SARDAR SYEDNA TAHER SAIFUDDIN SAHEB versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 November 1957 | [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1010 | 1957 INSC 108
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 November 1957
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, VIVIAN BOSE, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 99/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1010
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 108
Text of the judgment
1010
1957
iV11l'e111ber, 27.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
SARDAR SYEDNA TAHER
SAIFUDDIN SAHEB
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, S. K. DAS,
A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)
Practice-Appeal-1\fointainabi!ity-Suit based on personal right-Death of plaintiff pending appeal-Bombay
Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949 (Bombay XLII
-Of 1949).
Supreme Com·t-Appeal against interlocutory findingCertificate by High Court-Competence-Constitution of
lndia, Arts. 132, 133.
The appellant as the religious head of his community
-ex-communicated T who thereupon filed a suit for a declaration that the order of excommunication was invalid.
When the suit was pending the Bombay Prevention of Exeommunication Act, 1949, was passed and one · of issues
raised in the suit was whether the order of excommunication was invalid by reason of the provisions of the Act.
This issue was tried· as a preliminary issue and as it raised
the question of the vires of the Act, the State of Bombay
was impleaded as the second defendant in the suit. The
Bombay High Court decided the issue against the appellant,
but granted a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court
under Arts. 132 and 133 of the Constitution of India. Pending
the appeal the plaintiff died and the action was personal
to him consequently abated. It was contended for the
appellant that as the State of Bombay had been impleaded
as a party and that as the decision on the question of the
vires of the Act had been given in its presence, the
appellant was entitled to continue the appeal against the
State without reference to the plaintiff and seek the decision of the Court on the validity of the Act:
Held, that the appeal must be dismissed as not maintainable, because (1) the appeal was only a continuation
of the suit which, in the events, had abated, and (2) the
certificate under Arts. 132 and 133 of the Constitution was
incompetent, as it could not be granted in respect of an
interlocutory finding.
The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum and Others,
[1940] F.C.R. 110, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
99 of 1954.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the
20th August, 1952, of the Bombay High Court in
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1011
1957
Appeal No. 43 of 1952 arising out of Original Suit No.
1262 of 1949.
Sardar
N. C. Chatterjee, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Syedna Taher
Saifuddin Saheb
Nath, for the appellant.
v.
Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respon- Tire State of
Bombay
dent. \
1957. November 27. The following Judgment of Venkatarama
Aiyar J.
the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-On February 28th 1934,
the appellant who is the religious head of the Dawoodi
Bohra Community, passed an order excommunicating
one Tyebbhai Moosaji Koicha. On July 17, 1920, the
appellant had excommunicated two persons,, Tahirbhai
and Hasan Ali, and the validity of the order was questioned in a suit instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Barhampur. The litigation went up
to the Privy Council, which held that the appellant as
the religious head had the power to excommunicate
a member of the community, but that that power
could only be exercised after observing the requisite
formalities, and as in that case that had not been done,
the order of excommunication was invalid. Vide
Hasan Ali v. Mansoorali(').
Apprehending that the order dated February 28,
1934, was open to challenge under the decision in
Hasan Ali v. Mansoorali (supra) on the ground that
it had not complied with the requisite formalities, the
appellant started fresh proceedings, and on April 28,
1948, passed another order of excommunication.
Thereupon, Tyebbhai Moosaji filed the present suit for
a declaration that both the orders of excommunication dated February 28, 1934, and April 28, 1948, were
invalid and for other consequential reliefs.
While this action was pending, the Legislature of
the Province of Bombay passed the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act (Bombay XLII of 1949)
prohibiting excommunication, and that came into
force on November 1, 1949. The plaintiff contended
that the effect of this legislation was to~ render the
orders of excommunication illegal. The answer of the
-(1) A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 66.
1012
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
appellant to this contention was, firstly, that the Act
Sardar
had no retrospective operation, and that, in conSyedna Taher sequence, the orders passed on February 28, 1934, and
Salfuddt~ Saheb April 28, 1948, were valid, and remained unaffected
17ze State of by it; and secondly, that the Act was itself unconstiBombay
tutional, beca!lse the subject matter of the impugned
Venkatarama legislation was not covered by any of the entries in
Aiyar J,
List 2 or 3 of Seventh Schedule to the Government of
India Act, 1935, and the Legislature of the Provinceof Bombay had no competence to enact the law. After
the coming into force of the Constitution, the contention was also raised that the right of the defendant t<>
excommunicate members of the community was protected by Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution, and
that the impugned Act was void as infringing the same.
The issues in the action were then settled, and
issue No. 19, which was raised with reference to theabove contentions, was as follows :
"Whether the orders of excommunication made in
1934 and/or 1948 are invalid by reason of the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication
Act of 1949?"
This was tried as a preliminary issue, and as it raised
the question of the vires of a statute, the State of
Bombay was impleaded as the second defendant in
the suit. Shah J. who tried this issue, held that theimpugned Act was retrospective in its operation, that
it was within the competence of the Provincial Legislature, and further that it did not offend Arts. 25 and
26 of the Constitution.
