SHRI RADESHYAM KHARE & ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 30 September 1958 | [1959] 1 S.C.R. 1440
Key facts
- Decided
- 30 September 1958
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*, S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR*, K. SUBBA RAO
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 301/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1959] 1 S.C.R. 1440
Text of the judgment
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1440
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Ghaio
/!fall 6- So11s
v.
1'he Sltde of
Delhi ~ Others
D,.sC.j.
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STJPREME COUB.T RE;PORTS • • [1959]
business by :Messrs. Army a,.11d '.Ila vy St-0~e:o still remains
unfilled. The applications of the appellants and other
applicants were for a grant of L-2 license for 1954/
1955. That year has gone ptist and accordingly in the
changed eircumstances wo direct. the Chief Commissioner ~o fill ap the vacancy ctrnsed by the closure of
the business by ?.fossrs. Army and Xavy Stores by
inviting applications from intending licensees including
the appellitnts and Messrs. Gainda Mall Hem ltaj and
granting the oame to the most suitable party .• We,
therefore, accept this appP1~l, reverse the order of the
High Court and issue a mandamus to the effect aforesaid and also direct the respondents Xos. l to 4 lo pay
the appellant.s' costs of this appeal and of the proceed.
ings int.he High Court out of which this appeal ha~
arisen. Messrs. Gainda '.\Iall Hem Raj arc to hear
their own costs throughout.
Appeal allowed .
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SHRI RADESH1A'.ll 'KHARE & ANOTHER••
Seplembt:r 30.
v.
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THE STATE OF !llADHYA PHADESH & OTHEHS
(S. H. DAS c. J., BHAGWATI, s. K. DAS, ,J. L. KAPUR
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and 81.'BBA RAo ,JJ.)
Municipality -- Appoi11tmmt of Excwtivc OJJiccr •by State
Go·,:crnmcnt--lf an adtninistrafi;,·c act-C. J>. and Berar i'funicipalities Act, 1922 (Act I I of 1922). ss. 53A and 57.
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The n1ain point for clt~ci:;ion in this appeal by the lttunicipal
Comn1ittcc of Dhamtari and its Prcsi<lcnt \\·as, \\·hcther in appointing an Executive Officer in exercise of its po,,·ers under s. 53A of
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the C. P. and Bei;ar }!unicipalities Ac$, 1922, the State Go\'crn1nr.nt acted iii a judicial capacity or in an administra~ve one .
Complai.tng been made against the appellants, the a<ldi-
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tiona~
ollcctor \Vas directed to hold an enquiry and on
his •r~pOrt the State Go,·crnn1i;nt, by a notilicatiou un<lcr that
secti~n. apppin(cd all' Executive Officer
of the Municipal Committee for !8 Tnonth;> ,,·ith specified po\l,·crs and duJies. The
·~ppellants were gi\'en notice of the said enqlliry, filed objections
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S.C.R.• .SUPREfy[E copRT REPOR'CS
1441
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and the Presiq,ent was pe•sonally present on some occasions
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during the enquiry. The notific"ation charged the appellants
with incompetency as well as abnse of power. Against that Shri Radeshyam
notification the appellants moved tne High Court under Art. 226 Khare & Another
of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the same,
v.
but their application was rejected by the Judge sitting singly. The State of
An appeal under the Letters Patent against his deci'j,iOn was Madhya Pradesh
summarily dismissed. It was contended before this Court on
& Others
behalf of the appellants that, (1) although the notification pur•
ported to be one under s. 53A of the Act, it was in effect and
reality one under s. 57 of the Act, that (2) it was, therefore, incumbent on the Government under s. 57(5) of the Act to afford
the appellants an opportunity to furnish explanation and that
(3) even if the notification was one under s. 53A of the Act, the
Government was bound by the rules of natural justice to give
the appellants an opportunity to defend themselves.
Held (per curiam), that ss. 53A and 57 of the C. P. and
llerar Municipalities Act, 1922, differed materially in their scope
and effect, but it was not obligatory under either of them for the
Government to take any action at all. Although a finding of
incompetency of the Municipal Committee was a condition precedent to action under both the sections, the Government was
free to choose its remedy as the occasion demanded and it could
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.not be conteri<ied that because a notification made under s. 53A
• of the Act, along with a finding of incompetency, contained some
instances of abuse of power"as well, it must be held to have been
made u01der s. 57 of the Act.
• • Nor could the vesting of power in the Executive Officer by
<t:he notification, however substantial in character, be said, in
effect and reality, to amount to a dissolution of the Municipal
Committee under s. 57 of the Act.
Per Das C.J. and Kapur ].-The real test whether the
State Government functioned in a quasi-judicial capacity or in an
administrative capacity in exercising its powers under s. ·53A of
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the Act was whether the statute required it to act judicially
either ex!'ressly or by implication. The Act contained no express
provision to that effect, nor could the determination of the fact
' of.incompetency
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as a condition precedept to any action under
that s~ction, by itself, carry such an implication. In making
the notification under s. 53A of the Act, therefore, the Government functioned in an administrative capacity and not in a
quasi-judicial one. Even so, by the enquiry held, the State
Government afforded th~ appellants ampl<i opportunity to
defend !hemselves and there could hardly be any ground for
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complaint.
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Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, [1950] S.C.R. 621,
Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, [L924] l K.B. 171, Rex v. London
County Council, [1913] 2 K. B. 215, R. v. begislaMve,Commiltee of
he Church•Assembly, (1928) l K.B. 4rr and .Nakkudct Ali's Case,
1951) A.C. 66, referred to.
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1442
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SUPREME CO~RT R~PORTE\, • [1959]
!'er Bhagwati ].-Since the en~uiry hcld in this case
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satisfied the requirements of natural justice, it \\!as unnecessary
Shri Radrshyan1 to determine for the purpose of this case \\·hcther the State
1958
/(luue &
A11other Government
in acting undc·r s. 53A of the Act di<l so in a
quasi.judicial capacity or in an adrninistrati\'e one.
Th• State of
]'er S. K. Das J.-lf the question was one of compliance
Madhya Prade>h with th• rules of natural justice, the enquiry held in the pfcscnt
& OthtrJ
case coulcl hardly be said to have compliccl "·ith such rules'; but
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since the State Government in acting under s. 53A of the Act
harl only to consider policy and expediency and did at no stage
ha\'c anv form of lis before it, its action thereunder \\·as
purJcy Ov( an adn1inistrativc charact~r not atnenable to a \Vrit Of
certiorari.
v.
R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Commillee, (1952) 2 Q. B. 413,
applied.
!'er Suhha lfao J.-On a proper appreciation of the criteria
laid down bv s. 53A of the Act itself, there could be no doubt
that it imposed a duty on the Stak Government to act judicially
in ascertaining the fact of the incornpctcncy of the i\lunicipal
Committee to perfor1n its duties. It is clear that the clctcrrnination of such a jurisdictional fact could not have been left to
the subjective satisfaction of the (;oyernmcnt but \\·as intended
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to be arri\'etl at objectively and, therefore, it \\·as ;ncumbent up-•
on the Government to give a reasonable opportunity to the •
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appellants to explain the charge levelled against them. Such
enquiry as was held in the instant case could hardly t~ke the
place of reasonable opportunit)•to he given by the Governm'tn1
for the proposed action under s. 53A of the Act.
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Rc.t v. The Electricity Commissionas. (1924) 1 K. B. 171,
l'roi·ince of /30111ha)· v. Kusaldas S. Adi1111i. [1950] S.C.K 621 and
R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, (1952) 2 Q.B. 413, referred
to .
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISIJICTIO:<r:
301 of 1958.
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Civil Appert! No.
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Appeal by ~peciaJ lca,·e from the judgment a1,1d
order clat.ed February 21, 1958, oft.he i\ladhya Prlldesh
High Court: at ,Jalmlpur in Letters Patent Appeal Xo.
22 of 1958, against the order dated February 20, 1958,
of the said High Court in :Ilise. Petilion ~o. 266 of
1957.
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M. K. Narnbiyar, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dwiachanji
and Rmneshwar Nath, for. the appellants.
Jf. Adhik<rri, Arfrocate-General, Jfadhya Pradesh and
J.. N. Shroff, for tnc respondents.
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S.C.R. • .SUPREME COPRT REPORT..S
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1958. SeJitember 38. The following Judgments
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were delivered :
Shr'i Radeshyam
DAS C.J.-There· are two appellants in this appeal. Khare & Another
The second appellant is the Municipal Committee of
v.
Dhamtari constituted ·under the C. P. and Berar The State of
Municipalities Act, 1922 (Act II of 1922) and the first Madhya Pradesh
· its
· Pres1'd ent h avrng
· b een e1ec t·e d as. sue h
& -~
Others
appe 11 ant is
on July IO, 1956. He assumed charge of his office as
Das c. ;.
President on July 27, 1956. It may be mentioned
that•he was returned as a Congress candidate but has
since been expelled from that party for having contested the last general election as an independent candidate against the Congress candidate.
It appears that there are two factions in the Munici1Jal Committee. The first appellant alleges that one
Dhurmal Daga, a member of the committee belonging
to the Congress party was on August 7, 1956, detected
importing within the municipal limits certain cloth with•
out paying the octroi duty. Dhurmal Daga, on the other
• ·hand, alleged that the first appellant was guilty of grave
mismanagement of the affairs of the Municipal Committe~ and went on hunger strike for securing the
appointment of a committoo to enquire into the mis•conduct ·of the first appellant. Copies of the leaflets
containing the demands and charges w)lich are said to
have been widely distributed are annexures I and II to
the present petition. It appears that several persons
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and firms also preferred charges against the first appellant, the President of the Municipal Committee. The
Collect.,r, Raipur, personally intervened and persuaded
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the said Dhurmal Daga to abandon the fast on. an
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a!!sm:ance that he would look into the matter. The
Collector deputed one Shri N. R. Rana the Additional
Deputy Collector to enquire into the compln,ints of
mal-administration of the affairs of the Municipal
Committee. By a Memorandum No. K/J N. P.
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Dhamtari dated August 24, 1956, the said N. R. Rana
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called upon the first appellant as the President of tho
second appellant to give deta,iled explanation of each
complaint, a list of which was enclo!;ed t)lernwitli. A
copy of-that mamorandum along wit:b its 22°enclosur~s.
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1444
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SUPREME COU.RT REPORTS. , [l9:l9]
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is <inncxecl to the petition ;i,n<l •nmrked JU. Annexurcs
Iv and v t-0 the reti~ion are copies of the detailed
KJ.are & A•othu report on the obicct10n'll and the reply to the charges
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made against the .\lunicipitl Committee Aubmitted from
The-''"'' of the oflice of the .\lunicipal Committee by the first
Madhya I'radesh appelhmt as the President of the Municipal Committee.
6- Others
'I'I1c Ad<l itinnal Deputy CollPctor thereafter held the
enquiry. The High Court states that it had "gone
Das C. j.
through the materials on which the State Government
based its action on enquiry into the charges le\:elled
against t.he .\Junicipal Committee" and th<Lt the records of the enquiry showt'd that "on some occasions
the petitioner was presem during the enquiry". There
is no suggcBtion that the appellants wanted an opportunity to adduce any e\•ic!cnce or were prevent-0d fro~
doing so or that they were in any way hampered in
their defence. Presumably the Additional Deputy
Collector had nrndc a report which in due course must
have been forwarded to the Stale Go,·~rnment.
On No,·ember 18, 1957, a notification woo published. (
in the Official Gazette wherchy,the State Government, •
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in exercise of the powers conferred on it. by R. 53-A of
the C. P. & Berar Municip~\lities Act, 1922, app7iinted
one Shri B. P. ,Jain, the second rl'spondent. before t.rs;,
as the Executi\'e Officer of the l\Jnnicipal Committee,
Dhamtari, fi;r •a period of 18 months with certain
powt>rs as therein mentioned. A copy of that notilica.
tion
has been annexed to the petition and marked
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VIII but as th<> major part of the arguments canva,~,cd before us turns on t.hc contents of that 1.1otification
t.lw same is rcpro1lucecl below in ext-0nso:
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·"Dated, Bhopal, the 18th November, 195l,
Xo. !)262!115:{8-U-XVIl[-\Vhercas it appear• th the
Srntc Go\'ernment that. the :\I unicipal Committee,
Dhamrnri, has proved itself incompetent to perform
the duties imposed on it by or U!1der the Central Provinces and Berar ~Iunicipalities Act, l!J22 (11OP1922),
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inasmuch as it"
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(a) grnnteil gmin and building advances t-0 the
employees wiJhou~ prior sanction and no efforts were
made for the'ir rcr.ovcry,
'• (b) showed carelessness in cases or embe;:dement
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Shn /ladeshyam
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S.C.R.
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~UPREM1i1
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COURT REPORTi3
1445
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of the empl~yees and• did, not report such cases to
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Government,
Sh . Rd hy m
(c) failed to control the President who issued orders
'~no;her
in cases in which he had no authority,
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(d) spent thousands of rupees ·on sanitation and The state of
other works although there was no provision, in the Madhya Pradesh
budget,
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& Others
(e) allowed unconcerned persons to interfere in its
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working,
IJ) showed partiality in the appointments and dismissals of the employees, further such appointments
and dismissals were made against rules,
(g) delayed the constitution of the committee and
the framing of budget,
• _(h) misused the trucks of the municipality,
(i) failed to recover the lease money,
(j) shown partiality in the issue of transit passes to
certain traders, further excess octroi duty was charged on certain articles and in certain cases where octroi
, ,duty is not leviable it was levied just to harass the
• people,
(k) distributed municipal manure to certain
perso~ without any charge, similarly distributed the
fntl.nure free of cost and usea the truck of the municipality for this purpose,
(I) failed to control its president •wpo spent the
money of the Municipal Committee without any
authority,
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(m) spent huge amount on the maintenance of
the roads and drainage but their condition has remain-.
ed unsatisfactory'
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• (n) failed to give copies of the documents. as
allow"ed under rules, also failed to allow its members to
inspect the records as is permissible under rules,
(o) failed to invite tenders of purchase of articles,
and whereas, the State Government considers that
a gene6al improvement in the administmtion of th_e
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Municipality is likely to be secured by the appointr
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ment of a servant of the Government as Executive
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Officer of the Committee.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the pow.erlj conf~rred
by section 53-k of the Central Provinces and Bera.r•
Kh;;, ;
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1446
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S!JPREME CO~RT ll~PORTS. • [1959]
:\Tunicipalities Act, Hl22 (II ofol!)22), tlie ~tate Governrneut 11rc pll'ascd to appoint Shri B. P. Jain, Deputy
_, " .<a"""Y""'
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. . l C'om.
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/(hare
AtiJther
·O II (~e t or, a.s t>xecut1vc
\.>!.ueer of" t lle 'I
·' un1c1pa
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mittcr, Vhamtari, for a period of eightecu months
The St•tc of
from r.he dt1tc of his taking o,·er charge and with
Madhya P.ad"h refere11ce to sub-section (i!) thereof a.re further plt><1s('.d
& Othm
t-0 direcl that the Excruti,·e Officer shall ex.,n·ise and
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perform the folloll'ing powers a.nd dut.ies of t.he ComDa_,
mittcc to the exclusion of the Committee, President,
Viee-PreHident or Sncretary, under the provisio~1s of
the Ccntrnl Provi'.1cc:; and Berar :\Iuuicipalities Act,
1922 ( lI of 1922), na.mely :Chapter III. Appointment of Officers a.nd servants-Sect.ions 25, 26 1rnd 28.
Chapt.cr TV. Procedure in Committee meeting--.
Scetion 31.
Chapl-0r V. Property, contract an<l liabiliticsSect ion:; :n to 45.
Ch11pter VI. Duties of Committee-Sections 50
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an<l 51.
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Chapter VIII. The municuial fund-whole.
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Chapter IX. Imposition, assessment a.nd collection of 1.axes-whole.
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Chapter X. :llunici1ial Budgets and account~
whole.
Clmptcr,X•L Powers to regulate streets and buildi11g8-Sections !JO lo 94, !16, 98, 99, 103 and I 04.
Chapt.l!r XII. Power8 to prevent disea.He and
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public 11ui~a11ce-Sectio11s 117, 118(1), 119 and 132.
Chapter XV I I l. Offences, practice and. procedure-Sections 218.223.
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. Cha pl"r XIX. Special provi"ions for recovery ,pf '
taxcs-w hole.
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The Exccut.ive ofticer shall exercise general supervising powers in respct:t of all matters covered by t.he
Central Pro,·iqccs awl Bcrar i\l1111icipalitieH Act, 1922
(II
of 1922)'.
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958
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In Hindi (By order of the GO\·ernor of .Madhya
Pradesh)
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S. S. Joshi, •
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Deputy Sccretary
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SUPREM]j: COURT REPORTS
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1447
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On December'21, 1957., the two appellants before us
presente~ before the Mad~1ya Pradesh High Court the Shri Radesh:.m •
writ pet1t10n out of wh10h the present appeal has I<lum & Anather
arisen and on Januarv 11, 1958, obtained an order
v.
staying the operation of the order of appointment of The State of
the ~xecutive Officer. The writ petition was dis!pissed Madhya Prndesh
on February·20, 1958. There was a Letters Patent
& Others
Appeal which was dismissed in limine on February 21,
Das c. t
1958. The application for certificate under Arts. 132
and 133 was refused on March 21, 1958. The present
appellants applied for aud on April 1, 1958, obtained
from this Court special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The interim stay order made by this Court was eventually
vacated on May 13, 1958. The appeal has now come
u"p before us for final disposal.
Shri M. K. Nambiar, appearing in support of this
appeal, urged three points, namely :
(i) that though the Notification purports to have
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been made ii1 exercise of the powers conferred on the
• Btate Government by s. 53-A, in substance and in
reality it has been made' under s. 57 of the Act;
(ii? that if the Notification is held to be one made
u~for s. 57 it is ultra vires a.nd bad since the statutory requirements of affording reasonable opportunity
to explain has not been complied with ;.
(iii) that even if the impugned Notification be
held to come within s. 53-A it is still ultra vires since
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before promulgating it the State Government has committed a breach of the rules of natural justice in not
giving ltny opportunity to the appellants to defend
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th~mselves.
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There• was a charge of mala fide made against the
State Government founded on the fact that the first
appellant's leaving the Congress p1>rty had resulted in
ill-will towards the first appellant of that party which
was thPo ruling party in the State Goveriun1lnt, but as
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that charge has not been pressed before us nothing
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further need be said about it. I now proceed to deal
with the three points formulated above by learned
counsel for the appellants.
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1448
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~UPP.EulE CO'CRT JU<:PORTfi
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[1959] '
Re. (i) and (ii): Tht-se j.wo f>Oints arc \jOrt•elated and
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may lw com-e11ienth· deaft with t.ouethcr. The a.rguSi;ii u,1arshj11Hi
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f' 't
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1\·1:,1 r1, ~r·
.·hic.Jiiri nu•nt 111 8l1Jlport. o
t 11e1R 1s c e\·t' ope< n1 t\\'O \rays.
Jn
t.he jirsr. place it is said that the grounds set forth in
Tl" srnr, ,,
1he impugned notilication clearly indicttte that in
.11"d'•.•·n J'on1r•;, s11bsta11ce >111cl in rcalitv it. ha8 been iss11ecl mtlwr
,.,. ot1.cis
un(ler s. 57 of the~ 1\ct t:lla.n under !-{, !13- ..\.
