PURANLAL LAKHANPAL versus UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 17 September 1957 | [1958] 1 S.C.R. 460 | 1957 INSC 68
Key facts
- Decided
- 17 September 1957
- Bench
- NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, S.K. DAS, J.L. KAPUR, A.K. SARKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 96/1957
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1958] 1 S.C.R. 460
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 68
Text of the judgment
460
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
PURANLAL LAKHANPAL
v.
1951
Septtmber 11.
UNION OF INDIA
(BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR
and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)
Preventive Detention-Order continuing such detention beyond
three months-Validity-Opinion of Advisory Board, if a pre-requisite
-'Such detention', meaning of-Constitution of India, Art. 22 (4)(a)
-Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV ofl960) as amended by the
amending Act of 1951 (No. of 1951), s. 11 (I)
The appellant was arrested under s. 3 of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950 (IV of 1950) as amended by the amending Act
of 1951. The grounds of his detention were communicated to him
as required by s. 7 of the Act and his case was thereafter put up
before the Advisory Board constituted under s. 8 of the Act. The
Board reported that there was sufficient reason for his detention
and thereupon the Central Government acting under s. 11(1) of the
Act confirmed the order of detention and directed that such detention should continue for a period of twelve months from the date
of detention. The appellant challenged the validity of this order
by an application to the Punjab High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus and contended that
sub-s. (I) of s.11 of the Act was constitutionally invalid as it
contravened the provision of Art. 22(4) (a) of the Constitution. The
High Court found against him. The same point was canvassed in
appeal to this Court and it was contended that the expression
'such detention' occurring in sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) of Art. 22 referred
to detention for a period longer than three months mentioned in
cl. (4) of the Article ands. 11 (!)of the Act, in so far as it permitted detention for more than three months without a• specific
report from the Advisory Board that there was sufficient cause
for detention for more than three months, was ultra vires. It was
contended on behalf of the Union of India that the expression
'such detentiop.' referred to 'preventive detention~ occurring in
the first line of cl. (4) of Art. 22 and what an Advisory Board
contemplated by sub-cl. (a) of that clause was intended to do was
only to give its opinion as to whether there was suJlicient cause
for the detention itself and not as to the P,eriod of detention.
Held (per Bilagwati, Jafer Imam, S. K. Das and J. L.
Kapur J. J., Sarkar J. dissenting). The contention advanced on
behalf of the respondent was correct and the appeal must fail. The
expression 'sucn detention' in Art. 22 (4) (a) of the Constitution
refers to prevemive detention and not to any period for which
suc;1 detention 3aou1tl continue and s. 11 (;) of the Preventive
Detention Act do'"' not contravene the provision of Act. 22 (4)(a)
of the Constitution.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
The true scope and effect of cl. (4) of Art. 22 must be judged
in the light of the entire scheme envisaged by Art. 22 and so
understood, it becomes clear that the Constitution could not have
intended that while the determination of the necessity of preventive detention should be left to the Executive, the determination
of the period for which such detention should continue should be
left to the Advisory Board. In the very nature of things any
decision as to the period of such detention can be taken only by
the detaining authority upon which has been placed the responsibility for the detention. The reference to the Advisory Board is
intended to be a safeguard against any possible misuse of its power
by the Executive and affords a machinery for the review of its
decision on the basis of the representation made .by the detenu,
the grounds of detention or the report of any Officer who may
have passed the order, it is not a limitation on the Executive's
discretion as to the discharge of its duties connected with preventive detention.
A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88,
referred to.
An examination of the scheme of the Act shows that its
provisions are in conformity with the relevant provisions of the
Constitution. While the Act authorises. detention for more than
three months, it does provide for a reference of the order of detention to the Advisory Board and it is only after the Advisory Board
has made its report that the Government can fix the period of
detention under s. 11 (I) of the Act.
Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, (1952) S.C.R . .368
and Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, (1952)
S.C.R. 612, referred to.
Held further, that where the appropriate authority refuses to
disclose any facts or particulars as to dates, persons and place, on
the ground that such disclosure would be against public interest,
under cl. (6) of Art. 22, the person in detention cannot be heard
to say, apart from the question of mala fides, that the grounds did
not disclose the necessary facts or particulars or that in the
absence of such facts or particulars he was not in ·a position to
make an effective representation. In the present case the
grounds gave him a sufficient opportunity to make an effective
representation.
Lawrence Joachim Joseph D'Souza v. The State of Bombay,
(1956) S.C.R. 382 and State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya,
(1951) S.C.R. 167, relied on.
The test of the mala fides of the Executive in passing, an
order of preventive detention is whether the Executive in making
such ·order was actuated by any ulterior purposes other than those
mentioned in the order of detention.
19~7
p,,,an1a1
Laklulllpal
v.
Union of India
462
19S7
Pllf'anla/
Loldtanpal
"·
Union of lndifl
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
Per Sarkar, J.-The expression 'such detention'
in
Art. 22(4)(a) of the Constitution means detention for a period
longer than three months a)ld cannot mean detention simpliciter.
The object of Art. 22(4) is to impose a limitation on the power
which the Parliament and the State Legislatures have, under
Art. 246 of the Constitution, to enact laws for preventive detention by making such detention, where it is to be extended beyond
three months, dependent on the opinion of an Advisory Board.
There is nothing in the language of Art. 22(4) to show that
the safeguard the Constitution intended to provide by the opinion
of the Advisory Board is available in other cases of detention.
A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88,
referred to.
It cannot be said that since the Act provides for the obtaining of the opinion of the Advioory Board as to the sufficiency of
the cause for detention, that opinion, in view of Art. 22(4) (a),
necessarily is as to the sufficiency of the cause for detention for
more than three months. Where the statute does not contain the
provision that the Advisory Board must report that in its opinion
there is a sufficient cause for. detention for more than three months,
as required by Art, 22 (4) (a) of the Constitution, the lacuna cannot
be deemed to be cured by implication. A statute which authorises
detention for a period longer than three months without making a
proVision that the opinion of the Advisory Board must be
obtained that there is sufficient cause for detention for a period
longer than three months is to that extent invalid.
Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab, (1952) S.C.R.
368 and Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The State of Bombay,
(1952) S.C.R. 612, considered.
CRIMINAL APPELLATI!
JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 96 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgments and
orders dated September 24, 1956; of the Circuit Bench
of the Punjab High Court at Delhi and dated September 26, 1956, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh
in Criminal Writ No. 128-D of 1956.
Appellant in person.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor.General of India, and R. H.
Dhebar, for the respondent.
1957. May 24. BY TIIE CoURT.-We dismiss the
appeal by a majority of 4 to 1 (A. K. Sarkar J.
dissenting) for reasons to be recorded later.
1957. September 17. The Judgment of Bhagwati,
Jafer Imam, S. K. Das and J. L. Kapur JJ. was
s~c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
delivered by S. K. Das J. Sarkar J. delivered a separate
judgment.
um
p,,,lllllaJ
Lak/uznpaJ
S. K. Das J.-This is an appeal by special leave,
and the appellant is Puranlal Lakhanpal. On July 21,
1956, the Government of India in the Ministry of
Home Affairs passed an order of preventive detention
against the appellant in which it was stated, inter alia,
that with a view to preventing the appellant from
acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of India
and the relations of India with foreign powers, it was
necessary to make an order against the appellant. The
order then coiicluded-"Now, therefore, in exercise
of the powers vested in the Central Government by
cl. (a) (i) of sub-s. (1) of s.3 of the Preventive Detention
Act 1950 (Act No. IV of 1950), as amended, the
Central Government hereby orders that the said Shri
Puranlal. Lakhanpal, son of Shri Diwan Chand
Sharma, be detained."
The appellant was arrested and taken in custody on
the same date. On July 24, 1956, the grounds of
detention were communicated to the appellant under
s. 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, No. IV of 1950,
hereinafter referred to as the Act. The case of the .
appellant was then sent to an Advisory Board constituted under s. 8 of the Act, and the Advisory Board
having reported that there was, in its opinion,
sufficient cause for detention of the appellant, the
Central Government confirmed the order of detention
on August 20, 1956, and stated further that the
appellant "shall continue in detention for a period of
twelve months from the date of his detention". This
order was passed under sub-s. (1) of s. 11 of the Act.
Before that date, however, .the appellant moyed the
Punjab High Court as also this Court challenging the
legality of his detention and aked for the issue of a
writ in the nature of writ of habeas corpus. The
petition to this Court was dismissed and as nothing
turns upon that petition, no further reference need be
made to it. In the petition to the Punjab High Court
under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the appellant was
. v•.
