THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADHYA PRADESH AND BHOPAL versus SODRA DEVI
Supreme Court of India | Decided 17 May 1957 | [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1 | 1957 INSC 50
Key facts
- Decided
- 17 May 1957
- Bench
- NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*, S.K. DAS, J.L. KAPUR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 322/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 50
Text of the judgment
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX;
MADHYA PRADESH AND BHOPAL
v.
SODRA DEVI
(with connected appeal)
(BHAGWATI, S. K. DAS and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)
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Income-tax-Computation of total lncome-'individual', Meaning of-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (X of 1922), as amended by the
Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1937 (IV of 1937), s. 16(3).
The common question of Jaw for determination in these two
appeals was whether the word 'individual' in s. 16(3) of the
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended by Act IV of 1937,
includes a female and whether the income of minor sons from a
partnership, to the benefits of which they were admitted, was
liable to be included in computing the total income of the mother
who was a member of the partnership.
Held, (Per Bhagwati and Kapur JJ., S. K. Das J. dissenting}
that the question must be answered in the negative.
The word 'individual' oc«urring in s. 16(3) of the Indian
Income-tax Act, as amended by Act IV of 1937, means only a male
and does not include a female.
Shrimati Chanda Devi v. The Commissioner of Income-tax,
(1950) 18 J.T.R. 1944 and Musta Quima Begum, In re, 1(953) 23
I.T.R. 345, disapproved.
.
Where the Legislature uses ambiguous language in enacting
a statute, as. it has undoubtedly done in the instant case, recourse
must necessarily be had, for a clarification of such ambiguity, to
the pre-existing state of the Jaw in order to see what defect or
mischief therein was being sought to be remedied, the remedy that
was prescribed by the statute and the reason for it.
Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar,
(1955) 2 S.C.R. 603, Thomson v. Lord C/anmorris, (1900) I Cb. D.
718 and Eastman Photographic Materials Company v. Comptroller
General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, (1898) A.C. 571,
relied on.
A reference to the Income-Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, and the
Statement of objects and reasons that led to the passing of the
Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act -IV of 1937 makes it clear
beyond doubt that the mischief the Legislature was seeking to
remedy was one that resulted from a husband entering into a
1957
May 17
2
1957
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
MadhFtJ Pardesh
and Bhopal
v.
Sodra Devi
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
nominal partnership with his wife or a father admitting his minor
children to the benefits of a partnership, and the possibility of a
·
mother doing so was not even thought of.
Per S. K. Das J.-There is no ambiguity in s. 16(3) of the
Indian Income-Tax Act, as amended by Act JV of 1937, and, read
in the context of the other provisions of the Act and construed as
a whole, it clearly indicates that the Legislature used the word
'individual' in that sub-section in its ordinary connotation to
mean both a male and a fema1e person.
Even if, on the assumption that there is ambiguity in the
phraseology used in the sub-section, reference is made to the
Income-Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, and the Statement of objects
and reasons of the Amending Act IV of 1937 for the limited
purpose for which it is permissible to do so, they disclose nothing
concerning the policy adopted by the Legislature or the object
the statute was intended to accomplish that makes any other
meaning inevitable. The recommendations made by the Report
were not fully accepted by the Legislature and it cannot be a
reliable guide and the use of the word 'parent' in the Statement
clearly shows that the mischief envisaged was not confined to the
father alone.
Bhagwati J.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 322 and 25 of 1955.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 13,
1954, of the Nagpur High Court in Miscellaneous Civil
Case No. 71 of 1956 and appeal from the judgment
and order dated August 26, 1952, of the Punjab High
Court in Civil Reference No. 11 of 1952.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G. N.
Joshi and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant in C.A. No.
322 of 1955 and respondent in C.A. No. 25 of 1955.
R. J. Kolah, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and
Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent in C.A. No. 322
of 1955.
G. S. Pathak and M. L. Kapur, for the appellant in
C.A. No. 25 of 1955.
1957. May 17.
The Judgment of Bhagwati and
J. L. Kapur JJ. was delivered by Bhagwati J. S. K.
Das J. derlivered a separate judgment.
BHAGWATI J.-These two appeals with certificates
under Section 66A(2) of the Indian Income-Tax Act
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) raise a common
question of law and will be governed by this common
judgment.
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The facts leading up to these appeals may be shortly
1957
Stated as under.
The Commissioner
Prior to October 18, 1944, one Rai Bahadur Narsing- of Income-1ax,
das Daga (since deceased), his wife Shrimati Sodradevi M"'/!:,~08t,';/js"
(the assessee), and his three major and three minor sons
v.
constituted a joint and undivided Hindu family. There Sodra Devi
wa:s a severance of joint status between the erstwhile Bhagwati !·
members of the said joint family on October 18, 1944,
and the joint family properties were accordingly
partitioned. On such partition, the business of the
Spinning and Weaving Mills and agency shop at
Hinganghat fell to the share of the assessee and her
three major and three minor sons. A partnership was
entered into between the assessee and her three major
sons for the purpose of carrying on the business of the
Spinning and Weaving Mills and the agency firm at
Hinganghat. The three minor sons of the assessee
were admitted to the benefits of the partnership. The
genuineness of the partnership was not disputed. The
only question which arose for the consideration of the
Tribunal was whether the income falling to the share
of the three minor sons was liable to be included in the
total income of the assessee. On a construction of
s. 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Act, the Tribunal held that
the income falling to the shares of the three minor
son:> of the assessee was liable to be included in her
total income. The assessee thereupon applied to the
Tribunal for a reference to the High Court of Judicature
at Nagpur of the question of law arising out of its
order under s. 66(1) of the Act and the Tribunal
submitted a statement of case referring the following
question of law for the determination of the High
Court :
"Whether en a true construction of the provisions
of section 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, the income of the three minor sons of the assessee
is liable to be included in her total income."
The High Court heard the reference and came to the
conclusion that it was not the intention of the Legislature to include in the income of the mother, the
income of her minor children arising from the benefit
of partnership of a firm in which the mother is a
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
s
partner and accordingly answered the referred question in the negative. The High Court, however.
;1,iI,~:;·r;;;:;h grhanAted the neccessary. ~ertificafte under s. 66A(2)h of
and Bhopol
t e ct to the omm1ss1oner o Income-tax, Mad ya
s0 drv,D , Pradesh and Bhopal, and hence Civil Appeal No. 322
a el'/
of 1955 before us.
RhngwaUJ,
One lshwardas Sahni who died on November 7.
1946, "was a partner in the firm of Messrs. Ishwardas
Sahni & Bros. The firm's accounting year ended on
March 31, 1947. The said Ishwardas Sahni left him
surviving his widow Damayanti (the assessee) and two
minor sons. The ,assessee became a partner in the
said firm which also admitted her two minor sons to
the benefits of the partnership. The Income-tax
authorities included the minor sons' shares in the
reconstituted firm's profits in computing the income of
the asses~ee on the grou1;d that "individual" in
s. 16(3)(a )(ii) of the Act meant an individual person
of either sex. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
held that the word "individual" must be taken as
referring only to a male assessec wherever that
occurred in s. 16(3) and directed the deletion from
the asscssce's income of the shares of her minor sons in
the rrofits of the firm. At the instance of the Commisswner of Income-tax, Delhi, the Tribunal referred
to the High Court of Punjab at Simla the question of
Jaw arising out of its order under s. 66(1) of the Act
The referred
together with a statement of case.
question was :"Whether the word "individual" in Section 16(3)
(a)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, includes also a
female and whether the shares of the two minor sons
of Shrimati Damayanti Sahni in the profits of the
reconstituted firm of Messrs. Ishwardas Shani and
Brothers should be included in the income of Shrirnati
Damayanti Sahni in assessing her income, profits and
gains."
The High Court heard the reference and following
the decision given by the High Court of Allahabad in
Shrimati Chanda Devi v. The Commissioner of Incometax('), answered the referred question in the aflirmati\'e.
19 7
'f1ie co,,;mi.rsionc"
(1) [1~;1 0} 18 l.T.R. !'144·
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1957
The assessee obtained the requisite certificate under
s. 66(A) of the Act from the High Court and that is The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
how Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1955 is before us.
Madhya Pradesh
The common question of law which · we have to and Bhopal
determine in these appeals is whether the word Sodra·V. Devi
"individual" in s. 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Act includes also
a female and the income of the minor sons derived Bhagwati J.
from a partnership to the benefits of which they have
been admitted is hable to be included in the income of
the mother who is a member of that partnership.