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In order
•J>a.; C. J.
to a1•11rr,,iate this arg_11nw11t it is nccessar,\' to set. outt.he two sections of tlw C. P. and Bcrar :.\lunicipn.lit ies
Ar·t, l!l22 i11 extenso:
"53-A. (I) If :1 committee is not compet1;11t to
perform tlw duties imposed 011 it. or 1111dertake11 by it
h\' or under this Act or any other ennctment for t-lw
t.fine being in force :ind i'lw Stafo (im·crnmcnt considers that a general impro\·ement in the administ ration of the municipality is likely to be secured hy tl~e
appointment of " servant of t-he Go\'ernmcnt as the
excc11tivc officer of the committee, t.he State Uovernmcnt nmy, by an tll'flrr stat-i11g the reasons t.lien•for
ptiblishcd in the Gazette, appoint such s~·,·an1 as I.he~
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t•xec11t.i,·e officer of the committee for s11ch period not •
exceeding eight~en months as ·may be speciliPcl in such
order.
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(2) Any executiYe officer 1tppoi11ted under s11hscction (I) shall he clcemecl to be an officl'l' lent to thr'
committee bv. ( :o\·ernment 11ndel' sub-section (3) of
section 25. • •
(:~) When under
s11b-section (I) .:in exe•·uti\·e
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officer is appointed for :.111.v committee, the State
Go,-ernmcnt shall de!C'rminc from tinw to time which
powers, duties and fu11ct inns of 1he committc!e, preside11t, ,. ice-pl'csidcnt Ol' se<'retary under this Act or :IJJY '·
rule or h\·elaw madP t here11nclel' shall be c·xereisf.'d and
performc;cl by .-;urh oflit:el', in nddition to, or to the
exclusion of, their exel'cise and pel'formance by the
said cummitt<>c, president, ,-ice-president Ol' seerctary.
(4) Th~ scrret:iry of the co"mmit.tee shall l1e sub•
ordinate t.o the exe.cutirn oflicer.
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(5) The execut.i,-c officer shall lm\'c the right to
at.te;1d all m:etin~s of t~ie commit.tee and any joint
i:ommittc~ Ol' oil b-comn11ttce and to take part. m t.he
• tliscnssi•m so a,; fo make an cxplanati~n in 1'bgard to
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1449
S.O.R .• ."IUPl~EME OOIJRT REPOR'IOS
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the subject i!nder disc~rnsiQn, but shall not move,
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second, or vote on any resolution or other motion. "
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Shr·i Radeshyam
" 57 . (l) If a comm1 eel~ ·no, ?ompe en o per- I<ha" 6 . Another
form, or persistently makes default. m the performance
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of, the duties imposed on it or undertaken by it under The Stote of
this B.ct or any other enactment for the time being in Madhya Prndesh
force, or exceeds or abuses its powers to a grave
& Others
extent, the State Government may, by an order
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stating the reasons therefor published in the Official
Das c. J.
Gazeite, dissolve such committee and may order a
fresh election to take place.
(2) If after fresh election the new committee continues to be incompetent to perform, or to make
default in the performance of, such duties or exceeds
cii: abuses its powers to a grave extent, the State
Government may, by an order stating the reasons
therefor published in the Official Gazette, declare the
committee to be incompetent or in default, or to have
exceeded or abused its powers, as the case may be, and
.supersede it•for a period to be specified in the order.
•
(3) If a conunittee• is so cliHsol ved or superseded,
the following consequences shall ensue :
(aj all members of the ,committee shall, as from
thl'l date of the order, vacate their offices as such members;
(b) all powers and duties of the ccm11nittee may,
until the committee is reconstituted, be exercised and
performed by such person or persons as the State
•
Government may appoint in that behalf;
(c) 1111 property vested in it shall until the committee is reconstituted rnst in the State Government.
•
• (4) On the expiration of the period of supersession
specified in the order, the committee shall be reconstituted, and the persons who vacated their offices under
sub-section (3), clause (a), shall not, by reason solely of
such supersession be ?eemed disqualifjed for being
membePs.
•
•
(5) No order under sub-sect.ion (1) or sub-section
•
(2) shall be passed until reasonable opportunity has
been given to the committee to fu1~nish .an expl~nation.
·
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(6) Any
person
or persons appointed
by the Stat~•
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1450
,,
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SUPHEME COURT REPORT& , [1959)
•
•
Gon•rnmcnt to exercise and p'erform th!J' powers and
rlutics of a dissolved nr superseded committee may
Slrri Nnde$hY"'r.
.
. . l
d'ire('ts,·
Khare c:~ AtMther receive pa..yn1ent, i 1 t H! 1 ta.te :iovernmcnt so
. "·
for his ur tlwir services from the municipal fund."
n, swc of Learned coun8Pl fur the appellants points out that,
Madhya l'.a·/c;h <Lctiuwnmy be taken under s. 53-A " if n commit.tee i;;
,S.. Othrrs
· Illl]H>SC<
·
1 on 1t
·
nu·t compe t ent to per form t h e d utres
...............
1111d
t.lw
State
Go,·ernmrnt
considers
that
a
]Jas C. }.
general improvr·ment in the administrnt.ion of the
municipality is likely to be securerl. ................. ".
Whereas under s. 57 action can be taken nut nnh· " if
a committ€e is not competent l-0 p~·rform or persistently
makes default in the pcrform:rnce of the duties imposed on it or ............... ", but also if the committee
"iexceeds or abuses its puwt>rs to a grase extent .......'.i.
lt is pointer! out that in case of incompetency acti<>11
can be taken either und<'r s. 5:~. A or s. 57 but in cast>
of abuse of power ad.ion can b0 t.akt'n only under
s. 57. Heforence is then made to the grou11ds rnumerated in the 11otification itself itlld it is -argued that.
except perhaps grounds a, b, ~ and g which may be •
indi('ativc of inc01npetcncy, the other grounds •• which
arc, by far, greater in n1unber, obviously constit.11t.0
abuse of powers and from this circum,;tance thn cl\n.
clusion is 80•1ght to be drawn thfLt. in substance and in
reality the .impugned notification must have been
nrndc under s. 5i and that that being so tlw notifici>tion cannot he sustained becaus1' of the non-compliance
•
with tlw pro,·isions of sub-s. (;i) of s. 57 which expressly
lay down that no order under sub.s. (l) or (2).shall be
passecl until rcasonahlc opport11nit.y has bcnn give.n to '
t.he committee to fumish an explanation. I a!11 liot.
persuaded to uph.,lcl this argument..
In the first place it has to be remembered that tlw
sections under consideration only confor certain powers
on the State .Government bu~ that the latter is not
bou11d to t.ike anv action under cit.her of th~m. 111
•
the
11ext place it. ~hould be 11oterl that the t.wo s!'ol ions
•
differ makrially in t.heir scope and effect. U 11<lcr
s. 5:1-A the .:-itat~ Government. may only appoint a
serv:rnt. ot' the (i,i,·crnnwnt a8 the Executive J.)fh"t'r of
• lhc committee and may de;crmi1w, fro'm time to tiui.~,
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S.C.R. • •SUPREME COURT REPOR~S
1451
,
•
8
which powern and dut1es and functions of the comI95 ,
mittee, its president, vice-president or secretary shall Shri Radeshyam
be exercised and performetl by such officer and Kha" & Anoth"
indicate whether they should be exercised and perv.
formed in addition to, or to the exclusion of, their The State of
cxcfoise and performance by the said committee, Madhya Prndesh
&- Others
president, vice-president or secretary. The wor ding
of s. 53-A mi.kes it quite clear that the action that
Das C. ].
may be taken thereunder is to be effective for a
temporary duration not exceeding 18 months and the
purpose of taking such action is to ensure the proper
performance and discharge of only certain powers,
duties and functions under the Act. The section does
not, in terms, affect, either legally or factually, the
o('Xistence of the committee, its president, vice-president
or the secretary. i:lection 57, however, authorises the
State Government, in the circumstances mentioned in
the opening part of that section, to dissolve the committee itself and order a fresh election to take place so
• that the c"mmittee as a legal entity ceases to exist
• and all the sitting mevibers of the committee become
functj officio. If after such fresh election the same
situation prevails, then th~t section further authorises
; the State Government to declare the committee to be
incompetent or in default or to have exceeded or
abused its power as the case may be allcL to supersede
it for such period (not limited by the section) as may
be specified in the order. The effect of an order made
•
under s. 57 is, therefore, extremely drastic and puts an
·end t(\ the very existence of the committee itself and,
in view of the grave nature of the consequences that
•
.vill. ensue, the legislature presumably thought· that
some protection should be given to the committee
before such a drastic action was taken and accordingly
it provided, by sub-s. (5) of that section, that no order
should be passed uptil reasonable qpportunity had
been given to the committee to furnish a1i eKplanation
•
-a provision which clearly indicates that action under
•
s. 57 can only be taken after hearing and considering
all the explanations furnish)'d by o; on. behalf .of the
commij;tee. The legislature did not think tit to provide
a similar safeguard in s. 53A presumably becaMe
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1452
...
ST.iPHEME COC~T ItEl'ORTS •• [ 195\J]
•
the order 1111der t.h1' last, m~itioncd seetiou mis of
.
.
a
temµorarv duration. was not very drastic n,nd
Sh ti / ~adtSllJ,~111 d 'cl
t"'
,
"
•
I<ha" r- ,.1,, 011,,, 1
not ti1rl'aten the \'ery ex18tencc of the comv.
mittec.
A cursory reading of the t.wo sec:t.ions
The s1 .. 1e c/
will also inclic:ite lhttt the conditions precedent
Jladh1" p,";,-" to the t'>Kercise of the powers under hoth sections o~·err~ 011" "
lap to some C'xtcnt, naml'ly, that act ion can lw taken
.--under both if the committee" is not com1>c!ent. to f>Cl'/l ..s c. J.
form the duties imposed on it ......... ". To thP extent·
tha.t. the requircnwnto of t.h1• two Heclion> o\·erln1• the
~tale ( ;0\-cl'llment !ms the option of taking steps under
one ~ection or (.he ot.her according io its o\\·n assessment. of the exigencies of the sitnMiou. The position,
therefore, is that if a committee is not competent t.o
perform the dutie' imposed on it t.hc State Con'rn:•
ment !ms to makte up ivi mind as l•l whether it should
take :wv action M all and, if it thinks that act ion
should b1' taken, then it ha.s furl her to cl~cide for itself
11s t.o "hich of the t\\·o sections it. would act under.
ff t.hc Stat<' Gm·emmcnt considers th11t th8 incompc- •
tency docs not. rnn tu a grn\·" C\tentancl the <'xigcncics
of the :;ituation lllay he ackqtmtely met by appointing
:1n Exl'cuti''V Oliicer for :t sl1ort prriud not t'X<:c:~ding
18 months with certain powers to be <'V>r1:is1'd by hinf, ••
C'ither in addition to or in exc:iusion of t.heir C:\Pl'Cise
hy the committet', the president., vicc-prcsident 01· tlrn
secretary, the State Government may properly take
action under s. :i3-A. On t hP other hand if the State
•
Gm·crnment consirlc•rs, having regard to all the
cin:ums.t:tntcs oft IH> case, that the incompet.0,tll'y is
much too gra.,-c t.o permit the committee, it.s presidl.'lll,
•
vi,,e.prc,icknt or the secrt:t.ary to t'unct.ion at all, i•
m11v take action un<ler s. 5i and dissohc the cumruittec
a.nrl din>ct fresh eleet.iou to take pince. In other words
i11competc11cy on t.he µart of the eommittec gi\'es to the
St.;ck Govcmment <111 option to a.~ply one uf two rcmedies under tlie :<\ct, if, t.hat is to say, it c•msioors it
•
1wcessa.rv
t.1> take ill'tion at nil.
•
What; then, is the po~ition here ? Certa.iu 1·lmrgcs
h;td been madi; in '\riting :igainst the committee and
it~ pl'esidcnl which were {'orwardcd t.o the prrsident
\l'it.h a reqnest t.o si1l1mit. cxpln,nations ii"i detail. The
,
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S.C.R.
•
COURT REPORTS
• • SUPREME
•
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1453
•
z95B
president, a~ting in hi;, official capacity, gave detailed
explanations in writing and Sent the Same officially ch . R~dh
·' " &a esAnother
yam
. . 1 conrnut
. t ee t o th e Khare
f rom t h e offi ce of t h e mm1101pa
Additional Deputy Collector who was deputed by the
v.
Collector to hold the enquiry. The Additional Deputy The state of
Col!ector held the enquiry during which the J:\resident Madhya Pradesh
appeared in person on several days and came to cerc~ Others
ta.in findings and presumably made his report which
-.
in due course must have reached the :State GovernDas c. f.
ment. The State Government apparently accepted
such of those findings as have been set out in the
notification itself. Even according to leamed comrnel
for the appellants some of those findings ;i,mount only
to incompetency and the rest, he contends, amount to
abuse of power. I need not pause to consider whethel"
"the abuse of power thus found was of a grave nature
so as to fall within s. 57 as such or was of a minor
chamcter so as to be evidence of mere. incompetency.
Taking the position to be as contended by learned
counsel for. the appellants the position was that, as a
result of the enquiry, the St.;i,te Government found
two things against th~ appellant committee, namely,
(i) tlmt it was guilty of iucompetency and (ii) that it
•was also guilty of certain' abuses of power. I have
•already ·stated that the State Government was not
obliged to take any action at all eithe.r under s. 53-A
or under s. 57. If the State Government considered
that it was necessary to take action, it was entirely
•
for the State Government to consider whether it
would take action for incompetency or for abuse of
power.' In the present case the State Government
•
might have thought that the abuse of power so found
was not of a very grave nature but evidenced only
incompetency. Surely a committee which abused its
power might also have been reasonably regarded as
"incompetent to perform the duties imposed on it".
That .apart, supposil1g the committee' was guilty of
•
incompetency as well as of some abuses, what was
•
there to prevent the State Government, as a matter
of policy, to take action .for incompetency 1mder
s. 53-A ? The mere inclusio11 of th'e fim'l.in~s of abuse
of pm~er in • the catalogue of · the Committee/1'
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1454
•
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SQPREME COURT ~EPORTS
[1959]
•
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,_.
misdeeds doeo not obliterate lhi finding~ 011 incompctency. I see nothing wrong in the State t;ovcmment.
Sim !ladr;hpm
.
l
.
, ,,.
l
.
.
,
tc 11 mg
tic c:omm1ttcc: • ' i ou 1a\'C been gudtv
of
·
l(h ...1re <..:>
,_,
•
1nnl /u:r •
v.
111co111pet~11cy as well as of abuse uf power; hut 1
n, -"•'' "! sh;dl not, just at this moment, take drastic •1etion of
J/adhy., I'rnde;t. dissolving you outright, but shall be content to t;i.ke
"'-Ott.en
action and appoint ;rn Executive officer for 18 mouths
•
and confer some power on him under '· [i3-A ". In
DrH C. /.
l 8tatc G•Overnment waH well within
my ju d gment tie
its rights, in exercise of its option, to take action,
under s. ;;:~-A as it has in terms purported t.o do.· To
say that heeirnse some of the findings amount to
ahusc of power the Stale Government must act under
s. 57 is to deprive it of its <liscret.ion which tl11• Act 11ndo11htcdlv confers 011 it. Jn mv view the fact. that
the imp;;gned notific<Ltion reco;ds, apart from the•
findi11gs of incompetency, certain findings of abuse
of power, docs nut. lead to the co11dusion, <is enntenclt-<1
for the <1ppcllants, that the State·' Government had
t<1k1m act ion under s. ;)i and not under s. 53- ..\
although, in ternrn, it says it '1cted und(~r the last •
men t.ionecl section.
•
Lea.med counsel for the appdlants in support c.f hi~
content.ion that th<' impugr1ed notification w<1s real~.
made umler s. 57 of the Act, refers us t11 th<> p01nn·s •
and duties conferred on the cxecutiYc Officer thcrcbv
11ppuintecl to' be exercised and performed by him t'O
the "xdnsion of the committee, its president., ,·iceprrsiclcnt., or t.he se<'retary. His argument is that
although the municipal committee i' not ostensibly
dissoh·cd, it is in effoet and in re;llity so dissol\"ec!, for
,'
the .snbsta.1wCJ of the powers of the committee, its
president., vice-president or the secretary has Jice!1
taken aw;iy from them leaving only a sembbi.nce of
power which is n"thing but mere husk 1111<l the conclusion urged Ly learnl,d counselis thfll the impugned
not.ification •mt!8t bt• reg;1l'ded its ha Ying hcen. made
• nnder s. 57. ln the fir~t place, s..'\7 cloes not contem•
plate the ;ippointment of any executive Officer or the
confrrm<'llt of any power !HI him, while such appoi11tme.nt0 ;ind ·c<1,1fern'l.ent of• power is direct\\' contemt>l.1.t.c<l by· s. 53-A. In the second ~lace" t~ legal
•
,1958
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S.O.R. • .SUPREl\1~ oopRT REPORT.S
•
1455
,
existence of .the municfpal ,committee and the status
r958 /
•
of its members and its president, vice-president or the , .
1
Sm Rade> •yam
.
. d a t a'11 . I n th e eye Kha"
secretary h ave not b een impatre
& Another
of the law the municipal committee still exists and
v.
along with it the members of the committee, the presi- The State of
den11, vice-president and the secretary still hokl their Madhya Prnd"h
respective offices. These features clearly militate
& Others
against the suggestion that action has been taken
-•
Das C. ].
under s. 57. Learned counsel says that we must look
beyond mere form and get to the substance of the
matter. There can be no doubt that most of the
important powers have been taken away from the
committee, its president, vice-president and the
secretary, but that may well be due to the degree of
g_ravity of the incompetency found or inferred from
the other findings. :Further, a cursory perusal of the
Act and of the notification will show that various
other powers and duties have not been taken away
from the committee or conferred on the Executive
• • Officer. Tims the powers of the committee under
• ss. 128, 130, 131, 133 ~ 141 and 144, 145 and 147 to
149 are still vested in and are exercisable by the committee. Likewise the powers under ss. 120, 121, 122,
1!3 to 127, 129, 150, 152 to 160 to 162, 163, 163A and
0
168 are still vested in and exercisable by the president.
These powers that are still left with th13 JJommittee or
the president can hardly or with propriety be described as mere husks. It should not be overlooked
•
that the suggestion that the real power has been taken
away leaving only a semblance of it, is really an
argument in aid of a charge of mala fides, but, as
•
h.-re-in-before stated, the charge of mala fides· or
fraud on the part of the State Government has not
been persisted in or pressed before us. In my judgment, therefore, there is no warrant for contending
that the impugned notification, judged by its efl:ect,
must he regarded as having been made- urider s. 57 of
•
the Act. In this view of the matter the argument of
•
invalidity of the action founded on non-compliance
with the requirements of sub-s. (5),of s, 57 doe.snot
arise fo:t consideration at all.'
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1451i
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SUPREIIIE C01JRT·UEPORTS ,
•
[1959]
'._<:~
Re, (iii): In the writ. ttp~lication, iout of which
n
,
., . this appt,,i! 11rises, the principal prnyer of the t1ppelSI
1 1
·'"' ]
. c
. .
h
f
,
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J<Ju"'e &a '"'
.. ,;,,ti:ei· ant~ 18 H)l' a. \\'l'lt 111 t, e•nature o <.:t"rt1ora.r1 1or quas 1-
'
.
