GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO AND OTHERS versus ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 November 1958 | [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 319 | 1958 INSC 94
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 November 1958
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 100/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 319
- Neutral citation
- 1958 INSC 94
Text of the judgment
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
319
GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO
AND OTHERS
v.
ANDHRA PltADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT
CORPORATION AND ANOTHER
(S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA,
K. SunnA RAO and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Road Transport-Nationalisation-Scheme proposed by State
Transport Undertaking approved by Government-Procedure, if
violative offundamental rights-Scheme, if ultra vires-State Government~ if must act judicially in approving the scheme-' Colourable
legislation', Meaning of-Motor Vehicles Act (IV of r939), as
amended by Act zoo of r956, Ch. IV A, ss. 68C, 68D-Constitution
of India, Art. 3r.
With a view to nationalise the road transport services under
Ch. IV A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), inserted
into it by the amending Act 100 of 1956, the General Manager of
Andhra State Transport Undertaking published a scheme under
s. 68C of the Act in the Official Gazette and invited objections
thereto. By an order of the Chief Minister the objections
were received and heard by the Secretary to the Home Department, who was in charge of Transport, but were decided by the
Chief Minister. The State Government approved of the scheme
and published it in the Official Gazette. The petitioners, who
were plying their buses on various routes in the Krishna District
as permit-holde~s under the Act, apprehending that their routes
would be taken over by the newly established State Corporation
in implementation of the scheme, applied to this Court for the
protection of their fundamental rights to carry on their business.
It was contended, inter alia, on their behalf, (1) that Ch. IVA of
the Act was a piece of colourable legislation whose real object
was to take over their business, under cover of cancellation of
permits, in contravention of Art. 31 of the Constitution, (2) that
the scheme itself was ultra vires the Act, for the reason, amongst
others, that the State Government whose duty it was to act judicially in approving the scheme, had transgressed certain fpndamental principles of natural justice.
Held (Per curiam), that the question of colourable legislation
was, in substance, really one of legislative competence of the
legislature that enacted it. The legislature could only make laws
within its legislative competence. Its legislative field might be
circumscribed by specific legislative entries or limited by fundamental rights created by the Constitution. The legislature could
not over-step the field of its competency, directly or indirectly.
It would be for the Court to scrutinize if the legislature in purporting to make a law within its sphere, in effect and substance,
November J.
320
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Snpp.
reachecl beyond it. If, it had in fact the power to make the law,
its moth·e in making it would be irrelevant.
G11llapulli
/\. C. GaJ11pati i\'araya11 Dco v. The Stale of Orissa, [1954]
Nngeswaro Rao S.C.J~. J, followed.
t111d Others
The State of Bihar v. Maliarajadkiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh
fr952] S.C.R. RSg, ronsidcrecl.
A •dh'" v.Pr.idn h nf Darbhanga,
So JU<
. Ige<:1 it
. cou I(I i:iot b_e satd
. that Cl, 1. IV.<\ of the Act \VJ.S
5 1,11, Rond Tran.~tnrt Corport1tion a colourable piece of leg1s]at1on.
and A11otlter
The po\ver vested in the Regional Transport Authority by
s. 68l' of the Act involved no transfer of business of the existing
permit-holders to the State Transport Undertaking nor could the
latter be said thereunder to ta.ke over any assets of the forn1er.
Section 68G of the .\ct in providing for co111pcnsation for nn~
expired P<'riod of the permit did not imply that Ch.!\'.\ of the
1\t't in,·oJ,·cd any transfer of property or po:;session so as t0
<'ntitle the permit-holder to any compensation under Art. 31(2) of
the Constitution. Chapter IVA of the Act <licl not, therefore, infringe the fundatnental right of the petitioners under 1\rt. 31 of
the Constitution.
Per Das, (. J.. Bhagwati and Subba Rao, JJ.-While the
purpose of s. fiSC of the Act was no doubt to provide a stheme of
road transport service on the lines prescribed by it, the scheme
proposed might affect the rights of individual permit-holders by
excluding them, partially or completely. from the business in any
particnlar route or routes, and the procedure prescribed bys. 680
ancl Rules 8 and ro framed under the Act, requird that the
Gowrnment should hear both the objectors and the State Transport Undertaking before appro\'ing or modifying the scheme.
There was no doubt, therefore, that the State \\'as deciding a /is
and it was to do so judicially.
Province of Bombay'" K11saldas S. Ad11ani, [1950] S.C.R. 62r,
Nagcllilra Nath Bora v. Commissioner, Hills Division, [r958] S.C.R.
1240 and E.<pms Newspapers Ltd. v. Tile Union of India, [1959]
S.C.R. 12, relied on.
Fra11kli11 v. Mi11ister of Town and Country Planning, [1948]
A. C. 87, held inapplicable.
It was a fundamental principle of natural justice that the
authority empowered to decide a matter must have no bias in it
and another, no Jess fundamental, was that where the Act
prodded for a personal hearing, the authority that heard the
matter must also decide it. .The procedure followed in the instant case whereby the Home Secretary, in charge of Transport,
himself a party to the dispute, heard the objections and the
Chief Minister decided them, violated those principles and the
order of ihe State Government approving the seheme, therefore,
must be quashed.
·
' Per Sinha and Wanchoo, J.T.-The sole object of Ch. IVA of
. lhc Act was to' nationalise the road transport sen·iccs and the
ii1quiry envisaged by it was of a limited character. That inquiry
1958
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
was meant to find out whether the scheme propounded was in
public interest as required by s. 68C of the Act, and not to
Gullapulli
ad1"udicate rival claim of permit-holder on the one hand and the N ageswa,.4 Reio
State Transport Undertaking on the other; for, on approval of
and Others
the scheme, exclusion of private transport as proposed by the
scheme was bound to follow as a matter· of course. There could, A dis v.P d h
therefore, be no lis, and the Government in approving or modi- " n'" d ' 1°. es
· the scheme under Ch. I VA and t h e Rules f rame d t h ere- 5 talet C oa
ransf yrng
r
under must be held to act in its normal administrative capacity. por d °,;por~ ion
No objections could be taken, in the instant case, to the procedure
an
not er
adopted by the Government in empowering the Secretary to hear
objections while the Chief Minister decided them, and the
Secretary could in no sense be a party to any dispute.
Province of Bombay v. Ku-saldas S. Advani, [1950] S.C.R. 621,
Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner, Hills Division, (1958] S.C.R.
1240 and Express Ne11Jspapers Ltd. v. The Union of India, [1959
S.C.R. 12, referred to.
Frankli1i v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, [1948]
A.C. 87, applied.
Robinson v. lv!inister of Town and Country Planning, [1947] 1
All E. R. 851, referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 100 of 1958.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for
enforcement of fundamental rights.
M. K. Nambyar, K. Mangachari, G. Suryanarayana
and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the petitioners and intervener.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. Ganapathi Iyer, P. R. Rainachandra Rao and T. M. Sen,
for the respondents.
1958. November 5. The Judgment of Das, C. J.,
Bhagwati and Subba. Rao, JJ., was delivered by
Subba Rao, JI Sinha and Wa.nchco, JJ., delivered
separate judgitjents.
SuBBA RAo, J.-This is an application under Art. 32
of the Constitution for the enforcement of the petitioners' fundamental right to carry on the business of
motor transport in Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh,
and for prohibiting the respondents from taking over
the routes on which the petitioners have been plyipg
their stage carriages.
41
Subba Rao].
322
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
The petitioners have beeu carrying on motor transport business in Krishna Dfstrict for several yea.rs past
by obtaining permits uuder the . Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 (IV of 1939), as a.mended by Act 100 of 1956,
hereinafter called the Act, in respect of various routes.
Th ey est"ima t e t he va1ue of t 1101r
· m
· vestmen t. m
· t he
St a I e R oad T 1'ans.
port c.,p0 , .1; 0 n busmess at a sum of Rs. 20,00,000.
and Anoth"
The amending Act inserted a new Chapter IV-A
in the Act providing for the State Transport UnderSubba Rao f.
ta.king running the business to the exclusion, complete or partial, of all other persons doing business in
the State. Chapter IV-A provided for a machinery
called the State Transport Undertaking, defined
under s. 68-A(b) as an undertaking providing road
transport service, to run the transport business in
the State. In exercise of the powers conferred by
s. 68-C of the Act, one Shri Guru Pershad, styled as
the General Manager of the State Transport Undertaking of the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport, published a. scheme for the purpose of providiug an efficient,
adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated transport service in public interest to operate the transport
service mentioned therein with effect from the date
notified by the State Government. Objections were invited within 30 days from the date of the pu_blication of
the proposal in the Official Gazette, viz., November 14,
1957. 138 objections were received. Individual notices
were issued by the State Government by registered
post to all the objectors. On December 26, 1957,
the Secretary to Government, Home Depart~ent, in
charge of transport, heard the objections. 88 of the
objectors represented their cases through their ad voca.tes ; three of them represented their cases personally
and the rest were not present at the time of hearing.
After considering all the objections and after giving an
opportunity to the objectors, their representatives and
the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking, the State Government found that the objections
to the scheme were devoid of substance. On that finding, the State Government approved of the scheme in
G.O. Ms. 58, Home (Transport IV), dated January 7,
1958, and the approved scheme was published in the
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
and Others
v.
Andh.a Pradesh
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
323
8
Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated January 9, 1958. The
r95
scheme was ordered to come into force with effect
Gullapalli
·from January 10, 1958. The Government of Andhra Nageswara Rao
Pradesh also established a Road Transport Corporation
and Others
under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950
v.
LXIV
f
1950)
II
d
the
Andhra
Pradesh
Road
Andhra
Pradesh
(
0
, ca e
State Road TransTransport Corporation, with effect from January 11, port Corporation
1958, and by its order dated ,Tanuary 11, 1958, the and Another
said Corporation was empowered to take over the
management of the erstwhile Road Transport Depart- Subba Rao J.
ment. The said Transport Corporation is now implementfog the scheme of nationalisation of bus transport
under a phased programme. The petitioners, who
are plying their buses on various routes in Krishna
District, apprehending that their routes would be taken
over by the Corporation pursuant to the aforesaid
scheme, seek the aid of this Court to protect their fundamental right to carry on their business against the
action of the State Corporation on various grounds.
Mr. M.K. Nambiar, appearing for the petitioners, contends that the scheme, in pursuance of which the bus
routes operated by the petitioners· are sought to be
taken over by the State Road Transport Corporation,
is ultra vires and illegal on two grounds, viz., (a) that the
provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act violates the
fundamental rights secured to the citizens by the Constitution and (b) that the scheme framed under the
Act is ultra vires the Act.
The first ground is sought to be supported by the
contention that Chapter IV-A of the Act, in substance
and effect, authorizes the State to acquire the undertakings of citizens without providing for compensation
for the entire undertiikings and therefore it is a fraud
on the Constitution, particularly on Art. 31 thereof.
Shortly stated, his argument is that under Art. 31 of
the Constitution no law shall be made for the transfer
of ownership or right to possession of any property to
the State or to a Corporation without fixing the amount
of compensation or specifying the principles on which
compensation is to be determined and give~r, and that
Chapter IV-A of the Act is a colourable legislation enabling such a transfer of ownership without providing
324
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
for compensation for the property transferred, under
the guise of cancellation of a permit,
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
To appreciate this argument it would be convenient,
and Others
at this stage, to read the relevant provisions of the
v.
Articles of the Constitution, omitting the words urmecesAndhra Pradesh sary for the purpose of this case.
Stale Road Transport Corporatfon
"Art. 19(1) : All citizens shall have the right'958
and Another
• . . • •..•••.••.••••••...••...•.••.• , , . , •• , •..• , , , .. , , ... , , .. , , ...
Subba Rao].
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any
occupation, trade or business.
..................................................................
(6) Nothing in sub.clause (g) of the said clause
shall affect the operation of any existing law in.so far
as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any
law imposing, in the interests of the general public,
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of tJie right
conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular,
nothing in the said sub-clause, shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or
prevent the State from ma.king any law relating to,.(i) ..................................................... : ..•...•.
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a Col'flora.
tion owned or controlled by the State, of any trade,
business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.
Art. 31(1): No person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or
requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by
authority of a law which provides for compensation
for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either
fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the
prin-Oiples on which, and the manner in which, the
compensation is to be determined and given; and no
such law shall be called in question in any Court on
the ground that the compensation provided by that
law is not adequate.
(2A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any
property to the State or to a Corporation owned or
controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
325
1
provide fqr _the compulsory acquisition or requisition958
ing of pr~erty, notwithstanding that it deprives any
Gullapalli
person of his property."
Nageswa•a Rao
The Constitution (:First) Amendment Act· of 1951, and Others
which came into force on June 18, 1951, amended cl. (6)
v.
of Art. 19 by adding sub-cl. (ii) to tha.t clause, along Andhra Pr~desh
with other amendments. Clause (2) of Art. 31 has Slate Rcoad Tr~ns.
d b h port orporallon
been amen ded, an d c1. (2A) h as been mserte
y t e and Another
Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Act, 1955. Clause
(2A) has been inserted with a view to supersede the Subba Rao J.
majorit.y decisions of this Court in the cases of State of
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1 ), Dwarkadas Shriniwas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving
Go. Ltd. (2) and Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. (3 ). In
Subodh Gopal's case, a majority of a Bench of this
Court held:
"Clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 31 a.re thus not mutually exclusive in scope and content, but should in my
view, be read together and understood as dealing with
the same subject., namely, the protection of the right
to property by means of the limitations on the State
power referred to above, the deprivation contemplated
in clause ( 1) being no other than the acquisition or
taking possession of property referred to in clause (2)."
In Dwarkadas's case(~), this Court, while confirming the
aforesaid principle, held that the word 'acquisition'
has quite a wide concept, meaning the procuring of
property or the taking of it permanently or temporarily and need not be confined to the acquisition of
legal title by the State in the property taken possession of. In Saghir Ahmed's case (3) applying the said
principles, this Court held (at p. 728):
" If the effect of prohibition of the trade or business of the appellants (citizens) by the impugned legislation amounts to deprivation of their property or
interest in a commercial undertaking within the meaning of Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution, does not the
legislation offend against the provision of that clause
inasmuch as no provision for compensation has Leen
made in the Act? "
(1) (1954} S.C.R. 587, 608.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 674.
(3) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707, 728.
•
326
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
It may be noted that though the said decision was
given after the Constitution (First) Amendment Act,
Gullapalli
g (6), it d ea l t with a. matter that
Nag'>war• Rao 1951, amending Art. l
and Olhm
arose before the said amendment ca.me into force.
v.
In the aforesaid decisions, this Court by a. majority
Andhta Pradesh broadly· laid down the two principles: (a) that both
Staie !load Tr'.""-cls. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 dealt with the doctrine of
port Corpornlwn '
•
t d o~a..1~
• ' ; th ey d ea It WI'th th e t op1c
• of '<?Omand Another
em1nen
pulsory acqms1t10n of property'; and (b) that the word
Subba Rao;.
'acquisition' does not necessarily imply acquisition of
legal title by tbe State in the property taken possession
of, but may comprehend cases where the citizen has
been 'substantially dispossessed' of the right to enjoy
the property, with the result that the right to enjoy
property has been 'seriously' impaired or the value of
the property has been 'materially' reduced by the
impugned State legislation.
The Constitution (Fourth) Amendment- Act, 1955,
amended cl. (2) of Art. 31 and inserted cl. (2A) in that
Article. The amendments, in so far as they are relevant to the present purpose, substitute in place of the
words 'taken.possession of or acquired' the words 'compulsorily acquired or requisitioned' and provide an
explanation of the words 'acquired and requisitioned'
in cl. (2A). The result is that unless the law depriving
any person of his property provides for the transfer of
the ownership or right to the possession of any property to the State, the law does. not relate to 'acquisition or requisition' of property and therefore the limitations placed upon the legislature under cl. (2) will
not apply to such law. While realising this legal
posit.ion brought about by the amendment to the Constitution, the learned counsel contends that the right
to do business is property as held in Saghir Ahmad's
case (1) and that Chapter IV-A of the Act in effect
transfers ownership of that business to the Corporation,
owned or controlled by the State, though not directly
but by the dual process of preventing the citizen from
doing the business and enabling the Corporation to do
the same business in his place and that that result is
effected by a device with a view to avoid payment of
'958
(I) [1955) I S.C.R. 707, 728.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
327
compensation for the entire business so transferred.
r95B
The colourable nature of the legislation, the argument
Gullapalli
proceeds, lies in its device or contrivance to evade Nageswara Rao
limitations imposed under Art. 31 (2). To solve the
and Others
problem presented, it is necessary to have a correct
v.
appreciation of the phrase 'oolourable legislation'. This Andhra Pradesh
· m
· Th e State oJ,I B i'h ar v. State
Cou rt cons1"dere d t h"is question
P 1 Road
c P Trans.
'
dh.
.
S.
K
h
S.
h
,I D bh
(1)
ot
ora1ion
M ahara3a ira3a ir ames wqir ing OJ ar anga . and or
Another
In that case the constitutional validity of the Bihar
·
Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar 30 of 1950), was subba Rao J.
questioned. In the context of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Biha1· 30 of 1950), it was contended
that the impugned Act was a fraud on the Constitution and therefore void. . It was stated that the Act,
while pretending to comply with the Constitutional
provisions when it provided for the payment of compensation, in effect produced a scheme for non-payment
of compensation by shift or contrivance. Mahajan, J.,
as he then was, in rejecting the argument observed at
p. 947, thus:
"All these principles are well-settled. But the
question is whether they have any application to the
present case. It is by no means easy to impute a
dishonest motive to the legislature of a State and hold
that it acted ma.la fide and maliciously in passing the
Bihar Land Reforms Act or that it perpetrated a fraud
on the Constitution by enacting this law. It may be
that some of the provisions of the Act may operate
harshly on certain persons or a few of the zamindars
and may be bad if they a.re in excess of the legislative
power of the Bihar Legislature but from that circumstance it does not follow that the whole enactment is
a. fraud on the Constitution. From the premises that
the estates of half-a-dozen zamindars may be expropriated without payment of compensation, one cannot
jump to the conclusion that the whole of the enactment
is a fraud on the Constitution or that all the provisions
as to payment of compensation are illusory."
