of the Act were invalid
and ·ultra vires as they contravened the provisions of
Ans. 14, 19 (1) (f), and 31 of the Constitution and the
prayer made was that the entire proceedings should be
qua.shed a.s also all orders made by the Central Government in pursuance of the settlement under s. SA. In
rejecting the argument and prayer, :Ma.ha.ja.n, C. J.,
who delivered the judgment of the Court said at
p. 776(iJ [1955] 1 S.C.R. 773.
(3) [1955] I S.C.R. 769.
74
(2) [1954] 26 I.T.R. 725.
586
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
"In our judgment this petition is wholly miscon8 h h N
ceived. Whatever tax the petitioner has alreadv paid,
"' ".~' .,,. or whatever is still recoverable from him, is· being
The commi.,ionu recovered on the basis of the settlement proposed by
•f Income·tax, him and accepted by the Central Government. Because
IMhi .so Rajasthan of his request for a settlement no assessment was made
.so Anoth"
against him by following the whole of the procedure of
the Income-tax Act. In this situation unless and until
·.S • .f(. Das ].
the petitioner can establish that his consent was
improperly procured and that he is not hound thereby
he cannot complain that any of his fundamental rights
has been contravened for which he can claim relief
under art. 32 of the Constitution. Article 32 of the
Constitution is not intended for relief against the
voluntary actions of a person. His remedy, if any,
lies in other appropriate proceedings."
There has been a good deal of argument before us as
to the true effect of the decision in Gopal Das Mohta's
case('). While I recognise that the reason stated for
the decision, viz., that Art. 32 is not intended for relief
against voluntary actions of a person, comes very near
to saying that a person has waived his protection in a
given case since whatever injury he may incur is due
to his own act rather than to the enforcement of an
unconstitutional measure against him, I am unable to
bold that the decision proceeded strictly on the doctrine
of waiiver; it is perhaps true to say that; some of the
observations made therein are of a " Delphic nature to
be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation" (to borrow the words of Frankfurter, J.,
in Machinists v. Gonza.les ('). It seems to me that the
decision proceeded more upon the scope of Art. 32
than upon the doctrine of waiver. I am fortified in
this view by the circumstance that in a decision given
only a month earlier (see Bchram Kkursherl Pesikaka
v. The State of Bombay(')) the same learned Chief
Justice expressed himself strongly, though tentatively,
against introducing in our Constitution tbe doctrine
of waiver as enunciated by some American Judges
in construing the American Constitution, without a.
fuller discussion of the matter. The report of Gopal
r958
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 773.
(2) (1958) 356 U.S. 617, 6r9.
(3) (1955] I S.C.R. 613, 653, 65i·
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
587
Das Mohta's case (1) does not contain any reference
z95B
to the doctrine of waiver, and it is obvious that no Basheshar Nalli
fuller discussion of the doctrine took place in that
v.
case. It is not, therefore, reasonable to hold that the T.h• Commtss;11 ,,.,
effect of Gopal Das l\fohta's case is to uphold the of IneomHas.
doctrine of waiver. Babu Ra.o's case (~) merely follow- Delhi & Rajas1han
ed Gopal Das Mohta (1) and gave no separate reasons.
.s- Anolh1r
3
Laxmanappa Jamkhandi's case ( ) dealt with an s. I<. Das J.
order under s. 8(2) of the Act and said at p. 772 :" From the facts stated above it is plain that the
proceedings taken under the impugned Act XXX of
1947 concluded so far as the Investigation Commission is concerned in September, 1952, more than two
yea.rs before this petition was presented in this Court.
The assessment orders under the Income-tax Act
itself were made against the petitioner in November,
1953. In these circumstances we are of the opinion
that he is entitled to no relief under the provisionfl
of Article 32 of the Constitution. It was held by this
Court in Ramjilal v. Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh, [1951] S.C.R. 127, that as there is a special provision in Article 265 of the Constitution, that no tax
shall be levied or collected except by authority of law,
clause (1) of Article 31 must therefore be regarded as
concerned with deprivation of property otherwise
than by the imposition or collection of tax, and inasmuch as the right conferred by Art. 265 is not a right
confened by Part Ill of the Constitution, it could not
be enforced under Article 32. In view of this decision
it has to be held that the petition under Article 32 is
not maintainable in the situation that has arisen and
that even otherwise in the peculiar circumstances that
have a.risen it would not be just and proper to direct
the issue of any of the writs the issue of which is discretionary with this Court."
Here, again, there is no reference to the doctrine of
waiver, and the case was decided on the ambit and
scope of Art. 32 of the Constitution.
I would hold, therefore, that the decisions of this
Court relied on by the learned Attorney General do
(J) (1955] I S.C.R. 773·
(2) (1954] 26 I.T.R. 7t5.
(3) (1955] I S.C. R. 76g.
588
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
not help him in establishing waiver. Let me now
examine the circumstances on which the learned
11
Bash"h"' N" ' Attorney General founds his plea of waiver.
Indeed,
n. c•.::~.issio•" it is true that the assessee submitted to the discrimina.o/ Income-ta>. tory procedure applied to him by the Commission;
Delhi .s. Rajastlian he also asked for a settlement under which he agreed
.s. At1other to pay 75% of his alleged tax liability and a small
amount of penalty ; he made some payment in instals. K. Das J. ments even after Muthia.'s decision in December, 1955.
Do these circumstances a.mount to waiver? It is to
be remembered that in 1953-1954 when the discriminatory procedure of the Act was applied to him and the
report a.gain~t him was made by the Commission on
which the settlement is based, the assessee did not
know, nor had it been declared by a comt of competent jurisdiction that s. 5( I) of the Act was ultra vires.
In his application for a. settlement, he said clearly in
paragraph 3 that the Commission announced it as its
view that the income, profits and gains that had
escaped assessment in the hands of the assessee was
Rs. 4,47,915. The assessee also knew that under
the Act this finding was final and binding on him.
If in these circumstances, the assessee made an
application for settlement, can it be said that it is
a voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known
right ? I venture to think not. It has been said
that •waiver' is a troublesome term in the law.
The generally accepted connotation is that to con.
stitute ' waiver ', there must be an intentional
relinquishment of a known right or the voluntary
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, or conduct such as warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of a known right or
privilege. Waiver differs from estoppel in the sense
that it is contractual and is an agreement to release
or not to assert a right; estoppel is a rule of evidence.
(See Dawson's Bank Limited v. Nippon Menkwa Kabushiki Kaisha)('). What is the known legal right which
the assessee intentionally relinquished or agreed to
release in 1953-1954 ? He did not know then that
any part of the Act was invalid, and I doubt if in
z95•
(1) (1935) L.R. 6• I.A. 100, 1.o8.
(1) S.C.R..
SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS
589
1 8
the circumstances of this case, a. plea of ' waiver • can
95
be founded on the maxim of 'ignorance of law is no Bas~esha•· Nat'
excuse '. I do not think that the maxim " ignorance
v.
of law is no excuse' can be carried to the extent of The Ccmmissfotie'fsaying that every person must be presumed to know of Incom~-tu.
that a. piece of legislation enacted bv a. legislature of Delhi e;. Rajastha"
• . d'ict'ion mus t be heId• t o be mva.
•
l'1rJ , m
.
<I>
compe t en.t ]Uris
· Anolh••
·
case it prescribes a differential treatment, and he S. K.Das 1.
must, therefore, refuse to submit to it or incur the
peril of the bar of waiver being raised against him.
I do not think t.hat such pre-science is a necessary
corollary of the maxim. On the contrary, the presumption, if any, which operated at 'the relevant t.in1e
was the presumption that a law passed by a com.
petent legislature is valid, unless declared unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction. Further.
more, I do not think that any inference of waiver cau
be retrospectively drawn from the instalments paid
in 1956-57, particularly when the question of refund
of tlw amounts already pa.id is no longer a liv~ issue
before U!i. It would; I thiuk, be going too far to hold
that every unsuspecting submission to a. law, subsequently declared to be invalid, must gh·e rise to a.
plea of waiver: this would make constitutional rights
depend for their vitality on the accident of a timely
challenge and rcuder them illusory to a. very large
extent..
I hold, thetefore, that the necessa1·y foundation for
sustaining the plea of waiver has not been laid in this
case, and the onus being <m the respondenti>, the plea
must fail.
·
In view of my finding that the necessary foundation on facts for sustaining the plea. of waiver has not
been laid in this case, it becomes unnecessary to
decide, in the abstract, the further question if a. right
guaranteed by any of the provisions in Part III of the
Constitution can be waived a.t all. I a.m of the view
that this Court should indeed be rigorous in a.voiding
to pronou,nce on constitutional issues whe1·e a reason.
able alternative exists; for we have consistently
followed the two principles (a) that "the Court will
not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1959) Supp
a.dva.nce of the necessity of deciding it" (Weaver on
Constitutional La.w, p. 69) a.nd (b) "the Court will not
Ba•h•sh•r Nath formulate ·a. rule of constitutional la.w broader than iR
TA• c0 .:;.;.,ioner required by the precise facts to which it is to be
of Income-tax. applied" (ibid, p. 69).
