THE STATE OF MADRAS versus GANNON DUNKERLEY & CO., (MADRAS) LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 1 April 1958 | [1959] 1 S.C.R. 379 | 1958 INSC 35
Key facts
- Decided
- 1 April 1958
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, VIVIAN BOSE, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 210/1956
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1959] 1 S.C.R. 379
- Neutral citation
- 1958 INSC 35
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
379
the event of the appeal being dismissed or decided
r95 8
- .h
against them. Having regard to . .the undertakings'
b
·
a u1a1 1J urama 1
given, as also the fact that execution of the decree and A.noiher
in suit No. 483/4400 of the Co~u~t of Small Causes,
v. · ·
Bombay has been delayed long enough, · we are Nandrani Shivram
unable to accede to the request made by the appeland Others
lants.
Imam],
·The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
•
THE STATE OF MADRAS
v.
GANNON DUNKERLEY & CO.,
(MADRAS) LTD.
(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, s. K. DAS,'
A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)
Sales Tax-Building contracts-Tax on supply of materials in
construction works_-·State's pou·er of taxation-" Sale of good~"·,
Meaning of-Legislative practice-N aiure of agreement in building
contracts-Indian Sale of Goods Act, I9JO (III of I9JO), s. 4~
]'vfadras General Sales Tax Act, I939 (Mad. IX of I939L as amended by Madras Act XXV of .I947, ss. 2(c)(h)(i), Explanation I(i),
r. 4(3)--Government of India Act, I935 (26 Geo. 5, Ch. 2), s. ro7,
Sch. Jl II, List II, Entry 48.
The responde~t company, doing business, inter alia, in the.
construction of buildings, roads and other .works was assessed to
sales tax by the sales tax authorities who SO\lght to indude.·
the value of the materials used in the execution of building con~
tracts within the taxable turnover of the respondent. The vaii-.
dity of the assessment was challenged by the respondent .\vlio'
contended that the power of the Madras Legi~laljire to impose a.
tax on· sales under Entry 48 in List II in Sch. VII of the. Governc
ment of India Act, 1935, did not extend to imposing a tax 'on tlie,
value of materials used in construction works, as there was no
transaction of sale in respect of those goods, and that the provisions introduced in the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, by
the Maaras General Sales Ta·x (Amendment) Act, 1947, authorfs~
ing the imposition of such tax were ultra vi res. The Sales Tax
Appellate Tribunal.rejected the respondent's contention but, on
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April I.
380
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
revision, the High Court took the view that the expression "sale
of goods" had the same meaning in Entry 48 which it has in the
The State of
Indian Sale"of Goods Act, 1930, that the construction contracts of
Madras
·the respondent were agreements to execute works to be paid for
v.
according to measurements at the rates specified in the schedule
Gannon Diutkevlf:y thereto, and \Vere not contracts for sale of the· materials used
& Co..
therein, and that further, they were entire and indivisible and
(Madras) Ltd.
could not be broken up into a contract for sale of materials and a
contract for payment for work done. Accordingly, it held th~t
the impugned provisions introduced by the Madras General Sales
Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947, were ultrp vires the powers of the
Provincial Legislature. On appeal to the Supreme Court:
Held, (1) On the true interpretation of the expression "sale .
of goods " there must be an agreement between the parties for
the sale of the very goods in which eventually property passes.
Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras, [1953] S.C.R. 677 and
The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd., [1953]
S.C.R. 1069, relied on.
In a building contract, the agreement between the parties is
that the contractor should construct the building according to the
specifications contained in the agreement, and in consideration
therefor receive payment as provided therein, and in such an
agreement there is neither a contract to sell the materials used
in the construction, nor does property pass therein as moveables.
(2) The expression" sale of goods" was, at the time when the
Government of India Act, 1935, was enacted, a term of wellrecognised legal.import in the general law relating to sale of goods
and in the legislative practice relating to that topic and must be
interpreted in Entry 48 in List II in Sch. VII of the Act as having
the same meaning as in the sale of Goods Act, 1930.
The Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs. Budh Prakash Jai
Prakash, [1955] l S.C.R. 243, relied on.
(3) In a building contract which is one, entire and indivisible,
there is no sale of goods· and it is not within the competence
of ·the Provincial Legislature under Entry 48 in List II in Sch.
VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, to impose a tax on
the supply of the materials used in such a contract treating it as
a sale .
. Pandit Banarsi Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955) 6
S. T. C. 93, Bhur4mdl v. Stal< of Rajasthan, A. I. R. 1957 Raj. 104,
Mohamad Khasim v. State of Mysore, A. I. R. 1955 Mys. 41 and
Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, A. I. R. 1957 Ker.
146, disapproved.
Jubilee Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, A. I. R.
1956 JIyd. 79, approved.
I958
(4) The Madras General Sales Tax Act is a law relating not
to sale of goods but to tax on sale of goods and· consequently the
.
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s.e.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
381
Madras General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947, is not bad
I958
under s. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, on the
ground that it had not been reserved for the assent of the GoverT lie State of
·n.or-General.
Madras
D. Sarkar & Bros. v. Commercial Tax Officer, A. I. R. 1957
v.
Cal. 283, disapproved.
Gannon Dunkerley
.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
2l0of1956.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 5,
1954, of the"'Madras IDgh Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 2292 of 1952, arising out of the judgment and
order dated August 11, 1952, of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, in T. A. No. 863 of 1951.
1958. Jan. 22, 23, 24; Feb. 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11.
V. K. T. Chari, Advocate General for the State of
Madras and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant. The
provisions of the Constitution Act which confer legislative powers should be construed liberally. See
Navinchandra .L11afatlal v. The Commissioner of Income
Tax, (1955] 1 S. C. R. 829 at 833; Broken Hill South
Ltd. v. Comm·issioner of Taxation, N. S. W. (56 C.L.R.
337 at 379); Love v. Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd.
([1944] 1 K. B. 484); In re the Central Provinces a_nd
Berar Act No. XIV of 1938 ( [1939] :F. C.R. 18). The
words" sale of goods" in Entry 48 have to be interpreted in a wide sense and not in the narrow sense of
the definition of sale of goods contained in the Indian
Sale of Goods Act, 1930. See Irving's Commonwealth
Sales Tax Law and Practice, at pp. 62, 77. The Deputy
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Stronach (55
C.L.R. 305); M. R. Hornibrook (pty. Ltd.) v. Federal
Commissioner of Taxation (62 C. L. R. 272 at 276). '
Mahabir Prasad, Advocate General for the State of
Bihar and R. C. Prasad, for the State of Bihar (Intervener). The question is whether definiti~n in the Sales
Tax Act enlarges the concept of sale of goods as in the
Sale of Goods Act. The only requirement of a sale of
goods is that there should be transfer of property in
goods- for valuable consideration. See Hudson on
Building Contracts, 7th Edn., p. 386. Bujlding Contracts involve sale of materials.
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&Co.,
(Madms) Ltd.
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382 •
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
S. JYI. Sikri, Advocate General for the State of Punjab,
N.
S. Bindra and T. 111. Sen, for the State of Pun3"ab
The State of
Madras
(Intervener). The words "taxes on the sale of goods"
,..
in Entry 48 mean taxes on a transaction the effect of
Gannon Dnnk"l<y which is to transfer to a person for valuable COnsidera.
& Co.,
tion, all the rights of an owner in the goods. Sale of
(Macfra.;) l.td.
goods need not necessarily be in pursuance of a contract. Even an auction sale is a sale and can be subjected to sales tax. Exchange is also a sale of goods.
See Blackstone; Chalmers Salef! of Goods Act, 12th
Edn., pp. 3, 172; Benjamin on Sales 8th Ed., p. 2 ;
Halsbury, Vol. 29, 2nd Edn., p. 5, see p. 6, footnote (c);
Williston on Sales Vol. 1, revised Ed., p. 2, 433. Sale
has a wider meaning and a prior agreement to sell
goods is not necessary to constitute sale of goods.
See Great Western Railway Co. v. Commissioners of Jn.
land Revenue, ( [1894] 1 Q. B. 5071at 512, 515, 5'16);
Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ltd., ( [1955] A. C. 696·
at 719, 737); Nalukuya v. Director of Lands ( [1957]
A. C. 325 at 332); Ex parte Drake, In re Ware ( (1877)
5 Ch. D. 866 at 871); Blome Co. v. Ames ( (1937) 111
A. L. l~. 940) though a contrary view has been taken
in Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelmcm ( (1937) 115
A. L. R 485); Morgan v. Depu.ty ~Federal Commissioner of Land Tax, N. S. W., ( (1912) 15 C. L. R. 661 ·
at 665). The entries conferring legislative power are
flexible and elastic and should be so construed as to
include the extended and wider meaning of the words
used therein. Entry 48 should include not only what
was understood as sales at the time of the enactment
of the Government of India Act, 1935, but also all that
wliich may be regarded as sales later on. See The
Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in
Canada, In re ( [1932] A. C. 304 at 314); The King v.
Brislan: Ex parte Williams (54 C. L. R. 262 at 273,
283); Toronto"Oorporation v. Bell Telephone Company
of Canada, ( [1905] A. C. 52 at 57); Atto1·ney General
v. Edison 'Pelephone Company of London ( (1880) L.R.
6 Q. 13. D. 244 at 254); Nevile Reicl and Compa.ny
Ltd. v. The Commissioners of Inland. Revenue (12. Tax
Cas. 245 at 5.65, 567); Edwards v. A. G. for Canada,
( [1930] A. C. 124 at 127, 134); Attor!1'ey-General for
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(
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
Aiberta v. Attorney-General for Canada, ( [1947] A. C.
503 at 516,. 517) ; · N ewcas.tle Breweri~s Ltd. v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners, (96 L. J. K. B. 735) ; It is a
· r9s8
The State of
Madrns
v.
fallacy to deduce from the proposition that because
the contract is not an agreement to sell goods but a Cannon Dunkerley
contract Of work ana labour no sale of goods takes
&. Co.,
place. A works contract is a composite transaction (Madras) Ltd.
'Which can be split up and a sale of goods in the sense
of the Sales of Goods.Act can be, spelt out of it and it
is permissible for the State to do so and to tax the sale
of goods. Benjamin on Sales, pp. 155, 156, 167. and
352; Seath v. Moore (ll App. Oas. 350); Reid v.
·Macbeth & Gray ( [1904] A. C. 223); Langford Property
Oo .. Ltd. v . .Batten ( [1951] A. C. 786 at 813).
0: K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and T. M.
Sen, for the State of Mysore (Intervener). Sale of
goods is. nothing but a transfer of property for a price.
There need not be any bargain or contract to sell-but
the. sale must be voluntary. See Appleby v. MY,res
(L. R. 2 C. P. 651 at 658); Reeves v. Barlow (L. R. 12
Q. B. 436). The composite transaction of. a works
·. contract can be split up and the sale of goods therein
. be taxed.
Sardar Bahadur, for the State of Kerala (Intervener),
supported the appellant.
·
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G.
Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents. The powers of
the legislatures are limited and the Entries fix the
bounds of legislation. . See The Queen v. Burah
(5 I. A. 178 at 193); James v. Commonwealth.of
Australia, ( [1936] A. C. 578 at 613, 633); In· re
.
The Central Provinces and Berar Act XIV of Jf)38
( [1939] F. C. R. 18, 36, 37). In the absence of any
positrve directive in the Constitution ~ct itself or a
compelling contest, Entries have to be interpreted in
the light of existing law so as to be in conformity with
it. · The expression "sale of goods" was, at the time··
of the enactment of the Government of India Act,
1935; a term of well recognised legal import and it
must be interpreted in Entry 48 as having the same
meaning as in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. See
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384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
L'Union St. Jacques De Montreal v. Be Lisle (L.R.
6 P. C. 31 at 36); Royal Bank of Ca=da v. Larue
Th;./~ate of ( [1928] A. C. 1&7 at 196); Wallace Brothers and
:. ras
Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (75 I. A.
