SARDUL SINGH CAVEESHAR versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 May 1957 | [1958] 1 S.C.R. 161 | 1957 INSC 56
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 May 1957
- Bench
- B. JAGANNADHADAS*, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 53/1957
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1958] 1 S.C.R. 161
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 56
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
161
SARDUL SINGH CAVEESHAR
May 23.
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(and connected appeals)
(JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and
GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)j
Evidence-Conspiracy-Criminal breach of trust-Proof of
bogus character of transactions-Intention of accused-Evidence of
criminal acts outside the period of conspiracy-Admissibility-Indian
Evide11ce Act (I of 1872), ss. 10, 14.
·
A conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust in respect of
the funds of a company by utilising the same to purchase the
controlling block of shares of the company itself for the benefit of
the appellants was alleged to have been entered into between
December l, 1948, and January 31, 1949. It was the prosecution
case that the modus operandi was to screen the ultilisation of these·
funds by showing them as having been advanced for legitimate
purposes and invested on proper security but in fact utilising the
same for payment to the appellants. One of the main issues was
whether the loans by way of advance of the funds of the company
on January 20, 1949, were genuine transactions or bogus or makebelieve, and the question was whether the evidence relating to
the further transactions entered into outside the period of the
conspiracy jn 1949 and 1950. with a view to the screening of the
original transactions, was admissible in law.
Held : (1) In relation to the main purpose Qf the prosecution
viz., proof of the bogus character of the transactions of January,
1949, the transactions of 1949 and 1950 entered into outside the
period of conspiracy must, having regard to the ramifications, be
taken to be integrally connected and relevant to make out their
bogus character, though such evidence may necessitate reference
to and narration of the acts of the conspirators beyond the peried
of conspiracy.
(2) The conduct of each individual co-conspirator including
his acts, writings and statements irrespective of the time t1> which
it relates can be relied on by the prosecution to show the criminality of the intention of the individual accused with reference to
his proved participation in the alleged conspiracy to rebut a
probable defence · that the participation, though proved, was
innocent .. Such evidence is admissible under s. 14 of the Indian
Evidence Act.
Makin v. The Attorney General for New
(1894) A.C. 57, relied on.
19S7
South Wales L.K.
162
1957
Sardul Singh
Caveeshar
v.
The State of
Bombay
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
Per Jagannadhadas J.-Under s. JO of the Indian Evidence
Act the evidence of acts, statements or writings of a co-conspirator either under trial or not on trial but outside the period of
conspiracy would not be admissible against the other conspirators
in proof of the specific issue of tbe existence of the conspiracy on
the authority of Mirza Akbar v. The King Emperor, (1940) L.R.
67 I.A. 336.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeals Nos. 53 to 56 of 1957.
Appeals by special leave from the judgement and
order dated November 21, 1956, of the Bombay High
Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 861-864of1956 arising
out of the judgement and order dated June 1, 1956, of
the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge for Greater
Bombay at Bombay in Sessions Case No. 27/111
Sessions 1955.
A. S. R. Chari and M. S. K. Sastri, for the
appellants.
K. J. Khandalawala, Porus A. Mehta and R. H.
Dhebar, for the respondent.
1957. May 23. The Judgement of the Court was
delivered by
lagannadhadas 1, JAGANNADHADAS J.-These are 8:ppeals by s~cial
leave by four persons, who along with one Rammklal
Keshavlal Jhaveri (since acquitted) were committed
for trial in the Court of the Sessions Judge of Greater
Bombay, on charges of conspiracy to commit criminal
breach of trust of the funds of the Jupiter General
Insurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the
Jupiter) and in pursuance of the said conspiracy of
having committed criminal breach of trust some of
them being directors and agents of the said company.
They were alternatively charged for commission of the
offence of criminal breach of trust by some of them as
directors and the others for abetting the commission of
the criminal breach of trust committed by the directors.
The trial before the Sessions Judge was with the aid of
a jury. All of them except Jhaveri were found guilty,
appellants in Criminal Appeals Nos. 53 and 54, Sardul
Singh Caveeshar and Parmeshwar Nath Kaul, by a
majority verdict and appellants in Criminal Appeals
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
Nos. 55 and 56, Vallabhdas Phulchand Mehta and
1957
Charucharan Guba, by an unanimous verdict. . The sardul sinsll
verdicts of the jury were accepted by the Sessions Judge Caveeshar
who sentenced the appellants as follows:
The vs1a1e of
Appellant Sardul Singh Caveeshar to rigorous Bombay
imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs. 2,500. Jagan-;;;;n,adaJ J.
Appellant Parmeshwar Nath Kaul to rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 5,000.
Appellant Vallabhdas Phulchand Mehta to rigorous
imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 5,000.
Appellant Charucharan Guba to rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs. 2,500.
. The charge of conspiracy related to the period from
December l, 1948, to January 31, 1949, and comprised
in all eight persons of whom two Lala Shankarlal
Hiralal Bansal (hereinafter referred to as Lala Shankarlal) and Saubhagyachand Umedchand Doshi
(hereinafter referred to as Doshi) died before the
commencement of the trial. One Lala Ram Sharandas
alias Ramsharan Lala Haricharan Mahajan (hereinafter referred to as Mahajan) was also a party to the
conspiracy. But for some reason or other, the trial
against him was separated. The persons who were on
trial in the present case are the following.
1. Parmeshwar Nath Kaul, accused No. 1 and
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 54 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Kaul).
2. Vallabhdas Phulchand Mehta, accused No. 2
and appellant in· Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 1957
(hereinafter referred to as Mehta).
3. Ramniklal Keshvlal Jhaveri, accused No. 3
and since acquitted by the Sessions Judge (hereinafter
referred to as Jhaveri).
4. Charucharan Guha, accused No. 4 and appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1957 (hereinafter
referred to as Guha).
5. Sardul Singh Caveeshar, accused No. 5 and
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Caveeshar).
Lala Shankarlal, who was residing at No. 16, Bara
Khamba Road, New Delhi, was the managing director
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
of the Tropical Insurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Tropical). He was also a
Sardiil Singh
CaFeeshar
director of the Punjab Central Bank. He had also
••
floated
and was controlling a company called the Delhi
1'/re State of
Bombay
Swadesi Co-operative Stores (hereinafter referred to as
laganna.iJradas J. the Delhi Stores). He was also a leader of the
Forward Bloc in the year 1948.
Accused No. 1, Ka~, is a barrister and was in Lahore
till the partition of the country. Jn December, 1948,
he was in Delhi.
Accused No. 2 Mehta, at all material times was the
manager of the Bombay Office (General) of the Tropical.
Mahajan, at all material times was the secretary of
the Tropical. He was also a director-in-charge of the
Delhi Stores.
Accused No. 3, Jhaveri, was a Bombay solicitor and
at all material times was carrying on his profession as
a solicitor in Bombay.
Doshi was till his death, a solicitor in Bombay and
was carrying on his profession as such.
Accused No. 4, Guha, was in December, 1948, an
accountant of the Tropical.
Accused No. 5, Caveeshar, was the mana'ging director of the Peoples Insurance Co. He was also the
managing director of the New Hindustan Bank. He
was for some time a member of the All India Congress
Committee. He was also a leading member of the
Forward Bloc.
The case for the prosecution is that Lala Shankarlal
who was the brain behind the conspiracy and who at
the time was the managing director and had the
control of the Tropical, which by then was financially
in a tottering condition, planned along with his confederates to obtain the control of the Jupiter, which at
the time was in a sound financial position, by acquiring
the controlling block of shares of the Jupiter and
utilising the funds of the Jupiter itself for the acquisition of such shares.
By the date of the conspiracy the Jupiter had investments of the face value of Rs. two crores. It had
1957
S.C.R.
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165
issued 1,24,966 ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each of
1951
which Rs. 15 per share was called up. It had also sardut Singh
issued cumulative preference shares. Rai Bahadur caveeshar
Girdharilal Bajaj (hereinafter referred to as Bajaj) and The Siate of
Tulsiprasad Khaitan
(hereinafter referred to as
Bombay
Khaitan) were at the time i.e., in 1948, in control of Jagannadhadm J.
the Jupiter. These persons owned through the New
Prahlad Mills Ltd., the controlling block of shares of
the Jupiter i.e., about 63,000 shares of the Jupiter
between themselves and their nominees. After negotiations, conducted first through certain persons called
Mayadas and Chopra and then, through one Naurangrai,
a bargain was settled with Khaitan for the purchase
of this controlling block of shares at Rs. 53 per share
for a sum of Rs. 33,39,000. Out of this amount a sum
of Rs. 5,39,000 was to be paid over to Bajaj and
Khaitan directly in cash and only Rs. 28,00,000 would
be shown as the price for the purchase of the shares.
The arrangement was that on receipt of the cash of
Rs. 5,39,000 the management of the Jupiter was to be
handed over to Lala Shankarlal and his group and
that the balance of the money due of Rs. 28 ·lakhs was
to be paid over to Khaitan on or before January 20,
1949. In default of such payment within the prescribed
time, Lala Shankarlal, representing the Tropical, should
pay to Khaitan a· sum of Rs. 5 lakhs as damages for
breach. In pursuance of this agreement Rs. 4,85,000
were paid over to Bajaj on or about December 29,1948,
and a formal agreement dated December 29, 1948, was
entered into, incorporating the above terms. On that
very day Bajaj and other directors of Khaitan group
held a meeting and allotted 1,250 shares straightaway
to Lala Shankarlal and four of his nominees viz., Kaul,
Mehta, Jhaveri and Doshi, each 250 shares, as qualifying shares for each. They confirmed the transfer of
these shares by a resolution and co-opted Lala
Shankarlal, Kaul, Mehta, Jhaveri and Doshi as directors and themselves resigned their respective offices
as directors. Thereafter Khaitan resigned his position
as managing director of the Jupiter and at the same
meeting, Lala Shankarlal was appointed in his place
. as the managing director of the. Jupiter.
166
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
The transfer of 61,750 shares for the sum of
Rs. 28,15,000 to be paid to Bajaj and Khaitan before
January 20, 1949, was brought about in the following
way. At the meeting of some of the new directors of
v.
Tile State of the Jupiter dated January 11, 1949, it was decided to
Bombay
sell the Jupiter's securities of the face value of Rs. 15
lakhs
at the market rate and to obtain an overdraft
Jaga1111adl1adas J.
accommodation for Rs. 14 lakhs with the Punjab
National Bank on the pledge of the Government securities of the Jupiter. At the same meeting a loan of
Rs. 25,15,000 purported to have been granted to
Caveeshar by way of an equitable mortgage on an
alleged application by him dated January 4, 1949,
relating to his properties at Delhi sought to be given
as security on the basis of an alleged valuation report
of a firm of surveyors. There was another alleged
resolution authorising the director for purchase of plots
of Delhi Stores for Rs. 2,60,000. It may be mentioned
that this Delhi Stores was under the control of Lala
Shankarlal and, according to the prosecution, was a
defunct organisation at the time. The plan envisaged
by these resolutions was that cash was to be taken out
from the Jupiter partly by sale of securities and partly
by pledge of securities and that money was to be shown
as having been a loan to Caveeshar on the security of
his Delhi properties and a further amount as having
been invested for the purchase of plots of the Delhi
Stores. Lala Shankarlal was to receive these amounts
on behalf of Caveeshar and the Delhi Stores, and pay
over the cash that would thus come into his hands to
Bajaj and Khaitan as per the agreement. This
appears-according to the prosecution case-to have
been actually done in the following way. The safe
custody account of the entire holdings of the securities
of the Jupiter with the Bank of India was closed by a
resolution of the new directors of the Jupiter dated
January 11, 1949, and these securities were taken over
into the personal custody of Mehta. Thereafter securities of the value of Rs. 30 lakhs were offered for sale
through a broker who ultimately could sell only shares
of the value of Rs. 15 lakhs. For the remaining Rs. 15
lakhs an overdraft was raised with the Punjab
Sardul Sb1zh
Caveeshar
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167
National Bank on the application of Lala Shankarlal
1957
and on the pledge of some of the Government securities sardul Singh
of the Jupiter. The sale of securities realised Caveeshar
Rs. 13,99,768 and on the pledge of securities a sum of The ~tate of
Rs. 14,21,812 was obtained, making up a total of
Bombay
Rs. 28,21,580. Rs. 28,15,000 out of it was shown as Jacannadhadas J.
having been received by the Bank of India and cridited
in the cash-credit account of the New Prahlad Mills
Ltd. It is thus that Khaitan received the balance of
the money due under the agreement of December 29,
1948 . .
To prove this case a considerable body of prosecution evidence was given consisting of quite a large
number of details. It is necessary to set out the salient
features thereof in broad outline as alleged and sought
to. be prove~ by the. prosecution. This may .be dealt
with convemently with reference to three penods, the
first comprising the period of conspiracy as mentioned
in the charge i.e., December 1, 1948, to January 31,
1949, the second, relating to the period from February
1, 1949, to the end of December, 1949, and the third,
the period covering the year 1950.
First period : December 1, 1948 to January 31 1949.