Delhi .s- Rajasthan
My Lord the Chief Justice a.nd my learned brother
cS- Another
Kapur, J., have however expressed the view that the
fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 14 cannot be
S. K. Da; ].
waived; my lea.rued brethren, Bha.gwati a.nd Subba.
Rao, JJ., have expressed the view that none of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution
ca.n be waived.
I greatly regret to have to sa.y that I have come to
a. conclusion different from theirs with regard to this
question, and as they have thought fit to express
their views on it I proceed now to explain why I have
come to a conclusion different. from those of my
lea.rued brethren on this question.
This question was mooted, though not fully answered, in Behram Khurshed Pesikaka.'s case('). Venkatara.ma Aiya.r, J., expressed his views at pages 638 to
643 of the report. l\Ia.haja.n, C. J., with whom
Mukherjea., Vivian Bose a.nd Ghulam Hasan, JJ., concurred, ·expressed his views at pages 651 to 655 of the
report, a.nd my Lord the Chief Justice as Das, J.,
reserved his opinion on the question. The view which
Venkata.rama. Aiyar, J., expressed was this : if thl'
constitutional provision whioh has been infringed
affects the competence of the legislature which passed
the law, the lii,w is a nullity; as for example, when a
State en;octs a law which is within the exclusive competence of the Union; when, however, a law is within the
competence of the legislature which passed it and the
unconstitutionality a.rises by reason of its repugilancy
to provisions enacted for the benefit of individuals,
it is not a nullity, lmt is merely unenforceable; such
unconstitutionality can be waived a.nd in that case the
law·becomes enforceable. He said that in America
this principle was well settled a.nd he referred to
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, Volume l,
pages 368 to 371 ; Willis on Constitutional Law at
(1) [1955]1 S.C.R. 613, 653, 65••
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
1 958
pages 524, 531, 542 and 558; Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law at IJages 28 and 29-30. He then refer- Bashesh·ar Nath
red to certain American decisions in support of his
• v.
views and then said :The Commissioner
" The position must be the same under our Con- of Income-tax.
stitution when a law contravenes a prescription in- Delhi .s. Rajasthan
tended for the benefit of individuals ............ It is open .s. Another
to anvJ person whose right;s have been infringed to s. K.- Das J.
waive it and when there is waiver, there is no legal
impediment to the enforcement of the law. It will be
otherwise if the statute was a nullity; in which case it
can neither be waived nor enforced. If then the law
is merely unenforceable and can take effect when
waived, it cannot he treated aR non est. and as effaced
out of the statute book."
The contrary view expressed by Mahajan, C.•J., can be
best explained in his own words :
"We think t.hat it is not a correct proposition
that constitutional provisions in Part III of our Constitution merely operate as a check on the exercise of
legislative power. It is axiomatic that when the lawmaking power of a State is restricted by a written
fundamental law, then any law enacted and opposed
to fundamental law is in exc<>ss of .the legislative
authority and is thus a nullity. Both these declarations of unconstitutionality go to the root of the power
itself and there is no real distinction between them.
They represent but two aspects of want of legislative
power. The legislative power of the Parliament and
the State legislatures as conferred by Arts. 245 and
246 of the Constitution stands curtailed by the funda.
mental rights chapter of the Constitution."
His Lordship then referred to Art. 13 of the Constitution and said that it was a clear and unequivocal
mandate of the fundamental law prohibiting the State
from making any laws which came into conflict with
Part III of the Constitution. His Lordship added :
" In our opinion the doctrine of waiver enunciated
by some American Judges in construing the American
Constitution cannot be introduced in our Constitution
without a fuller discussion of the matter ......... Without finally expressing an opinion on this question, we
592
1 8
95
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1959] Supp.
are not for the moment eonvinced that this theory
Ba>heslmr Nuth has any relevancy in construing the fundamental
v.
rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. We
Th• Commi"io"" think that. the rights dcscribPd as fundamental rights
of Income-tax, are a necessary consequence of the declaration i11 the
Delhi & Rajastlmn preamble that the people of ludia have solemn!'·
&. Anot/,.,
'
·
J
resoJved t o cons t't
1 ut e I n d"1a mto
a sovereign
l Iemocra.
.s.· K . D ti.::. 1 •
tic republic and to secure to all its citizens i" ustice,
social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship ; equality of status
and of opportunity. These fundamental rights have
not been put in the Constitution merely for individual
benefit, though ultimately they come into operation in
considering individual rights. They have been put
t.here as a matter of public policy and the doctrine of
waiver can have no application to provisions of law
which have been enacted as a matter of constitutional
policy."
It would appear that the two main reasons which
Mahajan, C. J., gave in support of the views expressed
by him were these. Firstly, he held I hat the effect of
Art. 13 of the Constitution was to prohibit the State
from making any laws which ca.me into ro11tliet with
Part 11 I of the Constitution and )113 recoguised no
such distinction as was drawn by Venkatarama Aiyar,
J., between absence of legislative power (t.hat is, incompetence of the legislature) and non-observance of
provisions which operate merely as a check on the
exercise of legislative power. He thought that absence
of legislative power and check on the exercise of legislative power were both aspects of want of legislative
power. Secondly, he referred to the preamble and the
scheme of Part III of the Constitution in support of
his view that the doctrine of waiver did not apply. I
shall take these reasons in the order in which I have
stated them.
First, as to the effect of Art. 13 of the Constitution.
Article 13 is in two parts: the first part deals with
" a)l laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution " and
says that so far as such laws are inconsistent with the
provisions of Part III, they shall to the extent of such
(1) .S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
593
inconsistency be void; the second part deals with laws
1958
made after the commencement of the Constitution and
h.
N A
1
says that" the State shall not make any law which Ba.<"~~· " 1
takes away or abridges the rights conferred by The commissioner
Part III" of the Constitution and any law made in of ln&ome-ta,.,
contravention of cl. (2) of .Art. 13 shall to the extent of Delhi & Rajasthan
the contravention be void. It seems clear to me that & Another
the .Article itself recognises the distinction between S. f\. Das ].
absence of legislative power which will make the law
made by an incompetent legislatm::e wholly void, and
exerciJie of legislative power in contravention of a
restriction or check on such power, which will make
the law ·void to the extent of the inconsistency or contravention. The use of the words "to the extent of
the inconsistency" and "to the extent of the contravention" indubitably points to such a distinction, and
indeed this was pointed out in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1). This was an
unanimous decision of this Court and several earlier
decisions including the decision in Kesavan l\fadhava
Menon's case (2), on which Mahajan, C. J., placed so
much reliance, were considered therein. The decision
in Behram Khurshed Pesikaka (3 ) was also considered,
and then the following observations were made with
regard to Art. 13 of the Constitution at p. 598" Article 13(1) by reason of its language cannot be
read as having obliterated the entire operation of the
inconsistent law or having wiped it out altogether
from the statute book. Such law existed for all past
transactions and for enforcement of rights and liabilities accrued before the date of t.he Constitution, as.
was held in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case. The
law continued in force even after the commencement
of the Constitution, with respect to persons who were
not citizens and could not claim the fundamental
right. In short, Art. 13(1) had the effect of nullifying
or rendering the existing law which had become inconsistent with Art. 19(1Xg) read with cl. (6) as it then
$tood ineffectual, nugatory and devoid of any legal
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589,
(2) [1951] S.C.R. 228.
(3) [1955] I S.C.R. 613, 653, 654.
75
594
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
'95 8
Bn•heshn• Nath
force or binding effect only in respect of the exercise
of the fundamental right on or after the date of the
v.
commencement of the Constitution ............. AII la.w8,
He Commission" existing or future, which a.re inconsistent with the pro.
of . Incom~-tax. visions of Pa.rt III of our Constitution a.re, hy the
Delhi &· Ra7asth•n express provision of Art. 13, rendered void ' to the
"' Anoth"
extent of such inconsistency'. Such laws were not
s. K. Da• 1 . dead for a.II purposes."
The aforesaid vie';'I" expressed in Bhika.ji Na.rain's
case (1) was accepted in many later decisions including
the decision in Muthia.'s case('). The same distinction
was a.gain referred to in another unanimous decision of
this Court in The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Ghamarbaugwal,a (8 ) where at p. 885 it was observed :
"The Court of Appeal has rightly pointed out
that when the validity of a.n Act is called in question,
the first thing for the court to do is to examine whether the Act is a. law with respect to a. topic assigned
to the particular Legislature which enacted it. If it is,
then the court is next to consider whether, in the case
of a.n Act passed by the Legislature of a. Province
(now a. State}, its opera.ti on extends beyond the boundaries of the Province or the State, for under the provisions conferring legislative powers on it such Legislature can only make a. law for its territories or any pa.rt
thereof and its laws cannot, in the absence of a. territorial nexus, ha. ve any extra. territorial operation. If
the impugned law satisfies both these tests, then finally
the court has to ascertain if there is anything in any
other pa.rt of the Constitution which places any fetter
·on the legislative powers of such Legislature. The
impugned la.w has to pa.as a.II these three tests."