Union of India
S.K. D01 I.
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958}
'"1
permitted to urge an additional ground to the effect
that sub-s. (I) of s. 11 of the Act was unconstitutional
Loklumpa/
inasmuch as it offended against Art. 22(4) (a) of the
Y.
U11ian of India Constitution. This constitutional point was referred to
and decided by a Division Bench of the Punjab High
S.K. Da.r J.
Court by an order dated September 24, 1956. The
High Court held that sub-s. (1) of s. 11 of the Act was
neither repugnant to nor inconsistent with the provisions of Art. 22(4) of the Constitution. A single
Judge of the High Court then dealt with the petition
of the appellant on merits and dismissed it by an
order dated September 26, 1956. The appellant then
moved the Punjab High Court unsucessfully for leave
to appeal to this Court. He then moved this Court,
and obtained special leave to appeal from the aforesaid
orders of the Punjab High Court dated September 24,
and September 26, 1956, respectively.
Puranla/
We heard the appellant, who argued his case in
person, on May 22, 23 and 24, 1957. At the conclusion of the arguments on the last day of the term
before the commencement of the vacation, we intimated to the appellant the majority decision of the Court
that his appeal was dismissed, but stated that reasons
for the decision would be given later. These reasons
we now propose to give in the paragraphs that follow.
The first and foremost point which the appellant
has urged in support of his appeal is the constitutional
point, that is, the validity of sub-s. (1) of s. 11 of the
Act. The argument of the appellant is that sub-s. (1)
of s. 11 of the Act does · not conform to the constitutional mandate given by sub-cl. (a) of cl.(4) of Art. 22
of the Constitution. Therefore, our primary duty is "to
lay the Article of the Constitution which is invoked
beside the statue which is challenged and to decide
whether the latter squares with the former". Article 22
of the Constitution, in so far as it is relevent for our
purposes, is in these terms:
"22. (1) ..................................... .
(2). . . . . . . . . . . ' ...................... .
13) Nothing in clauses (1) and(2) shall apply-
S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
(a) to any person who for the time being is an
enemy alien; or
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained
under any law providing for preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall
authorise the detention of a person for a longer period
than three months unless(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who
are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as
Judges of a High Court has reported before the expira, tion of the said period of three months that there is in
its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall
authorise the detention of any person beyond the
maximum period prescribed by any law made by
Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with
the provisions· of any law made by Parliament under
sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of
an order made under any law providing for preventive
detention, the authority making the order shall, as
soon as may be, communicate to such person the
grounds on which the order has been made and shall
afford him the earliest opportunity of making a
representation aginst the order.
(6) Nothing in cluase (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that
clause to.disclose facts which such authority considers
to be against the public interest to disclose.
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe(a) the circumstances under which, and the class
or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained
for a period longer then three months under any law
providing for preventive detention without obtaining
the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with
the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);
(b) the maximum period for which any person
may in any class or classes of cases be detained under
any law providing for preventive detention; and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory
Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4)".
19'7
Pllranlal
Lak/ranpal
"·
Union of India
s:K. Dai J.
466
19$7
/'UrORIal
lakhanpal
••
Vnion of India
S.K. Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
Section 11 of the Act, which is challenged as
unconstitutional states :
"11. (1) In any case where the Advisory Board
has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause
for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue
the detention of the person concerned for such period
as it thinks fit.
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has
reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause
for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order
and cause the person to be released forthwith."
Now, the point taken by the appellant is this. According to him, the expression 'such detention' occurring in
sub-cl. (a) of cl. 4 of Art. 22 refers not merely to
the original order of preventive detention but to the
detention of a person for a period longer than
Board
three months; therefore, the Advisory
when it makes its report is required under
the sub-clause to record its opinion that there is
sufficient cause not merely for the original order of
detention but also for detention of that person for a
period longer than three months. It is contended that
such an opinion was not recorded by the Advisory
Board in the present case, and sub-s. (2) of s. 10 of the
Act merely required the report of the Advisory Board
to specify its opinion as to whether or not there was
sufficient cause for the detention of the appellant.
The appellant's contention.is that sub-s. (1) of s. 11 of
the Act, in so far as it permits the appropriate Government to continue the detention of the person concerned
beyond a period of three months without a specific
report from the Advisory Board that there is sufficient
cause for his detention for more than three months, is
11/tra vires; because it does not conform to sub-cl. (a) of
cl. (4) of Art. 22, nor does it give effect to the true
meaning of the expression 'such detention' occurring
in the said sub-clause.
On behalf of the respondent, the argument is that
the expression 'such detention' occurring in sub-cl. (a)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
467
1957
of cl. (4) of Art. 22 refers back to 'preventive detention'
occurring in the first line of cl. (4), and under the said
Puran/al
sub-clause the Advisory Board is to give its opinion as . Lak/ranpal
v.
to whether there is sufficient cause for the deten- Union of India
tion of the person concerned; there is no duty cast on S.IC. Das J.
the Advisory Board to determine the period of detention, and the failure of the Advisory Board to state in
its report that there is sufficient cause for the detention
of the person concerned for more than three months is
no violation of the constitutional mandate contained
in the said sub-clause.
We have to determine the correctness ot otherwise of
these rival contentions. No decision directly deciding
the point at issue has been brought to our notice.
There are, however, certain observations made in
A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras (1), with regard
to the meaning and effect of sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) of
Art. 22, to which a reference must now be made.
At page 117 of the report, Kania C.J, said :
"Article 22(4) opens with a d011ble negative. Put
in a positive form it will mean that a law which provides
fo:r preventive detention for a period longer than
three months shall contain a provision· ·establishing
an advisory board, [consisting of persons with the
qualifications mentioned in sub-clause (a)], and which
has to report before the expiration of three months if
in its opinion there was sufficientcause for such detention. This clause if it stood by itself and without
the remaining provisions of Article 22, will apply both
to the Parliament and the State Legislatures. The
proviso to this clause further enjoins ,that even though
the advisory board may be of the opinion that there
was sufficient cause for such detention, i.e., detention
beyond the period of three months, still the detention
is not to be permitted beyond the maximum period,
if any, prescribed by Parliament under Article 22(7)(b).
Again the whole of this sub-clause is made inoperative
by Art. 22(4)(b) in respect,of an Act of preventive
detention passed by Parliament under clauses (7)(a) and
(b). Inasmuch as the impugned Act is an Act of the
(lj [1950) S.C.R 88, I J 7.
60
468
19S7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
Parliament purported to be so made, clause 22(4) has
no operation and may for the present discussion be
kept aside."
v.
Union of India His Lordship was considering the Act of 1950 previous
to the amendments subsequently made therein from
S. K. Dtul.
1951 onward, and the observations appear to establish
the. following three points: first, clause (4) of Art. 22,
put in affirmative form, has reference to a law which
provides for preventive detention and authorises
detention for a period longer than three months;
second, the expression 'such detention' has again
reference to such a law providing for detention beyond
a period of three months; and lastly, cl. (4) of Art. 22
had no application to the Act of 1950 as it then stood.
We shall presently show that the first and the second
points do not really support the appellant's contention
and the last had particular reference toss. 9 and 12 of
the Act of 1950, as it then stood. The appellant has,
however, pointed 9ut that under the Act as it now
stands, every order of detention has to be placed before
the Advisory Board (s. 9 of the Act) and the Advisory
Board has to report ab6ut ev~ry order of detention
(s. 10 of tI:ie Act). Though under s. llA of the Act the
maximum period for which any person may be detained
in pursuance of a detention order which has been
confirmed under s. 11, is twelve months from the date
of detention, the Act now contains no provisions as to
the circumstances under which, or the class or classes
of cases in which, a person may be detained for a
period longer than three months without obtaining
the opinion of the Advisory Board; therefore, the
argument of the appellant is that the last point made
by the observation of Kania C.J. is no longer valid
in view of the amendments made in the Act of 1950.
We have proceeded. in this case on the footing that
sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) of Art. 22 applies to the Act as it
stands after the amendments, and even on that footing
there is, in our opinion, no inconsistency between that
sub-clause and the impugned provisions of the Act, aa
we shall presently explain.
In his dissentient judgment in Gopalan's case (supra),
Fazl Ali J., made the following observations with
Puronlal
Lalchanpal
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
469
19S7
regard to cl. (4) of Art. 22. Said his Lordship at pages
170 and 171 of the report :
Pur1111fal
Laklumpa/
v.
