SALES TAX OFFICER, CUTTACK AND ANOTHER versus M/S. B.C. PATEL & CO.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 April 1958 | [1959] 1 S.C.R. 520 | 1958 INSC 43
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 April 1958
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, VIVIAN BOSE, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 230/1956
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1959] 1 S.C.R. 520
- Neutral citation
- 1958 INSC 43
Text of the judgment
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
520
[1959)
That, to our mind, indicates that the bargain had been
freely made. There was 'nothing else to which our
Sdh Ganga Dhar
attention was directed as showing that the bargain
v.
was hard. 'Ve, therefore, think that the bargain was
Slta11kar ·Lal
a reasonable one and the eighty-five years' term of the
6' Others
mortgag\l should be enforced. vV c then come to the
Sarkar].
conclusion that the suit was premature and miist
fail.
.
In the result we dismiss this appeal with costs.
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Appeal di.smissed .
SALES TAX OFFICEH, CUTTACK
A::'\D ANOTHER
v.
M/s. B. C. PATEL & CO.
April Ij.
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(S. Il. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAH, S. K. DAS,
A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)
Sales Tax-l\1otification e11jorci11g the charge not wholly in consnnance tf'ith t.lze charging provision-Validity-Assessn1cnt for
periods both before .and aftci· the Constituti.011-Legality:-Orissa Sales
Tax Act, r947 (Omsa XIV of r947), s. 4-Consl1tution of India,
Art. r86.
This appeal by the Sales Tax authorities was directed against
the judgment and order of the Orissa High Court, passed under
Art. 226 of the Constitution, quashing five orders of assessment
covering five quarters made against the rPspondents \Vho carried
on the business of collection and sale of l{endu leaves in the erst\vhile Feudatory State of Pallahara to \vhich, on its 1nerger into
the province of Orissa on January 1, i948, the provisions of the
Orissa Sales Ta.x Act, 1947, were extended on March r, 1949· On
the same date the Government of Orissa issued a notification
under s. 4(1) of the Act which was in the following terms:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of
Section 4 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Orissa Act XIV of
1947), as applied to Orissa State, the Government of Orissa are
. pleased to appoint the 31st March, 1949· as the date with effect
from \Vhich every dealer \vhose gross turnover during the year ending the 31st Marci], 1949· exceed~d Rs. ~,ooo shall be liable to pay
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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under the said Act on sales effected after the said date". Section
4 of the Act, inter alia, provided: '' (r) . ·" . with effect frrm
.such date as the Provincial Governmrnt ·may by notification in Safrs Tax Officer,
Cuttack
the Gazette, appoint, being not earlier thari thirty days after the
v.
date of the said notification; every dealer· whose gross turnover
B.
C.
l'alel
& Co.
during the year immediately preceding the commencement of this
Act exceeded Rs. 5,000 shall be liable to pay tax under the Act
on sales effected after the date so notifi~d .... (2) Every dealer to
w~om sub-section (I) does not apply shall be liable to pay under
this Act \l'ith effect from the commencement of the year immediately follo~~ing ~hat during which his gross turnover first exceeded
Rs. 5,000 .
The' goods were admittedly delivered for oonsumption at
various places outside the State and the Sales Tax Officer as well
as the Assist1tnt Collector in appeal, proceeding on the basis that
the sales took place in the State, held that the respondents were
liable to Sales Tax for all the five quarters, two of which fell
before the commencement of the Constitution and three the;·eafter.• The contention of the respondents before the High Court
was that the notification- under s. 4(1) of the Act was invalid as it
ran counter to the provisions of that sub-section and no part of
that charging section could, therefore, come into force. It was
further contended that the assessment for the three quarters
' following the commencement of the Constitution was invalid by
reason ot Art. 286 of the Constitution. The High Court found
entirely in favour of the assessee:
Held (per Das C. ]., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and
Vivian Bose, JJ.), that the decision of the High Court in so far as
it related to tt1e three post-Constitution quarters was correct and
must be upheld. The orders of assessment for those quarters
contravened both Art. 286 of the Constitution ands. 3o(r)(a)(i)
of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and were without jurisdiction and
must be set aside. So far as the two pre-Constitution quarters
were concerned, the assessees were clearly liable under s. 4(2)
of the Act.
Per Das C. J. and Venkatarama Aiyar J. The first part.of
the impugned notification, appointing the date from which the
liability was to commence, was in consonance with s. 4(r) of
the Act and, therefore, clearly intra vires, whereas the second
part, indicating the class of dealers on whom the liability was to
fall, went beyond that section and must, therefor~. be held to be
ultra vires and invalid. But since the two parts were severable,
the invalidity of the second part could in no way affect the
validity of the first part which brought the charging section into
operation and the assessees were liable for the two pre-Constitution quarters under s. 4(1) as well.
' 1
Per S. K. Das and Vivian Bose JJ.-It would not be correct
to say that the second part of the notification was a mere surplusage severable from the rest of the notification. Liability to pay.the
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SUPREME COURT REP01{,TS
(1959]
tax under s. 4(1) of the Act could arise only on the issue of a. valid
notification in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section
Sales Tax Officer, and as there was no such notification the assessees were not liable
Cuttack
under s. 4(r) of the Act which did not come into operation. Subv.
sections (I) and (2) of s. 4 are mutually exclusive, and their
B. c. Paid & Co. periods of application being different both could not apply at the
same time and no notification ~·as necessary to bring into oper~
tion sub-s. (2) of the Act.
The goods having been admittedly sold and delivered for
consumption outside the State of Orissa, under Art. 286 (1)(a)
read with the Explanation as also under s. 30(1)(a)(i) of the Act,
the sales were outside the State of Orissa and, consequently, the
assessment for the three post-Constitution quarters were without
jurisdiction.
·
The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd., [1953]
S.C.R. 1069 and The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The
State of Bihar, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603, relied on.
Per Sarkar J.-There could be no liability under s. -4(1) of
the Act till a date was appointed thereunder, and where the
notification, as in the instant case, fixing such a date, \Vas not in
terms of that sub-clause, there was no fixing of a date at all and
the sub-clause could not come into play and no liability could
arise under it. It was impossible to ignore the second part of the
notification in question as a mere surplusage since the notification
read as a whole had one meaning and another without it. The
Government could not be heard to say that what it had said in
the notification was not what it actually meant.
Both the sub-clauses of s. 4 having been brought into force
at the same time by the same notification, they applied to all
dealers together and contemplated a situation in which the liability of a dealer under sub-cl. (1) might arise. It was apparent
from the scheme of the Act that sub-cl. (2) was not intended to
have any operation till a date was appointed under sub-cl. (1)
and a liability under it might have arisen.
t958
CIVIL APPEI,LATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
230 of 1956..
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated April 12, 1955, of the Orissa High Court
in 0. J.C. No~ 60 of 1952.
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R: Ganapathi Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants.
S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rames~war
l! ath, for the respondent.
1958. April 15. The Judgment of Das C, J. and
.
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Venkatarama Aiyar J. was delivered by Das C. J.
The Judgment of S. K. Das and Vivian Bose JJ. Sales Tax Officer,
was delivered by S. K. Das J. Sarkar J. delivered a
Cuttack
separate judgment.
·
v.
DAS C. J.-We agree that this appeal must be B. C. Patel & Co.
allowed in part but we prefer to rest our judgment on
Das C. ].
one of the material points on a ground which is different
f11om that adopted by our learned Brother S. K.
Das J. in the judgment which has just been delivered
by. him and which we have had the ad\ antage of perusmg.
The Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Orissa XIV of
1947), hereinafter referred to as the said Act received
.the assent of the Goyernor:General on April 26, 1947,
whens. 1 of :the Act came into force. On August 1,
1947, a Notification was issued by ~he Government of
Oris~a bringing the rest of the said Act into force in
the Province of Orissa, as ·it was then constituted.
Section 4, as it stood at all times material to this
appeal, ran as follows:
"4(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 5, 6, 7
and 8 and with effect from such date as the Provincial
Government may, by notification in the Gazette,
appoint, being not earlier than thirty days after the
date of the said.notification, every dealer whose gross
turnover during the year immediately preceding the
commencement of this Act exceeded Rs. 5,000 shall be
liable to pay tax under the Act on sales effected after
the date so notified:
Provided that the tax shall not be payable on sale
involved in the execution of a-contract which is shown
.to the satisfaction of the Collector to have been. entered
into by the dealer concerned on or before the date so
notified.