Against this finding, the present appellant preferred an appeal to a Bench of the Bombay High Court,
and that was heard by Chagla C. J. and Bhagwati J.
who held that under the Act, excommunication meant
the condition of being expelled, that it was a continuous state during which the person excommunicated
was deprived of his rights and privileges, and that,
therefore, the Act would operate to protect thoserights from the date it came into operation. They
further held that the Act was within the competence
of the Legislature, and they also repelled the conten1957
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPO~TS
1013
1951
tion that it infringed the rights guaranteed under
Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. In the result,
Sardar
Syedna Taher
they concurred in the decision of Shah J. and dismis- Saifuddin
Saheb
sed the appeal but granted a certificate to appeal to
v.
this Court under Arts. 132 and 133 of the Constitu- The State of
Bombay
tion. Hence this appeal.
Pending the appeal, the plaintiff died on March 11, Venkatarama
Aiyar J.
1953, and his daughter applied on May 22, 1953, to be
.substituted in his place. But eventually she did not
press the application, and that was dismissed on
October 5, 1953. In this Court by an order dated
November 21, 1955, the cause title was amended by
deleting the name of the plaintiff. Thus, the only
parties who are now before the Court are the defendant and the State of Bombay.
The question is whether in the event.s which have
happened, the appeal can proceed. We are of opinion
that it cannot. It should be remembered in this connection that no decree had been passed in the suit.
Only a finding has been given on a preliminary point,
and it is that finding that has been the subject of
appeal to the High Court of Bombay and thereafter to
this Court. There are other issues still to be tried,
and the action is thus undertermined. Now, the claim
with which the plaintiff came to Court was that he
was wrongly excommunicated, and that was an action
personal to him. On the principle, actio personalis
moritur cum persona when he died the suit should
abate. As a matter of fact, his legal representative
applied to be brought on record, but the application
was not pressed. The result is that the suit has abated.
This would ordinarily entail the dismissal of this
appeal.
Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the appellant argues that
as the State of Bombay had been impleaded as a
party, and that as the decision on the question of the
vires of the Act had been given in its presence, the
appellant is entitled to continue the appeal against
the State without reference to the plaintiff and seek
the decision of this Court on the validity of the Act;
and relies on the decision of the Federal Court in The
1014
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum and others( l ).
There, a suit was filed by a landlord for recovery of
Sardar
Syedna Toher rent. While it was pending in appeal, and Act was
Saifuddln Saheb
passed by the Legislature of the United Provinces
v.
The State of validating certain Government notifications requiring
Bombay
Venkatarama
A.iyar J.
the landlords to give to the tenants remission of rent.
The landlord contended that the Act was ultra vires,
and a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, for
whose opinion the question was referred, agreed with
this contention. Thereafter, the Government of the
United Provinces got itself impleaded as a party to
the appeal of the landlord, and a decision having been
given therein in accordance with the opinion of the
Full Bench, it preferred an appeal to the Federal
Court on a certificate granted under s. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and contended that the
impugned Act was valid. The judgment-debtor himself did not file any appeal. The question was whether the Government was entitled to file the appeal
when the party bad not chosen to contest the decree.
It was held by the Federal Court that the scope of
s. 205 of the Government of India Act was wider than
that of s. 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the
Government was entitled to file the appeal for getting
a decision on the validity of the Act, notwithstanding
that it had no interest in the claim in the suit. This
ruling has, in our opinion, no application to the facts
of the present case. Here, the action itself has abated,
and there can be no question of an appeal in relation
thereto, as an appeal is only a continuation of the suit,
and there can be no question of continuing what does
not exist.
But apart from this, there is another formidable
obstacle in the way of the appellant. Under Art. 132,
an appeal lies to this Court only against judgments,
decrees or ·final orders. That was also the position
under s. 205 of the Government of India Act. Now,
the order appealed against is only a decision on one
of the issues, and it does not dispose of the suit. In
The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum and others
(I} [1940) F.C.R. 110.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1015
1957
(supra), there was a decree, and the requirements of
s. 205 were satisfied. Here, there is only a finding on
Sardar
Syedna T<1lrer
a preliminary issue, and there is no decree or final Saiffuddin
Sa/re/,.
order. The Explanation to Art. 132 provides that :
v.
"For the purposes oi this Article, the expression The State of
B<mlbay
'final order' includes an order deciding an issue which,
if decided in favour of the appellant, would be suffi- Venkataramc
Aiyar J.
cient for the final disposal of the case."
Applying this test, even if we accept the contention of
the appellant that the impugned Act is bad, that
would not finally dispose of the suit, as there are other
issues, which have to be tried. We are clearly of
opinion that the appeal is not competent under Art.
132, and the fact that a certificate has been given does
not alter the position. It is said that the certificate is
also under Art. 133, but under that article also, an
appeal lies only against judgments, decrees or final
orders, and no certificate could be granted in respect
of an interlocutory finding.
The result is that this appeal must be dismissed, as
not maintainable. We should add by way of abundant caution that as we express no opinion on the
correctness of the decision under appeal, this order
will not preclude the appellant from claiming such
rights as he may have, in appropriate proceedings
which he may take. In the circumstances, there will
be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
RAJVI AMAR SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AtYAR, s. K. DAS, A.
K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)
State Service-Formation of new State by intergration
of States-Effect-Employee under intergrating State continuing in service of new State-Status-If can be inferred
1957
Novr1nber, ::!~J
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