SRI VENKATARAMANA DEVARU AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 8 November 1957 | [1958] 1 S.C.R. 895 | 1957 INSC 99
Key facts
- Decided
- 8 November 1957
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, VIVIAN BOSE, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, SYED JAFFER IMAM, A.K. SARKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 403/1956
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1958] 1 S.C.R. 895
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 99
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
895
SRI VENKATARAMANA DEVARU
AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS
(with connected petition)
(s. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JAFER
IMAM, A. K. SARKAR AND VIVIAN BOSE JJ.)
Temple Entry, Authorisation of-Validity of enactment
-Denominational right, if subject to general right of the
Hindu public-'Matters of religion', Meaning o)'-Madras
Temple Entry Authorisation Act (V of 1947), ss. 2 (2), 3Constitution of India, Arts. 25(2) (b), 26(b);
This was an appeal by the trustees of the ancient and
.renowned temple of Sri Venkataramana of Moolky Petta,
who were managing the temple on behalf of the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins in accordance with a Scheme framed
in a suit under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After
the passing of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act
(Madras V of 1947), which had for its object the removal
of the disability of Harijans from entering into Hindu public temples, the trustees made a representation to the
Government that the temple was a private one, and, therefore, outside the operation of the Act. But the Government did not accept that position and held that the act applied to the temple. Thereupon the trustees brought th!
suit, out of which the appeal arises, for a declaration that
the temple was not one as defined by s. 2 (2) of the Act but
was a denominational one having been founded exclusively
for the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. It was contended
that s. 3 of the Act was void as being repugnant to Art.
26(b) of the Constitution which vouchsafed to a religious
denomination the right to manage its own affairs in matters
of religion. The trial court found against the appellants.
It held t)lat matters of religion did not include rituals and
ceremonies. But on appeal the High Court while holding
that the public were entitled to worship in the temple,
passed a limited degree in favour of the appellants by reserving to the latter the right to exclude the general public
during certain ceremonies in which the members of ~he
denomination alone were entitled to participate. The
question for decision was whether the rights of a religious
denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion under Art. 26 (b) can be subjected to, and controlled
by, a law protected by Art. 25 (2) (b) of the Constitution.
Held, that the expression "religious institutions of a
public character" occurring in Art. 25 (2) (b) of the Constitution contemplates not merely temples dedicated to the
114
1957
November &.
896
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[1958]
public as a whole but also those founded for the benefit
of sections thereof and includes denominational temple• as
Sri Venkataramana well. While Art. 25 (1) deals with the rights of individuals
DevaruandOthcrs and Art. 26(b) with those of religious denominations, Art.
Th Sv.
if 25 (2) covers a much wider ground and controls both.
Myso:..•~"je/j1hm Article 26(b) must, therefore, be read subject to Art. 25(2) ·
(b) of the Constitution.
Although the right to enter a temple for purposes of
worship protected by Art. 25 (2) (b) must be construed
liberally in favour of the public, that does not mean that
that right is absolute and unlimited in character. It must
necessarily be subject to such limitation or regulation as
arises in the process of harmonising it with the right protected by Art. 26 (b). Where the denominational rights
claimed are not such as can nullify or substantially reduce
the right conferred by Art. 25 (2) (b), that Article should
be so construed as to give effect to them, leaving the rights
of the public in other respects unaffected.
The expression 'matters of religion' occurring in Art.
26 (b) of the Constitution includes practices which are regarded by the community as part of its religion and under
the ceremonial Jaw pertaining to temples, who are entitled
to enter into them for worship and where they are entitled
to stand for worship and how the worship is to be conducted
are all matters of religion.
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
Madras v. Sri Lakshimindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shiru,.
Mutt, (1954) S.C.R. 1005; Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania
Aiyar, (1914) 27 M.L.J. 253 and Sankaralinga Nadan v.
Raja Rajeswara Dorai, (1908) L.R. 35 I.A. 176, referred to.
Held further, that it is well settled that where the
original dedication is proved to have been for the benefit
of a particular community the fact that members of other
communities were allowed to worship cannot lead to the
inference that the dedication was also for their benefit.
Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroop, (1939) L.R. 67
I.A.: 1, referred to.
1957
.
-
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 403 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April
lL 1956, of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 145
of 1952, arising out of the judgment and decree dated
March, 31, 1951 of the Court of the Subordinate
Judge, South Kanara in Original Suit No. 24 of 1949.
M. K. Nambiyar, M. L. Naik, J. B. Dadachanji,
S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for
the appellant in C.A. No. 403 of 1956 and respondents
in special leave Petition No. 327 of 57.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
897
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L.
1957
Iyengar and T. M. Sen, for the respondents in C.A. Sri Venkataramana
No. 403 of 56 and petitioner in special leave petition Devaru and Others
No. 327 of 1957.
.
The ;;ate of
1957. November 8. The followmg Judgment ofMyso1·e and Others
the Court was delivered by
Venkatarama
VENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-.The substantial question
Aiyar J.
of law, which arises for decision in this appeal, is
whether the. right of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion guaranteed
under Art. 26(b), is subject to, and can be controlled
by, a law protected by Art, 25(2)(b), throwing open
a Hindu public temple to all classes and sections of
Hindus.
In the District of South Kanara which formed
until recently part of the State of Madras and is now
comprised in the State of Mysore, there is a group of
three villages, Ma:nnampady, Bappanad and Karnad
collectively known as Moolky Petah; and in the village
of Mannampady, there is an ancient temple dedicated
to Sri Venkataramana, renowned for its sanctity. It
is this institution and its trustees, who are the appellants before us. The trustees are all of them members
of a sect known as Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. It is
said that the home of this community in the distant
past was Kashmir, that the members thereof migrated
thence to Mithila and Bihar, and finally moved south·
wards. and settled in the region around Goa in sixty
villages. They continued to retain their individuality
in their new surroundings, spoke a language of their
own called Konkani, married only amongst themselves, and worshipped idols which they had brought
with them. Subsequently, owing to persecution by
the Portuguese, they migrated further south, some of
them settling at Bhatkal and others in Cochin. Later
on, a chieftain who was ruling over the Moolky area
brought five of these families from Bhatkal, settled
them at Mannampady, erected a temple for their benefit and installed their idol therein, which came to be
known as Tirumalaivaru or Venkataramana, and endowed lands therefor. In course of time, other
898
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[1958]
1957
families of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins would appear
/iri venkataramanato have settled in the three villages constituting
DevaruandOthersMoolky, and the temple came to be managed by mem-
The ;,~,, of hers of this community residing in those villags.
