THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX versus M/S. MCMILLAN & CO.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 October 1957 | [1958] 1 S.C.R. 689 | 1957 INSC 88
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 October 1957
- Bench
- NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*, S.K. DAS, J.L. KAPUR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 29/1955
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1958] 1 S.C.R. 689
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 88
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX
1957
v.
Oc1ober, 16.
M/s. McMILLAN & CO.
(BHAGWATI, S. K. DAs and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Income-Tax-Assessment-Acceptance by Income-tax Officer <f
he assessee's method of accounting-Power of Appellate Assistant
Commissioner in appeal-If can reject such method and adopt
a11otlzer-India11 Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), ss. 31, 13 proviso-Indian Income-tax Rules, R. 33.
...
The respondent assessee, a non-resident company, sold and
published books and magazines in various parts of the world. lt
submitted for the assessment year in question a return in which a
:fixed percentage of the marked price. of all publications sold in
India, printed in India or elsewhere, was adopted as the cost of
production and this method of accounting was followed in the
return. The Income-tax Officer accepting this method, assessed
the income at Rs. 82,623. The assessee preferred an appeal on
other grounds to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The
Appellate Assistant Commissioner was of opinion that the true
income of the assessee could not be deduced from the method of
accounting followed by him and accepted by the Income-tax
Officer and issued a notice under s. 31(3) of the Indian Income·
tax Act and after hearing the assessee fixed his assessable income
at Rs. 1,11,616 by applying the provisions of Rule 33 of the Indian
Income-tax Rules. The assessee appealed to the Appellate
Tribunal and the Tribunal, relying on a recent decision of the
Bombay High Court, held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to enhance the income in the way he did
and referred the matter to the High Court at the instance of the
appellant. The High Court held against the appellant and he
appealed. The questions for decision were whether it was open to
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in exercise of his powers
under s. 31(3} of the Act to reject the .method of accounting,
followed by the assessee and accepted by the Income-tax Officer,
under the proviso to s. 13 of the Act, and compute the income,
profits or gains of the assessee under Rule 33 of the Rules.
Held, (per S. K. Das and Kapur. JJ., Bhagwati, J., dissenting)
that the questions must be answered in the affirmative and the
appeal must succeed.
There is nothing ins. 31, read with the proviso to s. 13, of the
Indian Income-tax Act which prevents the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, in an appeal preferred by the asscssee, from
exercising the powers which the Income-tax Officer can exercise
under the proviso to s. 13 of the Act. Although it is for the
Jncome-tax Officer, in the first instance, to decide what would be
the correct method of accounting under the proviso in a particular case, he has, in doing so, to act reasonably and judicially and
L2SC/61 P. V-7
1590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
not subjectively or arbitrarily and any decision he may arrive at
cannot be treati:d as final. Neither s. \J nor the proviso imposes
The Commissioner any limitation on the wide powers conferred on the Appellate
of Income-Tax Assistant Commissioner bys. 31(3) of the Act once he is in proper
v.
seizin of the matter.
1957
--
M/s. McMi/1011
& Co.
Narrondas Manordass, Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax
(1957) 31 J.T.R. 909, approved.
K. F. Vakeel v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, l.T. Reference No. 21 of 1950, Bombay High Court, dissented from.
Case-law discussed.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has also the power in
an appeal to apply the provisions of Ruic 33 of the Indian Incometax Rules for the purpose of a correct computation of the assessee's
income although the Income-tax Officer has not done so.
Per Bhagwati,.J.-The difference in the language of the tw<>
conditions, on the fulfilment of which the meth<>d of accounting
regularly employed by the assessee can be rejected under the
proviso to s. 13 of the Indian ·Income-tax Act clearly indicates
that the Legislature intended that any determination as to the
second condition, namely, that the income, profits and gains of the
assessee cannot be property deduced from the method regularly
employed by him, must be of the Income-tax Officer atone and no
other authority described in the hierarchy of Income-tax authorities and defined by the Act.
K. F. Vakeel v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, J.T. Reference No. 21 of 1950, Bombay High Court, approved.
Nor are the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
under s. 3t (3) of the Act, in however wide terms they may have
been described, absolute in character being circumscribed, as they
necessarily are, by the nature of the pr<>ceedings before him and
are limited to the subject-matter of the assessment.
Narrondas Manordass, Bombay v. The Commissioner of lncometax, Bombay, (1957) 31 l.T.R. 909, referred to.
Case-Jaw discussed.
Section 31(3) of the Act has, therefore, to be read along with
s. 13 and its proviso and so read there can be no doubt the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner has no power fir appeal t<>
nullify the power which the Income-tax Officer atone has under
the proviso. He has no power to reject the method of accounting
regularly employed by the assessee suo motu. If he thinks that
the Income-tax Officer was in error in accepting that meth<>d as
the proper method for computing the assessee's income what he
can do is to set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax
Officer to make a fresh assessment under s. 31(3)(h) of the Act.
Nor can he in exercising his power of enhancing the assessment
under s. 31(3)(a) exercise the power under the proviso to s. 13
which is solely vested in the Income-tax Officer.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
The questions must, therefore, be answered in the negative.
...
'
1957
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION. Civil Appeal No. The Co;;;;;;ssioner
29 of 1955;
of Income-Tax
v.
Appeal by special l~ave from the judgment and M/s. McMillan
& Co.
order dated the 14th March, 1953, of the Bombay High
Court in Income-tax Reference No. 27 of 1952.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,
G. N. Joshi and R.H. D.hebar, for the appellant.
N. A. Palkhivala, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley,
Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra,'for the respondents.
1957. October l6. The judgment of S. K. Das and
J. L. Kapur JJ. was delivered by S. K. Das J. Bhagwati J. delivered a separate judgment.
S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave s. K. Dasi.
from the judgment and order of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, dated March ~. 1953, in
Income-tax Reference No. 27 of 1952, by· which the
said High Court answered certain questions of law
referred to it in the negative. The answer to those
questions depends upon the true scope and effect of
certain provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act (XI
of 1922), hereinafter referred as the Act, regarding
which t:bere has already been a difference of opinion
between two High Courts in India. Unfortunately,
we have come to a conclusion different from that of
our learned senior brother Bhagwati J., and we are
explaining in this judgment, as briefly and clearly as
we can, the grounds on which our conclusion is
founded.
Very briefly put, the relevant facts are these. The
assessee, respondent before us, is a non-resident com-·
pany which has its head office in London and branches
in India. It sells and publishes books and magazines
in various parts of the world. For the assessment
year in question, it submitted a return of income in
which with regard to all publications sold in India,
whether printed in India or elsewhere, a fixed percentage of what was known as the marked price was
adopted as the cost of production. This, if one may
so put it, was the method of accounting on which the
assesseo company submitted its return. The Income-
692
SUPREME COU;RT REPORTS
[1958]
ta~ Offi.cer apparently accepted it
. and subject to cerIThe Commissioner tam mmor modifications as respects some items of
of Income-Tax expenditure and an alleged bad debt with whieh we
v.
are not now concerned, assessed the assessee on an
M/s. McMillan income of Rs. 82,623. The assessee appealed to the
& Co.
Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The latter issued
s. K. Das 1. a notice under s. 31(3) of the Act against the assessee.
and after hearing the assessee, enhanced the assessment of the assessee company's business income to
Rs. 1,ll,616. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner
·
found:
.
1957
_
"It is noticed that on total turnover of Rs. 16,01,973
for the previous year ending 30th May, 1943, the gross
profit amounted to Rs. 4,09,360 working out to just
about 25.5 per ceni. In the case of World profit and
loss account I find that the gross profit earned was
£ 231,070 on total sales of £ 628,000 working out to
over 37 per cent. The difference in gross profit is so
wide that some explanation had to be called for from
the appellants, especially in view of the fact that the
appellants do not maintain what should be called an
Indian trading and profit and loss account on the same
lines as the World trading and profit and loss account~
The profit and loss account maintained in India shows
only the purchases at the rate at which these were
charged to the Indian branches by the London head
office instead of the real cost of these publications."
He was of the view that inasmuch as the fixed percentage of the marked price adopted by the assessee company as the production cost for its publications sold
in India did not correctly represent .the actual cost of
production, the method of accounting regularly employed is such that a true figure of income, profits
and gains is not deducible therefrom. He fixed the
income of the assessee company on the basis of the
net world profit of the assessee on its world turnover,
and applying that basis to its Indian business came to
the conclusion that the income of the assessee was
Rs. 1,11,616. He did so presumably under the proviso
to s. i3 and R. 33 of the Indian Income-tax Rules,
1922.
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
The assessee company then appealed to the Appel1957
late Tribunal. The Appellate
Tribunal
remanded
the
Ti'h c-·..,
•t
C
. .
b
e omm1s••oner
case t o the Appe11ate Ass1s ant omm1ss1oner, ut of Income-Tax
before the remand could be decided came the decision
v.
of the Bombay High Court in K. F. Vakeel v. The M/s.McMillan
Commissioner of Income-tax(1). The Tribunal then
& Co.
held that in view of that decision, the Appellate Assis- s. K. Das 1.
tant Commissioner rad no jurisdiction to enhance the
income to Rs. 1,11,616. Thereafter, the Commissioner
of Income-tax, Bombay City, appellant before us,
asked the Tribunal to submit certain questions of law
to the High Court of Bombay. These questions were"(1) Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant
Commissioner on appeal to reject the assessee':; books
of account, which have been accepted by the Incometax Officer ?
(2) Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant
Commissioner on appeal to invoke the provisions of
Rule 33 of the Indian Income-tax Rules for the purpose of computing the income· of a non-resident, the
Income-tax Officer not having done so ?
(3) Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant
Commissioner on appeal to enhance an assessment in
exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 31(3)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, where as
a result of definite information he is of opinion that
the in.come of the assessee has been under-assessed ?"
By its judgment and order dated March 4, 1953, the
High Court answered the first two questions in the
negative and held-rightly in our view-that the third
question did not arise. The appellant then asked for
and obtained special leave to appeal from the said
judgment and order of the Bombay High Court.
The first question appears to us to have been some:.
what widely framed and, in the terms in which it has
been expressed, is not confined to the method of accounting referred to in s. 13 of the Act. The Tucometax Officer, even when he accepts the assessee's method
of accounting, is not bound by the figure of profits shown in the accounts. If and when an appeal is
(I) I.T. Rtf<rence '-"o. 21 of 19~,o, Bombay High Court.
694
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
taken by the assessee to the Appellate Assistant Com-
The CommissloMr missioner, the latter can re-examine the books of
of Income-Tax account to test the correctness of the assessment made.
v.
M/•. McMillan
&
co.
s. K. Das J.
It is not disputed before us that 'accounts' must be
distinguished from the 'method of accounting'. Section 13 and its proviso are concerned with the method
of accounting. In the context of the statement of the
case, however, the fil'St question really means this : is
it open to the Appellate_ Assistant Commissioner, on
an appeal preferred by the assessee, to reject for the
first time the method of accounting, purporting to act
under the proviso to s. 13 of the Act, on the ground
that the income, profits and gains cannot be properly
deduced therefrom, .when the Income-tax Officer
although he has not expressly said so must be taken to
have accepted the self-same method of accounting ?