Section 16(3) of the Act provides :
"In computing the total income of any individual
for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included(a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of
such individual as arises directly or indirectly:
(i) from the membership of the wife in a firm
of which her husband is a partner;
(ii) from the admission of the minor to the
benefits of the partnership in a firm of which such
individual is a partner;
(iii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly
to the wife by the husband otherwise than for adequate
consideration or in connection with an agreement to
live apart; or
(iv) from assets transferred directly or indirectly
to the minor child, not being a married daughter, by
such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration ; and
(b) so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arises from assets · transferred
otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by such individual for the benefit of
his wife or a minor child or both."
Section 3·of the Act may also be referred to in this
context and it rims as follows :
Section 3. Charge of Income Tax :
"Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax
shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax
at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that
year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions
of this Act in respect of the total income of the pre·
vious year of every individual, Hindu undivided
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958}
family, company and local authority, and of every firm
and other association of persons or the partners of the
ofj,•come-tax,h firm or the members of the association individually."
M"a,,':/'0 Bf;a;:,•,s The same description of the assessee is also to be
v. . found in s. 4A, which deals with residence in the taxSodra Dm
able territories, s. 48 dealing with refund and s. 58
Bhacwa11 J.
dealing with the charge of super-tax.
The word assessee is wide enough to cover not only
an "individual" but also a Hindu undivided family,
company and local authority and every firm and other
association of persons or the partners of the firm or
the members of the association individually. Whereas
the word "individual" is narrower in its connotatiOn
being one of the units for the purposes of taxation
than the word "assessee", the word "individual"
has not been defined in the Act and there is authority
for the proposition that the word "individual" does
not mean only a human being but is wide enough to
include a group of persons forming a unit. It has been
held that the word "individual" includes a Corporation created by a statute, e.g., a University or a Bar
Council, or the trustees of a baronetcy trust incorporated by a Baronetcy Act. It would also include a
minor or a person of unsound mind. If this is the
connotation of the word "individual" it follows that
when s. 16(3) talks of an "individual" it is only in a
restricted sense that the word has been used. The
section only talks of "individual" capable of having
a wife or minor child or both. It therefore necessarily
excludes from its purview a group of persons forming
a unit or a corporation created by a statute and is
confined only to human beings who in the context
would be comprised within that category.
The Revenue urges before us that the word "individual" as used qua human beings is capable of including within its connotation a male as well as a
female of the species and having regard to the context
in which the word has been used in s. 16(3), it should
be construed as meaning a male of the species when
used in juxtaposition with "a wife" and as meaning
both a male and a female when used in juxtaposition
with "minor child" so that when s. 16(3) talks of
1957
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"such individual" in sub-els. (ii) and (iv) of cl. (a)
1957
thereof it refers to both a male and a female of the The Commissio11e1
species so as to include within its compass not only a t[ j,,11co~e-'d,xl
father of the minor child but also a mother.
~n'Jah:;ar'
The assessees, on the other hand contend that ·the s0 cJ. v. D .
word "individual" used in s. 16(3) is not used in its
ra
en
generic sense but is used in a restricted and narrower Bhagwati J.
sense as connoting only human being and if it is thus
restricted there is ample justification for restricting it
still further to the male of the species when regarded
in the context of s. 16(3). Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of cl.
(a) arc specific cases where the income of a wife or a
minor child of "such individual" arising directly or
indirectly from the several sources therein indicated is
to be included in computing the total income of the
"individual" for the purpose-of assessment and the
word could not have been used in a different sense for
the purposes of sub-cls.(i) and (iii) and sub-els. (ii) and
(iv) of cl. (a). The word "such individual" as used
in sub-cl. (a) can only have been used in one sense and
one sense only ;i_nd if that is the sense in which it
could have been used "such individual" should be
one who is capable of having a wife or minor child or
both and that individual can only be a male of the
~pecies and not a female.
,
The question for our determination is a very narrow
one and it turns on the constuction of s. 16(3) of the
Act. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh plunged
headlong into a discussion of the reasons which motivated the Legislature into enacting s. 16(3) by Act IV
of 1937, and took into consideration the recommendations made in the Income Tax Enquiry Report
1936 and also the statement of objects and reasons for
the enactment of the same, without considering in the
first instance whether there was any ambiguity in the
word "individual" as used therein. It is clear that unless
there is any such ambiguity it would not be open to
the court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature
should be primarily gathered from the words which
are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
construed in the light of surrounding circumstances
constitutional .principle and practice [Per Lord
X{.JJ.~C:"J;,:/,%;, AIshbhourne in Nairnhv.,. u.nive!siy of St . .:J.ndrewfsL(')]d.
and Bhopal
n t e 1atter event t e 1 o11owmg observabons o or
v.
Lindley
M. R. in Thomson v. Lord Clanmorris (')
SOdra Devi
would be apposite :
BhagwatiJ.
"In construing any statutory enactment, regard
must be had not only to the words used, but to tbe
history pf the Act and the reasons which led to its
being passed. You must look at the mischief which
had to be cured as well as at the cure provided" (See
also the observations of Goddard C. J. in R. v. Paddington and St. Marylel>one Rent Tribunal (').
The position in law has been thus enunciated in the
judgment of Das, Actg. C. J. (as he then was) in the
Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of
Bihar (4) :
"It is a sound rule of construction of a statute
firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when
Heydon's Case (') was decided that" ........ for the sure and true interpretation of
all statutes in general (be they ·penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things
are to be discerned and considered :
!st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
·2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which
the common law did not provide.
3rd. W'hat remedy the Parliament hath resolved
and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth., and
4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then
the office of all judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy,
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act
pro bono publico."
!957
rhe C;;;;;;;;issioner and
(1) (1909) A.O. 147.
(3) (1949) 65 T.L.R. 200, 203.
(2) (1900) I Ch. D. 718, 725
(4) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 6o3, 632.
(5) (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 E.R 637.
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In Jn re Mayfair Property Company ( 1) Lindley M. R.
1957
in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was TheCommissio11er
when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case". In Eastman °1 Income-tax,
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Pradesh
Photographic
M aterzals
Company v. Comptro /''ier Genera/ Madhya
and Bhopal
of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (2) Earl of s0 d v.D .
Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows :
ra el'l
"My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the Bhagwati J.
statute now in question, it is not only legitimate but
highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and
to the ascertained evils to, which the former Act and
given· rise, and to the later Act which provided the
remedy. These three things being compared, I cannot
doubt the eonclusion."
The High Court of Punjab based -its conclusion
primarily on the use of the word "or" between the
word "wife" and the words "minor child" in s. 16(3)(a)
of the Act and it was of opinion that these words were
used disjuntively and the "individual" referred .to in
s. 16(3)(a) of the Act may have a wife and minor child
or may not have a wife but have a "minor child1'. If
the individual assessed to income tax is a female that
individual will have no wife but she may have a minor
child and therefore s. 16(3)(a) of the Act does not
imply that the individual must necessarily be a male.
The argument based on the disjunctive user of the
word "wife" and the words "minor child" is capable of
being summarily disposed of. Even if the words "such
individual" in s. 16(3)(a) of the Act meant only a male
of the species the words "wife" and the words "minor
child" could only have been used with the word "or" in
between. A male of the species may not necessarily
have both a wife and a minor child. He may have a
wife but no "minor child". He may have a minor
child but may have no wife at the relevant period. If
therefore provision had to be made for the inclusion of
the income of a wife or minor child or both in the
total income of a male of the species the word "or" was
absolutely necessary to be interposed between the word
"wife" and the words "minor child". To construe the
word "or" as disjunctive between the word "wife" and
(1) L.R.. (1898) 2 Ch. 28, 35
(2) (1898) A.C. 571, 576
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the words "minor child" does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that the words "such individual" were
~[ //co~,,./:t;n used for both a male and a female of the species and
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were necessarily inconsistent with the user of those
0 ,,'l/'Bho',,,/
v.
words for the male of the species if the context otherSodra De1·i
wise lead to that conclusion. The reasoning adopted
Bhag.-a1iJ.
by the learned Judges of the High Court of Punjab
therefore does not clinch the matter.
We have therefore got to examine whether the use
of the word "individual" in s. 16(3)(a) of the Act is in
any manner ambiguous. The opening words of s. 16(3)
talk of "any individual" whose total income has got to
be computed for the purpose of assessment and the
words "such individual" used in section 16(3)(a) have
reference only to that individual.