Mysore and Others
In 1915, a suit, 0. S. No. 26 of 1915, was instituted
venkararama in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of South Kanara
Aiyar J.
under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for framing
a scheme for this temple. Exhibit A-6 is the decree
passed in that suit. It begins by declaring that "Shri
Venkataramana temple of Moolky situated in the village of Mannampadi, Nadisal Mangane, Mangalore
taluk is an ancient institution belonging to the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmin community, i.e., the community
to which the parties to the suit belong residing in the
Moolky Petah, i.e., the villages of Bappanad, Karnad
and Mannampadi according to the existing survey
demarcation". Clause 2 of the decree vests the general control and management of the affairs of the temple, both secular and religious, in the members of that
community. Clause 3 provides for the actual management being carried on by a Board of Trustees to be
elected by the members of the community aforesaid
from among themselves. Then follow elaborate provisions relating to preparation of register of electors.
convening of meetings of the general body and holding of elections of trustees. This decree was passed
on March 9, 1921, and it is common ground that the
temple has.ever since been managed in accordance
with the provisions of the scheme contained therein.
This was the position when the Madras Temple
Entry Authorisation Act (Madras V of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was passed by the Legislature of the Province of Madras. It will be useful at
this stage to set out the relevant provisions of the Act,
as it is the validity of s. 3 thereof that is the main
point for determination in this appeal. The preamble
to the Act recites that the policy of the Provincial
Government was "to remove the disabilities imposed
by custom or usage on certain classes of Hindus
against entry into Hindu temples in the Province
which are open to the general Hindu public". Section
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
899
2(2) defines 'temple' as "a place by whatever name
1957
known, which is dedicated to or for the benefit of or Sri venkataramana
used as of right by the Hindu community in generaIDevaru and Others
as a place of-public religious worship". Section 3(1) Tiie ;,~te of
enacts that,
Mysore and Others
"Notwithstanding any law, custom or usage to the Venkatarama
contrary, persons belonging to the excluded classes
Aiyar 1.
shall ·be entitled to enter any Hindu temple and offer
worship therein in the same manner and to the same
extent as Hindus in general; and no member of any
excluded class shall, by reason only of such entry or
worship, whether before or after the commencement
of this Act, be deemed to have committed any actionable wrong or offence or be sued or prosecuted therefor."
Section 6 of the Act provides that,
"If any question arises as to whether a place is or
is not a temple as defined in this A:ct, the question
should be referred to the Provincial Government and
· their decision shall be final, subject however to any
decree passed by a competent civil court irt a suit filed
before it within silt months from the date of the decision of the Provincial Government". It is the contention of the appellants-and that, in our opinion, is wellfounded-that the true intent of this enactment as
manifest in the above provisions was to remove the
disability imposed on Harijans from entering into
temples, which were dedicated to the Hindu public
generally.
Apprehending that action might be taken to put
the provisions of this Act in operation with reference
to the suit temple, the trustees thereof sent a memorial to the Government of Madras claiming that it
was a private temple belonging exclusively to the
Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, and that it therefore did
not fall within the purview of the Act. On this, the
Government passed an order on June 25, 1948, Exhibit
B-13, that the temple was one which was open to all
Hindus generally, and that the Act would be applicable to it. Thereupon, the trustees filed the suit, out
of which the present appeal arises, for a declaration
900
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[1958]
that the Sri Venkataramana temple at Moolky was not
Sri Venkataramanaa temple as defined in s. 2(2) of the Act. It was alDevaru and Othersieged in the plaint that the temple was founded for
T'h sv.
.r the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins in
" e tale OJ
•
Mysore and OthersMoolky Petah, that it had been at all times under their
Venkatamma management, that they were the followers of the
Aiyar
Kashi Mutt, and that it was the head of the Mutt that
performed various religious ceremonies in the temple, and that the other communities had no rights to
worship therein. The plaint was filed on February 8,
1949. On July 25, 1949, the Province of Madras filed
a written statement contesting the claim. Between
these two dates, the Madras Legislature had enacted
the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation (Amendment) Act (Madras XIII of 1949), amending the definition of 'temple' in s. 2(2) of Act V of 1947, and
making eonsequential amendments in the preamble
and in the other provisions of the Act. According to
the amended definition, a temple is "a place which is
dedicated to or for the benefit of the Hindu community or any section thereof as a place of public religious worship". This Amendment Act, came into force
on June 28, 1949. In the written statement filed on
July 25, 1949, the Government denied that the temple
was founded exclusively for the benefit of the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins, and contended that the Hindu
public generally had a right to worship therein, and
that, therefore, it fell within the definition of temple
as originally enacted. It_ further pleaded that, at any
rate, it was a temple within the definition as amended by Act XIII of 1949, even if it was dedicated for
the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, in asmuch as they were a section of Hindu community, and
that, in consequence, the suit was liable to be dismissed.
On January 26, 1950, the Constitution came into
force, and thereafter, on February 11, 1950, the plaintiffs raised the further contention by way of amendment of the plaint that, in any event, as the temple
was a denominational one, they were entitled to the
protection of Art, 26, that it was a matter of religion
1957
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
901
as to who were entitled to ta~e part in worship in a
1957
temple, and that s. 3 of the Act, in so far as it provid- Sri Venkataramana
ed for the institution being thrown open to commu-Devaru and Others
nities other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, was
v.
repugnant to Art. 26 (b) of the Constitution and was, My~::e S.:::JeJ~ers
in consequence, void.
Venkatarama
On these pleadings, the parties went to trial. The
Aiyar J.
Subordinate Judge of South Kanara, who tried the
suit, held that though the temple had been originally
founded for the benefit of certain immigrant families
of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, in course of tin1e it
came to be resorted to by all classes of Hindus for
worship, and that accordingly it must be held to be a
temple even according to the definition of 'temple' in
s. 2(2) of the Act, as it originally stood. Dealing with
the contention that the plaintiffs had the right under
Art. 26(b) to exclude all persons other than Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins from worshipping in the temple,
he held that "matters of religion" in that Article had
reference to religious beliefs ·and doctrines, and did
not include rituals and ceremonies, and that, in any
event, Arts. 17 and: 25(2) which had been enacted on
grounds of high policy must prevail. He accordingly
dismissed the suit with costs. Against this decision,
the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court
of Madras, A. S. No. 145 of 1952.