11
1
ing t.hc order passed by the Stale Government. on
?\ovembe;r 18, l!Jiii, The next prayer which is for n
Afodli)a hak<h writ of mandam1rn restraining tlw re:;pondcuts •from
{.,.. Otlu:rs
· ·
·
,I oruer
.l
·
g1vmg
e j"tee! tot Jw 11npugneu
rn
e1l'ar1y consequenlia.J on or ancillary to the main praym" The !11st
Dn.< C. }.
prayer is in the rmture of the usual prayer for
further or other re lid's, Therefore the present p<'J;ition
is esseutia.llv one for the issue of a writ of certiorari.
The writ of certiorari is a. well.known ancient high
prcrogMi\'e writ t!rn.t used to be issued by the Court.s
of the King's Bench to correct the e1-ro1's of the
inferior Courts strictly so called. Gradually the 8t:OL11'
of these writs came to be enlarged so as to enable t.ht:
Superior Courts to exereise comrol over n1rio110 bodies
whid1 11·crc not, strictly speaking, Courts at u,]] but-.
which 1rnrc, by ~l:itute, Yest.ed with powers tl!ld clutit'8
tlmt rcRernblcrl t.hosc that W<'rc vested i11 dw ordinan·.
inferior Courts. The law iH 1~ow well-set.tied thrtt ;1
writ. of certiorari will lie to control such a stat.uton·
body if it purports t-0 a.c~ without jurisdict.io1~ or iii
exceso of it or in 1·iolatinn of the principles of natufa'L
ju,;tice, or eornmits any error app11rent on the face of
t.he record8, ~n'l.>\'ide<l lhat, on tt true eon8t.r11ctio11 of
the statute creating such hody, it can be saicl to be a
quasi-judicial body entrusted with quasi-judicit1! func•
tions. It is equally Wf'll-set.llccl t.hat certiorari will
not lie to correct the errors of a statutory body ,which is
entrusted with purely administrative functions. It is,
the<'eforc, necessan' to ascertain the t.rnc mtture of tJ1.,
fu11ctimrn cnt.rust~d to nnd cxcrcioccl In' the ·~tat-c
(;ovcrnnwnt. under s. 5:!-A of the Act.
"
In l'rovince of JJ01nbuy v. Ku-•uldas S. Admni (')
this Court hr.~ discussed al c~11Hiuerable length the
nature of t!ie two kinds of act, judicial an<l d<lrnini .
•
strat.ive, and has laicl down certain tests for ascertain•
ing whether the a<'t of a statutory bo<ly iH a quasijudieial ac.t';"'' an arlrnini~trative act. It will, therefore,
v.
The s'"" of
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S.C.R. , .SUPRE¥E 00,URT REPORTS
1457
..
•
suffice to ref-.r to the c~lebi;;i,ted definition of a quasi-
'95 8 /
•
judicial body given by Atkin L. J. as he then was, in si . R d 1
Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (1) and which now
~;;:,;~,
holds the field. It runs as follows:
v.
"Whenever any body of persons having legal The State of
authority to determine questions nffecting rights of Madhya Prndesh
subjects, nnd having the duty to act judicinlly act iu
& Others
excess of their legal.nuthority they are subject to the
Da-:;;, j.
controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division
exeruised in these writs."
This definition wns nccepted as correct in Rex v.
London County Council(') and many subsequent
cases both in England and in this country. It will be
noticed that this definition insists on three requisites
~ch of which must be fulfilled in order thnt the net
of the body may be said to be qunsi-judicial act,
nnmely, thnt the body of persons (1) must have legal
nuthority, (2) to determine questions affecting the
rights of parties, and (3) must have the duty to act
~udicially. .'lince a writ of certiornri can be issued
only to correct the erro1~ of a court or a quasi-judicial
body, it would follow that the real and determining
test for nscertaining whether nn act authorised by n
Eli;>!,tute is a quasi- judicial act or an administrative net
!s whether the statute has expressly or impliedly
imposed upon the statutory body the fluty to net
judicially as required by the third condition in the
definition given by Atkin L. J. Therefore in consider•
ing whether in taking action under s. 53-A the State
Governl!lent is to be regarded as functioning as a
quasi-judicial body or a mere administrative body it
•
ha.~ to be ascertained whether the statute has expressly
or impliedly imposed upon the State Government a
duty to act judicially.
Helying on paragraphs 114 and 115 of Halsbury's
Laws of England, 3rd Bdition, Volume 11, at pages 5558 and• citing the case· of R. v. Mancheste1• Legal Aid
•
Committee (3 ), learned counsel for the appellants con•
tends that where a statute requires a decision to be
arrived at purely from the point of view of polic,y or
Kh;;, ;,
.
. ..
(1) [1~24] 1 K.B. 171.
(2) [1931] ! 1'.13. 215.
•
(3) [1952] 2 Q.B. 413.
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1458
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SUPREME COU,RT ll~PORTS •• [1959]
•
expediency the authority. is \mder no .duty to act
'h . R-I .
judicially. He urges tlmt where, on the other hand,
0
·' "
' crnyam
h e or d er has l o 1ie passc-u
-' on ev1'd ence e1t
. her un d er an
Kime
Another
t
6
v.
express provision of the statute or by implication 1111d
Tiu srare of
determination of particular facts on which its juris<licMadh.va i""de>h tion to. exercise its power depends or if there is &pro& Orhm
posal and an opposition the authority is under a duty
•
to
a.ct ju<liciidly. As stated in paragraph ll5 of
Vas C. ].
Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume ll, at page 57,
the duly lo act judicially may arise in widely diffJ:ring
circumstances which it would be impossible to i•ttempt
t-0 define exhaustively. The question whether or not
then~ is a duty to act judicially must be decided in
carh case in the light of the circumstances of the
particular case and t.hc construction of the particula,i·
statute with the assistance of the general principles laid
down in the judicial decisions. The ;lrinciples de<luciblc
from the various judicial decisions considered by this
Court in the Province of Bombay v. K. 8. Adrnni(') at
page 725 were thus formulated, namely: •
•
"(i) that if a statute emp~wers an authority, not
being IL Court in the ordinary sense, to d"cide clispute8
arising out of a claim p1adc by one party ' under
the statute which claim is opposed by another pal'tl
a11d to determine the respcctirn rights of the conll'sting parties \)'ho are opposed to each other, there is a /is
iu1d primafacie and in the absence of anything in the
statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority
•
t-0 act judicially and the dceision of the authority i8 a
quasi-judicial act; and
,
(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do
•
any act which will prejudicially affect the subje.f.t,
then, although there are not two partieH apart' from
the ;rnthority and the contest is between the authorit.y
proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it,
the final determination of the nuthority will yet be a
quasi-judicial act provided the authority is rcrptired by
•
the statute to act judicially."
•
It is clear that in the present case there is no que8tion
of auy CO\lt~t bet.ween t~\rn contending parties which
the State•Gb\'erqment is, under s. 53-A, to d!ll.!ide and,
'i958
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S.C.R., • SUPREME COURT REPOR~S
1459
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therefore, tliere is no ''lis ';in the sense in which that
I958/
•
word is understood generally, and the principle refer- Shi Rad,.hyam
red to under the first heading has no application. We Kha" & Another
have, therefore, to consider whether the case comes
v.
within the principle enunciated under the second head, Th, Stafr of
nafnely, whether the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Madhya Pradesh
If>. Others
Act, 1922, requires the State Government to act
-~
judicially when taking action under s. 53-A.
Das c. ;.
Learned counsel for the appellant draws our attention to the language in which s. 53-A is couched. He
concedes that the ultimate order under that section is
purely discretionary, that is·to say, the State Government is not obliged to take any action under the
section. It may make an order under the section or
.jt may not according as it thinks fit. But. in case the
State Government chooses to act under the section, it
can only do so if the conditions therein laid down are
fulfilled. A cursory reading of s. 53-A will show that
there are two pre-requisites to be s>ttisfied before the
State GoV'ernment can take action under s. 53-A,
namely, (1) that the municipal committee is not competerit to perform the duties imposed on it and (2) that
the State Government .considers that a general
.' fmprovement in the administration of the municipality
is likely to be secured by the appointment of a servant
of the Government as the Executive -Officer of the
committee. When both these conditions are fulfilled,
then and then only may the State Government take
•
action and make an order under s. 53-A. Of the two
conditions the second one, by the very language in
which it is expressed, is left entirely a matter for the
•
~tat.e Government to consider, for it depends entirely
on the view of its own duty and responsibility that the
I
State Government may take on a consideration of the
situation arising before it. In other words, the statute
has left that matter tli the subjective .i;let\)rmination of
the State Government. The first requisite, however,
•
•
is an objective fact, namely, whether the committee is
or is not competent to perform the duties imposed on
it. The determination of that fa~t, it ~s pointeti out,
has not been l,eft to the subjective. deterntination VY
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1460
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SUPRE:VIE COl113T RoE,PORTS •• [1959]
•
~9 18
the Strite Government. Lca.rncc:I counsel f0tr the appel.
.,,
liaddv""
!ants
1.1rgcs t.ha.t. if it werP- i1~tcndcd to leave t.l1c deter.
51
l>'h.,,, ,,. . 1>;,, 11,,, n11nat1on of this iaC't of mcompetcncy also to tho
"
suhjPcti\'e opinion of the State GoYcmmcnt, the ~ection
n,· .,,,,,, nf would ha Ye been framed otherwise. It would ha Ye
,\fo.ihyn l'rad 01• said sornrthi11g like this: "If the State GoYcrnntent
(,. Others
•consi d er:; t J1at a committee is not competent to pel'form
the clutics ...... anrl that t.hc general im]>roYcment in
[)_,_, C. _/.
the administration of the municipalities is likely to be
S<'cnrcd by ...... ". This the Legislature has not done
and has, thus, cl<'ar!Y evinced an intention not to lea Ye
it to the ipse dixit of Stf1te Go\'ernment. Section 53-A,
it is pointed out, differs materially in this re8pect from
s. :inf the Bomhay Lauri Requisition Ordinance (V of
1947) which wn.5 <'onsidercd by this Court in ]{11s11lda11 0
Adrani's cn8c ('). That section of the Bombay
Ordi11a nee open eel with I-he words: " If in the opinion
of the ProYincial Governmeut ............ " 11·hidt were
t.. >kcn as indicatiYe of the Legislature's intention tu
k11,ve the determi1mtion <>f the existence of,.]] the con- •
rlitions precedent entirl'ly to th~ subjective upi11ion of
the Prol'incial (;01·ernmcnt so as t.o make the :>etion a
purely Mhnini'31TMive one.• The nrgnnwut. is thar the
first requirmuent is the liurling of a fact which may ]Jt)•
called a, juri:;dict.ional fact, HD t.h:>t the power under •
s. 53-A «an <rnlS· be «xiercisl'd when thn.t jmiHdictiornd
fact is cst:>hlished to exist. The c1"tC'rmi11ation of the
•
existence of th1it juri8didiu11al fo.ct., it is contended, is
unt left to the suhjcctil'e opi11ion of the State GoYernment :rnd that alt.hough the ultimate act is an aqminist.rntil'e
one tlw State Go1·crnment must. at the preli•
minn:ry stage of determining the jurisclietional fact act
\
judicially and dvtcrmiuc it. objecti1·ely, that is to "say,
i11 a quasi-judicial wn.y. It is ass1rn1ed that whf'1te1·cr
there has to lw a cletermi1mtio1t of a fact which affects
the rights of .t.he,.JHHties, t.!tP dcci~ion must he a qun.si• · judicittl dei:ision, so as to Le liable to be conecter' Ly a
writ of certiorari. In Adrnni's case(') Kania C. ,J.
•
with whom Patanjali Sastri J. agreed, said at page
..
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:
"The resjioncl~ul's n.rgunwnt that whenever there
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x
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1461
•
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is a determination of a' fact which affects the rights of
'95 /
parties, the decision is quasi-judicial, does not appear Shri Rad<>hyam
to be SOUnd."
•
Rhare & Another
v.
]'urther down the learned Chief Justice said:
The State of
" ......... It is broadly sta(,ed that when the fact has
Madhya Pradesh
to jje determined by an objective test and wh1m that
(''>' Others
decision affects rights of someone, the decision or act
is quasi-judicial. This last statement overlooks the
Das C. ].
aspect that every decision of the executive generally
is a-decision of fact and in most cases affects the rights
of someone or the other. Because an executive
authority has to determine certain objective facts as a
preliminary step in the discharge of an executive fm1ction, it does not follow that it must determine those
,;(acts judicially. When the executive authority has to
form an opinion about an objective matter as a
preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power
conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact
and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike
• matters of'an administrative character and are not
amenable to the writ oi certiorari."
To the like effect is the following observation of Faz!
Ali J .• in the same case at ]i>age 642 : ·
; • "The mere fact that an executive authority has
to decide something does not make the decision
judicial. It is the manner in which tfie •decision has
to be arrived at which makes the difference, and the
real test is: Is there any duty to decide judicially?
•
As I have already said, there is nothing in the
Ordina:u.ce to show that the Provincial Government has
to decide the existence of a public purpose judicially
•
Oi q11asi-judicially."
·
I
Dealing with the essential characteristics of a quasijudicial act as opposed to an administrative act, I
said at page 719:
•
" ......... the two kfods of acts have--many common
•
featur~s. Thus a person entrusted to do an adminis•
•
trative act has often to determine questions of fact
to enable him to exercise his. power. He has to consider facts and circumstancei! and ~o weigh pros and
cons in Iois minq before he makes up ·his mind to exei;,.
cise his po":er just as a pepon exercising a judicial or.
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STJPREME COU!{T REPORTS •• [19.59]
•
qu:i~i-judicial function ha~ t-0' <lo. Both.have t-0 net
Sh, 1 Rafoh;·""' in good faith. . A good an.d valid a?mini~trati,·e or
I<ha" :;, _,i., 01 ,,,, exec11t.1vc act brnds the stibicct and affects his rights or
v.
imposes liability on him just as effectively as a qLiasin, State of judicial act does. The exercise of nn aclminiqr:i,ti,-e
Madhya J',.,1e.,1z or exel'\1ti\·c act may well be and is frequently n,adt!
"". Othm
<lependent by the Legislature upon a condition or contingency which may invol\'e a question of fact, but
DHC. ].
the questiiJn of fulfilment of which may, ne\·erthdess,
be left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the
cxccutin! authority, as was dune in the se\-cral Ordin:tnc:e:;, regulations and enactments con.-;idered and
construed in the SC\'Cral cases referred to ahtJ\-c. Thi!
first two items of the definition given by Atkiu L. J.
may be equally applicable to ttn administrative acte
The rc:i.l test which distinguishes :i. q1rnsi-j11dicial act
from an administrative :i.ct is the third item in Atkin
L. ,J.';; <iefinit.ion, namely, the duty lo ai:!. judi.,ially."
J found support for my opinion on the following
passage occurring in t.he judgnwnt of LtU'd Hewart.
C. ,J. in R. v. Legislatii·e Ca;mnittte of the Church
Assemlily (1) :
"ln order that a bot~\' may Sttti;;fy the rc"quired
test it i8 not enough that. it should haw legal autlru~
rity to determine questions alfrcting the rights ot'
suhjt!ct.s; th"r~ must be super-adde<l to that diarncteristic the fort.her characteristic that the bodv has
the duty t-0 act judicially."
•
•
The abon' passage was quoted wit.h approval by Lord
Radcliffe in deli\•ering the judgment of t.h'' Privy
Council
in Nakkud11 Ali's case (').
•
r ll!J\\' proceed lo apply the prin<:iplcs disc:usood
:•hove tu the fads of the present case. The simple
\
fact. that the incompetency of the committee goes to
the root. of the jurisdiction of the Sutto Go\·ernmcut
t.o exercise. itf>.jlower uutler s. r>3-A docs not rcr1uire
thnt that fact. must. be <lctermined juclicially. 'J'hc sole
•
•
•
•p1Cstio11 i;;, tloeH the statute require th" State Government to act judicially. There net·d not he any expl'e~ prov.isi()n that. the;Stitte Govemment must act
• lLHlicially: "[t will be sufficient if tliis rlut.i; may be
•
'i95S
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\1) 119iSJ I E.B. 111, 4I5.
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• ~UPREMEJ COURT REPORT~
1463
implied from ~h~ provisi~ns .of the statute. The mere
r95B /
fact that
a
question
of
fact
has
to
be
determined
as
.
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k
S/in
ades yatn
a prehmmary cond1t1on befo1't:l aet10n can be ta en Hhare & Another
under the statute by itself does not carry that implicav.
tion. There must be some indication in the statute The state of
as to"the manner or mode in which the preliminary Madhya Pradesh
fact is to be determined. I find nothing in s. 53-A
& Others
which in terms imposes any duty on the State Govern-·
-· •
.d
Das c. J.
ment to act judicially. No form of procedure is hu
down. or even referred to from which such a dnty
could be inferred. On the contrary, one finds a significant omission of any provision like that embodied in
snb-s. (5) of s. 57 which requires that no order under
that section shall be passed until reasonable opportulll.ty has been given to the committee to furnish an
explanation. It is also material to note that whereas
an order under s. 57 is of a permanent character the
one to be made under s. 53-A is to be of a limited
duration, i.e., for such period not exceeding 18 months
.'ts may be specified in such order. Further, s. 53-A
• contemplates swift acti~ and a judicial hearing may
easily frustrate the very purpose contemplated by
s. 53-A, for a judicial act wiU be subject to the powers
~f•superintendence of the superior courts and the
operation of the order under s. 53-A may be postponed, as it has been done in this very c!arre, by taking
the matter from court to court until it is set at rest
by this Court. In this connection reference may also
•
be made to s. 25-A of the Act which authorises the
State Qovernment to require the committee to appoint, inter alia, a Chief Executive Officer. If such
CQ,Ulrnittee fails to comply with the requisition wi1'hin
the period specified, the State Government may, under
sub-s. (3), if it thinks fit, appoint such officer and fix
his pay and allowance. Sub-section (4) authorises the
State Government to r~quire the comm~tee to delegate
to the "fficer so appointed such powers, dnties and func•
tions of the committee, its president, vice-president or
•
the secretary under this Act or any rule or bye-law
made thereunder as may be SP.ecified jn such requisition
and if t!ie committee fails to comply :nith lluch requisition within a reasonable time, the State Governme!ft•
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SVPREME COT.'.RT REPORT~ • [1959]
•
may determine the power~, du\ies am! fu111ctions which
1464
'
i958
shall be exercised and performed b\' such ofliccr in ad<liJ\h;;e c?~(c~,~~;;;;, t-ion to or to the exclusir>n of their .. exercise or 1•erforn1v.
a.nee by committee, it.s pr~sidcnt, vice-president or sec'/'he State of
rclary. Nobody will say that the State (;u,·crnnwnt
Madhyu 1'.a<fph must exercise the powers 11nder s. 25-A aft.er holding
& Othm
any judicial enquiry. The only difference in the Ian(
;.,~ J.
guage of s. 2-5-A a.ml s. 5:3-A both of which were ino;erted in t.he Act in 194 i is tha.t action can he taken
under 8. 53-A only when the ~nmmittee is incompetent
to perform the dutie< imposed on it-a fact the determination of which is not in so many words left t.o the
subjective opinion of the State Goverrmwut, whereas
action can he ta.ken under s. 25-A on t.he satisfaction
of the Stal<! Go\'ernmPnt a.s t-0 certain facts whic1i
is, in t.enns, left to the subjcctiV(! determimtt.ion of t.i1e
State Go\'ernJtient. If, as 1 have said, the determination of a jurisdictional fact is not hy itself sufficient to
inrlicate tlrnt, it lrns u, be done juclicially, there is
nothing else in s. 5:J-A or in any other H(«:tion of th(:.