Therefore, the mere use of the word " void " in
Art. 13 does not necessarily militate a.ga.inst the a.pplica.tion of the doctrine of waiver in respect of the provisions contained in Pa.rt III of our Constitution. Under
the American Constitution a.lso, a. la.w ma.de in violation of a. constitutional guarantee is struck down,
because under Art. VI of tha.t Constitution, " the
Constitution and the laws of the United States which
(1) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 589.
(2) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1247.
(3) (1957) S.C.R. 874.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
595
shall be made in pursuance thereof......... shall be the
supreme law of the land." I am unable, therefore, to 811 ,1ieshar Nath
accept the view that Art. 13 shows that the doctrine
v.
of waiver can never be applied in respect of the provi- Th• CommissiNH
sions in Part III of the Constitution.
of I 11 come-t~x.
Velhi cl'- Rajastha"
, 4 th
Let me now go to t h e second reason. I s t h ere any·
thing in the preamble and the scheme of our Constitu" :....': "
tion, with particular reference to Part III, which will s. 1c Dns J.
make the doctrine of waiver inapplicable? Let me first
place the two preambles side by side :
Preamble to our
Preamble to the American
Constitution.
Constitution, 1787.
" We, the people of . " We the people of the
India, having solemnly i United States, in order to
resolved
to constitute form a more perfect Union,
India into a sove:reign establish justice, insure
democratic republic and domestic tranquillity, proto secure to all its citizens : vide for the common
justice, social, economic defence, promote the geneand political ; liberty of ral welfare, and secure the
thought, expression, belief, blessings of liberty to our.
faith and worship; equa- selves and our posterity,
lity of status and of do ordain and establish
opportunity ; and to pro- this Constitution for the
mote among them all United States of Ame.
fraternity assuring the rica.."
dignity of the individual
and the unity of the nation ; in our Constituent
Assembly this twenty-sixth
day of November, 1949,do
hereby adopt, enact and
give to ourselves this
Constitution."
Undoubtedly, there is difference in phraseology and
emphasis: more than a century and half had passed
between the two Constitutions; many world events of
far-reaching social and economic consequences had
taken place in the mea.ntime, and men's ideas had
undergone radical changes. It may be that the dominant purposes, as shown by the preamble, of the
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959) Supp.
American Constitution were : (a) to form a more
Ea.hesha. Nath perfect Union; (b) to establish justice; (c) to insure
v.
domestic tranquillity ; (d) to promote general welfare;
The commi.'5ioner and (e) to secure the blessings of liberty. In our Cono/ Income-tu>. stitution, the emphasis is on the Welfare State-on·
Dtlhi .s. Hajastha•Justice, Liberty, Equality and ]'raternity. But the
b Another
question before us is the limited question of the application of the doctrine of waiver. I do not find anys. 1<. Das J.
t h'mg in t he two preamb!es which will make the
doctrine applicable in one case and not applicable in
the other.
It is necessary to refer here to one important distinction between the two Constitutions. Speaking broadly,
the American Constitution of 1787, except for defining
the enumerated powers of the Fedelal Government and
limiting the powers of the States, was ai:t outline of
government and nothing more. Its provisions were
written in general language and did not provide minute
specifications of organisation or power·. It contemplated subsequent legislation and interpretation for carrying the provisions into effect. In other words, it was
early recognised that the Constitution was not self.
executing. The Indian Constitution is more detailed,
and in Part III of the Constitution a.re provisions
which not merely define the rights but also state to
).Vhat extent they are subject to restrictions in the
interests of general welfare, etc. In other words, there
is an attempt at adjustment of individual rights with
social good, and in that sense the limitations or restrictions are also defined. But I do not think that this
distinction has any particular bearing on the question
at issue before us. The rights as also the restrictions
a.re justiciable, and a;n interpretation of the rights
given and of the restrictions imposed, by courts of
competent jurisdiction is contemplated.
Indeed, I recognise that there is a constitutional
policy behind the provisions enacted in Pa.rt III of
the Constitution. In a sense, there is a legislative
policy in all statutory enactments. In my opinion, the
crucial question is not whether there is a constitutional or legislative policy behind a particular provision, but the question is-is the provision meant
1 9JB
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
597
primarily for the benefit of individuals or is it for the
r958
benefit of the general public ? That distinction has, I Baslieshar Nath
think, been recognised in more than one decision.
v.
Take, for example, an ordinary statutory enactment Th• Commission,,
like s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure which says of Income-ta~.
that no suit shall be instituted against the Government Delhi & Uajasthan
or against a public officer in respect of any act pur& Anoth1 '
porting to be done by such public officer in his official s. K. Das 1_
capacity until the expiration of two months next after
a notice in writing has been given, etc. There is undoubtedly a reason of public policy behind this provision, but it is open to the party for whose benefit the
provision has been made to waive notice and indeed
the party may be estopped by his conduct from pleading the want of notice. As the Privy Council pointed
out in AL. AR. Villai:ar Ohettiar v-. Government of the
Province of Madras (1 ), there is no inconsistency between the propositions that the provisions of a section
are mandatory and must be enforced by the court and
that they may be waived by the authority for whose
benefit they are provided. The question then is-is
there anything in the statute which militates against
the application of the doctrine of waiver tu such right,
subject to the safeguards and precautions necessary
for the application of the doctrine, provided the right
is for the benefit of individuals?
I am conscious that rights which the Constitution
itself characterises as fundamental must be treated as
such and it will be wrong to whittle them down. But
are we whittling down fundamental rights when we
say that the question of waiver of fundamental rights
canv.ot be answered in the abstract-by a general
affirmative or a general negative; the question must
always depend on (a) the nature of the right guaranteed and (b) t.he foundation on the basis of which the
plea of waiver is raised. It is to be remembered that
the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution
are not confined to citizens alone. Some of the rights
are guaranteed to non-citizens also. Moreover, they
are not all rights relating to justice, liberty, equality
and fraternity ; some of the provisions define the rights
(1) (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 223, 228.
598
'9.! 8
SUl>REl\IE COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
while others indicate the restrictions or checks subject
to which the rights are granted. Article 33, for exam"·
pie, does not give any right to any person; on the
Th• Commi,,io•m contrary it gives power to Parliament to modify the
of. 1.,comc-Jax, rights conferred by Part III in their application to
Dclh• & 11a1asilmn certain categories of persons. Article 34 lays down a
01
& d" ""
. t'wn on ng
, ht s con fierred b y p art III while
res t rw
s. H. Das ;. martial law is in force in any area. lt is not, therefore, quite correct to say that all the provisions in
Part III grant fundamental rights, though the heading
is 'Fundamental Rights'.
There is, I think, a three-fold classification: (1) a
right granted by an ordinary statutory enactment; (2)
a right granted by the Constitution; and (3) a right
guaranteed by Pa.rt III of the Constitution. With
regard to an ordinary statutory right there is, I think,
no difficulty. It is well recognised that a statutory
right which is for the benefit of an individual can in
proper circumstances be waived by the party for whose
benefit the provision has been made. With regard to
a constitutional right, it may be pointed out that there
are several provisions in our Constitution which do
not occur in Part III, but which yet relate to certain
rights ; take, for example, the rights relating to the
Services under the Union and the States in Part XIV.
I do not think that it can be seriously contended
that a right which is granted to a Government servant
for his benefit cannot be waived by him, provided no
question of jurisdiction is involved. I may refer in
this connection to the provisions in Part XIII which
relate to trade, commerce and intercourse within the
territory of India. These provisions also impose certain restrictions on the legislative powers of the Union
and of the States witli regard to trade and commerce.
As these provisions are for the benefit of the general
public and not for any particular individual, they cannot be waived, even though they do not find place in
Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, the crucial
question is not whether the rights or restrictions occur
in one part or other of the Constitution. The crucial
question is the nature of the right given: is it for the
benefit of individuals or is it for the general public?
8 .,""'"'' .Yaih
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599 .
Tha.t, in my opinion, is the true test. I may here
I95 8
state that the source of the right--contractual or statu- Bashesh"' Nath
tory-is not the determining factor. The doctrine of
v.
waiver is grounded on the principle that a right, statu- The Commission,,
tory or otherwise, which is for the benefit of an indivi- of Income-tu, ·
dual can be waived by him. I am aware that a right Delhi &- Rajastlta"
which is for the benefit of the general public must in
& Anothet
its actual operation relate to particular individuals, in s. K. Das J.
the same way as a right for the benefit ofindividuals
will in its actual operation arise in connection with
individual A or individual B. The test is not whether
in its operation it relates to an individual. The test is
-for whose benefit the right has been primarily
granted for the benefit of the general public or for
individuals ?