The negotiati9ns for the purchase of the controlling
block of shares of the Jupiter were carried on from
about December 10, 1948. From 10th to 20th the
negotiations were through one Mayadas, introduced to
Lala Shankarlal by one Chopra. Mayadas was given
a letter of authority on December 15, 1948, by Lala
Shankarlal, as the managing director of the Tropical,
authorising him to buy for the Tropical the controlling
block of shares of the Jupiter at the maximum rate
of Rs. 49 per share with the promise of brokerage of
Rs. 40,000 on completion of the transaction. Chopra
also was acting with Mayadas as broker. These persons were dropped and the further negotiations from the
20th onwards were carried on through one Naurangrai
known to Lala Shankarlal for about40 years. Through
him the purchase of the controlling block of shares
numbering 63,000 was agreed to be purchased at Rs. 53
per share. The total purchase value was Rs. 33,39,000.
Khaitan asked for advance payment of Rs. 5,39.000 in
168
!95 7
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[1958]
cash and intimated that agreement would be made mentioning only Rs. 28 lakhs as the purchase price. NauCaYeeshar
rangrai was placed in possession of funds of
The s1~1e of
Rs. 5,39,000 on his executing a pro-note dated December
Bombay
23, 1948, (Ex. Z-4) for the said amount in favour of the
.:agam1adhadas J. Tropical by two cheques signed by Lala Shankarlal, one
for Rs. one lakh on December 22, 1948 (Ex. Z-!) and
another for Rs. 4,39,000, dated December 23, 1948, (Ex.
Z-3). These amounts were deposited by Naurangrai in
his bank account with the Bikanir Bank at Delhi. On
December 26, Lala Shankarlal and Naurangrai and
Khaitan met at Bombay and further details were
discussed on the 26th and 27th. Khaitan insisted on
previous payment of Rs. 5,39,000. Lala Shankarlal
asked for the list of securities and shares, the valuation
report and the balance sheet of the Jupiter. Naurangrai returned back to Delhi, drew Rs. 5 lakhs by way
of cash from his bank account and paid therefrom a
sum of Rs. 4,85,000 to Bajaj at Ghaziabad. He came
back to Bombay and informed Khaitan of the same.
Thereupon the agreement, Ex. Z-171, was executed on
December 29, 1948. The agreement was to the following effect. The Tropical was to pay the balance of
Rs. 28,54,000 on or before January 20, 1949, and on
such payment the Jupiter's shares numbering 63,000
were to be delivered over. The shareholder directors
belonging to the Khaitan group should resign and
nominees of the Tropical should be appointed as directors in their 'place. If the Tropical failed to pay
within the stipulated time, a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs by
way of damages was to be paid to Khaitan group
and if the Khaitan group failed to carry out their
obligations· damages of Rs. 2 lakhs were to be paid.
Subsequent to this agreement it was ascertained that
Khaitan had agreed to pay Naurangrai a commission
of Rs. 39,000. Lala Shankarlal undertook to pay the
same and to that extent the amount payable by
January 20; was understood to be reduced. Therefore, the sum payable under the agreement with the
above adjustment was Rs. 28,15,000. The agreement
was signed both by Khaitan on behalf of the New
Prahlad Mills Ltd., which owned the controlling block
sardul Singh
S.C.R.
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169
of shares of the Jupiter and Lala Shankarlal on behalf
1957
of the Tropical. On the very same date a meeting of Sardul Singh
the then Board of directors of the Jupiter was called.
Caveeshar
At this meeting 1,250 shares were transferred in the The s~1e of
names of Lala Shankarlal, Kaul, Mehta, Jhaveri and Bombay
Doshi, 250 shares for each, in order to qualify them Jagannadhadas J.
for becoming directors. Transfer of these shares was
confirmed by resolution. It is the prosecution case
that for these transfers no money was paid by the
transferees concerned. At that meeting the various
persons who constituted the previous directors tendered
their resignations in successive stages. At each stage
the resignations were accepted by the rest of the preexisting directors and new directors of Lala Shankerlal's group were co-opted. In the net result the entire
Khaitan group of. directors made way for the new
Lala Shankarlal group of directors and Lala Shankarlal
became the managing director. Thereafter there was
the first meeting of the new directorate of the Jupiter
on January 4; 1949. On that date Kaul was appointed
director-in-charge. A new Life sub-committee consisting of Mehta, Jhaveri and Doshi was appointed as also
a new finance sub~committee consisting of Lala Shankarlal, Kaul and Mehta, to review the investment
position of the company and to invest the company's
moneys upon such securities, shares and stocks, in such
manner as the committee thought fit. A power of
attorney was granted to Lala Shankarlal as the managing director. Kaul and Mehta were authorised individually to operate upon all the banking accounts in the
name of the company with all the banks. Three pdlicyholder directors as also the general manager, Joel,
resigned and their resignations were accepted. This
was followed by another meeting of the new directorate
on January 11. At that meeting the Board passed a
number of resolutions about some of which there is
considerable controversy and with reference to which
there is the evidence of one Subramaniam for the
prosecution. One of the undisputed resolutions of that
meeting was to withdraw a letter written by the previous general-manager, Joel, dated January 3, 1949.
By that letter (Ex. Z-30), Joel had written to the Bank
170
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
of India, Safe Custody Department, instructing the
bank that till further advice, they should not transfer
Cavee:~•r
any of the securities held by the bank on behalf of the
The s1a1e of
company. On January 11, 1949, a copy of this resoluBombay
tion was sent to the bank under the signature of Mehta
Jagannadhadas 1. for their information. By another letter of the same
date sent by the sub-manager, one Baxi, (Ex.Z-32) the
bank was instructed to close the safe custody account
and to hand over the entire holdings of the securities
of the Jupiter to Mehta. Accordingly all the securities
were brought into the office of the Jupiter and kept in
a steel cupboard. Two of the disputed resolutions of
January 11, were resolutions Nos. 7 and 8, one for sale
of securities of the Jupiter of the face value of Rs. 15
lakhs at the market rate, and the other for an overdraft
account of Rs. 14 lakhs with the Punjab National Bank
on pledge of the Government securities of the Jupiter.
After the entire shares and securities were withdrawn
from the safe custody of the bank, Kaul contacted one
Jagirdar, a sub-broker working in the firm of
Messers. Harkisondas Laxmidas, share brokers, and
authorised them by Jetter (Ex. Z-36) dated January 13,
1949, to sell three per cent conversion Joan 1946 of the
face value of Rs. 30 Jakhs at the best market rate. The
brokers sold on the 13th and 14th securities of the face
value of Rs. 15 lakhs and told Kaul that the market
was dropping and that further sale of those securities
was not feasible. The sale of securities of the face
value of Rs. 15 lakhs realised a sum of Rs. 13,99,788.
Kaul, on behalf of the Jupiter, opened a current
account on January 13, in the Punjab National Bank,
Bombay. On the 15th, Kaul, on behalf of the Jupiter,
sent two letters, one to the Punjab National Bank and
another to the Bank of India, stating that they were
forwarding per bearer Government securities of the
face value of Rs. 14 lakhs and Rs. 1 fakh respectively
and instructed those banks to deliver them to
Messers. Harkisondas Laxmidas against payment and
the proceeds to be credited to the account of the company. The above sale proceeds were accordingly paid
into the respective banks and the securiti
were
delivered overto the respective parties on January 17
Sard111 s,;1gh
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171
It is the prosecution case that meanwhile Lala Shan1957
karlal approached the Punjab National Bank, sardul Singh
Kashmere Gate Branch, Delhi, on January 17, 1949, Caveeshar
for the purpose of raising a loan on Government pro"' The ~tate of
missory notes. He opened a cash-credit account on Bombay
.the pledge of securities of the face value of Rs. l 5 Jagannadhadas J,
lakhs and passed a promissory note in favour of the
bank for the said amount. A loan of Rs. 14 lakhs was
then granted and a demand draft dated January 17,
for that amount in favour of the Jupiter on the Punjab
National Bank, Currimjee House Branch, Bombay,
was issued. A list of securities pledged with the bank
for the purpose has been put in evidence. The demand
draft was brought to Bombay and credited into the
account of the Jupiter in the Currimjee House Bradch
of the Punjab National Bank at Bombay on January
18. Thus by the sale and the pledge of the Jupiter's
own securities, a sum of Rs. 27,99,768 was raised and
kept available for use. On January 19, Mehta wrote
to the Punjab National Bank, Currimjee House
Branch, Bombay, to pay a sum of Rs. 28,15,000 to the
Bank of India where the New Prahlad Mills Ltd.,
(Khaitan) had got 61,394 Jupiter's shares lying in cashcredit account and to take delivery of those shares on
behalf of the Tropical and to debit Rs. 28,15,000 from
the Tropical account with them. On the same date,
Mehta, wrote also to the Bank of India, requesting it
to deliver 61,394 shares of the Jupiter to the Punjab
National Bank, Currimjee House Branch, Bombay,
with relevant transfer deed against payment of
Rs. 28,15,000 with reference to Khaitan's earlier
instructions to the Bank by his letter dated January
3, 1949 (Ex.Z-44). On the 19th, Mehta issued a cheque
for Rs. 75,000 on the Indian Bank, Tropical account
and deposited the same in the Punjab National Bank,
Currimjee House Branch, Bombay, Jupiter account.
This cheque was credited into that account on the 20th.
On the same day, i.e. 19th, Mehta wrote a letter to
the Punjab National Bank, Illaco House Branch,
Bombay, in which the Jupiter had its account to
transfer the account into the Punjab National Bank,
Currimjee House Branch, where, on the 13th, Kaul
172
1957
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[1958]
opened a current account for the Jupiter. Now with
this deposit the money to the credit of the Jupiter in
Caveeshar
the Punjab National Bank, Currimjee House Branch
was. Rs. 28,74,768. According to the prosecution it
The••State of
Bombay
was in reality out of this amount that Khaitan
Jagannadhadas J, was ultimately paid on January 20, by a cheque for
Rs. 28,15,000 as against the transfer of the stipulated
number of shares. It is the prosecution case that this
payment was camouflaged by certain apparent intermediate transactions. The prosecution case relating
to this may now be stated.
From January 18 to 20, 1949, five cheques were
issued on the Jupiter account in the Punjab National
Bank which were all deposited into the account of the
Tropical in the Punjab National Bank as follows:
1. A cheque for Rs. 2,55,050, dated January 18,
1949, signed by Kaul on behalf of the Jupiter in favour
of the Delhi Stores and endorsed in favour of the
Tropical by Guha, purporting to the director of the
Delhi Stores, which according to the prosecution, he
was not. This was again endorsed by Mehta on behalf
of the Tropical in order to put it into the Tropical
account.
2. Two cheques dated January 19, 1949, for
Rs. 14,36,000 and Rs. 1,42,450, on the Jupiter account
of the Punjab National Bank in favour of the Tropical
or order. These cheques are alleged to be written by
Guha and signed by Kaul on behalf of the Jupiter,
and endorsed on the reverse by Mehta on behalf of the
Tropical for deposit in the Tropical account of the
Punjab National Bank.
3. Two cheques dated January 20, 1949, for
Rs. 8,96,000 and Rs, 36,000, on the Jupiter account of
the Punjab National Bank in favour of the Tropical or
bearer. Both the cheques were written by Guha and
signed by Kaul on behalf of the Jupiter.
All these five cheques were deposited into the Tropical
account of the Punjab National Bank by a pay-in-slip
dated January 20, 1949, alleged to be in the handwriting of Guba and signed by him on the 19th. The total
of these cheques comes to Rs. 27,65,700. As a result of
Sardu/ Singh
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173
the previous instructions given on January 19, by
1957
Mehta, to the Punjab National Bank, the Bank paid Sardul SinRh
on January 20, a sum of Rs. 28,15,000, from the Caveeshar
Tropical account to the Bank of India and took deli- TheSt~teof
very of 61,394 shares of the Jupiter from the Bank of Bombay
India and the Punjab National Bank then held those Jaga11nadhadas.J.
shares for the Tropical in the Tropical account and
Khaitan was paid on the last date stipulated. It would
appear that including the 1,250 qualifying shares previously transferred, the shares transferred by Khaitan
fell short of the 63,000 shares, by 356 shares, but the
deficit appears to have been made up very shortly
thereafter.