It is now necessary to refer to another litigation
inter partes, the result of which has a material bearing
on the issues which arise for determination before us.
In 1951, the Madras Legislature enacted the Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,
(Madras XIX of 1951) vesting in the State the power
of superintendence and control of temples and Mutts.
The Act created a hierarchy of officials to be appointed by the State, and conferred on them enormous
powers of control and even management of institutions. Consequent on this legislation, a number of writ
applications were filed in the High Court of Madras
challenging the validity of the provisions therein as
repugnant to Arts. ·19, 25 and 26 of the Constitution,
and one of them was Writ Petition No. 668 of 1951
902
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[1958)
19s1
by the trustees of Sri Venkataramana Temple at
Sri VenkataramanaMoolky. They claimed that the institution being a
Devaru and 01Jrersdenominational one, it had a right under Art. 26(b)
Tire ;·
Mysore
f
to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, with-
.::f'O,,,.,,out interference from any outside authority, and that
Venkatarama
Atyar J.
the provisions of the Act were bad as violative of that
right. By its judgment dated December 13, 1951, the
High Court held that the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin
community was a section of the Hindu public, that the
Venkataramana Temple at Moollty was a denominational temple founded for its be~efit, and that many
of the provisions of the Act infringed the right granted by Art. 26(b) and were void. Vide Devaraja
Shenoy v. State of Madras ( • ). Against this judgment, the State of Madras preferred an appeal to this
Court, Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1953, but ultimately, it
was withdrawn and dismissed on September 30, 1954.
It is the contention of the appellants that by reason of
the decision given in the above proceedings, which
were inter partes, the issue as to whether the temple
is a denominational one must be held to have been con··
eluded in their favour.
To resume the history of the present litigation:
Subsequent to the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 15 of
1953 by this Court, the appeal of the plaintiffs, A.S.
No. 145 of 1952, was taken up for hearing, and on the
application of the appellants, the proceedings in the
writ petition were admitted as additional evidence.
On a review of the entire materials on record, including those relating to the proceedings in Writ Petition
No. 668 of 1951, the learned Judges held it established
that the Sri Venkataramana Temple was founded for
the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community, and that it was therefore a denominational one.
Then, dealing with the contention thats. 3_of the Act
was in contravention of Art. 26(b), they held that as
a denominational institution would also be a publicinstitution, Art. 25(2) (b) applied, and that, thereunder, all classes of Hindus were entitled to enter into
the temple for worship. But they also held that the
(I) (1952) 2 M.L.J. 481.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
903
evidence established that there were certain religious
1957
ceremonies and occasions during which the Gowda Sri Venka1arama11a
Saraswath Brahmins alone were entitled to partici_,Devaru and Other.1 ·
pate, and that that right was protected by Art. 26(b). The s~~te of
They accordingly reserved the rights of the appellants Mysore and Others.
to exclude all members of the public during those cere- Venkararama
monies and on those occasions, and these were specifiAiyar J.
ed in the decree. Subject to this modification, they
dismissed the appeal. . Against this· judgment the
plaintiffs have preferred Civil Appeal No. 403 of 1956
on a certificate granted by the High Court.
There is also before us Petition No. 327 of 1957 for
leave to appeal under Art. 136. That has reference
to the modifications introduced by the decree of the
High Court in favour of the appellants. It must be
mentioned that while the appeal was pending, there
was a reorganisation of the States, and the District of
South Kanara in which the temple is situated, was
included in the State of Mysore. The State of Mysore
has accordingly come on record in the place of the
State of Madras, and is contesting this appeal, and it
is that State that has now applied for leave to appeal
against the modifications. The application is. very
much out of time, and Mr. M. K. Nambiar for the appellants vehemently opposes its being entertained at
this stage. It is pointed out that not merely had the
State· of Madras not filed any application for leave to
appeal to this Court against the decision of the Madras
High Court but that it accepted it as correct and actually opposed the grant of leave to the appellants on
the ground that the points involved were pure ques,..
tions of fact, that· no substantial question of law was
involved, and that the judgment of the High Court ·had
recognised the rights of all sections of the Hindu public. It is argued that when a party acquiesces in a
judgment and deliberately allows the time for filing
an appeal to lapse, it would not be a .sufficient ground
to condone the delay that he has subsequently changed
his mind and desires to prefer an appeal. The contention is clearly sound, and we should have given effect
115
904
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958j
to it, were it not that the result of this litigation would
Sri Vcnkat.ra""'na affect the rights of members of the public, and we
Dev'"" and Othm consider it just that the matter should be decided on
v.
·' the merits, so that the controversies involved might
The S tale o,
fin ally settle d . We have accordmgly
.
Hysure and 01/rersbe
condoned the
I 't•t1ka/aran1a
Aiyar J.
delay, and have heard counsel on this application. In
view of this, it is unnecessary to consider the questions
discussed at the Bar as to the scope of Art. 132, who
are entitled to appeal on the strength of a certificate
granted under that Article, and the forum in which the
appeal should be lodged. It is sufficient to say that in
this case no appeal, was, in fact, filed by the respondent.
On the arguments addressed before us, the following questions fall to be decided :
(1) Is the Sri Venkataramana Temple at Moolky,
a temple as defined in s. 2(2) of Madras Act V of
1947?
(2) If it is, is it a denominational temple?
( 3) If it is a denominational temple, are the plaintiffs entitled to exclude all Hindus other than Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins from entering into it for worship,
on the ground that it is a matter of religion within'
the protection of Art. 26(b) of the Constitution?
( 4) If so, is s. 3 of the Act valid on the ground that
it is a law protected by Art. 25(2) (b), and that such
a law prevails against the right conferred by Art. 26
(b); and
( 5) If s. 3 of the Act is valid, are the modifications
in favour of the appellants made by the High Court
legal and proper?
On the first question, the contention of Mr. M. K.
Nambiar for the appellants is that the temple in question is a private one, and therefore falls outside the
purview of the Act. This plea, however, was not
taken anywhere in the pleadings. The plaint merely
alleges that the temple was founded for the benefit of
the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins residing in Moolky
Petah. There is po averment that it is a private temple. It is true that at the time when the suit was "instituted, the definition of 'temple' as it then stood, took
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
905
in only institutions which were dedicated to or for the
1957
benefit of the Hindu public in general, and it wassri Venkataramana
therefore sufficient for the plaintiffs to aver that theDevaru and Others
suit temple was not one of that character, and that it The 5v. if
would have made no difference in the legal position Mysore ::::/o~hers
whether the temple was a private one, or whether it Venkatarama
was intended for the benefit of a section of the public.
