V. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD. versus THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, COIMBATORE.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 February 1957 | [1957] 1 S.C.R. 663 | 1957 INSC 19
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 February 1957
- Bench
- T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR*, S.K. DAS, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 323/1956
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1957] 1 S.C.R. 663
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 19
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
It was because of the above two contentions raised
by counsel for the appellant and because it was a case
of reversal of a judgment of acquittal that we allowed
counsel to go into the evidence which he analysed and
drew our attention· to its salient features and to the
discrepancies in the statements of witnesses and the
improbabilities of the case ; but we are satisfied that
the learned Judges were justified in coming to the
conclusion
they did and the view of the trial
judge was rightly displaced. Upon a review of the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses we have come
to the conclusion that the appellant was rightly
convicted.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the judgment
of the High .Court is affirmed.
1957
Nisar Ali
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Kapur].
Appeal dismissed.
THE
V. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD.
'95'/
ti.
February 19.
REGIONAL TRANSPORT
COIMBATORE.
VENKATARAMA AYYAR.
AUTHORITY,
s. K. DAS AND
GAJENDRAGADKAR
JJ.)
Road Transport-Permit for stage carriage-Renewal-W heth er
a continuation of the original permit-Whether subject to implied
condition of validity of the original permit-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(IV of 1939), ss. 57, 58.
The appellant was granted a permit for stage carriage hy the
Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, but on appeal to the appellate authority, the
Central Road Traffic Board, by the unsuccessful applicants the
order granting the permit was set aside and the order of the
Central Road Traffic Board was appro\'ed hy the Government in
re"ision. The appellant. thereupon. moved the High Court for a
writ of certi01'<1ri to quash the proceedings of the Central Road
Traffic Board an<l the Gowrnment. During the pen<lency of these
proceedings there was a stay of operation of the order setting aside
the grant of the permit to the appellant. with the result that he
continued to run his buses notwithstanding the cancellation of his
permit.
Before the expiry of the perio<l fixed in the original
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19571
'957
permit, he applied for and got a renewal of the permit from the
Regional
Transport Authority under s. 58 of the Act. The High
V. C. K. Bus Strviet
Court finally dis1nissed the applic:ition for a writ of certiorari and
Ltd.
the question arose as to the validity of tbe renewal of the pennit
v.
The Regional
in view of the High Court's decision. ]'he 1natter was raised before
Transport
the High Court once again by proceedings under Art. 226 of the
il.utlwrity,
Constitution and the High Court held that the r.:-newal having been
Coimbator1
obtained on the basis of a pern1it which had been subsequently
cancelled, it c-oul<l not be regarded as a frc!:h permit, that when
the original permit \Vas set asi<le, it 111ust be taken to be non est
for all purposes, and that thr renc\val must therefore be held to
be a nullity. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held: (1) Under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1949, and the rules framed thereunder, a rene\\.·al is a continuation
of the original pennit. \Vhen the original permit \Vas rent\\'ed in
favoui of the appellant it v.·as subject to the Jecision of the High
Court in the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution which
\vere then pending and, therefore, 'vhen the order granting' the
original permit \Vas finally set aside the renewed permit becan1e
void.
Anjiah \', Regional 1·ransport Officer, Guntul', 1956 i\ndhra
Law Ti1nes, 347, disapproved.
(2) When the appellant applied for a renewal of his permit
under s. 58 of the .-\ct and not merely for a fresh permit the order
of the Regional Transport A'.Jthority granting the renewal rnust
be held to ha\'e been made subject to the implied condition that
the right of the appeilant to the original permit is recognized by
the
High Court and that accordingly, in the ever1t that had
happened, the reOC\\'cd pc:nnit ceased to be effective.
Veerappa Pill..1i v. Ran1a11 &, Ram.a; Ltd., (1952) S.C.R. 583,
explained and Jistinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.
