SRI RAM RAM NARAIN MEDHI versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 18 November 1958 | [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 489 | 1958 INSC 101
Key facts
- Decided
- 18 November 1958
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 13/1957
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 489
- Neutral citation
- 1958 INSC 101
Text of the judgment
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
489
No. 33 of 1956 is the holder of the jagir-estate and
therefore his entire interest in the estate is liable to Thakur Raghubir
Singh
resumption under the Act. In the Ajmer Regulations,
v.
(Vol. H to I,) at pp. 564-6, these two estates have been
State of A }mer
considered and their history is given, and they are
called jagirs. The history of jagirs in Rajasthan was Wanc/wo j.
considered by this Court in Thakur Amarsinghji v.
State of Rajasthan (1), at p. 330 onwards, and the word
'jagir' was held to connote all grants which conferred
on the grantees rights in respect of land revenue. In
the case of these two jagirs also, as annexures B and
C show, land revenue was remitted and they were
granted as estates for particular purposes. They arc,
therefore, clearly estates in view of the origin of the
title of 'the holder of these estates who is called a
jagirdar and therefore the State could take them over
under s. 4 of the Act.
There is no force in any of the points raised on behalf
of the petitioners, and the petitions fail and are hereby
dismissed with one set of costs to the contesting
rer:!pondcnt.
Petitions dismisser!.
SRI RAM RAM NARAIN MEDHI
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(and connected petition)
(S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, 'B. P. SINHA,
K. SuBBA RAO and K. N. W ANCHOO, JJ.)
Land Refarm-Distribution of ownership and control of agricultural land--Purchase by tenants-Validity of enactmcnt-Dombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 (llom.
XIII of 1956), ss. 32 to 32R-C?nstitution of India, Arts. r4, r9,
:JI, 3rA, Entry r8, List II, Seventh Schedule.
The petitions challenged the constitutional validity of the
Bomhay Tenancy and Agricultural lands (Amendment) Act, 1956
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 3•>J.
62
November rB.
490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
(Born. XIII of 1956) which. in further amending the Bombay
Tenancy an<l Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bom. LXVll of
Sri R1ini R11111 1948), sought to distribute the ownership and control of agriNa,ain l\fedhi cultural lands in implementation of the directive principles of
State policy laid down by Arts. 38 and 39 of the Constitutio11.
v.
The impugned Act sought to distribute e•1uitably the lands
Th~ Slate of
bet\vcen the landholders and the. tenants, except \Vhcre the landBombay
holder required the same for cultivation by himself, by way of
compulsmy purchase of all surplus lands by tenants in possession
thereof with effect from Aprill, 1957, called the 'tiller's day'.
The basic idea underlying the Act was to prevent concentration
of agricultural lands in the hands of the landholders. The Act
thus, being a legislation in respect of rights in and over land,
affected the relation between landlord and tenant and provided
for the transfer and alienation of agricultural lands. The petitioners, who were landholders as defined by s. 2(9) of the Act
contended that (r) the impugned legislation was beyond the
competence of the State Legislature, (2) that, not being protected
by Art. 31A, of the Constitution, it infringed Arts. 14, 19 and :Jr
of the Constitution am! (3) that it was a piece of colourable legislation vitiated in part by excessive delegation of legislative
power to the State. On behalf of the respondent it was urged
that the impugned legislation fell within Entry 18 in List 11 of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, that it 'provided for
the extinguishment or 1nodification of rights to estates and was
as such protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution and that there
was no excessive delegation of legislative power.
Held, that it was well settled that the heads of legislation
specified in Entry 18 in List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution should not be construed in a narrow and pedantic
sense but should be given a large and liberal interpretation.
There could, therefore, be no doubt that the impugned Act fell
within the purview of Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution and the plea of legislative incompetence must fail.
British Coal Corporation v. The King, (1935) A.C. 500; Unit<"d
Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, [1940] F.C.1{. 110 and Na11inchandra
Mafailal v. The Commissioner of Jnco1ne-tax, J)oinbay City, [1955]
I S.C.R. 829, relied on.
There could be no doubt that the Bombay Land Revepuc
Code, 1879, was the existing la\v relating to land tenures in force
in the State of Bombay within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a) of
the Constitution and the word '.estate' as deiinc<l bys. 2(5) of the
Code clearly applied not only to lands held by the various
tenure·holders of alienated lands but also to lanrl-holdcrs anrl
occupants of unalienated lands. 1~here was no an1higuity in that
definition and, therefore, no justification for putting a narro\ver
construction on that word so as to mean the land-holders of the
former category alone and not of the latter; even if there was
auy, the wider meaning of the w·.Jrd \Vas tl11~ orF~ to be adopted
in the context of the objective of the Act.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOU,TS
491
Case-law discussed.
The word 'lanclholrler' as defined in s. 2(9) of the Act also
made no distinction between alienated and unalienatetl lands
and showed that the interest of such a landholder. fell within
the definition of 'estate' contained ins. 2(5) of the Code.
There was nu warrant for the proposition that extinguishment or motliiication of any rights in estates as contemplated by
Art. 31A(1)(a} of the Constitution must mean only what happcnell in the prncess of acquisition of any estate or of any rights
therein by the State. The language of. the Article was clca1· amt
unambiguous and showed that it treated the two concepts as
distinct and different from each other.
Sections 32 to 32R of the impugned Act clearly con temp lated tlte vesting of the title in the tenure on the tiller's day, dcfoasible only on certain specified cont.ingencies. They were designed to bring about an extinguishment, or in any event a mollification of the landlord's rights in the estate within the meaning of
Art. 31A(1)(a} of the Constitution. The impugned Act, therefore,
was not vulnerable as being violative of Arts.14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution. It would not be correct to contend that the sections
merely contemplated a suspension of the landholders' right anti
not their extinguishment.
Thalmr Raghubir Singh v. Court of Warils, Ajmer, [1953]
S.C.R. 104c), held inapplicable.
Where the Legislature settled the policy and broad principles
of the legislation, there could be no bar against leaving matters
of detail to be fixed by the executive and such delegation of
power could not vitiate the enactment. In the instant case, sinr.e
the Legislature had laid down the policy of the Act in the
preamble, enunciated the broad principles in ss. 5 and h arnl
iixecl the four criteria in s. 7 itself, the last of which had necessarily to be read efusdcm · generis with the others, it was not
correct to .say that the impugned Act by s. 7 had conferred uncontrolled power on the State Government to vary the ceiling
area or the economic holding or that s. 7 was vitiated by an
excessive delegation of legislative power to the State.
Parshram Damodhar v. State of Bombay, A.LR 1957 llom.
257, disapproved.
Dr. N. B. Khare v. The Staie of Delhi, [1950] S.C. R. 519; The
Staie of West JJengal v. Anff•ar Ali Sarkar, [1952] S.C.R. 284 a11d
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, [1957] S.C.H.. 233, referred
to.
ORIGINAL JuRISDIC'l'ION: Potitions Nos. 13 & 3841 of 57 and 55 of 1958.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Const,itution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental right!!.
V. M. Limaye and S.S. Shukla, for the petitioners
(In .Petitions Nos. 13. 38- 41/57).
Sri /lam lta•n
N tirain ill edhi
v.
The ::>tale of
IJ0111bay
492
Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
Th• State of
Bombay
Bha.gwali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Pur8hottam Tricum<la8 and J.B. Dadachanji, for
the pe~itioner (In Petition No. 55/58).
H. N. Banyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
H. J. Umrigar, K. L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent.
1958. November 18. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J.-These six petitions under Art. 32 of
the Constitution challenge the vires of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act,
1956 (Born. XIII of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as
the " impugned Act "). It was an Act further to amend
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1948 (Born. LXVII of 1948) (hereinafter called the
" 1948 Act ").
The petitioners are citizens of India and landholders
within the meaning of the 1948 Act holding several
acres of land within the State of Bombay out of which
a few acres are under their own cultivation, the bulk
of the lands being under the cultivation of tenantsexcept in the case of the petitioners in Petition No. 58
of 1958 where the whole of the lands are under the
cultivation of tenants.
The 1948 Act had been passed by the State Legislature as a measure of agrarian reform on December 28,
1948, with a view to amend the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands and to make certain other
provisions in regard to those lands and the objectives
sought to be achieved were thus set out in the second
paragraph of the preamble:" AND WHEREAS on account of the neglect of
a landholder or disputes between a landholder and his
tenants, the cultivation of his estate has seriously
suffered, or for the purpose of improving the economic
and social conditions of peasants er ensuring the full
and efficient use ofland for agricultural purposes, it is
expedient to assume management of estates held by
landholders and to regulate and impose restrictions on
the transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses,
sites and lands appurtenant thereto belonging to or
occupied by agriculturists, agricultural labourers and
'•'
(1) S.C.R.