That individual
must be an assessee and it is in the computation of his
total income for the purpose of assessment that the
income of the persons mentioned in els. (a) and (b) have
got to be included. Sub-clause (a) refers to two distinct
sets of persons bearing a relationship with "such
individual", the assessee. One is a wife and the other
is a minor child. The case of the wife is dealt with in
sub-els. (i) and (iii) and the case of a minor child is
dealt in sub-els. (ii) and (iv). Sub-clauses (i) and (iii)
use the word "her husband" or "the husband" in place
of the words "such individual" with reference to the
income derived by the wife in the circumstances
therein mentioned, though, it may. be observed that
the user of the words "such individual" would not have
made the slightest difference to the position. Subclauses (ii) and (iv) which deal with a "minor child"'
use the words "such individual" in relation to the
minor child whose income under the circumstances
therein mentioned has to be included in computing the
total income of "such individual" for the purpose of
assessment. Whereas the words used in sub-els. (i)
and (iii) are specific and refer only to "her husband'"
and "the husband" as "such individual", the words
used in sub-els. (ii) and (iv) leave it indefinite as to
which is meant by the words "such individual"
whether a male and/or a female of the species. If the
words used in all these four sub-clauses were to be
1957
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1957
harmoniously read and the two cases which are
mentioned in sub-els. (i) and (iii) are not to be read The Commissioi:er
of !~come-tax.
differently from the cases mentioned in sub~els. (ii) !vfadi1ya
Pradesh
and (iv) the only way in which the words "such and Bhopal
individual" as used in sub-els. (ii) and (iv) could be Sodrav. Dei·i
understood would be to read them as confined to a
male of the species and not including the female. If B/zagwati J.
these words "such individual" as used in sub-els. (ii)
and (iv) are thus read restricted to a male of the
species, all these sub-clauses would have reference
only to the male of the species irrespective of the fact
that the words "her husband" and "the husband" have
been used in sub-els. (i) and (iii) instead of the wqrds
"such individual". If the words "such individual" had
been used in sub:..cls. (i) and (iii) as they have been
used in sub-els. (ii) and (iv) the position would have
been just the same because in that event also we would
have had to determine whether there was any justification for reading the words "such individual" used with
reference to sub-els. (i) and (iii) in any different sense
from the same words "such individual" as used in subcls. (ii) and (iv). The crux of the question, therefore,
is whether the words "such individual" used in the
opening part of s. 16(3)(a) are used to mean a male of
the species when they are read in juxtaposition with
the words "a wife" and are used to mean both a male
as well as female of the species, as the case may be,
when used in juxtaposition with the words "minor
child".
If that was the intention of the Legislature there
was nothing to prevent it from dividing cl. (a) into two
sut>-clauses whether they were numbered (a) and (ai)
or (a) and (b) respectively. The Legislature could as
well have enacted the provisions in the manner
following :
(a) : so much of the income of a wife of such
individual as arises directly or indirectly;
(i) from the membership of the wife in a firm
of which her husband (or such individual) is a partner;
or
(ii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly
to the wife by the husband (or such individual)
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19s1
otherwise than for adequate consideration
The c;;;;;;.isstoner connection with an agreement to live part;
of Income-tax,h
(ai) or (b) : so much of the income of a
[1958)
or in
minor
Madhya/'°"" child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly
Sodra Devi
Bhagwati 1 .
(i) from the admission of the minor to the
benefits of the partnership in a firm of which such
individual is a partner; or
(ii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly
to, the minor child, not being a married daughter by such
individual otherwise than for adequate consideration.
If these provisions had been enacted in the manner
aforesaid it would have been possible to urge, as has
been urged before us by the Revenue, that cl. (a)
referred only to a male of the species who only could
have a wife and cl. (ai) or (b) referred to male and/or
a female of the species.
The Legislature however chose to adopt a peculiar
mode of enactment either for the purpose of economy
of words or structural beauty and mixed up both these
sets of provisions into the enactment of cl. (a) of s.16(3)
of the Act as it stands at present. It rolled in both
these sets of cases and used the words "a wife" or
"minor child" of "such individual" raising thus the
question of construction which has got to be determined
by us. "Such individual" as is talked of in s. 16(3Xa)
may have a wife, may have a minor child or may have
both a wife and a minor child. When "such individual"
is thought of in connection with a wife, it can only be
a male of the species, but when "such individual" is
thought of in connection, with a minor child it can be
both a male as well as a female of the species, though,
of course, when "such individual" is thought of in
connection with "both" then again it would have to
be a male of the species and certainly not a female.
Such an interpretation would lead to the interpretation
of the same words "such individual" as meaning two
different things in two different contexts. They would
mean one thing when used in relation to "a wife" and
would mean another thing when used in relation to a
"minor child". They would be capable of being
understood in a narrower sense when used in connection with a "wife" and would be capable of being
.
·•
S.C.R.
4
..
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
13
19S7
understood in a wider sense when used in connection
with a "minor child". One may as well question the TheCommission .. -01 Income-tax,
elegance or the property of such user of the words Madhya
Pradesh.
"such individual" where the words "as the case may and Bhopal
be" are necessarily to be imported in order to under- Sodra
.v.
De•·i
stand the true import of these words, when again they
are used not in different parts of the same section but Bhagwati 1.
at one place only.
If one turns to s. I 6(3)(b) the 1words used therein
are "transferred ...... by "such individual'" for the
benefit of his wife or a minor child or both." There is
the indefinite article "a" used before the words "minor
child". If that indefinite article "a" had not been
used, the expression would have run "for the benefit of
his wife or minor child or both" thus leaving no doubt
at all that in cl. (b) at least the words "such individual"
meant only a male of the species. It is urged however
that the use of the indefinite article "a" shows that
the words "his wife" and "minor child" and "both"
have been used disjunctively and should be read in
the same manner as in s.16(3)(a) of the Act. The words
"his wife" would appropriately go with a male of the
species but the words "a minor child" would appropriately go with a male as well as a female of the
species, though the word "both" could only be appropriate in relation to a male of the species and not a
female who can have a minor child but not both a
wife and a minor child. The same want of elegance
or propriety can be predicated of this expression also
and the use of such expressions both in s. l 6(3)(a) and
s. 16(3)(b) raise questions of construction whether
what wasmeant by the Legislature was only a male
of the species in both these contexts or a male and/or
female of the species, as the case may be, applying
one or the other in accordance with the circumstances
attendant upon the computation of the total income
~f "any individual" for the purpose of assessment.
We are of opinion that the very' manner in which all
the four sub-clauses have been grouped together in
s. J6(3)(a) and the manner in which the expression
"for the benefit of his wife, a minor child or both" is
used in s. 16(3)(b) renders the words "any individual''
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1
957
or "such individual" ambiguous. There is no knowing with certainty as to whether the Legislature meant
:[ j,nc0 n;-::;:·h to enact these provisions with reference only to a male
aan~Bho;al s of the species using the words "any individual" or
s0 dr v.D . "such individual" in the narrower sense of the term
a •••
indicated above or intended to include within the
Bhagwati J.
connotation of the words "any individual" or "such
individual" also a female of the species, wherever
appropriate which woµld of course only be possible in
the cases contemplated in sub-els. (ii) and (iv) of
s. 16(3)(a) and in one of the three cases contemplated
in s. 16(3)(b). The Legislature certaintly was guilty
of using an ambiguous term in enacting s. 16(3) of the
Act as it did. In order to resolve this ambiguity
therefore we must of necessity have resort to the state
of the law before the enactment of the provisions; the
mischief and defect for which the law did not provide;
the remedy which the. Legislature resolved and
appointed to cure the defect and; the true reason of
the remedy within the meaning of the authorities
referred to above.
Before the enactment of s. 16(3) of the Act by the
Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1937 (IV of 1937),
there was no provision at all for the inclusion of the
income of a wife or a minor child in the computation
of the total income of "any individual" for the purpose of assessment. Whatever may have been the
income of a wife from her membership in a firm of
which her husband was a partner or from assets
transferred directly or indirectly to her by her husband
otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart, her income was
not included in the income of her husband in computing the total income of the husband for the purpose of
assessment. Similar was the position in the case of
income derived by a minor child from the admission of
the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm of
which "such individual" was a partner or from assets
transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child,
not being a married daughter, by "such individual"
otherwise than for adequate consideration. The income
derived by such minor child could not be added to the
The Commissioner
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
15
income of the father· for the purpose of assessment.