Let me now apply this test to some of the provisions
in Part III of t!ie Constitution. These provisions
have been classified under different heads: (1) right
to equality, (2) right to freedom, (3) right against
exploitation, (4) right to freedom of religion, (5) cultural and educational rights, (6) right to property and (7)
right to constitutional remedies. There can be no
doubt that some of these rights are for the benefit of
the general public. Take, for example, Art. 23 which
prohibits traffic in human beings, etc ; so also Art. 24
which says that no child below the age of 14 shall be
employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged
in any other hazardous employment. I do not wish
to multiply examples and it is sufficient to state that
several of these rights are rights which are meant
primarily for the benefit of the general public and not
for an individual. But can we say the same thing in
respect of all the rights? Let us take Art. 31, which
says that no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law and that no property shall
be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a
public purpose and save by authority of law which
provides for compensation, etc. Take a case where a
man's property is acquired under a law which does not
fix the amount of compensation or specify the principles on which or the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given. The man whose
600
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
property is taken may raise no objection to the taking
of his property under such law. Indeed, he may
Ba•ht<h•r Nath expressly agree to Government taking his land for a
Th• c 00,:,;,;,,fo.,,, public purpose under the law in question, though it
of /ncome-toK, _does not comply with Fhe requirements as to compeuDelhi .s: Rajasthon sation· • Can such a man after two or three years
c~ A"•'""
change his mind and say that the law is invalid and
his land on which a school or a hospital may have
5
been built in the meantime should be restored to him,
· K. Das f.
because he could not waive his fundamental right ?
In my opinion, if we e~press the view in the abstract
that no fundamental right can ever be waived, many
startling and unforeseen result.a may follow. Take
another example. - Suppose a man obtains a permit or
a licence for running -a motor vehicle or an excise
shop. Having enjoyed the benefit of the permit for
several years, is it open to him to say when action is
proposed to be taken against him to terminate the
licence, that the law under which the permit was
granted to him was not constitutionally valid? Having derived all the benefit from the permit granted to
him, is it open to him to say that the very Act under
which a permit was granted to him is not valid in
law ? Such and other startling results will follow if
we decide in the abstract, by a. genera.I negative, that
a fundamental right can never be waived. Take Art.
32, which is a right to a constitutional remedy,
namely, the right to move the Supreme Court by
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by .Part III. It is now well settled
by several decisions of this court that the right under
Art. 32 is itself a fundamental right. Suppose a person exercises that right and initiates appropriate proceedings for enforcement of a fundamental right. Later
he thinks better of it and withdraws his application.
Still later he changes his mind. Can he then say that
he could not waive his right under Art. 32 and the
order passed on his application for withdrawal had 1io
legal validity? We may take still another example.
Under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution, all minorities,
whether based on religion or language, have the right
to establish and administer educational institutioDS of
1958
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
601
their choice. Suppose, there is a minority educational
:r95B
institution and the minority has the right to adminis- B h h N 01 A
ter that institution, but they want grant from Govern- as esv~'
ment. The minority may have to surrender part of The con1mi;sion.,
its right of administration in order to get Government of Tneome-t~:r.
a.id. Can the minority waive its right? Such a Delhi & Rajastha"
question arose for consideration in the advisory opi- & Another
Ilion which we gave in connection with the Kera.la S. ,K. Das}.
Education Bill and, so far as I have been able to
understand, the effect of our opiniou is that the min.o. rity can surrender part of its right of administration
of a school of its own choice in order to get aid from
Government. If we now hold that the minority . can
never surrender its right, then the result will be that
it will never be able to ask for Government aid.
I do not see any such vital distinction between the
provisions of the American Constitution and those of
our Constitution as would lead me to the conclusion
that the doctrine of waiver applies in respect of constitutional rights guaranteed by the American Constitution- but will not apply in respect of fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.
Speaking generally, the prohibition in Part III is
against the State from ta.king any action in violation
of a fundamental right. The word •State' in that Part
includes the Government and Parliament of India as
also the Government and Legislature of each of the
States and also all local or other authorities within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. The American Constitution also says
the same thing in effect. By Art. VI it states that the
Constitution and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof shall be the
supreme law of the land. It is -well settled in America that the first ten amendments to the original Constitution were substantially contemporaneous and
should be construed in pari materia. In many of the
amendments the phraseology used is similar to the
phraseology of the provisions of Part III of our
Constitution.
The position under the American Constitution is
76
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
well settled aud a succinct statement of that positiou
will be found in ·Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law,
Basheshar .\·~th
v.
pp. 28-29. The lParned author has summarised the
Thi Co1nmission,·r posit io11 th US :
of. Inconie·t••.
" There are c0rt.ain constitutional provisions that
Delli .s. Rajasth"" may be waived by the person for whose protection
""Anoth"
they were intended. A person who has waived that
Protection in a given instance may not thereafter
S. K. Das].
raise the issue that his constitutional rights have been
infringed in that instance, since whatever injury he
may incur is due to his own act rather than to the
enforcement of an unconstitutional measure against
him.
r958
A person who would otherwise be entitled to raise
a constitutional issue is somet.imes denied that right
because he is estopped to do so. The factor usually
present in these cases is conduct inconsistent with the
present assert.ion of that right., or conduct of such
character that it would be unjust to others to permit
him to avoid liability on constitutional grounds. A
person may not question the constitutionality of the
very provision on which he bases the right claimed to
be infringed thereby, uor of a provision that .is an
integral part in its establishment or definition. The
acceptance of a benefit under one provision of an Act
does not ordinarily preclude a person from asserting
the invalidity of another and severable provision
thereof, but there are exceptions. to this rule. The
promoters of a public improvement have been denied
the right to contest the validity of the rule apportioning its cost over the benefited lands, and a I?erson who
has received t,he benefits of a statute may not thereafter assert its invalidity to defeat the claims of those
against whom it has been enforced in his own favour.
A state is estopped to claim that its own statute deprives it of its property without due process of law;
but it is permitted to assert that its own statute in. vades rights that its constitutio.n confers upon it.
Prior inconsistent conduct will not, however, preclude
a person from asserting the invalidity of an act if
under all the circumstances its assertion involves no
(l) S.C.R..
f-IUPREME COUR.T REPORTS
603
8
unfairn('SS or injustice to those against whom it is
'9'
raised."
81Uh1sllar N alh
The learned Attorney General placed reliance on
v.
the following decisions: (1) Pierce v. Somerset Rail" n. Commission"
u.:a,11 (1); (2) Wall Y. Par.rot Silver and Oopp~r . Com- of. Incom~-11u,
pany (2 ) ; (3) Pierce Oil Oorpom.tion v. Phoenix Refin- Delh• & Ra1as1lian
ing Oompari,11( 3 ); (4) Shepard v. Barrone); (5) United
& Anoth.,
6
States v. 111urdock
(6) Patton v. United States ( ); s. K. Das J.
and (7) Adams v. United States(7). The position in
America is so well settled that I think it is unnecessarv
to examine the aforesaid decisions in detail. I need
only refel' to the observations of l<'ra.11kfurtcr, 'J ., in
William A. Adam's case (supra). The observations
were made in connection with a case where a trial
was held without a jury at the request of the accused
person himself in spite of the guarantee of Amendment
VI. The observations were," What was contrived as protections for the accused
Rhould not be turned into fetters. To assert as an
absolute that a layman, no matter how wise or experienced he may be, is incompetent to choose between
judge and jury as the tribunal for determining his
guilt or innocence, simply because a lawyer has not
advised him on the choice, is to dogmatize beyond the
bounds of learning or experience."
I have not been able to find any real reason on the
basis of which the decisions given abo\·e wit.h regard
to the American Constitution can be held to be
inapplicable to similar cases arising under the Indian
Clonstit.ution.
'
Two subsidiary reasons have been given for holding
that the position under the Indian Constitution is
different.. One is that ours is a nascent democracy
and, therefore, the doctrine of waiver should not apply.
With respect, I am unable to concur in this view. I
do not think that we shall be advancing the cause of
democracy by converting a fundamental right into a
fetter or using it as a means for getting out of an
n;
(1) (1898) 171 U.S. 641.
(2) (1917) 2H U.S 407
(3) (1922) 259 U.S. 125
(4) (1904) 194 U.S. 553.
(5) (1931) 2R4 U.S. 14 I.
(6) (1930) 281 U.S. 276.
(7) (1942) 317 FS. 269.