Now, according to the prosecution, this payment of
the Jupiter's money for the purchase of the Jupiter's
shares was by means of ex f acie payment from funds
of the Tropical in the Punjab National Bank which
were brought up to the requisite level by the deposit of
five cheques as specified above in relation to a scheme
of camouflaged payment to be gathered from certain
resolutions of the new directorate of the Jupiter as they
now appear from its resolutions of January 11 and 20,
1949 and later confirmed on January 22. By resolution No. 5, as it now appears, a loan of Rs. 25,15,000
was granted to Caveeshar on his application dated
January 4~ and the valuation report of N. C. Kothari
of Messers. Master Sathe and Bhuta, surveyors. This
loan was on the equitable mortgage of Caveeshar's
properties in Delhi, the conditions being, a marketable
tile, period of loan three years, and other usual
clauses in mortgage deeds. The resolution authorised
Kaul to advance the above Joan on the said terms and
get all necessary documents executed and registered at
Delhi during the course of next eleven months. Resolution No. 6 authorised the purchase of certain plots
in Delhi said to belong to Delhi Stores for a sum of
Rs. 2,60,000. On January 20, there was another
meeting of the new directorate of the Jupiter at which
the minutes of the meeting of January, 11, were read
and adopted. Resolution No. 10 thereof confirmed the
payment of Rs. 25,10,650 to Caveeshar on equitable·
174
1957
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1958]
mortgage of his properties as per the previous resolution No. 5 of January 11. Resolution No. 11 thereof
Caveeshar
confirmed the purchase of plots from the Delhi Stores
v.
and the payment of Rs. 2,55,050 therefor. Resolution
The State of
Bombay
No. 9 confirmed the sale of the Jupiter's securities of
./:igannadhadas J. the face value of Rs. 15 lakhs and resolution No. 12
confirmed the pledge of the Jupitor's securities of the
face value of Rs. I 5 lakhs for cash credit account with
the Punjab National Bank for Rs. 14 Jakhs.
Now, on January 22, 1949, there purported to be,
according to the prosecution case, a meeting of the
Board of directors of the Tropical including Lala
Shankarlal. Resolution No. 11 thereof confirmed the
purchase of 63,000 shares of the Jupiter on behalf of
the Tropical for Rs. 28,15,000. Resolution No. 12
thereof confirmed the transfer of 48,399 shares out of
the above 6~,000 shares to the Delhi Stores as agreed
to by then. By resolution No. 13, sale of the headoffice building of the Tropical and certain plots of land
belonging to the Tropical to Caveeshar at Rs. 23,50,000
and Rs. 6,50,000 respectively as per agreement with
Caveeshar by the managing director, Lala Shankarlal,
on December 23, 1948, was confirmed. By resolution
No. 14, plots of land and building in Chandni Chowk
Delhi, sold by the managing director, Lala Shankarlal,
at a cost of Rs. 2,60,000 to the Delhi Stores, was
approved and confirmed. It is alleged that the resolutions of the Jupiter at the meetings dated 11th and
20th above noticed and of the Tropical dated the 22nd
disclosed the scheme of camouflaging which has been
resorted to, to screen the fact that the payment for the
purchase of the Jupiter's shares was directly out of the
Jupiter's amount.
This, according to the prosecution, indicates in its
broad outline the manipulations resorted to for the
above purposes. There is also evidence Jet in on behalf
of the prosecution of a number of relevant details such
as the presence or absence of the requisite entries and
papers in the various books of account and other
records of the concerned organisations, the Jupiter, the
Tropical and the Delhi Stores. Evidence has also been
given to show which of the accused was directly a
Sardul Singh
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
175
party to which of the various steps. Direct evidence
1957
of some of the ex-employees of the Jupiter, in parti- Sardul Singh
cular of one Subramaniam and of another Rege, has,
Caveeshar
according to the prosecution, considerable bearing on Thesiateof
the events that happened during this period, which Bombay
would, if accepted, go to indicate the devious and Jagannadhada3 J.
dishonest basis of the above alleged manipulations. In
addition to the above it would appear that some of the
shareholders who came to know about these transactions sent notices through solicitors to the new
directorate of the Jupiter and to some of the accused
persons, in particular Lala Shankarlal and Kaul,
individually warning them against the illegal and
improper dealings with the funds of the company. It
is also in evidence that two of the solicitors, Sethia and
Joshi, filed a suit against the new directors on January
19, 1949, for an injunction restraining the directors
from disposing of the Jupiter's securities so as to
enable the Tropical to have the finances for the
purchase of the controlling block of the Jupiter's
shares. It is the suggestion of the defence that these
notices were followed up by institution of a suit at the
instance of Khaitan himself and that ultimately after
the money was paid on the 20th within the time, they
were dropped. Evidence has also been given for the
prosecution about the financial condition and property
holdings of the Tropical, of the Delhi Stores, as also of
Caveeshar to show that none of them were in any such
position as to justify the various transactions put
through in their names. In particular, evidence has
been given that Caveeshar had no such property as
could possibly justify a loan of about Rs. 25 lakhs on
his security and that the alleged valuation report was
non-existent or bogus. Evidence was also given that
the Delhi Stores was a defunct company whose only
assets were (1) 39,750 shares of the Tropical of the
book value of Rs. 10 per share which had no market
quotation, (2) other shares of book value of Rs. 16,879,
and (3) cash in the bank of Rs. 133-14-6, and (4) book
debts of Rs. 93,40,414. As against these debts' it is
said that the Delhi Stores had liability to sundry
creditors to the extent of Rs. 1,40,259-3-8. The above,
M2SC-II-2
176
1957
Sardul Singh
Caveeshar
v.
The State of
Bombay
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
in broad outline, is the nature of the evidence relating
to the first period.
Second period: February I, 1949, to the end of
December, 1949.
Now, we may take up the evidence relating to the
second period commencing from February, J 949, to the
end of December, 1949. The background relating to
this period, according to the prosecution is, that Lala
Shankarlal and his other co-conspirators were fully
aware of the necessity of showing the transactions of
January, 1949, as no longer outstanding as early as
possible, so as to escape direct scrutiny thereinto by
the end of the calendar year and it is said that therefore they made some further manipulations with a
view to show the moneys advanced to Caveeshar and
the Delhi Stores as having been returned before the
end of the year. The events which Jed up to this may
now be noticed. On May 25, 1949, there was a meeting
of the new directorate of the Jupiter at which Lala
Shankarlal informed the directors that Caveeshar was
repaying his loan of Rs. 25 lakhs and odd and out of
that amount a sum of Rs. 14 lakhs might be invested
in purchasing40,000 shares ofthe Tropical and Rs. 11
lakhs on the equitable mortgage of the Tropical's headoffice building. Ultimately, however, this contemplated loan of Rs. 11 lakhs to the Tropical on the equitable
mortgage of its head-office building did not materialise
for one reason or other. Thereafter, according to the
prosecution, there were brought into existence, five
transactions, from May 25 to December 31, 1949,
which have been referred to in the evidence as follows:
Rs.
1. Raghavji loan (5-11-1949) which
resulted in repayment of
.
4,00,000
2. Fresh Caveeshar loan (5-11-1949)
5,30,000
which resulted in repayment of . .
3. Misri Devi loan (20-12-1949) which
resulted in repayment of . .
1,00,000
4. Purchase of 54,000 Tropical
shares (25-5-1949 to 20-12-1949) which
14,00,000
resulted in repayment of . .
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
177
. 1957
5. Transfer of Caveeshar from the
Tropical. to Jupiter account of balance
(31-12-1949) which resulted in repayment
of
.r.
Sardul Sing!,
· Cavee~har
80,650
Total
- - - - .-
The State oj
Bombay
25, 10,650
Jaga1111adhadas
In order to appreciate these transactions, it is
necessary to set out a few more details. Raghavji's son,
Chandrakant, was a member of the Forward Bloc, of
which Lala Shankarlal was one of the leaders.
Chandrakant had close political associations with Lala
Shankarlal. Raghavji was a gentleman about 80 years
old and a resident of Cutch and had a few properties at
that place. According to the prosecution, Chandrakant
was persuaded to permit his father's name to be used
for the purpose of advaneing some moneys on the footing of an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds
of his father's property in Cutch. At a meeting of the
Jupiter's directorate dated November 5, 1949, a loan
for Rs. 5 lakhs on the equitable mortgage of Raghavji's
properties was sanctioned subject to valuation report
and certain . terms and conditions specified therein.
Notwithstanding that the loan was to be advanced on
proper valuation report and other terms, it is the
prosecution case and evidence, that this sum of Rs. 5
lakhs was disbursed as follows: Rs. 3 lakhs in cash
from the Jupiter's funds and Rs. 2 lakhs as having
been received back from Caveeshar and paid over in
cash to Raghavji. The payment of these Rs. 2 lakhs
was really by book adjustment showing Rs. 2 Iakhs
as having been paid by the Tropical to Caveeshar out
of the moneys of Caveeshar with the Tropical and this
amount as having been paid into the Jupiter's account
by Cavceshar and paid again out of it to Raghavji.
Out of the other Rs. 3 lakhs taken in cash from the
Jupiter, Rs. 2 lakhs it is said was not paid to Chandrakant but 1vas shown as having been paid by Cavee~nar
into the Jupiter's account in reduction of the debt
owing from him to the Jupiter. The net result of these
adjustments was that Rs. 4 lakhs out of the Caveeshar
loan with the Jupiter was shown as reduced. What
178
1957
Sardul Singh
Caveeshar
v.
The State of
Bombay
Jagannadhada!/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
became of the other Rs. one lakh is not quite clear.
The next transaction is Caveeshar's fresh loan. At the
same meeting of the Board of directors of the Jupiter
dated November 5, 1949, where as Raghavji's loan for
Rs.5 lakhs was sanctioned, a further loan of Rs.5,30,000
was authorised to be advanced to Caveeshar against
pledge of shares of the People's Insurance Co., the
period of repayment being mentioned as two years.
This transaction merely meant a book adjustment
reducing the loan outstanding against Caveeshar and
a fresh loan to that extent on a different security. This
transaction fiirther reduced the original indebtedness
of Caveeshar to the Jupiter by this amount. The third
item is the Misri Devi loan. At a meeting of the
Board of directors of the Jupiter dated December 20,
1949, an application for loan of Rs. 5 lakhs from Misri
Devi shown as the daughter of Lala Dwarka Das
(though she was also the wife of Lala Shankarlal) was
said to have been considered and a loan in her favour
for Rs. 5 lakhs on the security of her property in New
Delhi was sanctioned subject to marketable title, period
of three years, and other usual clauses. In anticipation
of having to advance this loan a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs
appears to have been sent on November 22, 1949, by
Kaul, from the Jupiter's account in the Punjab
National Bank, Bombay, to its account at Delhi. Again
on December 27, 1949, Kaul appears to have sent a
further sum of Rs. 2 lakhs from the Jupiter's account
in the Punjab National Bank, Bombay, to its account
at Delhi, by telegraphic transfer. Towards this loan
a cheque on the Jupiter's account with the Punjab
National Bank at Delhi for Rs. 4 lakhs payabk to self or
bearer was given and a sum of Rs. one lakh was shown
as having been received by the Jupiter from Caveeshar
through his Tropical account and shown as paid to Misri
Devi. This reduced the Caveeshar loan due to the
Jupiter by another Rs. one lakh. At the same meeting
of December 20, a resolution was placed on record
showing that at the instance of Lala Shankarlal, a bargain was arranged on behalf of the Jupiter for purchase
of 54,000 shares of the Tropical instead of 40,000 shares
as previously contemplated in the resolution of the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.179
directors dated May 25, 1949, for the sum of Rs. 14
1957
lakhs and purchase on this footing was confirmed. sardul Singh
The payment of Rs. 14 lakhs by the Jupiter to the Caveeshar
Tropical was adjusted by showing the Tropical as The It~te 01
having paid Rs. 14 lakhs to Caveeshar and Caveeshar Bombay
as having paid back to the Jupiter a sum of Rs. 14 Jagan;;;;;;adas J.
lakhs out of the original loan of Rs. 25 lakhs and odd.
Thus in all, by these four transactions the original
Caveeshar's loan on the security of the alleged properties of Caveeshar was reduced by Rs. 24,30,000
leaving a balance of Rs. 80,650. · This amount was
adjusted by book entries on December 31, showing a
transfer of the said amount from his Tropical account
towards credit of the Jupiter account. Thus, by
December 31, 1949, the entire amount of Rs. 25 lakhs
and odd advanced to Caveeshar in January, 1949, on
the security of his properties in Delhi was shown as
having been wiped out leaving a fresh loan against
him on November 5, 1949, for a sum of Rs. 5,30,000
on the security of the shares of the Peoples Insurance Co.
It may be recalled here that for the payment of
Rs. 28,15,000 to Khaitan on January 20, 1949, the
original source of cash, according to the prosecution
case, was the sum of Rs. 25,15,000 granted by way of
loan to Caveeshar and Rs. 2,60,000 paid to the Delhi
Stores for purchase of plots of the Delhi Stores. Out of
this the original Caveeshar loan was, by the end of
1949, shown as having been completely wiped out as
above stated. So far as the purchase of plots of the
Delhi Stores is concerned, it would appear that though
in fact the Delhi Stores had no such plots to sell, this
transaction was shown as put through in the following
way. The resolution of the Board of directors of the
Tropical dated fanuary 22, 1949, showed certain plots
of land and the building in Chandni Chowk, Delhi,
belonging to the Tropical, as having been sold to the
Delhi Stores for the price of Rs. 2,60,000. Putting
these two resolutions together, it would appear that
the drawing out of Rs. 2,60,000 from the Jupiter's
funds by virtue of the relevent resolution dated
January 11, 1949, was substantially the payment
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1~57
of Rs. 2,60,000 by the Jupiter for the alleged purchase of
plots of land and building in Chandni Chowk which
Cavee.rhar
belonged to the Tropical. It does not appear that in
v.
its ultimate effect this transaction invited serious
rhe Stale of
Bombay
scrutiny and comment and there is nothing on the
1•.cwm.Ulladas J. record to show that any further attempt was made to
camouflage this transaction by fresh transactions.