323 and 324 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and orders dated April
27, and July 13, 1956, of the Madras High Court in
Writ Appeals Nos. 42 and 88 of 1956 arising· out of the
orders dated March 2.3, and July 9, 1956, of the said
High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 333 and 564 of
1956.
A.V. Viswanatha Sastri, /. B. Dadachanji,
Andley and Rameshwar Nath for the appellant.
S.
N.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganpathy Iyer and R. Gopalkrislman, for respondents Nos.
3 and 4.
S.C.R.
•
_,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
1957. February 19. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These are appeals against
the judgment of the High Court of Ma<lras on a certificate given under Art. 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution,
and they raise a question of some importance as to the
true legal character of a permit when · it is renewed
under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(IV of 1939) hereinafter referred to as the Act.
In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties,
it is necessary to state the material facts leading up to
the present dispute. Towards the end of 1952, the
appropriate authorities under the Act decided to grant
two additional permits for stage carriages in the
Ondipudur-Agricultural College route in the town of
Coimbatore in the State of Madras, ancj invited applications therefore under s. 57 of the Act. There were as
many as 39 applicants, and by his order dated December 3, 1952, the Regional Transport Authority granted
one permit to applicant No. 24, the Thondamuthur
Trading Company Ltd., and another to applicant No.
30, the V.C.K. Bus Service. There were appeals by
some of the unsuccessful applicants to the Central Road
Traffic Board, which by its order dated February 19,
1953, set aside the order of the Regional Transport
Authority and granted the permits, one to Stanes
Transports Ltd., and another to Thirumalaiswami
Goundar.
Revisions were preferred against this order
by the aggrieved applicants under s. 64-A of the Act,
and by its order dated July 9, 1953, the Government
confirmed the grant of the permit to Stanes Transports
Ltd., but set aside the permit given to Thirumalaiswami Goundar, and granted it instead to Annamalai
Bus Transport Ltd.
Thereupon, applicants Nos. 24 and 30 moved the
High Court of Madras under Art. 226 for a writ of
certiorari to quash the order of the Central Road Traffic
Board dated February 19, 1953 and of the Governmrnt dated July 9, 1953; but the applications were
dismissed by Rajagopala Ayyangar J. on March 8,
1954. Against the orders of dismissal, Writ Appeals
Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 were preferred, and they were
1957
V. C. K. Bus Service
Ltd.
v.
The Regional
Transport
Authoriry,
Coimbatore
Venkalarama
Ayyar J.
666
1957
V. C. K. Bus Sernic.
Ltd.
v.
Tht Regional
Tra,isport
Authority,
Coimbatore
f'o1!ataramt1
A_Y.7ar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
dismissed by Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapakesa
Ayyar J. on March 21, 1956. It should be mentioned
that the operation of the order dated February 19,
1953 was stayed pending the disposal of the revision
under s. 64-A and the writ proceedings in the High
Court, with the result that both Thondamuthur Trading
Company Ltd. and V.C.K. Bus Service which had been
granted permits by the Regional Transport Authority
on December 3, 1952, continued to run their buses notwithstanding cancellation of those permits on February
19, 1953. It should also be mentioned that in June
1954 the business of the V.C.K. Bus Service which
was the grantee of one of the permits under the order
of the Regional Transport Authority dated Decemher
3, 1952, was taken ·over by a Company called the V.C.K.
Bus Service Ltd., which i's the appellant before us, and
by an order of the Regional Transport Authority dated
July 7, 1954, it was recognised as the transferee of the
permit granted to V.C.K. Bus Service.
To continue the narrative, the permit which was the
subject-matter of the litigation aforesaid was for a
period of one year and a half, and it expired on June
30, 1954. Before its expiry,• the appellant applied on
April 15, 1954, for a renewal thereof for a period of
three years. This application was duly notified under
s. 57, and objections to the grant were preferred by
both Stanes Transports Ltd., and Annamalai Bus
Transport Ltd. On September 5, 1954, the Regional
Transport Authority granted a permit to the appellant
for a period of one year from July 1, 1954 to June 30,
1955, obviously in the expectation that Writ Appeals
Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 would by then have been
decided. On March 19, 1955, the appellant again
applied for a renewal of the permit, and that was also
notified under s. 57, and no objections having been
filed to the grant thereof, the Regional Transport
Authority by his order dated June 23, 1955, renewed
the permit for a period of three years from July 1, 1955
to June 30, 1958. It is this permit that forms the
subject-matter of the present litigation.