Act which will lead t-0 the coiwlusion tlmt, the State •
Government must act. jndicially.
The only other
thing strongly relied on .by learned couns..I icn· the
appellants is that the State Go\'ernment may exercts<.
its power under s ..53-A "by an order stat.irrg reasons
therefor publis1wd in the Gazette". The re'}uir<>ment
that the i)tatc Government must gil'l;. reasons for t.he
•
order it makes does not. necessarily re'}uire it to record
•
a judgment judicially im·i\'ed at. The kgislat.urc
might well ha~e thonght that public policy j'('quirl'd
that the State Go\'ernment entrnsll'd with large
administrati,·e power should record its re<Lso'!s Jin·
exercising the same so as to allay any misgi,·ings that
\
may arise in the minrl of the public. ln my judgment, the action ta.ken by the State (;o\'ernment uu<ler
s. 53-A is not 1!.iudieinl or qua~i-judicial act but is an
a<lminist.raii,-e itet. Learned cou1J>;c] for th~ n.ppcl•
hrnts relied on the case of C1qud ,._ Child ('). That
•
•
decision clearly went upon the construction of the
st>Ltwtc t.hat came.up for ;consid.,ra.tion. The fact that
actiou cou1d•be t<Lkcn under Umt statute on ~ffidn.nt.s
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ltEPORTS
• ~UPREME COURT
•
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1465
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was constru~ •as a cleilr iqdication that the Bishop
I958 ~
had to arrive at a decision as to the negligence of the
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. ev1"d ence a dd uced. b ef ore 1"t bY a ffid
Shri Radeshyam
V!car
on h earmg
. a- J(hare
,;;, Another
v1t which led to the next conclus10n that the Vicar
v.
must be given an opportunity of being heard and of The State of
addttcing evidence in his own defence. From tl1is cir- Madhya Pradesh
cumstance it was inferred that even when the Bishop
& Others
acted on his knowledge of fact he must also proceed
Das C. J.
judicially, for the two modes of procedure were treated OQ the same footing by the section itself. As I
have said, there is nothing ins. 53-A or any other section which may lead us to infer a duty to proceed
judicially as was done in that case. On the contrary
there are indications leading to a different conclusion.
• To say that action to be taken under s. 53-A is au
aaministrati ve action is not to say that the State
Government has not. to observe the ordinary rules of
fair play. Reference to the observation made by
Fortesque J. in Dr. Bentley's case about God asking
•. • Adam and Ji]ve whether they had eaten the forbidden
• fruit appearing in the judgment of Byles J. in Cooper
v. The Wandsworth Board of Works(') is apposite. The
decisil\n in the last mentioned case clearly establishes
. taat in some cases it may be necessary to give an
"opportunity to a party to have his say before an administrative action is taken against him. But that
is quite different from the well-ordered procedure involving notice and opportunity of hearing necessary
to be followed before a quasi-judicial action, open to
•
correction by a superior court by means of a writ of
certiorari, can be taken. The difference lies in the
iqanner and mode of the two procedures. For_ the
•
brea~h of the rules of fair play in taking administrative action a writ of certiorari will not lie.
I have already recounted the events and proceedings
•
that preceded the actu.al passing of the order under
s. 53-.4. If the action taken under tlr.tt gection is to
•
be regarded as an administrative action, as I hold it
•
•
should be, then I have no donbt that the appellants
have had more than fair play. It is said that the
State Government did not •hold aby enqniry l:iefore
,
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(1) [1863] '4 C.B'. (N.S.) 180; 143 E. R. 414. •
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SVPHE:11E CDURT I$EPORTS
[1959]
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making t.he order n.nd th.at, Oiercfore, ~t cannot. be
sai<l that the appell<ints had <m opportunity to defend
• "' &
.a ""Y""'
.
. k''lll(J. l do not
Khare
,;,,other t IH'lllSC 1\'eS ag1unst
D.n _,I' <l <'f 0 ,. t IUS
v.
consi<ler tlrnt there is :tny substance in this content.ion.
The State of
If the State Go,·cr·nment wantc<l to hol<l any enquiry
Madhya I'radeslt it wotLkl <lo SCJ through scinie of its officers.
~\'ho
Othm
would he more appropriate n.nd competent to hold the
•
enquiry
Da< C. f.
. except the officers on the spot? The Additioun.l Deputy Colleetor is obviously the person to
whom the duty of enquiry could properly be cntn~ste<l.
All the elrnrgcs lc\'elled n.gainst the appellams were
forwarded to them, :ind they Hubmit.ted exp\a.11ation.
The fir,t n.ppdlant, 11·ho is the President, personally
n.ttend!'cl mn.ny of the sittings. There is no ""ggestion
thn.t they Jrnd been prennh·cl from adduc:ing c\·ic!Pnce
in their owll defence, The enquiry was held info
wh:tt had been allegccl n.gn.fnst their conduct. It. was
sure.ly 11ot a J>lll'JHlSl'less enquiry. As a result of the
enquiry certn.in finding; \n•re arrived al which were
•
accepted by the Stn.te Government a.nd a.ii order wn.s, ,.
ma.de nndcr s. 53-A. J. do not sec wh&t. grievance the ,
0
appelln.nts can possibly have. ln my judgment there
!ms been no remissness on the p&rt of the• State
Government.
•
••
For reasons stat.eel ahove I would dismiss tiiis"
appeal. ·
lJliogr1·.lli _/.
BHAGWATJ J.-I also agree that the appeal should
•
be dismissed with cosk; bnt would like to add a fow
•
words of my own.
1 have l;n.d the h.. nefit of reading the jnc.lgm<'nts
prepared by my Lord the Chief .Jnstice, Kapur J. and
•
Snbbn. Hao ,J. l agree with the reasoning anp tlw
co11cluKio11s r~&c·.hecl in those judgments in r<·gard to
points Nos. (i) & (ii), viz.,
•
(i) that though the Xot.ification purports to hn.ve
been made in exercise of the P!>Wers conferred on the
St:ttc ()oycfnnient by s. 53-A, in substance r.nd in
•
reality
it has been made under s. 57 of the Act; 1ind,
•
•
(ii) thar if the Notifien.ti!)l1 is held to be one made
unde1· H. 57 it. jg ultra i:irn~ and bn.d since. the stR.tntor·v
·'
rcquiremeiit .'of a;~·ording re&Honn.blc opportunity t~J
'
~xplain has not been complied with.
•
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<l,,-;-_d ,
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SUPREM£ COURT REPORJ.'S
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In regard.to point J\i1i. (iii), viz.,
•
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1467
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(iii) that even if the impugned Notification be Shri Radeshyam
held to come within s. 53-A i~ is still ultra vires since Khare & Another
before promulgating it the State Government has
v.
committed a breach of the rules of natural justice in The State of
not•giving any opportunity to the appellants tQ defend Madhya Prade>h
& Others
themselves, however, there is a difference of opinion
between my Lord the Chief Justice and Kapur J. on Bhagwa7i J.
the one hand, and Subba Rao J. on the other, as to
the •character of the act performed by the State
Government while arriving at tho conclusion that the
Committee is not competent to perform the duties
imposed on it or undertaken by it. Whereas the
former are of the view that in arriving at such con0clusion the State Government performs only an administrative function, the latter is of the view that the
fact whether the committee is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it or undertaken by it is
a jurisdictional fact and in arriving at thflt conclusion ·
• the State Government performs a quasi-judicial func• tion. In my opinion, the determination of the question whether the State Government performs an admini&"trative or a quasi-judicial function in the matter
•o{ arriving at such conclusion is immaterial for the
•purposes of this appeal, inasmuch as an inquiry had
been instituted by the State Government.in the matter
of the charges levelled against the appellants and full
opportunity had been given to them to defend them•
selves. I need not add anything in this regard to
what has been said by my Lord the Chief Justice in
the judgment just delivered by him. I only wish
•
t,p say that the circumstances adverted to therein
am~y demonstrate that the appellants had notice of
the charges which had been levelled against them and
,
had rendered full explanation in regard to the same,
and, in the matter of·the inquiry in regard to those
chargA<s the principles of natural justi"e had been
•
complied with and the conclusion reached by the State
•
•
Government in the matter of the incompetence of the
committee was unassailable:
.
•
That being so, I would prefer not to· el::press any
opinion°on the-vexed question as to whether the ooe
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1468
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ST)PREl\IE COUJ{T H~POltT8 • • (1959]
•
performed by the State UQvcrf1rnent is <jj1asi-j11dicial
or
administmt.ive in character.
Snr1 na<1esnyaiu
'l'I
J h
.
.
Khare .~ Auotlirr
IC rcsu t,
owe\·er, l'f the same and I agree with
"·
the order proposed dismiosing the appeal with cost.s.
n, State of
S. K. DAS J.-·I agree generall.r with the concl11/ltCJ:iliy" Pradc.~h
& oihm
sions re'achcd hy mv Lord the Chief .Justice an<l'the
,reasons on which th'osc conclusions 1uc founded. Bnt.
s. K. Das J. I wish to add n fow words \l;it.!1 regard to the t.hird
ciuestion, namely, if in making the impugned notification, the 8tate C:o,·crnment viol11t.ecl the principles of
naturnl justice. The ;1 n:;wer to that quest.ion depends
on whether on a true construct.ion of t.he '"'levant
statute, the 8tai.e Covernment pnformcd an aclminis.
tmti\'C function or what has been callee! 11 quasrjndicial function in making the impugned notifica,..
tion.
I am of the Yiew that t.he action Utken bv the St.:Lte
Government under s. !l:l-A of the Act is in its.true nltture
an administrative act. It iil said that where t.hcre i~
':t c!uty to act judicially', the fuuctiorf is quasijudici;L!: that howe,·cr does not. hdp us very much in
11ndPrstan<ling the distinction between an adrui11istrati,·c function and a <prasi.judicial function. Where.
the statute clearly in<licat"s that the function is ju di-•
ei,11, there is little diffieult\'. The difficult\· <irises in
cases when• •tlic point ta.lrnn is that
necessary
impli<,,ttion the st..ituk re4uirc>s an .iclministmti,·e
hocly or executive authority to act judicially. lt is
•
in<kccl gerwrally correct lo say that where an ttdminist.rative bod\• or 1111thriritv is under a dut\· to ac.t, jurlici:tlly,
its f~uietion is jud-icial or quasi-juc'lieial. But it:
•
is, t<l some extent, a tautology t<> say that the (un8ti<>ll i" judicial or qwtsi-jndici<d if it is to lw <lone
\
jnd icially .
To get to the bottom of the clistinction, we nurnt go
a little rleeVir W.to t.he coutBnt ol' the expression 'duty
• to act judicially'. As has been repeated so•ottcn,
•
the question may arise in widely differing circum•
stances and a precise, clear-cut or exhaustive dchmtion <'lf the.cx.presf!lon is r~ot possible. But in decisions
dealing with "the <jUCHtion se\'t~ral tests.have br,en lard
0
down
; for exam pie.
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S.C.R, • .SUPREM.E
COURT
REPORTS
•
•
1469
•
•
'!!/·
(i) whetker there is' a li.s inter partes ;
(ii) whether ·there is a claim (or proposition) and Shri Radeshyam
an opposition ;
•
Khare b Another
v.
(iii) whether the decision is to be founded on the
The State of
taking of evidence or on affidavits;
Madhya Pradesh
(iv) whether the decision is actuated in whofo or in
& Others
part by questions of policy or expediency, and if so,
--;
whether in arriving at the decision, the statutory S. K. Das].'
body has to consider proposals and objections and
evidence ; and
(v) whether in arriving at its decision, the statutory body has only to consider policy and expediency
and at no stage has before it any form of lis.
The last twci tests were discussed and considered in
•R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee('). It is fairly
clear to me that tests (i) to (iv) are inappropriate in
the present case by reason of the provisions in s. 53-A
as contrasted with s. 57 and other sections of the Act.
The test which is fulfilled in the present case is test
(v), and thM makes the function under s. 53-A a purely
• administrative functiot1 in spite of the requirement of
an injtial determination of a jurisdictional fact and
the recording of reasons fo¥ the decision.
••
• I am content to rest my decision on the aforesaid
ground, as I am not satisfied that t~e enquiry held
by the Deputy Collector was a proper ertquiry if it be
held thats. 53-A entrusts a quasi-judicial function to
the State Government and therefore requires compli•
ance with the principles of natural justice. That
enquiry was for a different purpose altogether, the
charges were not the same, and in my view the Muni•
<!ipal Committee had no real opportunity of meeting
the charges on which the State Government ultimately
took action. I prefer, therefore, to base my decision
on the third question. on the short ground that the
function which the State Government--ex<;rcised under
•
s. 53-A was administrative in nature and it is settled
•
•
law that such action is not amenable to a writ of
certiorari.
,
On the first two que.stionEI I am fo entjr~ agreement
•
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(<) [1~52] 2 Q.B•413.
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1470
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SUPHE.\IE couiiT ll-E.l'OH.TS •• (1!)59]
•
'~958
Shri Hade:;hyani
with mv Lord the Chief .1 ust,ce and h:.ve nothing
useful
add.
lo
KAPUR J.-This appeal pursuant to special learn
of this Court is directed ag>iinst. the judgment and
The .).late of
order of the :lfadhya l:'rndesh High Court. Tlw ap1icl.
,\!adliya Pr,1dc1h
huts ate the .\lunieipal Committee of lJlmmtari and
0- Other5.
its !'resident Jfadhcshyam Khare who are challenging
.-the
order of the 8tak Governme11l of i\IadhY<L l'rnde:;h
l\.tip11r J.
appointing an Executirn Otlieer of the :llu11l.,ipal Committee u11der s. 53-A of the C. P. & Bcrar Munid'ipalitics Act (Act 11 of Ui22) to he termed in this judgnwnt, the Act.
The facts leading lo this appeal arc that. one
Dhuruial Daga who was a member of the Dhamtari
.\lu11icipal Committee (appellant No. 2) wa::; fou11d im•0
porting cottDn into the municipal area without paying
octroi duty. He the11 wc11t 011 hunger >:trike and tdso
<list.rihuted pamplilet" making all<>g"tiuns against both
the appellants. At this stfLgc the Collector of Haipur
di,;trict pnrsonally i11t-0n·cneu ant.I persuaded l.Jhurmal • •
Dag<t to break 111s fast 011 an tlssura11ce that he (the
Colketor) would look into his allegations. I 11 ])llrSUancc of that assura11ce Mr. Hana, Deput.y Collecl<.V'•
held an enquiry and c;.\llc<l the expla11atio11 of the•
l\Iunicipn,l Con1111ill-0e ant.I its President >ind submitted
his report on ':\o\·ember 22, Hl56, which was forwarded
to the State Govemrne11t on April 24, l!.l57. The St.at-0
<;o,·ermncnt tlwreupon took action under s. 53-A of
•
the Aet ;tud by a notitica;,i,111 dated \" 01-cmbcr 18, l!l57,
appoiutcu a Deputy Collector B. P .•fain res1JUndent
~o. 3 as Exccuti\'e Ulticl'!" of the Dhamt.ari Municip1d
•
Comi11ittec for a period of 18 months on the gr•untl
th1tt the .\I1111ieip1d Commit.t.ec was iueompcteut in the
pcrformauce of its duties under t.he Act. The relevant
part of the nut itication Wt\S as fq)lows:
"\\'hcrnas -"it appears to tl'lc St.iLl.-0 Gu\·cr,1me11t
• t;hat the 1\lunieip1d Cumrnitt.ee, DhamLari, h1ts pro\'e<l
•
•
itself incompetent to perform the duti~s impo8ed on it
by or under the Central Provinces 1t11d Bcmr Municipalities Acti, l!J22 (H of l 9'22), inasmuch as it•
• • {<t) gr~nkd grain and building arl vance; to the
•
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S.C.R.
• •
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SUPREM]l] COURT REPORTS
•
•
1471
1 95 8 /
employees '~thout priot saJJ.ction and no efforts were
made for their recovery,
shri Radeshyam
(b) showed carelessness in cases of embezzlement Kha" & Another
of the employees and did not report such cases to
v.
Government,
The State of
.(c) failed to control the President who. issued Madhya Pradesh
orders in cases in which he had 110 authority,
& Others
(d) spent thousands of rupees on sanitation and
Kapur-. _
1
other works although there was no provision in the
budget,
(e) allowed unconcerned persons to interfere in its
working,
(f) showed partia,lity in the appointment and
dismissals of the employees, further such appointments
and dismissals were made against rules,
•, (g) delayed the constitution of the committee and
the framing of budget,
(h) misused the trucks of the municipality,
(i) failed to recover the lease money,
t.
(j) sho\j'n partiality in the issue of transit passes
• •to certain traders, further excess octroi duty was
charged on certain articles and in certain cases where
octroioduty is not leviable it was levied just to harass
1'he people,
•
(k) distributed municipal manure to certain
•
persons without any charge, similarly 8i~tributed the
manure free of cost and used the truck of the municipality for this purpose,
•
(1) failed to control its president who spent the
money of the municipal Committee without any
authority,
4;,
(m) spent huge amount on the maintenance of
tlie mads and drainage but their condition has remained unsatisfactory,
(n) failed to give copies of the documents as
allowed under rules, alfID failed to allow its members to
inspect. the records as i~ permissible un1!1ir rules,
•
(o) failed to invite tenders of purchase of articles."
•
This order of the State Government was challenged
under Art. 226 in the Madhya Pradesh High Com;t on
•
the allegation that the orde'r passM bj. the State
~
Governntent constituted
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1-172
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SDPHEME COUHT HEPORT~
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[ 19::>9]
''95 8
·•a ffogrnnt :dn15e uf Lhe jiowPrs c;nierrcd uncler
seetion
;)il-A of the :llnni<'ipalitics Act. The cha1gc,;
1iyam
SIJTl
r1
Kha" & A,. 011,,, enumc:ratcd in the not.ilieatinn wprc nc1·er frnnwd. The
v.
State Con,rnnient did not SPl'\"C :my nntiee on the
The S1a1t of
:\Iuuicip:d Commit.tee or its l'rcside1{t to show cause
Madhya P.aJ,.,,, against the charges nor werP thny afforded auy O!'J>Or& Otl1e1:,
·
· s:iy 111
· tie
I matter."
tnn1ty
tu l 1:1\'C t I1e11·
The appellarots submitted that the finding about the
l(at•rtr ).
ineo111p1'lcncy of the rommitt<>e was 1·it iated becftusc
110 enquiry mi.' held and there was no cYiden.cc in
~uppnrt thereof :iml thr order wa~ l'Oid and inoperntil'e
hccause
(I) "there is non-olrnervancc of t.he mandaton·
pro1·isions. The power h:is not bel'n exPreiserl withii1
the limit,:; prescribed.
.•
(2) th<'re is no <letermination of the basic: facts.
(3) t,here is a 1·iola.tion of t.he rules of 11:it.11rnl
justice.
(4) the action is rnala fid<-."