The aforesaid observations lend support to the argument that the doctrine of coloura.ble legislation
imputes dishonest motive or mala fol.es to the State
(1) [1952) S.C.R. 889-
328
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
making the law. But, Mukherjea, J., as he then was,
clarified the legal position in ](, 0. Gajapati Narayan
N<1g,,warn Rao Deo v. The State of Orissa (1 ). It was contended in
aud Othm
that case that the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952,
Andhrav~rad"h ~as a cohlourable legislatMionkahnd. as sJuch vohid. hAdvertState Road Trans- mg to t at argument,
u eriea, ., as e t en was,
port Corporation says at p. 10 thus:
and Another
" It may be madey clear at the outset that the
doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any
St<bba· Rao J. question of bona Ji.des or ma/.a Ji.des on the part of the
legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the
question of competency of a particular legislature t.o
enact a particular Jaw. If the legislature is competent
to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it
to act are really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the
legislature lacks competency, the question of motive
does not arise at all.· Whether a statute is constitutional or not is thus always a question of power .........
.. . .. .If the Constitution of a State distributes the legislative powers amongst different bodies, which have to
a.ct within their respective spheres marked out by
specific legislative entries, or if there are limitations
on the legislative authority in the shape of fundamental rights, questions do arise as to whether the legislature in a particular case' has or has not, in respect
· to the subject matter of the statute or in the me.thod
of enacting it, transgressed the limits of its constitutional powers. Such transgression may be patent,
manifest or direct, but it may also be disguised, covert
and indirect and it is to this latter class of cases that
the expression 'colourable legislation' has been applied
in certain judicial pronouncements. The idea conveyed by the expression is that although apparently ·a
legislature in passing a statute purported to act within
the limits of its powers, yet in substance and in reality.
it transgressed these powers, the transgression being
veiled by what appears on proper examination, to be a.
mere pretence or disguise. As was said by Duff, J., in
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers
(1924 A. C. 3'28 at p. 337):
"Where the law making authority is of a. limited or
qualified character it may be necessary to examine
Gullapalli
(1) (1954] S.C.R. 1.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
329
with some strictness the substance of the .legislation
r9s 8
for the purpose of determining what is that the legisGullapalli
lature is really doing.'
Nageswara 1!<10
In other words, it is the substance of the Act that
and Others
is material and not merely the form or outward
v.
appearance, and if the subject-matter in substance is Andhra Pradesh
· beyon d t he powers
· of t h a t 1eg1s· State
.
.
somet h mg
wh"IC h IS
Por1 Road
c orPoraTran>•
•
1ion
lature to legislate upon, the form Ill whrnh the law is and Another
clothed would not save it from condemnation. The
legislature cannot violate the constitutional prohibi- Subba Rao J.
tions by employing an indirect method.''
We have quoted the observations in extenso as they
neatly summarise the law on the subject. The legal
position may be briefly stated thus: The legislature
can only make laws within it legislative competence.
Its legislative field may be circumscribed by specific
"legislative entries or limited by fundamental rights
created by the Constitution. The legislature cannot.
over-step the field of its competency, directly or indirectly. The Court will scrutinize the law to ascertain whether the legislature by device purports to .
make a law which, though in form appears to be within its sphere, in effect and substance, reaches beyond
it. If, in fact, it has power to make the law, its
motives in making the law are irrelevant.
The learned counsel for the petitioners can only
succeed if he can establish that the provisions of
Chapter IV-A constitute colourable legislation within
the meaning of the aforesaid definition. To test the
validity of the argument, it may be summarised thus :
Business is ' property ' within the meaning of Art.
19(1) (g) of the Constitution. Chapter lV-A of the Act
transfors the business to the Corporation controlled by
the State Government. Such a law should have
provided for payment of compensation for the business
transferred to the State Corporation ; instead, it adopted the device of cancelling the permit of the citizen
and giving it to the Corporation and providing compensation to the citizen only for the unexpired period
of the permit.
42
330
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
We shall now proceed to ascertain whether any of
the
aforesaid ingredients of device or contrivance are
Gulla pal Ii
b
Nogesw•ra Rao esta lished in this case. Does Chapter IV-A, in effect
and others
and substance, authorize, in law or foct, the transfer
v.
of the business of the citizens to the State or a CorpoA•dhra Pradesh ration, owned or controlled by the State? Under Art.
Stat• Road Tra••· 19(1) of the Constitution every citizen has a fundaport CorportJtton
l .
•
b .
.
and Another
menta right to carry on any usmess subject to
reasonable restrictions imposed by the State under
Subba Rao J. cl. (6) of Art. 19 in the interest of the general public.
The Constitution (first) Amendment Act, 1951, reserved to the State the right to make law for carrying on
by the State or by a Corporation, owned or controlled
by the State, any business to the exclusion, complete
or partial, of the citizens or otherwise. The Constitution, therefore, enables the State to make a law
placing reasonable restrictions on the right of a citizen
to do business or to create a monopoly or to make a
law empowering the State to carry on business to the
exclusion of a citizen. The right to carry on business
in transport vehicles on public. pathways is certainly
one of the fundamental rights recognized under Art. 19
of the Constitution. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(IV of 1939), regulates the right of a citizen to carry
on the said business for prot.ecting the rights of the
pulilic generally. 'Permit' is defined under cl. (20) of·
s. 2 of the Act to mean the document issued by the
Commission or a State or Regional Transport Authority authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a
contract carriage or stage carriage, or authorising the
owner as a private carrier or public carrier to use such
vehicle. Section 57 of the Act prescribes the procedure
for applying for and granting permits to carry on the
business in transport vehicles on public highways.
Section 47 lays down the matters to be considered by
the Regional Transport Authority in the disposal of
applications for such transport carriers. Section 59
gives the conditions of every permit and also prohibits
the transfer of permit from one person to another
except with the permission of the Transport Authority.
Under s. 60, the Transport Authority which granted
permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for
r95B
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
331
such period as it thinks fit for any of the reasons
z95'
mentioned therein. Section 61 provides for cases where
G..llapalli
a permit-holder dies. That section enablesth e succes- Nagcswrm• Roo
sor to use the permit for a period of three months and and others
to get the permit transferred to him subject to the
v.
conditions laid down therein. Section 68-F authorises Andhra Pradesll
the Regional Transport Authority, for the purpose of 51" 1e Road Tr~,.s. ·
· respec t of a. port
Corpcralt.t)fl
g1vmg
effect to an · a.pprov ed scheme m
""d Another
notified area or notified route, to refuse to enterta.i,O
any application for the renewal of any other permit, to s ..bba Rao J,
cancel any existing permit, to modify the terms of any
existing permit so as to render the permit ineffective
beyond a specified date, and to reduce the number of
vehicles authorised to be used under the permit. It is
manifest from the aforesaid provisions that the Regional Transport Authority can, in exertiise of its regulatory power conferred on it in the interest of the
public, issue a permit to a person in regard to a.
stage carriage authorising him to use the same in
a particular route for a particular period subject
to the conditions laid down in the permit, s.uspend
or cancel the same under specified conditions, and
renew or refuse to renew the same after the expiry
of the period subject to the conditions laid down in
the Act. Under Ch. IV-A, if a scheme has been
promulgated empowering the State Transport Undertaking to take on hand the transport service in
relation to any area, route or portion thereof to the
exclusion of any person, who has been carrying on the
business in that route, the Transport Authority is empowered to cancel the existing permit and issue a
permit to the State Transport Undertaking. It cannot be said that if the Transport Authority cancels
the permit of a. person carrying on his transport business in a route and gives it to another, the process involves a transfer of business or undertaking of the
quondam permit-holder to the new entrant. Indeed
the process does not involve even a transfer of the
permit from one to another. The true position is that
one permit comes to an end and another permit comes
into being. The power of cancellation of a. permit in
favour. of one and issuing a. new permit to another are
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
necessary steps in the regulatory jurisdiction entrusted
to the Regional Transport Authority. The business of
Gullapulli
1Vageswara Rao one has nothing to do with the business of another,·
and othm
they are two independent businesses carried on under
v.
two different licences. If .that be the true legal position
A ndl"a Pradesh in the case of issue of permits before ·Chapter IV-A
51"" Road T•ans- was inserted in the Act, we cannot see that the power
port Corporation f
JJ t"
f
. t"
.
d . .
and Another
0 CallCe a lOll 0 an eXIS 1ng permit an ISSUJDg one
to the State Transport Undertaking should involve a
Subba Rao J.
transfer of the previous permit-holder's business to the
State Transport Undertaking. The argument that the
process contemplated by s. 68-F of the Act involves
two integrated steps, viz., cancelling the existing permit and preventing the previous permit-holder from
doing the business and then issuing a permit to a
nominee of the State to enable it to do the same business and thereby, in effect and substance, transferring
the business of the existing permit-holder to the State
or its nominee, appears to be atkactive, but, in our
view, it is fallacious. It may be that by the said process
the existing permit-holder is precluded from doing his
business and it may also be that the State Transport
Undertaking carries on a similar business; but by no
stretch of language or extension oflegal fiction can it be
said that the State Transport Undertaki(1g is doing the
same business. which the previous permit-holder was doing. If there is no transfer in the case of cancellation
of a permit in favour of one and issue of a new permit
to another, equally there cannot be any such transfer in
the case of issue of a permit to the State Transport
Undertaking. Looking at the business not simply from
the standpoint of the right to do it or the activity
involved in it., but also from the standpoint of its
assets, it becomes clear that no assets pertaining to
the business of the quondam permit-holder are transferred to the State Transport Undertaking. Though
the cancellation of the permit has the effect of crippling his business, none of the assets of the business is
taken over by the State Transport Undertaking; he is
left in the possession of the entire assets of the business. It 'is no doubt true that in the context of the
~cheme of nationalisation he may not be able to make
(1) S.U.H. SUPH.EME COURT REPORTS
333
use of his assets in other routes or dispose of them at a
r95B
great advantage to himself; but, it cannot be said that
GullapaHi
by cancelling the permit, what is left with him is only Nageswara Rrro
the 'husk'. In fact the entire assets of the buHiness
and 01hers
are left with him and the State Transport Undertaking
v.
has not taken over the same.
Andhra Pradesh
. h pro- S/a/e
Huad Trans. lS
. Sal"d t hat s. 68 . G o.f t he A ct w}llC
1 it
. Last?'
port Corj>oration
v1cks for piiyment of compensation to the holder of ,wd Another
the permit, indicates that the legislature proceeded on
the basis that the cancellation of a permit involved a S11bba Uao J.
' transfer of property' from the previous permit-holder
to the State. In our view, no such irresistible conclusion flows from the said provision ; as the permit is
cancelled before the expiry of the term fixed therein,
the legiRlature thought it fit and proper to give some
compensation to the permit-holder who is prevented
from doing his business for the unexpired period of
the permit. Whether it is enacted by way of abundant
caution, as the learned Attorney General says, or the
provision is made by the legislature to mitigate the
hardship that is caused to the permit-holder by the
premature cancellation of the permit, we find it
difficult to draw the inference from the said provision
that the legislature assumed that a transfer of the
bw;iness is involved in the process laid down in
Chapter IV-A. We therefore hold that Chapter IV-A
of the Act does not provide for the transfer of ownership or the right to possession of any property to the
State or to a Corporation, owned or controlled by the
State. Under Art. 31 of the Constitution unless there
is such a transfer, the law shall be deemed not to
provide for compulsory acquisition or requisition of
property; and therefore, in such a case, no compensation need be provided for under Art. 31(2) of the
Constitution. We therefore hold that Chapter IV-A of
the Act does not infringe the fundamental right of the
petitioners under Art. 31 of the Constitution of India.
The next argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that even if Chapter IV-A of the Act is
constitutionally valid, the petitioners could be
deprived of their rights only in a<~cordance with the
law enacted for the purpose and in the manner provided
334
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
58
therein, and that in the present case, the scheme
was promulgated in derogation of the provision of the
said Chapter. The learned counsel contends that the
provisions of ss. 68-C and 68-D have not been comv.
plied with in framing the scheme. The learned
AndhRm Pdra dcsh counsel's contentions in this regard fall under different
S
7
·pa•t
- co,porntfon
m
m- su~-h~ads, and we shall proceed to consider
.
them
'9
Gnllapalli
Nageswam Rao
a"d Others ,
and Another
Subba Rao J-
Ser1at1m.
The first contention is that no State Transport
Undertaking is constituted under the Central Act and
therefore the scheme initiated by the said Transport
Undertaking constituted under the Motor Vehicles
(Hyderabad Amendment) Act, 1956, was bad. To
appreciate this argument some of the facts may be
stated. Before the State of Andhra Pradesh was
formed in November 1956, eight districts, popularly
called the Telengana, which are now in the Andhra.
Pradesh State, were formerly part of the Hyderabad
State. On September 29, 1956, the Motor Vehicles
(Hyderabad Amendment) Act, 1956, became law,
whereunder Chapter IV-A was inserted in the Central
Act in its application to the State of Hyderabad.
Under s. 68-A of Chapter IV-A of that Act, the State
Transport Undertaking was defined to µ:iean the Road
Transport Department of the State providing road service. Under that Act, therefore, the Road Transport
Department of the Hyderabad State was functioning
as a statutory authority. After the States Reorganisation Act came into force, the said eight districts of the
Hyderabad State became part of the State of Andhra
Pradesh; with the result that the Road Transport
Department of the Hyderabad State became the Road
Transport Department of the State of Andhra
Pradesh, though it was exercising its powers only in
respect of that part of the Andhra Pradesh State,
popularly known as Tclengana.· After the Andhra
Pradesh State was formed, Sri Guru Pershad, styled
as the General Manager of the An'dhra Pradesh Road
Transport Undertaking, published the scheme under
s. 68-C of the Act. The argument is that the State
Transport Authority constituted under Chapter IV-A
of the Hyderabad (Amendment) Act was not legally
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
335
constituted as the State Transport Undertaking under
r95B
the Central Act and, therefore, the initiation of the
Gullapalli
scheme by the Hyderabad State Transport Under- Nageswllra Rao
taking, which has no legal status under the Central Act
and Others
was bad. It is also pointed out that the State Transv.
port Authority under the Hyderabad Act differs from Andhra Pradesh
that under the Central Act in the following three State Road Transrespects: (1) statutory parentage; :(2) character and port Corporation
. 1 JUrIS
. . d'IC t"ion; an d and __
Another
const i't u t'10n; an d (3) t ern"tona
therefore the authority constituted under the Hydera- subba Rao J.
bad Act cannot function under the Central Act. This
argument has no relevancy to the facts of the present
case. We are not concerned in this case with a
statutory authority created under one Act and pressed
into service for the purpose of another Act, when the
latter has adopted the said statutory authority as one
constituted under that Act. Here there is the Andhra
Pradesh Road Transport Department providing road
transport service in Telengana, which is a part of that
State; and that Department, when it was a part of
the Hyderabad State was functioning as part of the
Hyderabad State Secretariat. The mere fact that the
H,oad Transport Department of the Andhra Pradesh
State was originally part of a department of another
State and came under the definition of the State
Transport Undertaking of the Hyderabad Act could
not make the said department any the less the Road
Transport Department of the Andhra Pradesh State.
Assuming for a moment that the Hyderabad Act is
still in force in the Telengana area, there is nothing
in law which prevents a department coming under the
definition of two statutes. Under the Act, the State
Transport Undertaking means an Undertaking providing road trasport service where such undertaking is
carried on by a State Government. This section does
not prescribe the parentage of the undertaking or impose a condition that the undertaking should be provid(ng transport service throughout the State. The
State Government maintained the department for providing road transport service and therefore the departnien t clearly falls within the definition of State Transport Undertaking. The citation from Salmond on
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
Jurisprudence to the effect that the law in creating
legal persons al ways does so by personifying some real ·
thing does not touch the question that falls to be decided in this case; for, the real thing, viz., the department,
v.
falls under the definition of both the Acts and therefore
Andh.a Piadesh it can function as a statutory authority under both the
Slate Rood r,••,_ A ts
,,
hoId t hat t he R oa d T ransport
port co,po.ation
c ·
e t here1ore
••d Anoth"
Department of the. Andhra Pradesh Government is a
State Transport Undertaking under the Central Act
Subba Rao J.
and therefore it was within its legal competence to
initiate the scheme.
The next objection raised is that the scheme was
published by Sri Guru Pershad, the General Manager
of the State Transport Undertaking and that it has
not been established that he had been legally authorized to represent the State Transport Undertaking,
the statutory authority constituted under the Act. \Ve
have already held that the Transport Department of
the disintegrated Hyderabad State continued to function as the Transport Department of the Andhra
Pradesh State after the merger of Telengana areas
with the Andhra State. In the affidavit filed by the
petitioners, it is stated that Sri Guru Pershad was the
General Manager of the Road Transport Department
of the erstwhile Hyderabad State, that he was never
appointed as the General Manager of the State
Transport Undertaking of the Andhra Pradesh State
and that, therefore, he had no legal authority whatever to publish the scheme. In the counter affidavit
filed on behalf of the first respondent, it is averred that the General Manager of the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport, which was a State Transport
Undertaking within the meaning of s. 68-B of the Act,
prepared a scheme and ·that was published in the
Andhra Pradesh Gazette on November 14, 1957. lt is
therefore a common case that Sri Guru Pershad was
the General Manager of the Road Transport U ndertaking of the erstwhile Hyderabad State. It is not denied
that Sri Guru Pershad continued to be the General
Manager of that Department functioning in Andhra
l'radesh. We have already held that the same department was. the statutory authority functioning under
z95S
Gullapalli
Nageswa'a Rao
ond 01hm
w
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
337
·the Central Act. Sri Guru Pershad was also the Genez958
ral Manager of that undertaking. In the circumstances, there is no substance in the contention that
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
Sri Guru Pershad should have been appointed as
and Others
the General Manager of the Undertaking under
v.
the Central Act. This is the first argument under Andhra Pradesh
a different garb. The pre-existing Road Transport State Ro•d Tr~•zs
Department of the erstwhile Hyderabad State, port Corporation
· h l"ts Genera.I Manager, Sr1· G uru p ers h a d , and _Another
wit
continued to function as a statutory authority under 5,,bba R~o J.
t;he Central Act and therefore he had the legal authority to represent the State Transport Undertaking,
which was a statutory authority. He published the
scheme and subscribed it as Guru Pershad, the General
Manager of the State Transport Undertaking (Andhra
Pradesh State Road Transport). The notification,
therefore, must be held to have been issued by the
State Transport Undertaking functioning under the
Central Act.