SUPHEME COUH,'f REPORTS
493
artisans in the Province of Bombay and to make pro·
visions for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing
"
Section 2(8) of the said Act defined " Land " to
mean:
"(a) land which is used for agricultural purposes,
and includes(a) the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such
laud ; and used for agricultural purposes; and
(b) ............................................................. .
(i) the sites of dwelling houses occupied by agriculturists, agricultural labourers or. artisans and land
appurtenant to such dwelling houses.
") .......................................................... .. "
(11
" Landholder" was defined in s. 2(9) of the said
Act to mean :"a zamindar, jagi'rdar, saranjandar, inamdar,
talukdar, malik or a khot or any person not herein before specified who is a holder of land or who is interested in land, and whom the State Government has
declared on account of the extent and the value of the
land or his interests therein to be a land-holder for
the purposes of this Act."
Under s. 2(21) of the said Act the words and expressions used in the Act but not defined were to have the
. meaning assigned to them in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, as the case may be.
With a view to achieve the objective of establishing
a socialistic pattern of society in the State within the
meaning of Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution, a
further measure of agrarian reform was enacted by the
State Legislature, being the impugned Act, hereinbefore referred to, which was designed to bring about
such distribution of the ownership and control of
agricultural lands as best to subserve the common
good thus eliminating concentration of wealth and
means of production to the common detriment. The
said Act received the assent of the President on March
16, 1956, was published in the Bombay Government
Sri Uani Ha1n
Narain Medhi
v.
The Stale of
Bombay
Bhagwali ].
494
SUPltEME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
Gazette on March 29, 1956, and came into. force throughout the State on August 1, 1956.
Sti RanJ R"'"
In about November, 1956, certain landholders from
Naraiti ll.icdhi
v.
Kolhapur and Sholapur districts in the State of Bombay
The SJale of
filed petitions in the Bombay High Court under Art.
Botnbay
226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutionu.lity
of the impugned Act on various grounds. A DiviIJhagwati ].
sion Bench of the Bombay High Court pronounced its
judgment on :February 21, 1957, dismissing those petitions with costs except in regard to a declaration as
regards the invalidity of section 88D of the Act. Tho
petitioners herein thereupon filed these petitions under
Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the vires of the
impugned Act and praying for a writ of mandamus
against the State of Bombay ordering them to forbear
from enforcing or ta.king any steps in enforcement of
the Act, costs and further reliefs.
Petition No. 13 of 1957 appears to have been filed
on December 3, 1956, but effective steps therein were
taken only when an application for stay with a prayer
. for an ex-pa.rte order being C.M.P. No. 359 of 1957 was
filed herein on March 21, 1957. Petitions Nos. 38 to
41 of 1957 were filed on March 21, 1957, and Petition
No. 55 of 1958 was filed on March 19, 1958.
All these petitions followed a common pattern and
the main grounds of attack were : that the State Ll'gislature was not competent to pass the said Act, the
topic of legislation not being covered by any entry in
the State List ; that the said Act was beyond the ambit of Art. 31-A of the Constitution and was therefore
vulnerable as infringing the fundamental rights enshrined in Arts. 14, 19 and 31 thereof; that the provisions of the said Act in fact infringed the fundamental
rights of the petitioners conferred upon them by
Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution; that the said
Act was a piece of colourable legislation and in any
event a part of the provisions thereof suffered from
the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power.
The answer of the State was that the impugned Act
was covered by Entry No. 18 in List lI of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution, that it was a piece of
legislation for the extinguishment or modification of
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
rights in relation to estates within the definition thereof in Art. 31-A of the Constitution and that therefore
it was not open to cha.Benge uudei· Arts. 14, 19 and 31
thereof and that it was neither a. piece of colourable
legislation nor did any part thereof come within the
mischief of excessive delegation.
As to the legislative competence of the State Legislature to pass the impugned Act the question lies within a very narrow compass. As already stated, the
impugned Act was a further measure of agrarian reform enacted with a view to further a.mend the 1948
Act a.ml the ohject of the enactment was to bring_
about such distribution of the ownership and control
of agricultural lands as best to subserve the common
good. This object was sought to be achieved by fixing
ceiling areas of lands which could be held by a person
and by prescribing what was an economic holding. It
sought to equitably distribute the lands between the
landholders and the tenants and except in those cases
where the landholder wanted the land for cultivating
the same personally for which due provision was made
in the Act, transferred by way of compulsory purchase
all the other lands to tenants in possession of the
same with effect from April 1, 1957, which was called
thP- "tillers day". Provision was also made for disposal of balance of lands after purchase by tenants
and the basic idea underlying the provisions of the
impugned Act was to prevent the concentration of
agricultural lands in the hands of landholders to the
common detriment. The tiller or the cultivator was
brought into direct contact with the State eliminating
thereby the landholders who were in the position of
intermediaries. The enactment thus affected the relation between landlord and tenant, provided for the
transfer and alienation of agricultural lands, aimed at
land improvement and was broadly stated a legislation in regard to the rights in or over land :-categories specifically referred to in Entry 18 in List II of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which specifies the head of legislation as " land, that is to say,
rightR in or over land, land tenures including the rela.tio11 of landlord and tenant, and the collection of
Sri Rani Ram
Narain 11il'dhi
v.
The Stale nf
Romliay
496
Sri Ram Nam
Narain i'vledhi
v.
The St11tr. of
Bomh.-iy
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
rents; transfer· and alienation of agricultural land ;
land improvement and agricultural loans; coloniza.
tion ".
It is well settled that these heads of legislation
should not be construed in a narrow and pedantic
sense but should be given a large and liberal interpretation. As was observnd by the ,Judicial Committee
of tho Privy Council in British Coal Corporation v.
'l'lte King('):"Indeed, in interpreting a constituent or organic
statute such as the Act, that construction most i.,.,neficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers
must be adopted."
The :Federal Court also in the United Provinces v.
Atiqa Begum (2 ) pointed out that none of the items in
the Lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense
and that each general word should be held to extend
to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly
and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. This
Court in N avincltandra M afatlal v. 'l'he Commissioner
of Income-tax, Bombay City (') also expressed the same
opinion and stated : " The cardinal rule of interpretation, however, is
that words should be read in their ordinary, natural
and grammatical meaning subject to this rider, that in
construing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power the most liberal construction
should be put .upon words so that the same may have
effect in their widest amplitude." (See also 'l'hakur
A mar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (') ).
Having regard to the princip_le of construction
enunciated above it is clear that the impugned Act is
covered by Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and is a legislation with reference to "land" and this plea of legislative incompetence of the State Legislature to enact the impugned ·
Act therefore fails.
If, then, the State Legislature was competent to
cm;tct the impugned Act, is the Act ultra vires the
Constitution as infringing any of the fundamental
(1) [1935] A.C. 500, _518.
· (3) [1955] I S.C.R. 829. 836, 837.
(2) [1940] F.C.R. IIO, 134.
(4) [1955] 2 S.C.R 303, 329.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
rights conferred upon the petitioners ? In the course
of the arguments before us learned counse.l for the
petitioners confined their attack only to the constitutionality of ss. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17A, 31A to 31D and 32
to 32R of the impugned Act as violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(g) of the
Constitution. The first question to consider in this
context however is whether the impugned Act is protected by Art. 31-A of the Constitution because if it is
so protected, no challenge on the score of the provisions thereof violating Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution would be available to the petitioners.
The relevant portions of Art. 31-A which fall to be
considered here read as follows :" (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
Art. 13, no law providing for:(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate
or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or
modification of any such rights .................. shall be
deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or a.bridges any of the rights
conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31.
Provided that where such law is a law made by the
Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article
shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been
reserved for the consideration of the President, has
received his assent .............. .
(2) In this article,(a) the expression "estate" shall, in relation to
any-local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law
relating to land tenures in force in that area, and,shall
also include any jagir, inam, or mua.fi or other similar
grant and in the States of Madras and Trava.ncoreCochin any janmam rights. ·
(b) the expression "rights" in relation to an
estate, shall include any rights vesting in a. proprietor,
sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat,
63
Sri Ram Ram
Narain ·Medhi
v.
The Stat• of
Bombay
B11agwati ].
498
Sri Ram Ram
Narain M edhi
v.
Tla6 State of
Bombay
BAagwati j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or
privileges in respect of land revenue." ·
The question which we have to address ourselves
initially is whether the lands held by the petitioners,
who are admittedly landholders within the definition
of the term contained in s. 2(9) of the 1948 Act, are
"estates" within the meaning of Art. 31-A of the
Constitution.