"In connection with the first Faint, the ques~ion
arises as to the exact meaning o the words 'such Union of Indio
detention' occurring in the end of Clause (4)(a). Two S.K. Da:J.
alternative interpretations were put forward : (1) 'such
detention' means preventive detention; (2) 'such
detention' means detention for a period longer than
three months, If the first inter,Pretation is correct,
theii the function of the Advisory Board would be to
go into the merits of the case of each person and
simply report whether there was sufficient cause for
his detention. According to the other interpretation,
the function of the Advisory Board will be to report to
the Government whether there is sufficient cause for
the person being detained for more than three months.
On the whole, I am inclined to agree with the second
interpretation. Prima facie, it is a serious matter to
detain a person for a long period (more than three
months) without any enquiry or trial. ·But article
22(4) (a) provides that such detention may be ordered
on the report of the Advisory Board. Since the report
must be directly connected with the object for which
it is required~ the safeguard. provided by the article,
viz., calling tor a report from the Advisory Board,
loses its value, if the Advisory Board is not to apply
its mind to the vital question before the Government,
namely, whether prolonged detention (detention for
more than three months) is justified or not. Under
article 22 (4) (a), the Advisory Board has to submit its
report before the expiry of three months and may
therefore do so on the eighty-ninth day. It would be
somewhat farcical to provide, that after a man has
been detained for eighty-nine days, an Advisory Board
is to say whether his initial detention was justified.
On the other hand, the determination of the question
whether prolonged detention (detention for more than
three months) is justified must necessarily involve the
determination of the question whether the detention
was justified at all, and such an interpretation only
can give real meaning . and effectiveness to the
provision. The provision being in the nature of a
470
19,7
SUPREM~
COURT REPORTS
[19S8J
protection or safeguard, I must naturally lean towards
the interpretation which is favourable to the subject
and which is also in accord with the object in view."
v.
Unian of lltliia These observations, it is urged, support the appellant's
contention.
S.K. D08 l.
Patanjali Sastri J. (as he then was) took a view
different from that of Faz! Ali J. in Gopa/an's case
(supra), and made the following observations at
pages 209 and 210 of the report:
"It was argued that the words 'sufficient cause for
such detention in sub-clause (a) of clause (4) had
reference to the detention beyond three months mentioned in clause (4) and that this view was supported
by the l;mguage of sub- clause (a) of clause (7) whereby
Parliament is authorised to prescribe the circumstances
under which and the class or classes of cases in which
a person may be detained for a period longer than
three months without the opinion of an Advisory
Board. In other words, learned counsel submitted,
the combined effect of clauses (4) and (7) was that no.
person could be detained for a period over three
months without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory
Board that there was sufficient cause for detention for
the ·Jonger period, except in cases where Parliament
passed a law authorising detention for such period
even without the opinion of an Advisory Board. Thus,
these two clauses were concerned solely with the
duration of the preventive detention, and so was the
Advisory Board which those clauses provided for that
purpose. I am unable to accept this view. I am
inclined to think that the words 'such detention' in
sub-clause (a)· reler back to the preventive detention
mentioned in clause (4) and not to detention for a
longer period than three months. An Advisory Board,
composed as it.has to be of Judges or lawyers, would
hardly be in a position to judge how long a person
under preventive detention, say, for reasons co.nnected
with defence, should be detained. That must be a
matter for the executive authorities, the Department
of Defence, to determine, as they alone are responsible
for the defence of the country and have the necessary
data for taking a decision on the point. All that an
Pwtm/al
LakhanpaJ
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
471
l9S7
Advisory Board can reasonably be asked to do, as a
safeguard against the misuse of the power, is to judge
Ptrran/al
whether the detention-._ is justified and not arbitrary LokliatrpaJ
or ma/a fide. The fact that the Advisory Board is Unlo11 v.of 111/Jia
required to make its report before the expiry of three
months and so could. submit it only a day or two S.K. Du J.
earlier cannot legitimately lead to an inference that
the Board.was solely concerned with the issue whether
or not t.he detention should continue beyond that
period. Before any such tribunal could send in its
report a reasonable time must elapse, as the grounds
have to be communicated to the person detained, he
has to make his representation · to the detaining
authority which has got to be placed before the Board
through the appropriate departmental channel. Each
of these steps may, in the course of official routine,
take some time, and three months' period might well
have been thought a reasonable period to allow before
the Board could be required to submit its report."
These observations are undoubtedly against the
contention of the appellant.
It is necessary to consider the whole scheme of Art.
22 in order to appreciate the true scope and effect of
cl. (4). Article 22 provides for protection against
arrest and detention in certain cases. Clauses (1) and
(2) refer to arrest and detention in certain circumstances and provide for certain safeguards. Clause (3)
. then states, inter alia, tJ;iat nothing in els. (0 and (2)
shall apply to any person who is arrested or detained
under any law providing for "preventive detention";
in other words, a law relating to "preventive detention" is put in a special category and is dealt with in
claqses (4) to (7). The power to legislate laws of
preventive detention is given to Parliament and the
State Legislatures by the Constitution. This power,
however, is not absolute, but is controlled by the provisions of els. (4), (5), (6) and (7) of Art. 22. ·The
maximum period of detention is not prescribed by the
Constitution, but Parliament may by law ·prescribe
such a period. The Constitution contemplates that
any law which authorises detention for more than
three months should be subject to certain safeguards,
472
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
as provided in cl. (4) of Art. 22 which directs that the
case of a detained person under any law authorising
Pmanlal
Ltlkhanpal
detention
for more than three months must be the
v.
Union ofllftilo subject of a report by an Advisory
Board. The
to
report
whether
there
is sufficient
Advisory
Board
is
ti.K. Dasi.
cause for such detention. If the Advisory Board
reports that the detention is justified then only the
detaining authority determines the period of detention.
On the other hand, if the Advisory Borad reports that
the detention is not justified, the detained person
must be released. Clause (4) of Art. 22 does not state
that the · Advisory Board has to determine whether
the person detained should be detained for more than
three months. What it has to determine is whether
the detention is at all justified. The setting up of an
Advisory Board to determine whether such detention
is justified is considered as a sufficient safeguard
against arbitrary detention under any law of preventive detention which authorises detention for more
than three months. The matter before the Advisory
Board is the subject 0£. detention of the person
concerned and not for how Jong he should be detained.
Clause (7) of Art. 22 is an exception to cl. (4) of that
Article. It authorises Parliament alone to pass a law
of preventive. detention authorising detention of a
person for more than three months without obtaining
the opinion of an Advisory Board so long as the
circumstances under which and the class or classes of
cases in which a person may be detained for a longer
period than for three months are set out in the enacted
law. The Constitution evidently does not contemplate
detention of the person for a period of three months
or less as sufficiently serious to have the safeguard of
a report by an Advisory Board to the effect that there
is sufficient cause for detention. Under the Constitution an Advisory Board is to be set up for all cases of
detention ll\ld.er a law authorising detention for more
than three months. When.. the case of a detained
person is placed before the Advisory Board under such
law it must be assumed that the Advisory Board
knows that if it reports that the detention is justified,
the cletenu may be detained for more than three
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
473
months and up to the maximum period provided by
the law. The expression "such detention" in Art.
22(4)(a) refers to preventive detention and not to how
long the person is to be detained.
1957
Puranlaf
Lakhanpal
v.
Union of India
S. K. Das J.
Moreover, it is clear that clause (4) lays down a
prohibition against any Jaw providing for detention
for more than three months without a provision for
_an Advisory Board, and cl. (5) provides for furnishing
the grounds of detention and affording an opportunity
of making a representation against the order of
detention. But these safeguards are subject to els. (6)
and (7). Under the former, facts, the disclosure of
which the detaining authority considers against the
public interest, are not required to be furnished.
Under the latter, Parliament may prescribe the
circumstances under and the class or classes of cases
in which a person may be detained for a period longer
than three months without ootaining the opinion of an
Advisory Board. The Constitution has therefore in
one case given discretion to the Executive not to
furnish facts in certain circumstances and in the other
case left it to Parliament to prescribe cases or classes
of cases in which reference to the Board need not be
made. Therefore, both the furnishing of grounds and
the report of the Board are, in a sense, limited
safeguards. Considering the circumstance that the
detention is of a preventive nature, the Executive has
necessarily to consider whether a persdn should be
detained and the period for which he should be
detained. It could not have been the intention to give
the power of determining the necessity of detention of
a particular person to the Executive, and leave to
another authority-the Board in this case-to say
whether the detention should be for three months or
more. In the very nature of things the decision as to the
period of detention must be of the detaining authority,
because it is the authority upon which responsibility
for detention has been placed. The reference to the
Board is only a safe~ard against Executive vagaries
and high-handed action and is a machinery devised by
the Constitution to review the decision of the Executive
M2SCIV-2
·474
19S7
Puranla/
Lakhanpal
v.