The learned counsel then contends that the scheme
published does not disclose that the State Transport
Undertaking was of the.opinion that the ~cheme was
necessary in the interests of the public and, therefore,
as the necessary condition for the initiation of the
:;cheme was not complied with, the scheme could not
be enforced. Section 68-C says that where any State
Transport Undertaking is of opinion that for specified
reasons it is necessary in the public interest that road
transport service should be run or· operated by the
State Transport Undertaking, it may prepare a scheme
giving particulars of the scheme and publish it in the
Official Gazette. An express recital of the formation
of the opinion by the Undertaking in the scheme is
not made a condition of the validity of the scheme.·
The scheme published in terms of the section shall
give particulars of the nature of the service proposed
to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto. It
is true that the preparation of the scheme is made to
depend upon the subjective opinion of the State Undertaking as regards the necessity for such a scheme. The
43
338
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
only question, therefore, is whether the State Transport
Undertaking formed the opinion before preparing
1
Na~;:,~;,: ~ao the scheme and causing it to be published in the Offiand Othm
cial Gazette. The scheme published, as already noticv.
ed, was signed by Guru Pershad, General Manager,
Andh>a Prad"h State Transport Undertaking, Andhra Pmdesh Road
State
Tra.ns- Transport.
The preamble to the scheme reads :
port Corporation
" I
.
,.
d by section
.
and Another
n exermse
of t h e powers conierre
68-0 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, it is hereby proSubba
J. posed, for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road 1ransport service in public interest, to operate the followi11g
transport services as per the particulars gfr ~n below
with effect from a date to be notified by the Governx95B
Road
Rao
1uent."
We have already held that Guru Pershad represented
the State Transport Undertaking. The scheme was
proposed by the said Undertaking in exercise of the
powers under s. 68-0 of the Act for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly
co-ordinated road transport service in public interest.
Except for the fact that the word 'opinion' is omitted,
the first part of the section 68-0 is incorporated in the
preamble of the scheme ; and, in addition, it also discloses that the scheme is proposed in exercise of the
powers conferred on the State Transport Undertaking
under s. 68-0 of the Act. The State Transport Authority
can frame a·scheme only if it is of opinion that it is necessary in public interest that the road transport service
should be run or operated by the Road Transport Undertaking. When it proposes, for the reasons mentioned in the section, a scheme providing for such a· transport undertaking, it is a manifest expression of its opinion in that regard. We gather from a reading of the
scheme that the State Transport Undertaking formed
: ~he necessary opinion before preparing the scheme and
·'publishing it. The argument of the learned counsel
carries technicality to a breaking point and. for the
aforesaid reasons, we reject it.
The next attack of the learned counsel centres round
the provisions of s. 68-D (2) of the Act. It would be
convenient, before adverting to his argument, to read
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
s. 68-D and the relevant rules made under the Act.
z95S
They read :
Gullapalli
Sec. 68-D: (1) Any person affected by the scheme Nageswara Rao
published under s. 68-C may, within thirty days from
and Others
the date of the publication of the scheme in the Official
v.
Gazette, file ObJ'ections thereto before the State Govern- SAia'
n,dhrRa PdrTadesh
oa
ransment.
port Corporation
(2) The State Government may, after considering and Another.
the objections and after giving an opportunity to the
objector or his representatives and the representatives Subba Rao J.
of the State Transport Undertaking to be heard in the
matter, if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme.
(3) The scheme as approved or modified under
sub-section (2) shall then be published in the Official
Gazette by the State Government and the same shall
thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates
shall be called the notified area or notified route.
Provided that no such scheme which relates to
any inter-State route shall be deemed to be an approv.
ed scheme unless it has been published in the Official
Gazette with previous approval of the Central Government.
R7fle 8 : Filing of object.ions (procedure) :Any person, concern or authority aggrieved by
the scheme published under s. 68-C may, within the
specified period, file before the Secretary to Government in charge of Transport Department, objections
and representations in writing.setting forth concisely
the reasons in support thereof..
Rule 9 : Conditions for submission of objections :No representation or objection in respect of any
scheme published in the Official Gazette shall be considered by the Government unless it is made in accordance with rule 8.
Rule 10: Consideration of scheme (Procedure regarding):After the receipt of the objections referred to
above, the Government may, after fixing the date,
time and place for holding an enquiry and after giving
if they so desire, at least seven clea1· days' notice of
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1959] Supp.
such time and place to the persons who filed objections
under rule 8, proceed to consider the objections and
G ullapalli
h d
Nageswara Rao pass sue or ers as they may deem fit after giving an
and Others
opportunity to the person of being heard in person or
v.
through authorised representatives."
Andhra Pradesh
Under the section the procedure prescribed for the
State Road Transl
b '
· ·
,
port corporation approva of a sc. erne may be summarized thus : 1 he
,and Another
State Transport Undertaking prepares a scheme providing for road transport service in relation to an area
Subb• Rao J.
to be run or operated by the State Transport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial,
of other persons, and publishes it in the Official Gazette. Any person affected by the scheme may, within
thirty days from the date of its publication, fiJe. before
the Secretary to Government in charge of Transport
Department objections and representations in writing
with reasons in support thereof. After receiving the
objections and representations, the Government fixes
a date for the bearing and after giving an oppor~unity
to the persons of being heard in person or by authorized representatives, considers the objections and then
modifies or approves of the scheme.
The following procedure was in fact followed by
the Government in this case: After the scheme was
prepared and published in the Official Gazette,' the
petitioners and others filed objections before the
Secretary to Government Transport Department,
within the time prescribed. 138 objections were received
and individual notices were ·issued by the Government
by registered post to all the objectors fixing the date of
the hearing for December 26, 1957. The Secretary to.
Government, Home Department, in charge of Trnnsport, heard the representations made by the objectors,
some in person and others through their advocates,
and also the representations made by the General
Manager of the Road Transport Undertaking. The
Secretary, after hearing the objections, prepared notes
and placed the entire matter, with his notes, before the
Chief Minister, who considered the matter and passed
orders rejecting the objections and approving the
scheme; and the approved scheme was thereafter issued in the name of the Governor.
x958
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
On the aforesaid facts, the first contention raised is
z958
that the State Government in approving the scheme
Gullt1palli
was discharging a quasi-judicial act and therefore the Nageswara
Rao
Government should have given a personal hearing to
and Ollsers
the objectors instead of entrusting that duty to its
v.
Secretary. Secondly, it is stated that a judicial hear- Andhra Pradesh
ing implies that the same person hears and gives the State Road Tr~ns
decision. But in this case the hearing is given by the port Corporation
. t er. and _Another
. .
by the Ch'ief M'mis
Secre t ary an d th e d ec1s10n
Thirdly, it is contended on the same hypothesis, that subba Rao J.
even if the hearing given by the Secretary be deemed
to be a hearing given by the State Government, the
hearing is vitiated by the fact that the Secretary who
gave the hearing is the Secretary in charge of the
Transport Department. The Transport Department,
it is stated, in effect was made the judge of its own
cause, and this offends one of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Lastly, it was pointed out
that though the enquiry was posted for hearing on
December 26, 1957, even before the enquiry was commenced, the Chief Secretary to the Government gave
an interview to the ' Deccan Chronicle ' and the ' Golconda Patrika' to the effect that the Government had
already taken a decision to nationalize the ·road transport in Krishna District and some routes had been
chosen, including the Guntur-Vijayawada route, thereby indicating that ~he Government has prejudged the
case before holding the enquiry~ The learned Attorney
General counters the said argument by stating that
the State Government strictly- followed the procedure
prescribed ·under s. 68-C of the Act, that the said
Government, being an impersonal body, gave the
hearing through the machinery prescribed by law, that
the said Government was discharging only an admini·
strative act and not a judicial act in the matter of
approving the scheme, that even if it did perform a
judicial act, the Home Secretary in charge of Transport Department had only collected the material and
the final orders were made only by the Chief Minister
and that the Chief Secretary's pres~ interview was
nothing more than a mere indication of the factum of
the proposed scheme.
342
z95B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
At the outset it would be convenient to consider the
Gullapalli
question whether the State Government acts quasiNage>wan Rao judicially in discharging its functions under s. 68-C of
and Others
the Act. The criteria to ascertain whether a partiv.
cular act is a judicial act or an administrative one,
Andh•a Pradesh have been laid down with clarity by Lord Justice Atkin
Slate Road T1ans- • R
· · 0 on_imissioners,
' ·
E x p arte Lond on
po>t co.po..tion m
e:i; ~. El
1 ec~ricity
1
and Anothe>
Electricity Joint Committee Oo. ( ) elaborated by Lord
Subba Rao J.
Justice Scrutton in Rex v. London Oounty Oouncil, Ex
Parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. (") and
authoritatively re-stated by this Court in Province of
Bombay v. Khusaldas S. Advani ('). They laid down
the following conditions: (a) the body of persons must
have legal authority; (b) the authority should be given
to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects
and (c) they should have a duty to act judicially. In
the last of the cases cited supra, Das, J., as he then
was, analysed the scope of the third condition thus at
page 725:
"(i) that if a statute empowers an authority not
being a Court in. the ordinary sense, to decide disputes
arising out of a claim made by one party under the
statute which claim is opposed by another party and
to determine the respective rights of the contesting
parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis
and prima f acie and in the absence of anything in the
statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority
to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a
quasi-judicial act; and
(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do
any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then,
although there are not two parties apart from the
authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to the act and the subject opposing it, the final
determination of the authority will yet bo a quasijudicial act provided the authority is required by the
statute to act judicially."
ln the case In re Banwari1,al Roy(') Das, J., as he thon
was, said much to the same effect at page 800 :
" A judicial or quasi-judicial act, on the other
hand, implies more than mere application of the mind
(l) [1924) l K.B. 171.
(3) [1950) S.C.R. 621.
(2) [1931) 2 K.B. 215.
(4) [1944) 48 C.W.N. 766.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
or the formation of the opinion. It has reference to
r9s8
the mode or manner in which that opinion is.formed.
Gullapalli
It implies 'a proposal and an opposition' and a decision Nageswara Rao
on the issue. It vaguely connotes 'hearing evidence
and Others
a.nd opposition' as Scrutton, L. J., expressed it. The
v.
degree of formality of the procedure as to receiving or Andhra Pradesh
hearing evidence may be more or less according to the State Road T•ans.
f
. l
b
h
.
port Corporatwn
:requirements o the part1cu a.r statute, ut t ere 1s an and Another
indefinable yet an appreciable difference between the
_
method of doing an administrative or executive act Subba Rao J.
and a judicial or quasi-judicial act."
This statement is practically in accord with the first
proposition extracted above. This Court again, in
Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division (1) in the context of the provisions of Eastern
Bengal a.nd Assam Excise Act, 1910 (I of 1910), considered the scope of the concept of 'judicial act'.
Sinha, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court,
made the following observations at page 408 :
"Whether or not an administrative body or
authority functions a.s a purely administrative one or
in a quasi-judicial ca.pa.city, must be determined in
ea.ch case, on an examination of the relevant statute
and the rules framed thereunder."
In Express Newspapers Ltd. v. The Union of India( 2 )
this Court again reviewed the law on the. subject to
ascertain whether the Wage Boa.rd functioning under
the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955) was
only discharging administrative functions or quasijudicial functions. Bhagwati, J., made the following
observation at page 613 :
" If the functions performed by the Wage Board
would thus consist of the determination of the issues
as between a proposition and an opposition on data
and materials gathered by the Boa.rd in answers to the
questionnaire issued to all parties interested and the
evidence led before it, there is no doubt that there
would be imported in the proceedings of the \Vage
Boa.rd a. duty to act judicially and the functions
(1) A.I.R. 1958 S. C. 398.
(2) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 578.
344
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
perforiii.ed by the Wage Boa.rd would be quasi-judicial
in
character."
Gullapalli
Nag,,wara Rao
The aforesaid three decisions lay down that whether
and Othm
an administrative tribunal has a duty to act judicially
v.
should be gathered from the provisions of the partiAndhra Pmdcsk cular statute and the rules made thereunder, and they
State Road Trn•s· l
I
the view
· · t hat 1'f an a.ut h or1ty
· 1s
· ca Jjcd
po 1 Co•pomtion c ear y express
Anoth"
upon to decide respective rights of contesting parties
or, to put it in other words, if there is a lis, ordinarily
Subba Rao J.
there will be a duty on the pa.rt of the said authority
to act judicially. Applying the aforesaid test, let us
scrutinize the provisions of ss. 68-C and 68-D and the
relevant rules made under the Act to ascertain
whether under the said provisions the State Government
performs a judicial a.ct or an administrative one.
Section 68-C may be divided into three parts : (i) The
State Transport Undertaking should come to an
opinion that it is necessary in public interest that the
road transport service in general or any particular
1 class of such service in relation to any area or route or
portion thereofshould he run or operated by the State
Transport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise ; (ii) it
forms that opinion for the purpose of providing an
efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service; and (iii) after it comes to
that opinion, it prepares a scheme giving particulars
of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered,
area or route proposed to be covered and such other
particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed
and causes it to be published in the Official Gazette.
The section, therefore, makes a clear distinction
between the purpose for which a scheme is framed
and the particulars of the scheme. To state it differently, though the purpose is to provide an efficient,
adequate, economical and co-ordinated road transport
service in public interest, the scheme proposed may
affect individual rights such as the exclusion, complete
or partial, of other persons or otherwise, from the
business in any particular route or routes. Under
s. 68-C, therefore, the State Transport Undertaking
may propose a. scheme affecting the proprietary rights
'95
:.d
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345
of individual permit-holders doing transport business
:c95B
in a. particular route or ;routes. The said proposal
Gullapalli
threa.tenli the proprietary right of that individual Or Nageswara Rao
individuals. Under s. 68-D read with Rules S and 10 and Others
made under the Act, any person affected by the a.forev.
said proposed scheme may file objections within the A.ndhr.a Pradesh.
• ·befiore t he Secreta.ry
· o.f . t h e T ransport Stale
Road.. Tra11sprescr1"b·ed time
port Corporation ·
Depa.rtment. Under the said prov1s10ns, the State and Another
Government is. enjoined to approve or modify the
scheme after holding an enquiry and after giving an Subba Rao J.
opportunity to the objectors or their representatives
and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking, to be heard in the matter in person or through
authorised representatives. Therefore, the proceeding
prescribed is closely approximated to that obtaining in
courts of justice. There are two parties to the dispute.
The State Transport Undertaking, which is. a statutory authority under the Act, threatens to .infringe the
rights of a citizen. The citizen may object to the
scheme on public grounds or on personal grounds. He
may ·oppose the scheme on the. ground that it is not in
the interest of the publjc or on the ground that the
route which he .is exploiting should be .excluded .from
the scheme for various reasons. There is, therefore, a.
proposal and an opposition alld the .third party, the
State Government is to decide that lis and prima faci,e
it· must do so judicially. The position is put beyond.
a.ny doubt by the provision in the Act and the .Rules
which expressly requir.e that the State Government
must decide the dispute aooording to the procedure
prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, viz., after considering the objections and after
hearing both thEI parties. It therefore appears to us
that this is an obvious case where the Act imposes a
duty on the State Government to decide the act judicially in approving or modifying the scheme proposed
by the Transport Undertaking.
The learned .Attorney General argues that ss. 68-C'
and 68-D do not contemplate the enquiry in rega,rd to
the rights of any parties, that the scheme proposed is
44
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I95 8
[1959] Supp.
only for the purpose of a.n efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated bus transport service
and should relate only to that purpose and that, therefore, the enquiry contemplated under s. 68-D, though
v.
assimilated to a judicial procedure, does not ma.ke the
AndMa Pradesh approval ·of the scheme any the less a.n administrative
5 1
~•0 : ~0 ·; r;~·•·act.
To put it shortly, his contention is that the
0
: • • ';.;;::,; • Government
is discharging only a.n administrative
duty in approving the scheme in public interest and
Subba Rao J.
no rights of the parties a.re. involved in the process.
There is some plausibility and attraction in the argument, but we cannot accept either the premises or the
conclusions. The scheme proposed may exclude
persons, who have proprietary rights in a route or
routes. As we have pointed out, the purpose must be
distinguished from the particulars in the scheme. The
scheme propounded may exclude persons from a route
or routes and the affected party is glven a remedy to
apply to the Government and the Government is
enjoined to decide the dispute between the contesting
parties. The statute clearly, therefore, imposes a. duty
upon the Government to act judicially. Even if the
grounds of attack age.inst the scheme a.re confined
only to the purpose mentioned in s. 68-C-we cannot
agree with this contention-the position will not be
different, for, even in that case there is a dispute
between the State Transpo1·t Undertaking a.nd the
person excluded in.respect of the scheme, though the
objections are limited to the purpose of the scheme. In
either view the said two provisions, ss. 68-C and 68-D,
comply with the three criteria of a judicial act la.id
down by this Court.