604
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1959] Supp·
agreement freely entered into by the parties. I appreciate that waiver is not to be light-heartedly applied,
•.
and I agree that it must be applied with the fullest
The commissioner rigour of all necessary safeguards and cautions. What
of /n,ome-tax, I seriou~Iy object to is a statement in the abstract and
Delhi .s- R•jasthan in absolute terms that in no circumstances can a right
·
Anoth"
given by any of the provisions in Part III of the
s. K. Dus J. Uonstitutfon be waived. Another point taken is that
. the provisions in Part III embody what are called
'natural rights' and such rights have been retained by
the people and can never be interfered with. I am
unable to acquiesce in this. The expression 'natural
rights' is in itself somewhat vague. Sometimes, rights
have been divided into 'natural rights' and 'civil
rights', and' natural rights' have been stated to be
those which are necessarily inherent or innate and
which come from the very elementary laws of nature
whereas civil rights are those which arise from the
needs of civil as distinguished from barbaric communities. I am unable, however, to agree that any such
distinction is apparent from the provisions in Part III
of our Constitution : all the rights referred to therein
appear to be created by the Constitution. I do not
think that Locke's doctrine of' nature.I rights', which
was perhaps the authority for the American Declaration of Independence, played any part in the enactment
of the provisions of Part III of our Constitution. The
doctrine which has long since ceased to receive general
acceptance, has been thus explained by E. W. Paterson
(see Natural Law and Natural Rights, Southern
Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1955, p. 61):
" The theory of natural rights, for which we are
indebted to the seventeentji-century English philosopher, John Locke, is essentially different from the
theories of natural law just discussed in that it lacked
the two important characteristics above mentioned:
the concept of an immutable physical order and the
concept of divine reason ............ ~e begins with the
purpose of justifying the existence of a government
with coercive powers. What inconveniences would
arise if there were no government? Men would live in
_ a 'stage of nature'; to avoid confusion with the
i958
Bashesh•• Noth
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
605
1 951
political state I shall call this a • condition of nature '.
In such a condition man would be free to work, to R~;hesh«r Nlllfl ·
enjoy the fruits of his labour, and to barter with
"·
others; he would also be free to enforce the Jaw of T/11 Commissiimir
nature (whose precepts Locke did not define) against of Inc1Hne-ta1.
every other man. Since Locke was an optimist about Delhi & RajostliH
human nature he thought men would get along pretty 6' Anotlr1r
well in this lawless condition. Yet the condition of S. K. D111 J.
nature is for Locke a fiction like the assumption of a
frictionless machine in mechanics. The chief disadvantages that men in this condition would suffer
were, he thought, the absence of an established l~w,
the absence of a known and impartial magistrate to
settle disputes, the absence of a power sufficient to
execute and enforce the judgment of the magistrate.
Moved bv these inconveniences, men would enter into
a social compact with each other whereby each would
transfer to a third person, the government, such rights
over his person and property as the government must
have in order to remove these inconveniences. All
other rights, privileges, and immunities he reserved,
as a grantor of land conveys the fee simple to his son
and reserves a life estate to himself. These reserved
rights were• natural' rights because they had origi. ilated in the condition of nature and survived the
social compact."
There are, in my opinion, clear indications in Part III
of the Constitution itself that the doctrine of • natural
rights ' had played no part in the formulation of the
provisions therein. Take Arts. 33, 34 and 35 which
give Parliament power to modify the rights conferred
by Part III. If they were natural rights, the Constitution could not have given power to Parliament to
modify them. Therefore, I am of the view that the
doctrine of 'natural rights' affords nothing but a
foundation of shifting sand for building up a thesis
that the doctrine of waiver does not apply to the
rights guaranteed in Part III of our Constitution.
The true position as I conceive it is this: where a.
right or privilege guaranteed by the Constitution rests
in the individual and is primarily intended for his
benefit and does not impinge on the right of others, it
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1!159] Supp.
can be wai\,ed provided such waiver is not forbidden
bv
law and does not. contrnv(\no r1uhlic polic.v or
Fasltt'shar /I.' ath
·
v.
public morals.
Thi Com,,,issio""
In the case before 11.<, l lia\'C held that there is no
0
1 !.come-tax, foundation on facts to sustain the plea of waiver.
D'1h~ "~ R~~°''"""
Therefore, I would allow the appeal w·ith costs. The
0
"
"
order of the Commissio1wr of Income.tax, Delhi, dated
s. h'. Da< J. January 29, 1958, mupt· he set asirlc au1l all proceedings
now pending for implenwntation of the order of the
Union Go,·ernrnent dated .TuJv 5, 1954, rnuHt- he
<pia•hed.
•
St•bb• Rao J.
SuBBA RAO, .J.-I ham had the ad,·antage of perusing the judgments of my Lord the Chief .Justice and
my learned brother, S. K. Das, J. I agree with their
conclusion, but I \l'Onld prefer to express my opinion
separMely in regard to the question of the applicabilitv of the dootrine of \\·ai\·er to the fundamental
rights.
This case raises a most serious and important question, viz., whether the doctrine of waiver operates on
the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution,
a question not confined to the immediate purpose of
this litigation, but to the public in general. The question is bound to arise. fr<.'quently, and the Yarying
obs1·rvations already PX pressed hy the learned Judges
of this Court woulcl lend ,;cope for conflicting decisions
involving parties in unnecessary litigation and avoidable hardship. The quest.ion was directly raised and
fully argued before us. In the circumstances, I cannot
share the opinion of m.r learned brother, S. K. Das, .J.,
that this Court should avoid a decision on this question
and lean' it to be decided in a more appropriate case.
The facts have b<>en fully stated by my Lord the
Chief Justice in his judgment and I need not restate
them.
The learned Attorney General contended that in the
American Law the principle of waiver was applied to
rights created by the Constitution except in cases
where the protection of the rights was based upon
public policy and that, by the same analogy, if no
public policy was involved, eve.n in India, the person
1 9JB
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
607
1 8
affected by the infringement of the fundamental rights
95
could waive the constitutional protect.ion guaranteed tu HashesharNatlt
him. It was said that in the present case the appellant
v.
waived his fundamental right under Art. 14 of the 1'he Commissioner
Constitution as the right was only in respect of his of In&ome-tas.
liability to tax and he could legitimately waive it. To Delhi cS- Rajasthan
appreciate this argument it would be convenient at the ,s. Another
outset to notice the American Law on the subject. .subba R~o J.
Certain rights, which are sometimes described as the
Bill of lUghts, have been introduced by the Amendments to the Constitution of America. They declare
the rights of the people of America. in respect of the
freedom of religion, ::>pecch, press, assemblage and from
illegal seizures. They guarantee trial by jury in
certain criminal and civil matters. They give protection against self-inurimination. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States prescribes that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process ofla.w ; nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution introduces the rule of due process as a protection
against the State action. The said amendments are
intended as a protection to citizens against the action
of the Union and the States. Though the rights so
declared are general and wide in their terms, the
Supreme Court of America, by a long course of judicial
interpretation, having regard to the social conditions
in that country, has given content to tho~e rights and
imposed limitations thereon in an attempt to reconcile
individual rights with social good, by evolving counterbalancing doctrines of police power, eminent domain,
and such others. During the course of the evolution
of the law, attempts were made to apply the doctrine
of waiver to the provisions of the Constitution of
America. American Courts applied the doctrine with
great caution and in applying the same, la.id down
definite principles.
The said principles were culled out from the various
decisions a:nd clearly summarized in the authoritative
text-books on the Constitution of America under
different heads:
608
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
WILLIS ON 'CONSTITUTIONAL LAW':
I. Self -incrimination :
Baslieshar l\r at h
The privilege against self-incrimination, like any
v.
The Con1111i.1~iont1 other prh-ilege, is one which may be waived.
rtj Jnconu~tax,
2. Double jeopardy :
Delhi Q5. Rajas//;,,"
Double jeopardy is a privilege and nmy be waived
6- An0Jhe1·
expressly or impliedly.
Subba R110 j.
3. Immunity against ·unreasonable searches and
8eizures:
The immunity is one which may be waived and
by consent one can make a search and seizure reasonable.
4. Jury Trial:
The United States Supreme Court ......... held that
neither a jurisdictional question nor the interest of the
State was involved, but only the privilege and right of
the accused, and that these were subject to waiver in
accordance with the nsnal rules.
5. Due Process of Law as a matter of jurisdiction:
In order to delimit personal liberty by exercis~rig
social control, t.!1e branch of the government. nndert.aking to do so must have jurisdiction. If it does not have
jurisdiction, it is taking personal liberty (life, liberty
or property) without dm> process oflaw. To this rule
there are no exceptions. It cannot be waived.
'COOLEY'S CONST'ITTTTIONAL LIMITATIONS':
Where a constitutional provision is designed for
the protection solely of the property rights of the
citizen, it is competent for him to waive the protection,
and to consent to such action as would be invalid if
taken against his will.
In criminal cases the doctrine that a constitutional
privilege may be waived must be true to a very limited
extent only. A party may consent to waive rights of
property, but the trial and punishment for public.
offences are not within the provinces of individual consent or agreement.
CORPUS JURIS SEOUNDUM:
It has been stated supra (p. 1050, note 32) that
the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges
.-
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
609
of a.ny character, a.nd since the word 'waiver' covers
r95B
every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a Baslieshar Nath
person may waive any matter which affects· his prov.
pcrty, and any alienable right or privilege of which he The commissioner
is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is of Income-tax,
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred Delhi &- Rajasthan
by statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided
&- Another
such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are S1tbba R"o J.
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of
the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does
not contravene public policy, and the principle is
recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and
agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made
solely for the benefit and protection of the individual
in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right and
without detriment to the community at large .........
As a general rule, rights relating to procedure and
remedy are subject to waiver, but if a right is so
fundamental in its nature as to be regarded by the
state as vitally integrnted in immemorially established
processes of the administration of justice, it cannot be
waived by anyone.