Union of India
S.K. Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
on the basis of a representation made by the detenu,
the grounds of detention, and where the' order is by
an officer, the report of such officer. It is not a
limitation on the Executive's discretion as to the
discharge of its duties connected with preventive detention ; it is a safeguard against misuse of power.
What then is the scheme of the Act under our
consideration ? An order of detention is made under
s. 3 of the Act. If the order is made by any officer
under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 a report has to be submitted to
the State Government to which the officer is subordinate and the order does not remain in force for
more than twelve days unless in the meantime it has
been approved by the State Government. Under s. 7
of the Act, the grounds of detention have to be communicated to the detenu, as soon as may be but
not later than five days from the date of detention.
Section 8 relates to the .constitution of an Advisory
Board. Under s. 9 in every case where a detention
order has been made under the Act, the appropriate
Government shall, within thirty days from the date of
detention under the order, place before the Advisory
Board the grounds on which the order has been made
and the representation, if any made by the detenu.
Section 10 prescribes the procedure of the Advisory
Board and lays down that the Advisory Board must
submit its report to the appropriate Government
within ten weeks from the date of detention. Sub-s. (2)
of s. 10 states that the report of the Advisory Board
shall specify in a separate part thereof the opinion of
the Advisory Board 11s to whether or not there is
sufficient, cause for the detention of the person concerned. Then comes s. 11 which we have already quoted
in extenso. The scheme of the Act has been explained
in several decisions of this Court. In Makhan Singh
Tarsikka v. State of Punjab ('), it was stated that
whatever might be the position under the Preventive
Detention Act of 1950, before it was amended in 1951,
under the Act as amended in 1951, the Government
must determine what the period of detention should
be only after the Advisory Board to which the case
(r) (1952] S.C.R. 368, 370.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
1957
is referred reports that the detention is justified.
Patanjali Sastri C. J. observed:
Pur011/a/
Lakftairpal
"It is, therefore, plain that it is only after the
...
Advisory Board, to which the case has been referred, Union of India
reports that the detention is justified, the Government S. K. Das/.
should determine what the period of detention should
be and not before. The fixing of the period of detention in the initial order itself in the present case was,
therefore, contrary to the scheme of the Act and cannot be supported."
In Dattatreya Moreshwar Ppngarkar v. State of
Bombay (1) Mukherjea J. (as he then was) said :
"It is now settled by a pronouncement of this
Court that not only it is not necessary for the detaining authority to mention the period of detention
when passing the original order under s. 3(1) of the
Preventive Detention Act, but that the order would
be bad and illegal if any period is specified, as it might
prejudice the case of the detenu when it goes up for .
consideration before the Advisory Board. The
Advisory Board again has got to express its opinion
only <;>n the point as to whether there is sufficient
cause for detention of the person concerned. It is
neither called upon nor is it competent to say anything
regarding the period for which such person should be
detained. Once the Advisory Board expresses its view
that there is sufficient cause for detention at the date
when it makes its report, what action is to be taken
subsequently is left entirely to the appropriate
Government and it can under s. 11(1) of the Act
'confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it
thinks fit'. In my opinion, the words 'for such period
as it thinks fit' presuppose and imply that after
receipt of the report of the Advisory Board the detaining authority has to make up its mind as to whether
the original order of detention should be confirmed and
if so, for what further period the detention is to con~
tinue. Obviously, that is the proper stage for making
an order or decision of this description as the
(1) (19,52] S.C.R. 612, 626.
61
476
1957
Puron/41
Lakhtmpal
••
Union of India
S.K. Da1 J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
investigation with regard to a particular detenu such as
is contemplated by the Preventive Detention Act is
then at an end and the appropriate Government is in
full possession of all the materials regarding him."
At page 637 of the report, the learned Judge further
said :
"Under the Constitution, the detention of a
person under any law providing for preventive detention cannot be for a period of more than three months
unless the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there
is· sufficient cause for the detention of the person
concerned. The Constrtution itself has specified the
maximum limit of the initial detention and detention
for a period longer than three months can only be
made on the basis of the report of the Advisory
Board."
In view of these observations, it is quite clear what
the scheme of the Act is. The Act authorises a
possible detention of more than three months ; the
order of detention is therefore referred to the Advisory
Board, and it is only when the Advisory Board makes
its report that the appropriate Government fixes the
period of detention under sub-s. (1) of s. 11 of the Act.
For all these reasons, we hold that sub-s. (1) of s. 11
of the Act does not contravene any of the provisions
of Art. 22 and is accordingly valid.
We now proceed to give our reasons with regard to
those points on merits which have been urged before
us by the appellant. The appellant has contended
that the grounds of detention communicated to him are
all vague, except ground No. 2, and that the grounds
so communicated did not give him an opportunity of
making an effective representation, a right guranteed
to him under cl. (5) of Art. 22. The grounds except
ground No. 2 were these :
"I. That since the last two years you are in
constant touch with foreign correspondents in India
and representatives of foreign countries to whom you
have been spreading reports and information about
-conditions in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which
.are false and calculated to prejudice the relaiions of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
India with foreign powers and also to prejudice the
security of the State.
............................................
1957
P11ranlal
Lak/ranpal
v.
3. That you are in constant touch with certain Union of /ndi,1
persons in Pakistan and Pakistani occupied part of S. K.DaJJ.
Jam.mu and Kashmir who are hostile to India and you
are assisting these persons in their activities which
are prejudicial to the security of India.
4. That you are receiving financial assistance
from persons in Pakistan and Pakistani occupied
part of J ammu and Kashmir for supporting and
furthering your aforesaid prejudicial activities.
5. That you are in regular connection with
persons in India who are engaged in promoting false
propaganda against India in relation to Kashmir and
have been attending their secret meetings for planning
action and propaganda in relation to Kashmir prejudicial to the security of India.
6. The Central Government is satisfied that you
are likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security
of India and in a manner prejudicial to the relations
of India with foreign powers and with a view to prevent you from so acting has passed the order for your
detention."
'
The same document·which communicated the grounds
of detention to the appellant also contained the
following statement in paragraph 7:
"The Central Government is satisfied that it is
against the public interest to disclose to you any facts
or particulars as to dates, persons and places and the
nature of your activities and the assistance received
or otherwise than those which have been already
mentioned."
The argument of the appellant is that by refusing to
disclose any facts or particulars as to dates, persons
and places, the detaining authority has really deprived
the appellant of the valuable right guranteed to him
.under cl. (5). This contention of the appellant is concluded by the recent decision of this Court in Lawrence
Joachim Joseph D' Souza v. The State of Bombay (1). It
{1) [1956] S.C.R. 38~.
478
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19~7
[1958)
was held therein that the right of the detenu to be
furnished
with facts or particulars was subject to the
P111tlll/IJ1
Uzkhan/lal
limitation
mentioned in cl. (6) and even if the grounds
v.
communicated
were not as precise and specific as
Union •f lndt.
might
have
been
desired, the appropriate authority had
S. K. Dos J.
the right to withhold such facts or particulars, the disclosure of which it considered to be against the public
interest. Such a privilege having been exercised in
the present case, the appellant cannot be heard to say,
apart from toe question of mala fides, that the grounds
did not disclose the necessary facts or particulars, or
that in the absence of such facts or particulars, he was
not in a position to make an effective representation.
In The State ofBombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (')
this Court has unanimously held that under s. "3 of the
Act, it is the satisfaction of the appropriate authority
which is necessary for an order of detention, and if the
grounds, on which the appropriate authority has
said that it is so satisfied, have a rational connection with the objects which are to be prevented
from being attained, the question of satisfaction cannot
be challenged in a court of law except on the ground
of malafides. It has been further held by the majority
that cl. (5) of Art. 22 confers two rights on the detenu,
namely, first, a right to be informed of the grounds on
which the order of detention has been made, and
secondly, to be afforded the earliest opportunity to
make a representation against the order. If grounds
which have a rational connection with the objects
mentioned in s. 3 are supplied, the first condition is
complied with. But the right to make a representation implies that the detenu should have such
information as will enable him to make a representation and if the grounds supplied are not sufficient to
enable the detenu to make a representation, he can
rely on the second right. The second right, however, is
again subject to the right of privilege given by cl. (6)
and as has been pointed out in Lawrence D' Souza's
. case (supra), the obligation to furnish grounds and the
duty to consider whether the disclosure of any facts
involved therein is against public interest, are both
(r) [1951]S.C.R •• 167.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
vested in the detaining authority and not in any
other..