Before we launch upon that enquiry it would perhaps be of help to note how the various land tenures
originated. Baden-Powell in his Land-SyRtems of
British India (1892 Ed.), Vol. 1, dealing with the general view of land tenures traced the origin and growth
of different tenures in the manner following at pp. 9799 (Chapter IV):" 4. Effects of Land-Revenue Admini&tration and
Revenue-farming. Then again, the greater Oriental
governments which preceded ours, have always, in one
form or another, derived the bulk of their State-revenues and Royal property from the land. In one
system known to us, " Royal lands " were allotted in
the principal villages, and this fact may have suggested to the Mughals their plan of allotting special farms
and villages to furnish the privy purse, and has had
other survivals. But, speaking generally, the universal plan of taking revenue was by taking a share of
the actual grain heap on the threshing-floor from each
holding. Afterwards this was commuted for a money
payment levied on each estate or each field as the
case might be ............... To collect this revenue, the
ruler appointed or recognized not only a headman and
accountant in ea.ch village, but also a hierarchy of
graded officials in districts and minor divisions of
territory formed for administrative purposes. These
officers were often remunerated by holdings of land,
and a class of land-tenures will be found in some parts
of India owning its origin to these hereditary official
holdings. Not only so, but during the decline which
Oriental governments have usually undergone, the
Revenue officials have been commonly found to merge
in, or be superseded, by revenue-farmers-persons who
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
contracted for a certain sum ofrevenue to be pa.id into
the Treasury from a given area., as representing the
State dues exigihle from the land-holdings within that
area. Such revenue-farmers, or officials, whatever
their origin, have always tended to absorb the interests
of the land-holders and to become in time the virtual
Ja.ndlords over them.
Nor is it only that landlord tenures a.rise in this
way. No sooner docs the superior right take shape
than we find many curious new tenures created by the
landlord or arising out of his attempts to conciliate or
provide for certain eminent claims in the grade below
him.
S. 5. Effects of Assignment or Remission of LandRevenue.
Yet another class of tenures arises in connection
with the State Revenue-administration; and that is
when the ruler either excuses an existing land-holder
from paying his revenue, either wholly or in part; or
"alienates " or assigns the revenue of a. certain estate
or tract of country in favour of some chief, or other
person of importance, or to provide funds for some
special objects, or to serve as a recompense for services
to be rendered.
At first such grants are carefully regulated, are for
life only, and strictly kept to their purpose, and to the
amount fixed. But as matters go on, and the ruler is
a had or unscrupulous one, his treasury is empty, and
he makes such grants to avoid the difficulty of finding
a cash salary. The grants become permanent and
hereditary; they arc also issued by officials who have
no right to make them; and not only do they then
result in landlord tenures and other curious rights, but
are a burden to after times, and have furnished a
most troublesome legacy to our own Government
when it found the revenues eaten up by grantees
whose titles were invalid, and whose pretensions,
though grown old in times of disorder, were inadmissible.
Such grants may ha.ve begun with no title to the
land but only a right to the revenue, but want of
Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
The Slate of
Bombay
Bhagwati j.
500
Sri Ra,.,, Ratn
Narain ltf edhi
v.
The State of
Honibay
BhagwaJi j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp~
supervision and control has resulted in the grantee
seizing the landed right also. "
Here we find the distinction between the State owned lands which are unalienated where the tenures
arise out of the exigencies of revenue collection and
alienated lands the revenue whereof is remitted either
wholly or in part or in other words "alienated" or
assigned to grantees for various purposes.
Various land tenures thus developed and series of
proprietorships came into existence. The main teimres which the British found when they came into
power comprised: (I) the Khas or tenure by Government; (2) the Raiyatwari tenure; (3) the Zamindari
or landlord tenure and (4) the Taluqdari or <louble
tenure.
It is interesting to note in this connection that in
the table compiled by Baden-Powell in Vol. Ill of his
Book at p. 142 giving some idea of the distribution of
the different classes of landed estates in Madras the
different classes of landed estates described therein
included not only Zamindaris but also "estates " held
by Raiyats paying diverse sums as and by way of
land revenue.
So far as the area within the State of Bombay was
concerned the position is thus summed up in Dttndekar's Law of Land Tenures, Vol. l at p. 12 :Section III. Classification of land accordiny to the
interest of the holder:
" Land is either Government land or not Government land; that is, it is either unalicnated or alienated.
The expression for unalienated land is khalsa or
ryatawari in some parts as opposed to dumala or inam
lands, that is, alienated lands. In Gujrat Government
lands are called "sarkari" as opposed to "baharkhali " lands meaning alienated lands-lauds the
produce of which had not to be brought to the common threshing ground. In some parts of Gujrat there
are, "talpad" (Government) lands as opposed to
"iVanta " lands. In old Regulations two kinds of
land have been referred to, namely, malguzarry land
and lakhiraj land. Tho former meant land paying
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
assessment to Government, whereas the latter meant
land free from payment of assmismcnt. Khalsa land
in the permanent occupation of holders was denominated, before the survey-settlements, in the different
parts of the Presidency by the expressions mirasi,
dhara, suti and muli. Government arable land not in
the permanent occupation of an occupant was and is
described by the name sheri. In alienated villages,
lands corresponding to Government " sheri " lands are
denominated by the expressions " sheri" " Khas
Karnath" and" Ghar Khedu ". Lands in leasehold or
farmed villages are called khoti lands. Lands which
are given under leases and the assessment of which is
regulated by the terms thereof are called kauli lands."
It will be observed that Mirasi, Dhara, Suti and
Muli were all tenures in regard to unalienated lands,
the tenure-holders being permanent holders of land
having hereditary interests in their holdings. The
Khoti tenures in the Konkan and the Bhagdari and
Narvadari tenures in some parts of Gujrat were also
tenures in regard to unalienated lands, the revenue
being assessed on those lands on entire villages and
not on specific pieces of land either in lump or on the
basis of a fixed Bighoti assessment on each field and
the tenure-holders being responsible for the payment
of the sum in certain specified modes. The general
prevailing tenure, however, was the Baiyatwari tenure
where the Raiyat or the tenant had the right of an
occupant in his holding. The right of an occupant
was a heritable right and on the death of a registered
occupant the name of his heir was entered in his place.
All these were land tenures in respect of unalienated
lands and the Bombay Survey and Settlement Act
(Born. 1 of 1865) passed in 1865 applied generally to
the same. There were of course certain Acts which
dealt with specific tenures mentioned above, e.g.,
Bhagdari and Narvadari Tenures Act (Born. V of
1862), and Khoti Settlement Act (Born. 1 of 1880); but
by and large they were tenures in regard to unalienated lands and were governed by the Bombay Survey
and Settlement Act, 1865. In 1879 the State Legislature
Sri Ram Ram
Narain M edhi
v.
The Stale of
Bombay
Bhagwati
.f.
502
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
enacted the Bombay Land Hevcuun Code (Born.
V of 1879) with a view to consolidate and amend the
Sri Ram flam
law
relating to Revenue Officers, to the assessment
Narain Medhi
and recovery ofland revenue and to other matters conv.
The Slate of . nected with land revenue administration.
This Act
Bombay
extended to the whole of theState of Bombay excluding
the City of Bombay and certain other areas thereBhagwati ].
in mentioned. \Ve shall have occasion to refer to
certain provisions of this Act hereafter.
Turning now to alienated lands in which category
were comprised lands not belonging to government
and lands not paying revenue to government which
were exceptions to the principles of State proprietorship and of liability of land-holders to pay land
revenue to government we find that the alienations
were classified as: (l) political tenures such as Jagirs
and Saranjams; (2) Service Inams ; (3) Personal Inams
and ( 4) Religious endowments. The principal alienations
were Inams, Jagirs or Saranjams and Watans. Each
of them was considered as a tenure, had got its own
history, its own features and peculiarities. Summary
settlements were effected by the government with
these tenure-holders and their rights as such recognized. There were Taluqdari tenures or estates in Gujrat
which also came under this category and it may be
noted that several pieces of legislation were passed by
the State Legislature in regard to those several tenures
of alienated lands, e. g., Titles to Rent-Free Estates
Act (Born. XI of 1852) ; Ahmedaba<l Taluqdar's Act
(Born. VI of 1862); Bombay Hereditary Offices Act
(Born. III of 1874); Broach and Kaira Encumbered
Estates Act (Born. XIV of 1877); Broach and Kaira
Encumbered Estates Act (Born. XXI of 1881); J\llatadars Act (Born. VI of 1887) and Gujrat Talnqdars Act
(Born. VI of 1888). Our attention was also drawn in
this connection to the various Acts passed by the State
Legislature (between 1949 and 1955) abolishing the
several land tenures in Bombay where the government
was not in direct contact with the tiller of the soil but
there was an interposition of intermediaries between
them, the intermediaries having leased out parts of
(I) S.C.R. 8UPRBD OOURT REPORTS
503
the lands to the tenants who actually cultivated the
soil and it was urged that the inrerests of these intermediaries were estates properly so called.
