BOMBAY DYEING & MANUFACTURING CO. LTD. versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 December 1957 | [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1122 | 1957 INSC 116
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 December 1957
- Bench
- VIVIAN BOSE*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 167/1954
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1122
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 116
Text of the judgment
1957
D ...mb<riO.
1122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
BOMBAY
DYEING & MANUFACTURING CO., LTD.
[1958}
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS
s.
(BHAGWATI, VEN1'ATARAMA AIYAR,
K. DAS, A
and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.)
K. SARKAR
Labou-r Welfare-Law creating a fund for welfare activities
..,ompanies called upon to pay fines realised from employees
and unpaid accumulation of wages-Constitutional validity9ombay Labour Welfare Fund Act (Bom. XL of 1953), ss. 3(1)
3(2)(a)(b)-Constitution of India. Arts, 31(2) 19(1)(f).
The Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act (Born. XL of 1953)
was enacted by the State Legislature with the object of constituting a fund for the financing of activities for the welfare of
labour ands. 3(1) of the Act provided as follov.;s : "There shall be constituted a fund called the Bombay
Labour Welfare Fund and, notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force, the sums specified.
in sub-section (2) shall be paid into the Fund. 11
Section 3(2) provided, inter alia, as follows:"The Fund shall consist of: (a) all fines realised from the employees;
(b) all unpaid accumulation;"
Notices were served on the appellant's company as also on
other companies similarly situated, ty the Welfare Commissioner, appointed under the Act, calling upon them to remit to
him the fines and unpaid accumulations in their custody. The
appellant in reply questioned the validity of the Act on the
ground that it contravened Art. 31(2) of the Constitution ar.d,
thereafter, filed a Writ petition, out of which the present appeal
arises, which was treated by consent of parties as a test case.
The Judges of the Divi8ion Bench who heard the matter held
that the impugned Act was intra vires, though on different
grounds, and dismissed the petition. The sole point for determination in the appeal v.·•as whether s. 3(1) and sub-els. (a), and
(b) of s. 3(2) of the Act were void as being violative of Art.
~I (2) of the Constitution:
Held, that the unpaid accumulation of wages remaining
with the appellant company was its own property and s. 3(1) of
the impugned Act in so far as it directs the payment of it under
3(2)(b) of the Act contravenes Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and
must be invalid. Article 31(2A) of the Constitution has no
retrospective effect and cannot apply and the matter must be
decided on the law as it 'toad at the date of the Writ petition.
t• •
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1123
19ii7
The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954]
S.C.R. 587 and Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur
Bombay
Dyeing 4J
Spinning anrL Weaving Co. Ltd., [1954] S.C.R. 674, applied.
Maniifactnring
;td.
Assuming that money w1as not property within the ~eaning
Oo.,
of Art. 31(2) and Art. 19(1)(~) applied that Article also would The sU.te of
be of no help to the respondent as the Act could not be sup- Bombay a"'l Ollle't-'
ported under Art. 19(5) of the Constitution.
Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales,
[1950] A.C. 235, held inapplicable.
The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar
Singh of Darbhanga, [1952] S C.R. 889, considered.
The impugned Act had not the effect of substituting the
Board as the creditor in place of the employee nor could it be
said to be a legislation in respect of abandoned property.
Altho4gh by defining 'unpaid accumulation' in the way it
did the Legislature ol:viously intended that only such wages
of .the employees as were time-barred should be taken by the
State, it being well settled that the law of limitation only bars
the remedy but does not extinguish the debt, SS. 3q}, 5(2} and
17 of the Act must be held to have the effect of transferring to
the Board the debts due by the appellant to its employees free
from the bar of limitation.
Such a transfer can be valid only if it gives a complete discharge to the employer from the debts. If it does not, the Act
must be held to infringe Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. The·
Act contains no provision granting a discharge to the debtor.
The bar of limitation prescribed either by s. 15 of the Payment
of Wages Act (Act IV of 1936) or Art. 102 of the Limitation Act
or the provisions of s. 56 of the Contract Act, assuming they
applied, could not give such a discharge.
Where the· Statute deals w'ith rights arising out of a· contract and interferes with the rights of one of the parties to it,
it must affect those of the other parties to it as well. Consequently, the impugned Act wh'ich takes over the rights of the
employees in respect of wages due to them without compensation and is, therefore unconstitutional, as contravening Art.
19(l)(f) or Art. 31(2)' of the Constitution, would l:e unconstitutional as regards the appellant as w~ll.
The purpose of a legislation relating to abandoned property
must be, in the first instance, to safeguard the property in the
interest of the true owner and thereafter, in absence of any
claim, the taking over of it by the State. The impugned Act
which vests the property absolutely in the State w'ithout any
regard for the claims of the true owner cannot be said to be a.
law relating to abandoned preperty.
1124
Sul'REl\lE COliRT REPOHTS
[1958]
Connecticut Mutul Life Insurance Company v. Moore, 333
U.S. 541, Anderson National. Bank v. I.tuckett, 321 U.S. 233 and
BamiAy Dyeillfl J, Standard Oil Company v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, referred
MaunfatJiu,rlnf
to.
Co., Lid.
v.
As regards the fines mentioned in s. 3(2)(a) of the Act the
TM.~lal• of
appellant must be held to be a bare trustee under s. 8 of the
l!om/my rind Other• Wages Act having no beneficial interest in fund created by
that Act, and, consequently, ss. 3(1) and 3(2)(a) of the Act cannot contravene Art. 31 (2) or Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.
Nor could it be said that the Act by extending the circle of
beneficiaries had encroached on the rights of the employees of
the appellant. These sections must, therefore, be held to be
constitutionally valid.
j[J.51
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 167
of 1954.
Appeal from the Judgment and decree dated September
14, 1953, of the Bombay High Court in Misc. Application
No. 267 of I 953.
R. J. Ko/ah, B. Narayanaswamy and J. B. Dadachanji,
for the appellants.
H. M. Seervai, Advocate General for the State of Bom·
bay and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
1957. December 20. The following Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
.,.....1n.... Company
VENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-The appellant is a limited
incorporated under the Indian Companies Act,
Aili"' J.
1879. It is carrying on business in the manufacture of textiles,
and owns three factories called Spring Mills, Textile Mills
and Bombay Dye Works, all of which are situate in Bombay.
In its balance sheet for the year 1951, it has shown as one
of its liabilities a sum of Rs. 1,65,731-1-0 under the heading
"Unclaimed wages". This amount is made up of wages earned by the workmen in the factories but remaining undrawn
by them, and reJ?resents accumulations from year to year
ever since the formation of the Company which, it is stated.
was about the year 1880.'The dispute in this appeal mainly
relates to this amount
In 1953, the Legislature of the State of Bombay enacted
the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act (Born. XL of 1953)
(hereinafter referred to as the Act). and it came into force
on June 4. 1953. We may, at this stage refer to the relevant
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1125
provisions of the Act, as it is their, validity that is t11e main
1 9s;
point for our determination in this appeal. The preamble to BombQy DtJ.<,.g '*
the Act recites that "It is expedient to constitute a Fund for ~':.~f::.'""'
the financing of: activities to promote ~elfare of la~~u.r !~ TlleB~ttof
the State of Bombay and for conductmg such act1v1tqes . Born/Jay 11nd OtAtrt
Section 2 is the definition section; sub-s. (2) defines an "em- Venkatarama
ployee" as meaning "any person who is employed for hire
.A.iyar J.
or reward to do any work, skilled or unskilled, manual or
clerical, in an establishment". "Employer" is defined in sub-s.