As in Lawrence D' Souza' s case (supra), it is unnecessary in the present case to consider the theoretical
contention as 'to whether or not Art. 22 (6) of the
Constitutfon overrldes the constitutional right to be
furnished grounds under Art. 22(5) to the_ extent of
denying all the particulars and leaving the grounds
absolutely vague. We are of the opinion that in the
present case the grounds furnished to the appellant,
though not as precise and definite as might be desired,
gave him a sufficient opportunity of exercising his right
under cl. (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution.
With regard to ground No. _2, the appellant has
urged the following points. Ground No. 2 communicated to the appellant is in these terms:
"2. That you addressed a Press _Conference at
New Delhi .on the 18th day of February, 1956 which
was attended by a large body of Press Correspondents
of foreign countries and that you made a speech (copy
of contents of which is hereto annexed) containing
various false statements about the conditions of the
people of Kashmir. The combined effect of these
statements is prejudicial to the security of India and
to the relations of India with foreign powers. Extracts
of such statements are given below : (then follow the
extracts)."
It is argued (1) that detention on this.ground is more
punitive than preventive; (2) that it is not relevant to
the objects for which the appellant has been detained,
namely, the security of India and her relations with
foreign powers, and (3) that there are verbal inaccuracies in reciting the grounds, with particular
reference to what happened at the Press Conference on
February 18, 1956. We have considered each one of
these arguments and are of the view that not one of
them has any substance. Firstly the ground no doubt
relates to what happened on February 18, 1956; that
does not, however, mean that the detention of the
appellant is punitive in character. What the appellant is likely to do in future must, to ·a large extent,
19,7
Pwaiilal
Lakhanpal
v.
Union of India
S.K. Das I.
480
19S7
...--
Puranlal
Lakhanpal
v.
Union of India
S. K. Das J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
be inferred from his past conduct. Secondly, we
think that the ground has a rational connection with
the objects which the appellant has to be prevented
from attaining. The objects of the appellant's detention are to prevent him from acting in a manner
prejudicial to (1) the security of ·India and (2) her
relations with foreign powers. Both these objects, we
think, come within the ground in question. Thirdly,
the verbal inaccuracies relied on by the appellant are
all so inconsequential in nature that we do not think
it necessary to state them in detail. By way of an
example, it may be stated that in the extract enclosed
with the ground, there is a statement to this effect:
"It would be no exaggeration to state that were a
plebiscite to be held there today, over 90 %of Kashmiris
would vote against India- etc." In his actual statement, however, the appellant said: "It would not be
an exaggeration to state that were a plebiscite to be
held there today, over 90 % of Kashmiris. would vote
against India etc." The only difference between the
two is that instead of the word 'not', the word 'no'
has been used in the extract ; otherwise, there is no
difference between the two statements. Such verbal
differences are not inaccuracies at all, and we are
unable to accept the contention of the appellant that
the detaining authority did not apply its mind to the
grounds communicated to him.
Lastly, the appellant has raised the question of
ma/a fides. This question has been considered at great
length by the learned Judge of the Punjab High Court
who dealt with the petition of appellant. The appellant
referred in his affidavit to some of his activities from
1954 onwards and to certain events which happened
between 1954 and 1956. He also referred to cer~ain
statements alleged to have been made by the Prime
Minister and the Home Minister, and he averred that
both of them were annoyed with him for his activities
and therefore the order of detention was not bona fide.
We are unable to accept this contention. We agree
with the learned Judge of the High Court that the
activities of the appellant and the events of 1954 to
1956 referred to by the appellant, do not in any way
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
481
show that the order of detention made against the
appellant was made for any ulterior purpose or for
purposes other than those mentioned in the detention
order. On the question of ma/a jides, it is not a
relevant consideration whether the activities. of the
appellant were liked or disliked by the authorities
concerned. The only relevant consideration is if the
order of detention was made for ulterior purposes or
purposes other than those mentiop.ed in the detention
order. On the materials placed before us, we unhesitatingly hold that no mala fides have been
established.
19S7
Pu ran/a/
Lakhanpa/
v.
Union of lnd"'
S.K. DasJ.
• These are our reasons for the order which we passed
on May 24, 1957, dismissing the appeal.
SARKAR J.-This appeal arises out of an application for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus. In my
view the appeal can be disposed of on one ground,
and in this judgment I propose to deal with that
ground alone.
On July 21, 1956 the appellant was taken into
custody under an order of detention passed against
him by the Government of India under the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950). On July 24,
1956, the appellant was served with the grounds on
which the order of detention had been passed as
required by the Act. The appellant thereafter made
a representation against the order which was considered by the Advisory Board, constituted under the
Act. On August 22, the appellant was served with
another order made by the Government of India
wherein it was stated that the Advisory Board had
reported that there was in its opinion, sufficient cause
for the detention of the appellant. This order further
stated that in view of the report of the Advisory Board
the Government of India confirmed the detention
order earlier made against the appellant and that the
appellant should continue in detention for a period of
12 months from the date of his detention. The appel...
lant challenged the legality of these orders of detention
and moved the High Court of Punjab for the issue
SarkarJ,
482
19S7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
of an appropriate writ for his release. The petition
was dismissed by the High Court. Hence this appeal.
The petitioner challenges the validity of the orders
v.
Union of India of detention on the ground that the provision of the
Preventive Detention Act, 1950, under which they
Sarkar J.
were made is ultra vires the Constitution. I have come
to the conclusion that this objection to the Act is sound
and that is why I do not find it necessary to discuss
the other contentions raised by the appellant.
The contention of the petitioner is based on
Art. 22(4)(a) of the Constitution. The relevant portion
of the article is set out below :
(4) No law providing for preventive detention.
shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer
period than thret. months unless(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons
who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed
as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the
expiration of the said period of three months that
there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such
detention :
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall
authorise the detention of any person beyond the
maximum period prescribed by any law made by
Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with
the provisions of any law made by Parliament under
sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7) .
. . . . . . .·• ............ ·- ........................ .
. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe(a) the circumstances under which, and the
class or classes of cases in which, a person may be
detained for a period longer than three months under
any law providing for preventive detention without
9btaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in
accordance with the provisions of sub-clause ·(a) of
clause (4);
(b) the maximum period for which any person
may in any class or classes of cases be detained under
any law providing for preventive detention; ....... .
. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . . .. . . . . . . .
Pura/al
Lakltallpal
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
483
The position, therefore, is that unless Parliament by
law otherwise prescribes, the provisions of cl. (4)(a) of
Art. 22 have to be complied with by any law providing for preventive detention. Parliament has passed
no law prescribing otherwise. The Preventive Detention Act, 1950, has therefore, in order to be constitutional to satisfy Art. 22 (4) (a). The appellant's contention is that it does not do this. Though the words
used are somewhat obscure, it is fairly clear, as was
accepted at the Bar, that the required provision for
the report of the Advisory Board has to be made in
the law authorising preveptive detention and it is not
by the force of Art. 22(4)(a) itself that that report
has to be obtained.
The present Act authorises a maximum period of
detention of 12 months from the date of detention. It
is therefore a law providing for preventive detention
and it authorises the detention of a person for a longer
period than three months. It must hence contain provisions satisfying sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) of Art. 22 if it is
intended to detain a person under it for a period longer
than three months. It has to provide that if under it
detention for a period longer than three months is to
be ordered then an Advisory Board, constituted as
specified, must report that there is in its opinion
sufficient cause for such detention. So much is not
in dispute. The difficulty ·is caused by the words
"such detention". The appellant contends that they
mean detention for a period longer than· three months
and therefore an Act authorising preventive detention
for more than three months has to provide that the
Advisory Board must report that there is sufficient
cause for detention for a period longer than three
months. The Act in this case does make provisions
for the constitution of the Advisory Board and for
submitting all cases of detention irrespective of their
periods of detention to it for its opinion as to whether
or not there is sufficient cause for detention, but it does
not provide that where it is intended to detain a person
for a period longer than three months then the
Advisory Board must report that there was sufficient
19S1
l'llTOlllal
Ld/lanpal
"·
Union of India
S•rkar J,
484
1957
Puranlal
Lakhanpal
v.