Gannon Dunk,,Jey 86 at 99); In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act
& co.,
XIV of 1938, ( [1939] F. C. R. 18 at 53, 54); The State
(Madras) Ltd.
of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, ( [1951] S. C.R. 682 at
705). The expression 'sale of goods' has always been.
understood by the Supreme Court in the sense of the
Sale of Goods Act, 1930. See PIJJ!patlal Shah v. The
State of Jlfadras, ([1953] S. C.R. 677 at 683); The State
of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd., ([1953]
S. C.R. 1069 at 1082, 1101, 1102); State of TravancoreCochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory,
( [1954] S. C. R. 53 at 80); Bengal Immunity Co., Ltd.
v. Tke State f!f Bihar, ( [1955] 2 S. C. R. 603 at 698,
700, 704). The matter is concluded by the decision in
The Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. M /s. Budh Prakash
Jai Prakash, ( [1955] l S. C. R. 243 at 247) where it has
beon specifically held th'1t it would be proper to interpret the expression " sale of goods " in Entry 48 in the
sense in which it was used in legislation both in England and in India.
'I!he definition of " sale " given in the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, is in conflict with that given
in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and as sale of goods is
a matter which falls within Entry 10 of the Concurrent
List, the definition in the Madras Act would be repugnant and void under s. 107 of the Government of
India Act, 1935. See, D. Sarkar & Bros. v. Commercial
Ta~ Officer, (A. I. R. 1957 Cal. 283).
·
A works contract cannot be disintegrated into a
contract for labour and a sale of goods. See Inland
Revenue Commissioners v. The Duke of Westminster,
( [1936] A. C. 1 at 19, 24); Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income 'Pax, Madras, (67 I. A. 394 at
400-401). A works contract is entire and indivisible;
it is in no sense a sale of goods or of materials, nor is
there any sale of goods or materials as chattels within
the meaning of Entry 48. In English cases a cleai: distinction has been made between works con.tract and sale
of goods. See Lee v. Griffin (121 E.R. 716); Robinson v .
r958
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
385
Graves, ( [1935] 1 K. B. 579 at 590, 593); Love v. Norr951!
man Wright (Builders Ltd.) ( [1944] l K.B. 484); Tripp
v. Armitage (150 E. R. 1597), Clark v. Bulmer (152
n.l'vfadras
State of
E. R. 793); Appleby v. Myers (L. R. 2 C. P. 651 at
v.
658); Seath v. Moore (11 App. Cas. 350 at 381); Reid Gannon Dunkerley
v. Ma<:beth & Gray, ( [1904] A. C. 223). See also Hud&- co ..
son on Building Contracts, pp. 165, 386 and 388 ; (Madras) Ltd.
&njamin on Sales, pp. 352 to 355.
Gopal Singh, for Gurbaksh Singh and M/s. Uttam
Singh Duggal & Co. (Interveners) and B. R. L. Iyengar,
for the United Engineering Co. (Intervener), supported
the respondents.
V. V. Raghavan, for the appellant, replied. Legislative history should not be pushed too far. See In re
Central Provinces and Berar Act XIV of 1938 ( [1939]
F. C. R. 18 at 54) ; Edwards v. A. G. for Canada
( [19i.!O) A. C. 124 at 134); Wallace Brothers case (75
I. A. 86 at 99); Poppatlal Shah v. The State of ~iJfadras,
( [1953} S. C. R. 677). A works contract can be split
up. Viewed from the point of view of the contractor,
he sells materials and renders service. There is a sale
of goods in the contract.
. S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Purijab (with the permission of the Court). Grant of
legislative power has been widely interpreted. See,
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.
(79 L. Ed. lllO at 1124); South Carolina v. United
States, (50 L. Ed. 262 at 269). Legislative history
cannot be used to cut down the meaning of the Entry,
but only to enlarge it. Lefroys Canadian Pedera.l
System, pp. 14, 15 and 18. There is no legislative
practice with respect to " taxes on sale of goods".
1958. April I. The Judgment ·of the Court was
delivered by
•
VENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-This appeal arises out
of proceedings for assessment of sales tax payable by
the re~ondents for the year 1949-1950, and it raises a
question of considerable importance on the construction of Entry 48 in List II of Sch. VII to the
49
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v,nkatarama
Aiyar J.
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
Government of India Act, 1935, " Taxes on the sale of
goods."
The State of
Mad,as
The respondents are a private limited company
v.
registered under the provisions of the Indian
Gannon Dunkerley Companies Act, doing business in the construction of
'"' Co.,
buildings, roads and other works and in the sale of
(Madras) Ltd.
sanitary wares and other sundry goods. Before the
Venkatarama
sales tax authorities, the disputes ranged over .a
Aiyar J.
number of items, but we are concerned in this appeal
with only two of them. One 'is with reference to a
sum of Rs. 29,51,528-7-4 representing the value of
the materials used by the respondents in the execution
of their works contracts, calculated in accordance with
the statutory provisions applicable thereto, and the
other relates to a sum of Rs. 1,98,929-0-3 being the
price of foodgrains supplied by the respondents to
their workmen.
•
It will be convenient at this stage to refer to the
provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939
(Mad. IX of 1939), in so far as they are relevant for
the purpose of the present appeal. Section 2(h) of
the Act, as it stood when it was enacted, defined
" sale " as meaning " every transfer of the property
in· goods by one person to another in the course of
trade or business for cash or for deferred payment or
other valuable consideration". In 1947, the Legislature of Madras enacted the Madras General Sales
Tax (Amendment) Act No. XXV of 1947 introducing
several new provisions in the Act, and it is necessary
to refer to them so far as they are relevant for the
pprpose of the present appeal. Section 2( c) of the
Act had defined "goods" as meaning " all kinds of
movable property other than actionable claims,
stocks and shares and securities and as including all
materials, commodities and articles", and it was
amended so •as to include materials "used in the
construction, fitting out, improvement or repair of
immovable property or in the fitting out, improvement
or repair of movable property". The definition of
" sale" in s. 2(h) was enlarged so as to include "a
transfer of property in goods involved in the execution
of a works contract". In the definition of "turn•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
387
over" ins. 2(i), the following Explanation (l)(i) was
z95B
added:
The State of
"Subject to such conditions and restrictions, if
Madras
any, as may be prescribed in this behalfv.
the amount for which goods are sold ·shall, in Gannon Dunkerley
relation to a works contract, be deemed to be the
& Co.,
amount payable to the dealer for carrying out such (Madras) Ltd.
c@ntract, less such portion as may be prescribed of venkatarama
such amount, representing the usual proportion of the
Aiyar J.
cost of labour to the cost of materials used in
carrying out such contract."
A new provision was inserted in s. 2(ii) defining
" works contract" as meaning "any agreement for
carrying out for cash or for deferred payment or other
valuable consideration the construction, fitting out,
improvement or repair of any building, road, bridge
or other immovable property or the fitting out,
improvement or repair of any movable property".
Pursuant to the Explanation (l)(i) ins. 2(i), a new
rule, r. 4(3), was enacted that " the amount for which
goods are sold by a dealer shall, in relation to a works
contract, be deemed to be the amount payable to the
dealer for carrying out such contract less a sum not
exceeding such percentage of the amount payable .as
may be fixed by the Board of Revenue, from time to
time for different areas, representing the usual proportion in such areas of the cost of labour to the cost of
materials used in carrying out such contract, subject
to the following maximum percentages ........ .'', and
then follows a scale varying with the nature of the
contracts.
It is on the authority of these provisions that tlie
appellant seeks to include in the turnover of the respondents the sum of Rs. 29,51,528-7-4 being the value
of the materials used in the construction works as
determined under r. 4(3). The respondents contest this
claim on the ground that the power of the Madras
Legislature to impose a tax on sales under Entry 48 in
List II in Sch. VII of the Government of India Act,
does rlot extend to impostng a tax on the value of
materials used in works, as there is no transaction of
sale in respect of those goods, and that the provisions
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388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
introduced by the Madras General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, • 1947, authorising
the imposition of such tax
The State of
d
Madras
are iiltra vires. As regar s the sum of Rs. 1,98,929-0-3,
v,
the contention of the respondents was that they were
Gannon Dunkerley not doing business in the sale of foodgrains, that they
& Co,
had supplied them to the workmen when they were
(Madras) Ltd.
engaged in construction works in out of the way places,
Venkatarama
adjusting the price therefor in the wages due to them
Aiyar ,
and that the amounts so adjusted were not liable to be
1
included in the turnover. ThE!' Sales Tax Appellate
Tribunal rejected both these contentions, and held that
the amounts in question were liable to be included in
the taxable turnover of the respondents.
Against this decision, the respondents preferred Civil
Revision Petition No. 2292 of 1952 to the High Court
of Madras. That was heard by Satyanarayana Rao and
Rajagopalan JJ. who decided both the points in \heir
favour. They held that the expression "sale of goods"
had the same meaning in Entry 48 which it has in the
Indian Sale of Goods Act (lll of 1930), that the construction contracts of the respondents were agreements
to execute works to be paid for according to measurements at the rates specified in the schedule thereto, and
Wtire not contracts for sale of the materials used therein, and that further, they were entire and indivisible
and could not be broken up into a contract for sale of
materials and a contract for payment for work done.
In the result, they held that the impugned provisions
introduced by the Amendment Act No. XXV of 1947,
were ultra vires the powers of the Provincial Legislature, and that the claim based on those provisions to
i~clude Rs. 29,51,528-7-4 in the taxable turnover of
the respondents could not be maintained. As regards
the item of Rs. 1,98,929-0-3 they held that the sale of
foodgrains to the workmen was not in the course of
any business M buying or selling those goods, that
there was no profit motive behind it, that the respondents were not dealers as defined in s. 2(d) of the
Act, and that, therefore, the amount in question was
not liable to be taxed under the Act. In the result; both
the amounts were directed to be excluded from the
taxable turnover of the respondents.. Against th~
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
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decision, the State of Madras has preferred the present
appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court The State of
under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution.
Madras
:Before us, the learned Advocate-General of Madras
v.
did not press the appeal in so far as it relates to the Gannon Dunkerley
sum of Rs. 1,98,929-0-3, and the only question, there&- Co.,
fore, that survives for our decision is as to whether the (Madras) Ltd.
provisions introduced by the Madras General Sales Tax venkatarama
(Amendment) Act, 1947 and set out above are ultra
Aiyar J.
vires the powers of tlie Provincial Legislature under
Entry 48 in List II. As provisions similar to those in
the Madras Act now under challenge are to be found
in the sales tax laws of other States, some of those
States, Bihar, Punjab, Mysore, Kerala and Andhra
Pradesh, applied for and obtained leave to intervene
in this appeal, and we have heard learned counsel on
theif behalf. Some of the contractors who are interested
in the decision of this question, Gurbax Singh, Messrs.
Uttam Singh Duggal and United Engineering
Company, were also granted leave to intervene, and
learned counsel representing them have also addressed
us on the points raised.
The sole question for determination in this appeal is
whether the provisions of the Madras General Sa'les
Tax Act are ultra vires, in so far as they seek to impose
a tax on the supply of materials in execution of works
contract treating it as a sale of goods by the contractor,
and the answer to it must depend on the meaning to
be given to the words "sale of goods" in Entry 48
in List II of Sch. VII to the Government of India Act,
1935. Now, it is to be noted that whiles. 311(2) of the
Act defines "goods " as including " all materials,
commodities and articles ", it contains no definition of
the expression "sale of goods". It was suggested that
the word "materials " in the definitio~ of " goods "
is sufficient to take in materials used in a works
contract. That is so; but the question still remains
whether there is a sale of those materials within the
meaning of that word in Entry 48. On that, there has
been ~harp conflict of opinion among the several High
Courts. In Pandit Banarsi Das v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (1), a Bench of the Nagpur High Court held,
{I) [I955] 6 S.T.C. 93.
.. •
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
390
[1959]
differing from the view taken by the Madras High
The State of
Court in the judgment now under appeal, that the
Mad,as
provisions of the Act imposing a tax on the value of
v.
the matel'.ials used in a construction on the footing of
Gannon Dunkerl<y a sale thereof were valid, but that they were bad in so
<!> Co..
far as they enacted an artificial rule for determination
(Madras) Ltd.
of that value by deducting out of the total receipts a
Venkatarama
fixed percentage on account of labour charges, inas•
hyar .
much as the tax might, according to that computation,
1
conceivably fall on a portion of tbe labour charges and
that would be ultra vires Entry 48. A similar decision
was given by the High Court of Ra jasthan in Bhuramal
v. State of Rajasthan (1 ). In Mohamed Khasim v. State
of Mysore('), the Mysore High Court has held that the
provisions of the Act imposing a tax on construction
of works are valid, and has further upheld the determination of the value of the materials on a percentage
basis under the rules. In Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v.
