BALDEO SINGH AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 April 1957 | [1957] 1 S.C.R. 995 | 1957 INSC 30
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 April 1957
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, S.K. DAS, P. GOVINDA MENON, A.K. SARKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 145/1955
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1957] 1 S.C.R. 995
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 30
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
time, determined to see that their
possibly escape the assassins' hands.
995
victim did not
As regards the second appellant, we need not say
anything more than that he was lucky enough to
escape conviction under s. 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, for the reasons 'given by the High Court, which
may not bear close scrutiny. He amply deserves the
punishment of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment under
s. 326 of the Indian Penal Code.
1957"
Vadioelu The var
v.
. The Stak of
Madras
Sinha J.
For the reasons aforesaid, both the appeals fail and
are dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
BALDEO SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS
(S. R. DAS c. J., ]AFER IMAM, s. K. DAS, GOVINDA
MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)
Gram Cutchet'l'y-Criminal
Jurisdictio11-Concu1-re1,t jurisdiction of ordinary ffiminal Courts-Enactment, if discriminatory in
character.-Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihm· Act 7 of 1948),
ss. 60, 62, 68, 69, 70, 73-Co11sti1t1tion of India, A1·t. 14.
The appellants wcr~ coilvicte<l of an offence under s. 379 of
the Indian Penal Code by a full bench of the Gram Cutcherry
constituted under the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj
Act, 1947. It was contended for the appellants that the convic·
tion was bad on the grounds int<T alia, that s. 62 of the Act
which provided for the criminal jurisdiction of Gram Cutcherries
ga \'e concurrent jurisdiction to the ordinary criminal Courts and
left it open to a party to go either to. the ordinary criminal
Courts or to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, and as the procedure
was substantially
followed in the ordinary criminal
Courts
different from that followed by a Gram Cutcherry, the Act was
discriminatory in nature and as such infringed Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
Held, that the impugned provisions of the Act · are net
discriminatory in nature.
The scheme of the Act is that a case or suit ·cognizable
under the Act by a Gram Cutcherry should be tried only by it
unless the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif concerned
chooses to take action under s. 70 or s. 73 of the Act. The
1957
April 2.
996
1957
Daf.deo Singh
and OtherJ
v.
The State of
Bihar and OthtrJ
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
reference to concurrent jurisdiction in s. 62 is explainable by
reason of the provisions in ss. 69, 70 and 73, so that on the
transfer or withdrawal of a case fro1n the Gr~un Cutcherry or the
cancellation of the jurisdiction of the bench, it may not be
said that the ordinary criminal Courts also have no jurisdiction to
try it.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 145 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated July 20, 1954, of the Patna High Court in
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 228 of 1954.
.S. P. Verma. for the appellants.
R. C. Prasad. for the respondents.
1957. Aoril 22. The Judgment of the Court was
·delivered b~
S. /[.Das].
S. K. DAs J.-J'his is an appeal by special leave
from an order cf summary dismissal passed by the
High Court of Pama on lulv 20. 1954. on an application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India. The relevant facts are these. One Uma Shankar
Prasad instituted a case against eight persons, including the three appellants before us.
Baldeo Singh,
Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, on the allegation
that they had forcibly cut and removed 'urad' and
'kodo' crops from his field in village Darwan on
October 1. 1953. at about IO a.m. Uma Shankar said
that he objected, but was threatened with assault.
The case was instituted before the Gram Cutcherry of
Bankat in the district of Chamoaran, constituted
under the provisions of the Biha,- Panchavat Raj Act,
1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948), hereinafter referred to as
the Act. Altogether four witnesses were examined in
the case, two on behalf of the prosecution and two
for the accused persons. The defence of some of the
accused persons was that the land on which the crops
stood belonged to one Yogi Sahni. who had sold it to
Sunder Singh, accused, on September 25. 1953. On
December 28, 1953, a bench of the Gram Cutcherry
acquitted all the accused persons. On Tanuary 7, 1954,
Uma Shankar Prasad preferred an appeal under s. 67
of the Act. The appeal was heard on June 24, 1954,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997
and the full bench by a majority, with three dissentient
panches, held the three appellants guilty of the offence
under s. 379, Indian Penal Code. and sentenced them
to imprisonment for fifteen days each. The appellants
then moved the High Court of Patna under Arts. 226
and 227 of the Constitution. with the result stated
above. The appellants then moved this Court and
obtained special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
Learned counsel for the appellants has pressed the
following contentions before us. His first and foremost
contention is that the Act, bv reason of certain
provmons
contained therein, · is discriminatory in
nature and offends against Art. 14 of the Constitution.