1957
The income derived by the wife or minor child could The commissioner
only be included in computing his or its total income of Income-tax,,,
for tlte purposes of assessment and neithet the husband ~~,,:p~lade&
nor the fath~r could be made liable for income-tax in s~v.D 1
respect of such income, whatever may be the reason
a ev
which actuated them in providing such income for the BhagwatlJ.
wife or the minor child.
The position was pregnan,t with difficulties for the
Revenue. There were no doubt genuine cases where a
wife or the minor child as the case may be, was
provided with such income on bona fide severance of
joint status between the erstwhile members of a joint
and undivided Hindu family and where after such
partition the adult member of the family entered into
a bona fide partnership admitting the minors to the
benefits of the partnership. There were, on the other
hand, innumerable cases were such severance of joint
status was resorted to mainly with a view to evade a
higher incidence of income tax. There were also cases
where husbands and fathers provided shares for their
wives and minor sons and thus evaded payment of
income tax in regard to their shares in the profits of
such partnerships. This evil was so rampant that the
Income Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, recognised the
same and made tq.e following recommendations for
remedying the situation (vide pp. 19 & 20 of the
Report).
CHAPTER 111-Assessees
Section I-Individuals.
(a) Wife's Income. Our attention has been drawn
to the extent to which taxation is avoided by nominal
partnerships between husband and wife and minor
children. In some parts of the country, avoidance of
taxation by this means has attained very serieus
dimensions. The obvious remedy for this state of
affairs so far as husband and wife were concerned is the
aggregation for assessment of their incomes, but such
a course would involve aggregation in a quite different
class of cases i.e., where the wife's income arises from
sources unconnected with the husband ............. .
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
M2SC(61)-2
•
•
•
•
•
..
•
•
•
•
•
4" . . . . . . . .
·•
.............................
.
16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958J
1957
We recommended, therefore, that the incomes of a wife
17,. Commissioner should be deemed to be, for income tax purposes, the
01 Income-tax,
income of her husband but that where the income of
Madh)'a Pradesh h
. denve
. d f rom
' her personal exertions
.
.
and Bhopal
t e WI"fie 1s
and 1s
s0 d v.D . unconnected with any business of her husband, her
ra ''"'
income from her personal exertions upto a certain
Bhagwati J.
limit, say Rs. 500, should not be so included ....... .
(b) Income of Minor children. There is also a
growing and serious tendency to avoid taxation by the
admission of minor children to the benefits of partner·
ship in the father's business. Moreover, the admission
is, as a rule, merely nominal, but being supported by
entries in the firm's books, the Income-Tax Officer is
rarely in a position to prove that the alleged participation in the benefits of partnership is unreal.
We suggest that the income of a minor should be
deemed to be the income of the father (i) if it arises from
the benefits of partnership in a business in which the
father is a partner or (ii) if, being the income of a
minor other than a married daughter, it is derived
from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the
minor by his or her father or mother, (iii) if it is
derived from assets apportioned to him in the partition
of a Hindu Undivided Family.
It may be noted that the recommendations of the
Enquiry Committee even in the cases hereinbefore
mentioned went· to the length of including the income
of the wife or the minor child as the case may be in
the income of the husband or the father in the compu•
tation of his total income for the purpose of assessment.
The mischief which the Enquiry Report sought to
remedy by its recommendations was one which wa~
the result of husbands entering into nominal partnerships between themselves and their wives and fathers
admitting their minor children to the benefits of such
partnerships. The mischief, if any, resulting from the
mothers admitting their minor children to the benefits
of partnerships in which they were members was
farthest from the thoughts of the Enquiry Committee
and was nowhere sought to be remedied~ Having
•
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS·
17
regard to the circumstances which prevailed at the
1957
time when the Enquiry Committee made its report, The commission"'
the only mischief which they sought to remedy by of Income-tax,
their recommendations was the one resulting from the Ma;:JaBho1;gtsh
male assessees indulging in such tactics for the evasion
v
•
of income tax by creating nominal partnerships between Sodra Devi
themselves and their wives on .the one hand and their Bhagwati J.
minor children on the other.
These recommendations were duly considered by the
Government and as a result thereof Act IV of 1937
"was enacted introducing s. 16(3) in the Act. What was
intended to be done by the Legislature in enacting
this amendment may be gleaned to a certain extent
from the) statement of objects and reasons appended
to the Bill which eventually became the amending Act.
Though it is not legitimate to refer to the stateipent
of objects and reasons as an aid to the construction or
for as certaining the meaning of any particular word
used in the Act or Statute (See Aswani Kumar Gohse v.
Arabinda Bose(1)), nevertheless, this Court in The
State of West Bengalv. Subodh Gopal Bose(2) referred
to the same "for the limited purpose of ascertaining
the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated
the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same and the
extent and urgency of evil which he sought to remedy".
The statement of objects and reasons which led to
the passing of Act IV of 1937 ran as follows :
"Reference is made in sections 1 and 4 of Chapter
III of the Income Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, to the
practice of avoiding taxation by means of nominal
partnerships between husband and wife or parent and
minor child or by the nominal transfer of assets to a
wife or minor child (or to an "association" consisting
of husband and wife) when there is no substantial
separation of the interests of the assessee and the wjfe
or child. These practices are reported to have become
very widespread already, with considerable detriment
to the revenue, and there is little doubt that if they
are not checked there will be progressive deterioration.
The proposals in the Report regarding the aggregation
of the incomes of husband and wife go beyond the
(1) (1953) S.C.R. I.
(2) (1954) S.C.R. 587, 628.
18
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
19 57
immediate necessities of the case and to that extent
of a new
M°f1.•c0 0 n;;/,,i":·,, principle which the Government of India do not desire
an':! shopat s
to establish in advance of the general public discussion
Sodr0 v. D 1
of the Report which has been arranged; and the
ev
present Bill has been· so drafted as to deal only with
Bhagwati J.
the abuses to which I have referred".
It is clear from the above extracts that the evil
which was sought to be remedied was the one resulting
from the widespread practice of husbands entering
into nominal partnerships with their wives and fathers
admitting their minor children to the benefits of the
partnerships of which they w.ere members. This evil
was sought to be remedied by the enactment of s.16(3)
in the Act. If this background of the enactment of
s. 16(3) is borne in mind, there is no room for any
doubt that howsoever that mischief was sought to be
remedied by the amending Act, the only intention of
the Legislature in doing so was ~o include the income
derived by the wife or a minor child, in the computation of the total income of the male assessee, the
husband or the father, as the case may be, for the
purpose of assessment. If that was the position, howsoever wide the words "any indvidual" or "such
individual" as used in s. 16(3) and s. 16(3)(a) may
api)ear be so as to include within their connotation the
male as well as the female of the species taken by
themselves, these words in the context could only have ·
been meant as restricted to the male and not including
the female of the species. If these words are used as
referring only to the male of the species the whole of
the s. 16(3)(a) can be read harmoniously in the manner
above comprehending within its scope all the four
cases specified in sub-cls.(i) to (iv) thereof and sci also
s. l 6(3)(b). We are, therefore, of opinion that the words
"any individual" and "such individual" occurring in
s. 16(3) ands. 16(3)(a)of the Act are restricted in their
connotation to mean only the male of the species, and,
do not include the female of the species, even though
by a disjunctive reading of the expression "the wife"
or "a minor child" of "such individual" in s. 16(3)(a)
and the expression "by such individual" for the benefit
The Commissioner their adoption would involve the admission
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
of his wife or a minor child or both" in s. 16(3)(b), it
1957
may be possible in the particular instances of the The co111missio11cr
mothers being connected with the minor children in M.0~h In~me1af,
5
the manner suggested by the Revenue to include the :,,l'Bho';,/ '
mothers also within the connotation of these words. s0 av. D .
Such inclusion which involves different interpretations
ra Cl'I
of the words "any individual" or "such individual" in Bliagwati J.
the different contexts could neve'r have been intended
by the Legislature and would in any event involve the
addition of the words "as the case may be" which
additon is not normally permissile in the interpretation of a statute.