(3) as meaning "any person who employs either directly or
through another person either on behalf of himself or any
other person. one or more employees in an establishment
and includes-in a factory any person named under s. 7(i)(f)
of the Factories Act. 1948, as the manager". Sub-seetion (10)
defines "Unpaid accumulations" as meaning "all payments
due to the employees but not made to them within a period
of three years from the date on which they became due whether before or after the commencement of this Act including
the wages and gratuity legally payable". "Wages" is defined
in sub-s. (11) as meaning "all remuneration capable of being
expressed in terms of money which would, if the terms of
the contract of employment, express or implied were fulfilled.
be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment: ........... ".
Then, there is s. 3, which runs as follows:
(l 1. "There shall be constituted a fund called the Bombay Libour Welfare fund and, not withstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the sums
specified in sub-section (2) shall be paid into the Fund.
~1. The Fund shall consist of-
la) all fines. realised from the employees;
U,J all unpaid accumulations;
(c) any voluntary donations;
(d) any fund transferred under sub-section (5) of sec. tion 7; and
<e) any sum borrowed under section 8.
1126
19fJ7
Bcmobuy v_qdng &.
Manufacrnri"'J
Oo., Ltd.
v.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
(3). The sums specified in sub-section (2) shall be co11ect.
ed by such agencies and in such manner and' the accounts of
the Fund shall be maintained and audited in such manner as
may be prescribed."
JJo•~'/,:Y ~":J,' f/,h.,., Section 7~1) provides that "the Fund shall v~st in and be hel~
and apphed by the Board as Trustees sub1ect to the prov1Venkatarama sions and for the purposes of this Act."
.'l•!JU·f' J.
.
.
.
.
Sub-section (2) of s. 7 1s very matenal, and 1s as follows:
"Without prejudice to the generality of sub-section (I)
the moneys in the Fund may be utilized by the Board to
defray expenditure on the following:
(a) community and social education centres including
reading rooms and libraries;
(b) community necessities;
(c) games and sports;
(d) excursions, tours and holiday homes;
(e) entertainment and other forms of recreations;
(f) home industries and subsidiary occupations for
women and unemployed persons;
(g) corporate activities of a social nature;
(h) cost of administering the Act including the salaries
and allowances of the staff appointed for the purposes of the Act; and
(i) such other objects as would in the opinion of the
State Government improve the standard of living and
ameliorate the social conditions of labour:
Provided that the Fund shall not be utilized in financing any measure which the employer is required under any
law for the time being in force to carry out;
Provided further that unpaid accumulations and fines
shall be paid to the Board and be expended by it under this
Act notwithstanding anything contained in the Payment of
Wages Act, 1936 (IV of 1936), or any other law for the time
being in force".
Section 11 provides for the appointlnent of an officer called
the Welfare Commissioner, and defines his powers and duties.
Section 17 enacts that,
"Any sum payable into the Fund under this Act shall.
without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be recover-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1127
able on behalf of the Board as an arrear of land revenue."
1115'!
Section 19 authorises the State Government to make rules Bo;/'ay tyeinv &:
to carry out the purposes of this Act, Section 23 provides
o:~ ~~"nu
~
~
Tlie State "f
(IV Brm1bay anJ OtkuB
"In section 8 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936
of 1936), to sub-section (8) the following shall be added, before the Explanation, namely:
"but in the case of any factory or establisl).ment to which
the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1953 (Born. XL of
1953), applies all such realisations shall be paid into the Fund
constituted under the said Act."
Rules were framed by the State of Bombay in exercise
of the powers conferred by s. 19, and they were published on
June 30, 1953. The material rules are Nos. 3 and 4, which
are as follows :
3. "Payment of fines and of unpaid accumulations by
·employer-(1) Within fifteen days from the date on which
the Act shall come into force in any area, every employer in
such area shall pay by cheque, money order or cash to the
Welfare Commissioner-
(a) all fines realised from the employees before the said
date and remaining unutilized on that date; and
(b) all unpaid accumulations held by the employer on
the aforesaid date.
(2) The employer shall along with such payment submit
a statement to the Welfare Commissioner giving full particulars of the amounts so paid.
(3) Thereafter, all fines realised from the employees and
all unpaid accumulations during the quarters ending 31st
March. 30th June, 30th September and 31st December shall
be paid by the employer in the manner aforesaid to the Welfare Commissioner on or before the 15th of April, 15th of
July. 15th of October and 15th of January succeeding such
quarter and a statement giving particulars of the amo.unts so
paid shall be submitted by him along with such payment to
the Welfare Commissioner.
ve.;;;;;rama
Aiyar J.
Il28
1957
Bomwy
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
4. Notice for payment of fines and unpaid accumulations
Dyeing <bbY Welfare Commi.lsioner-The Welfare Commissioner may,
1~':{";i~rlng
after making such enquiries as he may deem fit, and after
v.
calling for a report from the Inspector, if necessary, serve a
Th£ Blatt. of
•
1
.
f fi nes rea 1·1sed
Bombay and Others nol!ce on any emp oyer to pay any portion o
Venhltarama
Aiyar J.
from the employees or unpaid accumulations held by him
which the employer has not paid in accordance with rule 3.
The employer shall comply with the notice within 14 days of
the receipt thereof."
On July 7, 1953, the Welfare Commissioner, Bombay
appointed under s. 11 of the impugned Act, sent a notice to
the appellant· and other companies similarly situate, inviting
their attention to the relevant provisions of the Act and of the
rules and calling upon them to remit the fines and unpaid
accumulations remaining with them. in accordance with the
directions contained therein. To this. the appellant sent a
reply on the same date impugning the validity of the Act
as being in violation of the provisions of Art. 31(2), and
followed it up by filing the writ petition out of which the
present appeal arises. it being treated by consent of parties as
a test case.
The application was heard by Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar
J. who held that the impugned Act was intra vires but on
difierent grounds. The learned Chief Justice was of the opinion
that, on its true construction, the Act merely substituted the
Board as a creditor in the place of the! employees, that there
was not" taking of property, and that, in consequence, there
was no contravention of Art. 31(2). Tendolkar J. held that
"unpaid wages" were unquestionably moneys which belonged
to the employer and that he was being deprived of them, but
there was no taking of possession or acquisition of property
within Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution but a deprivation of
moneys, and as it was done under the authority of law, it
fell within the protection of Art. 31 (!). In the result, the
petition was dismissed. The learned Judges. however, granted
a certificate under Art. 132. and that is how the appeal comes
before us.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1129
The sole point for. determination in this appeal is whe19.;7
;ther s. 3 (1) and sub-els. (a) and (b) of s. 3 (2) of the Act are JJ0111bay Dy~lno a.
void as contravening the provisions of the Constitution; but Jto~~;ac'u'ti'J~
to decide it, we have to consider quite a number of questions
v.
. have been raised
.