It is to be noticed, however, that the several land
tenures which were thus abolished we~e not only tenures in respect of alienated lands but also comprised
unalienated lands, e.g., the Bombay Bhagdari and
Narvadari Tenures Abolition Act, 1949 (Born. XXXII
of 1949); The Bombay Khoti Abolition Act, 1949
(Bom. VI of 1950) and the Bombay Merged Territories
(Janjira and Bhor) Khoti Tenure Abolition Act, 1953
(Born. LXXI of 1953). There was no distinction made
thus between land tenures in regard to alienated lands
and those in regard to unalienated lands. It may also
be noted that all these Acts followed a common
pattern, viz., the abolition of these land tenures, award
of compensation to the tenure holders whose tenures
were thus abolished and the establishment of direct
relations between the government on the one hand and
the tenure-holders cultivating the lands personally and
the tenants cultivating the soil on the other. All
these persons, thus cultivating the soil were given the
status of occupants and direct relationship was thus
established between the government and them. These
Acts so far as our present .purpose is concerned are
only mentioned to show the different types of land
tenures which existed in the State of Bombay prior to
their abolition as aforesaid.
These were the various land tenures known in the
State. of Bombay and we may at this stage appropriately refer to the statistics (1886-87) of these tenures
given by Ba.den-Powell in Vol. III of his said Book at
p. 251 :-
Sri Ram Ram
Narain M edhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwati j.
<: ..
"'
"' ~""... .~-••
~""
"l
::;;i
...
~~
Oa
[ls.~~~~1~
....
'-....,
.
Tenure
-
Village landholders:
Raiyatwari
villages
Overlord
tenures
Taluqdari
Mewasi
Udhad Jambandi
Khot
Isafat
Revenue-free
i.e. inam &
Jagir
Number ofestates or
holdings.
1284,238
Number ofvillages
"'
!t i:I
;: .i
Remarks.
acres
C;
....
0
17.l
30,118!
530!
530!
41
123
41
123
1732'!;
7
2165£
Area in
~~
c
1732!
7
2165~
28,475,016
(occupied
land only)
1,419,397
(gross area)
79334
194,830
2160,517
36Q8
4483,343
I have added together. c1
"'='
these paying ·at full rates ~
and the much smaller numher paying at privileged
rates, the latter are 213,405,
and how far these represent bhagda.r, etc., etc., I
have no means of telling.
tz:J
=:::
tz:J
a
0
Cl
~
~
~
tz:J
~
~
~
17.l
These refer to whole viilages or estates not to revenue privileges on individual fields, etc., which
are included in village
land-holdings.
.-.
....
'°°'
.......
'°17.l
=
~
""
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
It is to be noted that the holdings of the land-
holders in Hyatwari villages apart from others were
also sty led therein as estates or holdings.
It was vehemently urged before us by learned counsel for the petitioners that the expression " estate "
aptly applied only to lands held by the various tenure
holders of alienated lands above referred to, and that
it could not apply to the holdings of occupants who
had merely a right of occupancy in specific pieces of
unalienated lands. The word "estate" had been defined in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, in
s. 2(5) to mean : "any interest in lands and the aggregate of such interests vested in a person or aggregate
of persons capable of holding the same," and would
prima facie cover not only an interest in alienated
lands but also in unalienated lands. It was however
urged that the expression "estate " should be construed in a narrower sense having regard to the legislative
history and particularly to the fact that the lands held
by the tenure holders of alienated lands only had prior
to 1879 been recognized as estates and the holding of
an occupant was not treated as such. The distinction
thus sought to be made between holders. of unalienated
lands and holders of alienated lands is not of much
consequence because even in regard to unalienated
lands besides the occupants there were tenure holders
called Bhagdars and Narwadars and Khotes who had
interests in lands held by them under those several
tenures which lands were unalienated lands. The
interests which theflP. tenure holders enjoyed in the
lands held by them were "estates " and it could not
therefore be predicated of the expression "estate" that
it could only be used in connection with alienated
lands. If this distinction was therefore of no avail,
we have only got to consider if there is·any reason
why a narrow interpretation should be put upon the
expression "estate" as suggested by the petitioners.
Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the
petitioners on a decision of this Court in Hariprasad
Skivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Divikar(1) where the word
"retrenchment" as defined in s. 2(oo) and the word
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 121, 132.
64
I958
Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwali ].
506
Sri Ra,n Rani
Narain Medhi
v.
Tho State of
Botnl)(iy
lJlkigwali j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
" retrenchment" in s. 25F of the Industrial DispntcR
Act, 1947, as amended by Act XLIII of 1953 were hold
to have no wider meaning than the ordinary accept.cd
connotation of those words and were hold to mean tho
discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer
for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishments inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and did
not include termination of services of all workmen on
a bona fide closure of industry or on change of ownership or management thereof. Even though the word
"retrenchment" was defined as meaning the termination of services by an employer of the workmen for
any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punish.
ment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, which
words were capable of includiug within their scope the
termination of services of all workmen on a bona fide
closure of industry or on change. of ownership or
management thereof, the word " retrenchment" Was
construed in a narrow sense because the word " retrenchment" connoted in its ordinary acceptance that
the bu8iness itself was being conducted and a portion
of the staff or labour force was discharged as surplusage. 'fhis Court obi!ervetl in the course of the
judgment at page 132 : " In the absence of any compelling words to
indicate that the intention was even to inoludu a. bona
fide closure of the whole business, it would, we think,
be divorcing the expression altogether from its coutext
to give it suoh a. wide meaning as is contended for by
learned counsel for the respondent. What is being
defined is retrenchment, and that is the context of the
definition. It is truo that an artificial definition may
include a meaning different from or in excess of the
ordinary aceeptatiou of the word which is the subject
of definition ; but there must then be compelling
words to show that such a meaning different from or
in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended. Where,
within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of
the word, every single requirement of the definition
clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word
defined."
(1) s.nR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
Reliance was also placed on a. decision of the Court of
Appeal in England in Re The Vexatious Actions Act,
1896, In re Bernard Boaler (1 ) where the words "legal
proceedings " were held not to include criminal proceedings, in spite of the words being prima facie capable of including the same. Kennedy, C. J., expressed
his view at page 32 that it was impossible to say that
the meaning of the expression " legal proceedings "
was in itself and by itself clear and unambiguous and
followed the dictum of Lord Esher in Rex v. City of
London Court (2 ) : "If the words of an Act admit of two interpretations then they are not clear ; and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity and the other does not, the
Court will conclude that the Legislature did not intend
to lead to an absurdity, and will adopt the other interpretation. "
8crutton, J., also expressed the same opinion at
p. 41 :" I find general words used in the Act capable of
two meanings, a wider and a narrower one. On the
whole I think the language i1:1 more suited to tho
narrower than the wider meaning. The narrower
meaning will affect the liberties of the subject to some
extent; the wider meaning will most seriously affoct
the liberties of the subject in a matter, his personal
liberty and safety, which I sec no reason in the Act, to
believe was in t.he contemplation of the Legislature. I
decline to make this more serious interference with the
liberty of the subject, unless the Legislature us1~s
language clear enough to convince me that that was
its intention, and I think ample meaning is provided
for its words, and ample remedy is provided for the
grievance in respect of which Parliament was legislating by putting the narrower construction on the
general words it has used. "
Are there any circumstances in the present caRe
which would compel us to put a narrower construction
on the expression "estate" in s. 2(5) of the Bombay
Land Revenue Code, 1879 ? It is true that the expreRsion " estate " was used prior to 1879 in connection
(1) (1915) 1 K.B. 21.
(2) [1892) I Q.B, 273, 290.
Sri Rain Rom
Narain M edlii
v.
Tlie Stal• of
Bombay
Bhagwati ].
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
with the interests which the various tenure holders of
alienated
lands held in their respective lands but it
Sri Ram Ram
does
not
therefore
follow that that expression could be
Narain M edhi
used only in connection with those interests and no
v.
The State of
others. The Watandars, Saranjamdars, Inamdars
Bombay
and Taluqdars and the like were no doubt holders of
"estates" but does that fact militate against the
Bhagwati j.
occupants also holding "estates" in the lands which
were the subject-matter of their tenures. The words
of the definition contained in s. 2(5) of the Bombay
Land Revenue Code, 1879, were clear and unambiguous.
They meant any interest in lands and the expression
"lands " was capable of comprising within its ambit
alienated and unalienated lands.