Union of India
Sarkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958J
cause for detention for a period longer than three
months, The provision for the opinion of the Advisory
Board is contained in s. 10(2) of the Act which is
in the following terms :
S. 10(2).-The report of the Advisory Bo;;.rd shall
specify in a separate part thereof the opinion of the
Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient
cause for the detention of the person concerned.
If therefore the appellant is right in his contention
that the words "such detention" mean detention for
a longer period than three months then the provisions
of the Act authorising detention for more than three
months must be held to be ultra vires. The question
is, what do these words mean ?
As a matter of pure construction of the language
used in sub-cl. (a) it seems to me that the words "such
detention" must mean detention for a longer period
than three months. The word "such" means,
of the kind or degree already described. Of the
meanings of the word "such" given in the Oxford
Dictionary this J find to be the only one appropriate
in the present context. Learned counsel for the respondent did not suggest any other meaning. Now what
is the kind or degree of detention that is earlier
described in the clause ? The only kind that I find is
detention for a longer period than three months. That
being so, I feel compelied to accept the appellant's
contention.
·
The learned Solicitor-General opposing the appeal
contended that the words "such detention" were
capable of two meanings, namely, detention simpliciter
and detention for a period longer than three months.
He advanced certain reasons why of the two possible
constructions the first one should be accepted. I will
come to the reasons later. Before doing so I wish to
state that I am unable to agree that the words "such
detention" are capable of two meanings. Clause (4)
contemplates a law of preventive detention but does
not authorise such law. Such a law is within the
legislative competence of the Parliament and the State
legislatures : See Art. 246 of the Constitution, item 9
of list I and item 3 of list III in the Seventh schedule
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
485
to the Constitution. Having contemplated such a law,
what cl. 4 proceeds to do is to lay down that, that law
shall not authorise the detention of .a person for a
longer period than three months unless the Advisory
Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. It only imposes a.limitation on the power to pass laws authorising preventive
detention. This is what Das J. said in A. K. Gopalan
v. The State of Madras (1). He there said (p. 324),
"articles 21 and 22 have put a limit on the power of
the State given under Art. 246 read with the legislative lists". Therefore the only object that cl. (4)
purports to deal with is detention for a period longer
than three months under a law of preventive detention
the existence of which it assumes. Hence the words
"such detention" must necessarily refer fo detention
for a period longer than three months. There is nothing
else to which it can refer. Preventive detention with-.
out reference to the period of it is not in contemplation
of cl. (4) at all. A law for preventive detention is
mentioned. The words "such detention" cannot
possibly refer to that law. That law may, no doubt,
provide for detention for a shorter period but such
shorter detention is not mentioned in the clause nor
really in its contemplation at all. So no question of
the words "such detention" referring to the shorter
detention arises.
But suppose the learned Solicitor-General was right
in his contention that the words, in the context they
are used, are capable of referring ·both to preventive
detention simpliciter and to preventive detention for
a period longer than three months, are there reasons
for preferring the first of the two alternative constructions? I am unable to find any. The learned SolicitorGeneral said that if the words referable only to
a detention for a period longer than three months then
people detained for a shorter period would be deprived
of the safeguard of the opinion of the Advisory Board
and lose the chance of being set free if it expressed
the view that there was no sufficient cause for
detention. That no doubt would be so. But I find
(r) (1950) S.C.R. 88.
1957
Puranlal
Lakhanpal
v.
.
Union 'of India
Sarkar J.
486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1957
(1958]
nothing in the language of cl. (4) to show that such
a safeguard was intended. If the language does
Lakhanpal
not support such an intention, then of courM: this
•• India argument must fail, however much the court may like
Union of
the safeguard to be provided in all cases of detention.
Sarkar J.
If it was the intention of the Constitution to provide
such a safeguard it would not have required that the
report of the Advisory Board should be made before
the expiry of the three months. That is what Fazl
Ali, J., said in Gopalan's case (') at page 171:
"Under Art. 22(4)(a), the Advisory Board has to
submit its report before the expiry of three months and
may therefore do so on the eighty-ninth day. It would
be somewhat farcical to provide, that after a man has
been detained for eighty-nine days, an Advisory Board
is to say whether his initial detention was justified."
As the Constitution could not have contemplated the
situation mentioned by Fazl Ali, J., it could not have
intended that all cases of detention irrespective of
their periods must also be placed before the Advisory
Board. It follows that it did not mean to provide the
safeguard referred to by the learned Solicitor-General.
In fact, all the other learned Judges who heard
Gopalan's case('), excepting Patanjali Sastri, J., expressed the same view. I set out below what they said:
Kania, C. J., (page 118 of the Report) :
"Reading article 22 clauses (4) and (7) together it
appears to be implied that preventive detention for
less than three months, without an· Advisory Board, is
permitted under the Chapter on Fundamental Rights,
provided such legislation is within the legislative competence of the Parliament or the State Legislature, as
the case may be. "
Mahajan, J. (p. 228).
"If the intention of the Constitution was that a
law made on the subject of preventive detention had
to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness, then
it would not have troubled itself by expressly making
provision in article 22 about the precise scope of the
limitation subject to which such a law could be made
Puranla
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
487
i957
and by mentioning the procedure that the law dealing
PurQll/a/
with that subject had to provide. Some of the proLakhallpal
visions of article 22 would then have been redundant,
"· India
for instance, the provision that no detention can last Union.of
longer than three months without the necessity of such
SarkarJ.
detention being examined by an Advisory Board."
Again at p. 237 :
"Clause (4) ~f article 22 eqjoins ........... that
no law can provide for preventive detention for a
longer period .than three months without reference to
an advisory board."
Mukherjea, J., (p. 281) :
"Preventive detention can be provided for by law
for reasons connected with six different matters specified in the relevant items in the legislative lists, and
whatever the reasons might be, there is a provision
contained in article 22(4)(a) which lays down that
detention for more than three months could not be
· permitted except with the sanction of the Advisory
Board."
Das, J., (p. 326) :
"In short, clause (4) of article 22 provides a limitation on the legislative power as to the period of preventive detention. Apart from imposing a limitation on
the legislative power, clause (4) also prescribes a procedure of detention for a period longer than three
months by providing for an Advisory Board."
The learned Solicitor-General then contended that
Art. 22 dealt both with preventive detention and other
kinds of detention. Thus clauses (1) and (2) dealt with
other kinds of detention while clause (4) and the remaining clauses of the article dealt with preventive detention.
Clause (3) said that nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall
apply to a person detained under any law providing
for preventive detention. The learned SolicitorGeneral contendeci that the words "such detention"
in clause (4) were intended to refer to preventive
detention without reference to its duration as distinguished from the other kinds of detention referred to
in clauses (1) and (2). He sought to reinforce his
argument by contending that preventive detention
488
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
for a period longer than three months was not a
separate kind of preventive detention and therefore
?uranlal
Lakhanpa/
the words "such detention" referred to the only kind
v.•
in the article,
·Union of India of preventive detention mentioned
namely, preventive detention simpliciter and without
SarkarJ.
any reference to the period of detention. I am again
unable to agree. It is true that the detention contemplated in the words "such detention" is preventive
detention. Clauses (4j to (7) of the article deal with
preventive detention alone and with no other kind of
detention. Therefore, in these clauses there was no
necessity of distinguishing preventive detention as such
from other kinds of detention and of using the word
"such" for marking this distinction. So read the
words "such detention"' really mean such preventive
detention. The question then arises, which preventive
detention ? The answer must be, one variety of preventive detention as distinguished from other varieties.