Tlw respondents denied tlw allegii.tions a,ncl submit-.
tc(\ that. the State (;01·ernment.111ade t.he order 1111der
~- ;):).A of the Act 011 the report. of ;\Ir. TI1tna., .Deputy
CoJk,ci.or who held 1t11 c11quiry i11lo thl' allcgat,inn.-;
made against thte :ippdla.nl under the orders of tll~.
Collector of Ha.ipur; that proper notice was gi1·en to
t.he Sccrel:ir.¥ o"f the illuni<:ipal Committee which filed
its Written ~tatement through it.,; l'rPsident :ippell<tnt
l\o.
I who appeared personally during the proce<,dings
•
of the enquiry, b11t no opportunity for" leading any
e1·idenee" was <lemandcd by the appellant nu;- was it
denied. Tlwy also pleaded thut nu formal enquiry
mi,: required under t.he law and t.hat the Court couJd
not go into the sutlieieney or otherwise of the retiwns
for t.1\king 1i.ction" and the same will not he enquired
into b.1· t.he Court ohjcct.ively."
A learned~ingle ,T udge of t,1e High Court cl is missed
the
petition holding that whatc1·cr he t.he !'Ositiun
•
under
s.
57, under s. 53-A no explanation w;is r<'q11ired
•
to lw callt!d from the municipal committee a.ml t.li<:
St1tt~ (;o,·er~me11J, was ;iuthorisecl under t,he law to
t\Ct prompt!_(.
'(he High Court 1wgatived the_ allcga•t1on that the Slate Guvernment had proce0ded against
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S.C.R . •
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~UPREME COURT REPOR'LS
•
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1473
•
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the Municip~l Committee,• appellant No. 2, at the
--,,
instance of Dhurmal Daga. The learned Judge Shri Radeshyam
said:
•
/{hare & Another
v.
"I have gone through the material on which the
The State of
Statti Government based its action on enquiry into the
Pradesh
charges levelled against the municipal committee and Madhya
& Others
find that there were several other complaints besides
those made by Dhurmal Daga. The record of the
Kapur •J.
enquiry shows that on some occasions the petitioner
was ')Jresent during the enquiry. I am satisfied that
the invocation of the power of th is Court under Art.
226 of the Constitution is not open to the present
petitioner".
A Letters Patent appeal against this judgment was
rtismissed on February 21, 1958.
The appellants have come in appeal to this Court by
special leave and have raised four points before us:
(1) That the notification though it purports to be
• under s. 53,. A of the Act is real! v under s. 57 which is
shown by the grounds given iii the notification, the
powers vested in the "Executive Officer and by the
effect"of the order;
; •(2) and if it is a notification under s. 57 it is ultra
vires because the statutory requirements of the section
had not been complied with;
(3) even if the notification be held to be under
s. 53-A of the Act it was still null and void and
•
inoperative as it violated the principles of natural
justice .and
(4) that the order made was mala \fide inasmuch
•
a.s it had been passed with an ulterior object of tal<ing
awa,y the control of the municipality from the Independent Party which was in a majority and that this
was m accordance with the policy adopted by the
State Government of ~uperseding or suspending municipalimes which were not controlled by the Congress
•
Party. As further proof of the mala fides of l'tes•
pondent No. 1, the State Government, it was alleged
that Radheshyam Khare appellant No. 1 was expelled
from 1Jie Congress Party "for six ye":in\ in about
•
March .1957 Because he stood as' an Independe.1•
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1474
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SIJPREl\IE COURT HEPOH-TS- • [1959)
.
candidate for election to .I.he tower Hotl!;c of l'adi:~•
rnent in the 1957 rlcetions.
Sliri Hadtsliyan:
lihar1 {- , 1., 011.,,
The allegation of m!tla fides was not seriously
pressed nor is 1here1tny material to sustain it.
v.
The Stat~ of
In order to <lecidc the other q ucst ions raised iu this
!11adhyr1 Prnde~li appeaL it is necessary to examine the scheme oi the
(..). Othe1 s
Act and its provisions relating to the powers of the
~tatc
GoYernmcnt in regard to mu11icipal com111itte(·S.
•
Kat11r }.
Chapter I of tlw Act makes proyisions for the constitution of municipalities. .Section 4 empower~ the
State Grn-crnmcut to siguify by uotifieat ion its intention
lo declare a local area t-0 be a municipality, to alter
its limits or to withdraw the whole of it from a
municipality. Section 5 gi1·es the right to the inhitbitants of such local area to file objections againe+
anything contained in the notification within a period
of 6 weeks and after consideration of such objections
if an~·, f.hc Stat<' Covemmeut can confirm, vary or
reverse its notification under s. 4. Sect.ions 6 to 8
cical with consequential orders on inclusion •and exclu- •
sion of local areas.
,
Seetion 9 1rnthoriscs the State Gornrnmcnt t~ gi 1·e
such powers to it municij;iality its in its opinion it i~
suited for. l t provides :
• •
"If t.hc circumst11nccs of any munici1mlity are
such that, ill ·the oninion of the faale Go1·ernment,
nny proYi;;ion of tl\is Act is unsuited thereto, the
Stnte Government may, bv notification:
•
(a.) withdraw the 'operMion of that prnvision from
the municipality;
•
(b) apply that provi,ion to the municipality i11 It
•
modified form to be Hpecitied in Rt>eh notificMion' •
(c) rnako any additional provision for the muni<!ipalit.y in respect of the matter mentioned in t.he
pro1·ision which has been withdrawn from, or applied
in a modified form to, the 1111111i<!ipality."
Chapter Ii cfc'.ils with the memliership of com1T1ittees
•
and chapter Ill with Subordimttl' Agencies. Under
•
•
this chapter fall Sub-Commit.tees, President;; a.nd other
officers of .'.11unicipal Committees. Section 2:) . .-\ which
deals with" !he ajJfl<•i11t.1na11t of 1~ Chief
E~ecutive
•
0
Officer, Health Ollicer or Supervisor is aB und<?r:
195 8
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S.C.R. • "SUPREME COURT REPOR'FS
•
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(1) "TrTe State Govern"ment may, if in its opinion
the appointm~nt of- .
.
Shd Radeshyam
(a) a Chief Executive Officer IS necessary for Khare .;;, A1>other
general improvement in the administration of the
v.
mnr;icipality .................. and it is satisfied that the The State of
state of the municipal fond justifies expendilure on Madhya Pradesh
· t hc committee
·
't
&Others
suc h appointment, reqmre
to appom
•
l
any such officer.
J{apur J.
(2) A requisition under sub-section (1) shall state
the period within which the committee shall comply
therewith.
(3) If the committee fails to comply with the
requisition within the stated period, the State Government may, if it thinks fit, appoint such officer at the
~.ost of the committee and fix his Pi>Y and allowances,
the rate of his contribution to the provident fund or
to his pension and other conditions of service.
(4) The State Government may requfre the committee to delegat.e to the Chief Executive Ofticer
• ...............•... appointed under this se_ction such powers,
• duties and functions of•the committee, president, vicepresident, or secretary under this Act or any rule or
b1e-law made thereunder ~s may be specified in such
•requisition, and if the committee fails to comply with
such requisition within a reasonable time, the State
Government may determine which powel's, duties and
functions shall be exercised and performed by such
officer in addition to, or to the exclusion of, their
•
exercise and performitnce by the committee, president,
vice-pr~sident or secretary.
(5) The secretary of the committee shall be sub•
otdiqate to the Chief Executive Officer.
•
(6) The provisions of sub-section (5) of section 53-A shall apply to the Chief Executive Officer
or Health Officer or S~1pervisor appointed under this
section ".
•
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•
Chapter IV deals with the procedure to be followed
•
•
in Committee Meetings, chapter V with property,
contracts and liabilities and .chapter VI with duties of
committees. Chapter VIII is head<>d" G:_ontrol ": It
•
prescribes the ;rnthorities which have the· power ~o.
conti;pl the. acts of commit.tees. and also lays down the.
)
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1476
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S"t'JPREME COUHT ltEPOltTS• • [1959]
~elho<l ~ts
• '95 8
extent of such contrnl and Urn
;f
exercise.
, h
Sect.ion 52 gives
to thP• De1)ut\·
Commissionei·
the
Shri R 11.-u'< yr1m
,
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gJuol! 5,.. Andl//r fJO\\"CI' to l'xam1ne the 1n·oceed1ngs of cn1nm1ttec8 or
v.
o'.Ib-eomrnit\.ees. SP"tion 53 empowers a Deputy Com.
n, Si.tc of missiorwr to suspend the execution of any orde1; or
Ma.ihya p,,,desh r"solution of a committc.~ or a sub-commit tee and
&. Othm
prescribes the circ11111sta11ces in whid1 this power can
be exercised. Then comes s. 53.,\ which em[JO\\l'J'8
Kotur J.
the nppointment of an Executi\'e Officer by the
State Government.. Section 54 prnvideo that i1r the
r;tse of emergency the State (;pyernrncnt, on the
receipt nf the report under s. :)2 or otherwise may
require a municipality to ext>cute any work or
pcrfonn nny ac\. which in its opinion is neccssitry for
t.he scrnce of t.hc public. U11der s. 55 the Stall~
Covcrnmc11t if S<tt.isned after recPiving a report under
s. 52 or after enquiry if any that a municipal committt>e has made rlcfault. in performing its dnties ma.y
appoint "some pernon lo perform " the rluty nn<l can
direct the municip:d "ommittee to pay• rca;onabl1, •
remuneration to the person 80 <Rppoinled. If default, •
is maclc in any such payment Uw State CoH·r14ment
can under 8. 5G direct a• per-<on haYing custody o~
municipal fn11ds to make such payment. Sect ion tN •
empowers the Statr G(l\"crnnw11t to dissoln: and.'01· to
suiwrserle th1! 1nunicipal cmnmitteP. h·1·tion 58 °gin•s
to th1· State (;oyernrncnt. the power of l'O\'ision rtnd
an
ovemll control ovn the actions of otlicet·,; acting
•
or ta kin 0er an\'
;L<:tio11 1111dcr the' Act. But it cannot
"
l'PV"1'se auy orrlcr 11nlPss notice. is given to t.l1e •JlcLl'I ics
inteTeslPd and they arc allowed to appear ;111rl he
hcafrl. Seel.ion 58.A aut.horises the State Governjllcl'IL
to Pnforce its orders. Section 58-B gi\·ies to the .~ta.le
(;o,·ernrnent the power of review o! order.-; pa8st>d hy
itself and Commissio11nrH and Deputy Commissioncrn
!Ht\'C simil:v powerH of reYi"'~ing i.hcir own order~
1n·o,·idc<l that no order shall be var}.,d unless n1~t.ice is
•
gi\·cn to t.}w p;Lrties interested to appear an1l be heard
•
in support of the order . .
U 1lder s. r:.o celitain oiliccrs appointed by gern•.ral
or special i>r~crs G>f the State Gonn·nn1fnl are.en tit lc>d
~t,~ Mtcncl any me1:ting of t.hc committee apd ·a<tdress
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SUPREM.E COURT REPORTS
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•
1477
it on any matter affecting. the work of their de1iart'958 / .
ments. Section 60 provides . for t.h0 settlement ofI SIiri. R-d
•h
a es yani
disputes between the committees and other loca Kha>e & Another
bodies.
v.
As ss. 53-A and 57 are the subject matter of contro- The State of
ver~y in this case it is necessary to quote tpem in Madhya Pradesh
full :
& Othm
Section 53-A "(1) If a committee is not competent
Kapur• J.
to perform the duties imposed on it or undertaken by
it bx or under this Act or any other enactment for the
time being in force and the State Government considers that a general improvement in the. administration of the municipality is likefy to be secured by
the appointment of a servant. of the Government as
the executive officer of the Committee, the State
0
Government may, by an order stating the reasons
therefor published in the Gazette, appoint such servant
as the executive officer of the committee for such
period not exceeding eighteen months as may .be
• specified i:t\ such order.
(2) Any executive officer appointed under subsection (1) shall be deemed to be an officer lent to the
comnhttee by Government under sub-section (3) of
'!rection 25.
•
(3) When under sub-section (1) an executive
•
officer is appointed for any . commit.tee, the State
Government shall determine from time to time which
powers, duties and functions of the committee, presi•
dent, vice- president or secretary under this Act or any
rule or bvelaw made thereunder shall be exercised and
perfor.ti1ed by such officer, in addition to, or to the
e.xclusion of, their exercise and performance bx the
•
said •committee, president, vice-president or secretary.
•
(4) The Secretary of the committee shall be subordi)
nate to tho executive officer.
(5) The executive <;>fficer shall have the right to
atten<i all meetings of the committee aJtd aRy joint com•
mittee and to take part in the discussion so as to make
•
an explanation in regard to the subject under discussion, but shall not move, second, or vote on any resolu'
•
·. •
"
tion or other motion ".
•
Section: 57 wl!ich gives power to· the Governmelll1'
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• ••
SUPHE~IE COURT REPORTS
1478
'
•
• •
[1959]
to dissoh·e or s11persede th~ mtmicia1dity iH as
follows :
•
.
Sliri • J("dt.<./;yatu
mme ,c,. Anotlia
"(1) If a committee is.not competent to perform, or
v.
persistently makes default in the performa11ec of, 1.hc.
Tile Stute of
dut.ies imposPd on it or undertnkcn by it under this
Madhy.• p.,.,i,,1i Act. or ;tn\·
. other enactment for the time being., i11 farce ,
& Othm
or exceeds or abuses iLs powers to a gra,·e extent, the
8tatc Government may, by nn order ;;titting t lw
Klpu' /.
re;tso11s tlwrefor published in the Oflici<d Gazette,
dissolve s11ch committee and mav order a fresh election
to ta.Im pl<tce.
•
•
(2) If after fresh elections the new commitl.ec continues to b<' incompclent to perform, or to make default
in the performance of, such duties or exceeds or
abus!" it-s power:i t~> a grave !'xt.cnt, the State (:overnnwnt may, by 1m order stating the reasons therdot~
published i11 the Official Gazette, declare the commit.t<.·e
t-o he incompetent or in default, or to have exc"eded or
abused its powers, ns the cas« 111ay be, and supers!,<le it
for a pt,riod to be Hpeciticd in the order.
•
(3) lf a committ.ee is so dissolved or superseded, the
following co11scque11ecs shall e11~11e:
(a) all mrn1bers of th" cnmmittl'c shall, as •from
the <l:ttc of the order, nrcal<' their offices as suc11•
members;
•
(h) tdl poweri\, a11d <lut ics of the comrnitt"e may,
1111t-il the com!nitwr is rcco1rnt ir-.ut{,d, b" exercised and
performed by s1wh person or persons as t-hc St;it"
Government
may appoint i11 that belmlf;
•
(c) all property vested in it shall u11t.il the eom111it.t"e
is reco11stitutrnl vest. in the State Government.. •
(4) 011 the expiration of the period of supcrscssion
speci°fied i11 the order, the committee shall be reco¥st.~
t-uted, and the persons who Yacated tlwir ofliccs 1111der
sub.section (3), cla11se (n), shall not, by reason solely
of such superscssio11 be deemed 1lisqualified for being
• i
'95 8
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•
•
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•
1nen1bcrs.
• ·•
•
(i)) !'\o order under s11b.,eetio11 (I) or 'uh-section (2)
•
shall be pasHed nnt-il n'aso1ia.ble oppDrtunity !ms
hee11 gi,·011 tu the commit}!'C to furnish a11 expbrna.
tiou. •
• •
•
• !ti) Any pc;son -or llersons appoil1teil by ti~ State
•
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S.C.R .• •SUPREME CQURT REPORTS
.
1479
/
Government-to exercise ancl perform the powers and
r958
•
dutieS" of a dissolved or superseded committee may
- •
. paymen t , 1'f' t h es t a t e G't>vernment so d'1rect s, ,,ior Kha
Shri Radeohyam
receive
e & An th
0
"
his or their services from the municipal fund."
' v.
A review of all these provisions shows that under The State of
the ~ct the municipalities are not independent •corpo- Madhya Pradesh
rations exercising powers unregulated by Governmen& Others
ta! control. They confer regulatory authority on
-•
J(apur ] .
the
State
Government
to
keep
control
over
munici•
palit.ies, the extent of control and the mode of its exercise being dependent on circumstances and expediency
varying with the exigencies of evary case. The Statute
leaves the discretion to the State Government to
choose the action to be taken and the provision under
i,yhich it IS to be taken. vVherever the legislature
intended an enquiry to be held before taking any
action provision is made for it and wherever it intended a person to be allowed to appear and be heard it
has specifically provided for it. Generally speakiug
<. • excepting where an order is to be reversed qua a
• particular person, ther~ is no provision for a hearing.
The nature and extent of regulatory powers of the
State 'Government and the Jllode of their exercise are
.iitatters of policy and expediency and indicate t.he
taking of administrative action by the State Govern.
ment and not the exercise of any juditiia,J power and
would therefore be excluded from judicial review.
Counsel for the appellants firstly submitted that
•
although the State Government has pnrported to act
under s, 53-A, in fact and in reality the order falls
under s. 57 and because the provisions of sub-sec•
t~n (5) have not been complied with, the order of· the
Stat~ Government is illegal, null and void. A com•
parison of the two sections 53-A and 57 shows the
,J
difference m the powers exercisable by the State
Government under th.; two sections and the consequences -that result therefrom. Under' 53-A all that
•
the State Government does is to appoint for a period
•
•
of not more than eighteen months an Executive Officer
who exercises such powers under the Act as are J11en•
tioned ip. the order which may be in. addition to or to
s.
I88 •
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1480
S~PHEME COCJ~T R~:l'OHTS.
•
•
...
• ••
• (1959]
•
the exclusion of their exercise hy the muni.ipality, etc.,
•
>i power a!:<o cx<~rcisahle under s. 25-A or to a lrmitcd
S/i,i lladeshyu"' i
d
"
u·'ml~r s. b·7 t lw 11111nw11ia
. . I vom, ,· 11c; ,.t1er 'egree un er s. "l(h are (.:."
1
v.
mittee itRelf is dissolved and nmy he superseded in
The s1u1e o.t
which case its members cease to Pxist and \·acate t-heir
J:ladhya l'rnd«h offices• and the powern and duties of the mtmi!!ipal
& Othm
committee then become \·estcd in the ]Hernon or prrRons
•>tppointed for the purpose by the 1'tate Gowrnment
1\·ap11r J.
and its property also 1·ests in the Stal<· Go1·ernment.
These consec111enccs do not follow an order u.ndcr
s. 53-A. But it i8 submitted that in re1dity the result is
the same lwc>tuse of.the powers which un"der the notilicat.ion have been given to the Executive Officer and
what is left with the Committee is onlv "hnsk''. If
this were so then whenever any act.ion is take'"
whether und<•r s. !l of th<' Act. or under s. 2ii-A in c01i.
ceivable cascH it wo11ld amount to HupPrSe>ision of the
munieipn,l committee and would tlwrefore fall under
s. 5i which argument was neither submit.led nor is
tenable. Accordi11g to the language of 'he two S<'C·, ?
tions, 53-A and 5i of the Act tltc two n!ass<!S of actions •
contemplated arc quite different and different crmseyuences follow ; one should, not be confused with the
other. The contention that the act.ion takPn und"r •
s. 53-A iH colourablc and the matter reallv fal!a under
s. 5i is an aUe!iation of mala tides which. lms not lH'en
made out.. If the statute gives to the State Government powers under itR Yanous provtsions and the
•
St.aw Go\'ernment chooses in its discretion to u;,e one
rather than the other it is beyond the power ,of any
court to contest. that discretion unless a case of abuse
is made out (per Lord Halshury L. C. in the Wc~minster
Corporation ,. London and North W,,~tern
•
Railn~iy Cu.(')). And it c:muot. on that ground alone
be held to be a mala fide ""t.