As a n.atter of fact, the definition of "Superior
holder" in s. 2(13) and the definition of" alienated" in
s. 2(20) of the Code, provisions of s. 111 in regard to
revenue management of villages or estates not belonging to the Government, of s. 113 with regard to the
partition of estates and of s. 136 prescribing liability
for revenue, aniongst others refer not only to alienated
lands but also to unalienated lands and the expression
"estates" used therein can have reference not only to
alienated lands but also to unalienated lands. If the
definition of the expression " estate" in the context of
the Code is thus clear and unambiguous as comprising
both the types of lands, there is no reason why a
narrower construction as suggested by the petitioners
should be put upon the expression " estate". (See the
observations of Kennedy, L. J., in Vexatious Actions
Act, 1896, In re. Boaler (1) at p. 31 and the observations
of this Court in Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja
Deo v. The State of Orissa ('). Even if there was any
ambiguity in the expression, the wider significance
should be adopted in the context of the objectives of
the Act as stated above.
\Ve are, therefore, of opinion that the expression
"estate " had the meaning of any interest in land and
it was not confined merely to the holdings of landholders of alienated lands. The expression applied
not only to ·such "estate " holders but also to land
holders and occupants of unalienated lands.
(1) [1915] l K. B. 21.
(2) [1956] S.C.R. 72.
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
509
It was however contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Bombay Land Revenue Ccide was not a
law relating to land tenures in force in the State of
Bombay and therefore the definition of the expression
"estate" contained therein would not avail the respondent. It was urged that the Code was passed by
the State Legislature in order to consolidate and
amend the law relating to Revenue Officers, and to the
assessment and recovery of Land Revenue, and to
other matters connected with the Land Revenue Administration in the Presidency of Bombay and was
merely concerned with the collection of land revenue
by the State and had nothing to do with land tenures
as such. This argument, however, ignores the various
provisions of the Code which define the status as also
the rights and obligations of the occupant who has
been defined in s. 2(16) of the Code to mean the holder
in actual possession of unalienated lands other than a
tenant provided that where the holder in actual
possession is a tenant, the landholder or superior landlord, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the
occupant. Chapter VI deals with the Grant, Use and
Relinquishment of unalienated lands and s. 65 thereof
prescribes the uses to which an occupant of land for
purposes of agriculture may put his land. Under
s. 68 an occupant is entitled to the use and occupation
of his land for the period therein prescribed on fulfilling the conditions therein mentioned and under s. 73
occupancy is stated to be transferable and heritable.
Section 73 as it was enacted in 1879 read as follows :
" The right of occupancy shall subject to the provisions
contained in section 56, and to any conditions lawfully
annexed to the occupancy and save as otherwise prescribed by law, be deemed an heritable and transferable
property." Certain amendments have been made in
this section by various Bombay Land Revenue
Amendment Acts, (Born. VI of 1901 and Bom. IV of
1913) and the section as it stands at present reads:"An occupancy shall, subject to the provisions contained in section 56, and to any conditions lawfully
annexed to the tenure, and save as otherwise prescribed by law, be deemed an heritable and transferable
Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwati J.
510
SYi Rani Ra1n
Na,.ain 1'Vledhi
v.
The State of
Bo1nbay
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
property." This goes to show that an occupant holds
the land under a tenure and occupancy is a species of
land tenures. The provisions contained in s. 73(A)
relating to the power of the State Government to restrict the right .of transfer and the provisions in regard
to relinquishments contained in ss. 74, 75 a.nd 76 also
point to the same conclusion. These and similar provisions go to show that occupancy is one of the varieties of land tenures and the Bombay Land Revenue
Code, 1879, comes within the description of "existing
laws relating to land tenures in force" in the State of
Bombay within the meaning of Art. 31A (2)(a). BadenPowell has similar observations to make in regard to
these provisions in his Land Systems in British India,
Vol. I at p. 321 :"Nothing whatever is said in the Revenue Code
about the person in possession (on his own account)
being "owner" in the Western sense. He is simply
called the " occupant", and the Code says what he
can do and what he cannot. The occupant may do
anything he pleases to improve the land, but may not
without permission do anything which diverts the
holding from agricultural purposes. He has no right
to mines or minerals.
These are the facts of the tenure ; you may theorize on them as you please; you may say this amounts
to proprietorship, or this is a dominium minus plenum ;
or anything else."
There is no doubt therefore that the Bombay Land
Revenue Code, 1879, was a.n existing law relating to
land tenures in force in Bombay at the time when the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, was
pa.seed and Art. 31A in its a.mended form was introduced therein and the expression "estate " had a
meaning given to it under s. 2(10) there, viz., "any
interest in land" which comprised within its scope
alienated as well a.s una.liena.ted lands and covered the
holdings of occupants within the meaning thereof.
The 1948 Act was passed by the State Legislature
in order to amend the law which governed the relations
between landlords and tenants of agricultural lands
the object sought to be achieved being a.s hereinbefore
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
set out. 8cction 2 of the Act defined the expressions " to
cultivate personally " (s. 2(6)); "landholder" (s. 2(9)); Sri Ram Ram
"protected tenant" (s. 2(14)) amongst other expres- Na1ain Medhi
sions and provided in s. 2(21) that words and expresv.
sions used in this Act but not defined shall have the The Slate of
Bombay
meaning assigned to them in the Bombay .Land
Hcvenue Code, 1879, and the Transfor of Property Act,
1882, as the case may Le. This brought in the defini- Bhagwati j.
tion of the expression" ei;tate" which had the meaning assigned to it in that Code, viz., "any interest in
land". The expression "landholder " in s. 2(9) above
was defined to mean "a zamindar, ja.girdar, saranjam<far, inamdar, talukdar, malik or a khot or any
person not hCl·oinbefore specified who ii; a holder of
land or who is interested in land, and whom the St.ate
Government has declared on account of the extent and
value of the land or his interests therein to be a landholder for the purposes of this Act." The latter part
of this definition is significant and shows that not only
holders of alienated lands but also holders of unalienated lands were comprised therein provided, however, the
extent and value of the land or their interests therein
were such as to deserve a declaration in that behalf at
the hands of the State Government. The only point to
note here is that no distinction was made even in this
Act between alienated lands and una.licnated lands and
all interests in land howsoever acquired were treated
on a par so far as the holdings were concerned, necessarily implying that even an occupant would come
within the description of landholder and his interests
, therein would come within the definition of " estate "
as defined in the Bombav Land Revenue Code, 1879.
Chapter III made provisions for protected tenants,
their special rights and privileges and whoever came
within the category of protected tenant was given the
right to purchase from tho landlord the land held by
him as such protected tenant notwithstanding anything contrary in law, usage or contract subject to the
provisions of sub.s. 6 which imposed restrictions on
the holdings of landlords as well as tenants. These provisions were analogous to t.hc provisions contained in
ss. 32 to 32 R of the' impugned Act except that in the
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Rupp.
1948 Act the protected tenant had the option to purchase
the land whereas under the impugned Act there
Sl'i llam l?am
was
a
provision for compulsory purchase of the land
Narain M edhi
by the tenant on a specified date subject to certain
v.
Th_e State of
conditions therein mentioned. Section 34 of the 1948 Act
Bombay
gave the landlord the right to determine protected
tenancy under certain conditions and was analogous
Bhagwati ].
to s. 31 of the impugned Act which empowered the
landlord to terminate the tenancy for personal cultivation and non-agricultural purposes. 50 acres of land
were prescribed as the limit of the holding either by
the landlord or the protected tenant which provision
was analogous to the one found in the impugned Act
in regard to ceiling area and economic holdings. Power
was given to the State Government under s. 36 to
reduce the limit of 50 acres by a notification i'n the
official gazette and power was also given similarly to
direct that the limits of fifty acres or the reduced limit
specified in such notification shall comprise such kind
or kinds of lands in the area as may be specified in the
notification. This power was analogous again to the
power given to the State Government unqer s. 7 of
the impugned Act to vary the ceiling area or economic
holding originally prescribed in ss. 5 and 6 of the Act.
These instances culled out from some of the provisions. of the 1948 Act go to show that the agrarian
reform which was initiated by that Act was designed to
achieve the very same purpose of distribution of the
ownership and control of agricultural lands so as to
subserve the common good and eliminate the concentration of wealth to the common detriment which
purpose became more prominent when the Constitution
was ushered in on January 26, 1950, and the directive
principles of State Policy were enacted inter alia in
Arts. 38 and 39 of the Constitution. With the advent
of the Constitution these provisions contained in the
1948 Act required to be tested on the touch-stone of
the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III thereof
and when the Constitution (:First Amendment) Act,
1951, was passed introducing Arts. 31A and 31Bin the
Constitution, c!Ire was taken to specify the 1948 Act in
the Ninth Schedule so as to make it immune from
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
attack on the score of a.ny provision thereof being
violative of the fundamental rights enacted in Part III
of the Constitution. The 1948 Act was the second item
in that schedule and was expressly saved from any
attack against the constitutionality thereof by the
express terms of Art. 31B.