Sart/ul
Singh
Now in addition to these transactions during this
second period there is the evidence given by the prosecution ofa number of other details during this period.
Of these the most important is that which relates to a
notice sent on May 13, 1949, by an ex-employee of the
Jupiter, Rege, through solicitors to Lala Shankarlal
and Kaul, alleging fraud in respect of purchase of
63,000 Jupiter's shares from Khaitan. This was
followed up by him by a misfeasance petition dated
August 10, 1949, in the High Court of Bombay against
all the directors of the Jupiter, and this in its turn led,
according to the prosecution, to certain intimidating
actions against Rege said to have been taken by Lala
Shan,karlal, Kaul and Mehta, as a result of which Rege,
it is said, was coerced into withdrawing his petition
followed by the ultimate dismissal of that petition by
order dated September 15, 1949. During this period
there were also acute differences between the directors
on one side and the brokers, Chopra and Mayadas, on
the other for the brokerage of Rs. 40,000 to which,
according to them, they were entitled for the original
negotiations carried out through them with the
Khaitan group for purchase of the controlling block of
the Jupiter's shares. It is also said that during this
period various ante-dated entries, vouchers and other
documents were brought into existence in order to
show an appearance of regularity with reference to the
transactions during the period of conspiracy in December, 1948, and January, 1949. There are also certain
letters of this period found or seized from the ollice of
the Tropical of the dates of August 10, December 21
and 22, 1949, purporting to have been written, the first
by Kaul to Lala Shankarlal and the second and third
by Guha to Lala Shankarlal. These letters, if true,
S.C.R.
·SUPREME COURT REPORTS
181
1957
are revealing, but are of course evidence only against
themselves. It is of some importance for the prosecu- Sardul Singh
Caveesbar
tion case against Caveeshar to notice that there are
v.
also two letters of this period alleged to be from The State of
Bombay
Caveeshar to Chopra dated March 17 and 30, 1949, the
first authorising Chopra to arrange for negotiations to Jagannadhadas J.
purchase the controlling block of shares of the Empire
of India Life Assurance Co. Ltd. and the second offering
to bring about a settlement in connection with
the claim by Chopra and Mayadas for commission
relating to the purchase of the Jupiter's shares.
Third period : During the year 1950.
The events of the third period as alleged by the
prosecution and in respect of which the prosecution
has given evidence may now be stated. The main
argument on behalf of the appellants before us relates
to the admissibility of the evidence relating to this
period. The background for the events of this period
was-according to the prosecution-the situation that
arose from the strong attitude taken by the auditors in
the course of their audit of the affairs of the Jupiter
for the year 1949, which was taken up at the commencement of 1950. The transactions of the Jupiter
during the year 1949 which came under their scrutiny
are said to have aroused their concern and this led
them to probe into the circumstances relating to the
original Caveeshar loan in January, 1949, to the tune
of Rs. 25,10,650. On January 6, 1950, the auditors
sent a letter to the Jupiter demanding inspection of
the documents relating to the said loan of Caveeshar.
This was followed up by a further letter dated February
6, from the auditors requesting for production
of the copy of the mortgage deed, valuation report
and all other documents and papers relating to
this Caveeshar loan as also for the inspection of
papers and documents relating to (1) Raghavji loan,
(2) Fresh Caveeshar loan, (3) Misri Devi loan, and (4)
purchase of 54,000 Tropical shares for Rs. 14 lakhs. In
that letter of February 6, the auditors stated as
follows :
182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
"We consider the above transactions mostly
unconscionable and we fail to understand how any
v.
responsible management could sell Government secuThe State of
rities and invest the proceeds in a huge Jot of shares in
Bombay
Tropical
Insurance Co. Ltd. and large advances on
Jogan.'tadhadas J.
shares of Peoples Insurance Co. Ltd., loans on properties in Cutch etc. We do not see the basis on which
nearly Rs. 26 per share of Rs. 10 was paid for purchase
of Tropical Insurance Company's shares. We consider
the position extremely serious and shall therefore
thank you to immediately send a copy of this report
to the Superintendent of Insurance and also appraise
the shareholders of the contents of this report forthwith."
No reply thereto having been received, the auditors
sent a copy of their letter of February 6, to each of
the directors of the Jupiter individually with a
forwarding letter on February 14, 1950. The next five
months were taken up-according to the prosecution
-in the attempt of the directors of the Jupiter to put
off or to evade the auditors by involving them in a
good deal of correspondence, oral explanations.
personal meetings, and so forth but without the
-production of the various documents called for exceptmg only a few. This resulted in a letter from the auditors to the Jupiter dated July 24, 1950, enclosing their
draft report to the shareholders setting out their
criticisms of the transactions of the directors for the
year 1949, and stating that only a cancelled pronote
of Caveeshar and a receipt by him were shown to them
in respect of the mortgage Joan of Rs. 25,10,650 to
Caveeshar. This, according to the prosecution, was
followed up by feverish activities of the directors to
bring about the screening by repayment, of the transactions from May to December, 1949, viz., (1)
Caveeshar fresh loan, (2) Raghavji loan, (3) Misri Devi
loan and (4) purchase of the Tropical shares.
Repayment of Caveeshar fresh loan of Rs. 5,30,000.
to the Jupiter, was done by raising money by sale of
the Tropical securities and paying that money to the
Jupiter in discharge of Caveeshar's fresh loan. It
appears that the Tropical securities of the face value of
19S7
Sardul Singh
Caveeshar
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
183
1957
Rs. 6 lakhs were pledged with the Grindlays Bank,
New Delhi, for an overdraft account of the Tropical. Sardul Singh
Caveeshar
It is said that these Tropical securities ·were got
v.
released from the Grindlays Bank by substituting for The State of
Bombay
them the Jupiter's securities of the face value of
Rs. 5,30,000. The prosecution case is that Kaul, lifted Jagarmadhada., Ji
these Jupiter's securities and gave them to Mehta and
that Mehta flew to Delhi, handed over these securities
to the Grindlays Bank (presumably as belonging to the
Tropical) and got released the · previously. pledged
Tropical securities. The Tropical securities so released
appear to have been sold on September 12, 1950, and
to have realised Rs. 5,01,592-1-2. That amount is said
to have been deposited in the Tropical account with
the Indian Bank. On- September 14, Mehta is said to
have drawn a cheque for Rs. 5,30,000 on the Indian
Bank in favour of the Jupiter and sent it with a covering letter to the Jupiter stating that it was repayment
by Caveeshar of his loan of Rs. 5,30,000 which had
been given to him by the Jupiter as per the Jupiter's
resolution dated November 5, 1949. The necessary
book entries are said to have been made, and a receipt
for Rs. 5,30,000 is said to have been sent to Caveeshar.
On October 27, 1950, Mehta is said to have brought a
sum of Rs. 17,158-12-0 in cash to the room of Kaul in
the Jupiter's office and to have paid in cash to the
accountant of the Jupiter in the presence of Kaul and
Guba. This amount was credited on that date in the
Jupiter's account as payment of interest due on the .
two loans to the Jupiter by Caveeshar. Thus the
further Caveeshar's loan was shown to have been com. pletely repaid with interest by entries in the Jupiter's
books dated September 14 and October 27, 1950. This
was followed up by the inclusion of narration in the
report of the Jupiter for the year 1949 that the loans
advanced to Caveeshar with interest thereon were fully
paid back to the Jupiter and .that all documents pertaining to the said Joans were returned to Caveeshar.
Tha further adjustments for repayment of Raghavji
Joan and Misri Devi loan and in respect of the purchase
of 54,000 Tropical shares by the Jupiter in December, 1949, are said to be connected with the attempts
184
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
of the accused to acquire the controlling block of
shares of the Empire. of India Life Assurance Co.,
Cal'eeshar
Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Empire of India)
v.
Tht! Stare of in order to utilise the funds thereof for these adjuste,nnbay
ments. The details of how the controlling block Qf
negotiated for and
: :1gannadf!ada.f J. shares of that Company were
acquired are not necessary to be gone into in detail
for the purposes of this case and the same may be
mentioned in liroad outline.
It is part of the prosecution case that anticipating
the trouble that was likely to arise from the transactions of 1948 and 1949 with the auditors, Lala
Shankarlal and other directors conceived an idea as
·early as in March and May, 1949, to purchase the
controlling block of shares of the Empire of India from
one Ramratan Gupta. There appear to have been some
unfruitful negotiations in this behalf for nearly a year,
But finally by October 5, 1950, an agreement was
executed under which a sum of Rs. JO lakhs was to be
paid in advance to Ramratan Gupta and another sum
of Rs. 33 lakhs and odd within thirty days thereafter
and the controlling block of shares of the Empire of
India of 2,618 were to be handed over to one Damodar
Swarup Seth, a nominee of Lala Shankarlal. The
amount of Rs. 43 lakhs and odd is said to have been
paid up by means of a number of cheques as follows:
Rs.
I. On October 5, 1950(i) Cheque by Damodar Swarup Seth
(Ex. Z-10) for
8,00,000
(ii) Cheque . by Bhudev Sanghi in
favour of Damodar Swarup Seth
(Ex. Z-11) for
2,00,000
·J~11rdul
Singh
Total of I
II. On October 16, 1950, six cheques by
Swarup Seth in favour of(i) Reyer Mills Ltd. for
(ii) Laxmi Ratan Cotton Mills for
10,00,000
Damodar
Rs.
10,55,844
8,06,895
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(iii) Premkumar Gupta for
(iv) Stores India Ltd. for
(v) Gulabachand Jain for
(vi) Biharilal Ramcharan for ..
III. On October 27, 1950(i) Cheque by Damodar Swarup Seth
(Ex. Z-13) for
Total of II & III
185
1957
6,71,787
36,799
97,500
5,04,072
Sardul Singh
Cavetshar
v.
The State oj
Bombay
J agamradhadas J.
2,08,650
33,81,547
The total of the first two cheques is Rs. 10 lakhs which
was paid as advance. The total of the remaining seven
cheques comes to Rs. 33,81,547 which was shown as
consideration for the purchase of 2,618 shares of
the Empire of India. Thus, on the payment of
Rs. 31,72,897 on October 16, 1950, by means of the six ,
cheques above mentiOned, the controlling block of
2,618 shares of the Empire of India was handed over
to Damodar Swarup Seth. It is the case of the prosecution that Damodar Swarup Seth was able to draw
these various cheques of the total value of over Rs. 43!lakhs because certain securities of the Jupiter set out
in Ex. Z-47 of the face value of Rs. 48,75,000 were
withdrawn from the Jupiter in pursuance of letters
written by Kaul and Guha and lifted away and handed
over without due authority to Damodar Swarup Seth
who opened a cash credit account with the Punjab
National Bank on the strength of those securities.
Having thus secured the controlling block of shares
of the Empire of India in October, 1950, it is the
prosecution case that hurried steps were taken to;
show, that the Raghavji loan and Misri Devi Joan
advanced by the Jupiter towards the end of 1949
were paid back with interest to the Jupiter in cash,
and that the Tropical shares which were shown .as
having been purchased by the Jupiter in 1949 were
sold away and realised the cash for which they were
purchased. On October 17, 1950, the day next after
the purchase of the controlling block of shares of the
Empire of India, one Roshanlal Kohli, a broker, is said
to have offered to the Empire of India to sell from the
186
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
Jupiter its securities of the face value of Rs. 20 lakhs·
On October 19, 1950, Roshanlal Kohli, purporting to
Caveeshar
act for the Jupiter wrote to the Empire of India that
v.
The State of for the purchase an advance payment of Rs. 20 lakhs
Bombay
is to be made. This was followed by a reply from the
J,1ga11nadhadas J. Empire of India agreeing to the same and an actual
payment of the amount by two bearer cheques issued,
by the Empire of India, one for Rs. 15 lakhs dated
October 26, 1950, and the other for Rs. 5 lakhs dated
October 27, 1950. No entry is said to have been made
in the Jupiter's records as to the receipt of this amount
though an entry of such payment was made in the
records of the Empire of India. But it is said that
this amount of Rs. 20 lakhs was utilised for adjusting
the Raghavji loan as well as the purchase of the Tropical shares by the Jupiter. It is the prosecution
evidence that Rs. ·14 lakhs out of Rs. 15 lakhs obtained
on the bearer cheque of October 26 was paid in cash
into the Jupiter account with the Punjab National
Bank, Bombay, on October 26 itself showing the same
as the sale proceeds of 54,000 Tropical shares which
the auditors had objected to as being an unconscionable investment. The actual payment was made
into the Jupiter account of the Punjab National
Bank, Bombay, by one Bhagwan Swamp and another
Bhudev Sanghi. A letter was obtained, signed by
Bhudev Sanghi (a nephew of Lala Shankarlal) (Ex.