The answer to the question depends on a correct
interpretation of ss. 13 and 31 of the Act. We shall
first read s. 13 of the Act :
"13. Income, profits and gains shall be computed,
for the purposes of sections 10 and 12, in acl!ordance
with the method of accounting regularly employed by
the nssessee :
Provided that, if no method of accounting has been
regularly employed, or if the method employed is such
that, in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer, the
income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced
therefrom, then the computation shall be made upon
such basis and in such manner as the Income-tax
Officer may determine."
The section enacts that for the purposes of s. 10 (pro. fits of business, profession or vocation) and s. 12 (income from other sources) income, profits and gains
must be computed in accordance with the method of
accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Th<!
choice of the method of accounting lies with the assessee; but the assessee must show that he has followed
the method regularly for his own purposes. The section and the proviso read together clearly make such
a method of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee a compulsory basis of computation unless, in
the opinion of the Income-tax Officer, the income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
1957
If the true income, profits and gains cannot be ascerfained on the basis of the assessee's method, or where Tiie c~ssloirtr
no method of accounting has been regularly employed, of /11come-Tax
the income must be computed upon such basis and in
v.
such manner as the Income-tax Officer may determine. M/s. McMillan
& Co.
Thus far, there is no divergence of opinion as to S. K. Das J.
the true scope and effect of s. 13 and its proviso. The
divergence starts when -s. 13 is read along with s. 31,
and we ~ome to the powers of the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner. Section 31, in so far as it is relevant
for our· purpose, is in these terms. :
"31(3). In disposing of an appeal, the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order
Qf assessment,-..
/ ·
(a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or
(b) set aside the assessment and direct the Income_tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making
such further inquiry as the Income-tax Officer thinks
_fit or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may direct,
.and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed
to ma~e such fresh assessment, and determine where
necessary the amount of tax payable on the basis of ·
such fresh assessment.
'
-
................................................ .
Provided that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall not enhance .an assessment or a penalty
unless the appellant has had a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause against such enhancement;
Provided further that at the hearing of any appeal
against an order of an Income-tax Officer the Incometax Officer shall have the right to be heard either in
person or by a representative."
On one side, the argument on behalf of the appellant is that s. 31 does not in any way limit or circumscribe the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner so as to exclude from the ambit of his
jurisdiction the power given by s. 13 and its proviso;
on the other side, the argument for the respondent is
thai by reason of the terms of the proviso, particularly
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958}
~
the expression "in the opinion of the Income-tax
The commissioner Officer" occurring therein, the power or duty of
of Income-Tax rejecting the method of accounting on the ground that
v.
the income, profits and gains cannot properly be
M/s. McMillan deduced therefrom is given to the Income-tax Officer
4
co.
alone and not to any other authority in the hierarchy
s. K. Das J. of authorities mentioned in s. 5 of the Act. Ancillary
to the aforesaid two main contentions, there is a further divergence of opinion as to whether the det~r
mination of the Income-tax Officer under the proviso
to s. 13, in so far as such determination depends on
his opinion, is final or not. On behalf of the appellant
it is contended that it is not final-whether the determination is in favour of the assessee or not-provided an appeal is preferred by the assessee and the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner gets seizin of the
assessment. For the respondent, the argument is that
it is final when the determination is in favour of the
assessee, even if the assessee prefers an appeal on any
other ground; but it is not final if the determination
is against the assessee and the assessee appeals against
that determination. These are the rival contentions
which now fall for consideration.
Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn a
distinction between what he called at one stage of his
arguments (i) an objective determination by the
Income-tax Officer-a determination based on certain
objective facts and leading to certain consequences
for or against the assessee-and (ii) a small category
of cases where the determination is purely subjecti'Je
and results in certain consequences for or against the
assessee. Learned counsel has expressed the same
argument in less philosophical terms by saying that in
one class of cases, the determination is by whosoever
may be the assessing authority at the 'initial or appellate stage, and in the other by a named authority only.
According to him, into the first class of cases the entire
hierarchy of Income-tax authorities are included;
but in the second class of cases, the decision must be
that of the named authority only. He has referred us
to certain other sections of the Act where, according
to him, the ·determination is also subjective, such as
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
-S. 4A(a)(iv), s. 10(2)(vi), s. 12B(2), s. 23A, etc.
1957
In some other sections, it is pointed out, two or more Tfie c;;;;;;,issioner
authorities are named, e.g., ss. 27, 38, 48, etc. By what of Income-Tax
we must admit is a very adroit and plausible piecing
v. .
together of some of these sections, learned counsel has M/s.&M~":_illan
built up his argument that in the present case the
opinion of the Income-tax Officer that the income, s. K. Das J.
profits and gains can be properly deduced from the
method of accounting regularly employed by thE! assessee is a subjective determination of the Income-tax
Officer alone, and the opinion of no oihec officer or
authority can be substituted therefor. The Appellate
Assistant Commissioner had, therefore, no jurisdiction
to go behind that opinion.
We are unable to accept this line of argument as
correct, and our reasons are these. Firstly,· we think
that learn~d counsel is reading more into tije expression "in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer"; occurring in the proviso to s. 13 than what is warranted by
the language used. Whether the method of accounting
is regularly employed or not is undoubtedly a matter
which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can go
into when he has seizin of the appeal. It is not challenged that if the Income-tax Officer decides against
the assessee and determines that the income, profits
and gains cannot properly be deduced from the assessee's method of accounting, the determination is liable
to be set aside on appeal by the assessee. What then is
the reason for holding that a subjective determination
or the determination of a named authority (whatever
expression may be used) is inviolate in one case but
not so in the other ? We have carefully examined the
other sections of the Act to which learned counsel for
the respondent has referred; but we are unable to
agree with him that the language used therein supports
tlie very subtle distinction that he has drawn. Let us
take, for example, s. 23 which deals with assessment,
Under sub-s. (3), the Income-tax Officer assesses the
total income of the assessee and determines the sum
payable on the basis of such assessment; under sub-s.
( 4) the Income-tax Officer makes the assessment to
698
19 7
5
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
the "best of his judgment"-an expression much
l'he c;,;;;;;;ssioncr stronger than "in the opinion of the Income-tax
of Income-Tax Officer". It is not disputed that in an appeal from an
v.
M/s. McMiiian
& co.
s. x. Das 1.
assessment under s. 23, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can interfere with the determination or
judgment of the Income-tax Officer, and in such an
appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can
make his own assessment and exercise the power
which the Income-tax Officer could exercise. Since
1939 an appeal lies from a "best of judgment" assessment made under sub-s. (4) of s. 23, but the right is
restricted to "the amount of income assessed or the
amount of tax determined". Why can he not then
interfere with the opinion of the Income-tax Officer
under the proviso to s. 13 ? It is contended that both
sub-ss. (3) and ( 4) of s. 23 prescribed objective conditions for the exercise of the power referred to therein. It is true that under both sub-sections the assessment must be a fair and honest estimate and not arbitrary or capricious. Apart from that, however, we do
not see. what other distinctive, objecUve conditions
there are which put those sub-sections in a different
category.
The words 'in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer'
are not to be construed in the sense of a mere discretionary power; but in the context of the words used
in the proviso to s. 13 they impose a statutory duty on
the Income-tax Officer to examine in every case the
method of accounting and t-0 see (i) whether or not
it is regularly employed and (ii) to determine whether
the income, profits and gains can properly be deduced
therefrom. Section 30 of the Act gives the assessee
a right of appeal ih respect of certain orders including
an order ·of assessment made under s. 23. Section 31
deals with the hearing of an appeal and powers of the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Before disposing
of the appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
may, if he thinks fit, make a further enquiry himself
or cause it to be made by the Income-tax Officer, and
in disposing of the appeal he may, in the case of an
order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or annul
the assessment : he may set it aside and order a fresh
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
assessment. There is nothing in the language of s. 31
~
of the Act which imposes any restriction on the powers The Commlssione1
of an Appellate Assistant Commissioner so as to pre- of Income-Tax
vent him from exercising the power under the proviso
v.
M/s. McMi//011
to s. 13. ·The restriction, if any, must be inferred from
& co.
the language of the proviso itself. It is contended that
the use of the words "in the opinion of the Income-tax s. K. Das J.
Officer" in the second part of the proviso to s. 13 suggests a complete elimination of the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner's jmisdiction to decide for the first time
that the method of accounting is such that the income,
profits and gains cannot be properly deduced therefrom. It is true that the decision as to the method of
accounting is to be arrived at first by the Income-tax
Officer after a careful scrutiny of the accounts whether
they are simple or complicated, and the power is to
be reasonably and judicially exercised, which excludes any subjective or arbitrary ·decision by the
Income-tax Officer. It cannot, however, be said that
a power so exercised is clothed with finalijy and would
be excluded from review by the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner; and in reviewing the order the appellate authority can exercise the same powers which the
Income-tax Officer could exercise. Our attention has
been drawn to the difference in language in which the
two conditions for the application of the proviso have
been expressed; the first condition is fulfilled if no
method of accounting is regularly employed;· the
second condition, however, requires an opinion, viz.,
the opinion of the Income-tax Officer that the income,
profits and gains cannot be properly deduced from
the method of accounting regularly employed. It is
pointed out that the first condition 'involves an objective determination-not by any named authority but
by any and every authority which may have to consider whether the condition as to the regularity of the
method employed has been fulfilled or not; whereas
the second condition involves a determination by a
named authority. The argument is that by reason of
the aforesaid difference in language, the Legislature
clearly intended that the opinion of no other officer can
be substituted for the opinion of the named authority,
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
1957
viz., the Income-tax Officer, with regard. to the fulfilThe c;,;;;;;issionerment of the second condition; therefore, once the
of Income-Tax Income-tax Officer accepts the method of accounting
v.
M/s. McMiiian
4 Co.
s. K. Das J.
as proper, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has
no jurisdiction to go behind that opinion. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is to be
remembered that with regard to both conditions, the
first and initial. duty is that of the Income-tax Officer
to determine whether the conditions or any of them
are fulfilled; secondly, if the opinion of the Incometax Officer with regard to the second condition is to
be inviolate by reas1m of the difference in language,
then it should be inviolate in all cases. Why should
it be inviolate in one case and not so when the assessee
appeals against a determination made adverse to him ?
We feel that the second condition is expressed in the·
terms in which it has been expressed, because it involves an inferential process and the expression 'in
the opinion of the Income-tax Officer' is aptly used as
that officer must in the first instance make the determination. If does not necessarily follow that the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner cannot revise the
determination and exercise the power which the
Income-tax Officer could exercise
A reference was also made by counsel for the respondent to the definition of 'Appellate Assistant Com-·
missioner' and 'Income-tax Officer' in ss. 2(3) and
2(7) of the Act. These definitions do not carry the
matter any further; because in order to determine the
scope of the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, ss. 30 and 31 must be looked at and they
will govern appeals, unless those powers are cut down
by the words of ss. 2(3) and 2(7) or any other provision of the Act.