. the argumen ts be- Bombay
Tlt.e State of
which
and d'iscussed m
and 011,er•
fore us. It will be convenient to deal with the two items, fines r enL-alarama
realised from the employees, s. 3(2)(a) and unpaid accumuA;yar J.
Jations, s. 3(2) (b) separately, as the issues involved in the de.termination of their validity are different.
Taking first unpaid accumulations, s. 3(2) (b), the contention of Mr. Kolah for the appellant is that .s. 3(1) is repugnant to Art. 31 (2) inasmuch as it deprives the employers of
moneys belonging to them without payment of any compensation merely on the ground that they represent wages due
to the employees. Now, money is undoubtedly property, and
it cannot. be disputed that a person who has money does not
-0ease to be its owner merely by reason of the fact that he
owes debts in satisfaction of which it may have to be applied.
Until the creditor takes appropriate proceedings under the
law for the realisation of his debt and the title of the debtor
is extinguished in those proceedings, the title to the property
continues in the debtor. Mr. Kolah is therefore clearly right in .
his contention that the liability of the appellant to pay wages
to the employees does not ipso facto extinguish its title to
the moneys belonging to it even pro tanto, and that the effect,
therefore, of s. 3(1) is to take away money belonging to it.
Then, the question is whether such a provision is hit by Art.
31(2) on the ground that it is acquisition or taking possession
of property for a public purpose without payment of compensation. It is common ground that the taking is for a public
purpose. The point in dispute is whether what is sought to
be done under s. 3 is acquisition or taking possession of property within Art. 31(2). Tendolkar, J., answered this question
against the appellant, because, in his view, Art. 31(2) would
apply only if there was a transfer of title to or beneficial interest in the amounts to the State, that s. 3(1) effected neither,
L/P(D)3SOI-7
1130
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
that it did deprive the employers of their moneys, but that
Bombay Dyeing "' fell under Art. 31 (I) and not Art. 31 (2), and that as that was
M :~'.ftrng
done under the authority of law, it could not be questioned.
v.
Subsequent to this decision, this Court had occasion t<l'
consider the true scope of Art. 31(2) in relation to Art. 31(1)
in The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose(') and in
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. T~ SholafJJ'& Sl!inning
and Weaving Co. Ltd('). In The State of West Bengal v.
Subodh Gopal Bose('), the majority of the learned Judges
took the view that Arts. 31 (!) and 31(2l were not mutually
exclusive, that it was not an essential requisite of acquisition
under Art. 31(2) that there should be a transfer of title to
the State, that deprivation of property and substantial abridgement of the rights of the owner were also within Art.
31(2), .and that a law which produced those results must, in
order to be valid, satisfy the conditions laid down in that
Article. Das, J., (as he then was) differed from this view. and
held that the contents of the two provisions were distinct,
that while Art. 31 (I) had reference to the "police power" of
the State, Art. 31(2) dealt with the power of "eminent domain". In Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholap,ur
Spinning and Weaving Co.(') the majority of the Judges
again reiterated the view expressed in The State of West
Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose(') that Arts. 31(1) and 31(2)
covered the same ground, and that substantial interference
with rights to property would be within the operation of Art.
31 (2).
0
The SW. of
Bombay and Other.
Venkatarama
.Aiyar J.
On these decisions, it should follow that s. 3 of the impugned Act is bad as infringing Art. 31(2), in that it deprives
the appellant of its moneys without giving any compensation. Mr. Seervai, however, resists this contention on the
strength of Art. 3 H2A), which was introduced by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. It is as follows.
"Where a law does not provide. for the transfer of the
ownership or right to possession of any property to the State
or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall
('l [19!i4] S.C.R. 587.
I') [1954) S.C.R. 674.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1131
not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or
1as1
requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives Bornbo11 -ii~;ng ~
any person of his property."
·
Jla••Jaeturing
Oo. Ltd.,
....
The argument is that the thet>ry that acquisition in Art. 31(2) 2'Aa Blah ~
8
11
is not confined to cases of transfer of ownership to the State,
~ IAer,
and that even deprivation of property would fall within it, Ve",!';14';."~
which is the baisis of the deoisions in The State of West Ben1JG
gai v. Subodh Gopal Bose(') and in Dwarkadas Slirinivas of
Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.(')
can, in view of the above amendment, no longer be accepted
as correct, and that those decisions therefore require to be
reconsidered in the light of the new Art. 31(2A). But-it is not
disputed that this provision has no retrospective operation
and that the rights of the parties must. be decided in accord·
ance with the law as on the date of the writ application, and
that on the provisions of the Constitution as they stood on
that date and as interpreted in The Staie of West Bengal v..
Subodh Gopal Bose(') and Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay
v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.(1), s. 3 (l)
of the impugned Act would be obnoxious to Art. 31(2). This
should be sufficient to conclude this question in favour of
the appellant, but the respondents contend that s. 3(1) is not
within the prohibition of Art. 31(2), because it operates only
on money, and money is not property for purposes of that
Article.
°""'°
There is considerable authority in America that the
power .of eminent domain does nt>t extend to the taking of
money, the reason being that compensation which is to be ·
paid in respect of money can only be money, and that, therefore, in substance it is a forced loan. In The State of Bihar v.
Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbl!angu('), this
view was adopted by Mahajan J. at pages 943-944, by Mukherjea J. at page 961 and by Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. at
pages 1015 to 1018. It is airgued for the respondents that the
position under Art. 31 (2) is the same as in America, as the
(') [1954] S.C.R. 587.
(') (1954] S.C.R. 674.
(') [1952] S.C.R. 889.
.
ll32
SUPRE:\IE COURT HEPOHTS
[1958]
proV1S10n therein that either the amount of the compensa.r. tion should be fixed or the principles on which and the manMan•Jaduri"11
ner in which compensation is tt> be determined should be
co., Lid., specified, involves that what is taken is not money. It is arr1,. s;;. of gued, on the other hand, for the appellant that the latest
.B""'""Y allci Otlltr•trends in American law show, as was observed by Das J. (as
Ve...tala••ma
he then was), at pages 984-985 in The State of Bihar v. Maha.Aiyur J.
ra;adhirai Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga('), a departure from the view held in earlier authorities that moneys
and choses in action could not be the subject of "eminent
domain"; and that, in any case, the principles of American
law should not be applied in the interpretation of the provisions of our Constitution. If the contention of the respbndents
is to be accepted, the question naturally arises what protection a person has in respect of moneys belonging to him if
he can be deprived bf them by process of legislation. The
answer of Mr. Seervai is that that protection is to be sought
in Art. 19(1)(f), that the word "property" therein has a wider
connotation that what it bears in Art. 31(2) and includes
money, and that the citizens have the right to hold tr.oney
subject only to law such as is saved J?y Art. 19(5). In support bf this position, he relied on the decision in Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The State of Aimer(') in which this Court
applied Art. 19(6) in pronouncing on the validity of the
Minimum Wages Act (XI of 1948) requiring the employers
to pay wages at a rate not less than that to be fixed by the
Government
195?