A great. deal of stress was l~d by the appellant>'
counsel on t1ie \i·ithdrnwal oft.he power> oft.he nrnniei•
pality and particularly under H. 31 and it was cont.tmd•
ed that th~ Commit.tee would not be able to hold its
mon~hh· meetings as required under that section. lt.
is diftic~lt.w·lnteriiret the notitic>1t.ion in this Jll<Lnne1-,
\.,
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(1) ~lCJ<•51 :\.C. .. 426..
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S.C.R.
COURT REPORTS
1481
• • SUPREME
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because so ~1t;rpreted ~t wirnld me.an that the Execu-
r95B
/.
tive 0fficer alone will meet for. the transaction of busi- Shri Rade~hyam
ness at least once a month winch would amount to an Khare & Anothe.
absurdity. The reference in the notification must be
v.
to sub-section (2) of s. 31 which deals with the power The State of
of ehe President, etc., to call a meeting'-' suo mot11. or on Madhya
Pradesh
[..,, Others
the requisition of a fifth of the members. Similarly the
mention of Chapter V in the notification cannot vest
Kapur•].
the property of the committee in the Executive Officer.
The. notification deals with powers and duties and not
with the vesting of property. It may however be mentioned that even where no ExecutJve Officer is appointed by the State Government it can direct that any
property vested in the municipality shall cease to be
•qo vested and it can make such orders as it thinks fit
regarding the disposal and management of such property (s. 38). No doubt the powers under s. 39, which
deals with the management of public institutions,
powers a.nd duties of the municipality, are taken
away and. are vested in the Executive Officer but
• these powers in any <lase are subject to rules m~de
by Government a.nd these rules are always subject
to change by the Sta,te Government. The powers of
1lhe municipal committee• under s .. 40 to request the
State Government for acquisition under the Land
Acquisition Act have also been withdrawn. Section 41
deals with transfers of municipal pro perty to the
Government and s. 42 with power of the municipality
••
to transfer municipal property but under that section
the control of the State is not excluded even when
there is no Executive Officer. Section 44 deals with
•
tJ:ie making of contracts and the other sections in. that
chaffeter do not deal with the powers and duties
•
of a municipal committee excepting s. 49. Chapter VI
)
prescribes the duties of a municipal committee and
•
some of those also have been vested in the Executive
Officoc. There is no aoubt that some very important
•
powers have by the notification been taken away from
•
the municipal committee and have been vested in the
Executive Officer but that· is a far step from s_aying·
)
that the committee has theri~by be<ln srnipe i1ded. This
•
exercis~ of its functions by the State Government is.Dii'
0
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1482
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SUPHEME COURT REPORTS, [1959]
•
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8
no <lifferPnt q1rn.lity leading, to 'different Jit.'Sults thau
what would have happcnc<l had action been ~aken
•
· Jw,\ ct. lt cannot t h ~reKha"
,,a '"'Y""'
A"oiher nn d l'r s. 2:J- A or 11111 l er R.~ oft
v.
fore be said under the circunrntanccs of this case that
1"he state of
the action of the State Government is cobweb varnish
Madhya Prnd"" or that,it is merely a coluumble order or a de\·ice to
01
&
""'
aYoid the requirements of suh-s. 5 of s. 57.
l t was then contended that the notification en111neratcs acts of the municipality some of which n.re
instances of mismanagement and others of abu~e of
power. It cannot be said that the allp,gations in regard
t-0 the spending of m,oney "'ithout a proYision in the
budget or showing partiality in the matter of appointment and dismissal or in the matter of issuing of
transport p:isses or di;;tributinn of municipal 11i:1n11rc0
or t.he charge of spending huge amounts on rnaintcn:
ance of roads and drninage without improving their
condition are nothing short of gross mismanagement
or abuse of power and cannot. fall under the charge of
incompetency in the performance of <lut.ici or in the ,
exercise of powers by the municipality. Assuming •
that t.hev ctm onh· be instances 'of abuse, there is nothing wro~g in t.hc State Gornrnment cnumcmtirfg all
the misdeeds and wrongs d(~ne bv the committee am!•
then saying that it prefors to tal~e action under s. 53-A •·
as it has done a.11d not under s. 57. If the acts and
omissions are instances of abuse the State Go\·ernment
could if it thought fit, take action under s. 57. If
••
having two courses open to it the State Government
took the lesser of the two actions, it.s discretion cannot
bo questioned, in the absence of proof of bad faith. It
•
cannpt therefore be said that t.he State GO\·ernment lui.s
only prnlPnded t-0 act un<ll'r s. 53-A but in rPality it:
•
was acti11g under s. 57 of the Act.
\•
lt was lastlv contended that t.he St<>te Government
when it a.els t;nder s. 53-A has a.duty to act j1idicially
and the rules ~f natural justice required tha.t the
• appell:ints should have been gi\·c11 an opportunity to
•
•
show cause against act.ion being taken under that section. 1\s said above under s. 9 of the Act the 1-itttte
Gove1:nmef!t Li"as, oti the ground of unsuitability, t.he
•
1"~""'r to withdra11· from the municipality an~ of the
•
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5 11
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S.C.R.
• •
.
•
.SUPREME
. COURT REPORTS
.
•
1483
powers confured under the, Act either wholly or partially·and under s. 25-A it has the power of appoint- Sh . R d •,
· a Ch'ie f' E xecutive
' Offi cer,'f I't IS
' necessary f or th
" &a ""yam
mg
· e Khare
Another
general improvement in the administration of the
v.
municipality and exactly the same consequences The State of
wo11ld follow as they do when an Executive Officer is Madhya Prnd"h
appointed under s. 53-A. There are also sections 52,
& Others
53, 54, 55 and 56 which place regulatory coutrol in
J.
certain Government agencies. If action taken under
those provisions is an exercise of executive functions
of the State Government can it be said that the
exercise of similar power under s. p3-A and for similar
object i.e. improving the general administration in
case of incompetency of the municipality will change
i'n administrative decision into a judicial or quasijudicial decision ? The real test to distinguish between
a quasi-judicial and an administrative act of an
authority is based on the duty of that authority
having power to determine a question, to act judicially.
'. , Lord Hewa.rt C. J. in R. v. Legislative Committee of the
• Church Assembly (1) sai<j. :
"In order that a body may satisfy the required
test it is not enough that it.should have legal authority
• te determine question affecting the rights of su hjects;
there must be superadded to that characteristic the
further characteristic that the body hall the duty to
act judicially".
And thus the authority taking a decision should not
••
merely determine a question it should also be under a
duty t~ act judicially. It is that essential characteristic which the State Government lacks in the present
•
Oj,Se.. When it considers something likely to result
•
from' its action it is merely taking executive action and
not determining a question or acting judicially. This
J
•
dictum of Lord Hewart was quoted with approval by
Das J. (as he then wa&.; in Kusaldas {ldvani's case(').
He said, "Therefore, in considering whetlier a parti•
cular statutory authority is a quasi-judicial body
•
or a mere administrative body it has to be ascertained whether the statu"tory authority has the
•
duty t11. act judicially". There' is tto~indication
J(a;;;-;
-
(1) [1928] r !{.B. 411, 415.
•
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{2) [195oj S.C.R. 621, 720.
•
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1484
~
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SVPHE:l1E COt:RT H.EPORT~ • [1959]
Stat~
.
has a <lut.v
to act 1'udieialh·
Sh Tl •R-l
0' t''>J'IHJ/
J
J
I<hm 6 .:lnot/.r. Executive Officer under~- 53-A
1
.
•
•
•
itself t.hal tlw
.Gun,rn1rnn1t.
whe11 it. n,plloints
au
['
nor has :tny procedure
"
liecn pwscribcrl a<; to the m11nncr in which the power
The >101, of
un<lcr thi,; sect.ion is to be exercised bv the State
\fadiiya l'radesli (~ovcrMrnent \Vbich tna.~l gj\·e. a.11 intliefition a.~ to
6· Other.s
·
nature o 1·. t I1c <Ieci,;1011
t11ken. The municipal committe1' is a crel\l.ion of the Act and therefore it h11R all
t lw power,; and is subject to 111l the cont.rob under
the Act which arc to be exercised as pro,ided tlwrcunder.
The Act giyes dilf"rPnt morlcs of reg11lat11ry 1·011trol
to the State Go,·crnment and the power,; of the St.ate
GoYernmcnt extend from rnvi:;ion of the actio11s, orders
and resolutions of the municip:d committl'o to t.h\l
exclusion of local :•rcas from its jurisdiction, t11king
away power:; given unclm· tho Act, the appointment of
Executive Oflicern, suspension and supersession of
m1111icipalitics. In certain sections e.g. s. ;)7 <lc:ding
with this rcgul:Llory control the statute rc•1uires that, • ·
t.he e:<pla1mtion of the commillf,e he r111lcd for before •
a particnla,r action is bi.ken by the Stak Go,·ernmcnt
:rncl in others no ouch rcquLremcnl is prcscribc1l. 'That.
is a clear indic11tion of the intention of tlw lel.!isl:it11Pcl
,.
that 11n opportunity wa.s to be giYtlll in one ca,;c :rnd
not in t.lrn ot)lc'r. In ot.her words a kind of ljlI<L>ijndicia.l approad1 was intended in ono case and
aclniinislr:tti \"C in thP other. The Privv Council in
••
Xal.:kmla Ali's crrne (') (a case under a Ce.\· Ion Regulat.ion) said :
"But, 1hat. l\]HHt, no procedure is hid down ·by the
,
rcgu.!ation for securing that the licPnsc holder i~ Lo
have notice of the Controller's intent.ion to re,·ok·•;, the
lieensr~.
or that there must. be any en1j11iry, pu hlic or
\
•
pri vale, before the Controller :tct s " .
fn Admni's cas~(') Fazl Ali J. ~.irnmining the clnty of
anthoriti~s
t'o act. judicially Raid "t p. 641:
•
•
"Tlwrc
are
no
ex
pre""
words
in
R. :~ or any other
•
~eetion, tu impose such a duty (to c!Ptermine judicially);
nor i~ ther~ ai1ything to (ompel us to hold that suc:li 11
rluty i8 i11113li'bd "..
•
•
i958
the statute
/
(I) ~1951] A.C. 66, i~·
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\.:) ~1950] ~.C.H. r.'121 •
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COURT REPORTS
• .SUPREME
•
•
•
1485
The learneci Judge to~k ipto consideration the fact
r958
/.
that ~ertain sections specifically provided an enquiry Sh·'. ~ Radeshyam
•
and others did not, and obse~ved:
Kha" & Anothn
" ......... the fact remains that there is nothing in
v.
the Ordinance to suggest that .the public purpose is to The State of
be determined in a judicial way ".
Madhya Pmdesh
&- Others
Therefore where in a statute like the present one some
Kapu. • J.
sections prescdbe the calling for the explanation of
the municipality before any action is taken by the
Staw Government and others do not, it is an indication of the intention of the legislature. to exclude. the
application of principles of audi q,lteram partem in the
latter case.
The section (s. 53-A) has to be read as one whole and
,pot in compartments. The relevant words are:
' "If the committee is not competent to perform the
duties imposed upon it ......... and the State considers
that a general improvement in the administration of
the municipality is likely to be secured by ............ "
• The latter portion i. e. "the State Government con• siders ...... is likely to be seemed" indic<J,tes a purely
subje~tive determination and taking a policy decision.
The use of the words "considers" and "is like.Iv"
• 'rMate to a subjective and not an objective proc~ss.
" To consider " means to think, to contemplate mentally, to regard and "likely " means prl'.loobly ; such as
might well happen; apparently suitable for. These
words cannot have any reference to objectivity but
••
suggest subjectiveness. The opening words of the
section," If the committee is not competent ...... " cannot be read separately from the latter part. When
•
=d~r s. 53-A the State Government appointl5 an
Exe<Jutive Officer which act it considers likely to improve the general administration of the municipality
it does not take two decisions, one objective as to the
•
incompetency of the administration of.the municipality
and ~ie other subjective as to the action likely to
•
improve the administration. The decision is only one.
•
•
The State Government is the sole judge of both
matters, namely, of the incol)lpeten~y anp t,he remedy
•
needed .• Both are parts of one mtegrat!id whole a
decision. taken 'in the exercise of the administratiTe'
•
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Sl;PREME COU~T R.~PORTS • , [l!J5!J]
8
.
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functions of the State Guvm-r1ment and tt<lmits of no
.•R-d
elemc;1t.
c1f juJici;i]
l'rorcss. , ( Vide The Proi·inc.e
o'
Sh ri a 1:5 11yani
~
.
'J
Khare & A,, 01 ,,., Bombay v. A usa/das Atlmm (') (pc'r Kama ( '. J. at
v.
p. 633.u3!i) <ind per Das .J. (as he then "·as) at p. 703).
Th• St•tc of
The State Government. must nccessarih· be the sole
Madhya Pia:lesh ju<lge e>f the stn.te of incompct.<'ncy c,f the' municiJt:flity
<>- Othm
otherwise it woulcl not be able to ta kc its udminist.rn.
K.;;;::: J. ti,·e decision as to the action \rhieh it ;;hould take and
which it considers is likely to improve the administratinn. Bot.h t ht> decisions as to the incompeten~y of
the municipality 11,ml thr exercise of the executive
function as tn the, act.ion to be taken thereon are
matters of like clmraet"r i.e. administrative matters.
(!( usaldas Admni's case at p. 6:l:I). lf that we, re' not
sot.hen on the question of incompetency the Stat,,.
Government procedure will be analogous to a judicial
prneess suhject to re\·icw of Courts arnl the act ion it
will take will be an administrative decision not subjerL Lo ju1lici;d reyicw which will not ouly lead to
inconvPnicnce but to confusi•m. The Pr•vy Council ,
poinw<l out in Vcnkalarau '" S~crelary of State(') tha,t •
" incoll\·eniPncc is uut a final consideration in a matter
of construction, but it is at, least worthy of eousideration, ancl it can lu1rdly be doubted that the suggcstL"lf •
proce<lurn of control by the CourlH over Covcrnmem
in the llltl:lt.d<:!lailed work of managing its Hcrvices
w11uld ca11se not mer!'h· inconvenience but confusion".
The very fact that ,;n order under s. 53._.\ is in the
••
uaturc of >Lll emergency action to protect the iuterests
of th<! mu.' payer and has ;1 limit<'d duration ,not ex.
eceding 18 months also neg<ttives the order being
•
founded cm an objective determination as to the iur.ompeteney of the committee. ~uch a const.rnhion
•
will defeat the very purpose of'· 53-A. Further act.ion
under s. fi7 is of a permanent nature :111d has accord•
iwdv been expresslr made· 8ul:rject to an explanation
bv"' the municipal c~mmittee. The absPnce of t1uch a
•
p;·ovision
from s. 53-A cleal'ly shows tluit the legisla•
•
tme did not intend that there should be un elaborate
heari.ng but intended tha L the Sl!lte should under
•
s. 5:~-A 1.;Lke' a s'wift a~lministrative decision. The
•
95
••
..
•
•
.,
•
1·,1 \103&1 LR u4 1+ 55.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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• ••
•
•
S.C.H. • •SUPREME CQURT HEPOR~S
•
•
1487
correct posi~on, as indicated above, is that the decision df the State Government as to incompetency and Shri Radeshyam
the decision as to the action• to be taken were really Khare &- Another
one decision, one integrated whole-a subjective deciv.
sion of the State Government that it considered that The State of
by the appointment of an executive officer a ~eneral Madhya Pradesh
& Others
improvement in the hitherto general administration
•
was likely to be secured. Merely because the fact of Kapur ]. •
incompetency is a preliminary step to the exercise of
an a.dministrative function by the State Government,
under s. 53-A it is not necessary that the fact is to be
determined judicially. Where the exercise of the
administrative fonctions of an Executive authority
like the State Government are subject to a decision as
;_o the existence of a fact, there is no duty cast on the
State Government to act judicially. Both the decision
as to the fact and as to the action to be taken are
really one and not two decisions, the determination
being for the purpose of taking an appropriate admi< • nistrative decision. As has been said above it is one
• integrated whole and oonnot be separated into parts
with ~ifferent legal qualities. This was the view of
Kania C. J. in the Provinoe of Bombay v. Kusaldas
• °Advan·i (1) where it was observed at p. 633:
" Because an executive authority has to determine
certain objective facts as a preliminary step to the
discharge of an executive function, it does not follow
that it must determine those facts judicially. When
••
the executive authority has to form an opinion about
an objeJ]tive matter as a preliminary step to the exer.r
cise of a power conferred on it, the determination of
•
tlii.e objective fact and the exercise of the exem1tive
•
powJr based thereon are alike matters of au administrative character".
•
Faz! Ali J. in that case said at p. 642 :
"For prompt action:the executive a,.uthorities have
often to take quick decisions and it will he going too
•
•
far to say that in doing so they are discharging any
•
•
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The word ' decision ' in common parlance js mor'< or l~s;; a na:tural
•
.
(3) [1o950] S.C.I!. 621.
•
•
•
•
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••
r
•
•
•
•
..
•
•
•
:'°'
1488
• '95
•
• ••
.
'
.
.f
SBPRE.ME COU~T REl'Ol{TS • • [l!J.59]
•
•
expression und it l»ln be used with rcfere1~e to purely
8
Siui u.u!esiiya,,1 (>:XPC:utivP as \'\ell a.s ju~icia-l orders.
The n1e1'e faCt
Kliaoc 0 . .1 ,, 01 h,, that it11 executive uuthority !ms to decide somet.hing
v.
1!01's not rn"ke the decision judicial. It is the rnunner
Tlie State of
in which the decision has to he arri>cd at which
Madhya l'rnd«h makes• the difference, arnl lht' real test is : ls t.!iere
& Others
._
u11y duty l<i act jud icia JI y ~ "
The l:inguage of sub-section ( 1) of s. 53-A indicates
that the question whether the .Stale Government considers th:Lt the action takeu under t-he section •i. e.,
the appointment of an Executive Ofiicer is likely to
secure an impro,·ement in the gt·neral administration
of the municipality is one of expediency, opinion and
policy, matt.er:; which a.r<' peculiarly for the State
Governnwnt to decide aud of which, always assumi11,s
that it is actiug bonot fide, it is the sole judge. :\o
objective test is possible. Thcrdore the 11sc of these
words " considers " and " is likely " nega.ti vcs any
objective approa.r:h or judicial or quasi-judicial process.
The State Governuwnt is not essentially :J! judicial or.
a c1uasi-j11dicial body but itscs~ntial function is admi- •
niHtrat.ive. The various proYisions of the Act. show
that it takes its d<,cisions a.I! t.o the mode and extent of
control of municipalities in pursuance of it;; opinic11;.
In
a.nd policy awl on grounds of expediency.
arriving at. itos C!ecision it at no sllLgc ha,; any form of
lis or quasi-lis before it. nor c:an it be said that then'
are two parties before iL The i\Iunieipal Committee
••
and itself cannot be termed quasi. litigants or parties
to" proposition and oppositio11. It is not bpund to
take action un<l"r s. 53.A or anv (Jtlier section of the
Act: It. ha.s to consider the c1uestion from t.he poi .. t.
of ,.i<'w of policy and expediency and the exigencies of
the ease which shows that it is not under a dutv a.t
•
any stage lo ad judicially to determine a question .