We shall now refer to the decisions of the several
High Courts in India bearing on the construction of
s. 16(3) of the Act. The earliest decision is that of the
High Court of Allahabad in Shrimati Chanda Devi v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. (1). That decision
emphasised that the sub-cl. (i) of cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) of
s.. 16 made it clear that where the husband was a
partner the income of the wife, by reason of her being
a member of the firm, was to be computed in the
income of the husband, and if the Legislature had
intended that the word "individual" in sub-cl. (ii)
should mean only the father and not the mother there
was no reason why they should not have used similar
language as in sub-cl. (i) and said "from the admission
of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm in
which his father is a partner". Why the Legsilature
used a particular expression and why it did not use
any expression whih would have been clearer and
better expressive of its intention is really difficult to
fathom. We may as well wonder why the Legislature
did not use the words "such individual" in sub-els. (i)
and (iii) of s. l6(3)(a) in place of the words "her
husband" or "the husband" when the intention of the
Legislature would have been equally carried out by the
use of those words. It may be that the draftsman considered the use of the words "her husband" or "the husband" when he used the same in juxtaposition with the
words "a wife" as appropriate or more elegant and
therefore ignored the obvious user of the words "such
(1) [1950] 18 I.T.R. 9H·
20
19s1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
individual" which would have been equally appro-
77re c;;;;;;..,sioner priate in that context. It would have been better ex,;!J,nco~,h pressive of the intention of the Legislature, as we have
Bhopal •
already divined above (viz., to use the words "any indiDev1
vidual" and "such individual" in s. 16(3) and 16(3)(a)
::::7"
s.i'a·
Bhagwatl J.
respectively in the restricted meaning of the male of
the spe.cies), to have used the words "the father" in place
of the words "such individual" in sub-els. (ii) and (iv)
of s. 16(3)(a). It is however difficult to fathom the
mind of the draftsman when he used one particular
expression in preference to the other and not much
help can be derived from the ratio adopted by the
learned Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in the
decision just referred to. It is also significant to
observe that the learned Judges considered that the
language of the section does not create any real
difficulty and therefore did not think it worth their
while to refer to the Income Tax Enquiry Report,
1936, and the passage therefrom which we have quoted
above. Suffice it to say that we do not concur with
the reasoning adopted by the learned Judges of the
High Court of Allahabad and are of the opinion that
the decision just referred to in so far as it militates
against the reasoning adopted by us herein is incorrect.
The later case of Musta Quima Begwn, In re (')
decided by the same High Court merely follows the
judgment in Shrimati Chanda Devi's case (2) and is
subject to the same criticism as above.
The decision of the High Court of Punjab in
Shrimati Damayanti Sahni v. Commissioner of Incometax, Delhi (') is the one under appeal before us in Civil
Appeal No. 25 of 1955. The learned Judges there
followed the decision of the High Court of Allahabad in
Shrimati Chanda Devi's case (2) and answered the
referred question in the affirmative. It follows from
what we have said above that that decision is also
incorrect and the referred question ought to have been
answered by them in the negative.
The latest decision in this context is that of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Commissioner of
(1) f1953] I.T.R. 345.
1950] 18 I.T.R. !H-4·
(2)
(3) [1953] 23 I.T.R. 41.
..
'
".
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
21
Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Smt. Sodra
1951
Devi (1) which is the subject-matter of Civil Appeal The Commissioner
'
,. ..
.
--·
No. 322 of 1955 before us. The High Court there M'tu, Incorr;-;:•ti
observed that the word "individual" as used ins. 16(3) :1'1tio~ i
of the Act was ambiguous and referred to the above s a v.D .
quoted passage from the Inquiry Committee's Report, 0 ra evi
1936, as also the statement of objects and reasons and Bhagwati J.
came to the conclusion that the word "individual" was
restricted to the male of the species and it was not the
intention of the Legislature to impose additional tax
on a mother assessee by including in her income the
income of her minor children arising from the benefits
of partnership of a firm in which the mother and the
minors were partners. We are of opinion that the
decision reached by the learned judges of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh in that case was correct and
the referred question was rightly answered by them in
the negative.
The result therefore is that Civil Appeal No. 322 of
1955 will be dismissed with costs, and Civil Appeal
No. 25 of 1955 will be allowed with costs, the referred
question being answered in the negatiye. . .
S. K. DAS J.-The .substantial question which falls s. K. Das J.
for decision in these two appeals is if the word
"'individual" in sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Indian
Income-tax Act, hereinafter referre<\ t<> as the Act,
includes also a female, and therefore the income of the
minor sons which arises directly or indirectly from
their admission to the benefits of partnership in a firm
of which their mother is a member is to be mcluded in
computing the total income of the mother within the
meaning of sub-s. (3), cl. (a), sub-cl. (ii), of s. 16. The
question is really one of pure construction, that is,
construction of sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act. Nothing
turns upon the facts of the case, and as the material
facts have been clearly set out in the judgment just
read by my learned brother Bhagwati J. I do not
think that any useful purpose will be served by
restating them.
Therefore, I proceed at once to a consideration of
sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act and state at the very
(1) [1955) 27 l.T.R. 9.
22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l958J
outset that, to my great regret, I have come to a conclusion different from that of my learned brethern. I
of Income-tax, shall presently read the sub-section; but before I de>
Madhya Pradesh
so, it will help the exposition which follows if I explain
and Bhopal
v.
in
a few words the standpoint from which I have
Sodra Devi
approached the question. Speaking generally, the
S. K. Das J.
expression "construction" includes two things: first.
the meaning of the words; and, secondly, their legal
effect or the effect which is to be given to them by the
courts. As in the case of documents, so in the case of
statutes also, they should be construed in a manner
which carries out the intention of the Legislature. It
may be reasonably asked-how is the intention of the
Legislature to be discovered ? The answer is that the
intention must first be gathered from the words of the
statute itself. If the words are unambiguous or plain,
they will indicate the intention with which the statute
was passed and the object to be attained by it; in
other words, the mtention is best declared by the
words themselves, and the words of a statute are to be
interpreted as bearing their ordinary, natural meaning unless the context requires a different meaning to
be given to them. If, however, the words are ambiguous, the policy of the legislation and the scope and
object of the statute, where these can be discovered,
will show the intention, which may further be brought
to light by applying the various well settled rules and
presumptions of construction. One such rule is that
the statute must be read as a whole and the construction made of all the parts together, J am emphasising
this aspect of the question to guard against any
possible suggestion that I have started with some
a priori idea of the meaning or intention behfod mbs. (3) of s. 16 of the Act and have tried by construction
to work that idea into the words of the sub-section. I
have been conscious all through of the warning given
by Lord Halsbury, in the following observations in
Leader v. Duffey (') :
"All these refinements and nice distinctions of
words appear to me to be inconsistent witl1 the modern
view, which is I think in accordance with reason and
1957
Tile Commissioner
(1) (1888) 13 App. Cas. 294, :~01,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23
common sense, that, whatever the instrument, it must
1957
receive a construction according to the plain meaning The commissionerof the words and sentences therein contained. But I M00~/ncomi-'"J· h
agree that you must look at the whole instrument, and,
iya v. ra es
inasmuch as there may be inaccuracy and inconsist- Sodra Devi
ency, you must, if you can, ascertain what is the s. K. DasJ;.
meaning of the instrument taken as a whole in order
to give effect, if it be possible to do so, to the intention
of the framer of it. But it appears to me to be arguing
in a vicious circle to begin by assumihg an intention
apart from the language of the instrument itself,. and
having made that fallacious assumption to bend the
language in favour of the presumption so made".
Keeping that warning in mind, I shall first take the
words of sub-s. (3) of s. 16 and see if they are plain or
unambiguous. Alternatively, I shall also consider the
proper construction of sub-s. (3) of s. 16 on the assumption that the word "individual" used in the sub-section is ambiguous and should therefore be interpreted
consistently with the principles laid down in the locus
classicus on the subject, namely, the celebrated Heydon's case(1) reported by Lord Coke and decided by the
Barons of the Exchequer in the sixteenth century.
l shall now read sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act .
"16. (3) In computing the total income of any
individual for the purpose of as_sess,ment, there shall
be included·
(a) so much of the income of a wife or minor
child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly(i) from the membership of the wife in a firm
of whjch her husband is a partner;
(ii) from the admission of the minor to the.
benefits of partnership in a firm of which such indivi~
dual is a partner;- ·
(iii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly
to the wife by the husband otherwise than for adequate
consideration or in connection with an agreement to
live apart; or
24
1957
The Commissioner
Of Incorne--tax.
Madhya Pratksh
and Bhopal
v.
Sodra Devi
S. K. DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19S8]
(iv) from assets transferred directly or indirectly
to the minor child, not being a married daughter, by
such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration; and
(b) so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arises from assets transferred
otherwise than for adequate consideration to the
person or association by such individual for the benefit
of his wife or a minor child or both."
.