The impugned Act which was passed by the State
Legislature in 1956 was a further measure of agrarian
reform carrying forwal'd the intentions which had their
roots in the 1948 Act. Having regard to the comparision of the various provisions of the 1948 Act and the
impugned Act referred to above it could be legitimately
urged that if the cognate provisions of the 1948 Act
were immune from attack in regard to their constitutionality, on a parity of reasoning similar provisions
contained in the impugned Act, thoug,h they made
further strides in the achievement of the objective of a
socialistic pattern of society would be similarly saved.
That pol!ition, however, could not obtain because
whatever amendments were made by the impugned
Act in the 1948 Act were future laws within the meaning of Art. 13(2) of the Constitution and required to
be tested on the self-same touchstone. They would not
be in terms saved by Art. 31B and would have to be
scrutinized on their own merits before the courts came
to the conclqlliou that they were enacted within the
constitutional limitations. The very terms of Art. 31B
envisaged that any competent legislature would have
the power to repeal or amend the Acts and the Regulations specified in the 9th Schedule thereof and if any
such amendment was ever made the vires of that
would have to be tested. (Vide Abdul Rahiman
Jamaluddin Hurjuk v. Vithal Arjun Undare (1) ).
That brings us back to the provisions of Art. 31A
and to a consideration as to whether the impugned
Act was a legislation for the acquisition by the State
of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights within the
meaning of sub-article (l)(a) thereof. We have already
held that the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, was
(1) (1957) 59 Born. L. R. 579.
65
Sri Ram Ram
Na•ain Medhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwati j.
514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1959] Supp.
an existing law relating to land tenures in force in the
State
of Bombay and that the interests of occupauts
Sri Ram Ram
amongst
others fell within the expression " estate"
Narain M edhi
contained
therein. That, however, was not enough for
v.
T"e Slate of
the petitioners and it was further contended on their
Bomb''Y
behalf that even though the impugned Act may he a
law
in regard to an " estate" within the meaning of
l:Jbagwali j.
the definition contained in Art. 31A(2)(a) it was not
law providing for the acquisition lly the State of any
estate or any rights therein or for the extinguishment
or modification of any such rights. The impugned Act
was certainly not a law for the acquisition by the State
of any estate or of any rights therein because even the
provisions with regard to the compulsory purchase by
tenants of the land on the specified date transferred
the title in those lands to the respective tenants and
not to the State. There was no compulsory acquisition
of any "estate" or any rights therein by the State
itself and this provision could not help the respondent.
The respondent, however, urged that the provisions
contained in the impugned Act were enacted for the
extinguishment or modification of rights in " estates "
and were, therefore, ~aved by Art. 31A(l)(a). It was
on the other hand urged by the petitioners (l) that the
extinguishment or modification of any such rights
should only be in the process of the acquisition by the
State of any estate or of any rights therein and (2)
that the provisions in the impugned Act amounted to
a suspension of those rights l?ut not to an extinguish·
Iilent or modification thereof. We shall now proceed to
examine these contentions of the petitioners.
Art. 3IA(l)(a) talks of two distinct objects of legislation ; one being the acquisition by the State of any
estate or of any rights therein and the other being the
extinguishrnent or modification of any such rights. If
the State acquires an estate or any rights therein that
acquisition would have to be a compulsory acquisition
within the meaning of Art. 31(2)(A) which was also
introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, simultaneously with
Art. 31 A(I) thereof. There was no provision made for
the transfer of the ownership of any property to the
(1) S.U.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
515
State or a Corporation owned or controlled by the
State with the result that even though these provisions
deprived the landholders of their property they did
not amount to a compulsory acquisition of the property by the State. If this part of Art. 31A(l)(a)
i~ thus eliminated what we are left with is whether
these provisions of the impugned Act provided for an
extinguishment or modification of any rights in
"estates". That is a. distinct concept altogether and
could not be in the process of acquisition by the State
of any "estate" or of any rights therein. Acceptance
of the interpretation which is sought to be put upon
these words by the petitioners would involve the addition of words "in the process of the acquisition by the
State of any estate or of any rights therein " or " in
the process of such acquisition " which according to
the well known canons of construction cannot be
done. If the language of the enactment is clear and
unambiguous it would not be legitimate for the Courts
to add any words thereto and evolve therefrom some
sense which may be said to carry out the supposed
intentions of the legislature. The intention of the
Legislature is to be gathered only from the words used
by it and no such liberties can be ta.ken by the Courts
for effectuating a supposed intention of the Legislature.
There is no warrant at all, in our opinion, for adding
these words to the plain terms of Art. 31A (l)(a) and
the words " extinguisbment or modification of any
such rights " must be understood in their plain grammatical sense without any limitation of the type suggested by the petitioners.
It, therefore, remains to consider whether the relevant provisions of the impugned Act were designed to
bring about an extinguh1hment or modification of the
la.ndlord's rights in their" estates". These provisions
are contained in ss. 32 to 32R of the impugned Act
and are under the heading " Purchase of lands by
Tenants". Section 32 provides that "on the first day
of April, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as " the tillers
da.y ") every tenant shall, subject to the provisions of
t\\e next succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free of all incumbrances
Sri Ram Ram
Narain M edhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagw<di ].
516
Sri Ham Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
1'hc State of
llombay
lihagwati ],
SUPREME COUHT HEl'OHTS
[1959] Supp.
subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by
him as tenant ..................... " provided certain con·
ditions are fulfilled. Under s. 32A the tenant shall be
deemed to have purchased the lands up to the ceiling
area and the tenant shall not be deemed to have purchased lands held by him as such tenant if he holds
lands partly as owner and partly as tenant but the area.
of the land held as owner is equal to or exceeds the
ceiling area (s. 32B). Section 320 empowers the tenant
to chose the land to be purchased if he holds lands
separately from more than one landlord and in spite
of anything contained in the Bombay l>revention of
Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1947 (Born. LXII of 1947) the tenant shall be deemed
to have purchased even such fragments of the land
held on tenancy (s. 32D). The balance of any land
after the purchase by the tenant as above is to be disposed of as if it were land surrendered by the tena.nt
(s. 32E); and the right of the tenant to purchase such
land where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a
person subject to any mental or physical disability or
a serving member of the armed forces is postponed
till one year after the cessation of disability. The
price to be paid by the tenant is to be determined by
the Tribunal as soon as may be after the tiller's day
and the Tribunal is in the first instance to record in
the prescribed manner the statement of the tenant
whether he is willing or is not willing to purchase the
land held by him as a tenant and if the tenant fails
to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing
to purchase the land, the Tribunal is to declare by an
order in writing that such tenant is not willing to
purchase the land and that tho purchase is iheffective
(s. 32G). These provisions al8o apply to a sub-tenant of
a permanent tenaut who is deemed to ha.ve purchased
the land subject to the conditions specified in ss. 32
to 32E (S. 321). Section 32J provides for an appeal to
the State Government against the decision of Tribunal. Section 32K prescribes the mode of payment of
price by the tenant; a.nd the purchase price is recoverable as arrears of land revenue (S. 32L). Under
s. 32M on the deposit of the price in lump sum or of
(1) S.C.H,. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
517
the last instalment of such price, the Tribunal is to
issue a certificate of purchase to the tenant in respect Sri Rant l?.ani
of the land, which certificate of purchase shall be con- Narain M edhi
v.
clusive evidence of purchase. If a tenant fails to
Tile
State
of
pay the lump sum within the period prescribed or is at
Bombay
any time in rtrrears of four instalments the purchase
i8 to be ineffective and the land is to be at the /Jhn gwali J.
disposal of the Collector and any amount deposited by
such tenant towards the price of the land is to be
refunded to him. Section 32N gives the landlord a right
to recover rent when purchase becomes ineffective, as
if the land had not been purchased at all. Section 32P
gives the power to the Collector to resume and dispose
of land not purchased by tenants. The amount of
purchase price is to be applied towards satisfaction of
debts (s. 32Q); and the purchaser is to be evicted
from the land purchased by him as aforesaid if he
fails to cultivate the land personally (s. 32R).
It is argued on the strength of these provisions
that there is no effective purchase or effective sale of
the land between the landlord and the tenant on the
tiller's day or the alternative period prescribed in that
behalf until certain conditions are fulfilled. To start
with it is only an inchoate right which is given to the
tenant to purchase the land which he can perfect on a
statement being made by him before tho Tribunal
that he is willing to purchase the land. Even if he
docs so, the land does not vt•st in him because only on
the payment of the purchase price either in lump or
by instalments can he get the certificate of purchase
from the Tribunal. If he commits default in payment, the purchase is ineffective and he gets no tit.le
to the land. These provisions, it is submitted, do not
vest the title to the land iu the tenant at all uutil all
these conditions are fulfilled and if any one or more of
them is not fulfilled the purchase becomes ineffectivein fact it is no purchase at all-with the result that
the title to the land which is already vested in the
landlord is not at all transferred to tho purchaser. If
that is so, there is no compulsory sale or compulsory
purchase of the land in question on the tiller's day or
the alternative period of time prescribed therefor and
518
SUPREME COURT HEl'OH.TS
[1959) Supp.
there is no extinguishmcnt of the rights of the landlord.