Z-152) that 54,000 Tropical shares belonging to the
Jupiter were sold by him as a broker, and that the
sale proceeds thereof were credited that day into the
account of the Jupiter in the Punjab National Bank
at Bombay and the corresponding entries were
made in the investment register of the Jupiter. It
is said that notwithstanding this transaction the
Tropical shares remained in the safe custody account
of the Jupiter in the Bank of Jndia right up to January 2, 1951, when on receipt of a letter dated January 2, 1951 (Ex .. Z-293) by Kaul to the Bank of India,
they delivered all his shares. These Tropical shares
appear to have been delivered over to a clerk of the
Jupiter and handed over by him to Guba. It is said that
these shares are now no longer traceable. The other
Sardfll Singh
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
187
bearer cheque for Rs. 5 lakhs drawn from the funds of
'957
the Empire of India, it is said, came into the Jupiter Sardul Singh
account as follows and purported to be repayment of
caveeshar
Raghavji loan. A sum of Rs. 5,18,388-14-3 wa.s put
. v.
in cash on October 27, 1950, into the Comilla Bank The s1a1e of
purporting to show it as sent by Raghavji in repayBombay
ment of the mortgage. loan taken by him from the J gannadhadas J.
Jupiter with interest thereon. There is ·a, receipt . a
issued by Kaul to Chandrakant, son of Ragha.vji,
showing that Rs. 5,18,388-14-3 was received in full
repayment of the mortgage loan. ·An entry was also
made in the Jupiter's cash book that interest wa.s paid
up-to-date.
-· '· .
With regard to the repayment of Misri Devi loan in
the books of the Jupiter there is an entry dated
October 7, 1950, showing a sum of Rs. 1,25,000 as
withdrawn·from the Imperial Bank. On the same date
there is another entry showing a sum of Rs. 4,25,000
as withdrawn from the Bank of India; Bombay. On
that very day, i.e., October 7, two cheques totalling
Rs. 5,50,000 were deposited with the Punjab National
Bank, Bombay. Kaul purported to send a. letter to
Lala Shankarlal informing him that the amount of
Rs. 5,50,000 was being sent for' the purchase of land
and building belonging to Sir Sobha Singh. The Punjab
National Bank, Bombay, was instructed to transfer the
above mentioned sum to their branch a_t Tropical
Building at Delhi to the credit of the account of the
Jupiter. All this was done between October 7 and 10.
On October 10, a memo was received from the Punjab
National Bank, Tropical Building, Delhi, informing
that the sum of Rs. 5,50,000 had been received by
them. The next day, i.e., on October II, a cheque for
Rs. 5,50,000 was drawn on that Bank by Lala Shan'
karfal in his ca pa city as the managing director of the
Jupiter. On the reverse of this cheque an endorsement
was made by Lala Shankarlal. It is the suggestion of
the prosecution that cash.was obtained on it and that
a demand draft for the said amount was obtained from
the Grindlays Bank in favour of the Jupiter on behalf
of Misri Devi {wife of Lala Shankarlal) on October 12.
This draft was signed on the reverse by Kaul. It was
188
19S7
SarduI s;.,h
Ca•·eeshar
The ~tare of
Bombay
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
received in Bombay and was deposited in the
Jupiter's account in the Bank of India. Misri Devi
loan was for Rs. 5 lakhs and a sum of Rs. 18,062-8-0
was by then due as interest thereupon. On October 16,
entries were made in the cash book of the Jupiter
showing that the loan of Misri Devi for Rs. 5 lakhs
with interest was recovered. The excess payment of
Rs. 31,937-8-0 was shown in the first instance as
credited to suspense account and thereafter as having
been refunded to Misri Devi on October 18. Thus the
Misri Devi loan was shown in the books as having
been also completely repaid.
Thus by these various adjustments and manipulations, the four transactions, viz., (1) Caveeshar fresh
loan on the security of the People's Insurance Com. pany's securities, (2) Raghavji's loan on the security
of his properties in Cutch, (3) Misri Devi's loan on the
security of her building in New Delhi, and (4) purchase
of 54,000 Tropical shares by the Jupiter, which were
all strongly objected to along with the original
Caveeshar loan of Rs. 25 lakhs and odd, were shown
as realised back in actual cash by October 27, 1950.
A letter was then written by the solicitors of the
Jupiter under instructions of Kaul to the auditors to
attend on October 28, 1950, at the office of the Jupiter
and to verify the accounts and moneys received from
the repayments of the loans and from the sale of the
Tropical shares. On October 29, the auditors went to
the office of the Jupiter and verified the same and
were satisfied that the moneys were received. The
repayment of these various loai;is and the sale of the
Tropical shares shown as having been realised in
actual cash would of course also clear up the objections
which the auditors raised as regards the original
Caveeshar loan on account of the requisite papers
relating thereto not being forthcoming. The auditors,
having thus been satisfied, signed the audit certificate
and the report of the Jupiter for the year ending 1949,
and appended a note that they had objected to certain
loans and purchases and that these loans had been
recovered and that the shares had been sold and the
moneys received.
S.C.R; ...
,
•I
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
189
z957
On October 23; 1950, a general body meeting of the
shareholders of: the Jupiter was held at which La.la. 5
Shanka.rla.l, Kaul, l\Iehta., Gulia and Ca.veeshar, were ";;'.,~~;;!:;h
present and the final report :of the auditors and the
· · v.
reply of the directors to the original objections of . _'Th•. Slate of
the auditors were read. The directors asserted at the ·· : ·Bombay
meeting that imaginary mistakes and nervous suspicion ]. . -d' d J
•
h a.d .oun
,.
dm
. respect of t h eir
. aganna "" as ,
was a11 t h at t h e au d 1tors
management for the year and that the events of the
. la.st 12 months were a complete refutation of the fear,
· suspicion and bias of the auditors.
_
· It is now necessary to trace the distribution of the
. lot of 63,000 shares of the Jupiter which were purchal!ed ·.: • -·
by Lala Shankarlal and his group ,from Kha.ita.n. • It · ·
may be recalled that on January 20, 1949, only 61,061
shares which stood in the name of the New Prahlad
·l\Iills were handed over. The remaining 1,939 shares
which stood in the names of_ others . (presumably
also belonging to the group of Kha.ita.n) ·were transferred partly before and partly after, ma.king up 63,000
shares. Out of these, 250 shares ea.ch 'vere transferred
a.t the outset as qualifying shares, in the names of La.la.
Sha.nka.rla.I, Kaul, l\Iehta., Jhaveri and Doshi,· totalling
1,250. These transfers were confirmed by the resolil- tion of the directors of the Jupiter dated December 29,
1948. Another 250 shares were transferred in the name
of Sa.rat Chandra. Bose. on January 20, 1949, but it ·\
would appear that he did not accept the same then
and intimated his non-acceptance some time much
later. On Aughst 31, 1949, 37,949 shares were transferred to the name of Delhi Stores and 14,601 shares
were transferred in the name of the Tropical and two ,
further lots of 4,475 ea.ch were transferred in the names
of Lala. Sha.nkarla.I and Ca.veeshar. On September 13,
1950, out of the lot of.37,949 shares .standing in the
name of the Delhi Stores, 4,000 shares were _kept
standing in the name of the Delhi Stores and the
ha.lance of 33,949 were distributed as follows:
3025 shares in the na.mo of Lala Sha.nka.rla.I
3025 shares in the name of Caveesha.r
50 shares in the name of Kaul
7075 shares in the name ofl\Iehta.
190
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
7500 shares in the name of Chandulal Ratanchand
Shah, an employee of the Tropical
Cal·eeshar
7500
shares
in the name of Himatlal F. Parikh,
v.
an employee of the Tropical
The! State of
Bo111bay
5774 shares in the name of Himatlal Harilal Shah.
.JaJ:annadhadas J. Out of the Jot of 14,601 shares kept in the name of the
Tropical 7,500 shares were transferred to the name of
one Baburam and 7,101 shares were transferred to the
name of Kaul. Out of another lot of 409 shares which
were purchased, 339 shares were transferred to the
name of Kaul. Thus the position of the distribution
of the purchased Jupiter's shares as on September 13,
1950, was as follows :
7750 shares in the name of Lala Shankarlal
7740 shares in the name of Kaul
7325 shares in the name of Mehta
7500 shares in the name of Caveeshar
4000 shares in the name of the Delhi Stores
7500 shares in the name of Chandulal Ratanchand
7500 shares in the name of Himatlal F. Parikh
5774 shares in the name of Himatlal Harilal Silah
7500 shares in the name of Eaburam
250 shares in the name of Jhaveri
250 shares in the name of Doshi
250 shares in the name of Sarat Chandra Bose
70 shares in the name of the Tropical.
Sardul Singh
63,409 Total.
This makes a total of 63,409 shares comprising 63,000
shares of the controlling block which were originaliy
purchased from Khaitan group and 409 shares sub·
sequently purchased which has nothing to do with the
present case. It may be noticed that no shares were
transferred in the name of Guha and that very substantial number of shares were transferred in the names
of the various other accused. It may also be noticed
that three persons who are not accused in the case, viz.,
Chandulal Ratanchand, Himatlal F. Parikh, Himatlal
Harilal Shah, had also very substantial number of
shares transferred to them.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
191
The case of the prosecution is that for the transfer of
1957
all these shares in the names ()f the various accused ~ardul .Singh
no money was paid by them and that it was the dis- caveeshar
tribution amongst themselves of the major portion of Tlie ~tate of
the original acquisition. of 63,000 shares which, ae<eordBombay
ing to the prosecution case, were in fact purchased by Jaga11nadhadasl.
utilising the very funds of the Jupiter over which
they obtained the control. This, according to the prosecution, completes the chain of misappropriation by
the various accused.
.
Since the appeals before the High Court and before
us are against the convictions and sentences based on ·
the acceptance of the verdict of the jury against each
of the accused, scope for interference on appeal either
by the High Court or by this Court is very limited.
Hence Mr. Chari for the appellant has pressed before
us only some legal contentions. His main argument
relates to the admissibility of certain portions of the
evidence given for the prosecution. Mr. Chari has
taken strong exception to the prosecution having led
evidence relating to the acquisition of the. controlling
block of shares of the Empire of India followed up by
the various steps said to have been taken by the
several alleged conspirators or by Lala Shankarlal in
1950 to screen the transactions of the later part of
1949. Mr. Chari contends that on the substantive
charge of conspiracy all these steps or actings are not
admissible in law.
Now the conspiracy as charged is in· substance a
conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust in
respect of the funds of the Jupiter by utilising the
same to purchase the controlling block of shares of the
Jupiter itself for the benefit of the Tropical (or for
the benefit of the conspirators). This conspiracy is
alleged to have been entered into between the dates
December l, 1948, and January 31, 1949. l\1r. Chari
says that primarily it is only the events of that period
comprising the acts, writings and statements of the
various conspirators of that period which would be
admissible as against each other under s. 10 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872). According to
the prosecution case the modus operandi was to screen
M2SC--3
192
19S7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
the utilisation of these funds by sl}owing tliem as having
been advanced for legitimate purposes and invested
Cavmhar
on proper security, but in fact utilising the same for
The s7dte of payment to the owners of the controlling block of
Bombay
shares of the Jupiter. Mr Chari says that strictly
Jagannadhadas 1. speaking, though for this purpose, only the acts, writings and statements of the conspirators during the
period December, 1948, to January, 1949, would be
admissible, he conceded that the evidence relating to
the steps taken and the acts, writings and statements
of the conspirators beyond January 31, 1949, and during the year 1949, i.e., towards the later part thereof,
by way of creating further transactions (viz., Raghavji
loan, Caveeshar fresh loan, Misri Devi loan and purchase of shares from the Tropical) in order to screen the
transactions of January, 1949, may be admissible, as
being directly connected, and that he does not object
to the same. But his point is that the transactions of
the year 1950 and the steps taken then are only for
the purpose of screening the second set of transactions
of the later part of 1949 and not the first set of transactions of January, 1949. He contends that evidence
relating thereto, which falls wholly outside the conspiracy period, is not admissible under s. l 0 of the
Evidence Act being too remote and having no direct
bearing on the original transactions which are the
subject matter of the conspiracy. He points out that
the alleged criminal breach of trust was committed on
January 20, 1949, when the Jupiter's moneys were
paid to Khaitan, and that the object of the conspiracy
must be taken to have been achieved when the
camouflage through the first Caveeshar Joan and the
advance said to have been made to the Delhi Stores
for purchase of plots was effectuated. He points out
that this is a case with numerous details even as
regards the events, statements and actings from
December 1, 1948, to end of December, 1949. He
urges that the events of the year 1950 are equally, if
not more, voluminous and have overburdened the
legitimate material in the case. This, he urges, has
operated to create confusion and prejudice in the
minds of the jury. We have been told that on account
sardul Singh
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
193
of this large volume of, what is contended to be,
19s1
inadmissible evidence the trial has got unduly pro- SardMI Singh
longed extending over a year. It is pointed out that
Caveeshar
the very narration of the outline of the prosecution case The s;~,e of
and of the evidence let i~ on behalf of the prosecution
Bo~y
has taken about 100 pages of typed matter in the Jagannadhada:J J.
charge to the jury by the learned trial Judge and in
the judgment of the High Court OJ) appeal. There can
be no doubt that in a case of this kind, having regard
to the nature thereof and to the ramifications of the
various transactions on which the prosecution relies to
make out its case, and having regard to the fact that
this was a jury trial, every attempt should have been
made to exclude material which is strictly not admissible in law. Otherwise it would have the effect of
confusing the jury and prejudicing its mind. But if
the evidence is clearly admissible in law, the Court
would not be justified in declining to receive it. All
that can be said is that it would have to take every
care in charging the jury to place fairly before it the
effect and implications of such items of evidence in an
adequate measure.