(2) Every dealer to whom sub-section (1) does nqt
apply shall be liable to pay tax under 'this Act with
effect from the commencement of the year immediately
following that during which his gross turnover first
exceeded Rs. 5,000 .
•(3) Every dealer who -has become liable to pay
tax under this Act shall continue to be so liable until
the expiry of three consecutive years, during each of
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524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
which ·his gross turnover has failed to exceed Rs. 5,000
and
such further period after the date of such expiry
Sales Tax Officer,
as may be prescribed and on the expiry of this latter
Cutt a ck
period his liability to pay tax shall cease.
v.
B. C. Pearl & Co.
(4) Every dealer whose liability to pay tax has
ceased under the provisions of sub-section (3) shall
Das~.].
again be liable to pay tax under this Act with effect
from the commencement. of the year immediateiy
following that during which his gross turnover again
exceeds Rs. 5,000."
On August 14, 1947, a notification was issued by the
Government of Orissa appointing September 30, 1947,
as the date with effect from which that sub-section
was to come into force in the then province of Orissa.
On January 1, 19!8, by a covenant of merger
executed by its ruler, the feudatory State of Pallahara
merged into the province of Orisstt. In exercise of the
powers delegated to it by the Government of India
under what was then known as the Extra Provincial
Jurisdiction Act, 1947, the Government of Orissa on
December 14, 1948, issued a notification under s. 4 of
that Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, extending the
Orissa Sales Tax Act to the territories of the erstwhile
feudatory States, including Pallahara · which had
merged into the province of Orissa. On March 1, 1949,
a notification under s. 1(3) was issued by the Government of Orissa bringing ss. 2 to 29 of the said Act into
force in the added territories. On the same da v
another notification w~s issued under s. 4(1) of the Act,
which was in the following terms :
• " In exercise of the powers conferred by Sn b-sectiort (1) of Section 4 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947
(Orissa Act XIV- of 1947) as applied to Orissa State,
the Government of Orissa are pleased to appoint the
31st March, 1949, as the date with effect from which
every dealer" whose gross turnover during the year
ending the 31st March, 1949, exceeded Rs. 5,000 shall
be liable to pay tax under the said Act on sales effected after the said date."
It was after this notification had been issued tha.t the
-respondents were sought to be made liable to tax.
The respondents were assessed under the said Act
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525
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
for five quarters ending respectively on September 30,
r95S
1949, December 3f, 1949, June 30, 1950, September 5 1 ; -0 ffi
30, 1950, and December 31, 1950. It will be noticed a"cu::ack icer,
that the first two quarters related to a period prior to
v.
the commencement of the Constitution and the remain- B. c. Patel & Co.
ing three quarters fell after the Constitution came into
force. The Sales Tax Officer, Cuttack having assessed
Das c. J.
the respondents to Sales Tax under the said Act for
each and all of the said five quarters and the respondent's several appeals against the said several assessment orders under the said Act having been pismissed
on April 12, 1952, the respondents filed a petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Orissa High
Court praying, inter alia, for a writ in the nature of a
writ oj certiorari for quashing the said assessment
vrder~ and for prohi.biting the appellantR from realising
the tax so assessed or _from maki1ig assessments on
them in future. The contention of the respondents
before the High Court was that the notification issued
by t-he Government of Orissa on March 1, 1949, under
s. 4(1) being invalid in that it ran counter to the provisions of that sub-section, no part of the charging
section came into force' and consequently they were
not liable to tax at all for any of the five quarters. As
regards the three quarters following the commencement of the Constitution, they urged an additional
plea, namely, that the assessment orders for those
three quarters were invalid by rea;son of the provisions
of Art. 286 of the Constitution. The High Court
accepted both these contentions and by its judgment
and order pronounced on April 12, 1955, cancelled the
assessments. The Sales Tax Officer, Cuttack, and· the
Collector of Commercial Taxes, Cuttack, have
appealed against the judgment and order of the High
Court.
_
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As regards the assessment orders for the three post.
Constitution quarters, the decision of the High Court
purport('! to have proceeded on the decision of this
Court in the State of Bombay v. United .Motors (India)
Ltd. (1). We find oqrselves in complete agreement with
(1) [1953) S.C.R ro69.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"[1959]
our learned Brother S. K. Das J. for reasons stated by
him that the assessment orders for the three postSales Tax Officer,
Constitution quarters were hit by cl. (1) of Art. 286
Cul tack
and
also s. 30 (1) (a) (i) of the Act and were rightly
v.
It
B. C. J>iilrl &- Co. held by the High Court to be without jurisdiction.
is with regard to the assessment orders for the two
Das C. ].
pre-Constitution quarters that we have come to a
conclusion different from that to which our learhed
Brother has arrived.
We proceed to state our
reasons.
The impugned notification, as hereinbefore stated,
was issued on March 1, 1949, under s. 4 (1) of the said
Act. Under that sub-section every dealer whose
gross turnover during the year immediately preceding
the commencement of the Act exceeded Rs. 5,000
would be liable to pay the tax under the Act o~ sales
effected after the date "so notified'', that is to sav,
the date which the provincial Government might by
notificationin the Gazette appoint. It is clear, therefore, that s. 4 (1) by its @wn terms determined the
persons on w horn the tax liability would fall but left it
to the provincial Government only to appoint the date
with effect from which the tax liability would commence. It follows, therefore, that the only power
conferred by s. 4(1) on the Government was to
appoint, by a notification in the Official Gazette, a
date with effect from which the tax liability would
attach to the dealers described and specified in the
sub-section itself as the persons on whom that liability
would fall. The Government of Orissa issued the
.notification, hereinbefore quoted, " in exercise of the
powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 4" and
appointed March 31, 1949, as the date with effect from
which the tax liability would commence. It was none
of the busiq,ess of the Government of Orissa to say on
what class of dealers the tax liability would fall, for
that had been already determined by the sub-section
itself. Therefore, by the notification the Government
of Orissa properly exercised its powers under imb-s. (1)
in so far as it appointed March 31, 1949, as th~ date,
but it exceeded its powers by proceeding to say that
all dealers whose gross turnover during the year ending
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
March 31, 1949, exceeded Rs. 5,000 should be liable
to pay tax qnder the Act. This part of the notifica- Safo~ Tax Offioer,
tion clearly ran counter to the sµb-section itself, for
Cutfack
under that sub-section it is only those dealers whose
v.
gross turnover exceeded Rs. 5,000 "during the year B. c. Patel & Co.
immediately preceding the commencement of this Act"
Das C. ].
that became liable to pay the tax. For the purposes
of 'the five assessment orders it made no difference
whether the ·Act is taken to have commenced on
December 14, 1948, when it was extended to the
feudatory States by notifica.tion under s. 4 of the
Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, or on March
1, 1949, when the notification under s. 1 (3) was issued,
for in either case the year immediately preceding the
commencement of this Act was April 1, 1947, to
March. 31, 1948. The position, therefore, is that by
the earlier part of the impugned notification the
Government of Orissa properly and rightly exercised
its power in appointing March 31, 1949, as the date
with effect from which the liability to pay tax under
the Act would commence, but by its latter part did'
something more which it had no business to do, i.e., to
indicate, contrary to the sub-seetion itself, that those
dealers whose gross turnover during the year ending
on March 31, 1949, would be liable to pay tax under
. the Act. The notification in/ so far as it purports to
determine the class of dealers on whom the tax liability would fall, was certainly invalid. The question
that immediately arises is· as to whether the whole
notification should be adjudged invalid as has been
done by the High Court and as is proposed to b~
done by my learned Brother S. K. Das J. or the two
portions of the notification should be severed and
effect should be given to the earlier part which is in
conformity with s. 4(1) and the latter J:>art which
goes beyond the powers conferred by the sub-section
to the Government of Orissa should be . rejected.