Aiyar J.
But then, the Legislature amended the definition of
'temple' by Act XIII of 1949, and brought within it
even institutions dedicated to or for the benefit of a
section of the public; and that would have comprehended a temple founded for the benefit of the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins but not a private temple. In the
written statement which was filed by the Government,
the amended definition of 'temple' was in terms relied
on in answer to the claim of the plaintiffs. In that
situation, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to have
raised the plea that the temple was a private one, if
they intended to rely on it. Far from putting forward
such a plea, they accepted the stand taken by the .
Government in their written statement, and simply
contended that as the temple was a denominational
one, they were entitled to the protection of Art. 26(b).
Indeed, the Subordinate Judge states in para. 19 of
the judgment that it was admitted by the plaintiffs
that the temple came within the purview of the definition as amended by Act XIII of 1949.
Mr. M. K.· Nambiar invited our attention to Exhibit
A-2, which is a copy of an award dated November
28, 1847, wherein it is recited that the temple was
originally founded for the benefit of five families of
Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. He also referred us to
Exhibit A-6, the decree in the scheme suit, O.S. No.
26 of 1915, wherein it was declared that the institution
belonged to that community. He contended on the
basis of these documents and of other evidence
the
case that whether the temple was a private or public
institution was purely a matter of legal inference to
be drawn from the above materials, and that, notwithstanding that the point was not taken in the pleadings,
it could be allowed to be raised as a pure question of
m
LISup. Court-2
906
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
law. We are unable to agree .with this submission.
Sri VenkataramanaThe object of requiring a party to put forward his
Devaru and Otherspleas in the pleadings is to enable the Opposite party
Th ;;
f to controvert them and to adduce evidence in support
1
Myso;e and•o~hersof his case. And it would be neither legal nor just to
Venkatarama refer to eviaence adduced with reference to a matter
Aiyar J.
which was actually in issue and on the basis of that
evidence, to come to a finding on a matter which was
not in issue, and decide the rights of parties on the
basis of that finding. We have accordingly declined
to entertain this contention. We hold, agreeing with
the Courts below, that the Sri Venkataramana Tern·
ple at Moolky is a public temple, and that it is within
the operation of.Act V of 1947.
(2) The next' question is whether the suit temple
is a denominational institution. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that at the inception the
temple was founded for the benefit of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins; but the Subordinate Judge held that
as in course of time public endowments came to be
made to the temple and all classes of Hindus were
taking part freely in worship therein, it might be presumed that they did so as a matter of right, and that,
therefore, the temple must be held to have become
dedicated to the Hindu public generally. The learned
Judges of the High Court, however, came to a different conclusion. They followed the decision in Devaraja Shenoy v. State of Madras (supra), and held that
the temple was a denominational one. The learned
Solicitor-General attacks the correctness of this finding on two grounds. He firstly contends that even
though the temple might have been dedicated to the
Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, that would make it only
a communal and not a denominational institution, unless it was established that there were religious tenets
and practices special to the community, and that that
had not been done. Now, the facts found are that the
members of this community migrated from Gowda
Desa first to the Goa region and then to the south,
that they carried with them their idols, and that when
they were first settled in Moolky, a temple was found19s1
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
907
ed and these idols were installed therein. We are
19s1
therefore concerned with the Gowda Saraswath Brah-srt .Venkataramana
mins not as a section of a community but as a sectDevaru and OJlters
associated with the foundation and maintenance of 'The s:· te 01
the Sri Venkataramana Temple, in other words, not as Mysore a/:t Others .
a mere denomination, but as a religious denomination. Venkatarama
From the evidence of P. W. 1., it appears that the
Atyar J.
·Gowda Sarawath Brahmins have three G1J,rm, that
those in Moolky Petah are follow'ers of the head of
the Kashi Mutt, ari'd that it is he that performs some
of the important ceremonies in the temple. Exhibh
A is a document of the year 1826-27. That shows thai
the head of the Kashi Mutt settled the disputes among
the Archakas, and that they agreed to do the puja
under his orders. The uncontradicted evidence of·
P. W. 1 also shows that du"ring certain religious ceremonies, persons other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins have been wholly excluded. This evidence leads·
irresistibly to the conclusion that the temple is a denominational one, as contended for by the appellants. ·
The second ground urged on behalf of the respondent is that the evidence discloses that· all communities had· been freely admitted into the temple, and
that though P. W. 1 stated that persons other than
Gowda Saraswath Brahmins could enter only with
the permission of the trustees, there was no instance
in which such permission was refused. It was contended that the inference to be .drawn from this was
that the Hindu public generally had a right to worship in the temple. The law on the subject is well
settled. When there is a question as to the nature
and extent of a dedication of a temple, that has to be
determined on the terms of the deed of endowment
if that is available, and where it is not, on other materials legally admissible; and proof of long and uninterrupted user would be cogent evidence of the terms
thereof. Where, therefore, the original deed of endowment is not available and it is found that all persons are freely worshipping in the temple without let
or hindrance, it would be a proper inference to make
that they do so as a matter of right, and that the
908
1957
SUPREME COURTS REPORTS
[1958]
original foundation was for their. benefit as well. But
sr· Venkataramana where it is proved by production of the deed of endowD;varu and Othersment or otherwise that the
original dedication was
v.
for the benefit of a particular community, the fact that
The State
of
bers of other commum"t"1es were all owed free1y
Mysore
and Othersmem
V•~7;!':'~':'a
to worship cannot lead to the inference that the dedication .was for their benefit as well. For, as observed in Babu Bhawan Din v. Gir Har Saroop ( 1 ), "it
would not in general be consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice that worshippers should be turned
away". On the findings of the Court J:ielow that the
foundation was originally for the benefit of the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmin community, the fact that other
classes of Hindus were admitted freely into the temple
would not have the effect of enlarging the scope of
the dedication into one for the public generally. On
a consideration of the evidence, we see no grounds for
differing from the finding given by the learned Judges
in the court below that the suit temple is a denominational temple founded for the benefit of the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins, supported as it is by the conclusion reached by another Bench of learned Judges
in Devaraja Shenoy v. State of Madras (supra). In
this view, there is no need to discuss whether this issue
is res jud~ata by reason of the decision in Writ Petition No. 668 of 1951.