Another distinction which learned counsel for the
respondent has drawn with regard to the finality of
the determination of the Income-tax Officer under the
proviso to s. 13 is this : he has said that where the
Income-tax Officer determines that the method is unacceptable in the sense that income, profits and gains
cannot be properly deduced therefrom, there is a deci-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
.sion; where, however, he does not so decide, there is
19S7
.no decision, and it is merely a case of non-exercise of The Commissioner
power. This distinction learned counsel for the res- of Income-Tax
pondent has drawn in order to get over the anomaly
v.
that follows in holding that in one case the determina- M/s. McMillan
tion is final and in another case it is not so. We are
cl Co.
not at all impressed by this distinction. for one thing s. K. Das 1•
the distinction is mueh too subtle, then again, looked
at from the proper standpoint, a non-exercise of the
power. under the proviso is also a decision inasmuch
.as it amounts to an acceptance of the method of
accounting on the ground that the income, profits. and
,gains can be properly deduced therefrom. In the instant case the Income-tax Officer has looked into the
.accounts and the computation on the basis of the
method employed has been adopted by him.
Lastly, it seems to us clear that the answer to the
question: .is provided by the language of s. 31. As
observ~d by Chagla C.J. in Mis. Narrondas Manordass,
Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax(1-), the language is wide enough to enable the Appellate Assistant ·
Commissioner to "correct the Income-tax Officer not
only with regard to a matter which has been raised
by the assessee but also with regard to a matter which
has been considered by the Income-tax Officer and
determined in the course of the assessment." We are
unable to accept the argument that the proviso, to s. 13
imposes a limitation on the powers of the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner under it. 31.. No doubt, the
two sections must be read harmoniously; but s. 13 and
its proviso contain no words of limitation or qualification upon the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in enhancing the assessment or setting aside
the assessment and directing a fresh assessment to be
made by the Income-tax Officer. Dealing with the
powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
Chagla C.J. in Narrondas's case ( 1 ) said
"It is clear that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has been constituted a revising authority against
the decisions of the Income-tax Officer; a revising
authority not in the narrow sense of revising what is
(1) (1957] 31 I.T.R. 909.
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958}
I9J7
the subject-matter of the appeal, not in the sense of
'The c0 , _1,s1oner revising those matters about which the assessee makes
of Income-Tax a grievance, but a revising authority in the sense that
v.
M/s.McMl//an
&·ca.
s. K. DasJ.
once the appeal is before him he can revise not only
the ultimate computation arrived at by the Incometax Officer but he can revise every process which led
to the ultimate computation or assessment. In other
words, what he can revise is not merely the ultimate
amount which is liable to tax, but he is entitled to
revise the various decisions given by the Income-tax
Officer in the course of the assessment and also the
various incomes or deductions which came in for
consideration of the Income-tax Officer." We are in
agreement with these observations.
The substance of the matter as it appears to us is
this : the proviso to s. 13 uses the expression "in the
opinion of the Income-tax Officer" merely because, in
the first illstance, it will fall on the Income-tax Officer
to determine after considering the method of accounting regularly employed whether income, profits and
gains can be properly deduced therefrom, in the same
way as any other question of fact has to be determined
initially by the Income-tax Officer; the Legislature
has not drawn any such nice distinction between objective and subjective determination as is sought to
be made out by learned counsel for the respondent.
Lastly, the proviso to s. 13 does not import any limitation on the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under s. 31 and the latter section gives the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner power to revise
every process which leads to the ultimate computation or assessment.
Two other points also require notice at this stage.
In the course of the arguments before us, a reference
was made to s. 33B, which was inserted by the Income-tax and Business Profits Tax (Amendment)
Act,. 1948. '!'here can be no doubt that, in
view of the language used in· s. 33B, the
Commissioner ·of Income-tax may interfere with
any order of the Income-tax Officer, including
a determination under the proviso to s. 13,
provided the other conditions of the section are fulfilled. Section 33B runs counter to the contention
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
703
1957
that a determination under the proviso to s. 13 is a
subjective determination or a determination of a The c;;;;;;ssiontr
named authority, which is inviolate in character. Any OJ Income-Tax
such construction as is contended for by the respondent
v.
will render this section nugatory.
Mfs. McMillan
& Co.
The other point is this : assume that a determina- s. K. Das 1.
tion under the proviso to s. 13 in favour of the assessee
can be gone into by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner when the assessee prefers an appeal on some
other ground, and assume also that the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner can set aside the assessment
if he finds that the Income-tax Officer has not applied
his mind to the proviso or·has wrongly held that from
the · method of accounting, the income, profits and
gains can be properly deduced; what can he do then ? ·
Can he act under the proviso himself and determine
the question or must he only direct the Income-tax
Officer to apply his mind afresh to the proviso ? On
one side, there is the language of the proviso, and on
the other the language of s. 31 which gives wide power
to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. At first
sight, there may appear some conflict between the
two. But on a closer scrutiny there is, we think, no
conflict. As we have said before, the language of the
proviso means only this that, in the first instance, the
Income-tax Officer must form his own opinion as to
whether the income, profits and gains can be properly
deduced from the method of accounting regularly employed, if any; but if he fails to apply his mind to the
proviso or comes to a wrong determination for or
against the assessee in the computation of the income,
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can correct the
error in computation, provided he ha-s seizin of the
assessment on an appeal filed by the assessee. If the
assessee files. no appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner does not come into the picture, because the
Revenue has no right of appeal from an assessment
made by the Income-tax Officer. Whether in a particular case a remand will be the proper order or
whether the error can be corrected by the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner himself will depend on the
circumstances of each case. If it be held that the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner can only set aside
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
1957
the assessment in such circumstances, an impossible
The commissioner result may follow. If the Appellate Assistant Como/ Income-Tax missioner holds that from the method of accounting
v.
the income, profits and gains cannot be properly
Mfs. McMillan deduced, let us assume that the only order he can pass
& co.
is to set aside the assessment and direct the Incomes. K. Das J. tax Officer to make a fresh assessment. But if the
opinion of the Income-tax Officer is the only opinion
which determines the matter, the Income-tax Officer
may adhere to his opinion. That will result in a
deadlock. If the proviso to s. 13 does not impose any
limitation on the power of the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, as we hold it does not, then the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has the power to correct
the error in the way most suitable in the circumstances of the case, provided he acts within the ambit
of his power under s. 31 of the Act. Section 31 ( 3) does
not in terms say that the power to vary the assessment including the power to enhance it is subject to
any limitation.
We have so far dealt with the questions at issue
untrammelled by any authorities. We now turn to
such authorities as have been placed before us. We
take up first the decision in K. F. Vakeel v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax('). The facts of that case
were these : the assessee carried on a business of loading and unloading ships from January 1, 1943 to June
30, 1944. Oi:t July 1, 1944, the assessee entered into a
partnership with his brother. The assessee maintained his accounts on the cash basis and his accounting
year was the calendar year. For the calendar year
1943 he was assessed to Income-tax on his accounts
which as stated were maintained on cash basis. On
July 1, 1944, when the firm of the assessee and his
brother came into existence the position was that there
were outstandings to the extent of Rs. 2,13,306 and
there were liabilities to the extent of Rs. 86,650.
Between July 1 and December 31, 1944, the assessee
recovered Rs. 2,02,209 and he discharged the liabilities
to the extent of Rs. 86,650. Therefore, the nett
amount that he realised between July 1 and December 31, 1944, was Rs. 1,15,559. It is this amount which
(1) 1.T. H.("f!'r("nce No. 21of1950.
S.C.R.
,
J.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
was the su}?ject-inatter of the reference. The contention
19.S7
of the assessee was that as this amount was realised The Commissioner
after he ceased to do business, it was a capital receipt of 1nc0me·Tax
which was not subject to tax. His further contention
v.
was that as he kept his accounts on cash basis, this M/s. McMTUan
amount could not be included in his accounts of the
& co.
business done from January 1 to June 30, 1944, s. K. Das J.
inasmuch as this amount was not realised during that
period but was realised during a period S'\.lbsequent to
the period for which accounts were kept. When the
matter went before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, he took the view that the assessee continued
to carry on the business till December 31, 1944; he
also held that a sum of Rs. 2,13,306 was recovered
from July 1 to December 31, 1944, and not a· sum of
Rs. 2,02,209 as alleged by the assessee. When the
assessee appealed to the Tribunal from the decision of
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, his contention
regarding the sum of Rs. 2,02,209 was upheld by the
Tribunal. His contention with regard to the termination of his business was also upheld by the Tribunal
and the Tribunal held that the business came to an
end on June 30, 1944, and not on December 31, 1944.
The assessee further contended before the Tribunal
that the nett amount of Rs. 1,15,559 which he realised
was a capital receipt and not a revenue receipt. The
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessee ·
should be assessed not on the cash basis but on the
accrual basis and, according to the Tribunal, the sum
of Rs. 1,15,559 had accrued to the assessee during the
period of accounts, viz., January 1, 1944, to June 30,
1944, and therefore it was subject to tax. The Tribunal took the view that it was not possible to discover the profits made by the assessee if the accounts
were ·maintained on cash basis and therefore the proper method of accounting was the mercantile, that is,
the accrual basis and not cash basis. The decision of
the High Court was based on two grounds : first, the
Tribunal was wrong in fo:rniing an opinion suo motu
that the cash basis was not the proper basis from
which income, profits and gains can be properly ascertained, because it wa.s not for the Tribunal to form an
L2SC/61 PV-8
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
opinion on that question at all; secondly, there was
The commisslontr nothing before the Tribunal which could justify it in
of Inct?me-Tax coming to the conclusion that the Income-tax Officer
v.
M/s. McMillan
" co.
s. K. Das 1.
was not in a position to deduce the income, pro.lits
and gains from the method of accounting adopted by
the assessee. The actual decision can be easily supported on the second ground itself, because the Tribunal committed an error of law in coming to a finding
on no material or evidence. Indeed, the learned
Advocate-General appearing for the Revenue, conceded in that case that in view of the state of the record
it was not possible for him to contend that the Tribunal's decision was correct -lllld further the Tribunal
was in error in holding that the assessee could be compelled to adopt the accrual basis in keeping his
accounts and give up the cash basis which he had
regularly maintained in the past. While, therefore,
the actual decision in the case was undoubtedly correct we are unable to accept as correct the following
further observations in connection with the first
ground:
"But it is for the Income-tax Officer, who is the
assessing officer, to be dissatisfied with the method of
accounting regularly adopted by the assessee. If he
found no difficulty in assessing the income, profits and
gains from the method of accounting regularly adopted by the assessee, then it is not for any other authority to come to a different conclusion. It may be that
if an opinion is formed by the Income-tax Officer that
opinion may be· subject to an appeal to the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal; but in the
first instance an opinion has to be formed by the
income-tax Officer as required by the proviso."