Sales Tax 0,(Jicer (3 ), the Kerala High Court has likewise affirmed the validity of both the provisions
imposing tax on construction works and the rules
providing for apportionment of value on a percentage
basis. In Jubilee Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Sales Tax
o,fficer (4), the Hyderabad High Court has followed the
decision of the Madras High Court, and held that the
taxing provisions in the Act are ultra vires. The entire
controversy, it will be seen, hinges on the meaning of
the words "sale of goods" in Entry 48, and the point
which we have now to decide is as to the correct interpretation to be put on them.
'l'he contention of the appellant and of the States
which have intervened is that the provisions of a
Constitution which confer legislative powers should
receive a liberal construction, and that, accordingly,
the expression• "sale of goods" in Entry 48 should be
interpreted not in the narrow and technical sense in
which it is used in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930,
but in a broad sense. We shall briefly refer to some of
the authorities cited in support of this position; In
z95B
(1) A.LR. 1957 Raj. 104.
(2) A.LR. 1955 Mys. 41.
(3) A.l.R. 1957 Ker. 146.
(4) A.LR. I956 Hyd. 79.
0
•
•
(
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
Briti,~h Coal Corporation v. King (1), the
question was
r958
whether s. 17 of the Canadian Statute, 22 & 24, Geo. V, The State of
c. 53, which abolished the right of appeal to the Privy
Madras
Council from any judgment or order of any court in
v.
any criminal case, was intra vires its powers under the Gannon Dunkerley
Constitution Act of 1867. In answering it in the
& Co.,
affirmative, Viscount Sankey L. C. observed:
(Madras) Ltd.
• " Indeed, in interpreting a constituent or organic Venkatatania
statute such as the Act, that construction most benefiAiyar 1.
cial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers must
be adopted. This principle has been again clearly laid
down by the Judicial Committee in Edwards v. A.G.
for Canada (2) ".
In James v. Commonwealth of Australia (3), Lord
Wright observed that a Constitution must not be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense. In In re the
Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938 (4),
discussing the principles of interpretation of a constitutional provision, Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. observed:
"I conceive that a broad and liberal spirit should
inspire those whose duty it is to interpret it ; but I do
not imply by this that they are free to stretch or
pervert the language of the enactment in the interests
of any legal or constitutional theory, or even for the
purpose of supplying omissions or of correcting
supposed errors. A ]'ederal Court will not strengthen,
but only derogate from, its position, if it seeks to do
anything but declare the law; but it may rightly
reflect that a Constitution of a Government is a living
and organic thing, which of all instruments has the
greatest claim to be construed ut res magis valeat quam
pereat."
•
The authority most strongly relied on for the appellant is the decision of this Court in N avinchandra
Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay
City (5 ), in which the question was as M the meaning
of the word "income" in Entry 54 of List I. The contention was that in the legislative practice of both
England and India, that word had been understood as
(1) "[1935] A.C. 500, 518.
(3) [1936] A.C. 578, 614.
(2) [1930] A.C. 124, 136.
(4) [1939] F.C.R. 18, 37.
(5) [1955] I S.C.R. 829, 833, 836.
' ..
•
I
I
I
\
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
not including accretion in value to capital, and that it
should therefore bear the same meaning in Entry 54.
The State of
I n reJecting
.
h
C
Madrns
t is contention, this 'ourt observed that
v.
the so-called " legislative practice was nothing but
Gannon Dunk,,ley judicial interpretation of the word 'income' as appear& Co.,
ing in the fiscal statutes", that in "construing an
(Madrns) Ltd.
entry in a List conferring legislative powers the widest
Venkatamma
possible construction according to their ordinary
Aiyar J.
meaning must be put upon the words used therein '',
and that the cardinal rule of interpretation was "that
words should he read in their ordinary, natural and
grammatical meaning, subject to this rider that in
construing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power the most liberal construction
should be put upon the words so that the same may
have effect in their widest amplitude."
The lrarned Advocate-General of Madras also urged
in further support of the above conclusion that the
provisions of a Constitution Act conferring powers of
taxation should be interpreted in a wide sense, and
relied on certain observations in Morgan v. Deputy
Federal Commissioner of Land Tax, N. S. W. (1 ) and
Broken Hill South Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation
(N.S. W.) (2) in support of his contention. In Morgan v.
r958
Deputy Federal Commissioner of Land Tax, N.S. W. ('),
the question was as to the validity of a law which had
enacted that lands belonging to a company were
deemed to be held by its shareholders as joint owners
and imposed a land tax on them in respect of their
share therein. In upholding the Act, Griffith C. J.
observed:
· " In my opinion, the Federal Parliament in selecting snbjects of taxation is entitled to take things as it
finds them in rerum natura, irrespective of any positive
laws of the States prescribing rules to be observed with
regard to the ~cquisition or devolution of formal title
to property, or the institution of judicial proceedings
with respect to it."
In Broken Hill South Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation,
N. S. W. ('),the observations relied on are the foilowmg:
(1) (1912) 15 C.L.R. 661, 066 .
(2) (1937) 561:.L.R. 337, 379.
•
•
.i,,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
" In any investigation of the constitutional
I95 8
Powers of these great Dominion_ legislatures, it is not The State of
proper that a court should deny to such a legislature
Madras
the right of solving taxation problems unfettered by
v.
a priori legal categories which often derive from the Gannon Dunkerley
exercise of legislative power in the same constitutional
& Co.,
unit."
(Madras) Ltd.
• On these authorities, the contention of the appellant Venkatarama
is well-founded that as the words "sale of goods" in
Aiyar 1 .
Entry 48 occur in a Cbnstitution Act and confer legislative powers on the State Lgislature in respect of a
topic relating to taxation, they must be interpreted
not in a restricted but broad sense. And that opens
up questions as to what that sense is, whether popular
or legal, and what its connotation is either in the one
·sense or the other. Learned counsel appearing for the
States and for the assessees have relied in support of
their respective contentions on the meaning given to
the word" sale" in authoritative text-books, and they
will now be referred to. According to Blackstone,
" sale or exchange is a transmutation of property from
one man to another, in consideration of som~ price or
recompense in value. " This passage has, however, to
be read distributively and so read, sale would moon
transfer of property for price. That is also the definition of" sale " in Benjamin on Sale, 1950 Edn., p. 2. In
Halsbury's Laws of England, Second Edn., Vol. 29, p.
5, para. I, we have the following:
" Sa.le is the transfer of the ownership of a thing
from one person to another for a money price. Where
the consideration for the transfer consists of othf)r
goods, or some other valuable consideration, not being
money, the transaction is called exchange or barter;
but in certain circumstances it may be treated as one
of sale.
The law relating to contracts of exch~nge or barter
is undeveloped, but the courts seem inclined to follow
the maxim of civil law, permutatio vicina est emptioni,
and to deal with such contracts as analogous to contracts•of sale. It is clear, however, that statutes relating to sale would have no application to transactions
by way of barter."
•
~o
•
'
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
In Chalmer's Sale of Goods Act, 12th Edn., it is stated
The State of
at p. 3 that "the essence of sale is the transfer of the
Madras
property in a thing from one person to another for a
v.
price", and at p. 6 it is pointed out that "where the
Gannon Dunkerley consideration for the transfer ...... consists of the deli& Co ..
very of goods, the contract is not a contract of sale
(Madras) Ltd.
but is a contract of exchange or barter". In Corpus
Juris, Vol. 55, p. 36, the law is thus stated:
Venkatarama
Aiyar ].
" Sale " in legal nomenclat'lre, is a term of precise
legal import, both at law and in equity, and has a well
defined " legal signification, and has been said to
mean, at all times, a contract between parties to give
and pass rights of property for money, which the
buyer pays or promises to pay to the seller for the
thing bought or sold. "
It is added that the word " sale " as used b:ii the
authorities "is not a word of fixed and invariable
meaning, but may be given a narrow. or broad meaning, according to the context. " In Williston on Sales,
1948 Edn., "sale of goods" is defined as " an agreement whereby the seller transfers the property in
goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price"
(p. 2). At p. 443, the learned author observes that "it
has doubtless been generally said that the price must
be payable in money", but expresses his opinion that
it may be any personal property. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary, "sale " is defined as "exchange of a
commodity for money or other valuable consideration,
selling".
It will be seen from the foregoing that there is
pl:actical unanimity of opinion as to the import of the
word " sale " in its legal sense, there being only some
difference of opinion in America as to whether prtce
should be in money or in money's worth, and the
dictionary meaning is also to the same effect. Now,
it is argued by Mr. Sikri, the learned Advocate-General
of Punjab, that the word "sale" is, in its popular
sense, of wider import than in its legal sense, and that
is the meaning which should be given to that "'ord in
Entry 48, and he relies in support of this position on
the observations in Nevile Reid and, Company Ltd .
z958
•
•
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue(1). There, an
r95a
agreement was entered into on April 12, 1918, for the The State of
sale of the trading stock in a brewery business and the
Madras
transaction was actually completed on June 24, 1918.
v.
In between the two dates, the Finance Act, 1918, had Gannon Dunkerley
imposed excess profits tax, and the question was
& Co.,
whether the agreement dated April 12, 1918, amount- (Madras) Ltd.
ed to a sale in which case the transaction would fall venkatarama
outside the operation of the Act. The Commissioners
Aiyar J.
had held that as tiUe to the goods passed only on
June 24, 1918, the agreement dated April 12, 1918, was
only an agreement to sell and not the sale which must
be held to have taken place on June 24, 1918, and was
therefore liable to be. taxed. Sankey J. agreed with
this decision, but rested it on the ground that as the
agreement left some matters still to be determined and
was, "in certain respects, modified later, it could not be
held to be a sale for the purpose of the Act. In the
course of the judgment, he observed that" sale" in
the Finance Act should not be construed in the light
of the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, but must
be understood in a commercial or business sense.
Now, in its popular sense, a sale is said to take
place when the bargain is settled between the parties,
though property in the goods may not pass at that
stage, as where the contract relates to future or
unascertained goods, and it is that sense that the learned Judge would appear to have had in his mind when
he spoke of a commercial or business sense. But apart
from the fact that these observations were obiter, this
Court has consistently held that though the word
•
" sale " in its popular sense is not restricted to passirig
of title, and has a wider connotation as meaning the
transaction of sale, and that in that sense an agreement to sell would, as one of the essential ingredients
of sale, furnish sufficient nexus for a Sta~ to impose a
tax, such levy could, nevertheless, be made only when
the transaction is one of sale, and it would be a sale
only when it has resulted in the passing of property in
the gf>ods to the purchaser. Vide Poppatlal Shah v.
The State of Madras (2 ) and The State of Bombay v.
(1) (1922) 12 Tax t;as. 545.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. 677, 683.
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
396
[1959]
The United .Motors (India) Ltd. (1 ). It has also been
held in '1.'he Sales 'Pax O.fficer, Pilibhit v. J.lf essrs. Budh
Th~~~:~, 0! Prakash Jai Prakash(') that the sale contemplated by
v.
Entry 48 of the Government of India Act was a
Gannon Dnnkedq transaction in which title to the goods passes and a
& Co.,
mere executory agreement was not a sale within that
(Madras) Ltd.
Entry. We must accordingly hold that the expression
"
sale of goods " in Entry 48 cannot be construed in
Venkatarama
Aiyar .
its
popular sense, and that it must be interpreted in
1
its legal sense. What its conn<itation in that sense is,
must now be ascertained. :For a correct determination
thereof, it is necessary to digress somewhat into the
evolution of the law relating to sale of goods.
The concept of sale, as it now obtains in our jurisprudence, has its roots in the Roman law. Under that
law, sale, emptio venditio, is an agreement by which
one person agrees to transfer to another the excl'llsive
possession (vacuam possessionem tradere) of something
(merx) for consideration. In the earlier stages of its
development, the law was unsettled whether ·the consideration for sale should be money or anything valuable. By a rescript of the Emperors Diocletian and
Maximian of the year 294 A.D., it was finally decided
t!iat it should be money, and this law is embodied in
the Institutes of Justinian, vide Title XXIII. Emptio
venditio is, it may be noted, what is known in Roman
law as a consensual contract. That is to say, the
contract is complete when the parties agree to it, even
without delivery as in contracts re or the observance
of any formalities as in contracts verbis and litteris.