It has been already stated that Writ Appeals Nos.
31 and 32 of 1954 were dismissed on March 21, 1956.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1957
Apprehending that the Regional Transport Authority
might, in view of the judgment of the High Court, I', C, K Bus Sertiu
Ltd,
cancel the permit which was renewed on June 23, 1955,
v.
the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 333 of 1956 for a
Tk Rcgio11a/
Transport
Writ of Prohibition restraining the Regional Transport
Authority,
A'.uthority from cancelling the permit, and that was
Coimbatore
Rajagopala Ayyangar J. on the ground
dismissed by
i ·enkatarmna
that when the original permit was set aside, the renewal
A)yar].
thereof fell to the ground. The appellant filed Writ
Appeal No. 42 of 1956 against this order, and that was
hy Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapakesa
heard
Ayyar J. who by their judgment dated April 27, 1956,
held, following a previous decisio11 of that Court' in
K. M 11t/11tvadivelu v. Regional Transport Officer(') that
the renewal having been obtained on the basis of a
permit which had been subsequently cancelled, it could
not be regarded as a fresh permit, that when the original permit was set aside, it must be taken to be 11011 est
for all purposes, and that the renewal must therefore
be held to be a nullity. In the result, they dismissed
rhe appeal, but granted a certificate under Art. 133(1)(c),
observing that the case raised a point of general
importance, which was stated by them in these terms :
"When an application for renewal of a permit is
made and granted and eventually it is held that the
original permit was itself wrongly granted, does the
renewed permit subsist for the period for which it was
renewed, or does it automatically cease to be in force
when it is finally decided that the original permit was
not granted validly ?''
This matter now comes before us in Civil Appeal No.
323 of 1956.
After the High Court delivered its judgment in
Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956 on April 27, 1956, the
respondents herein, viz., Stanes Transports Ltd. and
Annam:ilai Bus Transport Ltd., :ipplied to the Regional
Tramport Authority to grant them permits in accordance with the decisions of the High Court, and on ~fay
5, 1956, the Regional Tr:insport Authority cancelled
the permit granted by him on June 23, 1955, in farnur
(1) A.LR, 1956 !\fad. q3,
668
1957
V. C. K. Bus Stroiu
Ltd.
v.
T ht Rttional
Transport
.Authorit)",
Coimbatort
Vtnkatarama
Ayya,J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
of the appellant, and granted permits instead to the
respondents. Thereupon, the appellant filed Writ
Petition No. 554 of 1956 for a writ of certiorari to quash
the onle1 dated May 5, 1956, on the grounds which had
been put forward in Writ Petition No. 333 of 1956 and
Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956. That petition was dismissed by Rajagopalan J. on July 9, 1956, and the
Writ Appeal No. 88 of 1956 filed against that order
was dismissed by Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar J. on July 13, 1956. Leave to appeal
against that judgment was also given under Art.
133 ( 1) ( c), as the subject-matter thereof was the same
as that of Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956 in respect of
which leave had already been granted. Civil Appeal
No. 324 of 1956 relates to this matter. Thus, both the
appeals relate to the same matter, and raise the same
point for determination.