While we agree that, in the first instance, the Incometax Officer a~ the first assessing officer has to foi:m an
opinion' about the applicability of the proviso to s. 13,
we do not agree that it is not open to any other authority, which is lawfully in seizin of the order of assessment of which the method of accounting under s. 13
is only a part, to come to a different conclusion with
regard to the applicability of the prov.iso. Let us
examine this point a little more closely. The Income-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
1957
tax Officer may proceed in one of three ways-'--(1) he
may fail to apply his mind to the statutory duty The commissioner
imposed on him bys. 13 and its proviso and may accept · of Income-Tax
the assessee's method of accounting without at all con"· .11
sidering if (a) the method was regularly employed . M/s.:~~· aR
and (b) if the income, profits and gains of the assessee
can be properly deduced therefrom; (2) he may apply s. K. Das J.
his mind and decide in favour of the assessee that
the method is both regular and acceptable (iri the
sense that income, profits and gains can be properly
deduced therefrom); or (3) he may decide against
the assessee and hold that the method is either not
regularly employ~ or is unacceptable. In the first
case, there is a failure to perform a statutory duty and
it has not been seriously disputed that the appellate
authority can.direct the Income-tax Officer to perform
that duty. This is supported by high authority to
which we shall presently refer. In the third case, it
is conceded that the appellate authority can interfere
and set aside the opinion or determination of the
Income-tax Officer, and in doing so the appellate
authority must form his opinion if the method of
accounting is proper and acceptable. The dispute or
divergence of opinion relates only to the second case
and to a part of it only, because it is not disputed that
the finding as.to whether the method of accounting i~
regularly employed or not is an ot>jective determination which the appellate authority can i::.evise. Both
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal have wide powers to go inte questions of
fact and law, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
under s. 31(3) and the Appellate Tribunal under
s. 33(4). Even the Commissioner can revise an order
of the Income-tax Officer under s. 33B in certain circumstances stated therein. We see no justification for
holding that these powers, so widely expressed by the
statute, become ineffective in one particular case only,
namely, when the determination or opinion is in
favour of the assessee as respects the propriety of the
method of accounting. It is true that the Revenue
has no right of appeal under s. 30, but that it not a
decisive circumstance. The assessee can make any
708
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
order of assessment by the Income-tax Officer final by
Th• c;,;;;;,;ssioner not appe~lin~ therefr?m-.whether ~he ?rder is based
on a subjective or objective determmat10n. The point
is m;it what happens when there is no appeal; but the
M/s. McMi//an point is when the appellate authority is lawfully in
& Co.
seizin of the matter, what powers it can exercise.
of Tncome-Tax
Y.
s. x. Das 1·
We are, therefore, of the view that though Vakeel's
case ( 1 ) was rightly decided, some of the reasons given
in support of the decision are not correct in law.
NeXt comes the decision of the Punjab High Court
in Oriental Buiiding and Furnishing Company v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') where a view contrary to
that of the Bombay High Court was taken. Though
we hold that the conclusion arrived at in this decision
is correct, there is no detailed discussioI). in the judgment of the issues involved, except the bare statement that the powers of the Appellate Tribunal under
s. 33 are very wide.
Apart from the aforesaid two decisions which
directly bear on the question untler our consideration,
there are some other decisions which have an indirect
but not a decisive bearing on the question. First, in
order of priority, is the decision of the Privy Council
in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sarangpur Cotton
Manufacturing Co. Ltd.('). In that case, the assessees
had for years past adopted regularly the method of
valuation of stocks by taking some price well below
both cost and market price and they followed this
method in the relevant accounting year. The object
of this striking under-valuation was the creation of a
"secret reserve" which involved the retention of profits so as not to be included in the profits shown to the
shareholders by the profit and loss account and the
balance sheet, but which constituted part of the taxable profits. The Income-tax Officer, without applying his mind to the question whether the true profits
could be deduced from the method of accounting
regularly employed by the assessees, accepted the
accounts and held the assessees bound by the figure of
profit shown in the accounts. The Privy Council held
(r) l.T. R~fcrcnce No. 21 of 1950, Bombay High Court,
(2\ [19521 21 J.T.R. 105
(3) [1938) 6 I.T.R. 36.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
1951
that the profit shown in the profit and loss account
and the balance sheet was not the true figure for ne c;;;;;;;;ssioner
income-tax purposes and the Income-tax Officer could of l11co-·Tax
not reasonably conclude that the true profits could
v.
be properly deduced from a gross under-valuation. It M/s. &McMi/1111t1
Co.
is clear from the decision that their Lordships proceeded on the footing that the Income-tax Officer had fail- s. K. !Jas J.
ed to perform the statutory duty imposed on him; they
amended the question accordingly, answered it in•the
negative, and directed that it would be for t.h!'llncometax Officer to proceed to the proper discharge of his
duty under s. 13. The decision is clear authority for
the view that where there has been a failure to perform the statutory duty imposed on the Income-tax
Officer under s. 13 of the Act, his order is liable to be
set aside, ever. though he may have accepted the
accounts and held the assessee bound by the :6gure of
profit shown in the accounts.
·
There are a number of decisions where it has been
held that an order of the Income-tax Officer under the
proviso to s. 13 against an assessee is liable to be set
aside on appeal. We need only mention some of them
here: see Lala Sarju Prasad In re(1); Pearey Lal
Shukla of Cownpore In re( 2 ); and Commissioner of
Income-Tax v. Kamei;hwar Singh of Darbhanga( 3 ).
In these cases, it was held that the determination of
the Income-tax Officer under the proviso to s. 1$ did
not exempt his computation from e'Xatnirlati()ri .· 6rt
appeal, and the Appellate Assistant CommiSSi()ntfr .··
had jurisdiction, in an appeal against ;in .llSSessmetit
under the proviso to s. 13, to substitute a different
method of computation.
· ·
Lastly, we refer to a few only of the decisions in
which the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under s. 31 has been held to be confined''to the
subject-matter of the assessment appealed against, so
that he has no power to enhance the assessment by
assessing new sources of income : Jagarnath Therani
v. Commissioner of lncome-Taz (t); Gaja.1,akshmi
(1) [1943] II I.T.R. !1"25·
(3) A.I.R. lg!:J P.C. I o8.
(2) [1942] 10 I.T.R. ~9·
\·II {1925] 2 I.T.C. 4.
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958 J
19
57
Ginning Factory v. Commissioner of Income-Tax(')
The Commissioner Chowdhury Sharafat Hussain v. Commissioner of
of InCOltll!-Tax Incom-tax('). We do not think that these decisions
v.
touch the question at issue before us. The present is
M/s. McMillan not a case where the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
& co.
has travelled outside the ambit of his jurisdiction
s. K. Das.J. under s. 31 of the Act.
For the reasons given above, we would answer
question No. 1 in the affirmative. As to question No.
2, only a few words are necessary. Rule 33 of the
Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, is in these terms :
"33. In any case in which the Income-tax Officer
is of opinion that the actual amount of the income,
profits or gains accruing or arising to any person residing out of the taxable territories whether directly or
indirectly through or from any business connection in
the taxable territories or through or from any property in the taxable territories, or through or from
any asset or source of income in the taxable territories,
or through or from any money lent at interest and
brought into the taxable territories in cash or in kind
cannot be ascertained, the amount of such income,
profits or gains for the purpose of as~essment to
income-tax may be calculated on such percentage of
the turnover so accruing or arising as the Income-tax
Officer may consider to be reasonable, or on an amount
which bears the same proportion to the total profits of
the business of such person (such profits being computed in accordance with the provisions of the Indian
Income-tax Act) as the receipts so accruing or arising
bear to the total receipts of the business, or in such
other manner as the Income-tax Officer may deem
suitable." ·
A similar expression occurs in the rule:-"In any case
in which the Income-tax Officer is of opinion etc.".
For the same reasons which we have given with
regard to question No. 1, the answer to question No. 2
is also in the affirmative.
The appeal must, therefore, be allowed; the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dated
(r) (r952] 22 I T.R. 502.
(•) [r956] % I.T.R. 759·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
1957
March 4, 1953, is set aside and the two questions
referred to the said High Court are answered in favour The C;;;;,issioner
of the Revenue. In view of the difficulty of interpreta- of Income-Tax
tion and the divergence of opinion as respects the
v.
questions of law involved, we think that the parties M/s. McMillan
must bear their own costs throughout.
"° co.
BHAGWATI J.-This appeaJ with special leave from
the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay raises an interesting question· as to
whether the power under the proviso to s. 13 of the
Indian Income-tax Act (Act XI1of 1922) hereinafter
referred to a,s "the Act" of rejecting· the method of
accounting regularly employed by the assessee can be
exercised by. the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
while hearing an appeal of the assessee' under s. 31 of
the Act, if the Income-tax Officer had not done so in
the first instance.
The respondent is a limited company registered in
England having its registered office at St. Martin
Street, London. In India it has its branches at
Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. The respondent publishes as well as sells books and magazines in various
parts of the world. The Head Office and branches outside India invoice publications to the Indian branches
not at cost but at a valuation which is 25% of the
marked price for sterling publications and 30% of the
· marked price for currency publications. .For the purposes of computing the profits of its Indian branches,
the respondent takes the said valuation as the cost of
the publications.
For the assessment year 1944-45 the responaent
was assessed under the Act as a non-resident
company. Its year of account ended on April 30, 1943.
In submitting its return of income for the said assessment year 1944-45 and in the assessment proceedings
before the Income-tax Officer for that year, the respondent took the aforesaid invoice value as representing the cost of the books produced by it. The business
income returned by the respondent was Rs. 79,131.
By his assessment order dated March 24, 1945, the
Income-tax Officer accepted the method of accounting
employed by the respondent and its books of account
BhagwatiJ.
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
1957
for the Indian business. He, however, added back
~L c-· . . certain items of expenses shown in the respondent's
:.r: 11t
omm1ss1oner
of Income-Tux balance-sheet and profit and loss account and comput-
v.
M/s. McMillan
&C•.
Rhagwati J.
ed the income at Rs. 82,623 and disallowed the tespondent's claim for a bad debt of Rs. 3,592.
The respondent appealed against the said disallowance to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The
Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the respondent's claim for bad debt. He was, however, of
the view that the assessee's method of accounting, viz.,
taking the aforesaid invoice value as representing the
respondent's actual cost of production was such that
the respondent's profits could not be properly deduced
therefrom and issued notice to the respondent under
the first proviso to s. 31(3) of the Act, calling upon
the respondent to show cause why its assessment
should not be enhanced. After hearing the respondent
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner made an order
dated November 10, 1948, calculating the Indian business profits of the respondent on an amount which
bore the same proportion to the net world profits of
the respondent's business as the Indian turnover bore
to the world turnover and enhanced the Indian business income of the respondent by Rs. 1.11.616.
The respondent preferred an appeal to the Incometax Appellate Tribunal against this order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and contended inter alia
that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no
jurisdiction to discard the respondent's method of
accounting and re-computing the respondent's Indian
business profits in the manner he 'had purported to do
and that in any event for the reasons mentioned by
the respondent the margin of net world profits could
not be applied to the Indian business. By its order
dated April 29, 1950, the Tribunal remanded the case
to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with a direction that he should allow the respondent to prove the
actual cost of the goods invoiced to and sold in India.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner submitted
his remand report in due course. In the meanwhile,
however, the High Court had delivered its judgment
S.C.R.