The common law of England relating to sales deve1<'.>ped very much on the lines of the Roman law in
insisting on agreement between parties and price as
essential elements of a contract of sale of goods. In
his work on " Sale '', Benjamin observes :
" Hence"it follows that, to constitute a valid sale,
there must be a concurrence of the following elements,
z958
'
VIZ.,
(1) Parties competent to contract; (2) mutual
assent ; (3) a thing, the absolute or general property in
which is transferred from the seller to the buyer; and
(1) [1953] S.C.R 1069, 1078.
(2) (195>] l S.C.R. 243.
•
•
.
•
S.C.R.
t
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
(4) a price in money paid or promised." (Vide 8th
r958
Edn., P· 2).
The State of
In 1893 the Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Viet. c. 71
Madras
codified the law on the subject, and s. 1 of the Act
v.
which embodied the rules of the common law runs as Gannon Dunkerley
& Co.,
follows:
(Madras) Ltd.
1.-(l) "A contract of sale of goods is a contract
whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the Venkatarama
property in goods to the buyer for a money consideraAiyar ].
tion, called the pricti. There may be a contract of
sale between one part owner and another.
(2) A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
(3) Where under a contract of sale the property in
the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer
the contract is called a sale; but where the transfer of
the -property in the goods is to take place at a future
time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled the contract is called an agreement to sell.
(4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the
time elapses or the conditions are fulfilled subject to
which the property in the goods is to be transferred."
Coming to the Indian law on the subject, s. 77 of
the Indian Contract Act, 1872, defined "sale " as ''.the
exchange of property for a price involving the transfer
of ownership of the thing sold from the seller to the
buyer". It was suggested that under this section it
was sufficient to constitute a sale that there was a
transfer of ownership in the thing for a price and that
a bargain between the parties was not an essential
element. But the scheme of the Indian Contract Act
is that it enacts in ss. 1 to 75 provisions applicable in
general to all contracts, and then deals separately
with particular kinds of contract such as sale, guarantee, bailment, agency and partnership, and the scheme
necessarily posits that all these transactions are based
on agreements. We then come to the Indian Sale of
Goods Act, 1930, which repealed Oh. VII of the Indian
Contract Act relating to sale of goods, and s. 4 thereof
is practically in the same terms as s. 1 of the English
Act. Thus, according to the law both of England and
of India, in order to constitute a sale it is necessary
•
0
.
•
398
SUPREME COUBT REPORTS
[1959]
that there should be an agreement between the parties
for
the purpose of transferring title to goods which
The Stale of
Madrns
of course presupposes capacity to contract, that it
v.
must be supported by money com1ideration, and that
Gannon Dun/.,,/ey as a result of the transaction property must actually
<£-Co.,
pass in the goods. Unless all these elements are pre(Madms) Lid.
sent, there can be no sale. Thus, if merely title to the
Venkatarama
goods passes but not as a result of any contract
Aiyar ;.
between the parties, express or implied, there is no
sale. So also if the consideratioft for the transfer was
not money but other valuable consideration, it may then
be exchange or barter but not a sale. And if under the
contract of sale, title to the goods has not passed, then
there is an agreement to sell and not a completed sale.
Now, it is the contention of the respondents that as
the expression " sale of goods " was at the time when
the Government of India Act was enacted, a term of
well-recognised legal import in the general law relating
to sale of goods and in the legislative practice relating
to that topic both in England and in India, it must be
interpreted in Entry 48 as having the same meaning
as in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and a number of authorities were relied on in support of this
corttention. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark('), it
was observed :
" In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles
and history of which were familiarly known to the
framers of the Constitution. The language of the Constitution, as has been well said, could not be under•
stGod without reference to the common law."
In South Carolina v. United States ('), Brewer J.
observed:
"To determine the extent of the grants of power,
we must, theNfore, place ourselves in the position of
the men who framed and adopted the Constitution,
and inquire what they must have understood to be
the meaning and scope of those grants. "
A more recent pronouncement is that of Taft C. J.
who said:
'
r95B
(1) (1898) 169 U.S. 649, 654; 42 L. Ed. 890, 893.
,(2) (1905) 199 U.S. 437; 50 L. Ed. z6z, 265.
'
S.C.R.
r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
" The language of the Constitution cannot be
r95B ·
interpreted safely except by reference to the common The State of
law and to British institutions as they were when the
Madras
instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen
v.
and lawyers of the Convention, who submitted it to the Gannon Dunkerley
ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen states,
& Co.,
were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the (Madras) Ltd,
aommon law, and thought and spoke in its vocabu- venkatarama
Iary ". Ex parte Grossman (1).
Aiyar J.
In answer to thE! above line of authorities, the
appellant relies on the following observations in Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of
Chicago v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Railway
Company (2 ) :
" Whether a clause in the Constitution is to be
"restricted by the rules of the English law as they
exis~ed when the Constitution was adopted depends
upon the terms or the nature of the particular clause
in question. Certainly, these rules have no such res. trictive effect in respect of any constitutional grant of
governmental power (Waring v. Clarke (3) ), though they
do, at least in some instances, operate restrictively in
respect of clauses of the Constitution which guarantee
and safeguard the fundamental rights and liberties. of
the individual, the best examples of which, perhaps,
are the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, which guarantee the right of trial by jury."
It should, however, be stated that the law is stated in
Weaver on Constitutional Law, 1946 Edn., p. 77 and
Crawford on Statutory Construction, p. 258 in the
same terms as in South Carolina v. United States (4).
•
But it is unnecessary to examine minutely the precise
scope of this rule of interpretation in American law, as
the law on the subject has been stated clearly and
authoritatively by the Privy Qouncil in ~onstruing the
scope of the provisions of the British North America
Act, 1867. In L'Union St. Jacques De Montreal v. Be
Lisle( 5 ), the question was whether a law of Quebec
(1) (1925) 267 U.S. 87;
69 L. Ed. 527, 530.
79 L. Ed. IIIO, II24.
(3) (1847) 5 How. 441; 12 L. Ed. 226.
(4) (1905) r99 U.S. 437; 50 L. Ed. 262, 265.
(5) (r874) L.R. 6 ·P.C. 3r, 36.
(2)~1935) 294 U.S. 648, 669 J
•
'
400
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
' '95 8
providing for relief to a society in a state of financial
embarrassment was one with respect to " bankruptcy
The State of
Madras
and insolvency". In deciding that it should be deterv.
mined on a consideration of what was understood as
Gannon Dunkerley included in those words in their legal sense, Lord
"' Co..
Selborne observed :
(Madras) Ltd.
"The words describe in their known legal sense
Venkatarama
provisions made by law for the administration of the
Aiyar 1 .
estates of persons who may become bankrupt or insolvent, according to rules and definitions prescribed by
law, including of course the conditions in which that
law is to be brought into operation, the manner in
which it is to be brought into operation, and the effect
of its operation."
On this test, it was held that the law in question was
not one relating to bankruptcy. In Royal Bank of
Canada v. Larue (1 ), the question was whether 11,
sub-s. (10), of the Bankruptcy Act of Canada under
which a charge created by a judgment on the real
assets of a debtor was postponed to an assignment
made by the debtor of his properties for the benefit of
his creditors was intra vires the powers of the Dominion Legislature, as being one in respect of "bankruptcy and insolvency" within s. 91, sub-cl. (21), of
the British North America Act. Viscount Cave L. C.
applying the test laid down in L'Union St. Jacques De
Montreal v. Be Lisle('), held that the impugned
provision was one in respect of bankruptcy.
In The Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v.
John East Iron Works Ltd. ('), the question arose
•
ul}der s. 96 of the British North America Act, 1867,
under which the Governor-General of the Dominion
had power to appoint judges of the superior district
and county courts. The Province of Saskatchewan
enacted the • Trade Union Act, 1944, authorising
the Governor of the Province to constitute the
Labour Relations Board for the determination of
labour disputes. The question was whether this provision was invalid as contravening s. 96 of the British
North America Act. In holding that it was not; Lord
s.
(1) [1928] A.C. 187.
•
(2) (1874) LR. 6 P.C. 31, 36.
(3) [1949] A.C. 134 .
'
S.C.R.
r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
Simonds observed that the courts contemplated by
I95 8
s. 96 of the Aet were those which were g.enerally under- The State of
stood to be courts at the time when the Constitution
Madms
Act was enacted, that labour courts were then unv.
known, and that, therefore, the reference to judgesGannon Dunkerley
and courts in s. 96 could not be interpreted as comG Co .•
prehending a tribunal of the. character of the Labour (Madras) Ltd.
Relations Board. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Venkatarama
Vol. 11, para. 157, p. 93, the position is thus summed
Aiy.arf.
up:
•
"The existing state of English law in 1867 is
relevant for consideration in determining the meaning
of the terms used in conferring power and the extent
of that power, e. g. as to customs legislation."
Turning next to the question as to the weight to be
attached to legislative practice in interpreting words
in the Constitution, in Croft v. Dunphy (1), the question was as to the validity of certain provisions in a
Canadian statute providing for the search of vessels
beyond territorial waters. These provisions occurred
in a customs statute, and were intended to prevent
evasion of its provisions by smugglers. In affirming
the validity of these provisions, Lord Macmillan
referred to the legislative practice relating to customs,
and observed :
" When ·a power is conferred to legislate on a
particular topic it is important, in determining the
scope of the power, to have regard to what is ordinarily treate<i as embraced within that topic in legislative
practice and particularly in the legislative practice of
the State which has conferred the power."
•
•
In Wallace Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay City and Bombay Suburban
District {2 ), Lord Uthwatt observed:
"Where Parliament has conferred a power to
legislate on a particular topic it is permissible and
important in determining the scope and meaning of
the power to have regard to what is ordinarily treated
as embraced within that topic in the legislative
practirJe of the United Kingdom. The· point of the
. (1) (1933] A.C. 156, 165.
. 51
'
..
(2) (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 86, 99 .
•
•
402
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
reference is emphatically not to seek a pattern to
wl:tich
a due exercise of the 1iower must conform.
Tl1e State of
Madras
The object is to ascertain the general conception inv.
volved in the words in the enabling Act."
Gannon Dunkerley In lri re The Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV
(M ~ c~)'{ d
of 1938 (1), in considering whether a .tax on the sale of
1
a '"'
goods was a duty of excise within the meaning of
·
¥enkatarama
Entry 45 in List I of Sch . .VII, Sir. Maurice Gwye"r
Aiyar J.
C. J. observed at p. 53:
"Lastly, I am entitled to l~ok at the manner in
which Indian legislation preceding .the Constitution
Act had been accustomed to provide ·for the collection
of excise duties; for -Parliament must surely be presumed to have had Indian legislative practice in mind
and, unless the context otherwise clearly requires, not
to have conferred a legislative power intended to be
interpreted in a sense not understood by those to
whom the Act was to apply."
In The State of Bombay v. F. 'N. Balsara ('),in determining the meaning of the word "intoxicating liquor"
in Entry 31 . of List II of Sch. VII to the Government
of India Act; 1935, this Court referred to the legislative
practice with reference to that topic in India as throwing light on the true scope of the" entry.. (Vide pp. 704
to 706).
On the basis of the above aut.horities, the respon·
dents contend that the true interpretation to be put on
the expression "sale of goods" in Entry 4~ is what
it means in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and
what it has always meant in the general la-iv relating
•
to·sale of goods. It is contended by the appellant-and quite rightly-that in interpreting the· words of a
Constitution the legislative practice relative thereto is
not conclusive. But it is certainly valuable and might
prove determinative unless there are good reasons for
disregarding it, and in The Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v.
Messrs. 'Budh Prakash Jai Prakash('), it was relied on
for ascertaining the meaning and true scope of the
very:words which are now under consideration. '~here,
in deciding that. an a_greement -to sell is not a sale
within Entry 48, this Court referred· t<j the provisions
(1) [1939] F.c.R. 18, 37.
(2) [1951] s.c.R. 6Sz.
•
·
(3) (1955] 1 s.c:R. 243.
.
-
.
S.C.R.
.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
of the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, the Indian
r958
Contract Act, 1872, and the Indian Sale of Goods
Act, 1930, for construing the word "sale" in that
Tl'.~!~~~: of
Entry and observed :
v,
"Thus, there having existed at the time of thecrmnon Dunkerley
enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, a
& Co ••
well-defined and well-established diStinction between Wiadrns) Ltd.