Immediately the questiim of severability arises. Are
the two portions severable? We find no difficulty in
holdirrg that the portion of the notification' which
went beyond the powers conferred on the Government
of Orissa is quite clearly and easjly severable from that
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
which w.ts within its powers. It cannot possibly be
said that had the Government of Orissa known that
it had no power to determine the persons on whom
the tax liability would fall it would not have appointeel a date at all. In our view there is no'question of
the two parts being inextricably wound up. We,
therefore, hold that the notification, in so far as it
appointed March 31, 1949, as the date with effect frbm
which liability to pay tax would commence was valid
and the test of the notification was invalid and must
be treated as surplus without any legal efficacy. The
. result, therefore, is that the charging section was
effectively brought into force and the entire charging
section became operative and dealers could be pro.
perly brought to charge under the appropriate part of
the charging section.
•
It is true that the notification having also stated
that the dealers, whose gross turnover exceeded
Rs. 5,000 during the year ending March 31, 1949,
would be liable to pay the tax, the sales tax authorities naturally applied their mind to the question
whether during the year ending March 31, 1949, the
gross turno¥cr of tN.e respondents exceeded the
requisite amount, but did not inquire into the question
whether the respondent's gross turnover exceeded
J{.s. 5,000 during the year immediately preceding the
commencement of the Act which in this case was the
financial year from April I, 1947 to March 31, 1948.
·lf the matter stood there, it would have been necessary to. send the case back to the i-lales Tax Officer to
enquire· into and ascertain whether the quantum of
the gross turnover of the respondents during the last
mentioned financial year ending on March 31, 1948,
exceeded Rs. 5,000 or it did not. But a remand is
not called for because it appears from the judgment
under appeal that it was conceded that for the period
Aprill, 1949, till the commencement of the Constitution on January 26, 1950,'the respondents would haye
been liable to pay sales tax provided a valid notification ha cl been issued, under sub-s. ( 1) of s. 4. • This
· concession clearly amounts to an admission that the
"ross turnover• of the respondents
during the financial
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Sales Tax Officer,
cu11ack
v.
B. C; Patel&Co.
Das C. ].
[19591
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$.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
529
year ending on March 31, 1948, which was the year
r958
immediately preceding March 31, 1949, exceeded
Rs. 5,000. We have already held that the notifica- Sales Tax Office~,
• d
C1tllack
tion issued under s. 4(1) in so far as it appomte
March 31, 1949, as the date with effect from which B. c.
1 & co.
the liability to pay sales tax would commence was
good and valid in law. That finding coupled with
Das c. J.
the concession mentioned above relieves us from the
necessity of remanding the case to the sales tax
authorities. Even if we assume, contrary to the
aforesaid concession, that the gross turnover of the
respondents during the financial year ending ·on
March 31, 1948, did not exceed Rs. 5,000 and, therefore, s. 4 (1) did not apply to them the r~spondents
will still be liable to pay the sales tax for the two preCo9stitution quarters under s. 4 (2).
]'or reasons stated above we hold that the assessment orders for the three post-Constitution quarters
were invalid and we accordingly agree that this
appeal, in so far as it is against that part of the order
of the High· Court which cancelled the assessment
orders for those three post-Constitution quarters,
should be dismissed. We further hold that the assessments for the two pre-Constitution quarters were valid
for reasons stated above and accordingly we agree in
allowing this appeal in so. far as it is against that part
of the order of the High Court which. cancelled the
assessment orders for the two pre-Constitution quarters
on the ground that the notification issued under s. 4 (I)
of the Act was whollv invalid. Under the circumstances of this case "we also agree that the parties
should bear their own costs iri the High Court as well
as in this Court.
S. K. DAs J.-This appeal on behalf of the assessing s. K. Das J.
authorities, Cuttack, has been brought ~ursuant to an
order made on January 17, 1956, granting them special
le~ve to appeal to this Court from the judgment and
order of the High Court of Orissa dated April 12, 1955,
by which the High Court quashed certain orders of
ass~ssment of sales tax made against the responden~.
The short facts are these. The respondent, Messrs.
B. C. Patel and Co., is a partnership. firm carrying on
p:i·,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
the business of collection and sale of Ken du lea vee.
The firm has its headquarters at Pallahara, which was
Sales T.ax O!fi.cer, .c
Cuttack
1ormer1y one of t h e 10,,'eudatory S
, tates of Orissa an d
v.
merged in the then province of Orissa by a merger
B. c. Patel & Co, agreement dated January 1, 1948. The Sales Tax
authorities, Cuttack, in the State of Orissa, assessed
s. I<. Das J. the respondent to sales tax in respect of sales of Kendu
leaves which took place for five quarters ending on•
September 30, 1949, December 31, 1949, June 30, 1950,
September 30, 1950 and December 31, 1950. It should
be noted that two of the aforesaid quarters related to
a period prior to the commencement of the Constitution, and the remaining three quarters were post-Constitution. The facts which the Sales Tax authorities
. found were (l) that the respondent collected Kendu
leaves in Orissa and sold them to various merchapts
of Calcutta, Madras and other places on receipt of
orders from them, (2) that the goods were sent either
f. o. r. Talchcr or f. o. r. Calcutta, and (3) the sale price
was realised by sending the bills to the purchasers for
payment. The admitted position was that the goods
were delivered for consumption at various places outside the State of Orissa. The Sales Tax authorities
proceeded on the footing that all the sales took place
in Orissa even though the goods were delivered for consumption at places outside Orissa. By five separate
assessment orders dated May 31, 1951, the Sales Tax
Officer, Cuttack, held that the sales having taken place
in Orissa, the respondent was clear1y liable to sales tax
for the pre-Constitution period and, for the post-Constitution period, though the sales came within cl. ( 2)
of Art. 286 of the Constitution, the respondent was
liable to sales tax under the Sales Tax Continuance
Order, 1950, made by the President. These findings
were affirmed by the Assi8tant Collector of Sales Tax,
Orissa, on appeal, by his order dated April 12, 1952.
The respondent assessee then filed a petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High ·court of
Orissa and prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari
or other appropriate writ quashing the aforesaid orders
of assessment. The case of the respondent before the
HigQ. Court was t.hat the asse~sment orders, both with
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
regard to the pre-Constitution and post-Constitution
I958
periods, were invalid and without jurisdiction. The
High Court accepted the case of the respondent and SalescTa:. Ok'fficer,
.c
l entire
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itltac
held that tie
l assessment 'ord ers ~or
tie
per10
v.
were invalid and without jurisdiction. The present B. c. Patel$ Co.
appeal has been brought from the aforesaid judgment
and order of the High Court of Orissa dated April 12, s. IC Das J.
1955.
Though before the Sales Tax authorities and in . the
High Court, an attempt was made on behalf of the
respondent assessee to show that there were no completed sales in Orissa and what took place in Orissa
was a mere agreement to sell, that question is no
longer at large before us. The· Sales Tax authorities
found against the respondent on that question and the
High Court did not consider it necessary to decide it
on the petition filed by the respondent. The High
Court proceeded on certain other grounds pressed
before it by the respondent, and we proceed now to
consider the validity of those grounds. The grounds
are different in respect of the two periods, pre-Constitution, and post-Constitution, and it will be convenient to take these two periods separately.
But before we do so, it is necessary to state some
facts with regard to the enactment and enforcement
of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Orissa XIV of 1947),
hereinafter referred to as the Act, in the old province
of Orissa and the ·ex-Feudatory State of Pallahara.
The Act received the assent of the Governor General
on April 26, 1947, and was first published in the Orissa
Gazette on lVIay 14, 1947. Section I came into force
at once in the old province of Orissa and sub-s. (3) of
that section said that " the rest of the Act shall come
into force on such date as the Provincial Government
may, by notification in the Gazette, aripoint ". The
Provincial Government of Orissa notified August I,
1947, as the date on which the rest of the Act was to
come into force in the province of Orissa. It iii necessary at this stage to refer to the charging section,
nan1'ely s. 4 of the Act, which is set out below as it
stood at the relevant time:
"4. (I) Subject 1o the. provisions of $ections 5 1 ~ 1 1
•
5~2
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
(1959)
and 8 and with effect from such date as the Provincial
Government may, by notification in the Gazette,
S"lts Tax Officer,
appoint,
being not earlier than thirty days after the
Cuttack
date
of
the
said notification, every dealer whose gross
v.
tllrnover
during
the year immediately precedin" the
B. C. 'Patel (S- Co.
commencement of this Act exceeded Rs. 5,000 sh~ll be
S. K. Vas ].
liable to pay tax under the Act on sales effected after
the date so notified.