SUPRBME COURT REPORTS
713
in K. F. Vakeet v. The Commissioner of Income-·
1957
tax(1) to the effect that. n~ a~t~ority other than the 'Ille C;;;;;;;;ssioner
Income-tax Officer had 3ur1sd1ction to act under the l>f ITlcome-Tax
proviso to s. 13 of the Act;
v.
Relying upon that judgment, the respondent raised
two contentions before the Tribunal and they were (a)
that it was not competent to the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner on appeal to rej'ect the respoi::ident's
method of accounting which had been accepted by the
Income-tax Officer and (b) that it was not competel).t
to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal to
compute the Indian business profits of the respondent
·.mder r. 33 of the Indian· Income-tax Rules, the
Income-tax Officer not having done so. The Tribunal
accepted these contentions of the respondent and by
its order dated October 16, 1951, allowed the appeal.
At. the instance of the appellant, the Tribunal stated a case and referred the following questions of law
to the High Court for its opinion under s. 66(1) of
the Act:
"(l) Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant
Commissioner on appeal to. reject the assessee's books
of aecount, which have been accepted by the Incometax Officer ?
(2) Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant
Commissioner on appeal to invoke the provisions of.
Rule 33 of the Indian Income-tax Rules for the purposes of computing the income of a non-resident, the
Income-tax Officer not having done so ?
(3) Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant
Commissioner on appeal to enhance an assessment in
exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section
31(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, where as a result
of definite information he is of opinion that the income
of the assessee has been under-assessed ?"
The said reference was heard by the High Court on
March 4, 1953, and the Higli Court following its own
decision in K. F. Vakt?el's case, (supra), answered the
referred questions Nos. l & 2 in the negative and
stated that the referred question Nt>. 3 did not arise.
( 1) I.T. Reference No. 21 of 1950, Bombay High Court'.
M/s. UcMillan
& C11.
/Hragwati J,
714
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
The appellant applied to the High Court for a certiThe commiJSioner ficate of fitness to appeal to this Court under section
oJ Income-Tax 66A(2) of the Act but without success. The appellant
v.
thereupon applied for and obtained from this Court
M/s. McMillan special leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitu& Co.
tion.
Bhagwati J.
The provisions of the Act and the rules framed
thereunder that fall to be considered in this appeal are
the following :
"Section 13 : 'Method of Accounting' :
Income, profits and gains shall be computed for
the purpose of sections 10 and 12 in accordance with
the method of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee:
Provided that, if no method of accounting has
been regularly employed, or if the method employed
is such that, in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer,
the income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom, then the computation shall be made
upon such basis and in such manner as the Incometax Officer may determine.
Section 31 : Hearing of Appeal:
.................................................
(3) In disposing of an appeal, the Appellate Aso;istant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of
.assessment :
(a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or
(b) set aside the assessment and direct the Incometax Officer to make fresh assessment after making
such further enquiry as the Income-tax Officer thinks
fit or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may
direct, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon
proceed to make such fresh assessment, and determine
where necessary the amount of tax payable on the
basis of such fresh assessment ................... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
Provided that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
shall not enhance an assessment or a penalty unless
the appellant has had a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause against such enhancement; ......... .
.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .
1957
Rule 33 of the Indian In~ome-tax Rules, 1922 :
The Commissioner
"In any case in which the Income-tax Officer is of
opinion that the actual amount of the income, profits
or gains accruing or arising to any person residing out
·Of the taxable territories whether directly or indirectly
through or from any business connection in the taxable territories or through or from any property in the
taxable territories, or through or from any asset or
source of income in the taxable territories, or through
or from any money lent at interest and brought into
the taxable territories in cash or in kind cannot be
ascertained, the amount of such income, profits or
gains for the purposes of assessment to income-tax
may be calculated on such percentage of the turnover
so accruing or arising as the Income-tax Officer may
consider to be reasonable, or on an amount which
bears the same proportion to the total profits of the
business of. such person (such profits being computed
in accordance with the provisions of the Indian
Income-tax Act) as the receipts so accruing or arising
bear to the total receipts of the business, or in such
other manner as the Income-tax Officier may deem
suitable."
of Income-Tax
It is contended by_the learned Solicitor-General for
the appellant that even though no right of appeal is
conferred upon the Revenue against an assessment ·
order made by the Income-tax Officer, once the assessee carries an appeal before the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner the assessment order is wholly robbed
of its finality and the whole of the assessment is at
large before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
with the result that it is then open to the Revenue to
urge all the contentions which it could have done
before the Income-tax Officer and ask the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner to re-open the whole enquiry·
and, in effect, re-assess the assessee and even enhance
the assessment, provided of course, that the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner shall not enhance the assess-
ment unless and until he has afforded the assessee a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such
enhancement. It is further contended that the powers
which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner thus
M/s. ;;Millan
& co,
Bhacwa1iJ.
716
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
exercises are not circumscribed by any limitations and
fhe Commissionor are unfettered and in the exercise of such powers it is
01 Income-Tax competent to the Appellate ·Assistant Commissioner
v.
also to reject the method of accounting regularly
M/s. McMi//an employed by the assessee even though the Income-tax
& c~.
I1ha1wari J.
ffi
0 cer had not done so provided he, the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner, is of the opinion that the
method of accounting employed is such that the
income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced
therefrom and in that event the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner is also entitled to adopt the mode of
computation of the income prescribed by r. 33 of the
Indian Income-tax Rules.
It is,. on the other hand, contended by the learned
counsel for the respondent that the determination
whether the method of accounting regularly employed
by the assessee is such that the income, profits and
gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom is within
the exclusive province of the named authority, viz.,
the Income-tax Officer and such determination by the
named authority is the condition precedent to a certain consequence following thereupon, viz., the rejection of the method of accounting regularly employed
by the assessee. Such determination then cannot be
substituted by that-0f another authority, though while
entertaining an appeal at the instance of the assessee
such authority might consider whether the named
authority has correctly determined the question. Once
the named authority has determined that the case
does not fall within the proviso, no other authority
has jurisdiction to determine that question and the
main provision of s. 13 operates and the income, profits and gains of the assessee can only be computed for
the purpose of ss. 10 and 12 in accordance with the
method of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee. Not only is the Income-tax Officer bound in
such a case to compute the income, profits and gains
in accordance therewith by reason of the mandate
contained in the main provision of s. 13 but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner also is similarly bound
and the terms of s. 31(3) which gives the Appellate
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
Assistan' Commissioner power even to enhance the
1957
assessment cannot be construed as abrogating or set- Th c mmissiomr
ting at naught the imperative terms of s. 13 and the oeJ 1:come-Tax
proviso thereto which vest such power only in the
v.•
named authority and no other.
M/s. McMillan
•Co.
There is paucity of authority on the construction of
s. 13 of the Act. The High Court in deciding the
reference in question relied upon an unreported judgment of its own delivered on October 11, 1950, in K.
F. Vakeel v. The Commissioner of Income-tax and E.
P. Tax(1). In that case the Tribunal for the first
time came to the conclusion that it was not possible
to discover the profits made by the assessee if the
accounts were maintained on cash basis and therefore
the proper method of accounting·was the mercantile,
i.e., the accrual basis and not the cash basis, even
though the Income-tax Officer had accepted the
method of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
had concurred in the same. The question that arose
before the High Court was whether the Tribunal had
jurisdiction to do so. The High Court construed the
provisions of s. 13 of the Act and was of opinion that :
" ...... it is for the Income-tax Officer to form the
opinion that income, profits and gains cannot properly
be deduced from the method adopted by the assessee
and if such an opinion is formed by the Income-tax
Officer then the computation of income, profits and
gains has to be made upon such basis and in such
manner as the Income-tax Officer may. determine.
But it is for the Income-tax Officer, who is the assessing officer, to be dissatisfied with the method of
accounting regularly adopted by the assessee. If he
found no difficulty in assessing the income, profits and
gains from the method of accounting regularly adopted by the assessee then it is not for any other authority
to come to a different conclusion. It may be that if an
opinion is formed by the Income-tax Officer that
opinion may· be subject to an appeal to the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal; but in the
first instance an opinion has to be formed by the
Income-tax Officer as required by the proviso."
(1) I.T. Reference No. ~1 of 1950, Bombay High Court.
Bhapati J.
718
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
On the facts of the case before it, no opinion had
£he commissioner been formed by the Income-tax Officer that the method
of Jncome-Tax of accounting regularly employed by the assessee
was not satisfactory. It was the Tribunal that suo
motu came to the conclusion that cash basis was not
& Co.
the proper basis from which income, profits and gains
BhagwotiJ.
could be properly deduced. The High Court was of
opinion that the Tribunal was clearly wrong in forming that opinion, forgetting that it was not for it to
form an opinion on that question at all. The Tribunal
had vested in it the appellate powers and those powers
could only be exercised on the opinion formed by the
Income-tax Officer. There was nothing before it which
could justify it in coming to the conclusion that the
Income-tax Officer was not in a position to deduce the
income, profits and gains from the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee or that the
Income-tax Officer had formed any opinion whatever
on that question. The High Court accordingly set
aside the decision of the Tribunal on this point.
As against this decision of the High Court of
Bombay, the appellant relied upon a decision of the
Punjab High Court at Simla in Oriental Building and
Furnishing Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Delhi('). In that case the Income-tax Officer while
acting under s. 13 read with s. 23 ( 3) of the Act had
made certain disallowance which was reduced on
appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioned. The
Department went up in appeal against the order passed
by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal upon examining the
• assessee's method of accounting and the records placed
before the Income-tax Authorities came to the conclusion that the basis of computation adopted by the
Income-tax Authorities was faulty and the account
books did not reflect the correct account of the assessee. It accordingly computed the income of the assessee under the proviso to s. 13 of the Act and the question which arose for the consideration of the Court was
whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to do so. The
High Court was of opinion that (1) the Tribunal's
v.
M/s. McMillan
(1
[1952] 21 I.T.R. 105.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
1957
power of dealing with an order passed by an Appellate
Assistant Commissioner was plenary and had been The c;;;;;ssionei
expressed in s. 33 ( 4) of the Act as widely as could be of Income-Tax _.
conceived and (2) in an appeal under s. 33 the Tribuv. . .:::;,
nal was competent to decide facts as well as law and Mfs. McMillan
possessed authority to substitute its own order of
&: Co.
assessment for the order under appeal.
Bhagwati J.
These are the only two decisions bearing on the
construction of the proviso to s. 13 of the Act and
dealing with the question whether the . Appellate.
Assistant Commissioner or the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal as the case may be, could for the first time
exercise the power of rejecting the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee while entertaining appeals, if the Income-tax Officer had not done
so in the first instance. Whereas the High Court of
Bombay took the view that they were not competent
to do so, the High Court of Punjab took the view that
there being no limitation on the power to be exercised
by the Tribunal, it could while exercising the appellate
powers decide facts as well as law and substitute its
own order of assessment for the order under appeal.