& sale and an agreement to sell, it would be proper
f eiikalarama
to interpret the expression "sale of goods " in entrv
48
· ]_.
J
Aiyar
in the sense in which. it wa;s used in legislation both
in England and India and to hold that it authorises
the imposition of a tax only when there is a completed
sale involving transfer of title."
This decision, though not decisive of the present con- v
troversy, goes far to support the contention of the {
respondents that the words "sale of goods" in Entry
48 n'tust be interpreted in the sense which· they bear
in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930. ·
·
The appellant and the intervening States resist this
conclusion on the following grounds:
(1) The provisions of the Government of India ACt,
read as a whole, show that the words" sale of goods"
in Entry 48 are not to be interpreted in the sense
which they have in the Indian Sale of Goods Act,
1930;
.
(2) The legislative practice relating to the topic of
sales tax does not . support the narrow construction
sought to be put on the language of Entry 48.; .
(3) The expression " sale of goods " has in law a
wider meaning than what it bears in the Indian Sale
of Goods Act, 1930, and that is the meaning whjch
•
must be put on it in Entry 48; and ·
( 4) the language of Entry 48 should . be ebnstrued
_libe~ally so as to take in new concepts of sal_es tiix. .
We ·shall eXamin.e th_ese eontentioris -s~ri{iti1n~
· ···-··
. (1) As regards the first contention, the argmnent fa
that in the Government of India Act, 1935, there are
other provisions which give a clear indication that the
expression " sale of goods " in Entry 48 is not to be
interpreted in the sense which it bears in the Indian
Sale of Goods .Act, 1930. That is an argument open
'
.
•
•
404
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
to the appellant, because rules of interpretation are
only aids. for ascertaining the true legislative ·intent
The State of
Madras
and must yield to t h e context, w h ere t h e coµtrary
v.
clearly appears. Now, what are the indications contra?
Gannon Dunkerley Section 311(2) of the Government of India Act defines
<'> co..
" agricultural income " as meaning " agricultural in(Mad•·as) Ltd.
come as defined for the purposes of the enactments
relating
to Indian income-tax". It is said that ~f
Venkatarania
the
words
" sale of goods " in Entry 48 were meant
Aiyar j.
to have the same meaning ag those words in the
Indian· Sale of Goods Act, that would have been
expressly mentioned as in the case of definition of
agricultural income, and that therefore that is not the
meaning which should be put oh them in that Entry.
In our opinion, that is not the inference to be drawn
from the absence of words linking up the meaning of
the word "sale" with what it might bear in the Irtdian
Sale of Goods Act.. We think that the true legislative
intent is that the expression " sale of goods " in Entry
48 should bear the precise and definite meaning it has
in law, and that that meaning should not be left to
fluctuate with the definition of" sale" in laws relating
to sale of goods which might be in force for the time
beip.g. It was then said that in some of the Entries,
· for example, Entries 31 and 49, List ·II, the word
" sale " was used in a wider sense than in the Indian
Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Entry 31 is "Intoxicating
liquors and narcotic drugs, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and
sale of intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic·
drugs ... ". The argument is that "sale " in the Entry
•
mtJ.st be interpreted as including barter, as the policy
· of the law cannot be to prohibit transfers of liquor
only when there is money consideration therefor. But
this argument proceeds on a misapprehension of the
principles on 'which the Entries are drafted. The
scheme of the drafting is that there is in the beginning
of the Entry words of general import, and they are
followed by words having reference to particular
aspects thereof. The operation of the general words,
however, is not cut down by reason of the fact that
there are sub-heads dealing with specific aspects. In
•
. ,,
S.C.R.
).
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
Manikkasundara v. R. S. Nayudu( 1 ) occur the following observations pertinent to the present question:
The Stat• of
.
"The su.bsequent words and phrases· are not inMadras
tended to limit the ambit of the opening general term
v.
or phrase but rather to illustrate the scope and objects Gannon Dunkerley
of the legislation envisaged as comprised in the open~ Co.,
ing term or phrase."
(Madras) Ltd.
A law therefore prohibiting any dealing in intoxicat- Venkat<trama
ing liquor, whether by way of sale or barter or gift,
Aiyar J.
will be intra vires the 'powers conferred by the opening
words without resort to the words "sale and purchase ". Entry 49 in List II is " Cesses on the entry of
goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale
therein". It is argued that the word "sale'' here cannot be limi,ted to transfers for money or for even
consideration. The answer to this is that the words" for
consumption, use or sale therein" are a composite
expression meaning octroi duties, and have a precise
legal connotation, and the use of the word "sale therein " can throw no light on the meaning of that·
wor.d in Entry 48. '~Te are of opinion that the provisions in the Government of India Act, 1935, relied on
for the appellant are too inconclusive to support the
inference that " sale" in Entry 48 was intended tO" be
used in a sense different from that in the Indian Sale
of Goods Act.
(2) It is next urged that for determining the true
meaning of the expression " Taxes on the sale ofgoods"
in Entry 48 it would not be very material to refer
to the legislative practice relating to the law in respect
of sale of goods. It is argued that" sale of goods" and
•
"taxes on sale of goods" are distinct matters, each
having its own incidents, that the scope and object of
legislation in respect of the two topics are different,
'that while the purpose of .a law. relatJng to sale of
goods is to define the rights of parties to a contract,
that of a law relating to tax on sale of goods is to
bring money into the coffers of the State, and that,
accordingly, legislative practice with reference to
eithe~ topic cannot be of much assistance with reference to the other. Now, it is true that the object and
(1) [1946] F.C.R 67, 84.
.. ..
.
•
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
scope of the two laws are different, and if there was
any difference in the legislative· practice with reference
1
~~~:~s of to these two topics, we should, in deciding the question
v.
· that is now before us, refer more appropriately to that
r;,;, 110 n D"nkerley relating to sales tax legislation rather than that
& co:.
relating to sale of goods. But there was, at the time
(Madras) Ltd.
when the Government of India Act was enacted, no
law relating to sales tax either in England or in Indi(t.
'Venkatarama
The first sales tax law to be enacted in 'Ind1'a i's the
AiyaYJ.
Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, and that was in
exercise of the power conferred by Entry 48.
In
England, a purchase tax was introduced for the first
time only by the Finance Act No. 2 of 1940. The
position, therefore, is that Entry 48 introduces a topic
of legislation with respect to which there was no legislative practice.
In'the absence of legislative practice with reference
to sales tax in this country or in England, counsel for
the appellant and the States sought support for their
. contention in the legislative practice of Australia and
. America relating to that topic. In 1930, the Commonwealth Sales Tax Act was enacted in Australia imposing a tax on retail sales. A question arose whether a
contractor .who supplied materials in execution of a
works contract· could be taxed as on a sale of the
materials. In Sydney Hydraulic and General Engineering Co. v. Blackwood & Son (1 ), the Supreme Court of
New South Wales held that the agreement between the
parties was one to do certain work and to supply certain
. materials and not an agreement for sale or delivery of
•
the goods .. Vide Irving's Commonwealth Sales Tax
Law and Practice, 1950 Edn., p. 77. In 1932, the
Legislature intervened and enacted in the Statute of
1930, a new provision, s. 3( 4), in the. following terms :
" For the purpose of this Act, a person shall be
deemed to have sold goods .if, in the performance of
·any contract (not being a contract for the sale of
goods) under which he has received, or is entitled to
receive, valuable consideration, he supplies goods
the property in which (whether as goods or iJ;1. some
other form) passes, under the terms of the contract, to
some other person."
,958
•
(1) 8 N.S.,V.S.l!· Io'.
...
(
4_
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
After this, the question arose in M. R. ·Hornibrook
I'f5 8
(Pty.) Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1) "Ihe State'Of
whether a contractor who fabricated piles and used
Mairiu
them in constructing a bridge was liable to pay sales
v.
tax on the value of the piles. The majority of the Gai·non Dunkerley··
Court held that he was. Latham C. J. put his deci&- Co.,
sion on the ground that though there was, in fact, no (Madras) Lilt; ·
sale of the piles, in law there ·was one by reason of Venkatarama
s. 3(4) of the Act. Now, the judgment of the learned
Aiya~J>
Chief Justice is really !tdverse to the appellant in that
it decides that under the general law and apart from
s. 3(4) there was no sale of the materials and that it
was only by reason of the deeming provision of s. 3(4)
that it became a taxable sale. The point to be noted
is that under the Australian Constitution the power to
legisl!tte on the items mentioned .in s. 51 of the Constitution Act is vested exclusively in the Common- ·
wealth Parliament; Item (ii) in s. 51 is "Taxation;
but so as not to discriminate between States or parts
of States". Subject to this condition, the power of
Parliament is plenary and absolute, and in exercise of·
such a power it could impose a tax on the value of the
inaterials used by a contractor in his works contracts ; •
and it could do that whether the transaction amoul1ts
in fact to a sale or not. It is no doubt brought under
the Sales Tax Act, it being deemed to be a sale; but
that is only as a matter of convenience. In fact, two
of the learned Judges in M. R. Hornibrook (Pty.) Ltd.
v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1) rested their
decison on the ground that the use of materials in the ·
•
construction was itself taxable ·under the Act. B"'t
under the Government of India Act, the Provincial
Legislature is competent to enact laws in respect of
the matters enumerated in Lists II and III, ·and
though the entries therein are to be cousiorued liberally
and in their widest amplitude, the law must, nevertheless, be one with respect to those matters. A power to
enact a law with respect to tax on sale of goods under
Entry 48 must, to be intra vires, be one relating in fact
to sale of goods, and accordingly, the Provincial Legislature cannot, in the purported exercise of its . power
..•
•"
(r) (1939) 62 c.~.R. 272.
' .
•
408
SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS
[1959]
to tax sales, tax transactions which are not sales
by
merely enacting that they shail be deemed to be
The State of
Madras
sales.
.
v.
The position in the American law appears to be the
Gamio!' Dunkerley same as in Australia. In Blome Go. v. Ames (1 ), the
c:~ Co..
Supreme Court of Illinois held that a sales tax was
{Madtas) Ltd.
leviable on the value of materials used by a contractor
Venkatarama
in the construction of a·building or a fixture treating
Aiyar J.
the transaction as one of sale of. those mateTials. But
this decision was overruled by it later decision of the
same Court in Hei·lihy Mid-Continent Go. v. Nudelman ('), wherein it was held that there was no transfer
of title to the materials used in construction work as
goods, and that the provisions of the Sales Tax Act
had accordingly no application. This is in accordance
with the generally accepted notion of sale of goods.
This, of course, does not preclude theStates in exercise
of their sovereign power from imposing tax on construction works· .in respect of materials used therein.
Thus, the position is that in 1935 there was no legis· lative practice relating to sales tax either in England
or India, and that in America and Australia, tax on
the. supply of materials in construction works was
imposed but that was in exercise of the sovereign
powers of the Legislature by· treating the supply as a
sale. But apart from such legislation, the expression
" sale of goods " has been construed as having the
meaning which it has in the common law of England
relating to sale of goods, and it has been. held that in
that sense the use of materials in construction works is
•
not a sale. This rather supports the conclusion that
"sale" in Entry 48 must be construed as having the
same meaning which it has in the Indian Sale of
Goods Act, 1930.
(3) It is ne~t contended by Mr. Sikri that though
the word " sale " has a definite sense in the Indian
Sale of Goods Act, 1930, it. has a wider sense in law
other than that relating to sale of goods, and that, on
the principle that words conferring legislative powers
should be construed in their broadest amplitude, it
wpuld be proper to attribute that sense to it in Entry
•
(1) (1937) III A.L.R. 940.
. (2), (1937).• 15 A.L.R. 485.
...
r .
•
S.C.R.
r.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
409
48. It is argued that in its wider sense the expression
r958
'"sale of goods" means all transactions resulting in the
transfer of title to goods from one person to another, The State of
Madras
that a bargain between the parties was not an essential
v.
element thereof, and that even involuntary sales Gannon Dunkerley
would fall within its connotation. He relied in supG- Co.,
port of this position on . various dicta in Ex Parte (Madras) Ltd.
Drake In • re Ware __(1),
Great Western Railway Co. v. Vmkatarama
7_
Commissioners o.f Ir!M-"nd
Revenue (2 ), The Commis•
Aiyar ].
sioners of Inland Revenue v. Newcastle Breweries Ltd. (3 ),
Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ld. (4 ) and Nalukuy"a v.