Support is sought to be drawn for this contention
·from the decision of the House of Lords in Franklin v.
Minister of Town and Country Planning('). As strong
reliance is placed on this decision, it is necessary to
consider the same in some detail. The facts of that
case are: On August 3, 1946, the respondent, Lewis
Silkin, as Minister of Town and Country Planning,
prepared the draft Stevenage New Town (Designation)
Order, 1946, under para. 1 of Schedule 1 to the New
Gullapalli
Nagesw••• Rao
•nd Othm
(I) [1948] A.C. 87.
(1) s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
Towns Act, 1946, and on or about August 6, 1946, he
r95a·
caused the same to be published and notices to be
Gullapalli
given as prescribed by paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to Nageswara Rao
the Act. Thereafter objections were received from a
and Others
number of persons, including the appellants. Accordv.
ingly, the respondent instructed Mr. Arnold Morris, an Andhra Pradesh
Inspecwr-of the Ministry of Town and Country Plan- State Road Tr~ns
ning, lJo hold a public local inquiry a.s prescribed by port dc~por;"on
paragraph 3 of the said Schedule. - Mr. Morris held an not "
the inquiry at the Town Hall, Stevenage, on October 7 Subba Rao].
and 8, 1946, and on October 25, made a report to the
respondent in which he set out a summary of the submissions made and the evidence given by and on
behalf of the objectors and attached thereto a complete transcript of the proceedings, which began with
an opening statement by Mr. Morris giving a brief
recapitulation of the reasons that had led to the designation of Stevenage as the site of a New Town. On
November 11, 1946, the respondent made the order in
terms ofparagra.ph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Act. The
appellants applied to the High Court to have the order
quashed. It was contended, inter alia, that the said
order was not within the powers of the New Towns
Act, 1946, or alternatively, that the requirements of
the said Act have not been complied with; that the
Minister who ma.de the order had stated, before the
Bill was made into law, that he would make the said
order, and therefore he was biassed in any consideration of the said objections. The House of Lords held
that the respondent's functions under the Act were
only administrative and that he had complied with
the provisions of the statute. In that view, the order
of the Court of Appeal dismissing the applications filed
by the appellants was confirmed. Lord Thankerton in
his speech at page 102, observed thus :
"In my opinion, no judicial, or quasi-judicial,
duty was imposed on the respondent, and any reference to judicial duty, or bias, is irrelevant in the
present case. The respondent's duties under s. I of
the Act and sch. 1 thereto a.re, in my opinion, purely
administrative, but the Act prescribes certain methods
of or steps in, discharge of that duty. .. ................ It
348
r9s8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959} Supp.
seems clear also, that the purpose of inviting objecand, where theh are not wit)ldrawn, of having a
tions,
Gullaj)a'lli
Nageswara Rao public inquiry, to be eld by someone othtr than the
an·J others
respondent, to w horn that person reports, was for tho
v.
further information of the respondent, in order to the
Andhra Pradesh final consideration of the soundness of the scheme of
State Road Trans-th d ·
t'
· ·
port co,poration
e es1€ina.1?n.
.. ......... '........... . I· am O f· ~pmI?n
and A••'""
that no JUd1c1al duty 1s laid on the respondent m discharge of these statutory duties, and that the only
Subba R<10 J. question is whether he has complied with the statutory
directions to appoint a person to hold the public
inquiry, and to consider that person's report."·
At first sight the facts of this case may appear to have
some analogy to those in the present case, hut on a
deeper scrutiny of the facts and the provisions of the
New Towns Act, 1946, and Chapter IV-A of the Act,
they disclose essentfal differences in fundamentals.
Under the New Towns Act, 1946, the following steps
for deve!Oping a new town have been laid down: (I) It
is left to the Minister's subjective satisfaction, after
consulting local authorities, who appear to him to be
concerned, to make an order designating a particular area as the site of the proposed new town ;
(2) when he proposes to make an order, he prepares
a draft of that order giving the necessary particulars and publishes it in the London Gazette ca11ing for objections to the proposed order within a
prescribed time; (3) if any objection is made to t.he
proposed order, he shall cause a public local enquiry
t.o be held and shall consider the report of the person by whom the enquiry was held ; and (4) any person desiring to challenge the validity of that order
may apply to the High Court and he can get that
order set aside only if he satisfies the Court that the
order is not within the powers of that Act or that his
interests have been substantially prejudiced by any
requirements of that Act not having been complied
with. The steps to be taken for nationalising the
Road Transport under the Act are as follows: (l) The
State Transport Undertaking, which is a statutory
authority under the Act, proposes a scheme; (2) the
scheme may provide that the road ·transport services
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
349
should be run or oper~ted by the State Transport
r95B
Undertaking to the exclusiOn of & person or persons;
Gullapalli
(3) any person affected may file objections before the Nageswara Rao
Governmem; (4) the -Government following the rules and others
of judicial procedure decides the dispute between the
v.
Undertaking and the person or persons affected; Atidhra Pradesh
1
(5.) the.
dispute is not necessarily confined
on·ly
to the Sta
• Rcoapd T· ~ns.
.
· h
por1 01 Ort-' 1 ion
questwn whether the statutory requirements ave and Another
been complied with, but· may also rela.te to the question whether a. particular. person or persons should Subba Rao J.
not be excluded ; a.nd (6) a. persona.I hearing should
be given to both the parties by the Government.
A comparison of the pl,'Oc~ura.l steps under both
the· Acts brings out in bold relief the nature of the
enquiries contemplated under the two statutes. There,
there is no li~, no persona.I hearing and even t.he
public enquiry contemplated by a. third party is pre·
suma.bly confined to the question of statutory requirements, or a.t any rate. was for eliciting .further information for the Minister. lfere, there is a. clear disp11te between the two parties. The dispute compre·
bends not only objections raised on public grounds,
but also in vindication of private rights and it is required to be decided by the State Government a.fter
giving a personal hearing and following the rules of
judicial procedure. Though there may be some justification for holding, on the facts of the case before· the
House of Lords that that Act did not contemplate a
judicial act-on that question we do not propose to express our opinion-there is absolutely none for holding
in the present case that the Government is not performing a judicial act. Robson in ' Justice and Administrative Law', commenting upon the aforesaid
decision, makes the following observation a.t page 533:
"It should have been obvious from a cursory
glance at the New Towns Act that the rules of natural
justice could not apply to the Minister's action in
making an order, for the simple reason that the initiative lies wholly with him. His role is not to consider
whether an order made by a local authority should be
confirmed, nor does he ha\te to determine a controversy
between a public authority and private interests.
350
'95 8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
The responsibility of seeing that the intention of
Parliament
is carried out is placed on him."
Gullapalli
Nage;wara Rao The aforesaid observations explain the principle underand Othm
lying that decision aµd that principle cannot have any
v.
application to the facts of this case. In 'Principles
s1~dh~a :•;desh of Administr.ative Law' by Griffith and Street,
p:.~ c::p.,.;;.~:- the following comment is found on the ·aforesaid deciand Anothet
siun : After considering the provisions of s. l of the
New Towns Act, 1946, the authors saySubba Rao f.
" Like the town-planning legislation, this differs
from the Housing Acts in that the Minister is a party
throughout. Further, the Minister is not statutorily
required to consider the objections. It is obvious, as
the statute itself states, that the creation of new towns
is of national interest."
At page 176, the authors proceed to state :
"Lord Thankerton did not analyse the meanings
of' judicial ' and 'administrative' nor did he specify
the particular factors which motivated his classification. It is permissible to conclude that he looked at
the Act as a whole, applying a theory of interpretation
similar to the rule in Heydon's Gase (1584, 3 Co. Rep.
7a, 7b)."
At page 178, they conclude thus :
" It is submitted, however, that the thoroughness
with which the Courts analysed the statutes in the
Errington, Robinson, Johnson and Franklin Gases and
the emphasis which they have placed on the fact that
their decisions have been based solely on the statute
under consideration makes such an approach inevitable."
It is therefore clear that Franklin's Gase is based upon
- the interpretation of the provisions of that Act and
particularly on the ground that the object of the enquiry is to further inform the mind of the Minister
and not to consider any issue between the Minister
and the objectors. The decision in that case is not of
any help to decide the present case, which turns upon
the construction of the provisions of the Act. l<'or
the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the State Government's order under s. 68-D is a judicial act.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3Sl
The next question is whether the State Government
r95B
disposed of the objections of the petitioners judicially
Gullapalli
in the manner prescribed by the Act. It is said that Nageswara Rao
under the Act and rules framed thereunder, the State
and Others
Government should hear the dispute, but in this case
v.
the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department, Andhra Pradesh
· .
h Sta t e Government, gave th e h earmg.
· State
W h o is not t e
P0 1 Road
c P Trans1.
The State Government is an impersonal body and it
°,;n;;;,;on
. can only function through the machinery and in the
manner prescribed by law. Clause (60) of, s. 2 of the Subba Rao J.
General Clauses Act, 1897, defines' State Government'
as respects anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (VII Amendment) Act,
1956, to mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a
Union Territory, the Central Government. Under
Art. 154(1) of the Constitution, 'the executive power
of the State shall be vested in the Governor and shall
be exercised by him either directly or through officers
subordinate to him in accordance with this Constitution'. Article 163 enacts that' there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to
aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his
functions, except in so far as he is by or under this
Constitution required to exercise his functions or any
of them in his discretion'. Article 166(1) enjoins
that 'all executive action of the .Government of a
State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of
the Governor'. Sub-clause (2) of that Article says that
' orders and other instruments made and executed in
the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in
such manner as may be specified in rules to be made
by the Governor'. And under sub-cl. (3), 'the Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State,
and for the allocation among Ministers of the said
business in so far as it is not business with respect to
which the Governor is by or under this Constitution
required to act in his discretion '. In exercise of the
powers conferred by els. (2) and (3) of Art. 166 of the
Constitution, the Government of Madras made rules
styled as' The Madras Government Business Rules and
Secretariat Instructions '. Rule 9 thereof prescribes
:,,d
352
9 8
' '
c 14uapalli
Nageswa•a Rao
and Othm
v.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
that without prejudice to the provisions of r. 7,
the Minister i.n charge of a department shall be prima~
rily responsible for the disposal of the business apper,
taining to that department. Rule 21 enacts that ex,
cept as otherwise provided by any other Rule, cases
s:;d~a ~'';'.1"h shall ordinarily be disposed of by or upder the au thoc:;P•••;i~:·· rity of the Minister in charge who may, by mea.ns of
·~d Another
standing orders, give such directions as he thinks fit
for the disposal of cases in the department. Copies
Subba Rao J. of such standing orders shall be sent to the Governqr
and the Chief Minister. Rule 11 says that •all orders
or instruments made or executed by or on behalf of
the Government of the State shall be expressed to be
ma.de or executed in the name of the Governon '.
Under r. 12, 'every order or instrument of the Gov!lrnment of the State shall be signed either by a. Secretary, an Additional Secretary, a Joint Secretary, a
draftsman, a Deputy Secretal'.y, an Under Secretary
or an Assistant Secretary to the Government of the
State o.r such other officers as may be specially empciwered in that behalf and such signature shall be
deemed to be the proper authentication of such order
or instrument '.
After the formation of the Andhra State on October 3, 1953, the rules made by the Governor of Madra&,
under the provisions of the States Reorganization Act,
continue to be the rules of the Andhra State till they
are amended in accordance with such law. The
Governor of Andhra State, in exercise of the powers
conferred by els. (2) and (3) of Art. 166 of the Constitution, directed that until other provisions are made in
this regard, •the business of the Government of Andhra
be transacted in accordance with the Madras Government Business Rules and Secretariat lnRtructions in
force on the first day of October, 1953'. On October 26,
1956, after the . formation of the Andhra Pradesh
State, as the Andhra Pradesh was not a new State but
a continuation of the Andhra State, though there is
change in its name, the business rules of the Andhra.
State continue to govern the Secretariat of the Andhra
Pradesh Government. 'the effect of .the aforesaid provisions may be stated thus: A State Government
.;.:,
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
means the Governor; the executive power of the Stat~
vests in the Governor ; it is exercised' by him directly
Gullapalli
or by officers subordinate to him in accordance with
Nageswaya
Rao
the provisions of the Constitution ; the Ministers
and OtheYs
headed by the Chief Minister advise him in the exercise of his functions; the Governor made rules enabling Andhrav.Pradesh
the Minister in charge of particular department to dis- State Road Transpose of cases before him and also authorizing him, by por1 Corporation
means of standing orders, to give such directions as he and Another
thinks fit for the disposal of the cases in the department. Pursuant to the rule, the record discloses, the Subba Rao f.
Chief Minister, who was in charge of Transport, had
made a.n order directing the Secretary to Government,
Home Department, to hear the objections filed against
the scheme proposed by the State Transport Authority.
The aforesaid machinery evolved by the rules for
the disposal of cases by the State Government has
been followed in this case. The petitioners and otherfl
filed objections to the proposed scheme before the
Secretary to the Government Transport Department.
He gave a. personal hearing to the parties-some of
them appeared in person and others by representatives; the entire material recorded by him was placed
before the Chief Minister in charge of Transport, who
ma.de his order approving the scheme ; and the order
was issued in the name of the Governor, authenticated
by the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department. It may therefore be said that the State
Government gave the hearing to the petitioners in
the manner prescribed by the rules ma.de by the
Governor.
At this stage, the argument hinted at but not
seriously pressed, may be noticed. The Rules the
Governor is authorised to make, the argument proceeds, are only to regulate the acts of the Governor or
his subordinates in discharge of the executive power
of the State Government, and therefore will not govern
the quasi-judicial functions entrusted to it. There is a
fallacy in this argument. The concept of a. quasijudicial act implies that the a.ct is not wholly judicial;
45
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
it describes only a duty cast 011 the executive body or
authority to conform to norms of judicial procedure in
performing some acts in exercise of its executive power.
The procedural rules made by the Governor for the
v.
convenient transaction of business of the State Gov<lrnAndh•a P.adesh ment apply also to quasi-judicial acts, prov idcd those
5 1 1 11 0
P" ' c •Pd r,~ns-Rules conform to the principles of i"udicial llrocedure.
or1 or oration
and Another
The mode of performing quasi-judicial acts by administrative tribunals has been the subject of judicial
Subba llao J.
decisions in England as well as in India. The House
of Lords in Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1)
in the context of the Housing, Town Plam1iug Etc.,
Act, 1909, made the following •bserv a.tions at
page 132:
"My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal
is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it
must act judicially. They must deal with the question
referred to them without bias, and they must give to
each of the parties the opportunity of adequately
presenting the case made. The decision must be come
to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of
a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. But it
does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same."
In New PrakaBh TranBport Co., Ltd. v. New Swarna
Tramport Co., Ltd. (') this Court reviewed. the case
law on the subject and came to the conclusion that the
rules of natural justice vary with varying constitutions
of statutory bodies, and the rules prescribed by the
legislature under which they have to act, and the
question whether in a particular case they have been
contravened must be judged not by any preconceived
notion of what they may be but in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act. This Court re-affirmed the
principle in Nagendra Nath Bora v. CommiBBioner of
HiUB Division (supra)(').
With this background we shall proceed to consider
the validity of the three alleged deviations of the
State Government from the fundamental judicial procedure. In the present case, the officer who received
zpsB
Gull•P•lli
Nagesw••• ll•o
and 0111m
(1) [1915] A.C. 120.
(2) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398.
(3) .U.R. 1958 S.C. 398.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
the objections of the parties and heard them persor95a
nally or through their representatives, was the SecreGullapalli
tary of the Transport Department. u nder the 'Madras Ntrgeswara Rao
Government Business Rules and Secretariat Instruc- and Others
tions' made by the Governor under Art. 166 of the
v.
Constitution, the Secretary of a department is its head. A1tdlira Pradesh
One of the parties to the dispute before the State State Road Trans,
port Corporalio1t
Government was the T ransport D epartment function- 0 ,.d Another
ing as a statutory authority under the Act. The head
of that department received the objections, heard the subb.s Rao J,
parties, recorded the entire proceedings aud presumably discussed the matter with the Chief Minister before the latter approved the scheme. Though the
formal orders were made by the Chief Minister, in
effect and substance, the enquiry was conducted and
personal hearing was given by one of the parties to
the dispute itself. It is one of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure that the person or persons
who are entrusted with the duty of hearing a case
judicially should be those who have no personal bias
in the matter. In Ranger v. Great Western Rg. Go. (1)
Lord Cran worth, L.C., says:
" A judge ought to be, and is supposed to be,
indifferent between the parties. He has, or is supposed
to have, no bias inducing him to lean to the one side
rathe1· than to the other. In ordinary cases it is just
ground of exception to a judge that he is not indifferent, and the fact tha.t he is himself a pa.l'ty, or interested as a. party, affords the strongest ·proof that he
cannot be indifferent."
In Rex v. Sussex Justices Ex Parte McCarthy (2 ) Lord
Hewart, C. J., observed:
"It is said, and, no doubt, truly, that when
that gentleman retired in the usual way with the
justices, taking with him the notes of the evidence in
case the justices might desire to consult him, the
justices came to a conclusion without consulting him,
1md that he scrupulously abstained from referring to
the case in any way. But while that is so, a long line
of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance
( r) [1854) 5 H.L.C. 72, 89: 10 E.R. 82{, 827.
(2) [1924] I K.B. 256, 258.
356
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
but is of fundamental importance that justice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtGullapulli
b
b
Nag.,war• Rao edly e seen to e done. The question therefore is not
and Others
whether in this case the deputy clerk made any observ.
vation or offered any criticism whioh he might not
Andh•• P>ad"h properly have made or offered; the question is wheState Road T·~··-ther he was so related to the case in its civil aspects
port Corporation
b
k
• •
· h
and Anoth.,
as to e unfit to act as cler to the JUStwes· m t e
criminal matter. The answer to that question depends
s ..bba Rao J. not upon what actually was done, but upon what
might appear to be done."