Not much help can be derived from the reasoning'
adopted by the High Court of Punjab, though the High
Court of Bombay appears to have applied its mind
to the terms of the proviso to s. 13 of the Act and stated
that it was for the Income-tax Officer, who was the
assessing Officer, to be dissatisfied w,ith the method of
accounting regularly employed by the assessee. If
he found no difficulty in assessing the income, profits
and gains from the method of accounting regularly
employed by the assessee, then it is not for any other
authority to come to a different conc1usion. The
Income-tax Officer is really the authority entrusted
under the Act with the duty of computing the income, ·
profits and gains of the assessee under the relevant
provisions of the Act. It is for him to form an opinion
whether the method of accounting regularly employed
by the assessee is such that the income, profits and
gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom and it is
only if he forms such an opinion that the proviso
comes into operation and the computation of the
I
720
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
income, profits and gains of the assessee is to be made
The c;;;;;;;;;,,;oner upon such basis and in such manner as the Income-
•! Incom..,Tax tax Officer may determine.
v.
M/s. McMillan
& Co.
BhagwatiJ,
The appellant also referred to a decision of the
High Court of Allahabad in Pearey Lal Shukla of
Cawnpore, In re(') where it was held that the basis
and manner of assessment applied by the Income-tax
Officer under the proviso to s. 13 of the Act was liable
to interference on appeal by the Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner. This decision however
throws no light on the question which arises for determination in this appeal for the simple reason that it
proceeds on the basis that the Income-tax Officer has
formed an opinion that the method of accounting
regdlarly employed by the assessee is such that the
income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced
therefrom and the proviso having come into operation
the computation of the income has to be made upon
such basis and in such manner as the Income-tax
Officer may determine. The basis and manner thus
adopted by the Income-tax Officer can be examined
on appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
or the Commissioner while exercising the appellate
powers vested in them under the Act. This case is no
authority for the proposition that the power of rejection of the method of accounting regularly employed
by the assessee can also be exercised by the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner concerned while entertaining an appeal by the assessee against
the order of the Income-tax Officer.
There is, however, a decision of the PriVY Council
in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Sarangpur Cotton Manufacturing Co., Ltd.(') which throws
some light on the construction of s. 13 and the nature
and scope of the power to be exercised by the Incometax Officer under the proviso thereto. The assessees
in that case had employed a regular method of
accounting but had also for some years past adopted
regularly a method of valuation of stock by taking
some price under both cost and market price with the
object of creating a "secret" reserve, which involved
(1) [194~) IO I.T.R. •39·
(•) [1938) 6 I.T.R. 36.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
the retention of profits as not to be included in the
IJs7
profits shown to the shareholders. The ~ssessees sub- Tile c;;;;;;ssioller
mitted their profit and loss account showing a profit of of rncome·Tax
Rs. 2,64,086 and a return of the total income of the
v.
company showing an income of Rs. 1,99,086 which M/s. McMillan
was arrived at by taking into account the result of
& co.
under-valuation of stock which the company had Bhazwati J.
adopted in the previous years. The Income-tax
Officer, without considering whether the true income
could be arrived at from the method of accounting
employed by the assessees held that the assessees were
bound by the profits shown in the balance-sheet. On
appeal by the assessee the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed th~ assessment and the assessees
then applied to the Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay, to review the said order under s. 33 of the
Act, or in the alternative, to make a reference of the ·
questions of law to the High Court under s. 66(2) of
the Act. The Commissioner declined to review the
order and also to make the reference. Thereupon, the
High Court on an application made by the assessees
under s. 66(3) of the Act required the Commissioner
to make a reference and he. accordingly made the
reference in question. The High Court amended the
referred question as follows :
-
J
"Whether in the circumstances of the case the
Income-tax Officer was entitled to compute the 'income,
profits and gains of the assessees upon the basis of the
printed copy of the profit and loss account sent with
the letter of the assessees of July 18, 1931, without
regard to any under-valuation of the stock which may
have been or may be proved to have been made.",
The High Court was of opinion that the covering
letter formed part of the method of accounting employed by the assessees within the meaning of s. 13
of the Act and that the Income-tax Officer was not .
entitled to split up the method of accounting and to
regard the profit and loss account apart from the
covering letter; that the Income-tax Officer had only
accepted a portion of the method, without taking the
method as a whole, which he was not entitled to do.
It, therefore, held that the matter was still at large for
L2SC/61 PV-!l
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
1957
the proper decision of the Income-tax Officer and
The C;;;;;issio accordingly answered the amended question in the
of Income·Ta:er negative.
The Commissioner of Income-tax then
v
M /s. McMifla11
& co.
Bhacivati 1.
carried an appeal to the Privy Council and their Lordships found themselves unable to agree with the view
of the High Court as to the meaning of s. 13 of the
Act and they were of the opinion that the section
related to a method of accounting regularly employed
by the assessee for his own purpose and did not relate
to a method of making up the statutory return for
assessment to income.tax. Secondly, the section
clearly made such a method of accounting a compul·
sory basis of computation unless in the opinion of the
Income-tax Officer the income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom. The duty of the
Income-tax Officer was to determine whether it was
possible to deduce the true profits from the account
and the judgment of the Income-tax Officer under the
proviso must be properly exercised. Their Lordships
laid it down that it is the duty of the Income-tax
Officer where there is a method of accounting regularly
employed by the assessee not to prima facie accept
the profits and gains shown by the assessee but to
eonsider whether the income, profits and gains can
properly be deduced therefrom and to proceed accord·
ing to his judgment on the question. On the facts
of the case before them their Lordships were of the
opinion that the Income..:tax Officer acted on the
same view as that expressed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and did not perform the duty
above stated. In so far as the facts showed that the
method of accounting regularly employed by the
assessees did not show the true income, profits or
gains, the question was further amended by them as
follows:
"Whether in view of the provisions of Sec. 13 of
the Income-tax Act or otherwise, the Income-tax
Officer was right in computing for the purpose of Sec.
10 of that Act, the income, profits and gains in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee when that method in fact does
not show the true income, profits and gains" and was
answered in the negative.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
Their Lordships further observed that it would then
~
be for the Income-tax Officer to proceed to the proper The Commissioner
discharge of his duty under s. 13 in the light of the of Income-Tax
opinion therein expressed and reach a proper decision
v.
with reference thereto.
Mfs. McMillan
& Co.
This case discards the view that it is prima facie
duty of the Income-tax Officer concerned to accept the
profits shown by the assessee's accounts where there is
a method of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee and it lays down that it is his duty where
there is such a method of accounting to consider
whether the income, profits and gains can be properly
deduced therefrom. It is incumbent on the Incometax Officer to come to a det~rmination on that question
and if he forms the opinion that the method of
accounting is such that the income, profits and gains
of the assessee cannot properly be deduced therefrom
he is bound to reject such method of accounting and
make a computation upon such basis and in such
manner as he may determine. The Income-tax Officer
has to apply his mind to this aspect of the question
and come to his own determination in that behalf and
if he does not do so and mereiy accepts the pro.fits
shown by the accounts even though in fact the method
of accounting regularly employed by the assessee does
not show the true income, profits and gains, he is in
error and his action in thus accepting the method of
accounting is liable to be set aside at the instance of
the higher Tribunal. This leaves open however the
question whether if the higher Trib,pnal comes to that
conclusion, it will be open to the higher Tribunal to
substitute its opinion for that of the Income-tax Officer
concerned and proceed to assess the assessees applying
the proviso to s. 13 of the Act. Their LaTdships of the
Privy Council in the case before them did not do anything of the kind and observed that it would be then
for the Income-tax Officer himself to proceed to the
proper discharge of his duty under s. 13 of the Act in
the light of the opinion expressed in their judgment.
They did not send back the case either to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay or to the Assistant
L2SC/61 PV-10
Bhagwatl 1.
724
J957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
Commissioner of Income-tax but after having answer-
The Commissioner ed the amended question in the negative simply stated
of Income-Tax that the Income-tax Officer would doubtless proceed
v.
to reach a proper decision in behalf of the applicability
M/s. McMillan of the proviso to s. 13 of the Act having regard to his
&
co.
Bhagwatl J.
experience in the preceding years of assessment. They
neither left that duty to be performed by the Commissioner of Income-tax nor by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax but referred the performance of
that dutyto the proper authority who was the Incometax Officer who alone was invested with the duty of
performing it under the terms of the proviso to s. 13
of the Act. .
Certain decisions bearing -on the interpretation of
s. 33B of the Act were referred to in this context and
reliance was placed on certain observations contained
therein in regard to the powers vested in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner while hearing appeals
filed before him by the assessee. (Vide Commissioner
of Income-tax v. Tejaji Farasram Kharawala( 1 );
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amritlai BhogilaL &
Co.,( 2 ) and Smt. Durgabatti and Smt. Narmadabala
Gupta v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and
Orissa ( 8 ).
•
It may be remembered that the Revenue has not
been given any right of appeal before the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner against the assessment order
passed by the Income-tax Officer. It is pnly the assessee who has such a right conferred upon him under
s. 30 of the Act. When the Appellate Assistant Commissioner however hears such appeal though at the
instance of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer is
given the right to be heard, either in person or by a
representative, who appears before the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner to justify the assessment order
passed by him. The Legislature in its wisdom has not
given a substantive right to the Revenue to carry an
appeal against the order of the Income-tax Officer.
The decision of the Income-tax Officer is qua the
Revenue invested with a finality and the Income-tax
Officer is not regarded as a party aggrieved against
f1) [1953] 23 l.T.R. 412.
(3) [1956] 30 I.T.R. 101.
(2) [1953] 23 J.T.R. 420.
S.C.R.
'r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
1957
his own decision. He in fact represents the Revenue
and there is no question therefore of his ever being The c~ssionv
able to question his own decision which is considered of Income-Tax
to all intents and purposes a proper decision given by
v.
him having regard to all the circumstances of the case. M/s.&McMillan
Co.
The assessee is the only person who is given the right
of appeal against the decision of the Income-tax Offi- Bhagwati I.
cer. If the assessee does not choose to exercise this
right of appeal, the decision of the Income-tax Officer
acquires a finality both qua the Revenue and himself
but if the assessee chooses to exercise the same, the
appeal is heard by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Income-tax Officer is as aforestated, then
given the right to be heard either in person or by a
representative. There also the contest is between
the. Revenue on the one hand and the assessee on the
other. The powers which are vested in the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner while hearing such appeals
are statutory powers conferred upon him bys. 31 of
the Act and in the exercise of these powers the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may in the case of an
order of assessment (a) confirm, reduce, enhance or
annul the assessment, or (b) set aside the assessment
and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh
assessment after making such further enquiry as· the
Income-tax Officer thinks fit or the Appellat~ Assistant
Gommissioner may direct, and the Income-tax Officer
shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assessment, and determine where necessary the amount of
tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment. If
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner chooses to exercise the powers conferred upon him under the first. alternative and enhance the assessment he is enjoined
by the proviso to s. 31(3) of the Act to give to the
Appellant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against such enhancement. There are no doubt .Iimita.:.
tions grafted on this power of the .Appellate Assistant Commissioner but these limitations have to be
found from the very nature of the proceedings themselves. These limitations will be indicated at the
appropriate place hereafter.