Director of Lands, Native Land Trust Board of Fiji (5 ).
In Ex Parte Drake In re Ware (1), the question was
whether an unsatisfied decree passed in an action on
detinue extinguished the title of the decree-holder to
the thing detained. In answering it in the negative,
Jessel M. R. observed:
·
"The judgments in Brinsmead v. Harrison (6 ),
and especially that of Mr. Justice Willes, shew that the
theory of the judgment in an action of detinue is that
it is a kind of involuntary sale of the Plaintiff's goods
to the Defendant."
He went on to state that such sale took place when
the value of the goods is paid to the owner. In Great
Western Railway Co. v. Commissioners of Inland
Revenue (2), an Act of Parliament had provided for
the dissolution of two companies under a scheme of
amalgamation with a third company under which the
shareholders were to be given in exchange for their
shares in the dissolved companies, in the case of one
•
company, stock in the third company in certain
specified proportions, and in .the other, discharge of
debentures on shares already held by them in the third
company. The question was. wh<:ither a copy of the
Act had to be stamped ad valorem as on• conveyance
on sale under the first schedule to the Stamp Act, 1891.
· The contention of the company was that there was no
· sale by the shareholders of their shares to it, and
(r) 0 (1877) 5 Ch. D. 866.
(3) (1927) 12 Tax Cas. 927.
(5) (1957] A.C. 325:
52
,_
{?) (1894) l Q.B. 507, 512, 515.
(4) [t955] A.C. 696.
(6) (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. ~47•
•
410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
that the provision in question had accordingly no
application. In rejecting this contention, Esher M. R.
The State of
observed:
'Madras
v.
" Turning to the Stamp Act, the words used are ' a
Gannon Dunkerley conveyance on sale'. Does that expression mean a
& Co.,
conveyance where there is a definite contract of pur(Madras) Ltd.
chase and sale preceding it? Is that the way to construe
the Stamp Act, or does it mean a conveyance
Venkatarama
;y.,
J.
the
same
as if it were upon a contract of purchase and
4
sale? The latter seems to me' to be the meaning of
the phrase as there used. "
Kay L. J. said:
" And we must remember that the Stamp Act has
nothing to do with contracts or negotiations; it stamps
a conveyance upon a sale, which is the instrument by
which the property is transferred upon a sale. " •
This is a decision on the interpretation of the particular provision of the Stamp Act, and is not relevant
in determining the meaning of sale under the general
law. And, if anything, the observations above quoted
emphasise the contrast between the concept of sale
under the general law and that which is embodied in
the particular provision of the Stamp Act.
In The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Newcastle
Breweries Ltd. (1 ), the point for decision was whether
payments made by the Admiralty to the respondent
company which was carrying on business as brewers,
on account of stocks of rum taken over by it compulsorily under the Defence of Realm Regulations were
liable to be assessed as trade receipts to excess profits
•
duty. The contention of the company was that the
acquisition by the Admiralty was not a sale, that the
payments made were not price of goods sold but compensation for interference with the carrying on of
business by it, and that accordingly the amounts could
not be held to have been received in the course of
trade or business. In rejecting this contention, Viscount Cave L. C. observed:
"If the raw rum had been voluntarily f\Old to
other traders, the price must clearly have come into
the computation of the Appellant's. profits, and the
z95B
•
(1) (1927) 12 r.ax Cas. 927.
-·
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
circumstance that the sale was compulsory and was to
z9s8
the Crown makes no. difference in principle. "
c
The State of
. In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ltd. (1), the iacts
Madras
were that railway wagons belonging to the respondent
v.
company were taken over by the Transport Com- Gannon Dunkerley
mission compulsorily in exercise of the powers con&- Co.,
ferred by s. 29 of the Transport Act, 1947, and (Madras) Ltd.
c9mpensation was paid therefor. The question was Venkatarama
whether this amount was liable to income-tax on the
Aiyar 1.
footing of sale of the ,wagons by the company. The
contention on behalf of the Revenue was that compulsory acquisition being treated as sale under the
English law, the taking over of the wagons and payment of compensation therefor must also be regarded
as sale for purpose of income-tax. Lord Morton in
agreeing with this contention observed :
:• ...... the question whether it is a correct use of
the English language to describe as a ' sale ' a transaction from which the element of mutual assent is
missing is no doubt an interesting one. I think, however, that this question loses its importance for the
purpose of the decision of this appeal when it is
realized that for the last 100 years transactions by
which the property of A has been transferred to B, on
payment of compensation to the owner but without
the consent of the owner, have been referred to many
times, in Acts of Parliament, in opinions delivered in
this House, in judgments of the Court of Appeal and
the High Court of Justice, and in textbooks· as a
' sale '-generally as a ' compulsory sale ' ........ .
" The case of Newcastle Breweries Ld. v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners (2), referred to later, affords-a
striking modern instance of the use of the word ' sale '
as applied to compulsory taking of goods ........... .
"In these circumstances, whether this use of the
word ' sale ' was originally correct or in@orrect, I find
it impossible to say that the only construction which
can fairly be given to the word' sold' in section 17(1)
(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1945, is to limit it to a
trans~ction in which the element of mutual assent is
present."
...
~-
(1) [1955] A.C. 6,.96.
·-
(2) (1927) 96 L.J.K. B. 735·
•
'
412
z95B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
But the majority of the House came to a different con-
The State of
clusion, and held that the element of bargain was
Madrns
essential to constitute a sale, and to describe compulv.
sory taking over of property as a sale was a misuse of
Gannon Dunkerley that word.
& Co.,
In Nalukuya v. Director of Land8, Native Land
(Madras) Ltd.
Venkataran1a
Aiyar ].
Trust Board of Fiji, Intervener ('), it was held by the
Privy Council that compensation money pa.yable on
the compulsory acquisition of land was covered by the
words " the purchase money reueived in respect of a
sale or other disposition of native land" in s. 15 of
the Native Land Trust Ordinance, c. 86 of 1945, :JJ:iji.
The decision, however, proceeded on the particular
terms of the statute, and does not affect the decision
in Kirkness v. John Hudson&: Co. Ltd.(') that mutual
assent is an element of a transaction of sale.
It should be noted that the main ground on which
the decision of Lord Morton rests is that compulsory
acquisition of property had been described in the
legislative practice of Great Britain as compulsory
sales. The legislative practice of this country, however,
has been different. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
refers to the compulsory taking over of immoveable
property as acquisition. In List II of the Government
of "India Act, this topic is described in Entry 9 as
"compulsory acquisition of land". In the Constitution,
Entry 42 in List III is " acquisition and requisition of
property". The ratio on which the opinion of Lord
Morton is based has no place in the construction of
Entry 48, and the law as laid down by the majority is
in consonance with the view taken by this Court that
ba.rgain is an essential element in a transaction of sale.
Vide Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras (') and
The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India)
Ltd. ('). It is unnecessary to discuss the other English
cases cited ab<>ve at any length, as the present question
did not directly arise for decision therein, and the
decision in Kirknes8 v. John Hudson & Co. Ld. (')
must be held to conclude the matter.
Another contention presented from the same iJOint
(1) [1957] A.C. 325.
(3) [1953] S.C.R. 677, 683 .
•
(2) [1955] A.C. 696.
(4) [1953] ~.C.R. 1o6<;, 1078.
--
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
of view but more limited in its sweep is that urged by ·
I958
the learned Solicitor-General of India, the Advocatec
The State of
General of Madras and the other counsel appearing ior
Madras
the States, that even in the view that an agreement
v.
· between the parties was necessary to constitute a sale, Gannon Dunkerley
that agreement need not relate to the goods as such,
0- Co.,
and that it would be sufficient if there is an agreement (Madras) Ltd.
bjltween the parties and in the carrying out of that Venkatarama
agreement there is transfer of title in movables belongAiyar J.
ing to one person to another for consideration. It is
argued that Entry 48 only requires that there should
be a sale, and that means transfer of title in the goods,
and that to attract the operation of that Entry it is not
necessary that there should also be an agreement to
sell those goods. To hold that there should be an agreement to sell the goods as such is, it is contended, to
add ~o the Entry, words which are not there.
We are unable to agree with this contention. If the
words " sale of goods " have to be interpreted in their
legal sense, that sense can only be what it has in the
law relating to sale of goods. The ratio of the rule of
interpretation that words of legal import occurring in
a statute should be construed in their legal sense is
that those words have, in law, acquired a definite and
precise sense, and that, accordingly, the legislature
must be taken to have intended that they should be
understood in that sense. In interpreting an expres- /
sion used in a legal sense, therefore, we have only to
ascertain the precise connotation which it possesses
in law. It has been already stated that, both under
the common law and the statute law relating to sale (
of goods in England and in India, to constitute a
transaction of sale there should be an agreement, 1\
express or implied, relating to goods to be completed
by passing of title in those goods. It is of the essence
of this concept that both the agreement ·and the sale
should relate to the same subject-matter. Where the
goods delivered under the contract are not the goods
contracted for, the purchaser has got a right to reject
them, 1Jr to accept them and claim damages for breach
of warranty. Under the law, therefore, there cannot
be an agreement relating to one kind of property and
•
.._
•
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
958
'
1· a sa.le as regards another. We are accordingly of
The 5 ,.,, of · opinion that on the true interpretation of the expresMad,as
sion "sale of goods" there must be an agreement
v.
between the parties for the sale of the very goods in
Gannon Dunk"!'. which eventually property passes. In a building
(Ma~,;,~..Ltd. ·contract, the agreement between the .Parties is that
_
the contractor should construct a buildmg according to
Venkata•ama
the specifications contained in the agreement, and i;l
Aiy"' J.
consideration therefor receive payment as provided
therein, and as will presently be- shown there is in such
an agreement neither a contract to sell the materials
used in the construction, nor does property pass therein as movables. It is therefore impossible to maintain
that there is implict in a building contract a sale of
materials as understood in law.
(4) It was finally contended that the words of a
Constitution conferring legislative power should be
construed in such manner as to make it flexible and
elastic so as to enable that power to be exercised in
respect of matters which might be unknown at the
time it was enacted but might come into existence
with the march of time and progress in science, and
that on this principle the expression " sale of goods "
in.Entry 48 should include not only what was understood as sales at the time of the Government of India
Act, 1935, but also whatever might be regarded as sale
in the times to come. The decisions in Attorney.
General v. Edison Telephone Company of London('),
Toronto Corporation v. Bell Telephone Company of
Canada('), The Regulation and Control of Radio
C9mmunication _in Canada, In re(') and The King v.
Bri.slan: Ex Parte Williams (') were quoted as precedents for adopting such a construction. In AttorneyGeneral v. Edison Telephone Company of London('),
the question was whether the Edison Telephone
Company, London, had infringed the exclusive privilege
of transmitting telegrams granted to the PostmasterGeneral under an Act of 1869 by installation of telephones. The decision turned on the construction of
the definition of the word "telegraph" in the Acts of
(1) (1880) L.R. 6 Q.B.D. 244.
(z) [1905) A.C. 52 .
•
(3) [1932] A.C. 304.
(4) (193j) 54 C.L.R. 262.
_.
•
,,,•
S.C.R.
•.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
1863 and 1869. It was contended for the Company
r958
that telephones were unknown at the time when those
Acts were passed and therefore could not fall within The.Hadras
State of
the definition of "telegraph". The Court negatived
v.
this contention on the ground that the language of the Gannon Dunkerley
definition was wide enough to include telephones.
& Co.,
Toronto Corporation v. Bell Telephone Company of (Madras) Ltd.
Ganada (1) is a decision on s. 92(10)(a) of the British V enkatarama
North America Act, 1867, un d er wh ic h t he D ominion
Aiyar ].
Parliament had the e~clusive competence to pass laws
in respect of " lines of steam or other ships, railways,
canals, telegraphs, and other works and undertakings
connecting the province with any other or others of the
provinces or extending beyond the limits of the
province". The question was whether a law incorporating a telephone company and conferring on it powers
to enter upon streets and highways vested in a municipal corporation was intra vires the powers of the
Dominion Parliament under the above provision, and
whether in consequence a provision in an Ontario Act
requiring the consent of the municipal authorities for
the carrying out of those operations was ultra vire,,.
It was held by the Privy Council that the Parliament
of Canada was competent to enact the impugned law
under s. 92(10)(a) and that, therefore, it prevailed over
the Provincial Act. This decision, however, would
seem to have been reached on the words "other works
and undertakings " in the section.