This further H1q;ports t.lw viC\<l that a correct interpretation of the words " considers" and " is li,<ely to
•
he secured" i11dic>Ltes a. subjective decision :rnd thc~e
•
•
words m:1ke the order of the State (;oYcrnnwnt administmtive and not_juclicia.1 or 'JlH\Hi-judicial.
The argtiment t.hat the order is quasi-judicial
'JJecause it ·affects t.he rights of • t.he ~~unicipal
•
•
•
• •
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•
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•
•
Iiap"'
•
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•
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•
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•
S.C.R. • •SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1489
Committee P.;; ~acuous becoose all that the order com1958
"':
plained of does is that it restricts the exercise of .
-•
· powers b y th e munwJlla
· · 1 ~omm1•ttee · an d ves t s Kha"
Sh>i Radeshyam
cert.am
& Another
some powers in. another authonty contemplated by
v.
the statute. Besides every decision of the Executive The State of
gen~rally affects the rights of one citizen or ooother. Madhya Pradesh
In Advani's case (1) Kania C. J. said at page 632:
& Others
" ........... .it is broadly stated that when the fact has
___.,
to be determined by an objective test and when that
Kapu'. 1·
deci~ion affects rights of some one, the decision or act
is quasi-judicial. This last statement overlooks the
aspect that every decision of the t>Xecutive generally is
a decision of fact and in most cases affects the rights
of some one or the other."
• But it was contended that in its order the State
Government has to state reasons for taking action
under s. 53-A. In a democratic system of government
there is always the other party, the electors and citizens, who must know why the State Government
• takes one i:mrticular action rather than another. Be• sides the mere requirement of giving reasons would
not change what was an administrative body into a
judicial body or an admjnistrative decision into a
.Jddicial or quasi-judicial determination.
The following passage from Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. II, p. 56 (3rd Edition) a!JtJy states the
law and may usefully be quoted:
"If, on the other hand, an administrative body m
••
arriving at its decision has before it at no stage any
form •Jf lis and throughout has to consider the
question from the point of view of policy and expe•
dien~y, it cannot be said that it is under a duty at.any
•
time'to act judicially ".
·
2
See also R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee ( ).
•
In B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) Ltd. v. Minister of
Health(') it was also h4ld that the Mini,ster was entitled
to infd'rm his mind by informal machinery of an en•
quiry and merely because in order to inform his mind
• • •
the enquiry had to be held it could not be said that
the Minister was not performing ,his i:i.d!l;)inistPative
•
(') [0950] S.C.R. 62L
(2) ('952) z'Q.!0'4'3· 13'-
•
•
•
•
•
•
••
(3) (1947) 2 A.E.R. 395. •
••
•
•
• • ••
•
•
•
1490
•
•••
•
•
'
SGPREME COVUT ThEPORTS • • [1959]
•
•
At p. 405 Cohen L. J. went further and
function.
said:
Slni /ladt<l•)'am
" H· d ,
j · >. r
•
'
d b v l11m
'
,
A no ,.11cr
. is uoy
• as rPgarc s 1111ormatrnn recen·e
..
Kh art
v.
in his executive capacity is to use that informal ion
The Slate of
fairly 1Lnd impartially. This may involve that he
Madhya P.ad••" should give an opportunity to the authority or to"the
&. Oihm
object.or, as the case m1Ly b", of defiling with some
allegation in a communicMion he has recei\·cd before
Kap10' J.
the quasi-!is startl'd, but, if he fails to do so, he is
responsible only to Parliamcmt for the discharge of his
executive duties, and cannot be made rcsponoiLle in
these courts."
•
Appell1Lnts' counsel relied on some English cases,
the first of which was Cooper \'. Wands1corth Board
of Works(') where Byles ,J. said !Lt p. 420:
,•
" ...... although there arc no positive words in a
statute requiring that the party shall Le heard, yet
the justice of the common law will supply the omission
of the legislature."
This view is not in accord with the moder!~ exposition • •
of the law in Nakkuda Ali'.~ case (') or Franklin's
case ('). Lord Shaw in Arlidye's case (') n,~ected
. the concept of natural justl'r:e in the following langy•
•
age:
" ............ in,so far as it attempts lo reflect the old
jus naturale tt is a. confused and uuwarrant<xl trnnsfor into the et.hical sphere of a term employed for
other distiuctions; and, in so far it is rnsortecl lo for
••
other purpoHes, it is vacuous."
ln R. '" Jlrmchester Legal Aid Committe!!{') th<'
court
obs('n·ed :
•
"The true view, as it seems to us, is that thc~l11Cv
•
to act j11dic.ially may arise in widely different circun;.
stances which it would Le impossible, and, indeed,
•
inadvisable, to attempt to dcfinl' exhaustively. Where
the decisio11 is ~hat of a court then, uuless, as. in the
case, for instance, of .Justices granting excise lim•nces,
•
•
it is acting in a purely mini8lerial capacity, it is
•
•
clearly under a duty t-0 a,ct judicially. Wlwu, on the
:"
·\
1958
..._
._~
-
...
•
• •
••
•
"
•
• ,,
(1) [1863]-i:4.~.B. (j\.ti.) tSo, f43 E.R. 414, 420.
(2) [1951T A.C. 6'1, 7$.
(31 [1<14.SJ :\.4 8i.
•
(4) [1915] A.C.· 120, 13tl.
• (5} f1952J 2 Q.D. ·P~· 43!. •
•
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•
,;
•
•
I
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•
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•
•
S.C.R. • •SUPREME CQURT REPORi'S
•
•
1491
•
other hand~the decision i~ that of an administrative
~
body' and is actuated in whole or in part by ques- Sh . R d shyam
tions of policy, the duty to act judicially may arise in
~nothe>
the course of arriving at that decision."
v.
But, at page 431 it was said :
The State of
.
•
, .
Madhya Pradesh
"If, on the other hand, an admmistrative body m
& Others
arriving at its decision at no stage has before it any
___.
form of !is and throughout has to consider the quesl{apur J.
tion from the point of view of policy and expediency,
it cannot be said that it is under a duty at any
stage to act judicially."
,
That was a case of a debtor who applied for and
obtained a certificate of legal aid under the Legal .Aid
and Advice Act, 1949, in connection with his claim
0
for damages against a company but was thereafter
adjudicated bankrupt and at his instance the certificate was cancelled as his claim vested in the trustee
in bankruptcy. The trustee then applied for and
" , obtained ii> certificate of legal aid. The National
• Assistance Board and •the local Committee considered
only the financial circumstances of the bankrupt and
not M the trustee whose. disposa.ble income was in
1>xcess of the lowest limit entitling a certificate of legal
• aid. The debtor company applied for an order of certiorari to quash the certificate alleging ~hat the Committee had exceeded its jurisdiction. Under the Legal
Aid (General) Regulation, 1950, reg. 4(1), it was a condi••
tion precedent to the grant of a certificate that there
should have been a determination by the National
Assistance Board of the disposable income of the
•
trustee who was personally liable vis a vis his oppCillent.
!t v3as held that the Board having legal authority
•
to determine questions affecting rights of subjects had
a duty to act judicially and that it had exceeded its
•
jurisdiction. The case ;has some distinguishing features,
want~g in the case before us.
Tne Ertatute there
•
prescribed the limit of income of applicant for a certifi• • •
cate of legal aid and the regulations required the
determination by the .National Assistance Bo~rd of
•
}
the disfosable income and disposable cli.pitii.J of such
•
applica_nt whroh was a condition' pr~cedent to t!J.~
K;:,,;
0
•
•
•
•
•
.
•
• •
• • ••
•
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14!!2
•
• ••
•
SUPHEME couwr HF,PORTS •• [HJ.5!l]
•
•
•
grant, of the certificate. CJ.:arly without •such det.crminatio11 the graut of the certificate was not wilhi~1 the
' . ..___
s""
llade,hy""' . • 1· .
f h I' <l
I I
.
I
liha>r .<- """"" Jlll'IS( 1ct10n o t e .>oar ftm t 1crcforc tie Board ha<l
v
tn dctermine a question and was required to act j11<li1he State of
ci<llly within the rule laid down in the majority judgMadhy• J>,ade•'• ment i11 Kusaldas Advani's case ('). The Board uni.lcr
'" Othm
t.hat statute waR bound to gi,·c aid, if certain condi...__
lions were fulfilled and was quit<) unconeenwd with
I<apur J.
·
quc,t10ns
o f po ]'icy. " 'l'h ey I1a,·e to deci <l e the m<1tter
solely on the factR of a pa,rtieular case, solely 011·thc
e\·idence before them an<l apart from any ext.raucous
consid(•rations. Jn ot.her wordo, they must n,ct jndicifllly, not judiciously."
In Gabel v. Child (') the words "Whenever it shall
appeflr to the satisfaction oft.he Bishop" were held.•
to imply a duty lo act judicially and thereforn the
principles of 1mtural justice a,ppliecl. This rule is inconsistent with t.he decision of the l'rin· Council in
Nakkuda Ali's ca.~e (')or the deciRion of the House of
Lor<b in Franklin's case (') or the interprcta~ion placed •
upon the word "satisfied" in some of the later •
English ca;;es, Robin80n ,.. .1Jinio1trr of Town and
Country /'lanning (')and B .• Johnson cf• Go. (Buifders)
Ltd. v. ;l!ini.~fer of Health('). This Court in Ku.salda~· •
Adi-ani's case(') fl!so held this word to indicate a, snhjecti\'C approacfi. See 1tl80 Wij(;y8eha '· Festinf! (')
where the words of the Statute were" wheneYer it shall
appPttl'
to the (;ovcmor ...... ". See also R. \'. Metro••
710/ifan Police Commio1sioner (') where also the words
were" ......... if he is so satisfied ......... "and it was
held that these words <lid not imply " a judge or a
•
quasi-judge". The deci:<ion in these cases la:tin1'
•
down th<' rnle of application of natural justice must be
<'<mfincd to their own facts and the language of the
•
particular statute they int.erprctecl. No general rnle
(•a,n be deduce<! tl1cr<'from nor c·an they be applied to
• other stat.uteJ and other circumstances.
•
•
The
c:tse
before
m;
is
not
one
where
110 enljuiry has
•
'
•
r95B
•
(1) f1950] S.C-H. 621, ;20
(2) f~832]2Cr.&Jr.558. 37 H.l~.761.
•
(3) :1951] l~.:t. '"1.i. 78. •
• ·~) [1947] K.B. 7oi.
{i) [1919} A.C. 54r,.
•
• •
•• • •
•
(4) [1948J A.C. ~i(6) [1947] 2 A.£.R ..~95.•
• (8) [r953] 2 A.E.H.. ~17. •
•
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•
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•
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• ••
' •
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•
•
1493
CQURT REPOR;rs
.
.
been held. •There was an .enquiry against the appel-
S.C.It. ,
"
·SUPRE~E
/
z958
•
!ants 'in regard to specific allegations made against
---.
Shri Radeshyam
.
h
d b
f
h
them and a ter earing t em• a report was ma e Y a Kha" & Another
Deputy Collector which was forwarded to the State
v.
Government before it took action. One Dhurmal Daga The State of
marle a number of allegations Annexures l•and II .Wadhya Prad"h
and those allegations were supported by others like
& Others
Dear & Co., Poonam Chand Somraj, Dhamtari Traders
__.
1
and Shilaram and the affidavit of the State GovernKapur· ·
meat in the High Court shows that the notice was
issued to both the appellants to reply to the allegations. Radheshyam appellant No. 1 appeared before
the Enquiry Officer and gave a long explanation denying the allegations made by Dhurmal Daga and others.
J.t was after this that the Enquiry Officer made his
report which was sent ~o the State Government and it
took action which it considered apposite and that is
the action com plained of.
But it was submitted that no notice was given to
' • the appell11nts as to the nature of the complaint
• against them and the various charges which have
been enumerated in the notification were never specifically'brought to their noti,ce and they were not called
• 'i.rpon to show cause why action should not be taken
under s. 53-A. In the first place the words of the
section as explained above do not contemplate any
such notice and the argument based on the opening
words of the section that the municipality was guilty
of incompetence was an objective fact cannot be
accept¥d. It cannot be said in this case that in point
.< of fact the appellants did not know what the com•
plaint against them was or that they had no oppor•
tunity of giving their explanation in regard to the
charges. All the acts which are enumerated in the
notification are contained in the various allegations
•
which were made against the appellants by Dhurmal
and others. The appellants put a fong' explanation
•
giving their version of the facts contained in the com•
•
plaint and the Enquiry Officer sent his report after
•
hearing the appellants and on the considerati;rn of
•
> this report the State Gov~rnment pa'SseQ.. its order
•
under .El. 53-A. • The High Court after go,ing through
•
•
•
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•
•
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I
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1494
'
,
•
••
•••
•
SlJPREME COUl~T I{.E_PORTS •• [1959]
.
8
.
the record of the enquiry 1\ia;; satisfied as•to the pro.
sh,; 1indahymn pri~ty and legality of the enquiry and that portilln of
I<hu" ,s. Auoth" its Judgment has been quuted abo\'e,
v.
Then it was submitted that the enquiry hy :llr.
The State of
Hana was unauthorised bv t.hc State Government. and
},fadhya Pradesh
...
•
& Othus
was n" suhsr.itute for the enquiry required by the
statute. But the statute has prescribed no procedure
• j. for enquiries under s. 53-A even if it were to be said
KapHr
that the section contemplates <.1.n enquiry. And it i.-;
no defect affecting the final decision of the State
Government whether the en<piiry origiuates in th<·
manner it did "r the.State Government ordered it.
lu the;;e circumstances the third point rnis"d by the
appellants cannot he sustained and the sulimission. of
the appell:u1ts is without substance. The appeal thcrn.•
fore fails and is dismissed with costs r.hroughout.
'95
Subbn l?no ].
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
. .•
• •
St:BBA H.Ao J.-1 have had the ad\'antage of
re.iding the judgmi>nt prepared by my Lord. tlw
Ch id Justice .ind my learned brot.her, l~pm .J. I , '
regret my inability to agree with them in their vi""'" •
on the follwi11g tw" question;: (I) Whether 11ndel'
s. ;i3-A of the C. P. & Berar Municipalities Act (A"ct 11
of 1922), hereinafter called 'tlw Act., the Uov0mme1l('
performs a judicial act; and (2) whether in fact the •
Go\·ernmcnt !'=plied with the principles CJf natural
justice in making th<' Order dated Xo\·emhcr 8, 1956,
under s. 53-A of the Act..
As the facts have been folly 11:1rrntcd by my Lord,
the Chief .Jnstic<,, it would sutlicc ift.he facts r~le\·ant
to the aforesaid questions are briefly stated here. The
second appellant is the Municip:tl Commit.t<,e, Dhani.tn.ri, nnd t.Iw first appellant is its President. He ~ms
elected as President on July 10, l!l56, and took charge
of his offiec on .July 27, 1956. On August 8, 1956, one
Dhurmal Daga went on a hpnger strike for the
redress of hi~ grievances against t.he appellants.• The
Collector, Haipur, intervened and persuaded him tu
break his fast and ordered <.1.n inquiry into the charg<'
<>f m~ladministration. The Deput': Collector, who
madt• th<!}111J.°uiry," giwe i10tiee of the said in~uiry to
the Secrctarv tu tr1e Committee and thc'first a11pcllant
•
•
••
•
•
•
•
c
,
.. ,_.
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• ••
S.C.R. ,
•
•
•
•
~UPRE~'lE COlJRT
REPOR'CS
1495
•
1 958
filed a written reply on Se!'tember 7, 1956, and perso•
nally ttprieared
at
the
inquiry.
Presumably,
the
result
.
~
.
.
O Shrt Radesr1yam
of the mqmry was forwarded to the Government.
n Khare c; Anoth"
November 18, 1957, the Government issued an Order,
v.
under s. 53-A of the Act, enumerating fifteen charges The state of
invoiving acts of non-feasance, misfeasance,• gross Madhya Prndesh
negligence aud fraud, and stating that, by reason of
"" Othm
the said acts, it appeared to the Government that the Subba Ra: J.
Committee had proved itself incompetent to perform
the duties imposed on it by or under the said Act. The
order further proceeded to state that the Government
considered tha.t a general improvelillent in the administration of the Municipality wa.s likely to be secured by
appointing a servant of the Government as the ExecuJ<ive Officer of the Committee. The said Order also
appointed Shri B. P. Jain as Executive Officer and
entrusted to him most of the important powers and
duties of the Committee and the President. Before the
drastic action was taken, no opportunity was given
•either to tht> President or to the Committee to explain
their conduct in regard to any one of the charges. The
previous inquiry made by the Deputy Collector was to
attempt to persuade Dhurmal Daga, to give up his fast
.an.d that inquiry by the Deputy Collector could not,
in any sense of the term, be regarded as an inquiry for
taking action under s. 53-A of the Act: .;Records also
do not disclose whether that inquiry related to the
same charges which were the foundation for the
Government taking action under the Act. I, therefore,
proceed, on the footing that the Government acted
under s. 53-A of the Act without giving any opportnnity
•
tG. the appellants to explain their conduct in regard
•
to tli.e grave charges levelled against them, on the
basis of which they were held to be incompetent
within the meaning of s. 53-A of the Act.
•
The material part of;s. 53-A reads:
" If a committee is not competent' to perform the
•
duties imposed on it or undertaken by it by or under
•
•
this Act or any other enactment for the time being in
•
force and the State Government considers that a
•
general ,impro,:ement m the administr1it~ of the
•
..
••
190
•
• • •
•
•
••
•
•
•
•
. ..
•
•
•
14!l6
•
•••
.
.
'
·'
S,llPREME COTJRT R.EPORT/i ,
[1959]
•
municipality is likely to b@secured by th<~appoi11tment
•
of a scrnrnt of the Government as the exccutin! officer
Shn Radc;hyam
f' h
.
I "'
l'
I JV an
•
, A no 11,,.1 o t e com1111ttee, t. ie "tak .overnment ma\',
•
..
K IHlTt
v.
Order st!Lting the n•asons therefor published in the
The s1a1e of
Gazette, appoint such servant as the executive officer
.ltadhya l'rndd of t-h~committee fur such period not exceedingeigl\teen
6 · Othm
months as may be specified in such onkr."
' The learned AdnJcate-(;encral, a1ipearinir
for the
S111:Ua Rao ].
.._,
State, contended broadly that under thi,; section the
Go\'ernment: performs only an adminigtratil'e agt hy
appointing !Lll Executi\·c Officer for a short pPriod and
therefore no opport.rnity need be given to the affected
parties before action is taken thereunder. :\Ir. M. K.
Nam biar. counsel for the appellants, argued that
under this section the Gtl\·ernment is empowered .t.r>
dPprive t.he :\-1 unicipal Commit.tee, duly elected und<,r
t.he Act, of its powers, though for eighteen months, on
the basis of its incompetency :rnd it is against all
•,
principles of natural justice to stigmatize such a body
as incompett<nt without gidng it an opl'ortunity tr• ·'
•
explain its conduct. He would say that whether the
Committee is competent or not is an objecti1;c and
jurisdiction:il fact to be <ie~ided judicially by the Stall.'
Col'ermnent and, therefore, the act of the Uo1·ernmc~it.
is a judicial act, whi0h can only be discharged by
following the principles of natural justice.