•
...................................................................
(2) Every dealer to whom sub-section (1) does not
apply shall be liable to pay tax under this Act with
effect from the commencement of the year immediately
following that during which his g.ross turnover first
exceeded Rs. 5,000.
• (3) Every dealer who has become liable to pay
tax under this Act shall continue to be so liable until
the expiry of three consecutive years, during each of
which his gross turnover has failed to exceed Rs. 5,000
and such further period after the date of such expiry A.R
may be prescribed and on the expiry of thrs latter
period his liability to pay tax shall cease.
(4) Every dealer whose liability to pay tax has
ceased under the provision of sub-section (3) shall
again be liable to pay tax under this Act with effect
from ·the commencement of the year immediately
following that during which his gross turnover again
exceeds Rs. 5,000."
It is to be noticed that for a liability to arise under
sub-s. (1) of s. 4, a notification by the Provincial
Government is necessary, and the notification must fix
the date from which every dealer whose gross turnover
during the year.immediately preceding the commencement of the Act exceeded Rs. 5,000 shall be liable to
pay tax under the Act on sales effected after the date
so notified. ~uch a notification was issued for the old
province of Orissa on August 30, 1947, and September
30, 1947, was fixed as the date with effect from which
·every dealer whose gross turnover during the yeu,r
ending March 31, 1947, exceeded Rs. 5,000 was made
liable to pay tax under the Act on sales effected after
the said date. This was the position in the old pro-'
villlle of Orissa.. We have. already stated that the
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
533
ex-:Feu<latory State of Pallahara "·as merged into the
old province of Orissa by a merger agreement dated
Sales T"x Officer,
.January l, In48. After the merger of Pallahara in the
Cut tack
old province ofOrissa, the Government of Orissa under
v.
the delegat xl authority of the Central Government and B. C. Patel & Co.
exercising the powers under s. 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, HJ47 (X LVII of 1947) (as it 'Vas S. K. Das ].
then ca.lied) applied the Act to the former Orissa
States including Pallahara by a notification dated
December 14, 1948. The only modification made in
applying the Act to the Orissa States was to substitute
the words "Orissa States" for the words " Province of
Orissa ",wherever they occurred in the Act. By merely
a pp lying the Act to the Orissa States on December 14,
1948, all sections of the Act did not come into force
in that area at one<\ since a notification under sub-s. (3)
of s. t was necessn,ry to bring into force RS. 2 to 29.
Such a notifica,tion w11s issued on lVIarch 1, HJ4!). The
notification was in these ternrn:
" In exercise of the powers conferred by subsect.ion (:3) of section l of the Ori8Ba Sales Tax Act,
1947 (Orissa Act XIV of HH7), as applied to Orissa
Rt.ates, the Government ofOrissa are pleased to appoint
the 1st clay of ?lfarch, 194!), as the da,te on which
sections 2 t~ 2H of the said Act shall come into force".
The position therefore was this. Section 1 of the Act
came into fon·o in Pallaharn on December 14, 1948,
and the rcmn,ining sectiorn; came into force on March
1, Hl49, !lamely, those sections which Llealt with the
liability of a <lealer to pay sales tax, :;et up a machinery
for colleetion of the tax and dealt with other ancillary.
matters. A notification under sub-R. (1) of s. 4 was
also necessary for a liability to arise under that subsection in the said area, and sueh a notification was
issued on March 1, 194!). That notification must be
quoted in full, as one of the points for oui· decision is
the validity of the notification. The notification read:
" In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection ( 1) of section 4 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act,
• 1947 f()rissa Act XIV of 1947), as n,pplied to Orissa
. States, the Government of Orissa are pleased ~Q
~
.·
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
534
[1959)
appoint the 31st M~rch, 1949, as the date with effect
from which every dealer whose ._.gross turnover during
Sales Tax Officer,
Cuttack
the year ending the 31st March, 194!), exceeded
v.
Hs. 5,000 shall be liable to pay tax under the said Act
B. c. Patel & co. on sales effected after the said date".
Two other provisions of the Act must be referred to
s. K. Da; f. here. The word "dealer" is definetT in s. 2(c) .in
these terms :
•
"'dealer' ·means any person who carries on the
business of selling or supplyjng goods in Orissa,
whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise
and includes any firm or a Hindu joint family, and
af1y society, club or association which sells or supplies
gooqs to its members ; ". The word " year " is defined
in s. ·2(j) and means the financial year.
Now, with ·regard to the pre-Constitution period the
High Court has found that the notification unde·r subs. (1) of s. 4 dated March 1, 1949, was an invalid notification and therefore the respondent was not liable to tax
1.lnder that sub-section in respect of the trans11ctions
which took place in the pre-Constitution period. The
reason why the High Court has held that the notificatio1'· in question was invalid must now be stated.
The. scheme of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 is, firstly, to fix
a date,' not earlier than thirty days after the date
of the notification, from which the liability is to
commence;· and, .s!')condly, to impose a liability on
every dealer whose gi'oss turuover during the year
immediately preceding the commencement of the Act
exceeded Hs. 5,000. The tax liabilitv is on transac1'ions of sale which take place after the notified date
(which must necessarily be after the commencement of
the Act); but in determining on which class of dealers
tlie .incidence of taxation will fall, the crucial period.
as mentionad in the sub-section itself is the year
immediately preceding the commencement of the
Act. Therefore, the sub-section . conte.mplates two
matters, one of which may be called the 'relevant
date' and the other .'relevant period'. So far as the
old province of Orissa was concerned, there was no
. difficulty. The notificatie>n'fixed s·eptember 30, 1947, as
the relevant da.te, and the year immediately preceding
1 95 8
'•
....
•
S.C.R.
5S5
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the commen9ement of .the .Act in the old province
ryss
of Orissa. was the relevant period, viz., the financial
1. 1946toMarch311947. SalesTaxO(ficer,
Yea.r 1946c47 ' i.e. ' April
·
'
' .
Cuttack
Therefore dealers whose gross .turnover exceeded · v.
Rs. 5,000 in 1946-47, became liable urider sub-s. (1) of n. c. Patel & co.
4 to tax on transactions of sale after September 30,
19~ 7, in the old province of Orissa. The notification
s. J<. Das J.
for the Orissa States, however, fixed March 31, 1949,
as ·the . relevant date ; but in determining the class
of dealers who would be subject to the liability, it took
the year ending March 31, 1949, . as the relevant
period. This was clearly a mistake, ·because under
sub-s. (1) of s. 4 the crucial year is the year immediately
preceding the commencement of the Act. The Act
commenced in the Orissa States either on December 14,
1948, •or on March 1, 1949, and' the financial year
immediately preceding was the year 1947-48, i.e.,
April 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948. The notification
Would have been in consonance with the sub-section, if
it had mentioned the year ending March 31, 1948,
(instead of March 31, 1949) as the crucial year for
determining the class of dealers who would be subject
to the liability under sub-s. (1) of s. 4. This mistake
in the notification is the · ground on which the
High Court held th~t the assessments for the two
quarters of the pre-Constitution period were invalid
and without jurisdiction.
·The learned Solicitor-General who has appeared fo'r
the appellants has conceded that a mistake was' made
in the notification. However, he has argued~firstly,
that the mistake was immaterial and secondly, tha1'
the assessment orders for the pre-Constitution period
were justified under sub-s. (2) of s. 4. As to the first'
argument that the mistake was immaterial, he has
submitted that the liability to tax arosti under the
stio-seetion and not undpr the notification, and any
mistake in the notification did not affect such liability;
h'e has ·also submitted that the words and figures
,Y,hicli,.gave rise to the mistake were mere surplusage
ah'd' could he severed fro in the· rest of the notification;'
We are mfable to accept this argument. Fiora liability
to 1 arise· qrtdel' sub-s. (1) ~of s. 4, 'Ui.e · issue' ·of .a,
s; ·
•
SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
536
[1959]
notification is an essential prerequisite, and unless the
notification complies with the requirements of the
Sc1lcs Tax Officer,
sub-section,
no liability to tax can arise under it. The
Cu/lack
notification
not
only fixed the relevrmt date, but fixed
v.
the
relevant
period
for determining the class of
11. C. Patel/'.,., Co.
dealers who would be subject to the liability. In
S. J{. lJas J.
doing so, it made a· mistake, the result of which was
that the notification was not in conformity with the
]a,L \Ve do not think that it can be se;:ered in tho
'my suggested by the learned Bolicitor General.