This was followed in Rex v. Essex Justices Ex Parte
Perkins (1 ). In Franklin's Case ('), though on a construction of the provisions of that Act under consideration in that case it was held that the Minister was
not acting judicially ·in discharging his duties, his
Lordship accepted the aforesaid principle and expressd his view on the doctrine of 'bias' thus, at
page 103:
" My Lords, I could wish that the use of the word
'bias' should be confined to its proper sphere. Its
proper significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice
which the law requires from those who occupy judicial
office; or those who are commonly regarded as holding
a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator. The reason for this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he must come to his adjudication with an independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in the dis·
pute."
The aforesaid decisions accept the fundamental principle of natural justice that in the case of quasi-judicial
proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the
dispute between opposing parties must be one without
bias towards one side or other in the dispute. It is also
a matter of fundamental importance that a person
interested in one party or the other should not, even
formally, take part in the proceedings though in fact
he does not influence the mind of the person, who
finally decides the case. This is on the principle that
r958
(1) [1927] 2 K.B. 475.
(2) [1948] A.C. 87.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
justice should not only be done, but should manifestly
and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The hearing
Gidlapalli
given by the Secretary, Transport Department, certain- Nageswara Rao
ly offends the said principle of natural justice and
and Others
the proceeding and the hearing given, in violation of
. v.
that principle, are bad.
. Andhra Pradesh
• . is
. t h at w h'l
h Act an d th e Slate
Road TransThe second ob Ject1on
l e t e
port corporation
Rules framed thereunder impose a duty on the State and Aflother
Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure
prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secre- Subba Rao J.
tary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This
divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of
judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object
of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the
authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the
witnesses and clear-up his doubts during the course of
the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade
the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point
of view. If one person hears and another decides,
then personal hearing becomes an empty formality.
We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in
this case also offends another basic principle of judicial
procedure.
The learned counsel further contends that the mind
of the State Government was foreclosed before the
hearing was· given and therefore no real enquiry was
held by it as contemplated by the Act. This argument
is based upon the reports published on 27-12-1957 in
the 'Deccan Chronicle' and 'Golconda Patrika'. Therein it was stated under date December, 26, as follows :
"The Chief Secretary, Mr. M. P. Pai, told pressmen today that the Government has already taken a
decision to nationalize the road transport in Krishna
District and some routes had been chosen. The Guntur-Vijayawada route also comes under the nationalisation scheme. About 65 buses would be plying on
these routes."
The Chief Secretary was giving this information on
December 26, 1957, even before the enquiry was commenced. On the basis of this publication, it is contended, that the Government had already taken a decision
to nationalize the road transport before the scheme
358
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
was approved by the Government and that the entire
procedure was put through to implement the decision
Na~.:~:~; 1~00 already taken to meet the requirements of the techniand Others
ca.lities of law. In the counter-affidavit filed by the
v.
first respondent it is stated that the scheme was pubAnahra Pradesh lished in the Andhre. Pradesh Gazette dated 24-12-1957
State Road Tr~ns- and that the alleged statement only referred to the
1 0
Po•t 4c",;po~;
• n said propose.I under s. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act.
0
an
" "
Though the wording of the information published
Subb• Rao J. speaks of the decision of the Government, the Chief
Secretary obviously must have been referring to the
contents of the notification published two days earlier,
on 24-12-1957. We cannot from this publication in
the newspapers come to the conclusion that the Government having finally decided to reject a.II possible objections, went through a farce of an enquiry. We therefore hold, for the first two reasons, that the quasi-judicial enquiry held by the State Government was vitiated by tht1 violation of the aforesaid fundamental principles of natural justice.
The last argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that the Road Transport Corporation, i.e.,
the first respondent, cannot implement the scheme
proposed by the defunct State Transport Undertaking.
Some of the relevant facts are as follows : The State
Transport Undertaking published the scheme in the
Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated November 14, 1957. It
also appeared through its representative, the General
Manager, who made his representation to the Secretary of the Transport Department on 26.12-1957. '£he
State Government approved of the scheme on 7-1-1958
and the approved scheme was published in the Andhra
Pradesh Gazette dated 9-1-1958 and it was directed to
come into force with effect from 10-1-1958. The Government of Andhra. Pradesh established a Road Transport Corporation under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (Act LXIV of 1950), for the State of
Andhra Pradesh, with effect from 11-1-1958. The State
Government transferred the business of the Road
Transport Department to the said Corporation for
manngement. ·Thereafter, the said Corporation was
taking subsequent steps to implement the scheme.
1958
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME· COURT REPORTS
359
The argument is that the Road Transport Corporation
:r95B
has no power under the Road Transport Corporations
Gullapalli
Act to take over the business of the State Transport Nageswara Rao
Undertaking and to implement the scheme initiated
and Others
by that Undertaking. The said Corporation admittv.
edly comes under the definition of •State Transport Andkra Pradesh
· ' nn der t.he A.ct. B ut t he question
· IS
• W hether State
Road Trans·
A uth onty
port Corporation
the said Corporat10n IS also a successor to the State and Another
Transport Authority that initiated the scheme. It
would certainly be the successor if the Corporation Subba Rao J.
was legally entrusted with the duty of carrying on the
business the Road Transport Department was doing
On January 9, 1958, in exercise of the
before.
powers conferred by s. 3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh
established with effect from January 11, 1958, a Road
Transport Corporation called the Andhra Pradesh
Road Transport Corporation for the State of Andhra
Pradesh. In exercise of the power conferred by s. 34
of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, the
Governor of Andhra Pradesh made an order dat!'ld
11th January, 1958, for the following administrative
arrangements to come into force :
"(l) The Andhra. Pradesh Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) shall
take over the management of the existing Road Transport Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh.
(2) All land and all stores, articles and other goods
of the Road Transport Department shall pass to the
Corporation.
(3) (a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraphs
(b) and (c), all the assets and liabilities of the Road
Transport Department shall pass to the Corporation ...
"
The other clauses need not be read as they are only
consequential to the aforesaid clauses. It is therefore
clear from the said order that the Government entrusted the management of the Road Transport Department to the Road Transport Corporation and directed
the transfer of all assets and liabilities to the said Corporation. The effect of the said order is that the State
360
'95 8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Corporation carries on the Road Transport business
in
the place of the State Transport Department which
Gullapalli
Nageswarn Rao was functioning as the State Transport Undertaking
and Othm
under the Act before the said order. If there was no
v.
legal impediment in the Government transferring the
Andhrn Pradesh business carried on by one of its departments and its
Stat< Road 1 "~ns- assets to the Corporation, the Corporation would be a
port Corporation
· ·
State T ransport Underand Anothn
successor to the pre-ex1stmg
taking. The petitioners contest the position that the
Subba fl'ao J.
Government has any such power under s. 34 of the
Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. Section 34
reads:
"(l) The State Government may, aft.er consultation with a Corporation established by such Government., give to the Corporation general instructions to
be followed by the Corporation, and such instructions
may include directions relating to the recruitment,
conditions of service and training of its employees,
wages to be paid to the employees, reserves to be maintained by it and disposal of its profits and stocks.
(2) In the exercise of its powers and performance
of its duties under this Act, the Corporation shall not
depart from any general instructions issued under subsection (1) except with the previous permission of the
State Government."
The Road Transport Corporation was constituted
for extending and improving the facilities of the
road transport in the Andhra Pradesh area. The
Government transferred the Undertaking and its assets
to that Corporation and gave it directions under
s, 34 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950,
to take over the management of the said undertaking.
The fact that under the Road Transport Corporations Act the Corporation can acquire an undertaking
after paying compensation is not of much relevancy,
for, in this case, the Corporation does not purport to
acquire any transport undertaking of the petitioners.
It has not been brought to our notice that the said
direction is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950.
We, therefore, hold that the first respondent is the
successor to the State Transport Undertaking which
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3Gl
proposed the scheme and as admittedly it satisfied the
r958
requirements of the definition of ' Road Transport
Gullapalli
Authority' under the Act, it is within its rights in Nageswara Rao
implementing the scheme approved by the Governa11d Others
ment. .
v.
In the result for the :reason that the State Govern- Andhra Pradesh ·
·
·
't)
h Stale !load Trans'd
' k .h
ment d1 not ma e t e enqmry consistent WI 1 t e port Corporation
principles of natural justice in approving the scheme, and Another
the order approving the scheme is hereby quashed
and a direction issued to the first respondent to for- Subba Rao J.
bea.r from taking over any of the routes in which the
petitioners are engaged in transport business. This
judgment will not preclude the State Government from
making the necessary enquiry in regard to the objections filed by the petition~rs in accordance with law.
The petitioners will have liberty to file additional
objections if any. As the petitioners have failed on
substantive points in the case, the parties are directed
to bear their own costs.
W ANCHOO, J.-This petition under Article 32 of the Wanchoo J.
Constitution challenges the scheme of road transport
introduced in the Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh.
The petitioners raise two main contentions, namely,
(1) that the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, violate their fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution, and (2) that the
scheme introduced is ultra vires Chapter IV-A.
I have had the advantage of reading the judgment
prepared by my brother Subba Rao, J. I agree with
what he has said on the first content.ion and therefore
do not propose to repeat the facts and the reasons given
by him. I have, however, been unable, with utmost
respect, to persuade myself to agree fully with what
has been said on the second contention. I, therefore,
proceed to deal with that only.
The second contention of the petitioners is that the
scheme of road transport, which is sought to bo put
into effect, is ultra vires Chapter IV-A of the Motor
Vehicles Act, (IV of 1939), (hereinafter called the Act),
inasmuch as the provisions of that Ch[tpter have not
40
362
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
been strictly followed. Before I deal with the contentions of the petitioners in this matter, I may indicate
GullapalliR«o brie
· fl y t he steps reqmre
· d to b e ta k en be£ore a sc h eme
Nnge>wora
and Othm
of road transport is finalised under Chapter IV-A of
v.
the Act. The first step is the preparation of the
Andh.a Pradesh Scheme under s. 68C, which lays down that where any
Sfote Rood Tr~ns-state Transport Undertaking is of opinion that for the
port Corporal<on
· an effi cien
· t , a d equa t e, econonnca
' 1
th
d
purpose of provi'd mg
4 0
an · "
and properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is
"
W<mchoo J.
necessary in the public interest that road transport
services in general or any particular class of snch service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof
should be run and operated by the State Transport
Undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or
partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State Transport Undertaking may prepare a scheme for the purpose. After the scheme is prepared, it has to be
published in the Official Gazette and also in such other
manner as the State Government may direct. The
next step is that any person affected by the scheme
published under s. 68C may, within thirty days from
the date of publication, file objections thereto before
the State Government; [s. 68D(l)]. The third step is
that the State Government has to consider the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objectors
or their representatives and the representatives of the
State Transport Undertaking to be heard in the
matter, to approve or modify the scheme ; (s. 68D (2)).
]'inally, the scheme a.s approved or modified is published in the Official Gazette as the approved scheme;
(s. 68D(3)). Then comes the provisions for putting
this approved scheme into effect. Section 68F provides that the Regional Transport Authority shall
thereupon issue permits to the State Transport Undertaking on its application in pursuance of the approved
scheme. The Regional Transport Authority is also
given power to cancel or modify any existing permit
or refuse to renew any existing permit for this purpose.
Section 68G provides for compensation where any
existing permit is cancelled or its terms are modified.
The main attack of the petitioners is that sections
I95s
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREMJ:l] COURT REPORTS
363
680 and 68D were not complied with. The p;uticulars
r95B
of the attack may be summarised as below:Gullapalli
(1) There was no State Transport Undertaking Nageswara Rao
in existence which could have published the scheme;
and Others
68
( C)( ) E
"f S
T
U d
k"
A11dhra v.Pradesh
2. yen 1 a tate r~~sport n .erta mg 'Yas State Road Transthere, 1t did not form an opuuon as required by s. 680 port corporation
and in particular, the General Manager, who acted for and Another
the State Transport Undertaking, had no authority
to do so;
Wanchoo ].
(3) S. 68D(2) contemplates a hearing by the State
Government of the objections filed. There was no
such hearing, as the Home Secretary in-charge of
Transport Department, who heard the objectors must
be deemed to be one of the parties who have to be
heard by the State Government, and in any case, the
hearing by the Secretary was no hearing by the State
Government.
(4) There was no real hearing at all and no
genuine consideration of the objections by the State
Government as the issue had already been prejudged,
(vide speech of the Chief Secretary on the 26th of
:Pecember, 1957); and
(5) The scheme could not be enforced by the
Road Transport Corporation, which replaced the Road
Transport Department soon after the scheme had bAen
approved by the State Government.
It is necessary in order to appreciate and decide the
point raised on behalf of the petitioners to mention
briefly the facts relating to the preparation of the
scheme and subsequent steps taken for its approval
and enforcement. The scheme was published on
November 14, 1957, under the authority of Shri Guru
Pershad, General Manager of the State Transport
Undertaking Andhra Pradesh Road Transport. Chapter IV-A of the Act had come into force from the
15th of February, 1957. Before that Hyderabad
State, as it then was, had passed Act XLV of 1956,
amending the Motor Vehicles Act locally and incorporating in it provisions similar to the present Chapter
IV-A. Under the Hyderabad Act, the State Transport Undertaking was defined as the Road Transport
364
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
8
Department of the State providing road transport
r. u'lapalli
services. When the Hyderabad State came to end
Nag"wara Rao and what was known as the Telengana area of that
and Others
State waS' merged in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the
•·
Road Transport Department of Andhra Pradesh took
AndhRrn PraTdesh over the road transport services in the Telengana area
Seate oad rans- h' h
b .
b h ,.
:f
,
port Corporntfon w JC were emg nm y t e lOrmer I yd era bad State.
and Another
The present scheme was published, as already stated,
on the 14th of November, 1957, by Shri Guru Pershad
Wanchoo J.
on behalf of the Road Transport Department of
Anclhra Pradesh. The objections to the scheme were
received by the Secret;iry to Government in charge of
the Road Transport Department, and the objectors
were heard by the Home Secretary in charge of the
Transport Department on the 26th and 27t!J of
December, 1957. The scheme was finally approved by
the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on the 7th of
Januarv, 1958, and was to come into force from the
10th o{ January, 1958. The approved scheme was
published in the Gazette on January 9, 1958. In the
meantime, the Government of Andhra Pradesh decided to establish a Road Transport Corporation under
the Road Transport Corporations Act, No. LXIV of
1950, for the State of Andhra Pradesh. This decision
was published on the 20th of December, 1957, and the
Road Transport Corporation was to come in existence
from the 11th of January, 1958. It was to take over
the bnsiness of the Road Transport Department of
the State. The members of the Road Transport
Corporation were appointed on the 9th of January,
1958, and the Corporation was established with effect
from the 11th of January, 1958. It was this Corporation, which took over the duty of implementing the
approved scheme, which was published on the 9th of
January, 1958, and was to come into effect from the
10th of January, 1958. The steps necessary under
sections 68F, 68G and 68H of the Act to put the
scheme into force were taken by this Corporation.
Re. (1). The argument of the petitioners under this
head is put thus: There was a State Transport Undertaking under Hyderabad Act, which was operating in
the present Telengana area of Andhra Prade8h, This
95
•
~~
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
365
r95B
was the Road Transport Department of the Hydcrabad State, which became the statutory body under the
Gullapalli
Hyderabad Act. When, however, the Hyderabad Nageswara Rao
State came to end and the Telengana area was merged
and Otheu
in Andhra Pradesh on the 1st of November, 1956, the
v.
State Transport Undertaking of the Hyderabad State Andlira Pradesh
.
.
hc
h T l
State Hoad Transconhn ued to function as sue 1or t e e engana area port Corporation
of Andhra Pradesh. There was no extension of the and Another
Hyderabad Act to the rest of Andhra Pradesh, and
the present scheme relates to Krishna District which Wanchoo J.
ififnot in the Telengana area ; consequently, it was not
open to the State Transport Undertaking which was
existing under the Hyderabad Act to frame this
scheme for an area which was not in Telengana. It
was also urged that no State Transport Undertaking
was formed as such after the coming into force of
Chapter IV-A of the Act in February, 1957. I am of
the opinion that there is no force in this argument. It
is true that under the Hyderabad Act, the State
Transport Undertaking was defined as "the Road
Transport Department of the .State providing road
transport service" .. When Hyderabad State came to
end on the 1st of November, 1956, the Road Transport Department of Andhra Pradesh became the State
Transport Undertaking within the meaning of the
Hyderabad Act, though, as that Act was in force only
in the Telengana area, road transport services could
only be run in that area. When, however, Chapter
IV-A of the Act came into force from the 15th of
:February, 1957, and applied to the whole of the State
of Andhra Pradesh, the Hyderabad Act must be deemed to have been repealed by necessary implication, as
Chapter IV-A of the Act covered exactly the same field
as was covered by the Hyderabad Act. On the 15th
of February, 1957, there was only Road Transport
Department of Andhra Pradesh, which was in existence and which was providing transport services in
certain areas of the State. Now, under s. 68A, a State
transport undertakirig is defined as any undertaking
providing road tran~port service, where such undertaking is carried on by the Central Government or the
State Government ... " The Road Transport Department
366
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
of Andhra Pradesh was obviously an undertaking providing road transport service though only in a
part of the State, and was c~rried on by the State
Government of Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, the Road
v.
Transport Department of Andhra Pradesh became the
Andhra Prndcsh State Transport Undertaking under the definition in
State Rcoad Tr~ns- s. 68A. The fact that this undertaking which came in
port
· t ence by vir
· t ue of th e d e fi1111t10n
· ·
and orpomtion
Another
exrn
on t h e 15t h of
:February, 1957, was at that time providing road transwanchoo ].
port services only in a part of the State, would not
make it any the less a State Transport Undertaking
within the meaning of that term and there is nothing
in Chapter IV-A, which precludes a State Transport
Uudertaking, which is for the time being providing
transport services in a part of the State, from extending its activities and framing a scheme for other parts
of the State. I am, therefore, of opinion that a State
Tra.nsport Undertaking was in existence in November,
1957, when the scheme was prepared and published,
and it was the Road Transport Department of Andhra
Pradesh.