11ombt>y Dyeing
Assuming that the correct position is what the respbndents contend it is, the question that has still to be determined is whether the impugned Act could be supported under
Art. 1905. There was some discussion before us as to the
scope of this provision, the point of the debate being whether the words "imposing reasonable restriction" would cover
a legislation, which not merely regulated the exercise of the
rights guaranteecl by Art. 19(l)(f) but totally extinguished
them, and whether a law like the present one which deprived
the owner bf his properties could be held to fall within that
provision. It was argued that a law authorising the State to
(') [1952] S.C.R. 889.
(') [1955) 1 S.C.R. 752.
S.C.R.
SUP.REY.IE COURT REPORTS
1133
seize and destroy diseased cattle, noxious -Orugs and the like,
I96T
could not be brought within Art. 19(5) if the word 'restric- Bombay Du•ing "'
tion' was to be narrowly construed, and that accordingly the ~an•'facJZ:J"fl
power to restrict must be held to include, in appropriate
o., v. ·
cases, the power to prohibit the exercise of the right. That BO:/:,,.~
01
view does find support in the observations of Lord Porter
- -
::::f" °/.,,.
.
Commonwealth of Austraira v. Bank of New South
Wales('); but the present legislation cannot be sustained even
lll
on the above interpretation of the word 'restriction', as s.
3( l) of the Act deals with moneys and money cannot be
likened to diseased cattle or noxious drugs so as to attract
the exercise of police power under Art. 19(5). It appears to
us that whether we apply Art. 31(2) or Art. 19(5), the impugned Act cannot be upheld, and it must be struck down.
unless we accept the other contentions which have been
urged for the respondents in support of its validity. Those
contentions are firstly. that the Act merely substitutes the
Board as the creditor in the place of the employees, and that
ss. 3 and 17 merely prescribe the mode in which the obligation is to be enforced and-that was the ground on which
Chagla C. J. based his judgment; and secondly, that the impugn~d legislat!on is one in respect of abandoned property,
and it is not open to attack as contravening either Art.
19(l)(f) or Art. 31(2). It is those oontentions that now fall to
be considered.
As regards the first contention, the question is whether
on a fair construction of the provisions of the impugned Act,
it is possible to spell out a substitution of creditors. When an
employee has done h!s work, the amount of wages earned
by him becomes a debt due to him from the employer, and it
is property which could be assigned 'under the law. If the employee had assigned the debt to the Board constitUted under
the Act, the latter would be entitled to recover it from the employer. And what could be done by act of parties can also
be done by legislation. What we have to see, therefore, is
whether on the provisions of the statute it could be held that
(
1
)
(1950] A.C. 235, 311.
Venkatasa1111J
Aiyar J.
1134
1957
SUPRKME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
there is a statutory transfer of the wages earned by the work-
Bomba D ei"fl "' man to the Board. Section 5 of the Act vests the amounts men-
M•~uJdituring tioned in s. 3(2) in, the Bo11rd, and s. 3(1) directs that those
Oo., £14,
amounts should be paid by the employer to the Board. CounTh• slate of sel for the appellant contends that there are in the Act no
Bombay and OtMra words of transfer of the debts to the Board, and that there
is only a provision for pavment
of the amounts. But this is
Vtnbitarama
J
.Aiyar J.
taking tbo narrow a view of the true scope of those provisions. Looking at the substance of the matter, we are of opinion that s. 3(1) and s. 5(1) do operate to transfer the debts
due to the employees, to the Board.
It will be observed that the definition of "unpaid accumulations" takes in only payments due to the employees
remaining unpaid within a period of three years after they
become due. The intention of the Legislature obviously was
that claims of the employees which are within time should
be left to be enforced by them in the ordinary course of law,
and that it is only when they become time-barred and useless
to them that the State should step in and take them over. On
this, the question arises for consideration whether a debt
which is time-barred can be the subject of transfer, end if it
can be, how it can benefit the Board to take it over if it cannot be realised by process of law. Now. it is the settled law
of this country that the statute of Lim;tation only bars the
remedy but does not extinguish the debt. Section 28 of the
Limitation Act provides that when the period limited to a
person for instituting a suit for possession of any property
has expired, his right to such property is extinguished. And
the authorities have held-and rightly, that when the property is incapable of possession, as for example, a debt, the
section has no application, and lapse of time does not extingu'sh the right of a person thereto. Under s. 25(3) cf the
Contract Act, a barred debt is good consideration for a fresh
promise to pay the amount. When a debtor makes a payment without any direction as to now it is to be appropiated, the creditor has the right to appropriate it towards a
barred debt. (Vi de s. 60 of the O>ntract Act). It has also
been held that a ~reditor is entitled to recover the debt from
8.C.R.
SUPRE~IE COURT Rl~PORTS
1135
the surety, even though a suit on it is barred against the
1967
principal debtor. Vide Mahant Singlt v. U. Ba Yi('), Subra· Bombay Dyeing "
m~ia Aiyar v. Gopala Aiyar('), and Dil Muhammad v. Saiti ~:~~~J,~;.ng
Das('). And when a creditor has a lien over goods by way of
v.
·
1
h
f
h
J'
e...
b
·
•
'l'lie
StateOl!it.r•
of
·security for a oan, e can en orce t e 1en tvr o taming Bolllbay and
satisfaction of the debt, even though an action thereon
would be time-barred. Vide Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala
Dasi('). That is also the law in England. Vide Halsbury's .
Laws of England (Hailsham's Edition), Vol. 20, page 602,.
para. 756 and the observa~ions of Lindley L.J. in Carter v.
White(') and of Cotton L. J. in Curwen v. Milburn('). In
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 34, page 314, the Jaw is thus
stated.
·
"A majority of the courts adhere to the view that a
statute of limitations, as distinguished from a statute which
prescribes conditions precedent to a right of lM::tion, does not
go to the substance of a right, but only to the remedy. It
does not extinguish the debt or preclude its enforcement,
unless the debtor chooses to avail himself of the defence and
specially pleads it. An indebtedness does not lose its character as such merely because it is barred; it still affords suffi·cient consideration to suppbrt a promise to pay, and gives a
creditor an insurable interest."
, In Corpus Juris Secundum. Vol. 53, page 922, we have the
following statement of the law:
"The general rule, at least with respect to debts or money
.demands, is that a statute of limitation bars, or runs against,
.the remedy and does not discharge the debt or extinguish or
.impair the right, obligation, or cause of action."
The position then is that under the law a debt subsists
notwithstanding that its recovery.is barred by limitation, and
no argument has been addressed to us by the appellant that
the transfer of such a debt is invalid; and indeed it could' not
be, in view bf the provisions in the impugned Act, which re( ') (1939) L.R. 66 I.A. 198. (') (1910) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 308.
A.LR. 1927 Lah. 396. (') 192~\ I.LR 48 Cal, 817, 823
{') (1883,) .25 Ch. D. 666. 672. (') (1889) 42 Ch. D. 424, 434.