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel who
appeared in support of the appeals, contends that the
view taken by the learned Judges of the High Court
that when a permit is set aside by higher authorities,
it should be treatell as wholly non-exi.\tent, and that,
in consequence, a renewal thereof must be held to be
void, is not sound, that on a correct interpretation of
ss. 57 and 58, a renewal is practically in the nature of
a new grant, that the permit which was granted to the
appellant for the period July l, 1955 to June 30, 1958,
though styled a renewal, was in substance a fresh
permit, and that the fact that the old permit was set
aside -did not therefore affect the right of the appellant
under this permit. He also argues that the Act and
the rules framed thereunder contain elaborate provi-.
sions as to when a permit could be cancelled, forming
in themselves a complete code on the subject, that the
cancellation of the original permit is not one of the
grounds on which a renewed permit could be set aside,
and that the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated May 5, ~1956, was therefore ultra vires. The
contention of the learned Solicitor-General for the
respondents is that when a permit is renewed, the
renewal is, on a true. construction of the provisions of
the Act, in substance .. as in name a cdntinuation of the
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
669
previous permit, and that, in conseque!lce, when the
grant of a permit is set aside by a higher authority,
the renewal thereof must also stand automatically set
aside, and that further even if a renewed permit is not
to be regarded as a continuation of the original permit,
seeing that it is granted on the basis of that permit it
should be held to be subject to an implied term that it
should cease if the original permit is cancelled. The
two points that arise for decision on these contentions
are : ( 1) when a permit is renewed, is it a continuation
of the original permit, or is it, in fact, a new one ? and
(2) if a renewed permit is not a continuation of the
original permit, is the grant of it subject to the implied
condition that it is liable to be cancelled, if the original
permit is cancelled?
On the first question, it is necessary to refer to certain
provisions of the Act material thereto.
Section 57
prescribes the procedure to be followed in the grant of
stage carriage permits. Under sub-s. (2), applications
therefor have to be made not less than six weeks before
the date appointed by the Regional Transport Authority
therefor. Sub-section (3) requires that they should be
published in the prescribed manner, and provision is
made for representations being made in connection
therewith. When any representation is so received,
be
sub-s. (5) provides that the person making it is to
given an opportunity of being heard thereon in person
or by a duly authorised representative, and that the
application for permit is to be disposed of at a public
hearing. Section 58 deals with renewals, and is as
follows:
( 1) "A permit other than a temporary permit
issue<l under section 62 shall be effective without
renewal for such period, not less than three years and
not more than five years, as the Regional Transport
Authority may in its discretion specify in the permit :
Provided that in the case of a permit issued or
renewed within two years of the commencement of this
Act, the permit shall be effective without renewal for
such period of less than three years as the Provincial
Government may prescribe.
1957
V. C: K. Bus Servia
Ltd.
v.
The Regional
Transport
Authority,
Coimbatore
Vtnkatarama
A)yar ].
670
1 9.37
V. C. K. Bus S1·n·ia
Ltd.
v.
T Ju Rr[~iumil
Tra11:.Jpo11
Autf;oril)',
Coiinbatou
i'enkatnrmnt1
Ayyar ].
SCPREME COURT REPORTS
f1957J
(2) A permit mav be rwewed on an application
made and dispo,cd of as if it were an application for
a permit :
Provided that, other conditions being equal, an
application for renewal shall be given preference over
new applications for permits."
The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
based on s. 58 (2) is that under the Act an application
for renewal is to be dealt with exactly as an application
for a new permit, that it is to be notified under s. 57
and representations have to be called for in connection
therewith and considered at a public hearing, that·
though the grant of the previous permit furnishes a
ground of preference, it is subject to the limitation
that the other conditions are equal and is thus only
one of several factors to he taken into account, and
that therefore when a renewal is actually granted, it is
on an independent consideration of the merits and it
cannot be distinguished from a fresh grant. It was
further argued that the proviso to s. 58(2) meant little,
because it wa' well established that the g'rJnt of a
permit was not a matter of right, . and the authorities
under the Act would be acting within their powers if
they refu>ed an application for renewal and granted a
fresh permit to a new apiilicant. It was also contended
that though the statute spoke of a renewal of a permit,
that expression did not accurately bring out the true
position, became in legal terminology, renewal imports
that the t:ansaction which is renewed, as for example,
a lease. i, to operate for a further period but on the
same terms. hut that when a permit was renewed,. it
was open to the authorities to impose new conditions,
to alter the period during which it was to operate and
generally to modify its terms. and that therefore the
use of the word "renewal" should not lead to the
inference that it was the original permit that was being
continued.