Re. (2). The contentions on this head are two-fold.
In the first place, it is urged that the General Manager,
who acted for the State Transport Undertaking had no
authority to do so on its behalf This is a question of
fact and should have been specifically raised in the
petition. All that, however, is said about the authority of Shri Guru Pershad is to be found in paragraph
11 (e) of the petition in these words:
"Mr. Guru Pershad was the General Manager of
the Road Transport Department of the erstwhile
Hyderabad State. He was never appointed as Manager
of the State Transport Undertaking of Andhra
Pradesh, and therefore, he has no legal authority
whatever to publish a scheme ".
Now, it is obvious that this objection was only confined
to one point, namely, that Shri Guru Pershad had no
authority to act for the State Transport Undertaking
of Andhra Pradesh, as he was never appointed as
manager of that undertaking. It was not the case of
the petitioners that even if he had been appointed as
Manager of the Andhra Pradesh State Transport
'95
Gullapalli
Nageswa.a Rao
and Others
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
367
Undertaking, he would have no authority to frame
x95 a
and publish a scheme on behalf of that undertaking. It
Gullapalli
appears that Shri Guru Pershad, who was the Manager Nageswara Rao
of the road transport services when they were run by
and Others
the former Hyderabad State, continued to be such
v.
after the Telengana area of the Hyderabad State was 5~~dh;a {';desh
merged in Andhra Pradesh. It is unthinkable that p:r~ c:;pora;;;~
Shri Guru Pershad should have issued a notification in and Another
the Gazette on the 14th of November, 1957, styling himself as" General Manager, State Transport UndertakWanchoo J.
ing, Andhra Pradesh Road Transport ", if he was not
in fact the General Manager of the Andhra Pradesh
Road Transport. It must, therefore, be held that
Shri Guru Pershad was the General Manager of the
Andhra Pradesh Road Transport, and, therefore, of
the State Transport Undertaking. His authority to
publish the scheme, if he was the Manager of Andhra
Pradesh State Transport Undertaking, has not been
attacked. The scheme was published on the 14th of
November, 1957, by Shri Guru Pershad as such
Manager. The petitioners cannot at this stage be
allowed to challenge his authority to do so, when they
did not specifically raise this point in their petitions.
When, therefore, he prepared and published the scheme,
it must be held that he did so on behalf of the State
Transport Undertaking.
The second part of this contention is that the notification of the 14th November, 1957, does not say that
the State Transport Undertaking was of opinion that
it was necessary in the public interest that the road
transport services should be run and operated by the
State Transport Undertaking. The actual words used
in the notification are these :-" In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 68C of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, it is hereby proposed,
for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate,
economical and properly co-ordinated road transport
service in public interest, to operate the following
transport service as per the particulars given below
with effect from a date to be notified by the Government."
368
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
No doubt, the words " that the State Transport Undertaking
is of opinion " are not expressly to be found in
Gullapalli
N•gesw"'" Rao this notification; but at the same time it is impossible
and Othm
that a proposal like this should be prepared and
v.
published on behalf of the State Transport UndertakAndhrn hadesh ing without its forming an opinion that it was necesS1a1, Road r,ans- sary in the public interest to do so.
I am of opinion
port Co•porntion that the State Transport Undertaking must havo
and Anolh"
r
d th e opm10n
· ·
r
iorme
necessary un d er s. 680 b e1ore
1't
published its proposal and invited objections to the
wanchoo J.
same. There is no exact form of words provided for
this purpose, and it would be quite in order to draw
the inference from the words used in the notification
that it was published after the State Transport Undertaking had formed the opinion necessary under s. 680.
In this connexion, reference may be made to paragraph 2 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation,
where it is said that the General Manager of the
Andhra Pradesh Road Transport which was the State
Transport Undertaking, was of opinion that the transport services in the Krishna District of Andhra Pradesh
should be operated in the public interest by the
Andhra Pradesh Road Transport. It was, however,
urged on behalf of the petitioners that this only disclosed the opinion of the General Manager and not of
the State Transport Undertaking; but, as I have
already said above, the authority of the General Manager to speak on behalf of the State Transport Undertaking was never specifically challenged in the petition.
There is, therefore, no force in this -0ontention, and it
must be rejected.
Re. (3). This contention relates to the hearing by the
State Government under s. 68-D(2). In order to determine this question, it is necessary to consider whether
the State Government, when it gives a hearing under
s. 68-D(2), is acting as a quasi- judicial tribunal or is
merely performing administrative functions. If the
State Government acts as a quasi-judicial tribunal
certain considerations apply to the nature of the
hearing granted ; if, on the other hand, the State
Government acts administratively, certain other
r958
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
369
considerations apply in determining the propriety of
z95B
the hearing in fact given in this case. The contention
Gullapalli
on behalf of the petitioners is that the hearing con- Nageswara Rao
templated is as a quasi-judicial tribunal. The learned
and Others
Attorney General, on the other hand, contends that
v.
the State Government merely acts administratively Andhra Pradesh
when it gives a hearing under this provision. What 51 a 1•1 Rcoapd Trans.
. JU. a·icia. l act h as b een cons1'dere d b y porand Anoth.,
or oration
constitutes
a quasi·
this Court in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani (1). The principle has been summarised by Das J. Wanchoo f.
(as he then was) at p. 725, in these words :
"The principles, as I apprehend them are:
(i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not
being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes
arising out of a claim made by one party under the
statute which claim is opposed by another party and
to determine the respective rights of the contesting
parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis
and prima f acie and in the absence of anything in the
statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority
to act judicially and the decision of the authority js a
quasi-judicial act; and
(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do
any act which will prejudicially affect the subject,
then, although there are not two parties apart from
the authority and the contest is between the authority
proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it,
the final determination of the authority will yet be a
quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required
by the statute to act judicially.
In other words, while the presence of two parties
besides the deciding authority will prima f acie and in
the absence of any other factor impose upon the
authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two
such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the
authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if
the authority is nevertheless required by the statute
to acii judicially."
Now, it may be mentioned that the statute is not
likely to provide in so many words that the authority
(1) (1950] S.C.R. 62r.
47
370
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
giving the hearing is required to act judicially; that
can only be inferred from the express provisions of the
Gullapalli
Nagcowarn Rao statute.
In the present case, it is urged by Mr. Namand 01hm
biar appearing for the petitioners that there were two
v.
parties before the State Government, which was the
AmZha Prnd"h deciding authority under s. 68D(2), namely, the objcc51"1' Rcoad r,~,,'-tors and the representatives of the State Transport
Po•l o.parnlion U d
.
Th ere1ore,
,_.
. j acie,
.
and Anoth"
n erta ]nng.
accor d'mg to h"1m, prima
there would be a duty to act judicially and there is no
Wanchoo J.
other factor which would take away the inference to
be deduced from the presence of two parties before tbe
State Government, which has to decide the matter.
Whether there is any other factor will, however,
depend upon the circumstances of each case, and the
nature of the matter under hearing and the scope of
the hearing. The learned Attorney General contends
that if one looks at the nature of the matter to be
heard and considers the scope of the hearing before
the State Government in this case the only conclusion
possible is that the State Government acts administratively when it gives a hearing under section 68(2).
What then is the nature of the hearing before the
State Government? Article 19(fl)(iii is of help in this
connection. It provides that nothing in sub-clause (g)
of article 19(1), which deals among other things with
the right to carry on trade or business shall prevent
the State from making any law relating to the carrying on by the State or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, or business, whether
to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or
otherwise. Chapter IV-A has been inserted in the Act
to carry out this purpose, so that the State may
operate transport services to the exclusion, complete
or partial, of citizens. The scheme which has been
published provides that there will be a complete exclusion of citizens when· the scheme is enforced in the
area to which it relates. Now, the question is whether
the exclusion of citizens as a whole is also an issue to
be decided by the State Government when it hears
objections. Mr. Nambiar submits that the most important thing for the State Government to decide is
whether there should be complete exclusion of citizens
I958
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
371
on the enforcement of the scheme.
The learned
z958
Attorney General on the other hand contends that all
Gullapalli
that the State Government has to do is to see whether Nageswara Rao
the scheme published is in the interest of the public
and Others
and also whether it will provide an efficient, adequate,
v.
economical and properly co-ordinated road transport Andhra Pradesh
e Rcoapd Tr a.nsservice. ..The argument
continues . that if the State Sptat
.
or 1 or ora 1ion
Government comes to that conclus10n, the complete and Another
exclusion which the scheme provides ipso facto follows,
and the State Government has not to decide the Wanchoo J.
matter of exclusion as a separate issue. In other
words, the argument is that the State Government is
not to decide between the competing claims of citizens
providing transport privately and the State Transport
Undertaking providing transport to the exclusion of
citizens, and there is, therefore, no real lis in this case.
It is also pointed out that objection can not only be
filed by the bus operators of that area who are to be
exclnded but also by anybody who is affected -by the
scheme, including the members of the travelling
public. Giving my best consideration to the arguments
on either side on this aspect of the matter, I have
come to the conclusion that the scope of the hearing
before the State Government is of a limited character,
though the decision may affect citizens providing
transport, the question whether private citizens should
or should not be allowed to provide transport is really
not a matter in issue before the State Government.
What is in dispute before the State Government is
only whether the scheme that is proposed by the State
Transport Undertaking is an efficient, adequate,
economical and properly co-ordinated scheme for road
transport service and whether it is in the interest of
the public. If the State Government comes to the conclusion that it is so, a complete exclusion proposed
automatically follows and the question of exclusion is not to be determined as a separate issue as
between the objectors and the State Transport Undertaking. It is true that the State Government has
the right to modify the scheme and in so doing it
may drop a part of the scheme ; but here again it is
noL modifying the scheme because of any right of a
372
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
private citizen to carry on road transport service in a
particular area but because it considers that the
Gullapalli
Nag.,wara Rao scheme so far as that particular area is concerned is
and Others
not efficient, . adequate, economical or properly cov.
ordinated or in the public interest. Unless it comes to
.Andhra Pmdesh that conclusion with respect to any part of the area
State Road Tr~ns- comprised in the scheme and modifies it the conport Co1'poration
,
.
'
and Another
sequence of complete exclus10n ipso facto follows.
What I wish to emphasise is that the State Governwanchoo ].
ment is not determining whether there should be State
monopoly or private enterprise when it is considering
objections under s. 68D(2); it is only deciding whether
the scheme put forward before it is such as can be
approved with or without modifications within the
four corners of the law laid down under s. 68C. If it
comes to that conclusion, the complete or partial exclusion follows. If on the other hand it modifies any
part of the scheme, exclusion fails to that extent. Considering, therefore, the nature and the scope of the
hearing under s. 68D(2) it seems to me that there is
really no lis. Even though there may be two parties
before the State Government at the hearing, there is
no determination of the rights of the parties before it.
The determination is only of the efficiency etc. of the
scheme proposed and whether it is in the public
interest. Therefore, it cannot be said that the na.ture
of the hearing in this case makes the State Government a quasi-judicial tribunal and the decision a quasijudicial act within the meaning of the principles laid
down in Advani's Gase(').
I may in this connexion refer to Franklin v. Minister
of Town and Country Planning('). The facts there
were these: Under the New Towns Act, 1946, the
Minister prepared a draft order for a new town and
caused it to be published, and notices were given to
the persons affected. Thereafter objections were
received from a number of persons who were the
owners and occupiers of dwelling-houses and lands in
the affected area. The Act provided that on receipt
of the objections, an inspector was to hold a public
local inquiry into the objections and make a report to
z958
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 621.
(2) (1948] A.C. 87.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
373
the Minister. Thereupon, the Minister made the order
x958
under the Act. These proceedings, as provided by the
Gullapa//i
Act, were taken with respect to a place called Steve- Nageswara Rao
nage in 1946 and the Minister passed the -necessary
and Others
order eventually.. Some of the owners and occupiers of
v.
dwelling-houses and lands situate at Stevenage applied Andhra P•_adesh
to the Court to have the order quashed, on the ground, Stat• cRoapd Tr~ns1
.
ora 1 •on
among ot h ers, t h a t tl ie reqmrements
of t h e sa1.d Act parand or
Another
had pot been complied with and the interests of the
appellants had been substantially prejudiced. Accord- Wanthoo ].
ing to them, the New Towns Act, 1946, impliedly
required that the objections of the appellants should
be fairly and properly considered by the Minister and
that the Minister should give fair and proper effect to
the result of such consideration in deciding whether
the said order should be made and that such implied
requirements were not complied with. It was held in
that case that the Minister of Town and Country Planning had no judicial or quasi-judicial duty imposed on
him and the procedure followed was according to the
requirements of the Act.
Now, substitute in the place of the New Towns Act,
1916, Chapter IV-A of the Act; substitute in the place
of the draft order of .the Minister, the draft scheme
of the State Transport Undertaking ; and substitute
in place of the final order, the final approval of the
State Government after hearing the objections. It
would seem, therefore, that the parallel between the
present case and Franklin's case (1) is complete. There
a draft order was published, followed by objections
and an inquiry and hearing and a final order. Here
also a draft scheme is published, followed by objections and hearing, and final approval. There the
interest of persons occupying lands and houses in the
area proposed to be affected by the order were involved. Here also the interests of the bus-operators at
least, if not also of the travelling public, are involved.
In spite of that it was held that the Minister had no
judicial or quasi-judicial duty imposed on him by the
Act, and the reason was that he was merely considering whether the scheme should go through. Once he
came to that conclusion after following the procedure
(r) [1948] A.C. 87.
374
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
provided in the Act, the effect on those occupying
lands and dwelling houses would follow, according
Gullapalli
h
•
f h Act. H ere a 1so once the
Nageswa.a Rao to t e provisions o t e
and Othm
State Government decides that the scheme should be
v.
approved, the effect would be complete or partial exAndh.a Prad.,h clusion of the bus operators of that area, as envisaged
State Road Tr~ns- in the scheme.
To my mind, therefore, the present
port Corporation
•
' case (') an d. on a parity
· of
and Another
case 18
para ]] e] .to F ran kl·ins
reasoning I would hold that the function of the State
wanchoa '].
Government was administrative when it considered
the objections under s. 68D(2) and not quasi-judicial.
The only difference that I see between the two cases
is that the New Towns Act provided specifically for
hearing of the objections by an Inspector and not by
the Minister while this is not so in the present case.
I shall consider the effect of this later ; but this has in
my opinion, little, if any, bearing on the question
whether the State Government was acting quasi-judicially when deciding objections under s. 68D(2).
I may also in this connexion refer to Nagendra Nath
Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division (2 ), where it
was held by this Court that the question whether or
not an administrative body or authority functions as
purely administrative or in a quasi-judicial capacity,
must be determined in each case on an examination of
the relevant statute and rules framed thereunder.
Similar was the view expressed by this Court in
Express Newspapers Ltd. v. 'Phe Union of India('),
when considering the functions performed by a wage
Board, and it was observed that whether the wage
Board exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions is to
be determined by the relevant provisions of the statute
incorporating it and it would be impossible to lay down
any universal rule which would help in the determination of this question. Applying, therefore, the principles laid down by this Court in these cases and
taking into account the exprc~s provisions contained
in Chn,pter IV-A and the Hules framed thereunder,
the conclusion at which I arrive is that the hearing
under s. 68D(2) was not before a quasi-judicial tribu1rnl and the decision was not a quasi- judicial act and
1 958
(<) [19.~8] A.C. 07.
'
(2) A. I.H. 1958 S.C. 398.
(3) A.LR. 1958 S.C. 878.
t
\.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
375
the State Government was acting purely administratively.
Gullapalli
Having reached this decision, let me see what Nageswara Rao
actually happened in this case. '.l'he matter pertains and Others
to the Road Transport Department which was in A dh vP d h
charge of the Chief Minister. The Home Secretary Sta: ;:ad '~:;., 5 _
works under the Chief Minister and was in charge of port Corporation
the Road Transport Department. The Chief Minister and Another
ordered, when the objections were put up before him,
that the representation should be heard by the Home Wane/zoo f.
Secretary, and thereupon, the Home Secretary heard
the objectors and a note of the hea.ring was piacc<l
before the Chief Minister for orders. The Chief Minister then passed the order approving the scheme. The
main attack on this kind of hearing is two-fold. It is
urged in the first place that rule 10 framed under
Chapter IV-A of the Act provides that the objectors
will be given an opportunity of being heard in person
or through authorised representatives. It is said that
in view of this rule it was not open to the Chief Minister to direct the Home Secretary to hear the objections
when the decision was to be made. by the Chief
Minister. It is pointed out that in Franklin's case (1)
there was a specific provision that an Inspector will
hold an inquiry and hear the objections and ma.ke his
report, and thereafter the Minister will pass the final
order on the report of the Inspector. There is no such
specific provision in the Act or the Rules in this case,
and, therefore, the hearing by the Home Secretary in
these circumstances cannot be said to be a hearing by
the State Government or the Chief Minister who had
to decide the objections. The learned Attorney General relies in this connexion on the Rules of Business
framed under article 166(3) of the Constitution which
provides for the making of rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government
of the State, a copy of which was .shown to us. It is '
said in paragraph 13(1) of the counter-affidavit that
these Rules do not provide for personal heari.ng;
but it is open to the Minister to pass a standing order
as he thinks fit for the disposal of business in his
Ministry. Consequently, in exercise of this power, the
(r) [1948] A.C. 87.
376
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Chief Minister passed an order that the Home Secretary should hear these representations in order to
Gullapalli
N•geswa.a Rao comply with the provision of Chapter IV-A and Rule
and others
10, even though there is no provision in the Rules of
v. .