1
(: )
1136
1967
SUPHK\IE COl;RT Rl<ll'ORTS
(195 8}
lease the debts due to the employees from the bar of limita-
Bom/Jay Dyeing ,, tion. Section 3( [) provides that payment shall be made of the-
Ma0:("°£':i."!l
amounts specified in sub-cl. (2) "notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force." A
B~y 1;::::; 0 ;'l,. similar provision is again enacted in the second proviso te>
sub-s. (2) of s. 5 that "unpaid accumulations" and fines shall
Vnl:nla.rama
.Aiyar J,
be paid to the Board .. notwithstanding anything contained
in the Payment of Wag~s Act, 1936, or any other law for the
time being in force." One of those laws is the law of limitation, and the effect of these provisions is to suspend limitation in respect of the claims to which s. 3(2) relates. To dispel any doubt as to whether it wa·s competent to the Legislature of the Bombay State to modify the provisions of the
Limitation Act. it should be stated that limitation is •I topic
enumerated in the Concurrent List, being Entry 13 in List
III in Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and under Art.
254(2). the State Legislature can enact a law modifying the
Central Act, provided it is reserved for consideration by the
President and assented to by him, and that has been done in
the present case. Coming to the impugned Aot, there is one
other provision therein to which reference must be made.
Section 17 provides that without prejudice to other modes of
recovery, the sums payable to the fund under s. 3 may be recovered as arrears of land revenue. This is a provision which
is generally made when amounts are due and payable to the·
State, and Mr. Kolah concedes, that if the impugned law is
otherwise vMid, it cannot be said to be bad by reason of this
section. On the above analysis, there oannot be any doubt
that the effect of the relevalllt provisions of the Act is to transfer to the Board the debts due by the appellant to its employees free from the bar of limitation.
'v.
The question still remains whether there has been a substitution of creditors,. and that can only be, if the debt due
to the employee is discharged and in its place there is substituted the debts in favour of the Board. If, however, the employer is not relea!sed from his liability to the employee, then
the effect of s. 3(1) is omy to create in the Board a statutory
S.C.H.
·SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1137
creditor in addition to the creditor under the contract of em11JJ1
ployment, and there can be no question of substitution. Mr.Bombay Dyei1'il
Seervai ·agrees that if the Act does .not operate
to discharge Manufacturing
.
Go., Ltd.
the employer .from his obligations to the employees in respect
,v.
·
b
h
Id
b
The
!:!late
of
of t he wages d ue to them, then tt must e e to e uncon~ BoinJJav a7id Otloera
stitutional as infringing Art. 19(1 )(0, because his contention
·
·
l 'enkataram.o.
that the effect of the Act was only to take the property of the
Aiyar j.
employer in discharge of its obligations could not then be
maintained.
The real point for determination, therefore, is whether
on payment of the amounts in accorda!nce with s.3(1) of the
Act, the appellant gets a discharge of his obligation to the
employees in respect of wages due to them. The Act does not
contain any provision to that effect, and the abs6nce thereof
has been strongly relied on by the appellant as showing that
no substitu•ion of creditors was intended. In answer to this
contention, Mr. Seervai urges firstly that though the Act does
not, in terms, provide for the discharge of the appellant on
payment of the amount under s. 3(1), that is the result of the
provisions of the Payment of Wages Act (Act IV of 1936).
hereinafter referred to as the Wages Act, and secondly, that
the effect of s. 3(1) of the Act is to render the contract of empl<>yment void under s. 56 of the Contract Act, and the appel·
lant is thereby discharged from his obligations thereunder.
We shall now examine both these conten,ions.
To appreciate the first contention, it is necessary to refer
to the relevant provisions of the Wages Act. Section 2(vi) defines "wages" in terms which comprehend whatever falls
within the definition of that word in s. 2(11) of the impugned
Act. Section 3 casts on the employer the responsibility for
payment of wages to persons employed by him. Section 4
provides for the fixing of wage per;ods, which, however, are
not lo exceed one month. Under s. 5, the wages have to be
paid before the expiry of ten days after the last day of the
wage period in case of employees who continue in service
and in the case of those whose employment has been terminated, within· the second working day of such termination.
11as
in:;1
SUPIU<:ME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
Section J5 provides that where am unauthorised deduction
iBombay Dyoing 4' has been made from the wages of an employed person or pay.
ment of wages has been delayed, such person may apply to
the authority appointed under the Act for a direction for pay~ ht Statg o/
Bomliay ,..d 0 1,,.,,. ment of the amount deducted or the delayed wages, as the
case may be, together with payment of compensation. Such
Venb:Haranet1
Aiyar J.
application has ro be made within six months from the date
on which the deductions were made or the date on which the
payment of wages became due, and by Act No. 62 of 1953
of the Bomb~ Legislature, the period of six months has
been enlarged to one year. There is a proviso ro this section
that an application thereunder can be made after the period
prescribed therein "when the applicant satisfies the authori·
ty that he had sufficient cause for not making the application
within such "period." Section 22(d) of the Act provides that.
Manufacluring
Oo.,Ltd.
m
•·
"No Court shall entertain any suit for the recovery of
wage of any deduction from wages in so far as the sum so
·claimed could have been recovered by an application under
·section J 5 ...... "
Now, the argument of the respondents is that under the
provisions aforesaid, an employee has to prosecute his claim
for unpaid wages before the authority within the time limit·
·ed bys. 15 of the Wages Act. which is one year in the State
of Bombay, that if he fails to do so it becomes uncnforce·
able, and a suit with respect thereto under the general law is
also barred: The result is, it is contended, that having regard
to the definition of "unpaid accumulations" as meaning all
payments due to the employees but not made to them with·
'in a period of three years, the employer runs no risk of being
called upon to pay to the employee what has been paid by him
to the Board under s. 3(1), and that therefore a payment under
the impugned Act gives him what is, for all practical purpOses, a good discharge. This argument rests on the supposi·
tion that so far as unpaid wages are concerned, the operation
of the Wages Act is co-extensive with that of the impugned
Act. But that clearly is erroneous. It is true that wages as
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1139
.
de whatever are wages
defined in the Wages Act would mclu
_1957
under the impugned Act. But s. 1(6) limits the application o'l.Bomb11y Dyeing .r.
. are beIow Rs . -?OQ f or a .Manufacturing
the Wages Act to wages wh1ch
co., Ltd.
wage period. In respect of wages of Rs. 200 ?r more'. i~ is 'I'M 8~ of
the general law that would apply, and the period of hm1ta-Bom00y and Otha-a
tion is not one year under s. IS of the Wages Act but three Vtnl.;ntarama
years under Art. 102 of the Limitation Act, which period is
Aiyar J.
capable of extension under the provisions of the Limitation
Act beyond the three years mentioned in s. 2(10) of the impugned Act. Then, it is tq be noted that under the proviso to
s. 15(1), the authority has the power to admit a petition even
beyond the period mentioned there, if sufficient cause is
shown therefor. To this, the reply of the respondents is that
as on the terms of s. 3(1) and the second proviso to s. 5(2)
they are to take effect notwithstanding anything contained in
the Wages Act or any other law, they override the power conferred by the proviso to s. 15(1) of the Wages Act or the provisions of the Limitation Act.
Even as regards s. 22 of the Wages Act. there is divergence of judicial opinion as to its true scope. In Simpalax
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Alla-Ud-Din('), it was held that if
there was any bona fide dispute as to the amount payable, the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred by s. 22. On the
other hand, it was held in Bhagwat Rai v. Union of India(')
that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred, even
if there was a bona fide ~spute, and that the bar under s.