I have already stated that the sub-section must be
read as a whole and in the context of the other
provisions of the Act, particularly s. 16 of which it is a
part; it is only then that we shall arrive at its correct
meaning consistent with the other provisions of the
Act. The word "individual" used in sub-s. (3) of s. 16
occurs in several other provisions of the Act, e.g.s. 3,
s. 4A, s. 48 and s. SS. It is necessary to quote s. 3 in
extenso. That section is in these terms :
"Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax
shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax
at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that
year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions
of this Act in respect of the total income of the
previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided
family, company and local authority, and of every
firm and other association of persons or the partners.
of the firm or the members of the association
individually."
It is not disputed before us that the word "individual" occurring in ss. 3, 4A, 48 and SS means either
a male or a female; nor has it been disputed before us
that, according to the ordinary accepted meaning of
the word, it means a single human being as opposed
to "society," "family" etc., and that a single human
being may be of either sex. Learned counsel appearing for the assessees in the two appeals have pointed
out, however, that the word "individual" has not the
same width of meaning in sub-s.(3) of s. 16 as it has
in the other provisions; for example, ins. 3, the word
"individual" has been held to include a Corporation
created by a statµte, e.g., a University or a Bar
l
'
•·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
Council or the trustees of a baronetcy trust incorpo1957
rated by a Baronetcy Act etc.; whereas sub-s. (3) of The Commissioner
S. 16 makes it quite dclear Cthat the ~Ord "indidvidbual" M°/1,;:r;:-:S;,
there does not me1u e a orporat1on create
y a and Bhopal
statute. This indeed is correct. But the question s dr v. D •
before us is whether, in its context, sub-s. (3) of s. 16 ° ~ evi
imposes a further restriction on the word "individual", s. K. ·Das J.
confining it to a male individual only. The critical
question before us is whether such a further restriction is imposed on the word "individual" either by
the express words used in the sub-section or by necessary implication from the clauses and sub-clauses
thereof.
It is said to be a presumption in construction that
the same words are used in the same meaning in the
same statute and particularly in the same section or
sub-section. The pTesumption is, however, of the
slightest, and there are many instances where the
application of this rule or presumption is impossible.
The same words may often receive a different interpretation in different parts of the same Act, for words
used with reference to one set of circumstances "may
convey an intention quite different from what the selfsame set of words used with reference to another set
of circumstances · would or might have produced."
(Edinburgh Street Tramways Co. v. Torbain(1), per Lord
Blackburn). The classic example of the same word
having a somewhat different meaning in the same
section is provided by Offences against the Person Act,
1861, s. 57 of which deals with bigamy and enacts :
"Whosoever, being married, shall marry and other
person during the life of the former husband or wife
•.••.... shall be guilty of felony." It is obvious that the
word "marry" is used in two different senses in the
same section. There is another classic example in
Art. 31 of our Constitution where the word "law" in
cl. (3) of the said Article has been used in different
senses. This is referred to in a decision of this Court
in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar
Singh of Dharbhanga(2).
(1) (1877) 3 App. Cas. 58, 68.
(2) 1952 S.C.R. 889, 908, gog.
26
1957
The commissio11er
ofincome-rax,
Madhya Pradesh
v.
SodraDevi
s. K. Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1958}
The word "individual" is not defined in the Act, but
the meaning of the word in ss. 3, 4A, 48 and 55 is
reasonably clear. The word "assessee" is defined in
. a person by whom
cI. (2) of s. 2 of the Act, as meanrng
income-tax or any other sum of money (which would
include super-tax, penalty or interest) is payable under
the Act. It also includes every person in respect of
whom any proceeding under the Act is taken for the
assessment (a) of his income, (b) of his loss or (c) of the
amount of refund due to him. Thus the definition
covers two categories : first, persons by whom any tax,
penalty or interest is payable under the Act, whether
any proceeding under the Act has been actually taken
against them or not; and secondly, persons against
whom any of the proceedings specified in this clause
has been taken, whether he is or is not liable to pay
any tax, penalty or interest. 'A person' under s.3(42)
of the General Clauses Act, includes any company or
association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not; and under cl. (9) of the section 'a person' also
includes a Hindu undivided family and a local authority. Thus, we have six categories of assessees referred
to in s. 3(a)-the individual, (b) the Hindu undivided
family, (c) the local authority, (d) the company, (e) the
firm and (f) other association of persons. Read in the
context of s. 3 of the Act, the word "individual"
means, in the other sections, one of the six categories
of assessees referred to in s. 3. The same category
is also referred to in sub-s. (3) of s. 16, subject
only to this restriction that in the context of the
sub-section, the word "individual" does not include a
Corporation etc.
We now turn to the critical question before us-is
there a further restriction in the sub-section confining
the word "individual" to a male individual only ? My
answer is that there is nothing in the context of s. 16
or of the sub-section which confines the word "individual" to a male individual oµly. Section 16 deals
with the computation of total income and provides
what sums are to be included or excluded in determining the total income. The effect of including
exempted income in the assessee's total income is
•
S.C.R.
.. t
-~
f
' 4
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
·mainly two-fold : first, the tax payable by the assessee
1957
is determined with refere nee to the total income and The commissioner
therefore exempted income which is included in the 0! Income-tax,
. ble to Madhya
.
Pradesh
total mcome
wou Id· a ffiect t he rate o f tax app1tea
and Bhopal
· the chargeable portion of the total income; secondly, s0 d v. D .
in several cases reliefs are given or calculations made
ra evi
with reference to the total income. Sub-section (3) of s. K. Dasi.
s. 16 appears ex facie to be directed towards preventing an individual's attempt to avoid or reduce the
incidence of tax by transferring the assets to his wife
or a minor child or admitting the wife as a partner or
admitting a minor child to the benefits of partnership
in a firm in which such individual is a partner. I
agree that the sub-section creates, to some extent, an
artificial liability to tax by including the income of A
in the income of B, and must therefore be strictly
construed; that merely means that the words of the
sub-section must be _given their strictly natural meaning, and there should be no attempt at artificial
stretching one way or the other.
What then is the proper construction of the subsection .? It naturally falls into three interconnected
parts. The first part controls both cl. (a) and cl. (b),
and states that "in computing the total income of any
individual for the purpose of assessment, there slfall
be included so much of the income etc." as is specified
in els. (a) and (b). The second part is cl. (a) itself
which starts with an opening sentence that "so much
of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly" from four specific
cases shall be included in the total income of the individual, and then the cases are enumerated in four subclauses numbered (i), (ii), (~ii) and (iv). Then, comes
the third part which deals with cl. (b). I have divided
the sub-section into its three natural parts, but I must
make it clear that all the three parts must be construed
together as they are interconnected and interdependent. In the first part, there is no difficulty whatsoever,
in my opinion, in giving the word "individual" its
natural meaning, that is, that the word means either
a male or a female. The opening sentence of cl. (a)
contains the expression "so much of the income of a
28
t957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958
wife or minor child of such individual". Does the use·
n..eomm-of the word "individual" in the opening sentence of
,:/,, ,_,,,,.,....,cl. (a) give rise to any ambiguity or difficulty ? I do
~· Prod<sh not think that it does. It is quite obvjous that a female
Sadra Devi
individual cannot have a wife, but she can have a
S. K. Doss J. minor child whereas a male individual can have a
wife, minor child or both. It has been argued that
cl. (a) must be interpreted noscitur a sociis, and as the
expression "a wife or minor child" is capable of meaning only when used in connection with a male individual, the whole sub-section must be confined to a
male individual. I am unable to accede to this argument. The collocation or association of the words "a
wife or minor child" in connection with the words
"such individual" in the opening sentence of cl. (a)
docs not necessarily mean that the individual contemplated is a male individual only. I agree that the
word "or" in between the words "wife" and "minor
child" must be there, even when the individual talked
of is a male only ; in other words, the use of the disjunctive word "or" does not necessarily clinch the
issue. But I do not see any real difficulty in reading
the opening sentence of cl. (a) distributively so as to
mean a male individual when the wife is being talked
of 1lnd either a male or a female individual when a
minor child is talked of. I do not think that such a
construction does any violence to the words used ; on
the contrary, in my opinion, it gives effect to the plain
meaning of the word "individual".
Turning now to the sub-clauses numbered (i) to (iv).
there can be no doubt from the phraseology used that
sub-els. (i) and (iii) refer only to a male individual,
because a female individual cannot have a wife. It is
worthy of note, however~and this is very important
-that sub-els. (ii) and (iv) make it equally clear that
they are not confined to the male individual only in
the manner in which sub-els. (i) and (iii) are so confined.