The cases cited at the Bar illustrate the aforesaid
principles. The doctrine was applied to the obligations
under a contract in Pierce v. Somerset Railway (1); to
deprivation of property without due process of law in
Pierce Oil Corporation v. Phoenix Refining Company (2) and Shepard v. Barron (3 ) to trial by jury in
Patton v. United States(') and Adams v. United
States (5); and to self-incrimination in Un·ited States v.
Murdoclc (6 ). It is true, as the learned counsel for the
appellant - contended, that in some of the aforesaid
decisions, 'observations a.re in the nature of obiter, but
they clearly indicate the trend of judicial opinion in
America.
(1) (1898) 43 L. Ed. 316; 171 U.S. 641.
(2) (1922) 66 L. Ed. 85;; 259 U.S. 125.
(3) (1904) 48 L Ed. IH5; 194 U. S. 553,
(4) (1930) 74 L. Ed. 854; 281 U.S. 276.
(5) (1942) 87 L. Ed. 268.
(6) (1931) 76 L. Ed 210; 284 U.S. 141.
77
610
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
The American Law on the subject may be summariz.
ed thus: The doctrine of waiver can be invoked when
Boshesha• Noth the Constitutional or Statutory guarantee of a right is
Th• Comv,;.;,,;0 .,..not conceived in public interest or when it does not
of Income-ta<. affect the jurisdiction of the authority infringing the
Delhi & Rajasthan said right.
But if the privilege conferred or the right
& Anolh"
created by the statute is solely for the benefit of the
individual, he can waive it. But even in those ca.sea,
Sublia Rao j.
the Courts invariably administered a caution that
having regard to the nature of the right some precautionary and stringent conditions should be applied
before the doctrine is invoked or applied.
This leads me to the question whether the funda..
mental rights enshrined ·in the Indian Constitution
pcrto.in to that category of rights which could be
waived. To put it differently, whether the Constitutional guarantee in regard to tho fundamental rights
restricts or ousts the jurisdiction o~ the relevant
authorities under the Constitution to make laws in
derogation of the said rights or whether the said rights
are for the benefit of the general public. At the outset
I would like to sound a note of warning. While it is
true that the judgments of the Supreme Court of the
United States a.re of a great assistance to this Court in
elucidating and solving the difficult problems that
a.rise from time to time, it is equally necessary to keep
in mind the fact that the decisions a.re given in the
context of a. different social, economic and political set
up, and therefore great care should be bestowed in
applying those decisions to cases a.rising in India. with
different social, economic and political conditions.
While the principles evolved by the Supreme Court of
the United States of America may in certain circumstances be accepted, their application to similar facts
in India may not always lead to the same result11. It
is therefore necessary to consider the nature of the
fundamental rights incorporated in the Indian Constitution, the conditions of the people for whosjl benefit
and the purpose for which they were created, and the
effect of the laws ma.de in viol&tion of those rights.
The Constitution of India. in its preamble promises to
secure to a.II citizeus justice, social, economic and
1958
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
611
political ; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith
c958
and worship; equality of status and of opportunity ; Basheshar N alh
a.nd to promote among them all fraternity assuring the
v.
dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. The commission1r
One of the things the Constitution did to achieve the of I11eome-1ax,
object is to incorporate the fundamental rights in the Delhi &- Rajastha"
Constitution. They are dividedinto seven categories: .;. Another
(i) right to equality-Arts. 14 to 18; (ii) right to Subba Rao 1 .
freedom-Arts. 19 to 22; (iii) right against exploitation-Arts. 23 and 24; (iv) right to freedom of religion
-Arts. 25 to 28; (v) cultural a.nu educational rightsArts. 29 and 30; (vi) right to property-Arts. 31, 31A
and 31B; and (vii) right to Constitutional rcmedicsArts. 32 to 35. Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was,
pointed out, in Gopalan v. The State of Madras (1 ),
that fundamental rights contained in Part III of the
Constitution are really rights that are still reserved to
the people after the delegation of rights by the people
to the institutions of Government both at the Centre
and in the States created by the Constitution. Article
13 reads:-·
"(l) All laws in force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and
any law made in contravention of this clause, shall, to
the extent of the contravention, be void."
This Article, in clear and unambiguous terms, not
only declares that all laws in force before the commencement of the Constitution and made thereafter
taking away or abridging the said rights would be
void to the extent of the contravention but also prohibits the State from making any law taking away or
abridging the said rights. Part III is therefore enacted for the benefit of all the citizens of India, in an
attempt to preserve to them their fundamental rights
against infringement by the institutions created by the
Collstitution ; for, without that safeguard, the objects
(I) (1950] S. C.R. 88.
612
'958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
adumbrated in the Constitution could not be achieved.
For the same purpose, the said chapter imposes a
•.
limitation on the power of the State to make laws in
Tiu Commissioner violation of those rights. The entire part, in my view,
•I I..,;ome·tux. has been introduced in public interest, and it is not
Ihlhi <f> Rajasthan proper that the fundamental rights created under the
a,. Another
various Articles should be dissected to ascertain wheSubba Rao 1: ther any or .which part of them is conceived in public
interest and which part of them is conceived for individual benefit. Part III reflects the attempt of the
Constitution makers to reconcile individual freedom
with State Control. While in America this process of
reconciliation was allowed to be evolved by the course
of judicial decisions, in India, the fundamental rights
and their limitations are crystallized and embodied in
the Constitution itself; while in America a free hand
was given to the judiciary not only to evolve the content of the right but also its limitations, in the Indian
Constitution there is not much scope for such a process. The Court cannot therefore import any further
limitations on the fundamental rights other than those
contained in Part III by any doctrine, such as
" waiver " or otherwise. I would, therefore, hold that
the fundamental rights incorporated in Part III of the
Constitution cannot be waived.
·
It is said that such an inflexible rule would, in certain cases, defeat the very object for which the fundamental rights are created. I have carefully scrutinized
the Articles in Part III of the Constitution of India,
and they do not, in my view, disclose any such
anomaly or create unnecessary hardship to the people
for whose benefit the rights are created. Article 14
embodies the famous principle of equality before the
law and equal protection of the laws, and Arts. 15 to
18 and Art. 29(2) relate to particular applications of
the rule. The principle underlying these Articles is
the mainspring of our democratic form of government
and it guarantees to its citizens equal protection in
respect of both substantive and procedural laws. If
the doctrine of waiver is engrafted to the said fundamental principles, it will mean that a citizen can agree
to be discriminated. When one realizes the unequal
Basheshar Nath
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COUHT REPOH.'l'S
613
1
positions occupied by the State and the private citizen,
958
particularly in India where illiteracy is rampant, it is 8 ·h ~ N 111
easy to visualize that in a conflict between the State as es:~· a
and a citi~en, the latter may, by fear of force or hope ne Commissioner
of preferment, give up his right. It is said that in of Income-tax,
such a. case coercion or influence can be established in Delhi cS· Rajasthan
a. Court.of law, but in practice it will be well nigh im& Another
possible to do so. The same reasoning will apply to Subbo Rao J.
Arts. 15 and 16. Art. 17 illustrates the evil repercussion of the doctrine of waiver in its impact on the
fundamental rights. That Article in express terms
forbids untouchability; obviously, a person cannot ask
the State to treat him as an untouchable. Article 19
•·
reads:" (1) All citizens shall have the right(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of
India;
(e} to reside and settle in any part of the territory
of India;.
(f} to acquire, hold and dispose of property ; and
(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any
occupation, trade or business."
The right to freedom is the essential attribute of a
citizen under democratic form of government. The
freedoms mentioned in Art. 19 are subject to certain
restrictions mentioned in els. (2} to (6) of that Article.
So far as the freedoms narrated in sub-els. (a) to (g) of
Cl. (1) of Art. 19 a.re concerned, I cannot visualise any
contingency where a citizen would be in a worse position than he was if he could not exercise the right of
waiver. In regard to freedom to acquire, hold and
dispose of property, a. plausible argument may he
advanced, namely, that a citizen should have a right
to waive his right to acquire, hold and dispose of property; for, otherwise he might be compelled to acquire
and hold his property, even if he intended to give it up!
There is an underlying fallacy in this argument. The
Article does not compel a. citizen to acquire, hold and
614
SUPREME COUB.T ltEPOH.TS
[1959] Supp.
dispose of property just as it does not compel a perB•'''"har Nath son to do any of the acts covered by the other freev.
doms. If he does not want to reside in any part of
l'he Commi,,ioner the territory of India or to make a speech or to praeo/ Income~tax. tise any profession, he is at liberty not to do any of
Delhi .!; Raja,.han these things. So too, a person may not acquire the
o;. Another
property at all or practise any profession but if he
Subba Rao J.
seeks to acquire property or practise any profession,
he cannot be told that he has waived his right at an
earlier stage to acquire property or practise the profession. A freedom to do a particular act involves
the freedom not to do that act. There is an essential
••
distinction between the non-exercise of a right and the
exercise of a right subject to the doctrine of waiver.