It is also true that preventive detention for a period.
longer than three months is none the less preventive
detention and is not another kind of detention. At the
same time preventive detention for a period longer
than three months is not the same thing as preventive
detention for a shorter period. It is quite conceivable
that with regard to different periods of detention permissible under a law relating to preventive detention
different provisions may be made. Preventive detention certainly interferes with a person's liberty. It is
an inroad on his freedom. It may be that the makers
of the Constitution having given the legislatures power
to enact laws providing for preventive detention interfering with a person's liberty did not think it fit to
provide any limitation on such power when such detention was to be for a relatively shorter period but
thought it fit to restrict the power in the case of detention for what they conceived to be a long period. If such
was the intention, then the makers of the Constitution
would obviously make a distinction between preventive
detention for a shorter period and preventive detention
for a longer period. To say that there is no distinction
between these kinds of preventive detention is to
assume that the makers of the Constitution never
1957
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
489
1957
intended to make the distinction. For such an assumption I find no justification. Indeed, what I have read
Puranlal
Lakhanpal
from the judgment of this Court in Gopa/an's case,
would show that the distinction betwej!n preventive Unionv.of India
detention simpliciter and preventive detentiou for a
period longer than three months was in the mind of Sarkar J.
the makers of the Constitution, for it is there said that
no reference to the Advisory Board is contemplat~
by the Constitution excepting in a case of detention
for a period longer than three months.
The present argument of the learned Solicitor-Oeneral is on the basis that one of the possible constructions of the words "such detention" is detention for
a period longer than three months. That being so, and
the word "such" meaning in the ordinary English language, of the kind already described, even if two kinds
of detention, namely, preventive detention simpliciter
and detention for other reasons, have been earlier mentioned, the kind mentioned nearest to the word "such"·
must be the kind intended by it. Therefore again the
words "such detention" must l}e taken as referring to
detention for a period longer than three months.
Indeed cl. (4) and the other clauses have nothing to do
with other kinds of detention than preventive detention. The word "such" cannot therefore seek to make
a distinction from a thing occurring in a wholly
separate provision of the article, namely clauses (1)
and (2). That being so, I am unable to agree that the
words "such detention" refer to preventive detention
simpliciter.
I now turn to another question that arose. It
was said that Art. 22 (4) (a) applies only to a law
which authorises detention for more than three months;
that it is such a law alone which must provide for the .
opinion of the Advisory Board being obtained. It was
contended that, therefore, whenever a law authorising
preventive detention provides for a reference to the
Advisory Board, it necessarily provides for a report as
to whether there is sufficient cause for a detention for
a period longer than three months, and that being so,
no matter whether any provision had been made
that the Advisory Board must state whether in
M2SCIV61-3
490
1951
Puranlal
Laklrllnpal
v.
Unlolt of India
S<rrkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
its opinion sufficient cause existed for a detention
for a longer period or not, the report, when made,
must necessarily be taken to have expressed such
an opinion and the article therefore must be deemed to
have been complied with. This argument, of course,
assumes that the words "such detention" mean detention for a period longer than three months. It assumes
that the article requires that where the law of preventive detention authorises a detention for a longer
period it is necessary to obtain the opinion of the
Advisory Board that there is sufficient cause for
detention for such period. Now there is nothing in
the article to prevent an Act authorising preventive
detention providing for the opinion of the Advisory
Board being obtained as to there being sufficient cause
for the detention in any case of detention. Such a
provision in a law of preventive detention would be
perfectly legal. The present Act in fact contains such
a provision. Therefore, it cannot be said that whenever
a law provides for an opinion of the Advisory Board
being obtained as to the sufficiency of the cause for
detention, the opinion in view of Art. 22 (4) (a) necessarily is as to the sufficiency of the cause of detention
for a period longer than three months. Besides, if,
as the present argument assumes, it is obligatory in a
law authorising preventive detention for a period
longer than three months to provide for a report of
the Advisory Board stating expressly its opinion
as to the sufficiency of the cause for the detention
for the period mentioned, I am unable to appreciate
that such an obligation is satisfied by not making
the required provision but by showing that by
necessary implication the required opinion is deemed
to have been given, even though in fact it may
not have been given. The question is not what the
report is to be deemed to have stated nor even what it
has in fact stated, but what the statute should provide.
If the statute has not made the ebligatory provision
it must be held to be bad. It would be a strange
argument to say that it must be good because though
it did not contain the required provision it must
in view of the Constitution be deemed to contain it.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
491
It was then said that as it is not for the Advisory
Board to decide the period of detention to be ordered
there can be no point in providing that its opinion,
whether there were sufficient cause for detention for a
period longer than three months or not, should be
obtained. It seems to me that whether there is i.s any
point in obtaining such opinion or not it is wholly
irrelevant to enquire. If the language of the Constitution requires such opinion to be obtained, it has to be
obtained. l have stated that the language indubitably
requires such opinion to be obtained. The language
cannot have a different meaning because, otherwise, the
provision would be without any point at all. Furthermore, I am unable to see why if the Government fixes
the period of detention, it is unnecessary where the
period is to exceed three months to provide for the
opinion of an independent body being obtained
as to whether there is sufficient cause for detention for
that period. In my view it is eminently reasonable
to make such a provision. When a person's liberty
is to be curtailed for a longer period, a safeguard may
be considered necessary which it may not be when the
curtailment contemplated is for a comparatively
shorter period. I will repeat that the reasonableness of
such a provision is implicit in what I have read from
the judgment in G.opalan' s case (1). It is said there that
it is only in the case of detention for a period longer
than three months that the Constitution requires a
Provision that the Advisory Board's opi11ion should be
obtained. This view is clearly brought out by Fazl
Ali, J., when he said in that case at page 171 :
"Prima facie, it is a serious matter to detain a
person for a long period (more than three months)
without any enquiry or trial. But article 22 (4) (a)
provides that such detention may be ordered on the
report of the advisory board. Since the report must
be directly connected with the object for which it is
required, the safeguard provided by the article, viz.,
calling for a report from the advisory board, loses its
value, if the advisory board is not to apply its mind
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88,
63
19S7
Plli't111lal
blklumpal
"·
Union of India
Sarkar J.
492
1957
P11ran/a/
Laklranpal
v.
Union of India
Sarkat J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958
to the vital question before the Government, namely,
whether prolonged detention (detention for more than
three months) is justified or not."
I have so long discussed the question whether the
words "such detention" mean preventive detention
simplieiter or preventive detention for a period longer
than three months as a question of construction witl:·
out reference to the authorities. In fact, there is no
conclusive authority on the point, but some have been
referred to. These I now proceed to consider.
The first case referred to is Gopalan's case ('). That
was also a case concerned with the issue of a writ of
habeas corpus, and it turned on the very Act that is
before the Court now, as it stood in 1950. At the date
the order for detention in that case was made the Act
provided that in certain class of cases a person might
be detained for a period longer than three months
without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board
in accordance with the provisions of Art. 22(4) (a).
Such a provision is sanctioned by cl. (7) (a) of that
article. The order for detention made in that case was
of a kind where reference to the Advisory Board was
not obligatory. That being so, it was not necessary
for the court in that case to decide the precise meaning
of the words "such detention". None the less, however, three of the. learned judges indicated their views
on the question and the other three do not seem to
have dealt with it. Kania, C. J ., expressed the opinion
that the words "such detention" meant detention
beyond the period of three months. Referring to the
proviso to sub-cl. (4) (a), he stated (p. ll 7):
"The proviso to this clause further enjoins that
even though the advisory board may be of the opinion
that there was sufficient cause for such detention, i.e.,
detention beyond the period of three months, still the
detention is not to be permitted beyond the maximum
period, if any, prescribed by Parliament under article
22(7)(b)".
The learned Chief Justice therefore was of the view
that under Art. 22(4)(a) the Advisory Board had to be
(1)[1950] S.C.R. 88.
'S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
493
1957
of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for
detention beyond the period of three months. Mr.
Puranlal
Lakhanpal
Justice Fazl Ali expressed himself more clearly on the
v.
subject and said (pp. 170-171) :
Union of India
"In connection with the first point, the question StukarJ.
arises as to the exact meaning of the words "such
detention" occurring in the end of clause (4)(a).
Two alternative interpretations were put forward :
(1) "such detention" means preventive detention;
(2) "such detention" means detention for a period
longer than three months. If the first interpretation is
correct then the function of the advisory board would
be to go into the merits of the case of each person and
simply report whether there was sufficient cause for his
detention. According to the other interpretation, the
function of the advisory board will be to report to the
Government whether there is sufficient cause for the
person being detained for more than three months.
On the whole, I am inclined to agree with the second
interpretation. Prima facie, it is a serious matter to
detain a person for a longer period (more than three
nionths) without any enquiry or trial. But article
22 (4) (a) provides that such detention may be ordered
~n the report of the advisory board. Since the report
must be directly connected with the object for which
it is required, the safeguard provided by the article,
viz., calling for a report from the advisory board, loses
its value, if the advisory board is not to apply its
mind to the vital question before the government,
namely whether prolonged detention (detention for
more than three months) is justified or not. Under
article 22 (4) (a), the advisory board has to submit its
report before the expiry of three months and may
therefore do so on the eighty-ninth day. It would be
.somewhat farcical to provide, that after a man has
been detained for eighty-nine days, an advisory board
is to say whether his initial detention was justified.