The limits of the admissibility of evidence in conspiracy cases under s. 10 of the Evidence.Act have been
authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council in
Mirza Akbar v. The King-Emperior ('). In that case
their Lordships of the Privy Council held that s. 10 of
the Evidence Act must be construed in accordance
with the principle that the thing done, written, or
spoken, was something done in carrying out the conspiracy and was receivable as a step in the proof of the
conspiracy. They notice that evidence receivable
under s. 10 of the Evidence Act of "anything said, done,
or written, by any one of such persons" (i.e. conspirators) must be "in .reference to their common
intention". But their Lordships held that in the context
(notwithstanding the amplitude of the above phrase)
the words therein are not capable of being widely
construed having regard to the well-known principle
above enunciated. It would seem to follow that
where, as in this case; the charge specifies the period
(1) (19.Jo) L.R. 67 I..\. 336.
25
194
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
of conspiracy, evidence of acts of co-conspirators outside the period is not receivable in evidence. Indeed,
this position is fairly conceded by Mr. Khandalawala
v.
171• State of for the prosecution. But his contention is that the
Bombay
evidence objected to, viz., the acts and events of the
Jatannadhadas J. year 1950, would be relevant under the other sections
of the Evidence Act such as ss. 6, 8, 9, 11 and 14. This
would no doubt be sp. But it has to be remembered
that some of these sections are widely worded and mu~t
re~eive a somewhat limited construction as pointed
out by West J. in his judgment reported in Reg. v.
Prabhudas (') when considering the scope of s. 11 of
the Evidence Act.
Now, there. can be no doubt that one of the main
relevant issues in the case is whether the Joan of Rs. 25
lakhs and odd advanced on January 20, 1949, to
Caveeshar, as also the moneys said to have been paid
to the Delhi Stores by way of advance for purchase of
certain plots said to belong to it, were genuine transactions or bogus and make-believe. If they were genuine
transactions, by virtue of which money did pass to
them on the basis of good security, showing these
amounts to be genuine business investments, then it
would be difficult to make out that there was any
criminal breach of trust. Hence all evidence which
would go to show that these transactions are bogus, is
certainly admissible. That would be so notwithstanding that such evidence may necessitate reference to
and narration of the acts of the conspirators beyond
the period of conspiracy but within reasonable limits.
While it may be true that the manipulations by way
of the four fresh transactions from May to December,
1949 (apart from other features of these transactions
of which evidence has been given) would be cogent
evidence to show that the original transcations were
bogus, the evidence relating to the further transactions
to screen these transactions of the second half of 1949
by utilising the money of the Empire of India after
obtaining the control thereof, and by wrongfully utilising the Jupiter's securities, would also be relevant to
make out and emphasise the bogm character of the
1957
Sardul Singh
Cavttshar
(1) (1874) 11 Born. H.C.R. 90.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
195
1957
original debts. It cannot be said to be too remote
because it is to be remembered, as has been pointed Sardul Singh
out by Mr. Khandalawala, that the urgent necessity Caveeshar
for acquiring the control of the Empire of Tndia in The v.State of
Bombay
1950, and for utilising it for showing the alleged
investments of the second half of 1949 as having been Jagaimadhadas J.
realised back in cash in 1950, arose on account of the
firm attitude of the auditors who suspected the bona
fides of the original Caveeshar loan and of the connected transactions of the second half of 1949 when
they scrutinised in 1950 the affairs of the Jupiter for
the year 1949. The 1950 transactions appear clearly
to have been brought about not merely to screen the
transactions of the second half of 1949, but equally, if
not mainly, to dispel any suspicion, and to obviate
the scrutiny, in respect of the earlier transactions of
January, 1949, which related to the period of conspiracy. Thus in relation to the main purpose of the
prosecution, viz., proof of the bogus character of these
transactions of January, 1949, the transactions of the
second half of 1949 and of 1950 must, in the circumstances of this case and having regard to the ramifications, be taken to be integrally connected and relevant
to make out their bogus character. We are, therefore,
unable to agree with the general objection put forward
that the entire evidence relating to the 1950 transactions was inadmissible in evidence.
It is also reasonably clear that the conduct in general of each individual co-conspirator including his acts,
writings and statements is evidence against himself.
There can be no doubt that such conduct irrespective
of the time to which it relates can be relied on by the
prosecution to show the criminality of the intention of
the individual accused with reference to his proved
participation in the alleged conspiracy, that is, to
rebut a probable defence which may normally arise in
such a case, viz., that the participation, though proved,
was innocent. It has been pointed out to us that in this
case each one of the accused has put forward in his
defence that he was an unconscious tool in the hands
of a towering personality and a master-mind like Lala
Shankarlal about whose criminal intentions he was
196
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1957
[1958]
not aware. It was therefore, quite legitimate for the
prosecution to anticipate such defence and to give
Cavttshar
rebutting evidence. Such evidence would come under
v.
is well-settled that
Tht State of s. 14 of the Evidence Act. It
Bombay
the evidence in rebuttal of a very likely and probable
r(lgannadhadas J. defence on the question of intention can be led by the
prosecution as part of its case. This is laid down by
the Privy Council in Makin v. The Attorney-General
for New South Wales('). To anticipate a likely defence
in such a case and to give evidence in rebuttal of such
defence is in substance nothing more than the letting
in of evidence by the prosecution of the requisite
criminal intention beyond reasonable doubt.
Now Mr. Khandalawala for the prosecution urges
that the entire evidence for the prosecution relating to
the year 1950 falls within these two categories of
admissible evidence, viz., (I) evidence to make out the
bogus character of the original transactions of January,
1949, which is an essential issue in the case relating to
all the conspirators, and (2) evidence of the criminal
intention of each of the accused which is admissible
as against himself. Mr. Chari for the appellants contests this assumption and urges that the evidence that
has been admitted of the year 1950 is much wider
than what is covered by the above two and that it was
in fact and in substance evidence of the acts, writings
· and statements of individual conspirators of a period
outside the period of conspiracy, and treated as
admissible against other co-conspirators, on the central
issues in the case, viz., whether a conspiracy has been
made out and whether the individual accused were
participants in that· conspiracy. Mr. Chari very
strenuously contends that such evidence was inadmissible and that its admission has seriously prejudiced
the case of the appellants and has rendered any fair
and rational consideration of the case by the jury
extremely difficult, if not impossible. In particular
his strong objection was to the evidence relating to
the acts, writings and statements of Lala Shankarlal
of the year 1950, more particularly because he died
before the trial and was not before the Court on
Sardul Singh
{l) L.R. (1894) A.C. 57, 65.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
197
195 7
trial as a conspirator. His contention raises for
consideration two questions, viz.,
sardut Singh
(1) whether such evidence is admissible in proof caveeshar
of the conspiracy and in proof of the participation of The 'State of
individual accused in the conspiracy, and
Bombay
(2) whether in fact at the trial such evidence was Jagannadhadas J.
admitted and made use of on these issues.
Now it would be convenient to take up the latter
question for consideration in the first instance.
To substantiate his contention that the evidence of
conduct of individual conspirators of the year 1950
has been admitted and used against the other coconspirators in proof of the two main issues, Mr. Chari,
in his argument before the High Court relied on the
following paragraphs of the learned trial Judge's
charge to the jury, viz., paras 11, 55, 65, 73, 74, 75, 94,
101, 102, 136, 146, 388, 453, 541, 557, 588, 602, 657,
676, 678 and 689. We have carefully gone through
these paragraphs. It appears to us reasonably clear
that what have been referred to by the learned trial
Judge in these paragraphs are various items of
evidence in the prosecution case whose primary object
is to make out the bogus character of the transactions
in question though they necessarily bring in either the
deceased Lala Shankarlal or some other co-conspirator
as being a party to these various acts. Such evidence,
as already stated, is obviously admissible for that
purpose as being links in the chain of evidence relating
to the bogus character of the original tran!iactions and
not as being in themselves relevant to prove the
conspiracy. That the learned trial Judge was alive to
this distinction and would not have admitted such
evidence in proof of the issue of conspiracy is quite
clear from his ruling (interlocutory judgment No. 6)
dated August 22, 1955, relating to the admissibility of
the document which was marked as Ex. Z-71 in the
committal court. The learned Judge in that order has
categorically ruled out the admissibility of that document with the following conclusion after a good deal
of discussion of the legal point :
"I come to the conclusion that the statements
and actions of any one of the persons mentioned in the
198
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1957
(19581
charge are not admissible beyond the period of conspiracy unless they are authorised by any of the accused
Caveeshar
persons; in that event they are really the actions and
v.
The State of statements of that accused persons himself who has
Bombay
authorised the same. I, therefore, do not admit the
Jagannadhadas J. document (Ex. Z-71) in evidence."
We have not got before us the document (Ex. Z-71)
itself to enable us to see for ourselves what it relates
to, since it was exhibited only in the committal court
and ruled out at the trial. But there is no difficulty
in appreciating what the learned trial Judge actually
held. That the learned trial Judge acted on this
view is reasonably clear also from the fact that in
quite a number of places in his charge to the jury he
has repeatedly emphasised that subsequent conduct of
r. conspirator would not be admissible against any body
else but himself. (See paras 453, 541, 557, 588, 602, 657,
676, 685 and 689 of the learned trial Judge's charge
to the jury). No doubt in some of the paragraphs
previously noticed as having been objected to by Mr.
Chari, the very reference to acts and conduct of Lala
Shankarlal during the year 1950 whiCh is beyond the
period of conspiracy, may conceivably be capable of
being wrongly relied on by the jury in respect of issues
on which they are not admissible and might be capable
of producing some prejudice. But this is a possibility
inherent ip such cases as has been pointed out by the
Pril.'y Council in Walli Muhammad v. King('). Therein
their Lordships pointed out the difficulty in all cases
where two persons are accused of a crime and where the
evidence against one is. inadmissible against the other.
·Their Lordships recognised that however carefully
assessors or a jury are directed and however finnly a
Judge may steel his mind against being influenced
against one by the evidence admissible only against
the other, nevertheless the mind may inadvertently be
affected by the disclosures made by one of the accused
to the detriment of the other. Undouotedly this
weighty caution has to be always kept in mind when
Judges and juries have to deal with such complicated
cases. But that by itself without showing that ~erious
Sarcful
Singh
(1) (1948) 53 C:°w.N. 318, 32'-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
199
prejudice would, in all likelihood, have occurred in the
1957
particular case, would not be enough to vitiate the sardul Singh·
convictions. In this case that there has in fact been
caveeshar
any such prejudice has not been shown to our satisfac- The sY~1e of
tion. Indeed the fact that accused No. 3, Jhaveri, has
Bombay
been acquitted by the unanimous verdict of the jury Jagannadhadas ''
appears to indicate that the jury has shown itself capable of observing the caution given to them and making
careful discrimination.
In this view· probably the larger question raised by
counsel on both sides as to the admissibility of the
conduct of a co-conspirator outside the period of conspiracy and especially of deceased co-conspirators like
Lala Shankarlal and Doshi and a living conspirator
like Mahajan who is not on trial before the Court, in
proof of the two main issues in such a case (viz., the
existence of the conspiracy and the participation of the
individual accused in that conspiracy) may not require
to be dealt with. But as will appear presently the
learned Judges of the High Court have held such evidence admissible and have over-ruled, on that ground
also, the contention of Mr. Chari as to the prejudice
likely to have been caused because of their view as to
its admissibility. Hence it is only fair that the question
should be considered and a conclusion arrived at.
Besides, counsel on both sides have argued the matter
very elaborately and have pressed us to expiess our
opinion thereupon. Jt is to be noticed that the learned
trial Judge and the High Court appear to have taken
differing views on this matter. The learned Judges of
the High Court after elaborate discussion have definitely held that such evidence is admissible, as shown
by their conclusion on this part of the case in the
following terms :
"In this manner, all the observations which the
learned Judge made in paragraphs 11, 73, 74, 75, 94,
101 and 388, to which Mr. Chari has objected on the
ground of inadmissibility, wpuld be relevant to show
that there was a conspiracy in this case and that Lala
Shankarlal was a party to it."
That the learned trial Judge appears to have taken
the opposite view is reasonably clear from his ruling
200
1957
...,·ardul Singh
c:aveeshar
v.