(3) On the finding that the Sri Venkataramana
Temple at Moolky is a denominational institution
founded for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, the question arises whether the appellants are
entitled to exclude other communities from entering
into it for worship on the ground that it is a matter
of religion within the protection of Art. 26 (b). It is
argued by the learned Solicitor-General that exclusion of"persons from entering into a temple cannot ipso
facto be regarded as a matter of religion, that whether
it is so must depend on the tenets of the particular
religion which the institution in question represents,
and that there was no such proof in the present case.
Now, the precise connotation of the expression
(I) (1939) LR. 67 I.A. I.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
909
"matters of religion" came up for consideration by this
1957
Co\U't in The Commissioner, Hindu. Religious Endow-sr1 Venkataramana
ments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha SwamiarDevaru and Othm
of Sri Shirur Mutt . ( l ) ' and it was held therein. that .Th ;; I "
it embraced not merely matters of doctrine and belief Myso:e a!/o~hm
pertaining to the religion but also the practice ·of it, Venkatarama:
· or· to put it ill terms of Hindu theology, not merely
Aiyar 1•
. its Gnana but also its Bakti and Karma Kandas. The
following observations of Mukherjea J., (as he then
was) are particularly apposite to. the present discussion:
"In the first place, what constitutes the essential
part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with
reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If
the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe
that offerings of food should be given to the idol at
particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies
should be performed in a certain way at certain periods
of the year or that there should be daily recital of
sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all these
would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere
fact that they involve expenditure of money or. employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic. character;
all of them are religious practices and· should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of
article 26 (b)."
It being thus settled that matters .of religion in
Art. 26(b) include even practices which are regard~
ed by the communitY as part of its religion, we have
now to consider whether exclusion of a person from
entering into a temple for worship is a matter of. religion according to Hindu Ceremonial Law. l'here ·
has been di1ference of opinion among the writers as
to wh~ther image. worship had a place in th~ religion
of the HinduS, as revealed in the Vedas. On the• one
hand, we have hymns in pr.aise of Gods, and on ·~e ·
other, we have highly philosophical ·passages in the
Upanishads describing the Supreme Being as
(1) [195 4) S.C.R..1005.
910
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
omnipotent, omnicient and omnipresent and transcends,; Venkataramanaing all names and forms. When we come to the Puranas
Devaru and Otherswe find a marked change. The conception had be~' sv. 1 ·' come established of Trinity of Gods, Brahma, Vishnu
me
ta eOthersan
o,
d s·1va as mam'fest at1ons
.
Mysore a11d
of t he t hree aspects of
Venkatarama creation, preservation and destruction attributed to
Aiyar J.
the Supreme Being in the Upanishads, as, for example,
in the following passage in the Taittiriya Upanishad,
Brigu Valli, First Anuvaka:
"That from which all beings are born, by which
they live and into which they enter and merge." The
Gods have distinct forms ascribed to them and their
worship at home and in temples is ordained as certain means of attaining salvation. These injunctions
have had such a powerful hold over the minds of the
people that daily worship of the deity in temple came
to be regarded as one of the obligatory duties of a
Hindu. It was during this period that temples were
constructed all over the country dedicated to Vishnu,
Rudra, Devi, Skanda, Ganesha and so forth, and worship in the temple can be said to have become the
practical religion of all sections of the Hindus ever
since. With the growth in importance of temples and
of worship therein, more and more attention came to
be devoted to the ceremonial law relating to the construction of temples, installation of idols therein and
conduct of worship of the deity, and numerous are
the trei;ttises that came to be written for its exposition.
These are known as Agamas, and there are as many
as 28 of them relating to the Saiva temples, the most
important of them being the Kamikagama, the Karanagama and the Suprabedagama, while the Vikhanasa
and the Pancharatra are the chief Agamas of the Vaishnavas. These Agamas, contain elaborate rules as to
how the temple is to be constructed, where the principal deity is to be consecrated, and where the other
Devatas are to be installed and where the several classes of worshippers are to stand and worship. The following passage from the judgment of Sadasiva Aiyar
J. in Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar ('),gives
(I) (1914) 27 M.L.J. 253.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
911
a summary of the prescription contained in one of the
1957
Agamas :
Sri Venkataramana
"In the Nirvachanapaddhathi it is said that Sivad-Devaru and Others
wijas should worship in the Garbagriham,
Brahmin·s "''he
·
.. , sv.late of
1rom the ante chamber or Sabah Mantabam, Ksha~ Mysore and Others
triyas; Vysias and Sudras from the Mahamantabham, Venkatarama
"the dancer and the musician from the NrithamantaAiyar 1.
bham east of the Mahamantabham and that castes yet
lower in scale should content themselves with the
sight of the Gopuram."
The other Agamas also contain similar rules .
.Accor.ding to the Agamas, an image becomes· defiled if there is any departure or violation of any of
the rules, relating to worship, and purificatory ceremonies ( lmown as Samprokshana) have to be performed
for restoring the sanctity of the shrine. Vide judgment of Sudasiva Aiyar J. in Gopala Muppanar v.
Subramania Aiyar (suprq). In SankaraUnga Nadan
v. Raja Rajeswara Dorai ( 1 ), it was held by the Pri'Vy
Council '8f!lrming the judgment of the Madras High
Court that a trustee who agreed to admit into the temple persons who were not entitled to worship therein,
:according to the Agamas and the custom of the temple
was guilty of breach of trust. Thus, under ·the ceremonial law ·pertaining to temples, who are entitled to
enter into them for worship and where they are entitled to stand and worship and how, the worship is to
be conducted are all matters of religion. The conclusion is also implicit in Art. 25 which after declaring
that all ·persons are entitled freely to profess, practice
and propagate religion, enacts that this should ·not
affect the operation of any law throwing open Hindu
religious institutions of a public character to all classes
and sections of Hindus. We have dealt with this question at some length in view of the argument of the
learned Solicitor-General that exclusion of persons
from temple bas not been shown to be a matter of religion with reference to the tenets of Hinduism.· We
•t
•
•
e • • e t • •
t
• •
• • e t
.
I
•
•
•
(1) (1908) L.R. 3S I.A. 176,
. llti
.
•
•
•
•
I
•
•
I
t
I
•
.
f
•
'
t
I
e
t
•
I
e • • t
I
•
I
t
I
•
t
•
e • '
• ' t •,
912
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
1957
must accordingly hold that if the rights of the appels,; venkataramana lants have to be determined solely with reference to
Demm and Others Art. 26 ( b), then s. 3 of Act V of 194 7, should be held
Tl
;·
f
to be bad as infringing it.