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
The High Court of Bombay no doubt expressed the
The Co-;;;.ss·
opinion in the Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amrit1
of In';,,:,•.;;:' lal Bhogilal & Co.( ) :
J9S7
v.
M/s. McMillan
4' Co.
BhagwatlJ.
"As pointed out in the last reference, the object
of enacting section 33B was to confer a .power upon
" the Commlssioner in the interest of revenue to revise
orders of the Income-tax Officer which could not be
revised under any circumstances if the assessee did
not appeal from those orders. However erroneous the
order of the Income-tax Officer may be, however prejudicial to the Revenue, the assessee by refusing to
exercise his right of appeal could make that order
conclusive. In order to fill up this obvious lacuna the
Legislature enacted Section 33B. But once the assessee has appealed, there is no difficulty whatsoever in
the way of the department in agitating any question
before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which in
its opinion should be agitated and decided in the interest of public revenue. Now, it is clear that when ari
appeal is pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Income-tax Officer has the right to he
heard either in person or by a representative, and
the very point which the Commissioner has taken
and on which he has given his decision under section
33B could have been urged under the directions of
the Commissioner before the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner. It is only when no remedy is operi
to the Commissioner to revise the order of the
Income-tax Officer that this jurlsdiction under section 33B arises. But when a legal remedy is given
to him to get the orders of the Income-tax Officer revised, he cannot requisition to his aid the power conferred upon him under section 33B. Once the appeal
with regard to the year 1949-50 was pending before
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Commissioner was given the full right to get the order of the
Income-tax Officer revised in any manner he thought
necessary in the interest of public revenue."
These are however observations only with regard
to the construction of s. 33B of the Act and do not
throw any light on the nature and scope of the powers
{I) [1953] 23 I.T.R. 420·
•.•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
vested in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under
1957
.s. 31 of the Act, much less do they throw any light on The ;;;;;;,,'ssioner
the nature and scope of the power vested in express of lncome~Tax
terms in the Income-tax Officer under the proviso to
v.
s. 13 of the Act of rejecting the method of accounting M/s. McMillan
regularly employed by the assessee if in his opinion
& Co.
the method of accounting is such that the income, Bhagwati 1.
profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom. This decision does not help the appellant in its
contention that if the Income-tax Officer has not in
fact done so it will be open to the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner while hearing an appeal filed before him
by the assessee to exercise such power in the first
instance.
The position contended for by the appellant as
emerging from the decision of the High Court of Bombay just referred to is contrary to the one which was
enunciated by the learned judges of the High Court of
Bombay in K. F. VakeeL's Case (supra). I am clearly
of the opinion that the learned judges of the High
Court of Bombay did not intend to lay down any such
position.
In fact, in the later unreported decision of theirs
in M/s. Narrondas Manordass, Bombay v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay (1) the learned
judges of the High Court of Bombay laid down that
however wide in terms the powers conferred upon
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under s. 31 of
·,
the Act may have been worded, they are not absolute
· but are circumscribed by the very nature of the proceedings themselves. The learned judges in that context observed:
·~
"Now, in order to understand what the competence of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is and
what are the powers conferred upon the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner, it is necessary to bear in mind
certain salient facts. It is only the assessee who has
a right conferred upon him to prefer an appeal against
the order of assessment, passed by the Income-tax
Officer. If the assessee does not choose to appeal, the
order of assessment becomes final subject to any power
(1) (1957] 31 l.T.R. 909.
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
of revision that the Commissioner might have under
s. 33B of the Income-tax Act. · Therefore, it would
The Commiss1oner
of Income-Tax be wholly erroneous to try and compare the powers
v.
of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with the
M/s. McMillan powers possessed by a Court of Appeal, under the
& Co.
Civil Procedure Code. The Appellate Assistant ComBhagwati 1.
missioner is not an ordinary court of appeal in the
sense in which that expression is understood in the
Civil Procedure Code. It is impossible to talk of a
court of appeal when only one party to the original
decision is entitled to appeal and not the other party,
and in view of this peculiar position occupied by the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Legislature,
as we shall presently point out, has conferred very
wide powers upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner once an appeal is preferred to him by the assessee. If the assessee chooses to remain content with
the order of the Income-tax Officer there is nothing
that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can do,
however erroneous the assessment may be; but if the
assessment is opened up by the action of the assessee
himself, then the powers conferred upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner are much wider than the
powers of an ordinary Court of Appeal. The statute
provides that once an assessment comes before the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner his competence is
not restricted to examining those aspects of the assessment which are complained of by the assessee; his
competence ranges over the whole assessment and it
is open to him to correct the Income-tax Officer not
only with regard to a matter which has been raised
by the assessee but also with regard to a matter which
has been considered by the Income-tax Officer and
determined in the course of assessment .
1957
-. .
. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"It is clear that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has been constituted a revising authority
against the decision of the Income-tax Officer; a revising authority not in the narrow sense of revising
what is the subject-matter of the appeal, not in the
sense of revising those matters about which the assessee makes a grievance, but a revising authority in the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'729
1957
sense that once the appeal is before him he can revise
not only the ultimate computation arrived at by the The commissioner
Income-tax Officer but he can revise every process of Income-Tax
which led to the ultimate computation or assessment.
v.
In other words, what he can revise is not merely the M/s. McMillan
ultimate amount which is liable to tax, but he is en& co.
titled to revise the various decisions given by the Bhagwati 1.
Income-tax Officer in the course of the assessment and
also the various incomes or deductions which came in
for consideration of the Income-tax Officer."
The learned judges then cited with approval the observations of the Patna High Court in Jagarnath Therani
v. Commissioner of Income-tax(1) :
"Now this section [section 31(3)] relating to appeals is enacted for the benefit of the subject and also,
to the limited extent therein stated, for the benefit of
the Crown. But the subject-matter of the appeal is
the assessment and the scope of the appeal must, in
my opinion, be limited by the subject-matter. The
appellate authority has no powe;r to travel beyond the
subject-matter of the assessment, and, for all the reasons advanced by the appellant, is in my opinion, not
entitled to assess new sources of income."
the observations of the High Court of Madras in
Gajalakshmi Ginning Factory v. Commissioner of
Income~tax(2) (approved by the Patna High Court
in Bishwanath Prasad Bhagwat Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax(8) at p. 758) :
"Of course, it would not be open to the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner to introduce into the assessment new sources, as his power of enhancement should
be restricted only to the income which was the
subject-matter of consideration for purposes of assessment by the Income-tax Officer."
and their own observations in an unreported judgment of theirs in Sharrif Jima & Co. Ltd., Mombassa
~· Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City(~) :
"When the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
exercises his power of enhancement, he is dealing with
(1) [1925] 2 l.T.C. 4, 8.
(2) [1952] 22 l.T.R. 502, 510.
(3) [1956] 29 l.T.R. 748.
(4) I.T. Rrference No. 10 of 1950, Bombay High Court.
730
19S7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
the subject-matter of appeal before him, and enhance-
The c;;;;;;;;;,sU>ner ment is confined to the sources or items in respect of
which the assessment has been made by the Incometax Officer."
M/s. McMll/on
Af
ter considering the various authorities cited
& Co.
above the learned judges finally came to the concluBhagwati J.
sion :
"We do not think it can be seriously disputed that
those powers, are very wide and unfettered, but the
only question before us is whether there is any limitation upon those powers, and if there is any limitation
upon those powers, what is the nature and character
of the limitation. It is not as if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner pas completely unqualified powers;
his powers are limited to the subject-matter. of the
assessment and we have attempted to define what the
subject-matter of the assessment is."
It follows from the above that even though the
powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in
the matter of enhancement of the assessment provided
in s. 31(3) of the Act are not circumscribed by any
limitation thereupon and are as wide as wide can be,
there are well-recognized limitations on the same, one
of which has been rightly accepted by the learned
judges of the High Court of Bombay in their unreported decision above referred to. It now remains to
consider whether there is any other limitation on
such powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
to be found in the provisions of s. 13 of the Act and
the proviso thereto.
It is clear that not much light is thrown on this
question by the authorities directly bearing on the
construction of s. 13 of the Act above referred to
except the observations of the learned judges of the
High Court of Bombay in K. F. Vakeel's Case (supra).
This judgment of the learned judges of the High Court
of Bombay has not been dissented from either in Bombay or elsewhere and stands unchallenged and would
prima facie go to _establish the position canvassed
before us by the assessee that it is the Income-tax
Officer and the Income-tax Officer alone who is invested with the power to determine whether the method
of accounting employed by the assessee is such that
of Income-Tax
v.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
the income, profits and gains of the assessee cannot
properly be deduced therefrom.
1957
The Commisslone•
Not much help can be derived also from the com- of Income-Tax
v.
parison of the various provisions of the Act where the M/s. McMillan
Income-tax Officer is vested with the power of arriv& Co.
ing at the determinations on his own, viz., Section 4A
(a)(iv), s.10(5), s. 12B(2), s. 22(2), s. 22(4), s. 23(2),
s. 23A, s. 34 and s. 42(2) or where there are several
authorities named besides the Income-tax Officer for
arriving at determinations of the relative questions,
'Viz., s. 28 (1) and (2), s. 37, s. 38, s. 48, ands. 49E of
the Act with the provisions contained ins. 13 and the
proviso thereto. It is not necessary to probe into the
reasons for the enactment of these ,!leveral provisions
by the Legislature in the manner therein stated. It
is sufficient for the present purpose to scrutinise the
provisions of s. 13 itself and reach a conclusion on the·express terms thereof.
.,.
. Turning then to the provisions of s. 13 itself, one
finds that the main provision thereof enactS the rule
that income, profits and gains shall be computed for
the purpose of ss. 10 and 12 in accordance with the
method of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee. If the matter stood there the imperative
character of this provision would entail upon the
Income-tax Officer and upon all the income-tax authorities in the hierarchy to accept that method of
accounting for the computation of income, profits and
gains of the assessee for the purpose of ss. 10 and 12
·of the Act.
This method of accounting though regularly .employed by the assessee is however not invested with a
sacrosanct character and is subject to the proviso enacted in s. 13 and it is that if no inethod of accounting
has been regularly employed or if the method employed is such that in the opinion of the Income-ta:t Officer
the income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom, then the computation shall be made
upon such- basis and in such manner as the Incometax Officer may determine. Two conditions are thus
attached to the rejection of the method of accounting
regularly employed by the assessee and they are.
BhagwatiJ.
732
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
expressed in different phraseology: (i) if no method
The Commissioner of accounting has been regularly employed; and (ii) if
of Income-Tax the method employed is such that in the opinion of the
s v. .