<'he State of
Bon1bay
.1g1i11nadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
(interlocutory judgment No. 6) dated August 22, 1955,
already referred to, relating to the admissibility of the
document, Ex. Z. 71, in the committal court. In that
order he sets out the arguments of both sides as follows :
"It is common ground that the action of any of
the accused person subsequent to the period of conspiracy is admissible in evidence against that particular
accused person only. Mr. Khandalawala, therefore,
argues that the actions of Lala Shankarlal, of Doshi
and of Mahajan subsequent to the period of conspiracy
are admissible in evidence to prove that they were
party to the conspiracy alleged in the case and to
prove their guilt individually along with the accused
persons .....•...... He further submits thats. 10 of the
Indian Evidence Act is permissive and not an exception
as contended by Mr. Chari .......... He says that he
does not want to lead any evidence of the statements
and actions of Lala Shankarlal against these accused
persons, but he wants them in order that he may prove
before the jury that Lala Shankarlal was also
011e of the conspirators with the accused persons
.......... Mr. Chari's submission is that no evidence
in this case could be admitted which is not admissible
against the accused persons .......... He submits that
the question whether Shankarlal (or Doshi or l\fahajan)
was guilty of the offence of conspiracy or not cannot
arise in ·this trial. Proof of conspiracy, apart from the
accused persons, is irrelevant. He submits that whatever Shankarlal did during the period of conspiracy is
binding on these accused persons and the Court has to
determine (with reference to that evidence) whether
anyone of these accused persons was a conspirator with
Shankarlal or with lv!ahajan or with Doshi. All the
evidence that could be led in a trial must be against
accused persons and no one else. He, therefore, submits that the evidence that is sought to be Jed by the
prosecution is inadmissible in evidence."
Having thus set out the arguments of both sides, the
learned trial Judge stated his conclusion as follows :
"I think that the evidence in a criminal trial that
could be led must be admissible against the accused
(1) (19f8) 53 c.w.x. 318, 321.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS _
201
persons only and, therefore, the evidence of actions
1957
and statements of another person, apart from the sardul Singh
question of it being of the agent of the aCCUSed, is not
Caveeshar
admissible. Section 10 (of the Evidence Act) as The ':s-rate of
explained by the Privy Council in Mirza Akbar v.
Bombay
The King-Emperor(1), clearly lays down that the state- Jagannadhadas J.
ments and actions of the co-conspirator would only be
evidence against the accused per,ons, provided they
are within the period of conspiracy ............ I do
not think therefore, that Lala Shankarlal or Mahajan
or Doshi are accused persons before me and, therefore, '
the subsequent conduct of these persons beyond the
period of <::onspiracy unconnected by· any authority
from the accused persons i~ not admissible."
It is necessary, therefore;' to appreciate clearly what
exactly the Privy Council. in Mirza Akbar's case( 1) has
decided and whether the learned trial Judge was right
in coming to the conclusion he did on the authority of
that decision. In the said case their Lordships of the
Privy Council elucidated the principle of admissibility
of evidence in cases of conspiracy by reference to. the
English Jeadfng case of The Queen v. Blake(2). That
was a case in which two persons, T. and B., we.re
charged for conspiracy to cause certain imported goods
to be carried away from the port of London and
delivered to the owners without payment of the full
customs duty payable thereon. T. did not appear and
defend. B. pleaded not guilty. At the trial it was
proved that T. was agent for the importer of the goods,
B. was a landing waiter at the Custom House. It was
T.'s duty to make an entry describing the quantity
etc. of goods. A copy of such entry was delivered to
B. who was to compare this copy with the goods, and
if they corresponded, to write 'correct' on T.'s entry,
whereupon T. would receive the goods on payment of
the duty according to his entry. It was proved that T.'s
entry was marked 'correct' by B. and corresponded
with B.'s copy and that payment was made according
to the quantity there described, and that the goods
were delivered to T. Evidence was then offered of an·
(1) (1940) L.R. 67 I.A. 336.
26
(2) {1844) 6 Q..B. 126; 115 E.R. 49.
202
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958J
1957
entry by T. in his day book, of the charge made by
him on the importer, showing that T. charged as for
Cavee.shar
duty paid on a larger quantity than appeared by the
v.
The State of entry and copy before mentioned. It was held that
Bo111bay
all this evidence was admissible against B. But the
Jagannadhadas J, question arose as to the admissibility of a further item
of evidence. It was proved that B. received the
proceeds of a cheque drawn by T. after the goods were
passed. The counterfoil of this cheque was offered in
evidence, on which an account was written by T.
showing, as was suggested, that the cheque was drawn
for half the aggregate proceeds of several transactions,
one of which corresponded in amount with the difference between the duty paid and the duty really due
on the above goods. It was ruled that that item was
not evidence against B. Referring to this case their
Lordships of the Privy Council stated as follows in
Mirza Akbar's case(•) :
"The English rule on this matter (i.e., as to the
admissibility of evidence relating to a charge of conspiracy) is, in general, well settled. It is a common law
rule not based on, or limited by, express statutory words.
The leading case of R. v. Blake(_') illustrates the two
aspects of it, because that authority sl1011·s both what is
admissible and what is inadmissible. What, in that
case, was held to be admissible against the conspirator
was the evidence of entries made by his fellow conspirator containe.d in various documents actually used
for carrying out the fraud. But a document not
created in the course of carrying out the transaction,
but made by one of the conspirators after the fraud
was completed, was held to be inadmissible against the
other ........ It had nothing to do with carrying the
conspiracy into effect."
Their Lordships in that case also referred with
approval to two cases of the Indian High Courts, viz.,
Emperor v. Abani Bhushan Chuckerbutty(') and
Emperor v. G. V. Vaishampayana(•). Jn the case in
Emperor v. Abani Bhushan Chuckerbutty ('), one of the
documents sought to be put in evidence is a statement
Sardul Singh
(1) (1640) I •. R. 67 I.A. 336.
(2) (18-14) 6 Q.B. J06; 115 E.R. 49.
(3) {1910) l.L.R. 38 Cal. 169.
(4) (1931) l.L.R. 55 Born. 839
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
203
1957
of one of the co-conspirators, Abani, before a Magistrate after he was arrested. In that statement he Sardlll Sinth
Caveeshor
implicated himself and a large number of persons in
v.
the conspiracy. The question that arose was how far The State
of
Bombay
it could be used as evidence of the conspiracy and of
the fact thai the others were co-conspirators. Their Jagannadhadas J.
Lordships held as follows :
"We have come to the conclusion that the statement of Abani cannot properly be treated as evidence
under_section IO of the Evidence Act. That section,
in our view, is intended to make evidence communication between different conspirators, while the
conspiracy is going on with reference to the carrying
out of the conspiracy."
lt may be added that this statement was merely
treated as a confessional statement falling within the
··scope of s. 30 of the Evidence Act and .usable only as
such against the co-accused. The case in Emperor v.
G. V. Vaishampayana(i) was also a case of conspiracy
in which an approver as co-conspirator gave evidence.
He gave evidence of statements, made to him by
another co-conspirator by name Swamirao who was
not an accused before the Court, which had reference
to the alleged attack on the Lamington Road police
station which was the object of the conspiracy. These
statements were alleged to have been made after the
return of the attacking party to the approver at his
residence. Objection was taken to the admissibility of
such statements made after the completion of the
attack as evidence under s. 10 of the Evidence Act.
This objection was upheld on the ground that such ·
statements made after the completion of the attack
could not be said to have been made "in reference to
their common intention". It was pointed out that
the word 'intention' implies that the act intended is in
the future. It is noteworthy that in this case the
statements under consideration were made by a coconspirator who was not an accused at the trial and it
was not suggested that his evidence would be admissible on the ground that such statement would be
admissible against himself to show that he was . a
(IJ (1931) I.L.R. 55. Bnm. 839.
204
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
1957
co-conspirator with the accused on trial and that it
would become relevant on that basis, an argument of
Cavee1har
v.
the
kind which appears to have found favour with the
The State of
learned
Judges of the High Court in this case, as will
Bombay
be presently seen. In Mirza Akbar's case(') itself the
lt11aMadl1adas J.
question at issue was about the admissibility on the
charge of conspiracy of a statement made by one of
the co-conspirators before a Magistrate after arrest.
That was held to be not admissible.
The point to be noticed in all these cases is that the
statements which have been ruled out as inadmissible
under section IO of the Evidence Act were not sought
to be made admissible under some other section of the
Evidence Act. It is further to be noticed that in the
leading case of The Queen v. Blake(2), the question of
admissibility was dealt with as being one under the
general law and yet the only criterion of admissibility
was that which was special to the cases of conspiracy.
There was no suggestion that such evidence could be
brought in under any other category of admissibility
of evidence. It was ruled in that case that the statement in question was totally inadmissible to prove
conspiracy. It appears, therefore, that Mirza Akbar's
case(•) is a clear authority for the position that in
criminal trials, on a charge of conspiracy evidence not
admissible under s. IO of the Evidence Act as proof of
the two issues to which it relates, viz., of the existence
of conspiracy and of the fact of any particular person
being a party to that conspiracy, is not admissible at
all. But it is necessary to appreciate clearly that what
is· sought to be admitted in such a case is, something
said, or done, or written by any one of the co-conspirators behind the backs of the others as being in law
attributable to the others and what is sought to be
proved by such evidence taken by itself is the existence
of the conspiracy as between the alleged conspirators
and the fact that a particular person was a party to
the conspiracy. It is such evidence that is inadmissible
otherwise than under s. I 0 of the Evidence Act. Quite
clearly, in the n!?.t,qial class of cases, such evidence is
admissible as agauist himself and not against others,
Sardul Si11gll
(1) (19;0) L.R. 67 I.A. 336.
(,) (1844) 6 QB. 126; 115 E.R. 49.
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
205
excepting where there is relationship of agency or
1957
representative character or joint interest. (See s. 18 sardul Singh
of the Evidence Act). In civil cases it is well settled
Caveeshar
that a principal is bound by the acts of his agent if the The siatt o}
latter has an express or implied authority from the
Bombay
former and the acts are within the scope of his Jagannadhadas J,
authority. Therefore acts of an agent are admissible
in evidence as against the principal. An analogous·
principle is recognised in criminal matters in so far as
it can be brought in under s. 10 of the Evidence Act.
It is recognised on well established authority that the
principle underlying the reception of evidence under
s. 10 ·of the Evidence Act of the statements, acts and
writings of one co-conspirator as against the other is.
on the theory of agency. This is recognised in Emperor
v. Shafi Aluned(1) and also in Emperor v. G. V. Vaishampayana(2), the case already mentioned above and
referred to with approval by the Privy Council in
A1irza Akbar's case(3). In Roscoe's Criminal Evidence
(16th Edition), at p. 482 bottom, when dealing with
the evidence relating to criminal conspiracy, it is.
stated as follows :
"An overt act committed by any one of the conspirators is sufficient, on the general principles of agency,
to make it the act of all."
Now both the English rule as recognised in The
Queen v. Blake(4) as well as the rule in s. 10 of the
Evidence. Act, confine that principle of agency in,
criminal matters to the acts of the co-conspirator
within the period during which it can be said that the
acts were "in reference to their common intention"
that is to say, as held by the Pr.ivy Council in Mirza.
Akbar's case(3) "things said, done or written, while
the conspiracy was on foot" and "in carrying out the
conspiracy." The Privy Council has explained the
basic principle in the following terms :
"Where the evidence is admissible it is, in their
Lordships' judgment, on the principle that the thing
done, written or spoken, was something done in
(1) (1'.)05) 31 Born. L.R. 5!5, 519.
(2) (19:p)I.L.R. 55Bom.839.
(3) (1940) L.R. 67 I.A. 336.
(+) (1844)6Q.B.12G; 115E.R.49.
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19S7
[1958]
carrying out the conspiracy and was receivable as a
step· in the proof of the conspiracy."
It appears, therefore, that the learned trial Judge
was right in his view that the admissibility of evidem:e
Bombay
of the klnd which is now under consideration is ruled
Jagannadhadas J, out on the authority of Mirza Akbar's case('). The
argument that such evidence even ifit is of the conduct
of a deceased conspirator, is admissible under s. 8 of
the Evidence Act as being evidence of conduct on a
relevant issue, would appear to be untenable on the
very terms of s. 8, apart from the authority of Mirza
Akbar's case('). Seeton 8 in terms says as follows :
"The conduct of any person, an offence against
whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such
conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue
or relevant fact."
This appears clearly to rule out the conduct of Lala
Shankarlal, Doshi, and Mahajan behind the backs of
others, as inadmissible. Such conduct would be
admissible only to the extent that it is permissible
under s. 10 of the Evidence Act, if it is the conduct of a
co-conspirator whether he is alive or dead and whether
on trial before the court or not. Mr. Khandalawala
in his arguments against this view has. sugge.sted some
hypothetical cases to show the difficulties that may
arise on such a view. But a close consideration of
these suggested hypoth!!tical cases does not show that
they raise any serious difficulties. It is unnecessary to
notice them at any length.