In The Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, In re (2 ), the question was whether
broadcasting was covered by the expression "telegraph
and other works and undertakings" ins. 92(10)(a) of
the Constitution Act, 1867. The Privy Council
answered it in the affirmative on the grounds, firstly,
that broadcasting was an " undertaking connecting
the province with other provinces and extending
beyond the limits of the province ", and, secondly,
that it fell within the description of "telegraph". In
The King v. Brislan: Ex Parte Williams (3 ), the
quest1ion was whether a law. of the Commonwealth
..
(1) [1905) A.C. 52'
•'
.._
(2) (1932) A.C. 304.
(3) (1935)• 54 C.L.R. 262 .
•
•
..
•
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
Parliament with respect to radio broadcasting was one
with respect to "Postal, telegraphic, telephonic and
Th;f~~~~s of other like services" und!lr s. 51(5) of the Australian
v.
Commonwealth Act, and it was answered in the affirGannon Dunlwrley mative.
& co.,
The principle of these decisions is that when, after
(Madras) Ltd.
the enactment of a legislation, new facts and situations
arise which could not have been in its contemplation,
Venkatara;na
Aiyar J.
the statutory provisions could properly be applied to
them if the words thereof are in 'a broad sense capable
of containing them. In that situation, " it is not", as
observed by Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth of
Australia('), "that the meaning of the words changes,
but the changing circumstances illustrate and illuminate the full import of that meaning ". The question
then would be not what the framers understood by
those words, but whether those words are broad enough
to include the new facts. Clearly, this principle has no
application to the present case. Sales tax was not a
subject which came into vogue after the Government
of India Act, 1935. It was.known to the framers of
that statute and they made express provision for it
under Entry 48. Then it becomes merely a question
of interpreting the words, and on the principle, already
stated, that words having known legal import should
be construed in the sense which they had at the time
of the enactment, the expression " sale of goods "
must be construed in the sense which it has in the
Indian Sale of Goods Act.
A contention was also urged on behalf of the respondents
that even assuming that the expression
•
" sale of goods " . in Entry 48 could be construed as
having the wider sense sought to be given to it by the
appellant and that the provisions of the Madras
General Sales Tax Act imposing a tax on construction
contracts courd be sustained as within that entry in
that sense, the impugned provisions would still be
bad under s. 107 of the Government of India Act, and
the decision in D. Sarkar & Bros. v. Commercial Tax
Officer (') was relied on in support of this contention.
Section 107, so far as is material, runs as follows:
(r) [r936] A.G. 578, 6q.
(2) A.LR. 1957 li:al. 283.
c
••
•
•
.., •
S.C.R.
.•
SUPREME COURT RE:l?ORTS
417
'107-·(1) "If any provision of a Provincial law is
rep'ugnant to any provision of a Dominion law which The State of,
tlie Dominion Legislature ·is competent to enact or to
Madras
any provision of an existing law with respect to one
v.
of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legisla- Gannon Dunkerley
tive List, then, subject to the provisions of this
& Co.,
section, the <!Dominion law, whether passed before 01' (Mad,ras) Ltd.
after the Provincial law, or, as the case may be, the Venkatarama
existing law, shall prevail and the Provincial law shall,
Aiyar j.
to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
•
(2) Where a Provincial'law with respect to one of
the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative
List contains · any provision repugnant to the
provisions of an earlier Dominion law or an existing
law with respect to that matter, then, if the Provincial
law, )laving been reserved for the consideration of the
Governor-General has received the assent of the
Governor-General, the Provincial law shall in that
Province prevail, but nevertheless the Dominion
Legislature may at any time enact further legislation
with respect to the same matter."
Now, the argument is that the definition of "sale"
given in the Madras General Sales Tax Act is in
conflict with that given in the Indian Sale of Go<Jds
Act, 1930, that the sale of goods is a matter falling
within Entry 10 of the Concurrent List, and that, in
consequence, as the Madras General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947, under which the impugned provisions had been enacted, had not been reserved for
the assent of the Governor-General as provided in
•
s. 107 (2), ·its provisions are bad to the extent that
they 1:1.re repugnant to the definition of " sale " in the ·
Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The shbrt answer to
this ·contention is that the Madras General Sales
Tax Act fa a law relating ;riot to sale bf .goods, but to
tax on sale of goods, a'nd that it is not one of the
matters enumerated in .the Concurrent List or over
which the Dominidn Legislature is competent to
enact a law, but is a 'matter within the exclusive
competence· of the Province under Eritry·48 in List II.
The only question ·that can arise with reference to
53
•
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
8
such a law is whether it is within the purview of that
Entry. If it is, no question of repugnancy under
s. 107 can arise. The decision in D. Sarkar & Bros.
v.
v. Commercial Tax Officer(') on this point cannot be
c~nnon Dunkel'le~ccepted as sound.
.
·
. & Co.,
It now remains to. deal with the contention pressed
(Madras) Ltd.
on. us by the States that even if tJ:e supply of
v onkatarama materials under a building contract cannot be regarded
Aiyar J.
as a sale under the Indian Sale of Goods Act, that
· contract is nevertheless a composite agreement under
which the contractor undertakes to supply materials,
contribute labour and produce the construction, and
that it is open to the State in execution of its tax laws
to split up that agreement into its constituent parts,
single out that which relates to the supply of materials
and to impose a. tax thereon treating it as a sale. It
is said that this is a power ancillary to the exercrise of
the substantive power to tax sales, and reliance is
placed on the observations in The United Provinct
v. Atiqa Begum(") and Naviv-chandra Mafatlal v. The
Commissione1· ·of Income-tax, Bombay City (') at
p. 836. The respondents contend· .that even if the
agreement between the parties could be split up in the
maimer suggested for the appellant, the resultant will
not be a sale in the sense of the Indian Sale of Goods
Act,. as there is in a. works contract neither an agreement to sell materials as such, nor does property in
_them pass as movables.
The nature and incidents of works contracts have
been the subject of consideration in numerous decisions
of the English qourts, and there is a detailed consider•
ation of the points now under discussion, in so far
as building contracts, are concerned, in Hudson on
Building Contracts, 7th Ed., pp. 386-389 and as
regards chattels, .in Benjamin on Sale, 8th Ed.,
pp. 15~-168 ~nd 352-355. It is therefore sufficient to
refer.to the more important of the cases cited before
us. In.Tripp v. Armitage('); one Bennett, a builder,
had entered into an agreement with certain trustees to
bu\l!i,li. ho~el. The agreement provided inter alia that
I95
The state of
Madrns
_(J) .J'.\.,I.R. 1957 Cal. 283.
"(oj) [I955l I
•
s,c.R: 829, 833, 836.
(2) [1940] F.C.R. rro, 134.
(4) (1839) 4 M. & W, 687; 150 E.R. 1597.
•
419
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
)
the articles which were to be used for the structure
r95S
had to be approved by the trustees. Subsequently,
The State of
Bennett became bankrupt, and the dispute was
Madras
between his assignees iD. bankruptcy, and the trustees
v.
as regards title to certain wooden sash-frames which Gunnon Dunkerley
had been approved on behalf of the trustees but had
& Co.,
not yet been fitted in the building. The trustees (:\1adras) Ltd.
claimed them on the ground that property therein, Venhataiama
had passed to them when once they had approved
Aiyar J.
the same. In negativing this contention, Lord
.
Abinger C. B. observed :
· " ............ this is not a contract for the sale and
pur.chase of goods as movable ·chattels; it. is ;,
contract to make up materials, and to fix them ; and
until they are fixed, by the nature of the contrach
the J?roperty will not pass."
Parke B. observed :
" ............ but in this case, there is no contract at
all. with respect to these particular chattels-it is
merely parcel of a larger contract. The contract is,
that the bankrupt shall build a house ; that he .shall
make, amongst other things, window-frames for the
house, and fix them in the house, subject to the
approbation of a surveyor; and it was never intended
by this contract, that the articles so to be fixed should
become the property of the defendants, until they
were fixed to the freehold."
In Clr;rk v. Bulmer (1), the plaintiff entered into a
contract with the defendant "to build an engine of
100 horse power for the sum of £. 2,500, to be
completeq and fixed by the middle or end pf
•
December". Different parts of the engine were
constructed at the plaintiff's manufactory and sent in
parts to the defendant's colliery >vhere they were. fixed
piecemeal and were made into an engjne. The suit
was for the recovery of a sum of £. 3,000 as price for
"a main engine and other goods sold and delivered".
The contention of the defendant was that there was
'·
no contract of sale, and that the action should have
been "one for work and labour and materials used in
the course of ·that work and. not for price of goods
(1) (1843) II M. '& w. 243; 152 E. R. 793.
•
•
420.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
sold and delivered. In upholding .this contention,
Parke B ..observed :
Tl~;~;:: of
" The engine was not contracted for to be delivered,
v.
.
or delivered, as an engine, in its complete state, and
Gannon Dunk"ley afterwards affixed to the freehold; there was no sale of
& Go..
it, as an entire chattel; and delivery in that character;
(Madm') Ltd.
aml therefore it could not be treated as an engine sold
and delivered. Nor could the diffe.rent .parts of.it
Venkataraina
.4iyar J.
which were used in the construction, and from time to
time fixed to the freehold, and therefore became part
of it, .be deemed goods sold and delivered, for ther(l
was no ,qontract for the sale of them as moveable
goods; the contract· was in effect that the plaintiff was
to select materials, make them into parts of an engine,
carry them to a. particular place, and put them
together, and fix part to the soil, and so convert them
into a fixed engine on the land itself, so as to pump
the water out of a mine."
·
·
In Seath v. Moore (1 ), the facts were similar to those
in Tripp v. Armitage (').
A firm of engineers,
A. Campbell· & Son, had entered into five agree!lients
with the appellants, T. B. Seath and Co., who werff
ship· builders to supply engines, boilers and machinery
required for vessels to be built by them. Before the
completion of the contracts, A. Campbell & Son b(lcame
bankrupt, and the dispute was as regards the title to
machinery . and· other articles which were in the
possession of the insolvents at the time of their bankrqptcy but which had been made for the pmpose of
being fitted into the ships of the appellants. It was held
by the House of·Lords approving Ti·ipp v. Armitagf( 2 )
•
that there had been no sale of the machinery and
parts as such, and that therefore. they vested in the
assignee. For the appellant, reliance is placed on the
following obse1:vatfons of Lord 'Vatson at p. 380:
"The. English decisions to which I have· referred
appear to me to establish the principle that, where it
appears to be the intention, or in other words the
agreement, of the parties to a contract for building a
ship, that a particular stage of its constructioq, the
vessel, so far as then finished, shall be appropriated to
(r) (1886) It App. Cas. 350.
.
(2) (1839) 4 11. & W. 687; ·150 E.R. 1597.
.
•
.
.·
'
RC.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
the contract of sale, the property of the vessel as soon ·
i958
as it has reached that stage of completion will pass to
..
d
h
TheState.oj
the purchaf'!er, and su b sequent a dd it10ns ma e tot e
Madras
·chattel thus vested in the purchaser will, accessione,
v.
become his property."
Gan:w.• Dunker~ey
It is to be noted that even in this passage the title to
&- Co.,
(Madras) Ltd.
the parts is held to pass not under any contract but on
tke·principle of accretion. The respondents rely on Venkat11rama
the following observations at p. 381 as furnishing the
Aiyar J.
true ground of the decision :
"There is another principle which appears to me
to be deducible from these authorities and to be in itself sound, and that is, that materials provided by
. the builder and portions of the fabric, whether wholly
or partially finished, although intended to be used in
the execution of the contract, cannot be regarded as
appropriated to the contract, or as 'sold', unless they
have been affixed to or in a reasonable sense made
part of the.corpus. That appears to me to have Leen
matter of direct decision by the Court of Exchequer
Chamber in Wood v. Bell (1). In Woods v. Russell(")
the property of a rudder and some c.ordage which the
builder had bought for the ship was. held to have
passed in property to the purchaser as an accessory
of the vessel; but. that decision was questioned by
Lord Chief Justice Jervis, delivering the judgment of
the Court in Wood v. Bell (1), who stated the real
question to be' what is the ship, not what is meant for·
the ship ', and that only the things can pass with the
ship' which have been fitted to the ship and have once
formed part of her, although afterwards removed for
convenience'. I assent to that rule, which appears to
me to be in accordance with the decision of the Court
of Exchequer in Tripp v Armitage (3}".