So understood, even in the case of the right covered
by sub-cl. (f) of cl. (1), there cannot be any occasion
when a citizen would be worse off than when he had
no fundamental rights under the Article. The preservation of the rights under Art. 19 without any further
engrafting of any limitations than those already im- .
posed under the Constitution, is certainly in the
interest of the public; for, the rights are essential for
the development of human personality in its diverse
aspects. Some comment is made in regard to the right
covered by cl. (3) of Art. 20, and it is asked that if a
person has no liberty to waive the protection under
that clause, he could not give evidence even if he
wanted to give it in his own interest. This argument
ignores the content of the right under cl. (3) of Art. 20.
The fundamental right of a person is only that he
should not be compelled to be a witness against himself. It would not prevent him from giving evidence
voluntarily. Under Art. 21, no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to procedure established by law and Art. 22 give_s
protection against arrest and detention in certain
cases. I do not think that any situation can be conceived when a person 'Could waive this right to his
advantage. Article 23(1) prohibits traffic in human
beings and forced labour. It is not suggested that a
person can waive this Constitutional protection. So too,
_the right under Art. 24, which prohibits employment
i93B
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
of children in factories, cannot be waived. That
i95B
apart, so far as this Article is concerned, no question Basneshar Nath
of waiver can arise as a child cannot obviously waive
v.
his right under this Article. A1·ticle 25 gives guara.n- ne Co"'missioner
tee for religious liberty subject to certain restrictions of Jncott,.·la",
contained therein. It declares that all persons are Delhi &- t.'ajastnan
· 1ed to f re ed om of conscience
·
oqua11 y ent1t
an d th o & A>1o//,er
right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. 5110,,a Nao 1 .
This right is certainly conceived in the public interest
and cannot be waived. So too, freedom to manage
religious affair8, freedom as to payment of taxes for
promotion of any particular religion and freedom as to
attendance at. religious instruction or religious worship
in certain edncational institutions n.re all conceived to
enforce the religious neutrality of the State and it
cannot be suggested that they a.re not in public interest. The cultural and educational rights of the
minorities and their right to establish and administe1·
educational institutions of their choice are given for
the protection of the rights of the minorities and it
cannot. be said tlrn.t. they are not in public interest.
Article 31, which prohibits the State from depriving a
person of his property sarn by authority of la.w or to
acqnire any property without paying compensation, is
intended to protect the properties of persons from
arbit.rnry actions of the State. This Article is conceived in t.he interest; of the public and a person cannot say that he can be deprived of his property
without authority of law or that his land can be
acquired without 'compensation.
It is suggested that if a person, after waiving his
fuuda.menta.l right to property and allowing the State
to incur heavy expenditure in improving the same,
turns round and claims to recover the said property,
the State would be put to irreparable injury. Firstly,
no such occasion should arise, as the State is not expected to take its citizens' property or depri,·e them of
their property otherwise than by authority of law.
Secondly, if the owner of a property intends to give it.
to the State, the State can always insist upon conveying to it the said property in the manner known to
law.. Thirdly, ot.l1e1· remedies may be open to the
616
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
State-on that I am not expressing any opinion-to
recover compensation or damages for the improveBash.,har N«lh ments bona fid e ma d e or t h e l oss mcurre
'
d , h avmg
'
The co,:;,.ission'er regard to the circumstances of a particular case. These
of lncome-t,x, · considerat.ions, in my view, are of no rele>ance in
Delhi & Rajas11.,,. considering the question of waiver in the context of
& Another
fundamental rights. By express provisions of the ConSubba Rao J. stitution, the State is prohibited from making any law
which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by
Part III of the Constitution. The State is not, therefore, expected to enforce any right contrary to the
CoilsLitutiona.l prohibition on the ground that the
part>y waived his fundamental right. If this prohibition is borne in mind, no occasion can arise when the
State would be prejudiced. The prejudice, if any, to
the State would be caused not by the non-application
of the doctrine of waiver but by its own action contrary to the Constitutional prohibition imposed on it.
It is then said that if the doctrine of waiver is to be
excluded, a person can apply to the Supreme Court
under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the relief provided therein, withdraw the petition, get the order of the
Supreme Court dismissing it and then apply over
again for issue of a writ in respect of the same right.
The apprehension so expressed is more imaginary than
real; for, it has no foundation either in fact or in law.
When an application is dismissed, for whatever reason
it may be-whether on merits or on admission-, the
order of the Court becomes final and it can be reopened
only in the manner prescribed by law. There is no
scope for the application of the doctrine of waiver in
such a case.
Articles 33 and 34 contain some of the Constitutional limitations on the application and the enforcement of .the fundamental rights. The former Article
confers power on Parliament to modify the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution in their application to facts and the latter enables iti1'.o impose restrictions on the rights conferred by that !:'art, while martial law is in force in any area.
These two ArLiclAR, therefore, do not create fundamental rights, but impose limitations thereon and I
rpJ8
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
cannot appreciate the argument that their presence in
r95a
Part III either derogates from the content of the 8 h h N 11
fundamental rights declared therein Or SUStainS the as BS
at
doctrine of waiver in its application to the said rights. The commiuionir
Article 35 confers on the Parliament, the power to of Income-ta,,,
legislate for giving effect to the provisions of Pa.rt III Delhi cS- Rajasthan
to the exclusion of the Legislatures of the. States. & Another
This Article also does not create a fundamental right, Subba Rao J.
but provides a machinery for enforcing that right.
A startling result, it is suggested, would flow from the
rejection of the doctrine of waiver and the suggestion
is sought to be illustrated by the following example:
A person takes a permit for several years from the
State for running a motor vehicle or an excise shop.
Having enjoyed the benefit for several years and when
action is proposed to be taken against him to terminate
the licence, he contends that the law under which the
permit was granted to him offended his fundamental
rights and therefore constitutionally not valid. It is
asked whether it would be open to him to say that the
very Act under which the permit was granted to him
was not valid in law. To my mind, this illustration
does not give rise to any anomaly. Either a person
can run a motor vehicle or an excise shop with licence
or without licence. On the basis the law is valid, a
licence is taken a:nd the motor vehicle is run under
that licence and if that law offends his fundamental
right and therefore void, he continues to run the business without licence, as no licence is required under a
valid law. The aforesaid illustration does not, therefore, give rise to any anomaly and even if it does, it
does not affect the legal position.
I have considered the various provisions relating to
the fundamental rights with a view to discover if there
is any justification for the comment that without the
aid of the doctrine of waiver a citizen, in certain circumstances, would be in a worse position than that he
would be if he exercised his right. I have shown that
there is none. Nor is there any basis for the suggestion
that the State would irreparably suffer under certain
contingencies; for, any resulting hardship would be its
v:'
78
618
SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1959] Supp.
'958
own making and could be avoided if it acted in accordance with law.
Baslushar Nath
v.
A large majority of our people are economically
The Commission" poor, educationally backward and politically not yet
of. Incom~-tax. conscious of their rights.
Individually or even collecDelh• &Ra1asthantively, they cannot be pitted against the State organi& Anotb
zations and institutions, nor can they meet them on
subba Rao J.
equal terms. In such circumstances, it is the duty of
this Court to protect their rights against themselves.
I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the
fuudamentn,l rights created by the Constitution are
transcendental in nature, conceived and enacted in
national and public interest, and therefore cannot be
waived.
That apart, I would go further and hold that as
section 5(1) of the Act XXX of 1947 was declared to
be void by this Court in M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissionei· of Income-tax, Madras('), the appellant cannot, by the application of the doctrine of waiver, validate the enquiry made under the said Act. It is suggested that there is a distinction between a case where
the enactment is beyond the legislative competence of
the Legislature which made it and the case where the
law is unconstitutional on the ground of existence of a
constitutional limitation, that while in the former case
the law is null and void, in the latter case the law is
unenforceable and may be revived by the removal of
the limitation by an amendment of the Constitution.
Ou this distinction an argument is sought to be built
to the effect that as in the present case s. 5(1) of the
Act XXX of 1947 was declared to be invalid only on
the ground that it was hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, the law must be deemed to be on the statute
book and therefore the appellant was within his right
to waive his constitutional guarantee. I am unable to
appreciate this argument.
The scope of Art. 13(1) of tho Constitution was considered by this Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v.
The State of Bombay('). This Court, by a majority,
held that Art. 13(1) of the Constitution does not make
{r) [1955] 2 S.C.R. t247.
(2) (r951] S.C.R. 228.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
.
existing la.ws which are inconsistent with the funda-
r958
mental rights, void ab initio, but only renders such B h h N h
laws unenforceable and void with respect to the exer- as es ar al
cise of the funda.mental rights on and after the date of The Com";,.ission1r
commencement of the Constitution. Mahajan, C. J., of Income-tax,
who was a party to tha.t decision, explained the word Delhi & Rajasthan
'void' in Art. 13(1) of the Constitution in Behram Khur& Another
shed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay (1). He observed at Subba Rao].
page 652 thus :"It is axiomatic that when the law-making power
of a State is restricted by written fundamental law,
then any law enacted and opposed to the fundamental
law is in excess of the legislative authority and is thus
a. nullity. Both these declarations of unconstitutionality go to the root of the power itself and there is ho
real distinction between them. They represent but
two aspects of want of legislative power. The legislative power of Parliament and the State Legislatures as
conferred by Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution
stands curtailed by the fundamental rights Chapter of
the Constitution."