The learned Judges of the High Court (in reliance
on certain English decisions which, with respect, do not
appear to have any direct bearing on the question: at
issue) were of the opinion that since a person's conduct
is admissible against himself without the limitations of
s. I 0 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of Lala
Shankarlal would be admissible to show that there
was a conspiracy and that he was a conspirator
in it. It appears, with great respect, that this
reasoning is fallacious. The admission of such
evidence, in proof of conspiracy or of the fact
that he was a co-conspirator, is, in its essence,
'Sardul Si11gh
Cavushar
v.
The State of
(1) (1940) L.R. 67 I.A. 336.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
207
1957
admission not as against himself but as against the
others who are on trial. To the extent that such an Sardul Singh
issue, i.e., of there being a conspiracy and of his being Caveeshar
v.
a co-conspirator, is relevant at the trial,. it must be The State of
Bombay
proved only by evidence under s. 10 of the Evidence
Act, which is an exceptional section limited in its JagannadhadaJ J•
.application to conspiracies to commit an offence or to
.commit an actionable wrong. The learned Judges
have also failed to notice that the evidence of conduct
.admissible under s. 8 of the Evidence Act is of conduct
.of a person who is a party to the action. It is thus
reasonably clear that evidence of acts, statements or
writings of a co-conspirator either under trial or not on
trial but outside the period of conspiracy, would not
be admissible in proof of the specific issue of the existence of the conspiracy. It is necessary to add that
my learned brothers prefer to reserve their opinion on
this legal question on the ground that it does not call
for decision in this case.
In any case and as already explained above, in the
earlier portion of this judgment, it may happen with
reference to the facts of a particular case, that
evidence would be admissible of various facts outside
the period of conspiracy, if they are relevant on any
substantial. issue in the case. as for instance (in this
case) the bogus character of the loans and the criminal
intention of each individual accused. In respect of such
issues; the statement, act and writing of an individual
co-conspirator ·outside the period of conpiracy may
be nothing more than a link in the chain of evidence
relating to such matters or prefatory or explanato_ry
matter within reasonable limits. It would then be
admissible in that context but not as affecting the
other co-conspirators by its being treated as their act
or statement. on the theory of agency (though behind
their back). It has also been seen above that in the
present case evidence, if any, of the acts, statements
and writings of Lala Shankarlal and other co-conspi-
rators was admitted by the learned trial Judge only
on that footing. Therefore the contention of Mr. Chari
for the appellants that a good deal of inadmissible
evidence has been let in, cannot be sustained.
M2SC61-4
208
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1951
[1958}
The next point that is urged is that a number of
documents put in evidence which are said to be in the
handwriting of one or other of the accused were sent
••
to a handwriting expert for his opinion and that the
The State of
Bombay
expert was not called as a witness on the prosecution
Jagannadhadas J. side, nor was his report exhibited, but the jury was
asked to compare the handwritings in the disputed
documents with the admitted handwritings and to
form their own conclusions. It is urged that this was
not fair and that the prosecution was bound to
examine the handwriting expert and exhibit his
report. It is well settled, however, that the Court
cannot normally compel the prosecution to examine a
witness which it does not chose to and that the duty
of a fair prosecutor extends only to examine such of
the witnesses who are necessary for the purpose of
unfolding the prosecution story in its essentials. [See
Habeeb Mohamed v. The State of Hyderabad (')].
Mr. Khandalawala appearing for the prosecution states
that the examination of the handwriting expert was
not in any sense necessary in this case for unfolding
the prosecution case and we are inclined to agree with
him. Even if a different view is to be taken as to the
duty of the prosecution, to examine such a witness,
all that can be said normally in such a case is that the
defence is entitled to comment upon it and to
ask the jury to draw an
adverse inference in
respect of that portion of the case to which
the evidence of the handwriting expert relates. Mr.
Khandalawala for the prosecution points out that in
fact this has been done by Mr. Chari when addressing
the jury for the defence. He states also that he himself
in his address told the jury that it was open to them
to do so. Mr. Chari's grievance however is that the
Court has not in terms, directed the jury to this effect
in its charge to the jury. That no doubt appears to
be so. But in a case like this dealing with so many
details, we see no reason to think that this omission of
the learned trial Judge, was likely in this case, to have
caused any serious prejudice in the circumstances
above stated.
Sardul Singh
Canvttshar
(1) (1954) S.C.R. 475, 489, 490.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
209
1957
There is next a similar point sought to be made out
in respect of the non-examination of three persons, Sardul Singh
viz., Chandulal Ratanchand Shah, Himatlal F. Parikh, Caveeshar
v.
and Himatlal Harilal Shah. It is pointed out that The Slate o;
Bombay
shares were distributed to these three persons also
along with the distribution of shares to the various /agannadhadas J
conspirators. It is suggested that if they were
examined as witnesses they would have been able to
show the circumstances in which the distribution of the
shares had been made and this would have enabled
the accused to show that such distribution was innocent and not by way of dishonest gain. The same
considerations as with reference to the non-examination of the handwriting expert apply also to the nonexamination of these three persons. It has also been
pointed out to us that these transfers of shares to these
three persons took place before the amendment of
s. 6A of the Insurance Act, 1938 (IV of 1938), and
that consequently their non-examinatioo would not
have resulted in any serious prejudice. However that
may be, we are unable to find any adequate reason. to
think that the trial is in any way vitiated by the nonexamination of these witnesses or of the handwriting
expert.
The next argument advanced by Mr. Chari for the
appellants is that the prosecution was enabled to ask
the jury to convict the accused on a consideration
of prosecution evidence tending to prove alternative
sets of facts in relation to one of the important
questions in the case and that this is not permissible in
law. This argument has a bearing both on the general
case against all the accused and also on the case against
appellant Caveeshar. It has reference to the following portion of the prosecution case. It is to be recalled
that the original loan of Rs. 25 lakhs and odd from the
funds of the Jupiter to Caveeshar on the alleged security
of his supposed properties in Delhi was, according to the
prosecution case, · sought to be supported by the
conspirators by certain appearances, viz., an application for such a loan, a valuation statement of the
alleged properties and other necessary papers and alsoby certain resolutions Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the
27
210
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
directorate of the Jupiter at its meeting dated January
Sardal Singh 11, 1949, sanctioning such loan on the basis of such
Cavtt.Jhar
papers. The prosecution case appears to be that as a
v.
TM] State of fact these papers were non-existent and the resoluBomba;,
tions Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 were not in fact passed, on
Jagannadhadas J. the date when, according to the peresent appearances
in the minutes book, the matter was taken up for
consideration by the Board of directors at its meeting
of January 11, 1949. For this purpose they rely
amongst other things on the evidence of one
Subramaniam, the secretary of the directorate, whose
duty generally was to attend all meetings and to keep
a note of the minutes of the business done at each
meeting. The prosecution evidence appears also to be
that the necessary papers and resolutions were brought
into existence on a later date and ante-dated and
interpolated. With reference to this case of the prosecution the learned trial Judge in para. 545 of his
charge to the jury stated as follows:
"The question whether the resolutions Nos. 5, 6, 7
and 8 were passed or not (on January 11, 1949) is an
important question to consider so far as the criminal
intention alleged on the part of the accused Nos. 1, 2, 3
and 4 are concerned. In this case wh~t you have to
consider is whether you are prepared to believe the
evidence of Subramaniam or not that no such resolutions were passed at the said meeting. If you
disbelieve his evidence on this point, then consider
whether apart from his evidence, there is sufficient
evidence on record to lead you to the conclusion that
no such resolutions were passed. If you come to the
conclusion that there is no other convincing evidence
to show that the resolutions were not passed, then you
will come to the conclusion that they were passed in
the said meeting as it was in the minutes. In that
case the resolutions having been passed, you have to
consider whether the accused bona fide believed that
they were authorised to deal with the funds of the
company and pay the amount of Tropical Insurance
Co. on behalf of Caveeshar."
We do not see anything in this portion of the charge to
the jury to justify the contention that the prosecution
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
211
1957
was permitted to rely on alternative sets of facts.
It was certainly open to the prosecution to rely in a Sardul Singh
matter of this kind, both on direct evidence and on Caveeslrar
v.
circumstantial evidence and to maintain that even if Tire State of
Bombay
the direct evidence of Subramaniam is not acceptable,
the circumstantial evidence is enough for the proof of Jagannadliadas J.
its version. The alternatives· which the learned trial
Judge in his charge to the jury as extracted above
referred to were, in the first instance, alternatives which
arose on the reliance of the prosecution both on the
direct and on the circumstantial evicence, and then the
alternatives which arose for consideration in favour of
the accused if both the direct and cirsumstantial evidence
of the prosecution in this behalf are not acceptable.
The alternatives presented for the prosecution are not
in any sense the presentation of any inconsistent cases.
Doubtless the prosecution cannot be permitted to lead
evidence relating to inconsistent cases. B.ut so far as
we have been able to apprehend that is not what has
been done in this case. We are, there(ore, unable to
see any substance in this contention. It may be
noticed in this context ihat none of the documents
connected with this Caveeshar transaction are now
available. Indeed that was the position also even by
the time when the auditors wanted to see those documents in the year 1950 the explanation of the directors
at the time being that since that loan to Caveeshar was
discharged by him by complete payment all the relevant documents had been returned to him. Of course,
the case of Caveeshar himself is that he was not a
party to the alleged loan and that he was not aware of
any such documents and that the manipulations, if
any, were behind his back.
Mr. Chari next complains about what he says is a
serious mis-direction to the jury inasmuch as the
learned Judge asked the jury to ignore the fact that by
.the time the complaint was filed in 1951, the money
allegedly taken out of the Jupiter by means of the two
impugned transactions of January 20, 1949, had been
put back in cash and that the auditors themselves
were ultimately satisfted about it and that the sharehol"1ers at their general meeting in 1950 also accepted
212
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
Lala Shankarlal's explanation in respect thereof. But
we do not think that, in view of the evidence given
caveeshar
for the prosecution in the case to the effect that this
The s;~,. of
situation was hurriedly brought about in the month
Bombay
of Gctober, 1950, by utilising the securities of the
Jagann~as J. Jupiter itself, for purchasing the controlling block of
shares of the Empire of India and by getting money
otit of the Empire of India, it would have been fair to
the prosecution to direct the jury to take the apparent
return back of the moneys of the Jupiter shown as
given on the various investments, as a true indication
of the alleged misappropriation having been proved to
be merely an unwarranted suspicion. In the circumstances, the learned Judge appears to have been right
in directing the jury to ignore that portion of the case
either for or against the accused.
The next argument which requires notice is about
what are said to be certain irrational features of the
prosecution case. It would appear that in the arguments addressed by the defence counsel to the jury in
the trial court a number of circumstances relating to
the various alleged manipulations have been pointed
out which, on the assumption that the accused were
parties to the conspiracy as charged, could only be
characterised as irrational conduct of the various
accused concerned and which circumstances, it was
urged, must therefore be taken to be prima facie in
their favour as supporting their defence, viz., that they
had no knowledge of the criminality of the transactions which might have actuated the mind of Lala
Shankarlal, but that so far as they were concerned they
acted in perfect good faith. The complaint of Mr. Chari
for the defence, both in the High Court and here is that
the learned trial Judge has not adequately dealt with
them in his charge to the jury and that the appellants
have been prejudiced thereby. The learned trial Judge
has dealt with this aspect of the case in para 556 of his
charge to the jury and the learned Judges of the High
Court have somewhat more elaborately dealt with this
at pp. 159 to 162 of the typed paper-book containing
the judgment of the High court. Mr. Khandalawala
appearing for the prosecution points out to us that these
1957
sardul Singh
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
213
alleged irrational features have been dealt with by the
1957
learned trial judge in his charge to the jury then and sarJ;lsingh
there with reference to each particular item of evidence caveeshar
when it had to be referred to in the context of the general The ~tate of
narrative or the narrative as against each individual
Bombay
accused. All that can be said is that the learned trial Jagannadltadas J.
Judge has not once again repeated the same when
·
drawing the attention of the jury to this specific argument of Mr. Chari, who appears to have stressed them
in a general sweep by clubbing these together as being
thirty irrational features. We agree with the High
Court that there is no reason to think that the somewhat summary way in which the learned trial Judge
dealt with this in para 556 of his charge to the jury
can be taken exception to in the circumstances of the
case as being any material non-direction.
A special argument has been advanced on behalf of
the appellant Caveeshar that he was not a director of
the jtipiter and was not present at any of the meetings
of the conspirators as directors of the Jupiter and that
the evidence against him was more or- less on the same
footing as that against Jhaveri, actused 3, who has
been acquitted, at least in so far as it relates to the
period of conspiracy and that his case has been affected
·by the prejudice which may have been engendered in
the minds of the jury by the evidence relating to the
acts of Lala Shankarlal beyond the period of conspiracy.
On behalf of the prosecution we have been shown by
Mr. Khandalawala enough admissible evidence against
him which, if the jury choose to accept, could reasonably
be the basis for conviction.
Having given our best consideration to all the arguments addressed on both the sides, we have come to
the conclusion that there is no sufficient reason for
interference in special leave with the convictions, based
on the acceptance by the trial Judge of the verdict of
the jury. All the appeals are accordingly dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
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