Before cunsidering the \'alidity of the argunwnts
based upon the provisions of the sect-ion, it wo1ild be
••
convenient at thi8 stage to notice briefly the distinction
bP-lween a judieial and an administrati1·e act ~Lnd the
cri~ria laid down by decisions for ascertaining whether
•
a particular ad is a judicial act or an administratwc
one. The said crit.cria haYe been laid down with clarit.Y
by Lord ,Justi<·c Atkin in Re.r 1·. '1.'he Electricity Commissioners
('),elaborated by Lord ,Justice Scrutton in
•
Re.i· \'. London County Councilt') and authoritatively
restated in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Ad,.mii (') .
•
Th.aforesaid decisions lay clown the following condi•
•
tions
to he com plied "·ith : (I) The body of persons
•
must, hal'e. legal authority; (2) the authority should
•
r9.s8
<7
. .
•
(1) :1924~• h~- B. 171.
•
0
••
•
••
••
•
• •
•
(
t2) (1931~ 2 K. 0. ·.z'e.') .
(3) l1950J S.C.R. 621.
•
•
•
•
•
•
,
.
'
•
•
.
'
• ••
•
•
•
S.C.R . • .SUPREl\iE COJJRT REPOR'CS
•
1497
.• '
•
be given to t!etermine quest.ions affecting the rights of
i95S
•
subjects; and (3) they should have a duty to act h . - h•
. d' . ]]
So "lar th ere IS
. na d'!SpU t e. Th e ques t'ron Khare
S rillades yam
JU wrn y.
6 . Another
raised in this case is what do the words" a duty to
v.
act judicially" mean. If the statute in express terms The State of
says"that the decision should be arrived at judicially, Madhya Pradesh
, then it is an obvious case. If it does not expressly say
"'Others
so, can the intention of the Legislature be gathered or Subba 11~: J.
implied from the terms of the statute? If it can be so
gathlilred, what are the guiding factors for implying
such a duty on the part of a tribunal or authority ? In
this context a brief discussion of s~me of the relevant
cases will be helpful. This Court, as I have already
stated, restated the law laying down the criteria for
~certaining whether an act is a judicial act or not in
Kusaldas's case (1). There the question was whether
the Provincial Government was acting judicially in
making the order of requisition ·under s. 3 of the
Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (Born. Qrdinance
' •V of 1947). • The material part of the section under
• discussion read as follow$:
"If in the opinion of the Provincial Government
it is n"ecessary or expedient to do so, the Provincial
.Gl'lvernment may, by order in writing requisition any
land for any public purpose."
To ascertain the nature of the act of tl:re .Government
under that section, this Court reviewed the law on the
subject and held, by a majority, that on a proper con••
struction of s. 3 of the Ordinance, the decision of the
Bomba;ii Government that the property was required
• for a public purpose was not a judicial or a quasi•
juilic\a] decision but an administrative act and• the
Bombay High Court had, therefore, no jurisdiction to
issue a writ of Certiorari in respect of the order of
requisition. Das J. as he then was, after considering
•
the law on the subject :summarized the principles at
page 7!5 thus :
•
'
•
•
"(i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not
•
being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes
•
arising out of a claim made 'py one party irnder. the
1
•
statute \j;hich claim is opposed by anothel' ~rty and
•
(1) [1i50] S.C.R~ 62r.
•
•
•
0
·.
•
•
•
..
• • ••
•
•
•
1498
•
•
.
.
'
•••
/'
Sl}PREME COUllT 1u;ronTS •• [1959
to detenninC' the n•spccti.-c r~ights of tl1" contesting
•
•
pa,rtic8 who arc opposed to each •>ther, tlwre is a /.is
" in the
s:••
~adeAshya
~'
and
prima Jade and in ,~he nbsencc of anvthin
0
rill 1 ntt
,,
I\ntHt 0v.
statute to the contrary rt is the duty of the nuthority
The Staie o!
to act judicin,Jly and the decision of the aut.hority is a
Madhya l'•ad"h quasi-iudicial act ; and
•
<> 011om
(ii) that if a statutory aut.hority has power to do
•
any
act which will prejudicially affect the subject,
Subb<i /lo'lo ] .
then, although there are not. two parries apart from t.hc
authority and the cont{'St is bet\\ <'<'n the authorit ~: proposing to do the act ancl th" subject opposing it, the
final determination ,of the authority will yet be acpiasijudicial act provided the authority is rerp1ircd by the
statute to ar:t judicially."
The propositions so stated appear to me to he urwxcetltional. But the further difficulty is whether the duty
to act judicially should be expressly so stated in tl;e
statute or whether it can be gathered or implied from
the pro\·isions of the statute. I do not think that Das J.
as he thm1 was, meant to lay down a8oa condition,
that the duty to act judic:i:~lly should be expressly
stated in the statute, for rarclv anv statute would
describe the character of <ji.<posi;l of particulai· proceeding. lf it was intended to inoiot upon an expr<l!!~.
condition in the statute, t.1w· learned Judge would not
h:we scrutiqizerl the pmvi,ions of the Ordinance t.o
asecrlain whether the order thereunder was intcnckd
to be a judicial act or not. A useful discussion bringing
••
out in bold relief the difference between a judicial and
an administrative act is found in JI. v. Manchester
Legal Aid Committee('). There a debtor applied t-0 a
•
loci\! aid committ.et', 8Ct np under the Legal Aid apd
Advice Act, 1949, for a certificate for lc'gal a~d to
•
pursue a claim for alleged breach of contra.et. agair,,;t :t
limited
company. As he was adjudicated insolvent,
•
the certificate was re\·okcd al\<! on application made
by his trust.cc, 'it was granted to him :tgain. One of
•
the question;; raised was wheth<'r the legal r1id com•
•
mittee in issuing I.ht' certificate was acting judiciall~·
•
and. therefore subject to-an order of ce.rtiomri. The
•
court. hel!f t.liat tlte said liody was under a dt~ty to r1ct
•
•
• •
• •
•
0
1958
\
•
a
.. .• . •
.
•
•
•
•
r·
c
'
.
•
• ••
S.C.R.
• SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
1499
•
judicially. - Parker J. delivering the judgment of the
r95S
•
Court, summarized the law on the subject at page 428 Shti Rad~shyam
thus:
Khare & Another
" The true view, as it seems to us, is that the duty
v,
to act judicially may arise in widely different circum- The state of
st:tnces which it would be impossible, and, indeed, Madhya Prade.•h
& Others
inadvisable, to attempt to define ex haustiveIy. "h
,, ere
the decision is that of a Court, then, unless, as ' in the subba Rao 1 .
case, for instance, of justic.es granting excise licences,
it i.s acting in a purely ministerial capacity, it is
clearly under a duty to act judicially. When, on the
other hand, the decision is that pf an administrative
body and is actuated in whole or in part by questions
of policy, the duty to act judicially may arise in the
course of arriving at that decision. Thus, if, in order
0
·to arrive at the decision, the body concerned had
to consider proposals and objections and consider
evidence, then there is the duty to act judicially in
the course of that inquiry .........
Furthm;, an administrative body in ascertaining
facts or law may b,e under a duty to act judicially
notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the
formalities of and are not in accordance with the
~ practice of a court of Ia~ ................... ..
If, on the other hand, an administ.rative body in
arriving at its decision at no stage has before it any
form of lis and throughout has to consider the question from the point of view of policy and expediency,
it cannot be said that it is under a duty at any stage
to act judicially."
On the basis of the aforesaid principles, the learned
.Judge held that the local committee, though an
administrative body, was acting judicially in issuing
the certificate, as in ascertaining the facts for issuing
the certifi0<1te it was quite unconcerned with any
•
question of policy. ; I respectfully agree with the
prineiples enunciated by the learneil Ju'dge and they ,
are not in any way inconsistent with the principles
•
,
laid down by this Court. The law has been neatly
•
summarised in Halsbury's,Laws of England,, Third
Editiop, Volume 11, at pages 55 and· 56 and it is as
follows :
·
, "
0
• 0
}
•
• •
•
•
•
1500
•
.
•
'
•••
SUJ?REME COUR.T RllJ:fORTS • .[1959]
•
•
•
"It is- not necessa1\y thal ft should be a.court: -an
..
R•d
h
m
administrative
body-in ascertaining facts or law may
Sh
" c;.a "Another
ya
be un d er a d uty to act JUcnC!a
· .J.: • II y notw1t
· · h stan d'mg t h at
Khare
v.
its proceedings have none of the formalities of, and
Th• s1a1e 'of
are not·in accordance I with the·practice of,. a court of
Madhya PradBih law. It. is enough tf it is exercising, after hea-ritlg
& Othsrs
ev1·dence, jud icia J f unctions in the sense that it h as to
j
Subb;;"R.o 1.. decide on ·e'Vi.dence between a proposal and an opposition. A body· may be under a duty, however, to act
judicially (and subject to· control by means of these
orders) althot!gh there is no form of lis inter partes
before it; it is enough.that it should.have to__determine
a question solely on the facts of the particular case,
solely on the evidence before it, apart from questions
of policy or any other extraneous considerations."
•
"Moreover an administrative body, whose decision· •
is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy,
·1
may be under a duty to act judicially in the course of
I
arriving at that decision ........................ If, on the
,..
other hand, an administrative body in arriving at its • ,>
decisiou has before it at no stage.any form of lis and
throughout has to consider the question from the
point of view o:fi policy and.expediency, it. canuo( be
said that it is under .a duty at any time to act judi.• • •
cially."
It is not neces:>il.ty to multiply citations.
The concept of a " judicial act", has been eonceived
and developed by the English Judges with a
••
view to keep the administrative. tribunitls and
authorities within bounds. Unless the said conCJlpt is
broadly .and libero,lly interpreted, the object itself will
•
be defeated, that -is, the power of judicial review will.
•
become innocuoµs and ineffective. The comprehensive
phraseology of Art: 226 of the Constitution' supports
rather
tha1i negatives the liberal interpretation of that
•
concept. The ar,e;ument that Uie Court shall not
• obstruct the ·smooth working of the administr&tive
•
machinery does not appeal to me, for the simple
•
reason that the exercise of the power of judicial review
•
or, tO be more precise, the ~xistence of such power in
•
courts-for.• haTdly one act in thousands come.before
,.
oomts-elimina:tes "arbitrary action and enables the
•
r958
.. . . •
.
•
•
•
•
•
•
'
.-<.
•
•• •
•
•
•
s.c.R. • ·SUPRJ™:E COURT REPO~TS
'1501
•
•
•
administrstive machin~r.l' tp function without bias or
i958
•
discrrimination. With this background, the principles, 5 , . R_....d h
,
b
.
dh
rirsaesyam
as I appre h
end h
t em, may e conmse1y state t us: Khare a;. Anoth"
Every act of an admini&trative authority is not an
y.
administrative.or ..m..ipisterial act. The provisions of a n. state of
stll.tute may enjqin on a.n administrative authority tQ Madhya P••d"h
act administrativ()ly or to act judjcially or to act in
<>- ~"
part administratively and in pa~·t judicially. If policy Subba Rao J.
·and expediency are the guitlin.g factors in part or i~
whole throughout the entire process culminating in
the final decision, it is an obvious case of administrative act. On the other hand,. i£. the statute expressly
imposes a duty on the administrative body to act
judicially, it is again a clear case of a judicial act .
• Between the. two there are many acts, the determina• • tion of whose character creates .difficult problems for
th.e court. There may be cases where at one stage of
.the Ji!rocess the said body ms.y have to act judicially
and at another stage ministerially. The rule can be
< • broadly siated thus: The duty to act judicially may
not be expressly con~rred but may. be inferred from
•
the provisions of the statute. It may be gathered from
the cumulative effect of the .nature of the rights
• • oaffected, the manner of the disposal provided, the
objective criterion to be adopted, the phraseology
used, the nature of the power confen~ or the duty
imposed on the authority and other indicia afforded
by the statute. In short, a duty to aot judicially may
••
arise in widely different circumstanqes and it is not
possible or advisable to lay down a hard and fast rnle
or an "inexorable rule of guidance.
•
• In the present case, s. 53-A of· the Act itself prnvides
the-"necessary criteria to answer the qnestion. Before
the Government can take action under the section,
three preliminary condition& for· the exercise of the
•
power are laid down:: (1) The Committee is not competenA to perform the duties imposed -dn it ; (2) the •
•
State Government considers that a general improve•
ment in the administration of the municipality·is likely
•
to be secured by the appoirrj;ment.of >a .sei;vant .of the
Government; (3) an orderstating 'the reaso;is therefor.
I i'.].'he fir;t condition depends upon the· d.eterminatiort <1f
•
•
••
•
• • ••
•
..
..
1502
SUPJtEME COUPT HEPOP..TS '
.·.
. , I;
Lltl59]
an objecti,·c fact, namely, 1<hcthcr the culllmittee is
competent
to perform the dutie3 imposed upon it: lt
1
;d'~;;;,~;;, is a jurisdictional fact that confon; juriscliction 011 the
v.
Govrrnnwnt to take further aetio11. The determination
n, s1a1, of of this fact is not left to the suhjectirn :mtisfaotio11 of
Madhya Prnd"h the Government.
Indeed, the difforent phra,culcigy
"'° ~thm
trncd in regard to the second condition, nanwly, "the
Subba Rao J.
8tn.t.e Gcl\"ernment consiclers ", bri11gs out iu bold relief
the distinction between the two; while i11 the former
an objective fact has to be determined, m the laHer
the fact is left to the subjective satisfaction of the
Government. If the facts covered by both the conditions Me left t.o the subjective satisfaction of tlw
Government, the phraseology would have been different •rncl the clanse would have run thus: "If the
GovernmPnt considers that the committee is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it or undcrtak<·n by it by or under this Act or any other enact.
ment for t.he time being in force and that ;L general
improvement in r.hc administration of the m1.nic::ipality
is likely to IH, seeurecl by the ap;ioinlment of a servant
of the Gornrr.ment as the Executive Otlicer of the
Committee ...... " To accept the argument of the Counsel fur the respondents will be to rewrite the sectiou in'·
the abu'·" nHLlllWr which is not permissible. Thne is
also a goocl rer.sl>n and a justification for the diffcreuco
in the phmscology used in the section. The municipality is u.n elect.eel corporate body and is cntrnsted
with re,;ponsiblc statutory fonctions. While it may be.
nePcss<1ry, in public interest, to cleprive the committee
of some powers for a short period when it is proved
to be dc,mon~trnbly inc:ompetcnt, such a body canuo~
<>asily be relegated to a subordi11atc posit.ion on "the
mere will and pleasure of the Go»ernment. The section reconciles the public good and the committee's
rights and prestige, by condition'ng the exercise of the
power of the Government to depend upon the ohjec.
ti,·e determina.tion of tho jurisdictional ffl,Ct. Whaternr
ambiguity there may he in the section, it is dispelled
hy the thir<l eqndition, nat11ely, that. which enjoinH on
the (~overIUn~nt to gi,·e rea!mns. What is the object
M"the Legislature in impo8ing the Sa.id conc!&ion, if
•
•
•
•
•
•• • •
•
I
1 958
Sh . R
Kh;;,
•
..
•
' ;
I
•
!
'.ik
r ,,.. ,
·''.
-•
•
•••
•
•
•
•
S.C.R.• ·supREM°E COURT REPORTS
•
1503
•
•
the matter ls left to the subjective satisfaction of the
z958•
Government ? The concept ~f
satisfaction 5 1tri
, . R d h
. subjective
l
a es ya1n
of t he Government d oes not mvo ve any attempt to Kha",., Another
satisfy the mind or appeal to the good sense of
v.
another. The working of the mind need not be dis- The state of
closed and the validity of the section need not 'depend Madhya Pradesh
upon any objective standard. The condition to pass a
"'Othl's
speaking order is destructive of any idea of invulner- Subba Rao J.
r
ability, for the said condition implies that the order
should satisfy the mind of a 'reasonable man.
It is contended that a comparative study of the
provisions of ss. 53-A and 57 shows that the Government has to give notice before taking action under
s. 57, whereas no such duty is cast upon it under
, !!. 53-A and that would indicate the intention of the
Legislature that the Government is not expected to
act judicially under s. 53-A. There is some force in
this contention, but that is not decisive of the question
. to be decided in this case. If the provisions of a
• 'particular 'section necessarily imply a duty to act
judicially, the mere fad't that there is no express provisim1. to issue a notice to the affected parties cannot
(\Pnvert a judicial act into ~n administrative one. Nor
• does the argument that the order of appointment of
an Executive Officer is only for a te;nporary period
indicate the administrative character of the act. The
,.
finding of incompetency carries a stigma with it and
what is more derogatory to the reputation of the mem••
bers of the committee than to be stigmatized as incompetent to discharge their statutory duties? Would
it be reasonable to assume that public men in a demo•
o1'at~c country are allowed to be condemned unheard ?
What is material is not the period of the tenure of the
executive officer, but the ground for the appointment of
•
the officer, namely, thE;incompetency of the committee.
Shor°tlY stated, the p~sition is this : The committee is
•
comprised of elected representatives of the respective
•
constituencies; they are presumably competent men in
•
•
whom the electorate has co:qfidence. 'l'he Government
has to arrive at the finding of theii; inc!ilpipetenby on
)
•
the basis of objective facts to be ascertain'!la and to
•
~I
•
•
••
••
•
•
..
•
••
•
•
•
•
•••
•
.....
•
SUPRE:lfE CO"L"RT f{EPOitTb' • [1959]
•
•
•
•
•
give reasons for its finding. It is against all canpns of
natural justice that a tribunal should arrive at a finrlShri R,.d.sil"am ·
f ~
lung
·
· hout g1v111g
· ·
' , mg o 1ar-reac
consequence wit
an
'11are , A 11ot11er
•
K
v.
opportumty t-0 explam to the persons who would be
Tiu SM, of
affoctc~I by such a finding. For the aforesaid reas{)ns,
Madhya Pradtsh I have no doubt that the section imposes a duty on
&-.01!iers
the Government to <ict judicially in ascertaining the
objective
:\nd jmisdictional fact., namely, whether the
S11bba Rao ].
committee is incompet<•nt. It is a necessary condition
of such a duty to give an opportunity to the committee to exph\in the grave charges levolled against. it.
Admittedly, no sucli. opportunity was given to the
committee and I cannot agree with the learned Ad,·ocate-Ocnernl that the inquiry by the Deputy Collector
at an oarlier st.agfl for a different. purpose Imel in effect'
gi,·cn an opportunit.y to the committee. It is not
known what were r.he chal'g"s for which that inquiry
was held. The record discloses that the inquiry was
held by a subordinate ofliccr-thcre is noth~ng on re.
cord to show that thll (;ovcrnment authorised either
the Collector or the Deputy tollector t-0 make the
inquiry in connection with the fast of Dhurmal Jo)aga.
Jn my view, the inquiry caflnof, presumably take thil•
place of reasonable opportunity to be given by the •
Go,·crnment fo~ the proposed action under s. 53-A of
the Act. In lhe result, it follows that the Order of the
1-1 igh Court should be set aside and that of the Govern••
ment appointing the Executive Officer quashed. I do
it accordingly.
ORDER l'ER Cu1tIAl1 : This appeal is dismissed
•
wit.It.costs, in this court and the courts below.
•
~:
1504
~.,.
J
,
Appeal dismissed .
.
•
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•
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...
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•
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