(4) That brings us on to the main question for
determination in this appeal, whether the right guaranteed under Art. 26 (b) is subject to a law protected
hy Art. 25(2) (b) throwing the suit temple open to
all classes and sections of Hindus. We must now
examine closely the terms of the two articles. Art. 25,
omitting what is not material, is as follows :
"(l) Subject to public order, morality and health
and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons
are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the
right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law o.r prevent the State from
making any law(b) providing for social welfare and reform or
the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a
public character to all classes and sections of Hindus".
Article 26 runs as follows :
"Subject to public order, morality and health,
every religious denomination or any section thereof
shall have the right( a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable
property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance
with law."
We have held that matters of religion in Art. 26(b)
include the right to exclude persons who are not entitled to participate in the worship according to the
tenets of the institution. Under this Article, therefore, the appellants would be entitled to exclude al!
persons other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins from
entering into the temple for worship. Article
Mys;;, d,~Jcrfihm
Venkatarama
Aiyar J.
S.C.R.
·SUPREME COURT REPORTS
913
25(2) (b) enacts that a law throwing open public tern1957
ples to all classes of Hindus is valid. The word 'pub- Sri Venkataramana
lie' includes, in its ordinary acceptation, any section De••aru and Others
?f t~e J?Ublic! a~d the suit temple would be a public Tlte s~te 01
mstltution withm Art. 25(2) (b), a~d s. 3 of the ActMysore and Others
would therefore be within its protection. Thus, the Venkatarnma
two Articles appear to be apparently in conflict, Mr.
Aiyar J.
M. K. Nambiar contends that t}Jis conflict could be
avoided if the expression "religious institutions of a
public character" is understood as meaning institutions
dedicated to the Hindu comm~nity in geil:eral, though
some sections thereof might be excluded by custom
from entering into them, and that, in that view, denominational institutions founded for the benefit of a
section of Hindus would fall outside the purview of
Art. 25(2) (b) as not being dedicated for the Hindu
community in general. He sought support for this
contention in the law relating to the entry of excluded
classes into Hindu temples and in the history of legislation with reference thereto, in Madras.
According to the Agamas, a public temple enures,
where it is not proved to have been founded for the
benefit of any particular community, for the benefit of
all Hindus including the excluded classes. But the
extent to which a person might participate in the
· worship therein would vary with the community in
which he was born. In VenkatachaLapathi v. Subbarayadu ( '.), the following statement of the law was
quoted by the learned Judges with a apparent approval:
"Temple, of course, is intended for all castes, but
there are restrictions of entry. Pariahs cannot go
into the court of the temple even. Sudras and Baniyas
can go into the hall of the temple. Brahmins can go
into .the holy of the holies."
In Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar (supra).
Sadasiva Aiyar J. observed as follows at p. 258 :
"It is clear from the above that temples were intended for the worship of people belonging to all the
(I) (1890) l.L.R. 13 Ma<!. 293.
914
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
19S7
four castes without exception. Even outcastes were
Sri Venktllaramananot wholly left out of the benefits of temple worship,
Devaru ark/ Othmtheir mode of worship being however made subject to
Tiie ;,~,. of
seve~e restrictions as they could not pass beyond the
011rersDWaJastambam (and some times not beyond the temVenkataroma ple outer gate) and they could not have a sight of the
Aiyor J.
images other than the procession images brought out
at the times of festivals."
The true position, therefore, is that the excluded
classes were all entitled to the benefit of the dedication,
though their actual participation in the worship was
insignificant. It was to remove this anomaly that
legislation in Madras was directed for near a decade.
First came the Malabar Temple Entry Act (Madras
XX of 1938). Its object was stated to be "to remove
the disabilities imposed by custom and usage on certain classes of Hindus in respect of their entry into, and
offering worship in, Hindu temples". Section 2 ( 4)
defined 'temple' as "a place which is used as a place
of public worship by the Hindu community generally
except excluded classes .......... ". Sections 4 and 5
of the Act authorised the trustees to throw such temples open to persons belonging to the excluded classes
under certain conditions. . This Act extended only to
the District of Malabar. Next came the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation and Indemnity Act (Madras
Act XXII of 1939). The preamble to the Act states
that "there has been a growing volume of public
opinion demanding the removal of disabilities imposed
by custom and usage on certain classes of Hindus in
respect of their entry into an offering worship in
Hindu temples", and that "it is just and desirable to
authorize the trustees in charge of such temples to
throw them open to ...... the said classes". Section 3
of the Act authorised the trustees to throw open the
temples to them. This Act extended to the whole of
the Province of Madras. Then we come to the Act,
which has given rise to this litigation, Act V of 1947.
It has been already mentioned that, as originally passed, its object was to lift the ban on the entry into
temples of communities which are excluded by custom
Mysore and
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
915
.from entering into them, and 'temple' was also· de1957
fined as a place dedicated to the Hindus generally. Sri Venkataramana
Now, the contention of Mr. Nambiar is that Art.Devam and Others
25(2)(b) must be interpreted in the background of
v.
1
the law as laid down in Gopala Muppanar v. Subra- M{s~;e S:::Je o~hers
ma1,ia Aiyar (.supra) and the definition of 'temple'
Venkatarama
giv:en in the statutes mentioned above, and that the
Aiyar J.
-expression "religious institutions of a public character" must be inter}>reted as meaning institutions
which are dedicated for worship to the Hindu community in general, though certain sectiorts thereof were
prohibited by custom from entering into them, and
that, in that view, denominational temples will fall
outside Art. 25(2)(b). There is considerable force in
this argument. One of the problems which had been
exercising the minds of the Hindu social reformers
during the period preceding the Constitution was the
existence in their midst of communities which were
classed as untouchables. A custom which denied to
large sections of Hindus the right to use public roads
and institutions to which all the other Hindus had a
right of access, purely on grounds of birth could not
be considered reasonable and defended on any sound
democratic principle, and efforts were being made to
secure its abolition by legislation. This culminated
in the enactment of Art. 17, which is as follows :
" 'Untouchability' is abolished and its practice in
any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 'Untouchability' shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law."