22(d) was absolute, and certain observations in Modern Mills
Ltd. v. Mangalvedhekar(') and A. R. Sarin v. B. C. Patil(')
were relied on. as supporting this contention. Even if Mr.
'Seervai is right in his contention that the law is corre9tly laid
down in Bhagwat Rai v. Union of India(') and that the decision in Simpalax Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Alla-Ud-Din(')
jg wrong, the fact remains that claims in respect of unpaid
wages to which the impugned Act applies must, in view of
:s. 1(6) of the Wages Act, fall at least in part outside the pur(1) A.I.R. 1945 Lah. 195.
f'), I.L.R. 1953 Nag. 433.
(') A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 342, 145.
(') AI.R. 1951 Bom. 423.
1140
1957
Bombay Dy,ing
.Mantif1icturinr;
Oo., LUI.
&
SUPREME COlJHT REPORTS
(1958)
view of that Act, and the protection afforded by s. 15 of that
Act will not be available with reference thereto .
lt is next contended that even if the impugned Act does
7•1., State of not protect the employer in respect of unpaid wages which
Bombay and 011..,. fall outside the Wages Act, it should be upheld in so far as
Venkatarama
Aiya' J.
it relates to those claims which fall within the purview of
that Act, as the bar of limitation under s. 15 of that Act is
sufficient safeguard to the employer against being made liable
at the instance of the employees for wages which had been paid.
to the Board. And it is also contended that even with reference to claims for unpaid wages which fall outside the Wages
Act the impugned Act should be held to be valid if such
claims are barred under the provisions of the Limitation Act.
In other words, the contention is that the impugned Act
should be upheld in respect of that portion of the unpaid
wages the recovery of which by the employees is barred by
limitation whether under s. 15 cf the Wages Act or the Limitation Act.
The impogned Act, it should be noted, merely enacts
that all unpaid accumulations should be paid to the Board. It
makes no distinction between claims for unpaid wages which
are barred by limitation and those which are not so barred.
It is contended for the respondents that when the subjectmatter of a law comprehends distinct matters as to some of
which it is unconstitutional and bad, it should nevertheless be
upheld as regards the others, if those others form a distinct
category, and that this principle applies not only when a
classification into distinct categories appears on the face of
the law but also when it exists in fact. Now, the doctrine of
severability in application is well-established in our law (vide
The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara('). The State of Bombay
v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.('), and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India('), and the principles applicable
have been stated fully in Chamarbaugwalla's Case('). But assuming on the basis of the above authorities that we can con(') (1951] S.C.R. 682.
(") [1957] S,C.R. 930.
(') (1953] S.C.R. 1069.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S
1141
fine the operation of the impugned Act to those claims of un1957
paid wages which are barred by limitation, the question still Bombay Dr1eing "'
. whet l1er t he 1mpugne
.
d Act gives
.
1s
a d'1scharge to th e empIo- JlanufrLcturing
oo., Ltd.
yer even in respect of those claims; for, as already stated, the T v;
.
. ts
. establ'1- Bombay
lie .Slate of
operation of Art. 19(l)(f) can be avoided
onIy t'f. 1t
rmd 011ier8
shed that there has been a substitution of creditors, which I'enkatara111a
can only be if and when the employer gets a discharge from
Aiyar J.
those obligations to the employees. The point to be decided
therefore is whether the effect of the bar of limitation is to
discharge the employer from liability to the employees.
It has been already mentio~ed that when a debt becoltJes
time-barred it does not become extinguished but only unenforceable in a court of law .. Indeed, it is on that footing that
there can be a statutory transfer .of the debts due to the employees, and that is how the Board gets title to them. If then
a debt subsists even after-it is barred by limitation, the employer does not get,-in law, a discharge therefrom. The
modes in which an obligation under a contract becomes dis·charged are well-defined, and the bar of limitation is not one
of them. The following passages in Anson's Law of Con.tract, 19th Edition, page 383, are directly in point:
"At Common Law lapse of time does not affect contractual rights. Such a right is of a permanent and indestructible
character, unless either from tile nature of tile contract, or
from its terms, it be limited in point of duration.
"But though the right possesses this permanent character, the remedies arising from its violation are withdrawn
after a certain lapse of time; interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium. The remdies are barred, though the right is not extinguished."
And if the law requires that a debtor should get a discharge
before he can be compelled to pay, that requirement is not
satisfied if he is merely told that in the normal course he is
not likely to be exposed to action by the creditor.
That this distinction is not purely academical but is of
practical importance will be seen, when regard is had to the
1142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958J
1951
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Under that Act,
there is no period of limitation prescribed for referring a dispute for adjudication by a tribunal. Even when a claim for
v.
wages falls within the purview of the Wages Act and an apThe State of
Bombay and 0th"' plication under s. 15 of that Act would be barred, it can
nevertheless give rise to an industrial dispute in respect of
Vinkatarama
_.Aiyar J.
which action can be taken under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was held by the Federal Court in Sham·
nagore Jute Factory Co. Ltd. v. S. M. Modak(') that s. 2'.t(d)
of the Wages Act did not take away the power of the authorities to refer to a tribunal set up under the Industrial Disputes Act a claim which could be made under the Wages
Act, as that section had application only to suits and did not
exclude other proceedings permitted by law for the enforcement of payment If a tribunal appointed under that Act can
direct an employer to make payment of wages, it follows that
the bar under s. 15 of the Wages Act does not give an absolute protection to the employer, and the same consequence
must follow when the bar of limitation arises under the Limitation Act. The result therefore is that when an employer
makes a payment under s. 3(1) of the Act he gets no discharge
from his obligation to the employees, even when the enforcement thereof is barred by limitation.
Bombay Dy1dng d1
Manufacturing
Oo., Lid.
The contention based on the provisions of the Wages
Act failing, Mr. Seervai falls back on s. 56 of the Contract
Act as furnishing a ground for holding that the employer is
discharged. Para. (2) of s. · 56 provides that,
"a contract to do an act which, after the contract is made,
becomes impossible, or by reason of some event which the
promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when
the act becomes impossible or unlawful."
It is argued that by operation of s. 3 of the impugned Act,
the performance of the contract by the employer has become
impossible, and the contract has thereby become void. Section
(') [1949] F.C.R. 365.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1143
56 of the Contract Act embodies the law relating to frustra1961
tion of contracts, and the true scope of that section was con- Bonibay Dyei g .,,
sidered by this Court in Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Manufacturing
Bangur and Co.('). The ppsition was thus stated by Mukher0<>., Ltd.
• J
y,
1ea · :
'l'Ae S/,a1e of
• •
.