In Reid v. Macbeth & Gray (4 ), the facts were that a
firm of snip-builders who had agreed t~ build a ship
beca~e bankrupt. At the date of the bankruptcy,
there was lying at railway stations a quantity of iron
and steel-plates which were intended to be.fixed in the
(r) (T856) 6.E. & B. 355; rrg E.R. 669.
(4) [1904] A.C. 223.
(2) (18.2) 5,B. & AL 942; ro6 E.R. 1436.
(3) (1839) 4 iii. & W. 687; 150 E.R. 1597·
:· •' .
•
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
I
ship. The dispute was between the assignee in bank-·
ruptcy and the shipowners as to the title to these
The State~of
.
I t was h eld b .y t h e H.ouse of Lords following
Madras
articles.
v.
Beath v. Moore (1) and m particular the observations
Gannon Dunkerley of Lord Watson at p. 381 that the contract was one
& Co.,
for the purchase of a complete ship, and that under
(Madras) Ltd.
that contract no title to the articles in question passed
Venk•tarama
to the shipowners. The following observations of Lord
z958
1
Aiyor J.
•
~;;;rT1~:e :a::~: ::: c:::::::~e c::t::c: :~:s:::
£lrchase of the ship. There is no contract for the sale
or purchase of these materials separatim ; and unless
you can find a contract for the sale of these chattels
within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, it appears . .
to me that the sections of that Act have rio application
whatever to the case."
·
•
If in a works coritract there is no sale of materials as ·
defined in the Sale of Goods Act, and if an action is ·
not maintainable for th,,i value of those materials as
for price of goods sold and delivered, as held in the
above authorities, then even a disintegration of the
building contract cannot yield any sale such as ean be
. taxed under Entry 48.
The decision in .Love v. Norman Wright (Builders)
Ld. ('), cited by the appellant does notireally militate
against this conclusion. There, the defendants to the
action had agreed with the Secretary of State to supply
black-out curtains and curtain rails, and fix them in a
number of police stations. In their ·turn, the defend. ants had entered into a contraflt with the plaintiffs
that they should prepare those curtains and rails and ·
erect them. The question was whether the sub-contract was one for sale of goods or for work ·and services.
In deciding ~hat it was t~e former, Godd:i-rd L. J.
observed:
" If one orders another to make and fix curtains
at his house the contract is one of sale though work
and labour are involved in the making and fixing, nor
does it matter that ultimately the property was tb pass
to the War Office under the head contract. As .
.
• (1) (1886) II App. Cas. 350.
•
(2) [1944) I k.B. 484, 487 .
-
••
S.C.R.
423
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
r95S
between ' the! plaintiff and the defendants the former
passed the property in the goods
to
the
defendants
who
,
The Stal• of
p;i.ssed ip on to the War 0 ffi ce. '
Mad,,as
It will be seen that in this case there was no question
v.
of .an agreement to supply materials as parcel of a Gannon Dunkerley
'contract to deliver a chattel; the goods to be supplied
& Co.,
·
't
.
d
'l
h'
h
th
b'
t
(Madras)
Ltd.
were t h e cur ams an ra1 s w ic were e su 1ec ·
'
m.atter of the contract itself. Nor was there any ve.nkatarama
question of title to the goods passing as an accretion
Aiyar J.
under the general law, because the buildings where
they had to be erected belonged not to the defendants
but to the Government, and therefore as between the
parties to the contract, title could pass only under their
. contract.
- The contention that a building contract contains
within it all the elements constituting a sale of the
materials was sought ·to be established by referenct to
the form ofthe action, when the claim is in quantum
meruit. It was argued that if a contractor is prevented by the other party to the contract from completing
. the construction he has, as observed by Lord Blackburn in Appleby v. Myres (1 ), a. claim against that
party, that the form of action in such a case is for
work done and materials supplied, as appears frem
Bullen & Leake's Precedents of Pleadings, 10th Ed., at
pp. 285-286, and that that showed that the concept of
sale of goods was latent in a building contract. The
answer to this contention is that a claim for quantum
meruit is a claim for damages for breach of contract,
and that the value of the materials is a factor relevant
•
only as furnishing a basis for} assessing the amount ,of
compensation. That is to s~y, the claim is not for
· price of goods sold and delivered but for damages.
That is also the position under s. 65 of the ~ndian
Contract Act.
Another difficulty in the way of accepting the contention of the appellant as to splitting up .a building.
·contract is that the property in materials used therein
does not pass to the other party to the contract as
movable property. It would so pass if that was the
agreement between the parties. But if there was no
~-
(I) (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651.
.
•
•
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
such agreement and the contract was only to construct
a building, then the materials used therein w.ould beTh e State of
Madras
come the property of the other party to the contract
v.
only on the theory of accretion. The position is thus
Gannon Dunk~rley stated by Blackbur~ J. at pp. 659-660 in Appleby v.
<>-Co.,
Myres (1 ):
,
·
(Madras) Ltd.
" It 'is quite true that materials worked by one
Ven;;:;;;;;a~a into the property of another become part of tha:t pra.Aiyar 1 .
perty. This is equally true, whether it be fixed or
movable property. Bricks buirt into a wall become
part of the house ; thread stitched into a coat which is
under repair, or planks and nails and pitch worked
into a ship under repair, become a part of the coat or
the ship."
When the work to be executed is, as in the present
case, a house, the consti'uction imbedded on the.land
becomes an accretion to it on the principle quicquid
plantatur solo, solo cedit and it vests in the other party
not as a result of the contract but as the owner of the
land. Vide Hudson! on Building Contracts, 7th Edn.,
p. 386. It is argued that the maxim, what is annexed to the soil goes with the soil; has not been accepted
as a correct statement of the law of this country, and
reliance is placed on the following observations in the
Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in
Thakoor Ohunder Poramanick v. Ramdhone Bhuttacharjee (') :
· " We think it should be laid down as a general
rule that, if he who makes the improvement is not a
mere trespasser, but is in possession under any bona
•
fide title or claim of title, he is entitled either to
remove the materials, restoring the land to the state
in which it was before the improvement was made, or
to obtain compensation for the value of the building
if it is allowlold tO remain for the benefit! of the owner
of the soil,-the option of taking the building, or allow ing the removal of the material, remaining with the
owner of the land in those cases in which the building
is not taken down by the builder during the continuance of any estate he may possess."
•
The .. statement of the law was quoted with approva,l
.
,.(1) (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651.
•
(2) (1866) fi W.R. 228 .
-
(
..
S.C.lt.
425
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
by the Privy Council in Beni Ram v. K undan Lall (1)
x9s8. ·
and in Narayan Das Khettry v. Jatindranath (2). But The state of
these decisions are concerned. with rights of persons
Madras
who, not being trespassers, bona fide put up construev.
tions on lands belonging to others, and as to such Gannon Du>Jkerley
persons the authorities lay down that the maxim
& Co.,.
recognised in English law, quicquid plantatur solo, solo (M adra$) Ltd.
adit has no application, and that they have the J!~nkatarama
right to remove the superstructures, and that .the
Aiyar J.
owner of the land shoflld pay compensation if he elects
to retain them. That exception does not apply to
buildings which are constructed in execution of a
works contract, and the law with reference to them is
that the title to the same passes to the owner .o(tpe
land as an accretion thereto. Accordingly, there. can
be l\o question of title .to the materials passing as
movables in favour of the other party to the contract.
It; may be, as was suggested by Mr. Sastri for the
respondents, that when the . thing to be produced
under the contract is moveable property, then any
material incorporated into it might pass as a mov ".
able, and in such a case the conclusion that no
taxable sale will result from the disintegration of the
contract can· be rested only on the ground that th~re
was no agreement to sell the materials a~ such. But
we are concerned here with a building contract, and
in the case of such a"'."contract, the theory that it can
be broken up into its component parts and as regards
one of them it can· be said that there is a sale must
fail both on the grounds that there is no agreement
to sell materials as such, and that property in the.In.
•
does not pass as movables .
./To sum up, the expression" sale of goods" in Entry
148 is a nomen juris, its essential ingredients being an
agreement to sell movables for a price and property
passing therein pursuant to that agr;ement. . In a
building contract which is, as in the present case, one,
entire and indivisible-and that is its t\Orm, there is
no sale. of goods, and it is not within the competence
of tlte Provincial. Legislature ' und'er Entry 48 · to
(1) (1899) L. R. 26 ·r. A.
sB.
(2) (1927) L. R. 54 I. A. 215,
54
•
•
•
'•
426
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
impose a tax on the supply of the materials used in
such
a contract treating it as a sale.
The Slate of
Madras
This conclusion entails that none of the legislatures
v.
constituted under the Government of India Act, 1935,
Gan,n~"'· Dunke.ley was competent in the exercise of the power conferred
& Co.,
by s. 100. to make laws with respect to the matters
(Madras) Ltd.
enumerated in the Lists, to impose a tai( on construcVenkatarama
tion contracts and that before such a law could be
Aiyar J.
enacted it would have .been necessary to have had
recourse to the residual powers of the GovernorGeneral under s. 104 of the Act. And it must be
conceded that a construction which leads to such a
result must, if that is possible, be avoided. Vide
Manikkasundara v. R. S. Nayuau ('). It is also a fact
that acting on the view that Entry 48 authorises it,
the States have enacted laws imposing a tax on the
supply of materials in works contracts, and have 'been
realising it, and their validity has been affirmed by
several High Courts. All these laws were in the
statute book when the Constitution came into1force,
and it is to be regretted that there is nothing in it
which offers a solution to the present question. We
have, .no doubt, Art. 248 and Entry 97 in List I confer>ring residual power of legislation on Parliament,
but clearly it could not have been intended that the
Centre should have the power to tax with respect to
works constructed in the States. In view of the fact
that the State Legislatures had given to the expression " sale of goods " in Entry 48 a wider meaning
than what it has in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, that
•
S~ates with sovereign powers have in recent times
been enacting laws imposing tax' oh the use of materials in the construction of buildings) i and that 'sucji. a
power should more properly be lodged with the States
rlj.th.e:r than the Centre, the Constitution might ha-(,e
given.' ah inclusive definition of" sale " in Entry 54 so
as' to cdve't 'the extended sense. But our duty is to
interpret tlie ·Iaw as we find it,"and having anxiously
considered the ;q'uestion,' we are of 'opinion that there
is rio sale as stich' Of materials used •in a ! building• contract, and that the 'Provincial Legislatures had'. no
competence to impose a tax thereon under Entry 48.
x958
•\1) [1946] F.C.R. 97, 84 •
•
-
s;c.R.
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
427
To avoid misconception, it must be stated that the
z958
above conclusion. has ·reference \·to wo. rks contracts, ~~~ef
which· are entire· and''indivisible,\ aS the contracts ofMJdras
the respQ~dehts JjaV,~ been held by th~' learned Judges
v.
o~ th~ Cqurt b~lo'\V' to ,he. ~ The" se,veral forms which Gannon Dunkerley
such , kinds· of contracts , can ,assume are set out in
"" Co .•
Hudson on Building Contracts; at<p. 165 .. It is pos-. (Madras) Ltd.
sible that .the parties might enter inte> distinct and venkatarama
separate ·contracts, 'one for the: transfer 'of materials
Aiyar J.
for money consideraticm, and the other for payment
of remuneration for services and for work done. In
such a case; there, are really two agreements, though
there is a single instrument embodying them, and the
power of the St.ate to separate the agreement to sell,
from the agreement to do work and render service and
to impose a tax thereon \cannot be questioned, and will
stand untouched by the present judgment.
In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with·
costs.
1
.,
!I
Appeal dismissed.
.
~.,
PANDIT BAN ARSI DAS BRANOT.
v.
April 3.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
& OTHERS
(and connected appeals)
(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, s. K. DAS,
·
A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BOSE J J.)
.
Sales Tax-Building contracts-Tax on supply of materialsV alidity-Statute providing for exemption from t11xation, but also
enabling Government to a111end such exemption by notificationConstitutionality-C entral Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, r947
(C.P. & Berar 2I of 1947), ss. 2, 4{a), 6(1)(2).
;·
· Section 4(a) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax
Act, 19~7, provided that every dealer whose turnover exceeded
certain limits shall be liable to pay tax in accordance with the
provisions of the A~t on all sales effected after the commencement
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