Income-tax Officer the income, profits and gains cannot
11
Mf .&M~1::_' °" properly be deduced therefrom. It is to be noted that
these two conditions are couched in quite different
Bhagwati J.
terms. In the case of the first condition, the mere
fact of no method of accounting having been regularly
employed is enough to bring the proviso into operation but in the case of the second condition the Incometax Officer has to form an opinion that the method of
accounting is such that the income, profits and gains
cannot properly be deduced therefrom before the proviso can ever come into operation. The determination
of the Income-tax Officer concerned to that effect is
the condition of the rejection by him of the method
of accounting regularly employed by the assessee and
unless and until he comes to that conclusion he cannot
reject the same and compute the income, profits and
gains of the assessee upon such basis and in such manner as he may determine. The difference in the language of these two conditions is advisedly adopted by
the Legislature. The fact that no method of accounting has been regularly employed by the assessee would
be obvious to any Income-tax Officer merely on a
perusal of the statement of account furnished by the
assessee and would not require any mental process
which can be properly described as a determination.
The mental process involved, however, in the case
of the second condition is of a much more elaborate
character and the Income-tax Officer has to apply
his mind to the question whether even though the
method of accounting has been regularly employed
by the assessee, such income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom. Here the Incometax Officer concerned has to form a definite opinion
on the question and if he comes to the conclusion
that the income, profits and gains of the assessee
cannot properly be deduced from the method of
accounting regularly employed by him the proviso
at once comes into operation. He is entitled to reject
the method of accounting regularly employed by the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
9 7
assessee and compute the income, profits and gains of
i s
the assessee upon such basis and in such manner as The commissione,..
he may determine. This is not the mental process of of Income-Tax
the nature required for the fulfilment of the first conv.
M/s. McMillan
dition. It is the application of mind to t h e question
& Co.
whether income, profits and gains of the assessee can
be properly deduced from the method of accounting Bhagwati J.
regularly employed by the assessee and the Incometax Officer has to come to the conclusion that it cannot
be so done. This determination is under the terms of
the proviso itself a determination of the Income-tax
Officer himself and of no other authority in the hierarchy of the Income-tax Officers. It may be noted
that the term "Income-tax Officer" has been defined .
ins. 2(7) of the Act as distinct from the term "Appellate Assistant Commissioner" defined ins. 2(3) of the
Act. The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner and the Inspecting Assistant Commis- ·
sioner are separate entities each with a jurisdiction of
its own and the one cannot by any chance be interpreted to mean the other. If, therefore, the proviso to
s. 13 of the Act talks of the Inc"ome-tax Officer, it is
the Income-tax Officer alone as defined in s. 2(7) of
the Act and not the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
as defined ins. 2(3) of the Act or any other officer in
the hierarchy of Income-tax Officers. Such an interpretation would involve the deletion not only of the
term "Income-tax Officer" from the proviso to s. 13
but also the absolute negation of the expression "in
the opinion of the Income-tax Officer" mentioned
therein. I for one cannot ascribe to the Legislature
any negligence or oversight nor can I impute to it any
intention to use these words as though they were
superfluous or redundant. The words used by the
Legislature must be given their full effect and significance and the only way in which these words can be
construed is to ascribe to the Legislature the intention
to make the determination by the Income-tax Officer
a· condition of the proviso being brought into operation, with the necessary consequences of the rejection of the method of accounting regularly employed
by the assessee and the computation of the income,
profits and gains of the assessee upon such basis and
734
I9S7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
in such manner as the Income-tax Officer himself may
The Com.Ussloner determine.
of lncome--Tax
To that extent the decision of the High Court of
v.
M/s. McMillan Bombay in K. F. Vakeel v. Commissioner of Income& Co.
tax & E. P. Tax(') would appear to be correct.
JJhagwati'J.
It is however urged that this interpretatkm would
involve the necessary consequence that the determination of the Income-tax Officer within the proviso
to s. 13 of the Act wopJ.d be final so far as the Revenue
was concerned as it had no right to appeal against the
determination of the Income-tax Officer, whereas the
assessee would have the right under s. 30 of the Act
to carry an appeal before the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner and such a result could certainly not
have been contemplated by the Legislature while
enacting this measure. It is also contended that once
the assessee carries an appeal before the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner he himself destroys the finality of the determination made by the Income-tax
Officer and the whole matter is at large so much so
that even though the Revenue could not have preferred an appeal on its own, once the appeal is entertained by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner it
would be able to urge any and every ground including
the one which would bring the case within the proviso
to s. 13 of the Act even though the Income-tax Officer
had not entertained the same in the first instance.
The first contention is wholly untenable for the
-simple reason that when proceedings are entertained
by the Iricome-tax Officer, he represents the Revenue
and the contest then is between the Revenue (as represented by him) on the one hand and the assessee on
the other. If the Revenue itself decides the question
in a particular manner in the process of assessment,
it cannot legitimately be heard to say that it has not
been given any right of appeal against the decision of
the Income-tax Officer who represents it fully all the
way. The party aggrieved by the decision of the
Income-tax Officer can only be one and that is the
assessee the Revew1e having decided the question in
its own favour. The assessee only can, in the circum(1) I.T. Reference No. 21of1950, Bombay High Court.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT ·REPORTS
735
1957
stances, therefore, be given the right of appeal against
the decision of the Income-tax. Officer. Even when The c;;;;;;;ssioneJthe assessee files an appeal .before the Appellate of Income-Tax
Assistant Commissioner, the Revenue is represented
v.
by the Income-tax Officer himself who appears before M/s. McMillan
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner either in person
& co.
or by a representative. So, there also the Revenue is llhQKWatl 1~
fully represented and has its full say at the hearing
of the appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the only say which it can ever have would
be to support the decision which has been given in the
irst instance by the Income-tax Officer who is its representative in the assessment proceedings. No grievance can therefore be made that the Revenue has
been conferred no right of appeal and that if the assessee does not choose to appeal against the decision of
the Income-tax Officer, it has no redress whatever.
It has, in fact, no grievance at all which can ever be
redressed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
and if the Revenue cannot by any chance be treated
as an aggrieved party the whole of this argument is
robbed of significance. It is futile on the part of the
appellant therefore to urge that there is finality in
one case and no finality in the other.
The second contention put forward by the appellant
is equally devoid of substance. The powers of t&e
Appellate Assistant Commissioner are statutory and
they are to be found in the four corners of s. 31 of the
Act. The nature and scope of these powers have been
already discussed above and these powers are not
absolute in character but are circumscribed in the
manner indicated in the judgment of the High Court
of Bombay above referred to. The Income-tax Officer
who appears before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner either in person or by his representative is
concerned to support his own decision .and therefore
he cannot be ever heard to say that the decision which
he has reached in the matter of the proviso to s. 13 of
the Act is wrong in any manner whatever. The
Appellate Assistant Commissioner even though he is
exercising these appellate powers, cannot on its own
or suo motu arrive at the conclusion that the method
of accounting regularly employed by the assessee is
736
19 7
s
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
such that the income, profits and gains of the assessee
The commissionercannot be properly deduced therefrom. He can only
of Income-Tax arrive at the conclusion on the record before him and
v. .
M/s. McMillan
& co.
JJhagwati I.
on the materials presented before him by the assessee
. before him
as weII as t h e Income-tax Officer appearmg
either. in person or by a representative that the conclusion which has been reached by the Income-tax
Officer within the terms of the proviso to s. 13 of the
Act is not proper and if he comes to that conclusion
the only thing that he can do is to set aside the assessment within the meaning of s. 31(3) (b) of the Act
and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh
assessment after making such further enquiry which
the Income-tax Officer thinks fit or he, the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner, may direct. He ha~ no jurisdiction to arrive at a determination of his own as to
the method of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee being such that the income, profits and gains
of the assessee cannot properly be deduced therefrom.
That is the function of the Income-tax Officer by the
very terms of the proviso to s. 13 itself and he cannot
arrogate that function to himself by abrogating or
setting at naught the express terms of the proviso to
s. 13 which lay down that the power of rejection of the
method of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee and computation of the income, profits and
gains of the assessee upon such basis and in such manner as the Income-tax Officer himself may determine
is only vested in the Income-tax Officer as defined in
s. 2(7) of the Act. The power of enhancement of the
assessment conferred upon the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner under s. 31(3)(a) cannot be construed
to mean that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
can on his own exercise such power within the meaning of the proviso to s. 13 even though the Income-tax
Officer himself has not done so in the first instance.
The powers conferred upon the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner under s. 31(3)(a) have got to be read
with this further limitation that even though he can
enhance the assessment, he cannot do so by exercising the power which is vested not in him but is vested
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
737
1957
only in the Income-tax Officer concerned under the
proviso to s. 13 of the Act. Section 31(3) of the Act The Commissoner
has got to be read harmoniously with the provi'sions of Jncome-~ax
of s. 13 and the proviso thereto and if they are so read
v.
the only conclusion to which one can arrive is that M/s. McMillan
even though the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
& Co.
exercises the wide powers conferred upon him under Bhagwari J.
s. 31(3) of the Act, he cannot abrogate or set at naught
the express power which is vested in the Income-tax
Officer under the proviso to s. 13 of the Act.
The learned Solicitor-General urged that if the
proviso to s. 13 of the Act was so interpreted it would
not only deprive the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
of the power to bring the proviso to s. 13 of the Act
into operation in a proper case but would also deprive
the Commissioner of the power which he has to revise
the Income-tax Officer's order of assessment under
s. 33B of the Act. As already indicated, the Court is
not concerned here with the interpretation of s. 33B
of the Act and it may also be noted that there was
no such provision to be found in the Act as it stood at
the relevant period. Assuming, however, that the
power of the Commissione'r to revise the Income-tax
Officer's orders under s. 33B of the Act has to be con-;sidered in this context, there is nothing in the terms
of that section which militates against the conclusion
arrived at on the construction of the proviso to s. 13 of
the Act. If the Commissioner considers that any
order passed in the record of any proceedings u_nder
the Act by the Income-tax Officer is erroneous in so
far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue,
it is open to him after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard as he deems necessary to pass
such orders thereon as the circumstances of the case
justify. If he comes to the conclusion that the Incometax Officer concerned is in error in the matter of accepting the method of accounting regularly employed
by the assessee and ought to have come to the conclusion that the method of accounting employed is such
that the income, profits and gains cannot properly be
deduced therefrom, it would be open to the Commissioner to record that opinion of his and pass an order
738
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assess-
The Commissioner ment which would be within his competence and
of Income-Tax would be the only order thereon which the circum-
v.
M/s. McMillan
4c Co.
Bhagwa111.
stances of the case would justify. No injustice would
be done to the Revenue. The ends of justice would
b
e equally served if the Commissioner in such a case
makes an order cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment and remands the case back to
the Income-tax Officer with a direction to apply hi11
mind properly to the facts of the case and determine
the question which is within his exclusive province
under the terms of the proviso to s. 13 of the Act. I
cannot see any difficulty of the type envisaged by the
learned Solicitor-General and am of opinion that this
contention of the appellant also must be negatived.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the conclusion
reached by the High Court of Bombay in the instant
case was correct and the referred questions Nos. 1
and 2 were rightly answered by the High Court in the
negative. As stated by the High Court the question
No. 3 did not arise for consideration at all and I
would, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.
'
BY THE CoURT.-ln accordance
with the judgment
of the majority, the appeal will be allowed. Each
party will bear its own costs throughout.
Appeal allowed
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