In sub-els. (i) and (iii) the word "individual" is not
used, and the words used are "her husband" and "the
husband". In sub-els. (ii) and (iv) the words used are
"such individual". Why did the Legislature make this
difference in phraseology ? If the intention was to
•
••
S.C.R.
;
--
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
29"
confine the entire sub-section to a male individual
19s1only, nothing could have been easier than to qualify The c;;;;;,fssionet"the word "individual" by the adjective "male" in the of llll:Olne·tax,
first part of the sub-section which controls both clauses M'::J'l»!;:ts"
(a) and (b); alternatively in sub-els. (ii) and (iv) it
v.
.
would have been easy to use the word "father" instead Sodra IHv•
of "such individual". It is true that a change of s. K. Das 1.
language is some, though possibly slight, indication of
a change of intention. I am unable, however, to accept
the argument advanced before us that the phraseology
employed in sub-els. (i) and (iii) different as it is from
that employed in sub-els. (ii) and (iv) can be accounted
for on the ground of elegance or felicity of expression.
It seems to me that if the intention was to confine the
word "individual" to a male individual only, elegance
and clarity both required that the word "individual"
should be qualified by the adjective "male", and the
word "father" should have been used in sub-els. (ii)
and (iv). I am aware that a draftsman often uses
different words merely to avoid repetition. I am also
aware that it is dangerous to suppose that the Legislature foresees every possible result that may ensure from
the "unguarded use of a single word, or that the language
used in statutes is so precisely accurate that you can pick
out. ... this and that expression and skilfully, piecing
them together, lay a safe foundation for some remote
inference", (As per Lord Loreburn, L.C., in Nairn v.
University of St. Andrews and Others(1). But what is
noteworthy in the present case is that the difference
in phraseology ]?etween sub-els. (i) and (iii) on the one
side and sub-els. (ii) and (iv) on the other, is so striking
that the conclusion appears to -me to be reasonably
plain; it is not really a case of the unguarded use of a
single word or picking out an expression here or picking out another expression there in order to piece out
some remote inference. The striking difference in
phraseology hits, as it were, one in the face when one
reads the four sub-clauses. It seems to me that the
meaning is very clear. In the opening part of cl. (a),
the word "individual" is used to mean a male or a
female; two of the sub-clauses, however, are confined
(1) [ 1909] A.C. 147, 16r.
30
1957
The Co11Jmissio11er
of lncome·tax,
Madhya Pradesh
and Bhopal
v.
Sodra Del'i
S. K. DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
to the male only and therefore the word "husband" is
used in juxtaposition to the word "wife". In the other
two sub-clauses, however, the word "individual" is
used in order to make it clear that they refer either to
a male or to a female individual. I do not see any
incongruity or disharmony in the enumeration of the
four sub-clauses, nor do I appreciate the argument
urged before us that the word "individual", on the
construction adopted by me, has a different meaning
in two of the four sub-clauses of cl. (a). The word
~'individual" has and retains the same meaning,
namely a male or a female, all throughout the subsection. All that happens is that in two of the subclauses of cl. (a), when the Legislature intends that
they should be confined to a male individual only, the
word "husband" is used to make the intention clear.
On the same reasoning, when the Legislature intends
in two other sub-clauses that they should apply to
either a male or a female, the word "individual" is
used to include either of them. I am unable to accept
the contention that such an interpretation offends
against the rule of harmonious construction. So far
as cl. (b) of the sub-section is concerned, the word
"individual" is again used and that again relates to a
male or a female. The last part of the clause reads
"by such individual for the benefit of his wife or a
minor child or both". Here again the sentence has to
be read distributively-that is, when the wife is talked
of, the individual can only be a male; when a minor
child is talked of, the individual can be a male or a
female; when both wife and minor child are talked of,
the individual can again be a male only. There was
some argument before us with regard to the use of the
indefinite article "a" before the words "minor child"
and it was submitted by the learned Solicitor-General
that if the Legislature intended to confine cl. (b) to a
male individual only, it could have easily dropped the
indefinite article and used the word "his" before the
words "minor child". Personally, I do not attach
much significance to the use of the indefinite article
"a". It is to be noted that no such indefinite article
is usP-d before the words "minor child" in the opening
.1
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
31
sentence of cl. (a); but I do not see any compelling
19s1
reasons why the natural meaning of the word "indi- The com1;1issio11er
v1f"duahl" s~ould. not bes gihven to ~t in cl. be(a) anil~ cl.. (b) M!J!:;:n;,~'d:;h
o t e SUU"'SCCt1on. uc meaning can eas y given and Bhopal
to both the clauses if they are read distributively, and soar~· Dev
such reading does not, in my opinion, do any violence
to the language used.
s. K. Das J.
On a plain reading of the sub-section, I have come
to the conclusion that there really is no ambiguity and
the word "individual" has been used in the sub-section
in its ordinary accepted connotation, that is, either a
male or a female individual ;two of the sub-clauses of
cl. (a) are no doubt confined to a male individual and
that has been made clear by the use of the words
"wife" and "husband", instead of the words "such
individual".
Assuming, however, that there is some ambiguity in
the sub·section by reason of (1) the use of the phraseology in sub-els. (i) and (iii) of cl. (a), and (2) of the
opening sentence of cl. (a) which controls all the four
sub-clauses of that clause, what then is the position ?
The four principles laid down in Heydon's case have
been thus summarised :
"That for the sure and true interpretation of all
statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are
to be discerned and considered : (1) what was the
common law before the passing of the Act; (2) what
was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide; (3) what remedy the Parliament hath
resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth; (4) the true reason of the remedy.
And then the office all the Judges is always to make
such construction as shall suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions
and evasions for the continuance of the mischief and
pro privato commedo, and to add force and life to the
cure and remedy according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act pro bono publico."
Let me now apply these principles in the construction of sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act.
M2SC(61}-3
32
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
The sub-section was introduced in 1937, and before
111e commissioner the \:nactment of the sub-section, there was no proof Income-tax,
vision for the inclusion of the income of a wife or a
Madhya
Pradesh ffilnor
•
· t he computation
· o f t he total mcome
·
and Bhopal
ch"ld
1
m
of
s0 drv. D .
a
"''
s. K. Das J.
an individual. The Income Tax Enquiry Report, 1936,
referred to the widespread evil of the evasion of tax
by the severance of the joint status amongst members
of a joint and undivided Hindu family. The Report
said :
"Our attention has been drawn to the extent to
which taxation is avoided by nominal partnerships
between husband and wife and minor children. In
some parts of the country, avoidance of taxation by
this means has attained very serious dimensions. The
obvious remedy for this state of affairs so far as husband and wife are concerned is the aggregation for
assessment of their incomes, but such a course would
involve aggregation in a quite different class of case,
i.e., where the wife's income arises from sources quite
unconnected with the husband ................... .
..........................................
We recommend, therefore, that the incomes of a
wife should be deemed to be, for Income-tax purposes,
the income of her husband, but that where the income
of the wife is derived from her personal exertions and
is unconnected with any business of her husband, her
income from her personal exertions up to a certain
limit, say Rs. 500, should not be so included ....... .
(b) Income of minor children.-There is also a
growing and serious tendency to avoid taxation by the
admission of minor children to the benefits of partnership in the father's business. Moreover, the admission is, as a rule, merely nominal, but being supported
by entries in the firm's books, the Income-tax Officer
is rarely in a position to prove that the alleged participation in the benefits of partnership is unreal.
.......................................'. . . . . . . . .
We suggest that the income of a minor should be
deemed to be the income of the father (i) if it arises
..
'
S.C.R.
...... J
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33
from the benefits of partnership in a business in which
19s1
the father is a partner or (ii) if, being the income of The Commissioner
a minor other than a married daughter, it is derived M.0 '/,nco;;:J:',;
from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the :ni~pal s
minor by his or her father or mother, (iii) if it is derived s~11v. 0 .
from assets apportioned to him in the partition of a
evi
Hindu Undivideq Family."
s. K. DassJ.