Construing Art. 25(2)(b) in the light of Art. 17, it
is arguable that its object was only to permit entry of
the excluded classes intO temples which were open to
all other classes of Hindus, and that that would' exclude its application to denominational temples. Now,
.denominational temples are founded, ex hypothesi, for
the benefit of particular sections of Hindus, and so long
as the law recognises them as valid-and Art. 26
clearly does that-what reason can there. be for permitting entry into them of persons other than those
for whose benefit they were founded? If a trustee
916
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958J
diverts trust funds for the benefit of persons wh<il are
Sri venkataramananot beneficiaries under the endowment, he would be
Devaru and Otherscommitting a breach of trust, and though a provision
The s~~te of of th~ Constit~tion is not open t~ a~tack on t~e grou_nd
Mysore and Othersthat it authorises such an act, is it to be lightly 11'1.Venkatarama ferred that Art. 25(2) (b) validates what would, but
Aiyar J.
for it, be a breach of trust and for no obvious reasons
of policy, as in the case of Art. 17? There is, it should
be noted, a fundamental distinction between excluding persons from temples open for purposes of worship to the Hindu public in general on the ground that
they belong to the excluded communities and excluding persons from denominational temples on the
ground that they are not objects within the benefit of
the foundation. The former will be hit by Art. 17
and the latter protected by Art. 26, and it is the contention of the appellants that Art. 25(2)(b) should
not be interpreted as applicable to both these categories and that it should be limited to the former. The
argument was also advanced as further supporting this
view, that while Art. 26 protects denominational institutions of not merely Hindus but of all communities
such as Muslims and Christians, Art. 25(2) (b) is limited in its operation to Hindu temples, and that it could
not have been intended that there should be imported
into Art. 26(b) a limitation which would apply to institutions of one community and not of others. Article
26, it was contended, should therefore be construed
as falling wholly outside Art. 25(2)(b), which should
be limited to institutioni; other than denominational
ones.
The answer to this contention is that it is impossible to read any such limitation into the language of
Art. 25 (2)(b). It applies in terms to all religious institutions of a public character without qualification
or reserve. As already stated, public institutions
would mean not merely temples dedicated to the public as a whole but also those foUllded for the benefit
of sections thereof, and denominational temples would
be comprised therein. The language of the Article
being plain and unambiguous, it is not open to us to
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
917
read into it limitations which are not there, based on
1957
a priori reasoning as to the probable intention of the Sri Venkataramana ·
Legislature. Such intention can be gathered only Devara and Others
from the words actually used in the statute; and in a
v.
Court of law, what is unexpressed has the same·valueCy:;: S::Je c'f~ers
as what is unintended.. We must therefore hold that!'"· v. k denominational institutions are within Art. 25(2) (b).
e~ 1;!~'~'.""
It is then said that if the expression "religious institutions of a public character" in Art. 25(2) (b) is
to be interpreted as including denominational institutions, it would clearly be in conflict with Art. 26 (b),
and it is argued that in that situation, Art. 26(b)
must, on its true construction, be held to override Art.
25(2) (b). Three grounds were urged in support of
this contention, and they must now be examined. It
was firstly argued that while Art. 25 was stated to
be "subject to the other provisi9ns of this Part" (Part .
III), there was no such limitation on the operation of
Art. 26, and that, therefore, Art. 26 (b) must be held
to prevail over Art. 25(2) (b). But it has to be noticed that the limitation "subject to the other provisions
of this Part" occurs only in cl. ( 1) of Art. 25 and not
in cl. (2). Clause (1) declares the rights of all persons to freedom of conscience and the right freely to
profess, practise and propagate religion. It is this
right that is subject to the other provisions in the
Fundamental Rights Chapter. One of the provisions
to which the right declared in Art. 25 (1) is subject is
Art. 25 (2). A law, therefore, which falls within Art.
25(2) (b) will control the right conferred by Art. 25
(1), and the limitation in Art. 25(1) does not apply
to that law.
It is next contended that while the right conferred
under Art. 26(d) is subject to any law which may be
passed with r~ference thereto, there is no such restriction on the right conferred by Art. 26 (b). It is accordingly argued that any law which infringes the right
under Art. 26(b) is invalid, and that s. 3 of Act V of
1947 must accordingly be held to have become void.
Reliance is placed on the observations of this Court in
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
.,
\ ..
\ '
••
,
'
918
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
[1958]
its contents and has reference to the rights of
communities, and controls both Art. 25(1) and
Sri Venkataramana Art. 26 (b).
·
Devaru and Others
h .
. .
v.
. ~- The result t en 1s that there are two prov1s10ns of
TPe State of
equal authority, neither of them being subject to the
MysoreandO'km other. The question is how the apparent. conflict
between them is to be resolved. The rule of construe.
Venkatarama
tion is well settled that wheu there are in an enactA~ ~
ment two provisions whic h cannot b e reconciled with
each other, they should be so interpreted that, if
. possible, effect could be given to both. This is what is
known as the rule of harmonious construction. Applying this rule, if the contention·· of the appellants is to
be accepted, then Art. 25(2)(b) will become wholly
nugatory in its application to denominational temples, ·
though, as stated above, the language of that
Article includes them. On the other hand, if the contention of the respondents is accepted, then full effect can
be given to Art. 26(b) in all matters ofreligion, subject
only to this that as regards one aspect of them, entry
into a temple for worship, the rights declared under
Art. 25(2)(b) will prevail.· \Vhile, in the former case,
·Art. 25(2)(b) will be put wholly out of operation, in the
latter, effect can be given to both that provision and
Art. 26(b). \Ve must accordingly hold that Art. 26(b)
must be read subject to Art. 25(2){b).
(5) It remains to deal with the question whether the
modifications made in the decree of the High Court in
favour of the appellants are valid. Those modifications refer to various ceremonies relating to the
worship of the deity at specified times each day and
on specified occasions. The evidence of P. \V. I establishes that on those occasions, all persons other than
Gowda Saraswath llrahmins were excluded from
participation thereof. That evidence remains uncontradicted, and has been accepted by the learned
Judges, and the correctness of their finding on this
point has not been challenged before us. It is not in
·dispute that the modifications aforesaid relate, according to the view taken by this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, .Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur lllutt
z9s1
-
S.C.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
919
(supra), to matters Of religion,: being . intimately
I957
connected w~th the wor~hip of the d~ity .. On the findings,; v,.;:;;:,,amana
that the smt temple· IS \a denommatwnal one, thoDevam and Othm
modifications made in the High Court decree would be
v.
within the protection of Art. 26(b).
The Stat• of .