Bombay ond 01/itra
"In the large ma1onty of cases however the doctrme of
Vn.l:alarania
frustration is applied not on the ground that the parties them·
.Aiyar J.
selves agreed to an implied term which operated to release
them from the performance of the contract. The relief is
given by the court on the ground of subsequent impossibility
when it finds that the whole purpcse or basis of a contract
was frustrated by the intrusion or occurrence of an unexpect·
ed event or change of circumstances which was beyond what
was contemplated by the parties at the time when they' entered
into the agreement. Here there is no question of finding out
an implied term agreed to by the parties embodying a provision for discharge, because the parties did not think about
the matter at all nor could possibly have any intention re·
garding it. When such an event oi' change of circumstances
occurs which is so fundamental as to be regarded by law as
striking at the root of the contract as a whole, it is the court
which can pronounce the contract to be frustrated and at an
end. The court undoubtedly has to examine the contract and
the circumstances under which it was made. The belief,
knowledge and intention of the parties are evidence, but
evidence only on which the court has to form its own conclusion whether the changed circumstances destr.ayed altogether
the basis of the adventure and its underlying. object. This
may be called a rule of construction by English Judges but
it is certainly not a principle of giving effect to the intention
of the parties which underlies all rules of construction. This
is really a rule of positive law and as such comes within the
purview of section 56 of the Indian Contract Act."
Counsel for the respondents relies on these observations,
and contends that when the contract of service was entered
into between the employer and the employees, they could
{') [1~54] S.C.R. 310, 323.
Il44
SUPRE.i\IE COURT REPORTS
[1958]
not have contemplated that the Legislature would have intervened and required the employer to pay the arrears of
_\f 1J·1<'11f'1,.J.uring
wages to the Board, and that that is a supervening impossiCo .. Lid.
,.
bility which brings s. 56 into play and renders the contract
Tiu: Stafo G/
Bombay and (.llic,rs void. We are not satisfied that the performance of the contract of service has been rendered impossible by reason of s.
V~nka.~1ram4i
Aiyar J.
3(1) of t·he impugned Act. But assuming that that is the position. what follows? The matter would then be governed by
s. 65 of the Contract Act. which provides that when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore
it or to make compensation for it to the person from whom
he received it. Under this section, the employer is liable to
make compensation to the employee for the work done by
him, and that liability can be enforced against him in spite
of the fact that he has paid the unclaimed wages to the Board
under s. 3(1) of the Act. We are therefore of ()pinion that
even if the matter is governed by s. 56 of the Contract Act,
the employer is no more discharged than by the operation of
the bar of limitation under s. 15 of the Wages Act, or the
provisions of the Limitation Act. In this view, it must be held
that the provisions of the impugned Act are unconstitutional,
in that they take away the property of the appellant in violation of either Art. 19 (I) (f) or Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
1:J51
.Bomb('!I J1111·ing d:
A contention was also raised on behalf of the appellant
that even if the impugned Act did not encroach on any of the
Constitutional rights of the appellant, it clearly violated the
rights of the employees in that it deprives them of their right
to wages earned by them, that it was therefore void as against
them as being in contravention of Art. 31 (2), and being void
against them, it was void against the appellant as well. For
the respondents. it is contended that the Act cannot be held
to infringe Art. 31 (2) even as regards the employees, as choses in action equally with money are outside the operation
of that Article, and reliance is placed on the observations
already referred to in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhi-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
1145
I
(supra) at pages
1967
942, 960-961 and 1015 to 1018. Now, as the Act takes over BombayDyeing <11
the rights of the employees in respect of wages due to them Manu/actnri"il
Co.,W.
even when they are net barred without making any provision
v.
f
.
.
The 8 tale"
for compensation of the same to them, it must at least to Bombay and OtJ.er4
that extent be held to ·be unconstitutional, whether as con· Venkatarama
Aiyru·J.
travening Art. 19(1) (f) or Art. 31(2) it is unnecessary to de- .
cide.
lt is then argued that this is an objection open only to
the employees, and that the appellant can make no grievance
of it. It is no doubt true that a question as to the constitutionality
a statute can be raised only by a person who is
aggrieved by it; but here, the statute deals with rights arising
out of contract, and that presupposes the existence of at
least two parties with mutual rights and obligations,
and it is difficult to see how when the rights of one party to
it are interfered with, those of the other can remain unaffected by it. Let us assume that the appellant makes a payment
to the Board under s. 3 (1) of the impugned Act on the footing that the law is not unconstitutional as against him. What
is there to prevent the employee from suing to recover the
same amount from the appellant on the ground that the Act
is unconstitutional? It will be no answer to that claim to
plead that the appellant has already paid the amount to the
Board. The fact is that a statute which operates on a contract must affect the rights of all the parties to the contract,
and if it is bad as regards bne of them, it should be held to
be bad as regards the others as well. It is unnecessary to pursue this question further, as we have held that the Act is
unconstitutional even as regarqs the appellant.
It remains to deal with the contention of the respondents
that the impugned legislation is, in substance, one in respect
of abandoned property, and that, by its very nature, it cannot be held to violate the rights of any person either under
Art. I 9(1) <0 or Art. 31(2). That would be the correct position if the character crf the legislation is what the respondents claim it to be, for it is only a person who has some interest in property that can complain that the impugned legisL/P(DJ a SCl--8
n1;a Sir, Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga
of
1146
SUPREllIE OOuR'l' REPORTS
(1958}
lation invades that right whether it be under Art. 19\IJ (fl or
Bombay Dyeing"' Art. 31(2), and if it is abandoned property ex llvpo1/1es1
Jlanufacluring
there is no one who has am··· interest in it· But can .the 1·mUo. Lill.
~.
pugned Act be held to be legislation with respect to abanTbc Stal< of
I d
., T
.
. .
JJ,,m;,, 11 and Otlwn <one property'
o answer th.IS question,
1t JS necessary to
examine the basic principles underlying such a legislation.
Venkalara.:ma
Aiyar J.
and ascertain whether those are the principles on which the
Act is frsmed. The expression "abandoned property" or to
use the more familiar term '"bona vacamia" comprises properties of two different kinds, those which come in by escheat and
those over which no one has a claim. In Halsbury's Laws of
England, Thlrd Edition, Vol. 7 page 536, para. 1152. it is
stated that "the term bona vacalllia is applied to thlngs in·
which no one can claim a property and includes the residuary
estate of persons dying intestate". There is, however, this distinction between the two classes of property that while the
State becomes the owner of the properties of a person who
dies intestate as his ultimate heir, it merely takes possession
of property which is abandoned. At common law, abandoned
personal property could not be the subject of escheat. It
could only be appropriated by the Sovereign as bona vacantia. Vide Holdsworth's History of English Law. Second Edition, Vol. 7, pages 495-496. In Co1111ectic111 Mutual Life
Insurance Company v. Moore\'.!. the principle behind the
law was stated to be that "the State may. more properly, be
custodian and beneficiary of abandoned property than any
other person." Consistently with the principle stated above. a
law relating to abondoncd property enacts firstly provisions
for the State conserving and safeguarding for the benefit of
the true owners property in respect of which no claim is
made for a specified and reasonable period, and secondly.
for those properties vesting in the State absolutely when no
claim is made with reference thereto by the true owners
within a time limited.
There has been quite a number of laws on abandoned
property in the American States, and their validity has been
1967
(') 333 U.S. 541, 546; (1947)) 92 L. Ed. 863. 869.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1147
the subject of numerous decisions in the Supreme Court of
195~
United States. In Anderson National Bank v. Luckett('), the BombavD11dng--.1J
law related to Bank ·deposits. It provided that if moneys in .M~1,~11 u
deposit had not been demanded or operated on, for a period
The 8iats of
of 10 years in the case of demand deposits and 25 years in Btntt6at1 and Othera
the case of non-demand deposits, they might be presumed Vellialaramn
to have been abandoned and the Banks were to transfer
.Aiynr J.
them to the State. Claims to the deposits might be made to
the Commissioner of Revenue, who was to determine on their
validity, his decision being open to review by the Courts.