It is clear, however, that the report is of very little
help in the construction of the sub-section, because the
Legislature did not accept in full the recommendations
made in the Report. Two of the rules in Heydon's
case lay down (1) that we must find what was the
mischief or defect for which the earlier law did not
provide and (2) what remedy the Parliament has
resolved and appointed to cure the mischief or defect.
lo the case under our consideration, the interpretation
which has been put by me on sub-s. (3) of s. 16 does
not militate against any of the aforesaid rules of Heydon's case. The interpretation put by me undoubtedly
remedies the mischief or defect for which the earlier
law did not provide. The only serious criticism made
by learned counsel for the assessees against that interpretation is that the remedy not merely cures the
mischief for which the earlier law did not provide, but
it goes a little further and attacks the evil even when
the evil is committed by a female individual, though
the Income-Tax Enquiry Report (except in one part)
did not in specific terms refer to such an evil committed by a female individual. I can see nothing in the
rules laid down in Heydon's case which militates
against the view taken by me. There is no presumption that, while remedying an evil, the Legislature
may not cast its net very wide so as to. remedy the
evil in all its aspects. Let me again refer to sub-els. (i)
and (ii) of cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act. Those
two sub-clauses are absolute and unqualified in terms
and not subject to any exception. If the wife owns
and manages a business and she takes her husband
into partnership with her in the business, the result of
the partnership would be that the wife's income from
the business would be no longer taxable in her hands
but would be included in the total income of her
34
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
husband under the sub-section, even though the hus-
The Commissioner band may be a dormant partner. This clearly shows that
of Incon;;'~:'\ the Legislature was not confining itself to the recomMa;::'Bho;at mendations made in the Income Tax Enquiry Report.
v.
Sodra Devi
s. x. Das J.
What is to be included in the total income of an individual under cl. (a) is the income of a wife or minor
child arising directly or indirectly "from the membership of the wife" in the firm or "from the admission of
the minor to the benefits of partnership" in the firm
of which the individual is a partner. The clause
covers the share of the profits of the firm received by
the wife in her capacity as a partner or by the minor
child in his or her capacity as one admitted to the
benefits of partnership. But the income received from
the firm by the wife or the minor child under any
other contract with the firm or in any other capacity,
does not fall within the clause and is not included in
the husband's or parent's total income.
From what is stated above, it is clear that the Legislature did not confine itself strictly or solely to the
recommendations made by the Income Tax Enquiry
Committee but provided for all such aspects of the
evil or mischief as it thought fit to remedy by the
Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1937 (Act IV of
1937). In these circumstances, I do not think that the
recommendations made by the Income-tax Enquiry
Committee can be relied upon to restrict the meaning
of the word "individual" used in sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of
the Act. As to the Statement of Objects and Reasons
which led to the passing of Act IV of 1937 and which
has been set out in the judgment of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh, I do not think that the Statement
can be referred to as an aid to construction for ascertaining the meaning of the word "individual" used in
the sub-section. Even if it is referred to "for the
limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponser of the Bi11
to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of
the evil which he sought to remedy", the use of the
word "parent" in the Statement of Objects and Reasons
shows that the evil was not confined to the male individual only, and the sponsor of the Bill was aware of
'·
f-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
it. The Statement reads : "Sec. 16(3) was thus
1957
designed to bring within the ambit of taxation incomes The Commissionqr
of wives and minor children as income of husband or :f~ncon;c'°t~h
parent, which otherwise would escape the whole an~°BhJ:Ot'
burden of taxation." I emphasise the use of the word Sodr~·Devi
"parent" which would show that the evil contemplated
was an evil which was not confined to the "father" s. K. Da.i 1.
only but included the mother as well.
My conclusion therefore is that there is nothing in
the policy of the legislation and the scope and object
of the statute which compels one to cut down the
natural meaning of the word "individual" used in
sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act so as to confine it to a male
individual alone.
I now turn to such authorities as have been cited
before us. There has been a difference of opinion in
the High Courts with regard to the interpretation of
sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act. In Shrimati Chanda
Devi v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1), the Allahabad
High Court has taken the view that the mirtor's income
which arises directly or indirectly from the admission
of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm of
which the mother is a partner, can be included in the
mother's assessable income under s. 16(3)(a)(ii) of the
Act. The Allahabad High Court proceeded on the
footing that the language of the fob;§~ction did not
create any real difficulty and it was not cipen to it to
take the help of the Income-tax Enquiry Report. I
have considered this case from both the points of view,
and have arrived at the same conclusion at which the
Allahabad High Court arrived. It is not necessary to
mention the other reasons given by the Allahabad
High Court, because they have already been stated by
me in an earlier part of this judgment. This decision of
the Allahabad High Court was followed by the Punjab
High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi v.
Shrimati Damayanti Sahni (2), which has given rise to
one of the two appeals before us. The Punjab High
Court gave no additional reason except to state that in
cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) of s. 16, the word "wife" and the
0
(1) (1950) ill I.T.R. 944.
(2) (1953) 23 I.T.R. 41.
36
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
words "minor child" were used disjunctively.
[19581
I have
Th• commlnloner already stated that the use of the disjunctive "or" is
of
not decisive; but there is no real difficulty in reading
I•con:;::t·h
M"'//:!J'Bhopa/'
v.
Sod,a Devi
s. K. DasJ.
clauses (a) and (b) distributively. The Madhya Pradesh
High Court took a different view in Sahodradevi
N. Daga v. Commissioner of Income-tax ('), which has
given rise to the other appeal before us. In my view,
the learned Judges in that case did not attach sufficient
importance to sub-els. (ii) and (iv) of cl. {a). If I may
say so with great respect, they confined their attention
primarily to sub-els. (i) and (iii) of cl. {a) and to cl. {b),
and from those provisions they inferred that the intention was to confine the word "individual" to a male
individual. I venture to think that all the three parts
of the sub-section, including the four sub-clauses of cl.
(a) must be read together in order to understand the
true meaning and effect of the sub-section. The learned
Judges further seemed to think that the use of the
words "such individual" in sub-cl. (ii) of cl. (a) was due
to inadvertence. I am unable to agree. I have already
pointed out that the phraseology in sub-els. (i) and
(iii) of cl. (a) is so strikmgly different from the phraseology used in sub-els. (ii) and (iv) that only one and one
reasonable conclusion can be drawn, namely, that the
word "individual" has been used in its accepted connotation, and when the Legislature wanted to confine the
operation of a sub-clause to the male individual only,
it used the word "wife" and "husband"; where, however, the Legislature wanted to refer to either a male
or a female, it used the word "individual" which, in its
ordinary connotation, means either a male or a
female.
For the reasons given above, I agree with the view
expressed by the Allahabad and the Punjab High
Courts and do not accept the interpretation given by
the Madhya Pradesh High Court. In my opinion, the
question should be answered in the way the Allahabad
and the Punjab High Courts answered it; therefore,
Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1955 should be allowed with
costs and Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1955 should be dismissed with costs.
(1) (1955) 27 I.T.R. 9·
,•
S.C.R.
<
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
37
BY COURT : In accordance with the Judgment of the
1957
majority Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1955 is dismissed The Commissio11er
with costs and Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1955 is allowed 01 Income-tax,
· h costs, t he ·refierred question
· be"mg answere d m
· t he Madhya
Pradesh
wit
and Bhopal
negative.
Sodr~· Devi
RAGHUBAR MANDAL HARIHAR MAND AL
1957
v.
May22.
THE STATE OF BIHAR
(BHAGWATI, S. K. DAS and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)
-~-
..
J
Sales Tax-Assessee's accounts rejected as unreliable-Assessment made 011 guess without reference to evidence or materialValidity-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944 (Bihar Act VI of 1944),
s. 10(2)(b)-Indian I11come-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), s. 23(3).
The appellant filed the necessary returns, as required by the
provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944, and produced the
account books. The Sales Tax Officer considered that the account
books were not dependable and, after rejecting them as well as
the returns, proceeded to estimate the gross turnover by adopting
a figure by pure guess, without reference to any evidence or
material, and made the assessment under s. 10(2)(b) of the Act.
Held, that under s. 10(2)(b) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act,
1944, a duty is imposed on the assessing authority to make the
assessment after hearing such evidence as the assessee may produce
and such other evidence as the assessing authority may require
on specified points, and, in case the returns of the assessee and
his books of account are rejected, the assessing authority must
make an estimate, but this must be based on such evidence or
material as the assessing authority has before him, including the
assessee's circumstances, knowledge of previous returns and all
other matters which the assessing authority thinks will assist him
in arriving at a fair and proper estimate.
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax,
West Bengal, (1955) l.S.C.R. 941 and Income-tax Commissioner v.
Badridas Ramrai Shop, Ako/a, (1937) L.R. 64 I.A. 102, relied on .
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
249 of 1954.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated January 8, 1952, of the Patna High Court
in Misc. Judicial Cases Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and
19 of 1949.
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