:Now, we come to the second •wgument-whether
the pre-Constitution assessment orders are justified
under su h-s. (2) of s. 4. The High Court held that
they wf.re not, and gave two reaso1rn for its view : one
was that sub-sections (I) and (2) were mutually
excJusfrc and the other 'ras based on the O}iening
words of snb-s. (2), which says that "every dealer tq
"hum sub-section (1) docs not apply etc." The High
Court expressed the view that if tho notification under
snb-s. {l) WE're correctly dra'rn np, the sub-section
would have applied to the respondent; therefore, the
opening words of sub-s. (2) barred the application of
the sub-sect ion to the respondent. At first sight, there
appears to be some force in this dew. But on a
closer examination we do not think that the vic11·
expressed by tlw High Court is correct.. Sub-sections (I)
and (2) are mutually exclusive only in the sense that
1hey do not operate in the snme field ; that is, the
relevant periods for their application are different.
The rele\·ant period for the •>pplica.tion of snb-s. (1) is
'•'the year immerlintdy preceding the commencement
of the Act." Su Ji-sect ion (2) however does not require
a.ny notification, and nncler .it cver.v dealer is liable to
pay tax under the A.cl with effect from the commencement of thPo yca.r immediately following that during
which his gross turnover fint exceeded Rs. 5,000.
Obviously, the relevant period for the application of
E.nb-s. (2) is the ;\'Par immediately following that
during which the gross turnm·er of a dealer first
exceeded Hs. 5,000. The contrast between tlie two
· sub-sections is this: for sub-s. (1) the crucial year is
thf year iimne.diately prec~ding the cormnenceinent of
•
•
J
'
•
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT BEPORTS
537
the Act; but for sub-s. (2) the crucial year is the
i95S
year in which the dealer's gross turnover first exceed- Sales Tax Officer.
ed Rs. 5,000. We ageee that for the same relevant
cuitack
year both sub-sections (1) and (2) cannot apply,
v.
because snb-s. (2) says-" Every dealer to whom sub- B. c. Patel &- Co.
s. (1) does not ::tpply etc." Let us, for example, take
tpe year 194'6-47 in the old province of Orissa. That 5 · I<. Das f.
was the year i mmecliat'.lly ·preceding the commencement of the Act in that area, and sub-s. (1) applied to
all dealers whose gross turnover exceeded Rs. 5,000,
first or otherwise, in that year; sub-s. (2) did not
apply to such dealers evcl1 if their gro;;s turnover
exceeded Rs. 5,000 for the first time in that year;
because where snb-s. (1) applies, sub-s. (2) does not
apply. But what is the case before us? The year
in1mediatcly preceding the commencement of the Act
in the Pallahara area was 1947-48, and sub-s. (1)
would have applied to the respondent if the notification had mentioned thnt yea,1-. But it did not, and .
the result was that it 'ms not necessary to find if the
respondent's gross turnover exceeded Rs. 5,000 in
HJ4 7-48. 'Vhat was found was that the respondent's
gross turnover exceeded Its. 5,000 in HJ48-49, that is,
·the year ending March 31, HH9, which was not the
year irnmediately preceding the commencement of
the Act in the Pallalrnra area,, Obviously, therefore,
sub-s. (1) did not apply to the respondent; hut he
clearly ca,mc tinder sub-:;. (2). The Act came into
force in the Orissa States on i\Jarch 1, 1949. By March
31, Hl49, the reRpomlcnt's gros:; turnover cxcecclecl
Hs. 5,000. He was, tlwreforc, liable to pay tax under·
sub-s. (2) >vith effect fnnu the commencement of the
year immediately foUo"'illg 1\farch :31, 19Ml, that is,
from April 1, 1949. H has been argued for the respondent that the won[ ' first' in :ml,.s. (2) means
' first ' after the commencement of the Act. Assuming
this to be correct, the respondent still comps under
sub-s. (2); because even if the Act came into force
on March 1, 1949, the respondent's gross turnover
first cxceecled .Rs. 5,000 in the year ending .March :H,
1949-whioh was after the commencement of the
Act.
•
•
0
~UPREME COURT REPORTS
538
[1959]
We are, therefore, of the view that all the require.
ments
of sub-s. (2) are fulfilled in this case, and the
Sales Tax Ojficer,
cuuack
two assessment orders made against the respondent for
v.
the pro-Constitution period were validly made under
B. c. Patel c:~ Co. sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the Act. The effect of the invalid
notification under sub-s. (1) was that there was no
s. h·. Vas J. liability thereunder, and no dealers·wero liable to pay
tax under that sub-section". ]3nt that did not mean
that any dealer who properly came under sub-s .. (2)
was free to escape his liability to pay tax. Surely, the
position cannot be worse than what it would have been
if the Provincial Governnient had failed to issue a
notification under sub-s. (l ).
\Ve now turn to the post-Constitution period. The
short ground on which the High Court held the assessment orders for this period to be invalid was based on
the decision of this Court in 'l'he Stnte of Bombu,y v. 'l'he
United Motors (India) Ltd. (1). Said the High Court:
"Clause (1) of Article 286 prohibited a State from
taxing a sale unless such sale took place within the
1:-ltate as C'xplained in the Explanation to the clause of
the Article. Similarly, clause (2) of that Article restricted the power of a State to tax a sale which took
place 'in the course of inter-State trade or commerce '.
Doubtless, by virtue of the proviso to that clause an
01·cler by the President may save taxation on such
inter-State sales till the :Hst March, l.951. The recent
decision· of the Supreme Court reported in A.LR. (1953)
S.C. p. 252 has settled the law regarding the true scope
of these two clauses of the A.rticle. Where a transac•
tioi1 of sale involves inter-State elements if the goods
are delivered for consumption in a particular State
that Rtate alone can tax the sale by virtue of clause (1)
of that Article and by a legal fiction that sale becomes
'intra-State sate'. Clause (2) of Article 286 applies to
those transactions of sale involving .inter-State elements
which do not come within the scope of clause (1) of
that Article. On the admitted facts of the present
case, clause (1) of Article 286 would apply. The Sj1les
iuvol ve inter-State elements inasmuch as the buyers
are outside Orissa, price is paid outside Orissa and
•
(r) ['9>3] S.C.R to69 .
•
I
,'
'
S.C.R.
•
•
SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS
goods are delivered for consumption outside Orissa.
Hence, by virtue of clause (1) of Article 286 as explain- Sales Tax Officer,
ed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the State
Cuttack
of Orissa is not competent to tax such transactions of
v.
sale. "
ll. C. Patel & Co. •
The learned Solicitor General has rightly pointed
out that in a later decision of this Court in The Ben- S. K. Das].
gtil Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar
and Others (1), which was not available to the High
Court when it delivered its judgment, the view express'.'
ed in the United 111 otors' case (2) was departed from in
so far as the earlier decision held that cl. (2) of Art.
286 of the Constitution did not affect the pmver of the
State ·in which delivery of goods was made to tax
inter-State sales or purchases of the kind mentioned in
the ~xplanation to cl. (1) and the effect of the Explanation was that such transactions were saved from the
ban imposed by Art. 286 (2). The learned Solicitor~·
General, therefore, contends that on the basis of the
later decision, the assessments made should be held
to be valid under the Sales Tax Continuance Order,
1950, made by' the President, even though the sales
took place in course of inter-State trade or .commerce.
It is necessary to state here that by the Adaptation
of Laws (Third Amendment) Order, 1951, made by thu.
President in exercise of the 'power given by cl. (2) of
Art. 372 of the Constitution, s. 30 was inserted in the
Act to bring it into accord with the Constitution, from
January 26, 1950. Section 30 which in substance reproduced Art. 286 of the Constitution, as it then stood,
was in these terms-.
·
" :30. (1) ·Notwithstanding anything contained· in
this Act- · · ·
(a) a tax onsale or purchase of goods shall not be
' .
•
imposed under this Act ·
"·. (i) where such sale or purchase takes place outside t.he State of Orissa ; or ' ~ .. (ii) where such sale or purchase takes 'place in the
course of import ,of the goods into, ·or' export of the
gooch; out of~ the territory of India ;
. .