His rights in the land are merely suspended
Sri Rain Ram
Narain I'd edhi and such suspension is certainly not an extinguishrnent of his rights therein nor a modification thereof
v.
The Slate of
within the meaning of the expriJssion used in Art. 31A
Uo1nbay
(l)(a). Reliance is placed in support of this proposition on the observations of this Court in Thakur
Bhagwali J,
Raghuhir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer ('). In that
case this Court considered the provisions of s. 112 of
the Ajmer Teuancy and Land Hecords Act (Xl,ll of
1950) which provided that if a laudlord habitually
infringes the rights of a tenant under the Act he would
be deemed to be a landlord who is disqualified to
manage his own property and his property would be
liable to be taken under the superintendence oft.he
Court of Wards. Mahajan, J., (as he then was) observed at p. 1055 : "Section 112 of the Act XLII of 1950, intended
to regulate the rights of landlords and tenants, i~
obviously not a law providing for " the acquisition by
the State " of the estates of the landlords, or of any
rights in those estates. It is also not a law providing
for the extinguishment or modification of any such
rights. The learned Attorne1-General laid emphasis
on the word "modification' used in Article 31A.
That word in the context of the article only means a
modification of the proprietary right of a citizen like
an extinguishment of that right and cannot include
within its ambit a mere smipeusion of the right of
management of estate for a time, definite or indefi.
nite."
These observations were confined to suspension of
the right of managemcut of the estate and not to a
suspension of the title to the estate. Apart from the
question whether the suspension of the title to the
estate for a time, definite or indefinite would amount
to a modification of a right ill the estate within the
meaning of Art. 31A (l)(a), the position as it obtains
in this case is that there is no suspension of the title
of the landlord at all. The title of the fandlord to the
land pllsses immediately to the tenant on the tiller's
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049.
'
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
day and there is a completed purchase or sale thereof
as between the landlord and the tenant. The tenant is Sri Ram Ram
no doubt given a locus penitentiae and an option of 1Varain Medhi
v.
declaring whether he is or is not willing to purchase the
land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear The State of
Bombay
or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writ- IJhagwali J.
ing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase
the land and that the purchase is ineffective. It is only
by such a declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes ineffective. If no such declaration is
made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand
as statutorily effected on the tiller's day and will
continue to be operative, the only obligation on the
tenant then being the payment of price in the mode
determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits
default in the payment of such price either in lump or
by instalments as determined by the Tribunal, s. 32M
declares the purchase to be ineffective but in that
event the land shall then be at the disposal of the
Collector to be disposed of by him in the manner provided therein. Here also the purchase continues to
be effective as from the tiller's d1ty until such default
is committed and there is no question of a conditional
purchase or sale taking place between the landlord
and tenant. The title to the land which was vested
originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the
tiller's day or the alternative period prescribed in that
behalf. This title is defeasable only in the event of
the tenant failing to appear or making a statement
that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as
determined by the Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested
interest in the land defeasable only in either of those
cases and it cannot therefore be said that the title of
landlord to the land is suspended for any period detinite or indefinite. If that is so, there is an extinguishment or in any event a modification of the landlord's right in the estate well within the meaning of
those words as used in Art. 31A(l)(a).
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the
impugned Act is covered by Art. 31A and is protected
520
Sri llatn Ratn
Na rain ]1,1 crllli
v.
The State nf
llombay
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
from attack against its constitutionality on the score
of its having violated the fundamental rights, enshrined in Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. That
being so, the attack levelled against ss. 5, 6, 8, 9, 17 A,
31A to 31 D and 32 to 32R on the score of their being
violative of the fundamental rights conferred upon the
petitioners is of 'no avail to the petitioners. This
being the true position it is not necessary for us to
consider the interesting questions which were argued
before us at some length, viz., the nature, scope and
extent of the provisions contained in Arts. 31(1) and
31(2) of the Constitution and the line of demarcation
between them as also the impact of Art. 31(1) on the
fundamental right enshrined in Art. 19(l)(f) of the
Constitution. Suffice it to say that under the circumstances 1io fundamental right of the petitioners before
us is infringed by the impugned Act or the provisions
I.hereof and the petitions under Art. 32 cannot be
sustained.
The impugned Act being within the legislative competence of the State Legislature no question as to its
being a piece of colourable legislation can arise. It is not
a legislation resorted to hy the State Legislature with
a view to by-pass the provisions of List II of the
seventh schedule to the Constitution, attempting to
do something which it was otherwise not competent
to do. The legislation being covered by Entry 18 of
tho said List is really a ful'ther measure for agrarian
reform which it was well within its competence to
enact. It is not an expropriatory legislation in the
guise of one covered by Entry 18 in the said List. lt
only fixes the ceiling area for the holding of the landlord cultivating the land personally and transfers the
1ixeess holding to the tenant in actual cultivation
thereof and there too the price of the land as fixed by
the Tribunal has got to be paid by the tenant to the
landlord. The tenant also is not entitled to hold land
beyond the ceiling area and there is a balance sought
to be struck between the interests of the landlord and
those of the tenants so that the means of production
are not conc:ent,rated in the hands of one party to the
common detl'iment. The price payable is also either
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
521
in lump or in such instalments as may be determined
by the Tribunal and on default committed by the ten- Sri Ram Ram
ant in payment thereof the purchase becomes ineffec- Narain MedM
v.
tive and the land deemed to have been purchased by
The
State of
the tenant reverts to the Collector to be dealt with in
Boml1ay
accordance with the provisions contained in the Act
in that behalf. It may be that instahnents may be Bhagwati ].
spread over a particular period which may thus be
determined by the Tribunal and unless default is committed by the tenant in payment of four instalments
the purchase does not become ineffective.
That,
however, is not a provision which makes the payment
of price in any manner illusory.
The landlord is
entitled to the rents of the land as if there had been
no purchase of the land by the tenant and the payment of such rent is made the first charge on the land.
There is, therefore, no scope for the argument that the
provisions in this behalf contained in the Act were
illusory or that the impugned Act is a piece of eolourable legislation.
The only question that now survives is whether s. 7
of the impugned Act is bad by reason of excessive
delegation of legislative power. Section 7 invests the
Government with the power to vary the ceiling area
and economic holding which have been prescribed in
sH. fi and 6 of the Act. Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act
read as under :" 5. Ceiling area: (1) For the purposes of this
Act, the ceiling area of land shall be(a) 48 acres of jirayat land, or
(b) 24 acres of seasonally irrigated land or paddy
or rice land, or
(c) 12 acres of perennially irrigated land.
(2) Where the land held by a person consists of
two or more kinds of land specified in sub-section (1),
the ceiling area of such holding shall be determined
on the basis of one acre of perennially irrigated land
being equal of two acres of seasonally irrigated land
or paddy or rice land, or four acres of jirayat land.
66
522
Sri Ram Ram
N aroin M edhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
6. Economic holding-(l) For the purposes of
this Act an economic holding shall be(a) 16 acres of jirayat land, or
(b) 8 acres of seasonally irrigated land, or
paddy or rice land, or
(c) 4 acres of perennially irrigated land.
(2) Where the land held by a person consists of
two or more kinds of land specified in sub-section (1)
an economic holding shall be determined on the basis
applicable to the ceiling area under sub-section (2) of
section 5.
7. Power of Government to vary ceiling area and
economic holding: Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 5 and 6, it shall be la wfol for the
State Government, if it is satisfied that it is expedie11t
so to do in the public interest, to vary, by notification
in the Official Gazette, the acreage of the ceiling area
or economic holding, or the basis of determination of
such ceiling area or economic holding, under subsection (2) of section 5, regard being had to(a) the situation of the land,
(b) its productive capacity,
(c) tlie fact that the land is located in a backward
area, and
(d) any other factors which may be prescribed."
It is contended that s. 7 does not fix any criteria for
the guidance of the State Government and that the
power which is given to the State Govemment to
vary the ceiling area and economic holding is unguided and unfettered and that it is possible to exercise it
at the sweet will and discretion of the State Government even in favour of a. single individual or in favour
of political sufferers and the like. It is urged that no
broad principle or policy is enunciated by the Legislature in this behalf and it would be open to the State
Government to exercise this power arbitrarily and
even in a discriminatory manner and that such entrustment of power to the State Government amounts
to excessive delegation of legislative power and s. 7
therefore must be held to be void.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
523
The principles by which the courts arc guided in
the determination of this question are now well settled.