It is advisable to set out first those provisions of the
Act which, according to learned counsel for 'the appellants, are discriminatory in character. Section 62 of
the Act, which provides for the criminal iurisdiction of
Gram Cutcherries, is in these terms :
"Notwithstanding
anything
contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and subiect to the
provisions of this Act. a bench of the Gram Cutcherry
shall have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
Criminal Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench is situate for the trial of the following offences as well as abetment of and attempts to
commit any such offence, if committed within the local
limits of its jurisdiction, namely :
(a) offences under the • Indian Penal Code, sections 140, 143, 145, 147, 151, 153, 160, 172. 174, 178,
179, 269, 277, 279, 283, 285, 286, 289, 290, 294, 323,
334, 336, 341, 352, 356, 357, 358, 374, 379, 380, 381,
403, 411. 426, 428, 430, 447, 448, 461, 504, 506, 510 ;
(b) offences under the Bengal Public Gambling
Act, 1867:
( c) offences under sections 24 and 26 of the
Cattle Trespass Act, 1871 :
( d) except
as
otherwise
provided,
offences
under this Act or under · any rule or bye-law made
thereunder ;
( e) any other offence under any other enactment, if empowered in this behalf by the Government :
1957
Ba!tleo Singh
and Others
"·
The State af
Bihor and Othm
S. K. Do,].
998
1957
Baldeo Singh
and Otlu1s
v.
T"' State qf
Bihar and Othtrs
S. K. Dar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Provided that the bench shall not take cognizance
of ahy offence under sections 379, 380, 381 or 411 of
the Indian Penal Code in which the value of the property alleged to be stolen exceeds fifty rupees or in
which the accused(i) has been previously convicted of an offence
punishable under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal
Code with imprisonment of either description for a
term of three years or upwards; or
(ii) has been previously fined for theft by any
bench of the Gram Cutcherry ; or
(iii) is a registered member of a criminal tribe
under section 4 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924 ; or
(iv) has been bound over to be of good behaviour
in proceedings instituted under section 109 or 110 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898."
It is worthy of note that the section contains two
important qualifications : one is contained in the nonobstante clause with which the section begins and the
other is contained in the expression 'subject to the
prqvisions of this Act.' The importance of this second
qualification will be apparent when some of the other
provisions of the Act are set out. Subject to the two
qualifications mentioned above, s. 62 gives a bench of
the Gram Cutcherry jurisdiction concurrent with that
of the ordinary criminal . Court within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the bench is situate for the trial
of the offences mentioned therein. Section 63 vests
the bench with the powers of a Magistrate of the third
class. Section 64 is not relevant for our purpose and
need not be read. Section 65 provides for exclusive
civil jurisdiction of a bench of the Gram Cutcherry in
certain classes of suits, subject to certain provisos.
Section 66 says that certain suits shall not be heard
by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry. Section 67
provides for appeals. Then comes s. 68, which is
very important for our purpose and must be quoted in
extenso-"No court shall take cognizance of any case or
suit which is cognizable under the Act by a bench of
the Gram Cutcherry unless an order to the contrary
has been passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
999
the Munsif concerned under the provisions of the Act
or any other law for the time being in force."
Section 69 gives the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the
Munsif power to transfer a case or suit pending before
a Magisuate or a MunsiJ to a bench of the Gram
Cutchen1' having jurisdiction to try it. Section 70
gives the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif
power to withdraw any case or suit pending before a
bench of the Gram Cutcherry and transfer the same to
the ordinary Courts. Section 71 provides, inter alia,
that no legal practitioner shall appear, plead or act on
behalf of any party in any suit or case before the Gram
Cutcherry. Section 73 gives power to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Munsif to take necessary
action when there has been a miscarriage of justice or
there is an apprehension of a miscarriage of justice.
Sub-section (2) of s. 73 says that when an order under
sub-s. ( 1) has been made in respect of any suit or case,
the complainant or the plaintiff, as the case may be,
may institute the case or suit afresh in the Court of
the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Munsif of competent
jurisdiction.