(b) a ta:( oh the safo or purchase of any goods
(r) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603.
(2) [1953} S.C.R. 1Q69.
•
•
540
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
shall not, after the 31st day of i\forch, Hl51, be imposed
where
such sale or purchase takes place in the course of
Sales Ta,¥ Officer,
inter-State
trade or commerce except in so far as
Cu flack
Parliament
may
by law otherwise provide.
v.
B. c_ Patel,., Co,
(2) The explanation to clause (1) of Article 286 of
the Constit,ution shall apply for the interpretation of
S. K. Das].
sub-cla1rne (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (1)."
\Ve are of the view thn,t the Bengal I inrnunity decrsion (') does not really help the learned Solicitor-General to establish his contention that the assessments for
the post-Constitution period were valid. The admitte<l
position was that the goods sold were dclil-ered for
consumption at various plaees outside the State of
Orissa. Therefore, under cl. (1) (a) of Art. 286 read with
the Explanation a,s n,lso urnler s. :30 of the Act, the
sn,lcs were outside Orissa. It is trne that the Bengal
Immunity decision (1 ) took a view different from th:it of
the e;irlier decision in so far as it held that inter-State
sales were converted into intra-State sales lw the Explanation; but it was . pointed out tlrnt tl{e St;ites'
power with respect to a, sale or purchase might be hit
by one or more of the bans imposed by Art. 286.
\Vith reference to the different clauses of Art. 286,
it w:is observed in the majority judgment of the Bengal I min unity <leci.sion (1):
"These several bans nrny overhp in some case,~
bnt: in their respective scope >incl operntion they are
separate and independent. They deal with different
phases of a sale or purchase but, nevertheless, they are
distiL1ct and one has nothing to do with and is not
dependent on the other or others. The States' legi ..;lative power with respect to a sale or purchrLsc may be
hit by one or more of these bans. Thus, take the case
of a sale of goods declared by Parliament as essential
by a seller in )Vest Bengal to a purchaser in Bihar in
which goods arc actually delivered as a direct result of
such sale for consumption in the State of Bihar. A
law made by West Bengal without the assent of tho
President taxing this sale will be unconstitutional because (l) it will offend Article 286 (1) (a) as the •s:i.le
has taken place outside the_ territory by virtue of the
.
(!) [1955] > S.C.R. 003,
.
•
.
...
'
,.
S.C.R.
I
5±1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Expla1rntio11 to cLiuse (l) (a), (2) it will also offend
Article 286 (2) as the sale has taken pbce in the course Sales Tax Officer,
of inter-State trade or commPrce and (3) fmqh law will
Cu/tack
also be contrary to Arlide 286 (>3) as the goods are
v:
essenti11l eommodities and the President\; assent to the B. C. Pu tel <£.: Co.
law was not obtained as required by clause (3) of
Article 286. This appears to us to be the general S .. [(. Das ].
sc!ieme of that article." (see pp. 688-6:39.of the report).
At p. ll47 of the report, it was further observed" The operative provisions of the several parts of
Article 286, rn1mely, clause (1) (a), clause (1) (b), cbm;e
(2) and claur;c (3) are manifestly intended to deal with
different topics and, therefore, one cannot be projected
or read into another. On a careful and anxious consider~tion of the matter in the light of the fresh arguments advanced 11nd discuss~ons held on the present
occasion we are detinitely of the opinion that the Explanation in clause (1) (ti) cannot be legitimately extended to clause (2) either as an exception or as a
proviso thereto. or re;1d as curtailing or limiting the
ambit of clause (2)."
As to the President's order, it 'rns stated at p. 6.56:
"It will be noticed that under that proviso the
President's order was to t<tke effeet ·"notwithstanding
that the imposition of snch tax iR contrary to the pro'--isions of thi,.; clause". This non obstante clause does
not, in terms, supersede cla,use (1) at all and, therefore,
prirna. .facie, the President's order was subject to the
prohibition of clause (1) (a) read with the Explanation."
Obviously, therefore, even on the Benga,l Immunity
deci8ion (1) the asRessmcnts for the post-Constitution
period in this case were hit by cl. (1) (a) of Art. 286 as
also s. 30 (1) (a) (i) of the Act and were ri~ht,ly held to
be without jurisdiction.
The result, therefore, is that in our view this app:~al
should r;ucceed in part, as we hold that the a-isessme,ats
for tb.e_Jwo quarters of the pre-Constitution period
were valid under sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the. Act. and the.
(I) [19~5] 2 s C.R. 6o3.
6~
•
•
542
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
assessments for the post.Constitution perio<l were invalid.
ln view of the divided success of the parties
Sales T(lx Officer,
we further think that they should bear their own costs
Cultack
in the High Court and in this Court.
v.
B. C. Patel & Co.
SARKAR J.-Thc respondents are a firm of merchants carrying on business in a part of the State of
Sarkar].
Orissa which was formerly the feudatory State of
Pallahara. This State of Pallahara had merged in the
Province of Orissa under an agreement with the
Government of India, dated January 1, 1948: On
December 14, 1948, the Government of Orissa under
the powers conferred by s. 4 of the Extra Provincial
Jurisdiction Act, 1947, and with the permission of the
Government of India, issued a Notification applying
t.he Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Orissa XIV of 1947),
passed by the Legislature of Orissa, to the areas ~vhich
previously eonstituted the feudatory States including
Pallahara, then merged in Orissa. The respondents
were rtssessed to sales tax under this Act in respect of
their sales which took place during five quarters
between July l, 1949 and December 31, 1950. They
had appealed under the provisions of the Act to higher
authorities from the original orders of assessment, but
were unsuccessful. They then applied to the High
Court of Orissa on November 11, 1952, for an appropriate writ directing the Sales Tax Officer, the assessing
authority and one of the appellants herein, to refrain
from realizing the tax or from giving effect to the
a.ssessment orders in any manner whatsoever and
quashing such orders and also prohibiting future
assessment. By its judgment delivered on April 12,
1955, the High Court allowed the petition and cancelled the assessment orders. From that judgment the
present appeal has come to this Court.
The question that I propose to discuss in this judgment is whether the respondents are liable to pay tax
under the provisions of the Act in the circumstances
which existed in this case and to which I shall refer a
little later. The sections of the Act under which the
tax is sought to be levied are set out below :
S. 1. (1) This Act may be called the Orissa Sales
T~x Act, 1947._
•
•
,...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5i3
(2) It extends to the whole of the Province of
Orissa.
Sales Tax Officer,
(3) This section shall come into force at once and
Cuttack
the rest of this Act shall come into force on such date
v.
as the Provincial Government may, by notification in B. C. Patel & Co.
the Gazette, appoint.
Sarkar].
S. 2. In this Act, unless thero is anything repugnant in the subject or context,(j) "year" means the financial year.
S. 4. (1) Subject to the provisions of sections 5,
6, 7 and 8 and with effect from such date as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the
Gazette, appoint, being not earlier than thirty days
after the date of the said notification, every dealer
whose gross turnover during the year immediately
preccaing the commencement of this Act exceeded
Rs. 5,000 shall be liable to pay tax under the Act on
sales effected after the date so notified :
Provided that the tax shall not be payable on sale
involved in the execution of a contract which is shown
to the satisfaction of the Collector to have been
entered into by the dealer concerned on or before the
date so notified.
(2) Every dealer to whom sub-section (1) does not
apply shall be liable to pay tax under this Act with
effect from the commencement of the year immediately following that during which his gross turnover
first exceeded R.s. 5,000.
(3) Every dealer who has become liable to pay
tax under this Act shall continue to be so liable ·until
the expiry of three consecutive years, during each of"
which his gross turnover has failed to exceed Rs. 5,000
and such further period after the date of such expiry
as may be prescribed and on the expiry of this latter
period his liability to pay tax shall cease. •
(4) Every dealer whose liability to pay tax has
ceased under the provisions of sub-section (3) shall
again be liable to pay tax under this Act with effect
from •the commencement of the year immediately
foll.owing that during which his gross turnover again ·
exceeds Rs. 5,000.
1 -~
•
544
SUPHEME COURT REPORTS
[l!J5!l]
It is conceded that the respondents are dealers within the meaning of the Act. The term " turnover " is
Salts Tax Officer,
defined in the Act but for the purpose of this judgment
Cut!ack"
it. cai1 be taken in its popular sense. It is also un.
v.