This decision in clear and unambiguous terms lays
down that there cannot be any distinction on principle between Constitutional incompetency and Constitutional limitation. In either case, the Act is void,
though in the latter case, the pre-constitutional rights
and liabilities arising under the statute are saved.
This Court a.gain dealt with the meaning of the word
'void' in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya
Pradesh {2}. There the question was whether an Act
which was declared void on the ground of inconsistency with the Constitution, can be revived by any
subsequent amendment to t.he Constitution removing
the inconsistency. This Court answered the question
in the affirmative. Das, acting C. J., observed at
ps.ge 598 thus :"As explained in Keshavan Madhava Menon's
case, the law became void not in toto or for all purposes or for a.ll times or for all persons but only 'to the
extent of such inconsistency', that is to say, to the extent it became inconsistent with the provisions of Part
(1) [1955] l s. c. R. 613.
(2) [1955] 2 s. c. R. 589.
620
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
III which conferred the fundamental rights on the
citizens. It did not become void independently of the
v.
existence of the rights guaranteed by Part III ...... In
The Commissioner short, Article 13(1) had the effect of nullifying or ren0!. I•com~-tax. dering the existing law which had become inconsistent
Delh~ ~ lla~astlian with Art. 19(l)(g) read with clause (6) as it then stood
•ot "
ineffectual, nugatory and devoid of any legal force or
subba Rao J.
binding effect only with the exercise of the fundamental right on and after the date of the commencement of the Constitution................... . It is only as
against the citizens that they remained in a dormant
or moribund condition. In our judgment, after the
amendment of clause (6) of Art. 19 on the 18th June,
1951, the impugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and became revivified and enforceable against
citizens as well as against non-citizens."
This judgment does not say anything different from
that expressed in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case (1)
nor does it dissent from the view expressed by
Mahajan, C. J., in Behram Khurqhed's case (2 ). The
problem that confronted the learned Judges was a
different one and they resolved it by applying the
doctrine of ' eclipse '. The legal position, vis-a-vis,
the law declared to be void either on the ground of
legislative incompetence or for the reason of constitutional limitation, as stated in the earlier decisions,
remains unshaken by this decision. So long as the
inconsistency remains the law continues to be void,
at any rate vis-a-vis the fundamental rights of a person. We are not concerned in this case with the
doctrine of revival; for the inconsistency of s. 5(1) of
the .Act with the fundamental right under Art. 14 of
the Constitution has not been removed by any amendment of the Constitution. So long as it is not done, the
said section is void and cannot affect the fundamental
rights of the citizens. In M. Gt. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras('), it was declared
that s. 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 was unconstitutional
on the ground that it infringed the fundamental
rights of the citizens under Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Basheshar Nath
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 228.
(2) [1955) 1 S.C.R. 613.
(3) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1247.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
U n<lor Art. 141 of the Constitution, the law declared
by the Suprcre Court is binding on all the Courts in Basheshar Nalh
India. It follows that the Income-tax Commissioner
v.
had no jurisdiction to continue the proceedings against The CommissioKer
0 1
the appellant under Act XXX of 1947. If the Com- D 0~!~ ; ·!a:;.4
missioner had no jurisdiction, the appellant could not ' ~ An:~:; "
by waiving his right confer jurisdiction on him.
The scope of·the doctrine of waiver was considered Subba Rao J.
by this Court in Behram Khurshed's case (1). There
a person was prosecuted for an offence under s. 66(b)
of the Bombay Prohibition Act and he was sentenced
to one month's rigorous imprisonment. One of the
questions raised there was whether s. 13{b) of the
Bombay Prohibition Act, having been declared to be
void under Art. 13(1) of the Constitution in so far as
it affected the consumption or use of liquid medicinal
or toilet preparation containing alcohol, the prosecution was maintainable for infringement of that section. The Court held that in India once the law has
been struck down as unconstitutional by the ~upreme
Court, no notice can be taken of it by any Court,
because, after it is declared as unconst.itutional, it is
no longer law and is null and void. Even so, it was
contended that the accused had waived his fundamental right and therefore he could not sustain his
defence. Mahajan, C. J., delivering the judgment of the
majority, repelled this contention with the following
observations at page 653 :"The learned Attorney General when questioned
about the doctrine did not seem to be very enthusiastic about it. 'Vithout finally cxpreRsing an opinion
on this question we are- not for the moment convinced
that this theory has any relevancy in construing the
fundamental rights conferred by Part III of our Constitution. We think that the rights described as
fundamental rights are a necessary consequence of the
declara.tiou in the preamble that the people of India
have solemnly resolved to constitute India. into a.
sovereign democratic republic and to secure to all its
citizens justice, social, economic and political ; liberty
of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship ;
(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 613.
622
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
equality of status and of opportunity. These fundamental
rights have not been put in tho Constitution
h h
1I
' mere1y 1or
" th o m
· d"1v1"d ua1 b enefit ti10ug h u l"
. BasesarN"
v.
t1mate Iy
The Commissionu they come into operation in considering individual
of Income-tax, rights. They have been put there as a matter of
Delhi& Rajasthanpublic policy and the doctrine of waiver can have no
0
& A" ' " "
application to provisions of law which have been enSubba Rao J.
acted as a matter of Constitutional policy. Reference
to some of the articles, inter alia, Articles 15(1), 20, 21,
makes the proposition quite plain. A citizen cannot
get discrimination by telling the State 'You cu.11 discriminate', or get convicted by waiving the protection given under Articles ·20 and 21."
On the question of waiver, Venkatarama Aiyar, J.,
in his judgment before review, considered tho American decisions and was inclined to take the view that
under our Constitution when a law contravenes the
provisions intended for the benefit of the individual,
it can be waived. But the learned Judge made it
clear in his judgment that the question of waiver had
no bearfog to any issue of fact arising for determination
in that case but only for showing the nature of the
right declared under Art. l9(l)(f) and the effect in law
of a statute contravening it. Das, J., as he then was,
in his dissenting judgment, did not state his view on
this question but expressly reserved it in the fo!lowiug
words:" In coming to the conclusion that I ha vo, I have
in a large measure found myself in agreement with the
views of Venkatarama Aiyar, J., on that part of the
case. I, however, desire to guard myself against
being understood to agree with the rest of the obser.
vations to be found in his judgment, particularly
those relating to waiver of unconstitutionality, the
fundamental rights being a mere check on the legislative power or tho effect of the dl.'claration under
Art. 13(1) being 'relatively void'. On those topics I
prefer to express no opinion on this occasion."
I respectfully agree with the observations of Mahajan, C. J. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the
doctrine of waiver has no application in the case of
fundamental rights under our Constitution.
r958
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
ORDER
The appeal is allowed. The order of the Income Basheshar Nath
Tax Commissioner, Delhi, dated January 29, 1958, is Th c v . . .
.L'
•
Ie- ofe Income-tax
o"'"''ss1oner
set as1'de an d a 11 proceed"mgs now pend"mg 1or
Imp
mentation of the order of Union Government dated Delhi & Rajastl:an
July 5, 1954, a.re quashed. The appellant shall get & Another
costs of this appeal.
Subba Rao ].
N. T. VELUSW AMI THEVAR
v.
G. RAJA NAINAR AND OTHERS
(T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR
and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.)
Election Dispute-Rejection of Nomination paper by Returning
Officer-Validity of rejection raised before Election petition] urisdiction of Tribunal to entertain grounds of disqualification not
raised before Returning Officer-" Improperly rejected", meaning of
-Representation of the People Act, r95r (43 of r95r), ss. 7, 36(2),
roo(r)(c), roo(r)(d)(i).
The nomination paper of the fourth respondent who was
one of the candidates for election to the Legislative Assembly of
the State, was rejected by the returning officer on the ground
that as he was the Headmaster of a Government-aided school he
was disqualified under s. 7(d) and (e) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, to be chosen for election. One of the voters of
the constituency filed a petition praying that the election of the
appellant be declared void under s. rno(1)(c) of the Act on the
ground that the rejection of the nomination paper of the fourth
respondent was improper because the latter had ceased to be a
Headmaster at the time of his nomination and that, further, the
institution was a private one. The appellant, who was the
second respondent in the petition, contended that the nomination
paper of the fourth respondent was rightly rejected not only on
the ground put forward before the returning officer but also for
the reasons that he was interested in Government contracts and
that he had agreed to serve as a teacher under the District
Board. The question was whether in an election petition. chalJe11ging the validity of the rejection of a nomination paper under
s. rno(r)(c) of the Act, it was open to the parties to raise grounds
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