There is force in these contentions, but there are
other provisions bearing on this question, and when
they are reviewed as a whole, it is abundantly clear
that the intention of the legislature was to treat a
renewal as a continuation of the previous permit. To
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
671
start with, s. 58(1) enacts that a permit sh::ill be effective
for the period specified therein, but this is qualified by
the words "without renewal". Therefore, when there
is a renewal, the effective period is not the original
period specified, bu_t the period up to which the renewal
is granted. That indicates that the life of a renewed
permit is one and continuous. The matter is placed
bevond doubt when we turn to the rules which have
been framed under the Act. Rule 184 ( 1) provides
that when a renewal is granted, it shall be endorsed on
the permit itself, and Form No. 33, which 1s prescribed
therefor is as follows :
"This permit is hereby renewed up to the ..... .
day of. ..... 19 ...... ".
Thus, \~hat is renewed is "this permit". In this
connection, reference must be made to the definition of
"permit" in s. 2(2) of the Act as "the document issued
by a Provincial or Regional Transport Authorit:/'.
Rule 185 is very material for the purpose of the present
rfocussion, and it runs as follows :
''If an application for the renewal· of a permit has
been made in accordance with these rules and the
preocribcd fee paid hy the prescribed date, the permit
shall continue to he effective until orders are passed on
the application or until the expiry of three months
from the <late of receipt of the application whichever
is earlier. If orders on the application are not passed
within three months from· the date of receipt of the
application, the permit-holder shall be entitled ro have
the permit renewed by the Transport Authority for the
period specified. in the application or for one year
whichever is less and the Transport Authority sha 11
call upon the permit-holder to produce the registration
certificate or certificates and Part B or Parts A and R
of the permit, as the case may be, ancl endorse the
renewal in Parts A and B of the permit accordingly
and return them to the permit holder".
Under this rule, when an application for renewal is
made, the permit already granted is to be in forcr
until an order is passed thereon, and what is more
important, if no order is passed within three months,
19.'\7
V. C. J;. Bu-. Srrvfrt
Ltd.
v.
Th<" Rrgiona/
T ran~Oort
Autho~it·"·
CuimhatO..e
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
672
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1957
f19571
the permit hccomes automatically renewed for the
period
mentioned in the rule. This goes a long way
r. C. K. Bus Service
Ltd.
to support the contention of the respondents that on
v.
the scheme of the Act, renewal is a continuation of the
Th, Rtgiona!
Tran.:.port
original permit. It should also be mentioned that the
Authorjty,
rules provide for different forms for an application for
Coimbatore
fresh
permit ;md one for renewal, and the fee to be
Venkatarama
paid along with those applications is also different.
Ay;•a, J.
A reading of the relevant provisions of the Act and of
the rules leads indubitablv to the conclusion that a
renewal is a continuation · of the permit previously
granted. The fact that the grant of renewal is not a
matter of course, or that it is oprn to the authorities
to impose fresh conditions at the time of renewal does
not, when the permit is in fact renewed, alter its
character as a renewal.
We shall now consider the authorities cited by
learned counsel for the appellant as supporting the
view that a renewal under the Act is in the same
position as a fresh permit. In Mahabir Motor Co. v.
Bilzar State('), the point for decision was whether an
appeal lay under s. 64 (f) against an order granting a
renewal of a permit. The contention before the Court
was that the Act made a distinction between the grant
of a permit and a renewal thereof, and that as s. 64 (f)
provided only for an appeal against an order granting
a permit, no appeal lay against an order granting a
renewal. In repelling this
contention the
Court
observed:
"Both grant and renewal stand more or less on
the same footing by reason of ss. 47, 57 and 58 of the
Motor Vehicles Act. ....... ".