Business for oral hearing by the Minister or the SecreAndhra Pradesh tary. It is urged by Mr. Nambiar that tho order
Stat• Road Tr~•·- passed by the Chief Minister in this case that the hear.
port Corporation .
.
by t he H ome Secretary was not
and Another
mg should be given
_
a standing order but an order in this particular case.
wanchoo J.
That seems to me to be correct; but the question is
whether, when·· an administrative hearing of this
nature is being given under a rule which provides that
the State Government should give a hearing to objectors, it is necessary that the Minister who decides
must also hear. It seems to me that where the hearing is administrative, it is not essential that the
Minister must hear, so long as a hearing is given by
an officer of the Government. I may in this connexion
refer to article 154 of the Constitution, which provides
that the executive power of the State shall be vested
in the Governor and shall be exercised by him either
. directly or through officers subordinate to him in
accordance with the Constitution. This being an administrative hearing comes within the executive power
of the State and there would be no infirmity if the
Governor, who in view of the provisions of the General
Clauses Act, is the State Government, authorised
through the Chief Minister a subordinate officer to
give the hearing. Reference in this connection may
also be made to Local Government Board v. Arlidge (' ),
which dealt with the manner of hearing of an appeal
by the Local Government Board under the Housing,
Town Planning &c., Act, 1909. The following observations of Lord Haldane at p. 132 a.re apposite in this
context:" In the case of a Court of Law tradition in this
' country has prescribed certain principles to which in
the main the procedure must conform. But what that
procedure is to be in detail must depend on the nature
of the tribunal. In modern times it has become increasingly common for Parliament to give an appeal
z958
(1) [19r5J A.C. 120, 132.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
377
in matters which really pertain to administration,
1958
rather than to the exercise of the judicial functions
of
Gullapalli
.
an ord inary Court, to ant h orities w h ose f unct10ns are Nageswara Rao
administrative and not in the ordinary sense judicial.
and others
Such a body as the local Government Board has the
v.
duty of enforcing obligations on the individual which Andhra Pradesli
are imposed in the interest of the community. Its State R_oad Trans·
· th a t of an orgamza
• t"10n w1"th executive
· portandCorporation
ch arac t er is
Another
functions. In this it resembles other great depart_
ments of the State. When, therefore, Parliament Wanchoo f.
entrusts it with judicial duties, Parliament must be
taken, in the absence of any declaration to the contrary, to have intended it to follow the procedure
which is its own, and is necessary if it is to be capable
of doing its work efficiently."
These observations show that when one is dealing with
a body like the State Government one has to take into
account the procedure usually followed by the State
Government in matters that come before it. In these
circumstances if the Minister ordered, in the absence
of specific rules on the point, that the hearing should
be by the Secretary, he was, in my opinion, complying
with the essential requirement, namely, that there
should be an oral hearing by the State Government
before the decision of the objections. The bifurcation
of the function of hearing from the function ofdeciding
cannot in the circumstances, when the hearing was
administrative, be said to be improper or against rule
10, and was necessary in order that the Government
may function efficiently. ··Therefore, I am of opinion
that the hearing by the Secretary was sufficient compliance of rule 10, which required a personal hearing
before the decision of the objections.
The second ground of attack under this head is that
in any case the Home Secretary who was also in
charge of the Road Transport Department was not the
right person to hear the objections on the ground that
the scheme was put forward by his department. Here
again the fact that the hearing was of an administrative nature has to be borne in mind. Bearing that in
48
378
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
58
'9
Gullapalli
Nageswam Rao
[1959] Supp.
mind and also considering that it was the Chief Minister who finally decided the matter and approved the
scheme, it cannot be said that the Home Secretary in
and Othm
charge of the Transport Department was an improper
v.
person to give the hearing. After all, the scheme was
s17dl~a00~'":"h _put forward as a proposal. It was open to approval
a' Corporation
•ans or modification after hearing the obJections. The body
port
and Anoth"
w.hich put forward the scheme was the State Transport
Undertaking which was a limb of the Government.
Wnnchoo J.
The Government has in a case of this kind to hear
objections against a scheme prepared by one of its own
limbs. In these circumstances, if the Head of the
Department, namely, the Secretary hears the oral
objections on a scheme prepared by some one in that
department who would necessarily be under him, like
the General Manager of the Itoad Transport Department, it does not follow that the Secretary is an improper person to give the hearing because he hears his
subordinate who put forward the scheme also, along
with the objectors. Further, the Secretary in. this case
is not the deciding authority which is the Chief
Minister. He made notes of the hearing and conveyed
the argumen1;s to the Chief Minister, and as the
matter was purely administrative, the procedure cannot be said to be improper. I am, therefore, of opinion
that the contentions under this head must be rejected.
Re. (4). It is said that there was no real hearing at
all and no genuine consideration of the objections as
the issue had already been pre-judged, and reliance in
this connexion is placed on the statement of the Chief
Secretary dated the 26th of December, 1957. It
appears that the Chief Secretary said that the Government had already taken a decision to nationalise
transport in Krishna District and some routes had
been chosen. Learned Attorney General contends that
this only refers to the scheme which had already been
published on the 14th of November, 1957. Mr. Nambiar
on the other hand contends that it goes much further
and shows that the Government had already made up
their mind to nationalise road transport in Krishna
District and therefore the hearing which the State
Government gave to the objectors to the scheme was·
0
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
379
a farce. Now, taking into account what I have said
I95 8
above about the scope of the hearing under s. 68D(2),
Gullapalli
it would be clear that there was no pre-judging of the Nageswara Rao
issue so far as the scheme was concerned. It is true
and Others
that the Chief Secretary said that there would be
v.
nationalisation in Krishna District which meant of Andhra Pradesh
• of th e priva
· 't e b us opera t o!s; State
Uoad Transcourse comple t,e cxc1us.ion
port Corporation
but I ,have already said that the scope of the hearmg and Another
under s. 68D(2) is to consider whether the scheme is
efficient, etc., and is in public interest. If the answer is Wanchoo J.
yes, complete exclusion follows. Therefore, when the
Chief Secretary said that the Government had decided
to nationalise road transport in Krishna District, he
was certainly not saying that the Government was
wedded to the scheme which was published and to
which objections had been invited. The speech merely
emphasises the aspect of complete exclusion; but it
nowhere says that the scheme which was to bring
about the exclusion into effect had already been approved. I may again in this connection refer to
Franlcl·in's case (ibid), where also an argument was raised that the Minister was biased so far as any consideration of the draft order was concerned, as he had
said in an earlier speech that he would make the said
order. It was held that as the Minister had no judicial or quasi-judicial duty imposed on him, consideration of bias in the execution of this duty was irrelevant, the sole question being whether or not he
genuinely considered the report and the objections.
In the present case also, the sole question was whether
the objections to the scheme were genuinely considered.
If after genuine consideration they were approved,
complete exclusion would follow. Simply because the
Chief Secretary said that the Government had decided
to nationalise road transport in Krishna District, it
di<l not follow that the Government was not prepared
to consider fairly the objections to the scheme on the
,
<tpproval of which nationalisation would follow through
complete exclusion. Considering, therefore, that the
hearing before the State Government under s. 68D{2)
was purely administrative, there is no force in thil:l
objection.
380
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959) Supp.
Re. (5). It is urged that the scheme was· proposed
by the Audhra Pradesh Road Transport Department
GullapalliRao as t h e State T ransport U n derta k ing wit h'm t he
Nag,,wara
and 01hm
meaning of s. 68A and was approved while that underv.
taking was still in existence. But immediately after
Andhra Pradesh the scheme was approved the Undertaking came to an
State Road Tr~ns- end and the Road Transport Corporation came into
porl Corporation
•
.
· cou Jd not carry out t h e
and Another
existence
an d t h at Corporat10n
scheme which had been approved before it came into
Wanchoo ].
existence. The argument seems to be that the body
which prepared the scheme and got it approved is the
body which can enforce it, and as the Road Transport
Corporation neither prepared it nor got it approved, it
cannot enforce it. I am of opinion that there is no
force in this contention. The Road Transport Corporation co,me into existence on the Uth of Jo,nuary,
1958. On the same d11te the State Goveri1ment passed
an order under s. 34 of the Road Transport Corporation Act No. LIV of 1950 by which it directed that the
Corporation shall take the management of the Ho~.d
Transport Department of the Government of Andhra
Pradesh and all assets and liabilities of the Department shall pass to the Corporation. The staff of the
Road Transport Department were given option to
s~rve under the Corporation and direction was given
that those who opt to serve the Corporation shall be
employed by the Corporation subject to the regulations
made under the Act and the assurance given by the
Government t.o the employees.
·
It was urged in the first place that such an order
could not be passed under s, 34 of the Road Transport
Corporation Act. Section 34, however, gives very wide
powers to the State Government to give directions to
the Corporation, including directions relating to tho
recruitment, condition of service and training of its
employees, wages to be paid to the employee, reserve to
be maintained by it and disposal of its profits or stocks .
•
In the circumstances, it was open to the State Government, under the wide powers conferred by s. 34 of the
Road Transport Corporation Act, to ask the Corporation
which was being created to take over tho assets,
liabilities and the employees of the Road Transport
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
381
Department which was being wound up. Now, the
1958
effect of this order was to make the Road Tran::iport
Corporation a successor of the Road Transport DepartGttttatalli
h'
.
Ch
IV
A
Nageswara Rao
.
ment. It is true t h at t h ere IS not mg ill
apter
and Others
of the Act which provides for succession of one kind
v.
of undertaking as defined ins. 68A(b) by another kind Andhra Pradesh
of undertaking as defined therein, but when in fact it State i:oad hanshappens that the Road Transport Corporation is port CorJ>omtion
and Another
·
ord ere d und er s. 34 of t he ·R oad T ransport Corporat10n
_
wanchoo J.
Act to take over everything from the Road Transport Department, there is no reason why it should
not be considered to be the successor of the Road Transport Department which was at that time the State
Transport Undertaking. If the Road Transport Corporation is thus a successor of the State Transport Undertaking from the 11th of January, 1958, I do not
see why it cannot enforce the scheme which had already been approved at the instance of its predecessor.
I can see no sense in requiring the Road Transport
Corporation to go through all these steps which had
been gone through by its predecessor, except that it
would delay the coming into force of the scheme ; probably, the argument has been raised merely for the
sake of delay. But I am of opinion that the Road
Transport Corporation in this case being the successor
of the State Transport Undertaking which got the
Scheme prepared and approved is entitled to enforce
it under s. 68-F of Chapter IV-A in the absence of any
provision to the contrary in the Cha.pter. This contention also fails.
In view of what I have said above on the second
contention, the petition fails and I would dii:;mii:;s it
with costs.
SINHA, J.-I have had the advantage of perusing
Sin!:"].
the judgments prepared by our brothern, Subba Hao
and Wan'Jhoo, JJ. After giving my best consideration
to the opinions expressed in. the two judgments, I
have come to the conclusion that I am not in a poi:;ition
to agree with all the conclusious arrived at by our
brother Subba Rao.
Two main controversies were raised on behalf of the
petitioners, namely, (1) that the provisions of Chapter
382
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
IVA of. the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (which will be
referred to in the course of this judgment as the Act),
Na~::~t:~l~ao Violate the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens
and Others
of India under the Constitution, and (2) that the
v.
scheme framed under the Act, was ultra vires the Act.
Andhra P>adesh I agree with my brother Subba Rao that the said ChapStat• Road T.ans· ter IV A of the Act does not infringe any fundamental
port co,poratiqn rights of the petitioners, and that those provisions are
and Another
•
.
JIy va l"d
. h h'1m m
. h oId const1tut10na
I • I a 1so agree wit
Sinha 1.
ing that the Road Transport Department of the Andhra
Pradesh Government, is a State Transport Undertaking under the Central Act; that the Notification publishing the scheme had been validly done, and that the
conditions precedent to the initiation of the scheme,
had been fulfilled. But I do not agree with him in his
conclusion that the State Government, in approving
the published scheme, was discharging any judicial or
quasi-judicial function. On the other hand, I agree
with my brother Wanchoci in his conclusion that in so
doing, the State Government was only performing its
normal administrative function.
As my learned brothers aforesaid have stated the
relevant facts in detail, it is not necessary for me to
repeat them, but as I differ from my learned brother
Subba Rao, with whom some of my colleagues on the
Constitution Bench have agreed, and for whose opinions, I have the greatest respect, I should state my
reasons for differing from them and for agreeing with
our brother Wanchoo. It may be taken as the settled
view of this Court that the question whether a certain
decision envisaged in a statute, is judicial or quasijudicial or only administrative in character, must depend upon the terms of the statute law itself, apart
from any pre-conceived notions about the funutiuns
of a court or other tribunals vested with the duty and
jurisdiction to decide controversies as a judicial body,
vide Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani (1),
N agendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Di vision(')
:wd Express Newspapers Limited v. Union of India (3 ).
Now, let us see what has been envisaged by the imz958
(•I (1950] S.C.R. 62r.
(2) A.LR. 1958 S.C. 398.
(3) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 578.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
I95 8
pugned provisions of Chapter IV A of the Act. The first
step in the process is the preparation of a scheme of
Gullapalli
road transport service by a State Transport Undertak- Nageswara Rao
ing "for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate,
and Others
economical and properly co-ordinated road transport
v.
service." Such a scheme may be to the exclusion, Andhra Pradesh
complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise. The State Rcoad Tr~ns,h
h
h
. h port orporation
second step wou ld be to pu blis puc a sc eme m t e and Another
Official Gazette and also in such other manner as the
State Government may direct, giving particulars of the
Sinha J.
nature of the service proposed to be rendered, area ol'
route proposed to be covered and other prescribed
particulars:...._(s. 68-C). The third step in that process
is the filing of objections to the scheme by any person
affected by the scheme so published. Those objections
have to be filed before the State Government within
thirty days from the date of the publication of the
scheme-(s. 68-D (1) ). The fourth step is to be taken
by the State Government, of considering the objections
after giving an opportunity to the objectors or their
representatives and the representatives of the State
Transport Undertaking, to be heard-(s. 68-D(2) ).
And the last step is that after hearing all concerned,
the State Government may approve or modify the
scheme. It is noteworthy that this section does not
contemplate an outright rejection of the scheme but
only a modification, if it is necessary. The scheme as
approved or modified, has then to be published in the
Official Gazette, and thereupon, the scheme becomes
final. Such a scheme is called the "approved scheme",
and the area or route to which it relates, is called the
"notified area" or "notified route"-(s. 68-D(3) ). The
approved scheme may at any time be cancelled, or
modified by the State Transport Undertaking, according to the procedure already indicated, as contained in
s. 68-C and s. 68-D, if it is proposed to modify it-·
(s. 68-E). The provisions of Chapter IV, relating to the
grant of stage carriage permits, etc., have been abrogated so as to make it obligatory on the Regional Transport Authority to issue permits applied for by a State
Transport Undertaking, in pursuance of the approved
scheme. Not only that, with a view to giving effect
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
'958
to the approved scheme in respect of a notified area or
Gullapalli
notified route, the Regional Transport Authority has
Nafeswa.a Rao been authorized to refuse renewal of any permit, to
and Others
cancel any existing permit, or to modify the terms of
v.
any existing permit-(s. 68-F'). The provisions of s. 64,
Andhra P•adesl• relating to appeals by aggrieved persons against orders
State Road 1 yans- f
t a permit,
. or of" revocat10n
. or suspeno re.f usa ) to gran
.
.
,
Por I C orPora I ion •
and Another
s1on of a permit, or of refusal to renew a permit, etc.,
Sinha J.
have been abrogated in so far as those orders have
been passed under s. 68-F.
A review of the provisions aforesaid, contained in
ss. 68-C to 68-F in Chapter IV-A, leads to the following conclusions :(1) A State Transport Undertaking has been
authorized to determine whether or not it is in the public
interest that road transport services in general, or any
particular class of service, should be run and operated
by the State Undertaking, in relation to any area or
route or a portion thereof, keeping in view the purpose
of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and
properly co-ordinated road transport service. It is for
the State Transport Undertaking to prepare a scheme
in furtherance of its determination in favour of such a
service, and to publish the same in the Official Gazette
and elsewhere, with a view to informing the public,
including those who may be affected by such a scheme.
(2) Objections to such a scheme may be taken by
parties interested, but such objections are not claims.
(3) The State Government is authorized to decide
the question whether the proposed scheme should be
approved or modified, after hearing the parties or their
representatives in support of their objections to the
scheme. As the objections have to be directed to the
merits of the scheme proposed by the State Transport
Undertaking, there is no question of any lis between
conflicting claims.
(4) No particular person or body of persons in
the Governmental hierarchy of officers, has been designated as the Authority to hear the objections and to
pronounce upon them, unlike the provisions in Chapter IV. Neither the provisions in Chapter IV-A nor
the rules made in pursuance of s. 68-I, contemplate
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
385
adducing evidence or calling witnesses in support of or
in opposition to the proposed scheme.
Gullapalli
(5) The right of appeal as contemplated by s. 64 Nageswara Rao
in Chapter 1v' has been expressly abrogated by
and Others
s. 68:1!:(3). Nor is there an?' proyisio~ i!-1 Chapter IV-A, Andhra v.Pradesh
reqmrmg reasons to be given m writmg for an order State Road Transpassed by a Regional Transport Authority under port Corporation
s. 68-F(l) and (2), as contrasted withs. 57(7) in Chap- and Another
ter IV, which requires the Authority to give its reasons
Sinha ].
in writing for refusing an application for a permit of
any kind, because such an order is open to appeal,
revision or review.
The question now arises whether, in view of the provisions of Chapter IV-A, summarized above, and the
conclusions as it~dicated above, the determination by
the State Government is judicial or quasi-judicial in
character, as contended for the petitioners, or only of an
administrative character, as contended on behalf of
the respondents. In order that a determination may
be characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial, it is essential that it should be objective, based on evidence
pl'O and con (not necessarily given in accordance with
the strict rules of evidence) by a determinate authority
who should not have the right to delegate such a function of a judicial character. Section 68-D(2) authorizes the 8tate Government to decide whether or not the
proposed scheme should be approved or modified.