IJ. C. JJafd b Co. necessary to consider ss. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Act, for
nothing turns on them in this appeal.
Sarhar J.
Section l of the Act came into force in the P<tlhihara
area on December 14, l!J48, bv virtue of the notifiea.
tion of that date mentioned e;trlier. On March 1, 1949,
the Uovcrnmcnt of Oriss::i, issued undPr s. 1 (3) of the
Act a notification, being l\otific::ttion No. 2267/F,
appointing that date as the date on \l·hich the rest of
the Act would come into force in the Pallahara area.
It is not in dispute that i\Iarch l, 1049, has to be considered as the date of the commencement of the Act in
the Pallahara area. That is the result of the definition of the commencement of an Act given in
2 (8)
of the Orissa Geneml Clauses Act, 1937. As will have
been noticed s. 4 (l) of the Act required a date to be
appointed before liability under it could arise. Such a
date had been appointed by the Government of Orissa
before the Act \rns applied to the areas previously
belonging to the feudatory States and the Government
felt that this appointment of a. date would not be an
appointment fnr these areas. The case before ns has
proceeded on the basis that that appointment was not
a proper appointment under this section for these
areas. In fact, the Uovernnwnt of Orissa had on
..\fareh 1, HJ4!J, issued a .l\otitication .:\o. 226\J/F, purporting to appoint a date nrnler s. 4 (1) for the areas
vreviously covered by the feudatory States including
the Palblrnra State, then merged in Orissa. That
K otitication is in these terms :
ln exercise of the pOlrnrs collferrcd by sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947
(Orissa Act; XIV of ]!)47), as applied to Orissa States,
the Government of Orism are pleased to appoint the
31st March, 194\J, as the date with effect from which
every dealer whose gross turno\'er dnring the year
ending the 31st March, 1949, exceeded Rs. 5,009 shall
· be liable to pay tax under the said Act on sales
effected after the said date .
s.
•
,
s.c.R.
•
\.
\.-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
So it would appear that in regard to Pallahara area
two notifications were issued on March 1, 1949, by one Sales Tax Officer,
of which under s. 1 (3) the rest of the Act was applied
Cut tack
to, and by the either a day was appointed as required
v.
B. C. Puld & Co.
by s. 4 (1), for this area.
The sections under which liability to tax arises
Sarkar ].
under the Act primarily are· sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 4.
I have said lia,bility arises primarily because unless
liability under eithet· of them arises there is no lirtbility
under the Act at all. Hut once lia.bility under either
of these sub-sections arises, that liability continues for
certa,in succesRive years under imb-s. (3) and when it
has come to an encl under that sub-section it can again
revive under sub-s. (4). Unless however liability has
arisen under sub-RR. (1) and (2), no liability arises undei·
sub-ss. (:3) and (4). The question that I propose to
disctiss is whether in the circumstances of this uasc,
the respondents can be made liable under either
sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of s. 4.
I shall first consider snb-s. (1) of s. 4. In order that
a liability under this sub-section may arise there has
to be an appointment of a elate as provided in it, for
the liability ii:; in respect of sales effected after tha,t
date. It is contended that such an appointment of a
date was nrncle by Xotification No. 2269/F of March l,
1949. The respondents say that the notifieation is
invalid and that therefore no date under the sub-section has been fixed at all. I think that the respondents' contention is right. Under the sub-section, on a
date being appointed a dealer becomes liable to tax on
sales effected after that date provided his grrn:;f> tur.i1over during the year immediately preeeding the commencement of the Act exceeds Rs. 5,000. Now the
Act having commenced on Ma,rch 1, 1949, and a year
contemplated in the Act being under s. 2(j), a financial
year, the year irnmediately preceding the commencement of the Act \voulcl be the year 194 7-48. Therefore,
the respondents' liability under the sub-section, vrnulcl
depend on his turnover for the year 1947 -48 exceeding
Rs. ~,000. But t]lQ notification said that the dealer
whose gross turnover during the year ending March :ll·,
1949, that is, the yca.r 1948-49, exceeded Rf>. 5,000,
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
546
[1959]
would be liable to pay tax on the sales effected after
the date mentioned in it. The notification, therefore,
is not in terms of the section. It is contended that the
v.
words·" whose gross turnover during the year ending
B. c. Patel G- Co. the 31st March, 1949, exceeded Rs. 5,000" in the N otification are mere surplusage as they purported to say
Sarkar j.
which dealers would be able to pay tax and this the
section did not require it to say. It is therefore safd
that these words should be ignored and thereupon _the
notification wol1ld become unobjectionable. I am
unable to agree that it is possible to ignore these words.
The notification with these words has one meaning
and without them a different one. The Government
having issued the notification cannot now be permitted
to say that it has a meaning other than that which its
words bear. Having said that a dealer whose turnover in the year 1948-49 exceeded Rs. 5,000 would be
liable to pay tax on sales after a date mentioned, the
Government cannot now turn round and say that a
dea;ler would be liable to pay tax on such sales under
the sub-section though his turn-over during the year
1948-49 did not exceed Rs. 5,000.
Whether the
Government need have specified any year during
which the turnover had to exceed Hs. 5,000 to give
rise to the liability for the tax or not, is irrdevant.
The question is whether the Notification has appointed
a date as a result of which liability to pay tax under
the sub-section arises. That it clearly has not. The
Notification, therefore, is bad and has no effect at all.
The result is that there has been no date appointed
•
under the sub-section and no liability can therefore
arise under it at all. It does not, as things stand,
operate to fix any liability: It is as it were that the
sub-section had not been brought into life. The appellants cannot, therefore, claim to levy any tax on the
respondents under sub-s. (1) of s. 4.
The appellants then contend that even if as a result
of no date having been fixed under sub-s. (1) no liability to pay tax arises under it at all and the respondents cannot be taxed under it, thev are none the- less
liable to be taxed under sub-s. (2)." Under sub-s. (2)
a d~aler can on}y be made liable if he is one " to
Sal" Tax Officer,
cuttack
•
•
,
..
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
547
whom snb-s. (1) does not apply". It is clear that the
r958
words "to whom snb-s. (1) does not apply" mean,
"who is not liable under that sub-section", for both Sales Ta., Officer,
sub-sections having been brought into force at the
Cnttack
same time by one notification, they apply to all dealers 13 _c. Pa~~z & co.
together. The appellants say that, the respondents
are dealers who are not liable under sub-s. (1) ·because
Sarkar J.
n~ date having been appointed, no liability under it
arises.
I am unable to accept this contention. vVhen it is
said that a person not liable under one provision shall
be liable under another, a situation is contemplated
in which the liability of the person under the former
provision might have arisen. It does not seem to me
to be possible to say that a person is not lia.ble under
a section, when no question of liability under it can
arise" at all, \.vhen it is really a dead letter in the
statute book.
Further the appellants' contention seem to me to be
against the scheme of the two sub-sections. Sub-section (1) applies to all dealers. Thus after a date has
been appointed all dealers would be liable to pay tax
under it if their turnover in 1947-48 exceeded Rs. 5,000.
But suppose there are some dealers whose turnover
in the year 1947-48 did not exceed Rs. 5,000. In such
a case, sub-s. (2) would apply to them and them only,
and make such of them liable to tax whose turnover
in the year mentioned in it, exceeded Rs. 5,000. As
to this there is no doubt. Thus it 'vould appear that
sub-s. (2) was not meant to apply to all dealers but to
a class of them and tax some or all of this class. If
the appellant's contention is right, then it would be
possible for sub-s. (2) to apply to all dealers. This I
conceive was not the intention. The result of accepting it would be that when no date has been appointed
under sub-s. (1), the words, "every deltler to whom
sub-s. (1) does not apply" would mean all dealers and
when a date has been appointed, it would mean only
such dealers whose turnover in 1947-48 does not
exceoo Rs. 5,000. I am quite clear in my mi~d that
the words were intended to refer to a definite class o1
people. It could not have been intended that the same
•
.548
SUPREME
counr REPORTS
[1950]
wor<ls would refer to different classes of people according as a date nnder sub-s. (1) was appoint<>d or not.