The validity of this law was questioned on the ground that
sufficient opportunity had not been given to the depositors
to claim the deposits, and that as they could attack the law
as unconstitutional, the Bank got no protection by payment
to the State. In repelling this contention, the Supreme Court
observed that the Act did not deprive the depositors of any
of their rights, they being given ample opportunity to establish their rights, and that it metely substituted the State in
the place of the Bank as their debtor. The Court also held
that it was "within the Coostitutional power of the State to
protect the interests of depositors from the risks which attend
long neglected accounts, by taking them intO custody when
they have been inactive so long as to be presumptively abandoned". In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore
(supra), the law was with reference to moneys payable on
life insurance policies, which had matured. It provided that
if those amounts had remained unclaimed for a period of
seven years, then it had to be advertised by the companies
in the manner provided therein, and if no claims were pre·
ferred thereafter, the amounts were to be paid to the State
Comptroller for care and custody. In holding that the law
was valid. the Court observed.
"There is ample provision for notice to beneficiaries and
for administrative and judicial hearing of their claims and
payment of same. There is no possible injury to any beneficiary."
(') 321 U.S. 233, 241; (1943) 88 L. Ed. 692, '101.
1148
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
In Standard Oil Company v. New Jersey('), the Jaw related
to shares and unpaid dividends, and provided for the State
.1t.nufa<turing
taking them over, if they remained unclaimed for a period
r.•n., Lid.
of 14 years. There was a provision for notice to the un7'1"' .~;.,.of
known owners by advertisement. It was held following ConBotnb"Y and Olhers necticut Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Moore (supra)
V••""""'ma that the law was valid.
1961
R·n•wy Dye;49 "'
A.Jyt1r J.
In the light of the above discussion, there cannot be any
reasonable doubt that the impugned Act cannot be regarded
as one relating to abandoned property. The period of three
years mentioned in s. 2(10) of the Act is merely the period
of limitation mentioned in Art. 102 of the Limitation Act,
and even taking into account the class of persons whose
claims are dealt with in the Act, as counsel for respondents
would have us do, the period cannot be regarded as adequate
for raising a presumption as to abandonment. A more serious
objection to viewing the legislation as one relating to abandoned claims is that there is no provision made in the Act
for investigating the claims of the employees or for payment
of the amounts due to them, if they established their claims.
The purpose of a legislation with respect to abandoned
property being, in the first instance, to safeguard the property
for the benefit of the true owner and the State taking it over
only in the absence of such cla~ms, a law which vests the
property absolutely in the State without regard to the claims
of the true owners cannot be considered as one relating to
abandoned property. This contention of the respondents
must also be rejected.
In the result, we are of opinion that s. 3(1) in so far as
it relates to unpaid accumulations in s. 3(2)(b) is unconstitutional and void.
We have now to deal with the question as to the validity
of s. 3(1) and s. 3(2) (a) of the Act, which require the employers to hand over to the Board the fines realised from the employees. So far as this item is concerned, the position of the
(') 341 U.S. 428; (1950) 95 L.Ed. 1078.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1149
employers is wholly different from what it is as regards unpaid accumulations. Section 8 of the Wages Act deals with Bo-mbay J.lyei11!1 ,r,
the question of fines which could be imposed by the em- M ®u/adwring
Oo., Ltd.
v.
ployer, and it provides that they should be entered in a sepa'J'lie tJlale o/
rate register, and applied for the benefit of his employees. Bomba!!
or,d Of!tuw
It is not denied by the appellant that under this provision the
Venkataramo
fines are constituted a trust fund, and that the employers are
Aiyar J.
bare trustees in respect of such fund. Now, the grievance of
the appellant is that the Act deprives it of its rights as trustees, and vests them in the Board, and that, further, while
the beneficiaries under s. 8 of the Wages Act are its own employees, under s. 5(2) of the impugned Act they include other
persons as well. There might have been substance in the complaint that the appellant had been deprived of its rights as
trustee if it had any beneficial interest in the fund. But admittedly, it has none. and it is therefore difficult to hold that
there has been such substantial deprivation of property, as
will offend Art. 31(2) according to the decisions in The State
of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co.
Ltd. (supra) or such unrea~onable interference with rights to
property, as will infringe Art. 19(1)(f). It is argued with some
emphasis that in en.larging the circle of beneficiaries, the Act
has encroached o-n the rights of the employees of the appellant. But then, the trust is the creation not 9f the appellant
but of the Legislature, which gave the. employees certain
rights which they did not have before, and what it can give,
it can also take away or modify, and we do not see how the
employers are aggrieved by it. We are of opinion that no
valid grounds exist on which s. 3(1) ands. 3(2)(a) of the impug·
ned Act could be attacked as unconstitutional, and they-must
accordingly be held to pe valid.
In the result. we hold, in modification of-the order of the
Court below, that the provisions of the impugned Act are un·
constitutional and void in so far as they relate to _"unpaid accumulations", but that they are valid as regards "fines"; and an
appropriate writ will issue against the respondents in the terms
1150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1967
stated above. The appeal succeeds in part, but as it is stated
"unpaid accumulations" form by far the most substantial
that
Bombay Dyri!SQ <b
MtJ/nujar.Mdinq
portion of the claim, we direct the respondents to pay half the
.co.1W.
costs of the appellant here and in the Court below.
\".
The State o/
Bum.bay umd Ol/u:r8
Appeal allowed in part.
V~nkaWama
Aiytn' J.
1968
JanVGry 22.
RAJA GANGA PRATAP SINGH
v.
THE ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., LUCKNOW
\S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAll, B. P. SINHA,
J. L. KAPUR and A. K. SARXAll JI.)
Statute, Constitutional validity of-Whether a question of
inteTPretation of the Conltitution-Severabilitl/, if 1hottld be
considered before deciding question of validitv-Dutii of Court
-Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908), s. 113 proviso-Con1Utution of India, An. 228.
The respondent, a scheduled bank, sued the appellant for
recovery of money under a mortgage. The appellant claimed
reduction of the debt under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndari Debt
Reduction Act, 1953. An advance or debt due to a scheduled
bank was excluded from the definition of "debt" lliven In the
Act. The appellant contended that the definition In so far as It
excluded certain debts offended Art. 14 of the Constitution as it
made an arbitrary distinction between several cluses of debton.
The appellant applied to the court under the proviso to 1. 113
of the Code of Civil Procedure prayinc that a case be stated
for the opinion of the High Court as to the validity of the impugned portion of the definition. The Court rejected the application. The appellant made an application in revision to the High
Court and also an application under Art. 22.8 of the Constitution for withdrawing the case for a decision of the question of
the validity of the definition. The Higb Court dismiased the aPplications. The Courts below held that in eitber view of the
question as to the validity of the impu&ned portion of the definition, the appellant would be left without the remedy which he
sought, because that portion of the definition was not severable
from the rest and the whole definition would have to be excluded and therefore it was not necessary to decide that question
to dispose of the case :
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