The "State Government" ma.y mean. the Governor
himself or any of his Mrnisters or Deputy Ministers or
any officers in the Secretariat, according to the rules
of business promulgated under Art. 166 of the Constitution. Section 68-D(2) could not have meant that the
Governor himself or any of his 1\linisters should personally hear the objections-that would be throwing too
great a burden on them. The objections may be heard
by any one who has been delegated that power. If
that is correct, the function to be performed under
s. 68-D(2), does not satisfy the test of a judicial hearing. Under that section, the objections may be heard
by 'A' and the decision arrived at by 'B'. If that is
49
386
z95B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
a regular procedure under that section, that is not an
Gullapalli
index of a judicial process.
Nageswara Rao
Another very important consideration pointing to
and Others
the conclusion that the determination under s. 68-D(2)
v.
is not of a judicial character (using it in the oomprehenAndhra P.adesh sive sense including 'quasi-judicial' which expression
State Road Trans- h
· d!JOJa
· l ,aut h ont1es
· · ), IS
·
port Corporation
as not b'een approve d by h"Jg h JU
and Another
that no objective tests have been laid down in Chapter
Sinha J.
IV-A with· reference to which, the determination has
to be arrived at. The expressions "efficient", '"adequate", "economical", "properly co-ordinated" and "public interest", are matters of opinion and polio~-, as
s. 68-0 itself indicates, and do not lay down any objective tests. If I am right in that conclusion, there cannot
be any question of evidence forthcoming in proof of
something which is subjective to the authority determining that matter.
A very fundamental consideration in this connection,
is whether ss. 68-0 and 68-D contemplate any lis. In
other words, what is the proper scope and ambit of the
inquiry envisaged by those sections ? The, scheme prepared and published in accordance with s. 68-0, by a
State Transport Undertaking, is placed before the
public only after the Undertaking has reached the conclusion that it is necessary in the public interest. After
the scheme has been prepared and published as aforesaid, the objections to be filed under s. 68-D have reference to the basic question whether or not the scheme
as published, was in public interest. Such objections
are open to any person or organization, e.g., an Automobile Association, and are not limited only to persons
who are providing road transport services. In my
opinion, it is a mistake to suppose that the objections
contemplated by s. 68-D(l), could be on grounds personal to the objectors who are engaged in the business
of providing road transport services. It is not open
to any particular individual carrying on the business
of providing road transport services, to claim that his
route should be excluded from the operation of the
published scheme. I am led to that conclusion by the
effective words of s. 68-D(l), namely, "file objections
thereto", that is, to the scheme published under s, 68-0.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
387
The objections have to be limited to the merits of the
scheme as propounded by the State Transport UnderGullapalli
taking. It will, therefore, be opening the gates too Nageswara Rao
wide to hold that the objections have reference to partiand Others
cular routes or portions of routes covered by private
v.
•
. .
The un d erlymg
. purpose of lllVl
. 't"mg State
And11ra Prades"
t ransport serv10es.
Road Transobjections, is not to invite "claims" by individual .busi- port Corporation
nessmen engaged in providing road transport services, and Another
but to bring out useful information bearing on the
Sinha J.
feasibility and soundness of the scheme, as propounded by the Undertaking. Once, the Government has
decided upon a policy of nationalization of road transport facilities, the question of safeguarding the interest
of individual businessmen in that line, is no more relevant. What is relevant for the purpose of the inquiry
by the Government, on receipt of objections, is whether
the published scheme is in the interest of the public.
In my opinion, therefore, it is erroneous to suppose
that the object of s. 68-D(l) is to afford any remedy to
a privateindividual in his personal interest. Partic.ulars of the scheme required to be published under s. 68C,
are meant for the information of the public, so that
persons feeling interested in a public venture like that,
may offer intelligent and constructive criticism with
reference to the merits of the scheme. It is equally
erroneous to suppose that there are two parties-one,
represented by the Undertaking, ,and the other, repre1:1ented by persons who are engaged in the business of
providing road transport services-and that the Government is the third party, which is the arbitrator
between the two contesting parties. That, in my opinion, is not a correct reading of the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act. The whole aim and object of
that Chapter is to replace individual businessmen engaged in that trade, by nationalised road transport
services which are meant to be run in the interest of
the community as a whole, and thus to serve the best
public interest. The Government is as much interested in the scheme as the Road Transport Undertaking
which is a creature and a limb of the Government,
brought into existence with a view to implementing the
policy of the Government to provide nationalised
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
road transport services. That being the whole scheme
of the policy of nationalisation, it is not correct to reGuUnpnlli
l)rcsent the State Transport U n<lertaking as entering
Nage~wara Rao
""'1 oihm
into competition with other in<li vi<luals or incorporatv.
eel bodies whose business it is to provide the same kind
Andhra Prnd"h of transport facilit.ies.
That is made clear by the prostate l!oad y,~,,,. visions of s. 68-F, which, as indicated above, make it
port Corporolrnn
bl'tg~ t ory on th ~ J>.eg1ona
.
JT ranspor t A U th Ori'ty t 0 !SSUe
'
and A nolh"
0
permits as applied for by tho State Transport Undertaking. It follows from the foregoing observations
Sinha ].
that there is no question of the Government functioning as an adjudicating authority as between the rival
claims of the Undertaking and private persons engaged in the same kind of activity, or that the Secretary to
Government in the Department of Hoad Transport,
when he personally heard the objections, was functioning as a judge, or that he was disqualified, by any bias,
from hearing those objections. If we carry this line of
reasoning to its logical conclusion, then even the Minister in-charge of the Department, may be said to be equally interested, and therefore, equally biased, and thus,
disqualified from hearing those objections and coming
to his own determination, as contemplahid in s. 68-D(2).
In my opinion, the concept thata person should not be a
judge in his own cause, is wholly foreign to the scheme and provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act.
The scheme as prepared and pnhlished, may have
proposed, as it did in the instant case, completely to
exclude other persons from providing road transport
service in the notified area by the notified routes. But
the State Government is not concerned with determining whether any or some or all of the objectors could be
permitted to provide or continue to provide their own
road transport service. The State Government under
s. 68-D(2) has only to decide whether or not the propos· ed scheme should be approved or modified in any way.
The decision to be arrived at by the State Government,
is confined to the scheme, and is not concerned with
rival claims by persons providing road transport service
in the same area or by the same routes. That, in my
opinion, is t_he reason why under that section, the State
Government has not been authorized altogether to
(l),S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
cancel the scheme, but only to approve or modify it.
r9JB
The State Government has to examine the soundness
Gulla pa Iii
of the declaration made by the Road Transport Under- Nageswara Rao
taking that the proposed scheme is in public interest.
and Others
The stage of cancellation comes, if at all, later under
v.
s. 68-E when experience gained in working the approv- Andhra Pradesh
'
l d th. e Sta t e T ransport U nd er t a.k'mg Stale
Road Tranied sc h eme,
m~y ea
port Corporation
to the couclus1on that it should be cancelled or modified. and Another
But at the initial stage, that is to say, unders. 68-D, the
proposed scheme is already there only to be approved
Sinha J.
or modified in the light of the objections raised, if any.
It has been held and it may be taken as well-settled
that when there is a competition between a number of
applicants for a particular route for supplying road
transport service, the Regional Transport Authority
or any other Authority deciding between those conflicting claims, has to determine the matter in a quasijudicial way, because they are determining questions
affecting the rights of individuals. But in the proceeding before the State Government, no such rival claims
have to be decided upon. What has to be determined
is whether the proposed scheme will serve public
interest. Thus, in proceedings under Chapter IV of
the Act, individual claims have to be decided upon,
whereas under· Chapter IVA, it is the collective interest
of the community as a whole, which is the subject.
matter of determination by the State Government.
In other words, the proposed scheme is the outcome of
the decision by a limb of the State Government (State
Transport Undertaking), which has come to the conclusion that it is in the public interest that road transport service should be run and operated by the State.
The calling of objections by persons affected by the
scheme, is not with a view to deciding between the
rival claims of the State Undertaking and individuals
providing road transport services in the areas or routes
proposed to be covered. The State Transport Undertaking has not made any claim at this stage. Such a
claim arises after the determination by the State
Government under s. 68D(2). That stage is reached
when the State Transport Undertaking applies for
permits under s. 68F. Such a ~laim for a permit, once
390
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
'95 8
made by the Undert:i.king, is no more a rival claim to
be
treated along with the claims of other individuals
Gullapalli
Nugeswura Rao providing such road transport services, but an absolute
and Others
claim which under that section shall be granted by the
v.
Regional Transport Authority which is authorized
Andh.a Pradesh even to cancel an existing permit or modify the terms
State Road r.~ns- of an existing permit, or to refuse renewal of permits,
port Corporat•on with a view to impl~menting the approved scheme.
and Another
I n my opm10n,
· ·
th ereiore,
"
· not correc t t o view
·
the
I•t is
Sinha J.
proceedings under Chapter IV A before the State
Government as a lis between any rival claims, unlike
proceedings under Chapter IV of the Act. In view of
these considerations, I wo"uld hold that there is no lis
between rival claims, no determinate tribunal to determine any lis, and no procedure prescribed in Chapter
IV A approximating or even simulating judicial procedure. That being so, there is no question of any bias,
because there can be none in a determination which is
come to by officers of the Government in the discharge
of their administrative duties.
As already indicated, the question now under consideration, does not admit of a general answer. The
answer must depend upon the relevant statutory
provisions, and one case decided on its own basic
statutory provisions, cannot be a controlling authority
for another; but, by way of illustration, reported cases
dealing with similar questions, ha_ve been referred to.
My learned brother Wanchoo, J., has referred in detail
to Franklin's case, hence, I need not add any observations with reference to that case. But another case,
namely, Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country
Pwnning ('), perhaps, not referred to at the bar, seems
to me to be instructive in so far as it has discussed this very question with reference to the provisions of s. 1(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act,
1944, which is in these terms :" Where the Minister of Town· and Country Planning (in this _Act referred to as 'the Minister') is satisfied that it is requisite, for the purpose of dealing satisfactorily with extensive war damage in the area of a
local planning authority, that a pa.rt or parts of their
(1) [1947] l All E.R. 851, 853, 854.
'
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
area., consisting of land shown to his satisfaction to
r958
have sustained war damage or of such land together
Gullapalli
with other land contiguous or adjacent thereto, should Nageswara Rao
be la.id out afresh and redeveloped as a whole, an order and Others
declaring all or any of the land in such a part of their
v.
area to be land subject to compulsory purchase for Andhra Pradesh
dealing with war damage may be made by the Minister State Road Tra.ns• th at heh a If is
• ma. de t o h'im by th e port dCorporation
i'f an app}'1cat'ion m
A th
authority before the expiration of five yea.rs from such an ~ er
date as the Minister may by order appoint as being the
Sinha J.
date when the ma.king of such applications has become
practicable. A part of the area of a local planning
authority as to which the Minister is satisfied as aforesaid is in this Act referred to as an 'area. of extensive
war damage'."
Lord Greene, M. R., who delivered the leading judgment of the Court of Appeal, reversing that of Henn
Collins, J. thus summarized the procedure laid down
in the Act:" The procedural provisions in connection with
the obtaining of an order under the sub-section may,
so far as relevant, be summarised as follows: (a) Under
sub-s. (4) at lea.st two months before the application
is ma.de the authority must publish a notice in a local
newspaper; (b) under sub-s. (5) the application must
'designate' the land to which the application relates by
reference to a map with or without descriptive matter;
(c) under sub-s. (6) the application must be accompanied by a statement illustrated by a map, 'for indicating
the manner in which it is intended that the land in the
area of extensive war damage should be laid out as
respects its internal arrangement and in relation to the
existing or intended lay-out of the surrounding locality,
and the manner in which it is intended that such land
should be used whether for purposes requiring the
carrying out of development or otherwise'; (d) under
sub-s. (7) if the Minister is satisfied that these particulars are adequate for enabling the 'expediency of the
ma.king of an order' to be properly considered, he
notifies the authority who must then advertise for objections; (e) under sched. I unless the Minister, apart
from an objection (which must be accompanied by a.
392
'95
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
written statement of its grounds) decides to refuse the
Gullapalli
application or to make an agreed modification to meet
Nageswarn Rao tho objection, he must 'consider the grounds of the ob.
and Others
jection as set out in the statement' and may call for a
v.
further statement. Under para. 4 .of the schedule the
Andhra Pradesh Minister 'if satisfied that he is sufficiently informed
State Road, Trans-,.
'
.L"
"d (sc. w het h er'
t.
ior t h e purpose
of h"is d ec1'd'mg. as a1oresa1
PorI C oryora ion
and Another
or not to make the order applied for), as to the matters
Sinha J.
to which the objection relates' he may decide •to make
the order without further investigation. Subject to
this, the Minister (para. 5) must give the objector an
opportunity of appearing before a person nominated
by the Minister and, if the objector avails himself of
this, a similar opportunity to the authority. Under
para. 6, if it appears to the Minister that the matters
to which the objection relates call for investigation by
a public inquiry, he must cause such an inquiry to be
held, in which case, the requirements of .para. 5 as to
a private hearing need not be complied with; (f) under
s. 1(8), subject to the provisions of ached. I, the
Minist.er may make the order with or without modification, except that he cannot extend the area unless
all persons interested consent."
In the· case of Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. v.
Minister of Town and Country Planning (1), Henn
Collins, J. considered the nature of the order to be
passed under s. 1(1) of the Town and Country Planning
Act, 1944, and came to the conclusion that the
Minister's function was of a quasi-judicial character.
He followed that decision in the case which came up
before the Court of Appeal in Robinson v. Minister of
Town and Country Planning ('). The Court of Appeal
reversed the decision of the learned Judge, and did not
approve of his decision in Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd.
v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (1). In the
course of his judgment, Lord Greene, M. R,, observed
as follows at page 859 : " It is the case of an original order to be made by
the Minister as an executive authority who is at liberty
to base his opinion on whatever material he thinks fit,
(1) (1947] I All E.R. 454·
(2) (1947] I All E. R. 851, 853, 854.
'
•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
whether obtained in the ordinary course of his execar95a
tive functions or derived from what is brought out at
Gullapalli
a public inquiry if there is one. To say that, in com- Nageswara Rao
ing to his decision, he is in any sense acting in a
and Others
quasi-judicial capacity is to misunderstand the nature
v.
of the proceas altogether. I am not concerned to dis- Andhra Pr~desh
.
. itse
. lf must becond ucte d on wh at State
Road 1 ranspute t h at the mqmry
port Corporation
may be described as quasi-judicial principles, but this and Another
is quite a different thing from saying that any such
principles are applicable to the doing of the executive
Sinha J.
act itself, i.e., the making of the order. The inquiry
is only a step in the process which leads to that result,
and there is, in my opinion, no justification for saying
that the executive decision to make the order can be
controlled by the courts by reference to the evidence
or lack of evidence at the inquiry which is here relied
on. Such a theory treats the executive act as though
it were a judicial decision (or, if the phrase-is preferred, a quasi-judicial decision) which it most emphatically is not."
I have devoted considerable space to the decision of
the Court of Appeal, (supra), to show the close resem·
blance between the procedure envisaged in the Act of
the British Pa.rliament, and the law as laid down in
Chapter IV-A of the Act. In the reported case also,
there had to be an inquiry if objections were raised
to the notified scheme of town planning, and the Minister concerned had to consider all the evidence led on
behalf of the objectors. In that case, unlike the instant
case, there was a proviaion for receiving evidence pro
and con, but even then, the Court of Appeal did not
hold that the function of the Minister was of a judicial
or quasi-judicial character., chiefly on the ground that
no objective tests were possible in coming to his conclusions before passing the order under the relevant section of the Act of Parliament.
For the reasons given above, I have come to the
conclusion; in agreement wiuh my brother W anchoo, J.,
that the Government or the Minister concerned, when
passing an order under s. 68-D(2), had not to discharge
a quasi-judicial function, but was acting only in its or
50
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
his administrative capacity. It follows from this conclusion that all considerations flowing from the basic
Gullapalli
idea of the proceedings before the State Government
Nageswara Rao
and 011.,,.
being of a quasi-judicial ch aracter, are wh oJIy out of
v.
the way. ·It must, therefore,' be held tha~ the order of
Andhra' Prade<h the State ·Government, impugned in this. case, is not
State Road Trans- open to any interference by the courtR. I would, thereport Corporation fore, dismiss the petition with costs.
r95B
and Another
Sinha ].
·
ORDER
In view of the opinion of the majority the order approving the scheme is hereby quashed and a direction
issued to the 'first respondent to forbear from taking
over any of the routes in which the petitioners are
engaged in transport business. This will not preclude
the State Government from making the necessary enquiry in regard to the objections filed by the petitioners in accordance with law. The petitioners will
have liberty to file additional objections, if any. The
parties to bear their own costs.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI
November 5.
v.
S. TEJA SINGH
(T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR
and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.)
I ncome-tax-Penalty-New assessee-Failure to send estimate
of tax-Absence of notice t-0 the assessee-Competency of Income-tax
Officer to levy penalty-Indian Income-tax Act, r922 (XI of r922),
ss. r8A(3), r8A(9), 22, 23, 28.
The respondent who had not been assessed to income-tax
prior to the assessment year 1948-49 made suo motu returns on
July 4, 1949, showing an income of Rs. 4,494 and Rs. 31,646
respectively, for the assessment years 1948-49 and 1949-50, but
failed to send an estimate of the tax on his income as provided
in s. 18A(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Incometax Officer took action under s. 28 read withs. l8A(9) of the Act
and imposed a penalty on him for the years 1948-49 and 1949-50.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org