This observation has reference to the procedure to be
followed in the renewal of a permit and the right of
appeal given under s. 64 as part of that procedure.
It has no bearing on the character of a permit when
it is renewed. Another decision on which the appellant
strongly relied is Anjiah v. Regional Tra11sport Officer,
Gu11t11r(' ). There, the facts were that an order of
suspension had been passed for breach of one of the
(1) f1956J l.L.R. 34 Patna 429.
(~) [1956) An<lhra Law Tin1es 347.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
1957
conditions of the permit. The correctness of the order
was challenged before higher authorities, but without V. C. K. Bus Smie1
Ltd.
success. Meantime, the period fixed in the permit
v.
had expired, and it had been renewed. The question
Tk&gjMipl
Tronsporl
was whether the period of suspension could be enforced
~hori(y,
against the renewed permit. It was held by the
Coimbator1
Andhra High Cou_rt that it could not be, because
VenkataratQO
the renewal was, in essence, a new permit and not a
AJ.)'ar J.
mere continuance of the old one. The reason for this
decision was thus stated in the judgment :
"There is no right of renewal as such and when
a permit is renewed, there is no right either, on the
part of the permit-holder to insist upon the continuance
of the old terms. It would be undesirable that there
should be any such restrictions upon the right of the
authorities to grant the permit to anybody they choose
or subjecF to any conditions that they think it to be
necessary to impose, provided that they are acting all
the time in the public interest and subject to the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules
made thereunder."
These considerations, though not without force, cannot, in our opinion, outweight the inference to be drawn
from 1:he other provisions to which we have made
reference and for the reasons already given, we are
unable to agree with this decision.
In the view that we have taken that under the
provisions of the Act and the rules, a renewal is a
continuation of the original permit, there can be no
doubt as to what the rights of the appellant are.
When the proprietor of V. C. K. Bus Service was
granted a permit by the Regional Transport. Authority
on December 3, 1952, that grant was subject · to the
result of the decision of the higher authorities. On
September 5, 1954, when the permit was renewed in
favour of the appellant,
that was subject to the
decision of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of
1954, which was then pending. When the renewed
permit dated September 5, 1954, was again renewed
on June 23, 1955, that was likewise subject to the
result of the decision in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954.
When the High Court by its judgment dated March
6-79 S, C, India/59
674
1957
Y. -C. K. Bus ·Se,,,k.
Ltd.
v.
Tiii Rtgi<na/
Transpcrt
Authoril;,,
Coimb01or1
Y1nkatarama
AY.)'ar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
21, 1956, passed in the said Writ Appeal upheld the
cancellation of the permit which had been granted by
the Regional Transport Authority on December 3,
1952 to V. C. K. Bus Service, the permit renewed on
June 23, 1955, became ineffective at least as from that
date. The Regional Transpon Authority was therefore
right in treating it as having become void, and granting by his order dated May 5, 1956, permits to the
respondents.
The second question arises on the alternative contention advanced by the respondents that even if the
renewal is to be regarded, not as a continuation of the
original permit but as an independent grant, it must
be held to have been sul:iject to an implied condition
that if the original permit is ultimately set aside, the
renewal thereof should come to an end. Mr. Sastri,
learned counsel for the appellant, disputes the correctness of this contention. He argues that when there
is a document . embodying the terms of a contract, it
is not permissible to imply therein a condition, if thatwill contradict or vary any terms contained in it, that
to read into the permit a condition that it is to cease
if the decision of the High Court went against the
appellant, would be to modify the terms contained
therein that it is to be effective upto June 30, 1958,
and that it could not therefore be implied. He also
relies on the following observation of Lord Parker in
F. A. Tamplin Steamship Company Limited v. AngloMexican Petroleum Products Company Limited('):
"This principle is one of contract law, depending
on some term or condition to be implied in the contract
itself and not on something entirely dehors the
contract which brings the contract' to an end. It is,
of course, impossible to imply in a contract any term
or condition inconsistent with its express provisions,
or with the intention of the parties as gathered from
those provisions."