The argument of learned counsel for the appellants
is that inasmuch as s. 62 gives only concurrent jurisdiction, it leaves it open to a party to go either to the
ordinarv criminal Courts or to a bench of the Gram
Cutche;ry. According to him, this opens the door for
discrimination, because the procedure followed in the
ordinary criminal Courts is substantially different from
tliat followed by a Gram Cutcherry. The procedure
to be followed by the latter is indicated in s. 60 which
states :
"Subject to the provisions of this Act and to am
rules or directions that mav be made or issued bv the
Government in this behalf, the procedure to be f~l!ow
ed by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry shall be such as
it rn~ty co!1sidcr just and convenient and the bc:Kh
shall not be bound to fol\mv anv laws of evidence o;:
procedure other than the procedure prescribed bv or
under tliis Act."
This argument as to cfocriminaiion fails to take note
of the other pro·:isions 0£ the Act which we have set
4--61 S. C. Indi:\/59
1957
Ba/deo Singh
~and Others
v.
The State o
Bihar and Othm
S. K. Das].
1000
1957
Baldeo Singh
and Others
v.
The:s1ate of
Bi~ar and Others
S. K. Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
out above. Section 62 is. in express terms, subject to
other provisions of the Act ; therefore, it is subject to
s. 68 which states that no Court shall take cognizance
of any case or suit which is cognizable under the Act
by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, unless an order to
the contrary bas been passed by the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate or the Munsif concerned under the provisions
of the Act or any other law for the time being in
force. On a proper construction of s. 62 and s. 68. it
is clear that there is really no discrimination and a
case cognizable by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry
must be tried there. unless there bas been an order to
the contrary in the exercise of his judicial discretion
by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif concerned as contemplated by the latter part of s. 68. The ~
provisions of the Act under which such an order can
be passed are contained in the succeeding sections
already referred to by us. The whole scheme of Cb. VII
of the Act is that a case or suit cognizable under the
Act by a Gram Cutcberrv should be tried by a bench
of the Gram Cutcherry save in those exceptional cases
which are provided for in ss. 70 and 73. The reference
to concurrent jurisdiction in s. 62 is explainable by
reason of the provisions in ss. 69, 70 and 73, so that on
the transfer or withdrawal of a case from the Gram
Cutcberry or the cancellation of the jurisdiction of the
bench, it may not be said that the ordinary criminal
Courts also have no jurisdiction to try it.
For these reasons, we are nf the view that tk
impugned provisions of the Act are not discriminatory
in nature, and there is no merit in the first contention
pressed before us.
Secondly, learned counsel for the appellants has
referred us to rr. 60 and 61 of the
Bibar
Gram
Cutcberry Rules, 1949. Rule 60(2) requires that the
decision of the full bench shall be signed by the
members and where a dissentient judgment has been
delivered, the minute of dissent shall also be recorded . ~·· •.
under the signatures of the dissenting members. These r
requirements were fulfilled in the present case, and no
materials have been placed before us which may lead
to the conclusion that rr. 60 and 61 have been violated.
°"
y
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1001
The third and last cor1tention on behalf of the
appellants is that the conviction of t;vo of the appellants, Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, is bad,
because there was no evidence at all against them. The
two witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution
definitely said that they saw Baldeo Singh (appellant)
and two other named persons who have been acquitted,
but <lid not identify the rcmaiuing persons who aho
forcibly cut an,! removed the crops. Oa this evidence,
there was no legal basis for the conviction of Ramdeo
SinglL and Shcodhar Singh. Our attention bas been
drawn to Ramdeo Singh's own statement in which he
said that he had removed the crops of his own field
That statement, standing by itself. is not an admission
of guilt. We agree with learned counsel for the appellants that there was no evidence whatever to sustain
the conviction of Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh.
Their conviction was manifestiv, and on the face of
,
the record, erroneous.
The High Court was moved for the exerme of its
power of superi1m:ndence under Art. 227, and it is
open to us in this appeal to exercise the same power.
We would accordingly allow this appeal so far as
Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh are concerned and
set aside their conviction and sentence. They will now
be discharged from bail. So far as Bakko Singh is
concerned, he was rightly convicted. We do not,
however, think that any useful purpose will be served
by sending him to jail for a short period. We would
accordingly reduce his sentence to a fine· of Rs. 30/only or in default imprisonment as directed by the full
bench of the Gram Cutcherry. The appeal is disposed
of accordingly.
Appeal disposed of accordingly.
1957
Ba/deo Singh
and Others
v.
The Stalt of
Bihar and Others
S. K. Das].
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