In the State of Bihar v. Maharajadhirajii Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga(1) Mahajan, J., (as he then
was observed):"The legislature applied its mind to the question
of the method and manner of paymcut of compensation. lt settled its policy and the broad principles.
It gayc the State Government the power to determine
matters of detail after having settled vital matters of
poli<;y. It cannot be said that the legislature did
not apply its mind to the subject-matter of tho legislation and did not lay down a policy. The proportion
in which compensation was payable in cash or in bonds
or whc.ther the whole of it was to be paid in cash is a
matter which only the State Government could fix
and similarly, the interval of instalments and the
period of redeemability of the bonds were also matters
of detail which the executive could more appositely
determine in exercise of its rule-making power. It
cannot be said in this case that any essential legislative power has been delegated to the executive or that
the legislature did not discharge the trust which the
Constitution had reposed in it. If the rule-making
authority abuses its power or makes any attempt to
make the payment illusory the expropriated proprietor
will not be without a remedy."
If the legislature settles the policy and the broad
principles of legislation, there is no bar against leaving
the matters of detail to be fixed by the executive and
such delegation will not amount to excessive delegation of legislative power such as to vitiate the enactment. ln the case before us the preamble to the Act
says what_ the policy of the impugned Act is, viz.,
further to amend the 1948 Act whieh as we have already
observed sets out specific objectives to be achieved.
l:lcctions 5 and 6 prescribe the ceiling area and the
economic holding which are fixed by the legislature
itself having regard to the normal conditions then
prevailing within the State. The legislature knew
wha,t, were the different types of land, their situation
(1)
(1952j S.C.H. 889, 954·
Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwali ].
524
Sri llani Rani
Narain Medhi
v.
Tho State of
Bo1nbay
Bhagwali ].
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
and productive capacity and having regard to all the
relevant factors determined the ceiling area as also the
economic holding. .There were, however, bound to be
differences between district and district and one pal"t
of the State and another and ,having therefore enunciated the broad principles and policy which were
embodied in ss. 5 and 6 of the Act the legislature
enacted s. 7 empowering the State Governmnnt to
vary the ceiling area and the economic holding if it was
satisfied that it was expedient so to do in the public
interest, regard being had to the various criteria therein specified. The State Government was to be guided
in arriving at its satisfaction in regard to the expediency thereof by (a) the situation of the land, (b) its
productive capacity, (c) the fact that the land is located in a backward area, and (d) any other factors which
may be prescribed. In so far as the situation of the
land and its productive capacity were variable factors,
more so if the land was located in ·a backward area,
the State" Government was enjoined to have regard to
these factors as determining the variations one way or
the other from the normal standard adopted by the
Legislature in ss. 5 and 6 of the Act. " Any other
factors which may be prescribed " would be factors
ejusdem generis to the factors mentioned earlier in the
section and could not be any and every factor which
crossed the mind of the executive. The very terms of
the section preclude any single individual being treated
in this manner because it talks of the variation in the
ceiling area. and the economic holding being considered
by tho State Government to be e{'podicnt in the public
interest and the satisfaction of any individual interest
could hardly be said to he a. matter of public interest.
No doubt individuals would ho .benefited by the variatiorrn contcm]Jlatcd in s. 7 but for that purpose the
State Government has got to bo satisfied that it is
expedient in the public interest to do so and no variation in regard to ceiling area or tho economic holding
of a single individual can ever be said t.o have been
contemplated within the terms of s. 7. It appears however that this argument found favour with the Bombay
High Court in its decision in Paras/tram Damodltar v.
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
525
State of Bombay (I) where the Court observed that tho
power to issue a notification may be exorcised in Sri Ua1n Uam
favour of a single individual under the authority Narai11 Mcdhi
reserved under s. 7 and may lay the State Government
v.
open to a charge of favouritism. With great respect The Slate of
Hombriy
to the learned judges of that High Court, we are of the
view that no such thing is ever contemplated in the
terms of s. 7 of the Act. There is also no warrant for llhagwali .f.
the suggestion that the State Government might vary
the ceiling area and the economic holding, say for
instance, for benefiting the political sufferers within
the State. If tho situation of the land and its productive capacity as also the fact that the land is located
in a backward area are the criteria to be determined
before the State Government is satisfied that it is
expedient to vary the ceiling area and the economic
holding in the public interest and " any other factorn
which may be prescribed" are to be read efusdem
generis with the above as already observed, no question of benefiting political sufferers can ever enter into
the picture. That would be an extraneous consideration. It does not come within the criteria specified in
s. 7 of the Act on a true construction thereof. Such
considerations therefore do not militate against the
validity of the provisions contained in that section.
In our opinion, the broad principles and policy have
been laid down by the legislature, the criteria have
been fixed according to which the State Government
has to be satisfied that it is expedient to vary the
ceiling area and economic holding already prescribed
by the legislature and the mere matter of working out
the details having regard to those criteria which arc
specifically mentioned therein which has been delegated to the State Government does not amount to any
excessive delegation of legislative power.
It is also to be remembered that this power of variation of the ceiling area and the economic holding is
vested in the State Government and is left to its
subjective satisfaction having regard to the criteria
therein specified. As was observed by Kania, C. J., in
Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi(~):- ·
(1) A. 1. R. 1957 Bom. 252.
(~)
[1950] S. C. R. 519, 526.
526
SUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
. "This whole argument is based on the assumption that the Provincial Government when making
Sri Ram Rani
Narain Mcdhi the order will not perform its duty and may abuse the
provisions of the section. In my opinion, it is not.
v.
The Stale of
proper to start with such an assumption and decide
Bombay
the legality of an Act on that basis. Abuse of the
power
given by a law sometimes occurs; but the
Bhagw:Jti ].
validity of the law cannot lie contested because of
such an apprehension."
These observations of Kania, C. J., were quoted with
approval by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in The State of
West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sa.rlcar (1) where it was
stated:" Whether a law conforring discretionary powers
on an administrative authority is constitutionally valid
or not should not be determined on the assumption
that such authority will act in an arbitrary manner in
exercising the discretion committed to it."
The above observations of Kania, C. J., were then
quoted and the judgment proceeded :" On the contrary, it is to be presumed that a
public authority will act honestly an<l reasonably in
the exercise of,, its statutory powers, ....................... .
We may lastly refer to the observations of this
Court in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (') :"It may also be remembered that this power is·
vested not in minor officials but in top-ranking authorities like the Commissioner of Income-tax and the
Central Board of Hevenue who act on the information
supplied to them by the Income-tax Officers concerned.
This power is discretionary and not necessarily discrirnin11tory and abuse of power cannot be easily assumed
where the discretion is vested in such high officials.
(Vide Matajog Dobey v. H. S. Bhari, [1955J 2 S. C. R.
925, 932). There is m6reover a presumption that
public officials will discharge their duties honestly an<l
in accordance with the rules of law. (Vide Peo11le of
the State of New York v. John E. Van De Carr, etc.,
(1950-310-HJ9 U.S. 552; 50 L. Ed. 305)). It has also
been observed by this Court in A. Thanaal K unju
(1) [1952] S. C. R 284, 301.
(2) f.1957] S. C. R. 233, 257, 258.
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
527
Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti, [1955] 2 S. C.R.
1196, with reference to the possibility of discriminatfon
between assessees in the matter of the reference of their
cases to the Income-tax Investigation Commission that
" it is to be presumed, unless the contrary were shown,
that the administration of a particuln,r law would be
done " not with an evil eye and unequal hand " and
the selection made by the Government of the cases of
persons to be referred for investigation by the Commission would not be discriminatory."
This presumption, however, cannot be stretched too
far and cannot be carried to the extent of always
holding that there must be some undisclosed and
unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or
corporations to hostile and discriminatory treatment
(Vide Gulf, Colorado, etc. v. W. H. Ellis, (1897) 165 U.S.
150; 41 L. Ed. 666). There may be cases where
improper execution of power will result in injustice to
the parties. As has been observed, however, the
possibility of such discriminatory treatment cannot
necessarily invalidate the legislation and where there
is an abuse of such power, the parties aggrieved are
not without ample remedies under the law (Vide
Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumony Mangaraj, [1955] 1
S. C. R. 140, 146). What will be struck down in such
cases will not be the provision which invests the
authorities with such power but the abuse of the
power itself."
It, therefore, follows that s. 7 of the Act cannot be
impugned on the ground of excessive delegation of
legislative power.
All the various contentions urged by the petitioners
therefore fail and the result is that the petitions filed
by the petitioners before us must be dismissed with
costs. 'rhe State of Bombay which is the only respondent in all these petitions will however get only
.
one set of costs therein.
Petitions dismis.sed.
Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bliagwati ].
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