Sales Tax Officer,
Tho sdiemc is that some might Le made liable undee
Cutfact.
sub-s". (l) and those that escape liability 11rnler it might
v.
SnlHection (2) W>ts
B. C. Patel G· Co. be made liable under s11b-s. (2).
not intended to have any operation at all till a date
Sar liar J.
was appointed under sub-s. (1) and a liability under
it might ha,-e arisen.
•
It seems to me that if liability under sub-s. (2) arose
without a date under sub-s. (1) having been appointed, the result would Le anomalous. It would make
11 dealer liable under both sub-sections which is plainly
something which the Act dirl. not intenrl to do. An
illustration will nrnko this dear .. Under sub-s. (2) a
dealer will be liable to pn,y tax with effect from the
commencement of the year immediately follQwing
that during which his gross turnover first exceeds
Rs. 5,000. The year from the commencement of which
liability to pay lax arises under it m1rnt be a year
commoncing after the Act comes into force, for otherwise the Act will lrn ve heen gi vcn a, retrospective
operation and this, there is no reason to think, was
intended. Now this year must he one immediately
following that year when the dcab-'s turnover first
exceeds Rs. 5,000. This preceding year, however,
need not be one commencing aHer the Act, for the
sub-section does not say so. lf such year is before
the commencement of the Act, that \Yonl<l not nrnke
the sub-section operate retrospectively either, for the
tax would be payable only on sales after the commencement of the Act and tlrnt year would only
furnish the requisite on which liability arises: see
'1.'he Queen v. Inhabitants of St. ilfan;, White Chapel(').
I may point out that if this view is not Tight, then in
the present c~se the assessment orders could not hiwe
been made under sub-s. (2), for they were based 011
the respondents' tumovcr for 1948-±rJ, exceeding
]{,s. 5,000 and thi8 year did not commence after the
comn1encemcnt of the Act.
If the appellants ·are correct in their contel'ltion,
th.,n the respondents' turnover .having first exceeded
.(1) (1848) 12 q. Il· 120, 127; u6 .E.R. Sn, 814.
I•
r
(
S.O.R.
•.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
549
Rs. 5,000 in l!H8-49 they became fothle nnder snhs. (2) to pay tax on all sales made from the commenceSales Tux Ojficer,
ment of the succeeding year, that is, from April l,
Cu/lack
1949. This liability to 1my the tax arose on the expiry
v.
of tlw year ln48-4~ \vhen their turnover Jirst rxceedrd Tl. C. Patel,<;. Co.
Es. 5,000, that is, .it arose on April l, 1940, though
Sarkar].
the assessment had to be made later, as it must
nMcssarily be made periodically, after sales have been
effected. The liability that arose on April l, 1949, is
to continue for all times but if for three 1mccessive
vears their turnover did 1fot exceed Rs. fi,000, then
after these thrnc years and a further period prescribed
the liability would rease under sub-s. (3). Assume
that the period prescribed was three months. So the
respondent:-;' liability having arisen on April 1, HJ49,
it. co~1tinuecl in respect of all H<tles made from t h1tt
date till at least June 30, 1952, and the taxing autlwrities were entitled to make aRsessment orders under
su b-s. (2) in respect of such sales from time to time.
Now snpposc, on July 1, 1949, the Government issued
a notification appointing Augirnt 1, Hl4U, as the date
under snb-s. (1 ). Immediately all dealers whose turnover in 194 7-48 had exceeded Rs. fi,000 became liable
to pay tax'under that sub-section on sales effected
after August 1, 1940. Assume that the respondents'
turnover for l\J4 7-48 was in excess of Rs. 5,000. They
then became liable to pay tax also under snb-s. (1) o.u
all sales effected after August 1, 194£1. Tl1c result is
that on sales effected after this date, the respondents
became liable to pR.y tax under both the Sllh-scctions
at the same time. I cannot conceive that snch .a
result could have been intended.
I will now put it from another point of view. Under
suh-s. (3) once liability to pay ta.x ariseR, it will go on
for three years and snch further time a~ may be prescribed which Ke will assume was three mouths,
though the turnover failed to exceed Its. 5,000 for any
of these years and after that the liability will cemw.
In the present case the respondents were Jirnt ri.:;sessed
by irn order made on May 31, 1951, on sales in the
quarter ending September 30, 1949. I -ivill assume
•
•
550
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
that the liability to pay the tax'--arose under sub-s. (2).
Suppose now that for the year 1949-50, 1950-51 and
Sales Tax Officer,
1951-52 the respondents' turnover was below l'ts. 5,000.
Cuttack
On
these facts their liability ceased on June 30, 1952.
v.
:Now
suppose, on June 1, 1951, that is, the day after
B. C. Patel G Co.
the order of assessment in respect of the liability
Sarkar].
under sub-s. (2) had been made, July 1, 1951, had been
appointed the date under sub-s. (1) and it was found
that the respondents' turnover for 1947,48 had exceeded Rs. 5,000. They immediately became liable to pay
tax on sales effected after July 1, 1951, and such
liability would then under sub-s. (3) continue for
1951-52, 1952-53, 1953-54 and up to June 30, 1954.
The position then would be that under sub-s. (3) the
respondents' liability can be said to have come to an
end on June 30, 1952, and also to have continued up
to June 30, 1954. That would be an absurd resuit.
For all these reasons it seems to me that no liability
arises under sub-s. (2) unless a date has been appointed
under sub-s. (1) and a liability can arise under the
latter sub-section. The fact that under sub-s. .(1)
liability is made to arise on tho turnover of the year
immediately preceding the commencement of the Act,
to my mind, shows that it was contemplated that the
date under sub-s. (1) would be fixed soon after the Act
commenced. That would indicate that the intention
was that both sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 4 would begin
to operate at the same time. It was not contemplated
that any question of liability under sub-s. (2) would
arise before such a question under sub-s. (1) arose.
. I would, therefore, hold that in the present case
the appellants are not entitled to levy any tax on the
respondents under sub-s. (2). In this view of the
matter I find it unnecessary to go into the other ques.tions discussed at· the bar.
.
The conclusion that I come to is that the appeal
fails and it be dismissed with costs.
PER CURIAM.-The appeal is allowed in part. The
decree, in so far as it sets aside the assessments for
the quarters ending on June 30, 1950, Septemb~ 30,
· 1950 and December 31, 1950, is upheld, but the decree,
.in so far as it sets aside the assessments fox the
.
•
,. .
,.
.•
S.O.R.
551
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
quarters ending on September 30, 1949 ·and December
I958
31, 1949, is reversed and the orders of assessment of
the Sales Tax authorities are restored. Parties to bear SalescTax Ok'ffic:;r,
· th'is
ullac
' own costs 111
' t lie H'ig h Cour t as we 11 as 111
t h en
v.
Court.
B. c. Patel &- Co.
Appeal allowecl in part.
S«rkar ].
MAHADAYAL PREMCHANDRA
•
v.
April r5.
C0;\1MEECIAL TAX OFFICEH,, CALCUTTA
& ANOTHEH,
(S. R. DAS c. J., BHAGWATI, s. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUU
and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)
Sales Tax-Sales by Mills in Kanpur to customers in BengalAgent of Mills in Bengal receiving commission on sales, if a dealer
within the definition and liable to sales tax-Turnover of agent, if can
include price of goods sold by Mills-Bengal Finance (Sales Tax)
Act, r94r (Ben. VI of r94r), s. 2(c).
The appellants were commission agents in West Bengal for
certain Mills in Kanpur. They were paid commission once at the
end of each year on all the sales effected by the Mills in Vv'est
Bengal. The orders were placed with the Mills either through
the appellants or 'directly by the customers but goods were sttpplied to customers directly and payments were made through
banks. The appellants, except for canvassing business for the
Mills, did not take any part in the sale transactions. The Mills
only maintained a personal account of the appellants in which
the commission was credited. The Commercial Tax Officer was
doubtful of the liability of the appellants to sales tax on these
transactions and referred the matter to the Assistant Collector for
opinion. The Assistant Collector, without giving the appellants
any opportunity to be heard, expressed the opinion that the
appell.ants were liable and directed the Commercial Tax Officer to
do the needful. The latter, thereupon, assessed the appellants to
tax holding them liable for all such sales. The appellants pre:
•
ferred this appeal by special lea;e :
•
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