On the other hand, the determination of the question,
whether prolonged detention (detention for more than
three months) is justified must necessarily involve the
determination of the question whether the detention
was justified at all, and such an interpretation only
494
1951
PUTan/a/
Lakltanpa/
v.
UnioR of India
Surklzt F,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
can give real meaning and effectiveness to the provision. The provision being in the nature of a protection
or safeguard, I must naturally lean towards the interpretation which is favourable to the subject and
which is also in accord with the object in view."
Patanjali Sastri, J., preferred the other view but he
realised that the view taken by Fazl Ali, J., was also
a possible view. He expressed himself in these words
on the subject (at page 210) :
"I am inclined to think that the words "such
detention" in sub-clause (a) refer back to the preventive detention mentioned in clause (4) and not to
detention for a longer than three months. An
advisory board, composed as it has to be of Judges or
lawyers, would hardly be in a position fo judge how
long a person under preventive detention, say, for
reasons connected with defence, should be detained.
That must be a matter for the: executive authorities,
the Department of Defence, to determine, as they
alone are responsible for the defence of the country
and have necessary data for taking a decision on
the point. All that an advisory board can reasonably
be asked to do, as a safeguard against the misuse or
the power, is to judge whether the detention is justified and not arbitrary or ma/a fide. The. fact that the
advisory board is required to make its report before
the expiry of three months and so could submit it only
a day or two earlier cannot legitimately lead to an
inference that the board was solely concerned with the
issue whether or not the detention should continue
beyond that period. Before any such tribunal could
send in its report a reasonable time must elapse, as the
grounds have to be communicated to the persons
detained, he has to make his representation to the
detaining authority which has got to be placed before
the board through the appropriate departmental
channel. Each of these steps may, in the course of
official routine, take some time, and three months'
period might well have been thought a reasonable
period to allow before the board could be required
to submit its report.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
Assuming, however, that the words "such" detention" had reference to the period of detention, there is
no apparent reason for confining the enquiry by the
advisory board to the sole issue of duration beyond
three months without reference to the question as to
whether the detention was. justified or not. Indeed,
it is difficult to conceive how a tribunal could fairly
judge whether a person should be detained for more
than three months without at the same time considering whether there was sufficient cause for the detention
at all. I am of opinion that the advisory board referred
to in Clause (4) is the machinery devised by the Constitution for reviewing Drders for preventive detention
in certain cases on a consideration of the representations made by the perosns detained. This is the view
on which Parliament has proceeded in enacting the
impugned Act as will be .seen from sections 9 and 10
thereof, and I think it is the correct view. It follows
that the petitioner cannot claim to have his case
· judged by any other impartial tribunal by virtue of
article 21 or otherwise."
For the reasons earlier stated I prefer to accept the
view expressed by Mr. Justice Fazl Ali.
The next case referred to is Makhan Singh Tarsikka
v. The State of Punjab (1). This was also a case for the
issue of a writ of habeas corpus for the release of
a person detained under the same Act as it stood in
July 1951. In this case the first order for detention,
that is to say the order made before the reference to
the Advisory Board itself fixed the period of detention. It was held that that was illegal because the
Act made it plain that it is only after the Advisory
Board to which the case has been referred reports that
the detention is justified, the Government should
determine what the period of detention should be and
nofbefore. The fixing .of the period of detention in
the initial order in the present case was, therefore,
contrary to the scheme of the Act and cannot be sup·
ported. On this ground the petition for the issue of a
writ. was allowed. This case was obviously not
(1)[195~) S.C.R. 368.
1957
PUTan/al
Lakhanpal•
v.
Union of India
Sarkar J.
496
1951
Puranlal
Lak!tanpal
v.
l.lnion of India
Sarkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
concerned with Art. 22(4) (a) and does not in any
manner decide the question before me. I am, therefore,
unable to find any assistance from it.
Lastly, reference was made to Dattatreya Moreshwar
Pangarkar v. The State of Bombay('). That again was
concerned with an application for the issue of a writ
of habeas corpus and also turned on the present Preventive Detention Act. There, after the initial order
for detention which did not mention any period, the
case had been referred to the Advisory Board which
reported that there was sufficient cause for detention
and then the Government issued an order stating
that it confirmed the detention order issued against
the dctenu. The question was whether this confirmatory order was in terms of s. l l(l)(a) cf the same Act as
in this case as it stood in 1952. That section provided
that where the advisory board had reported that there
was sufficient cause for detention, the Government
might continue the detention for such period as it
thought fit. It was contended that the section required
the period of detention to be mentioned in the
confirmatory order and as the confirmatory order
did not specify the period it was bad and did not
justify the detention. It was held that such omission did
not invalidate the order. Again it will be seen
that this c~.se was not concerned with Art. 22 (4) (a).
We we.-e referred to certain observations of Mr. Justice
Ivlukherjea ia this case in support of the proposition that the words "such detention" in. Art. 22 (4)
(a) meant detention simpliciter. These observations
are set out below (pp. 626-27):
"It is now settled by a pronouncement of this
court that not only it is not necessary for the detaining authority to mention the period of detention ·
when passing the original order under section 3(1) of
the Preventive Detention Act, but that the order
would be bad and illegal if any period is specified, as
it might prejudice the case of the detenu when it goes
up ·for consideration before the Advisory Board. The
Advisory Board again has got to express its opinion
(1}[1952] S.C.R. 612.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
1957
only on the point as .to whether there is sufficient
cause for detention of the person concerned. It is
Puranlal
neither called upon nor is it competent to say any- Lakhanpal
v.
thing regarding the period for which such person Union of India
Board
should be detained. Once the Advisory
SarkarJ.
expresses its view that there is sufficient cause
for detention at the date when it makes its report,
what action is to be taken · subsequently is left
entirely to the appropriate Government and it can
under section 11(1) of the Act confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person
concerned for such period as it thinks fit."
It was sought to be argued that Mukherjea, J.,
intended to say that all that the Advisory Board was
required to do was to express its opinion on the question of justification of the detention simpliciter. This
may be so, but Mr. Justice Mukherjea was construing
the Preventive Detention Act which admittedly made
that provision. He was not saying that Art. 22(4)(a)
also said the same thing. Indeed what I have read
earlier from his judgement in Gopalan's case (1) would
show that his view about Art. 22(4)(a) was otherwise.
Again the learned Judge was not concerned with the
question whether the relevant provision of the· Preventive Detention Act was ultra vires the Constitution.
Furthermore, for the reasons earlier stated, the fact
that the Government decides the terms of detentiondoes not indicate that it is not intended that when
detention for a period longer than three months is
contemplated, it is not necessary to obtain the opinion
of the Advisory Board as to whether there was suffi- ·
cient cause for detention for the period. Reference
was also made to the following portion of the judgment of Mahajan, J. (2), occurring at p. 637 of
the report.:
"Under the Constitution, the detention of a
person under any law providing for preventive detention carinot be for a period of more than three months
unless the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there
is suffioient cause for the detention of the person concerned."
(1J[1950] S.C.R. 88.
(2}[1952] S.C.R. 612.
498
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
1957
It was suggested that the learned Judge indicated
PurD11/al
that all that was necessary was for the law to provide
for an opinion of the Advisory Board as to the
justification of the detention itself irrespective of
whether it was to be for a period longer than three
months. It is clear that here Mahajan, J., was not
considering the meaning of the word "such detention". He was not concerned with deciding whether
these words meant detention simpliciter or detention
for a period longer than three months. His observations in Gopalan's case (') that I have earlier set out,
would in my view indicate that the Advisory Board is
required to give an opinion as to whether detention for
a longer period than three months is justified or not.
It cannot therefore be said that Mahajan, J., held the
view that the words "such detention" in Art. 22(4)(a)
mean simply peventive detention.
I therefore come to the conclusion that there is
nothing either in Makhan Singh's case (2) or Dattatreya
Moreshwar Pangarkar's case (') which takes a view
contrary to that which I have taken.
In the result I would allow the appeal.
Lakhanpal
v.
Union of !Nila
Sarkar J.
(1)[1950) S.C.R. 88.
(3)[1950) S.C.R. 610.
(2)[1950) S.C.R.
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