The learned Solicitor-General for the respondents MymeandOthm
assails this portion of the decree on two grounds. He Venkat:ama
firstly contends that the.right .to enter into a temple
Aiya• 1 .
which is protected by Art. 25{2)(b) is a right to enter
into it for purposes of worship, that that right should
be liberally construed, and that the modifications in
question constitute a _serious invasion of that. right,
and should be set aside as unconstitutional. \Ve agree
that the right protected by Art. 25(2)(b) is a right to
enter into a temple for purposes of worship, -and that
further it should be construed liberally in favour of the
public. But it does not follow from this that that
right is absolute and unlimited in character. No
member of the Hindu public could, for example, claini
as part of the rights protected by Art. 25(2)(b) that a
temple must be kept open for worship at all hours of
the day and night, or that he should personally perform those services, which the Archakas alone could
perform. It is again a well-known practice· of religious
institutions of all denominations to limit some of its
services to persons who have been specially initiated,
though at other times, the public in general are free to
participate in the worship. Thus, the right recognised
by Art. 25{2)(b) must necessarily be subject to some
limitations or regulations, and one such limitation or.
regulation must arise in the process of harmonising
the right conferred by Art .. 25(2)(b) with that protected by Art. 26(b).
·
. \Ve have held that the right of a. denomination to
wholly exclude members of the public from worshipping
in the temple, though comprised in Art. 26(b), ·must
yield to the overriding right declared by Art. 25{2)(b)
in favour of the public to enter into a temple for
worship. But where the right claimed is not one of
general and total exclusion of the public from worship
in the temple at all times but of exclusion from certain
religious services, . they being limited by the rules of
117
920
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958)
x957
the foundation to the members of the denomination,
. v ·-;;;
·
then the question is not whether Art. 25(2)(b) over5
;:var': :n~'a;;:;,: rides that right so as to extinguish it, but whether it is
v.
· possible-so to regulate the rights of the persons
The State of
protected by Art. 25(2)(b) as to give effect to both the
1'fysore
Others rights. If the denominational rights are such that to
·
••d
Venkatarama
Aiya~ J.
give effect to them would substantially reduce the
right conferred by Art. 25(2)(b), then of course, on our
conclusion that ·Art. 25{2)(b) prevails as against
Art. 26(b), the denominational rights must vanish.
But where that is not the position, and after giving
effect to the rights of the denomination what is left to
the public of the right of worship is something substantial and not merely the husk of it, there is no
reason why we shouhl not so construe Art. 25(2)(b)
as to give effect to Art. 26(b) and recognise the rights
of the denomination in respect of matters which are
strictly denominational, leaving the rights of the public
in other respects unaffected.
The question then is one of fact as to whether the
rights claimed by the appellants are strictly denominational in character, and whether after giving effect
to them, what is left to the public of the right of
worship is substantial. That the rights allowed by the
High Court in favour of the appellants are purely
denominational clearly appears from the evidence on
record. P.\V. 1 put forward two distinct rights on
behalf of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. He firstly
claimed that no one except members of his community
.had at any time the right to worship in the temple
except with their permission; but he admitted that the
members of the public were, in fact, worshipping and
that permission had never been refused. This right
will be hit by Art. 25 (2) (b), and cannot be recognised.
P.\V. I put forward another and distinct right, namely,
that during certain ceremonies and on special occaeions, it was only members of the Gowda Saraswath
Brahmin community that ha.d the right to take part
therein, and that on those occasions, all other persons
would be excluded. This would clearly be a denominational right. Then, the question is whether if this
right is recognised; what is left to th'l public of their_
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
921
1957
mination what is left to the public of the right of
worship is something substantial and not merely thesri Venkataramana
husk of it, there is no reason why we should not so Devaru and Others
construe Art. 25(2)(b) as to give effect to Art. 26(b) TheS;~te of
and recognise the rights of the denomination in res-Mysore and Others
pect . of matters which are strictly denominational, ven;;;;;;;;.ama
leaving the rights of the public in other respects
Aiyar J.
unaffected.
The question then is one of fact as to whether the
rights claimed by the appellants are strictly denominational in character, and whether after giving effect
to them, what is left to the public of the right of worship is substantial. That the rights allowed by the
High Court in favour of the appellants are purely denominational clearly appears from the evidence on
record. P.W. 1 put forward two distinct rights on behalf .of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. He firstly
claimed that no one except members of his community had at any time the right to worship in the temple except with their permission; but he admitted that
the members of the public were, in fact, worshipping
and that permission had never been refused. This
right will be hit by Art. 25(2) (b), and cannot be
recognised. P.W.1 put forward another and distinct
right, namely, that during certain ceremonies and on
special occasions, it was only members of the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmin community that had the right to
take part therein, and that on those occasions, all other
persons would be excluded. This would clearly be a
denominational right. Then, the question is whether
if this right is recognised, what is left to the public
of their right under Art. 25 (2) (b) is substantial. The
learned Solicitor-General himself conceded that even
apart from the special occasions reserved for the
Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, the other occasions of
worship were sufficiently numerous and substantial,
and we are in agreement with him. On the facts,
therefore, it is possible to protect the rights of the appellants on those special occasions, without affecting
the substance of the right declared by Art. 25(2)(b);
iL1 .S.up, Court/61-3
922
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19581
and, in our judgment, the decree passed by the High
Sri venkataramana Court strikes a just balance between the rights of the
Devaru and Others Hindu public under Art. 25(2)(b) and those of the
The s~~te of denomination of the appellants under Art. 26(b). and
Mysore and Others is not open to objection.
venkatarama
Aiyar J.
Then, it is said that the members of the public
are not parties to the litigation, and that they may
not be bound by the result of it, and that, therefore,
the matter should be set at large. Even if the members of the public are necessary parties to this litigation, that cannot stand in the way of the rights of
the appellants being declared as against the parties
to the action. Moreover, the suit was one to challenge the order of the Government holding that all
classes of Hindus are entitled to worship in the suit
temple. While the action was pending, the Constitution came into force, and as against the right claimed
by the plaintiffs under Art. 26(b), the Government
put forward the rights of the Hindu public under Art.
25(2) (b). There has been a full trial of the issues involved, and a decision has been given; declaring the
rights of the appellants and of the public. When the
appellants applied for leave to appeal to this Court,
that application was resisted by the Government inter
alia on the ground that the decree of the High Court
was a proper decree recognising the rights of all sections of the public. In view of this, there is no force
in the objection that the public -are not, as such, par,•
ties to the suit. It is their rights that have been agita,..
ted by the Government and not a.n:y- of its rights.
In the result, both the appeal and the application
for special leave to appeal must be dismissed. The
parties will bear their own costs throughout. The
appellants will take their costs out of the temple
funds.
Appeals Dism.iSsed.
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