It is undoubted law that when the terms of a contract
or grant are reduced to writing, no condition can be
implied therein, which will be inconsistent with its
express terms. But th~ contention of the respondents
(1) [1916) • A.C. 397, tn
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
195?'
involves no conflict with this principle. They do not
seek to obtain any modification or alteration of the V. Cc 1'. Bus Servi&1
Ltd.
terms of the permit, leaving it to operate subject to
-v.
such modification or alteration. They want that the
Tr.. &givnal
Transport
whole permit with all its terms as to duration and
Authority,
otherwise should be held to have become inoperative.
Coimbator1
What they are pleading i5 a condition subsequent on
Ymkataramn
the happening of which the permit will cease, and to
AY.Yar J.
that situation the observation quoted above has no
application. Reference may be made in this connection to . the following observation occurring later in
the speech of Lord Parker in F. A, Tamplin Steamsh~p
Company Limite{l v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products
Company, Limite'd (supra) :
"Moreover, some conditions can be more readily
implied than others. Speaking generally, it seems to
me _easier to imply a condition precedent defeating a
contract before its execution has commenced than a
condition subsequent defeating the contract when it
is part performed."
Thus, there is no legal obstacle to implying a condition
that the renewal should stand cancelled if the right of
the appellant to the original pen;nit was negatived by
the High Court.
That brings us on to the question of fact, whether
on an examination of the permit and of the circumstances under which it came to be granted, we can
infer that it was the intention of the Regional Transport Authority to renew the permit subject to the
result of the decision of the High Court in the appeal
which was then pending before it. The r-ermit granted
to the V. C. K. Bus Service on December 3, 1952, had
been cancelled on February 19, 1953, and it was only
by reason of the stay orders that the bus was permitted
to run. When the app~llant applied for renewal on
April 15, 1954, there was opposition to the grant
thereof from both the respondents herein, based on
the decision of the Government dated July 9, 1953,
and it was in view of their objection that the Regional
Transport Authority renewed the permit for one year
from July 1, 1954 to June 30, 1955. It is: true that
-
676
1957
Y. C. IC. Bus Sm;,.
Lit!.
v.
T Iv Reginal
T 14n1port
AMlhorily,
Coi""'4tort
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
when the appellant applied again for renewal on March
19, 1955, the respondents did not raise objection thereto, but as the appeals in the High Court were still
pending, they had good reason to believe that the
renewal would not affect whatever rights might be
declared in their favour by the High Court. As all
the papers relating to the grant of the original permit
and the subsequent proceedings were part of the
record before the Regional Transport Authority when
he renewed the permit on June 23, 1955, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that he really intended
to renew the permit only subject to the decision of the
High Court.
It is of the utmost importance in this connection to
bear in mind that the appellant applied not for a fresh
permit but for a renewal, and in sanctioning it, the
Regional Transport Authority expressly acted in exercise of his powers under Rule 134-A read with s. 58 of
the Act, and if he did not expressly provide that it was
subject to the decision of the High Court, it must be
because he must hav•: considered that that was implicit
in the fact of its being only a renewal. That that is
how the appellant understood it is clear beyond doubt
from the proceedings taken by it immediately after the
High Court pronounced its judgment.
But it is argued for the appellant on the strength of
the decision in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman
Ltd.( 1) that the mere knowledge on the part of the
authorities that the rights of the parties were under
litigation is not a sufficient ground to import a condition in the permit that it is subject to the result of that
litigation, when in its terms it is unconditional. We
do not read that decision as authority for any such
broad contention. There, the question related to five
permits, which had been originally granted to one
Balasubramania. Raman and Raman Ltd. obta1ried a
transfer of the relative buses, and applied to the fransport authorities for transfer of the permits to itself.
Then, Veerappa having subsequently obtained a
transfer of the same buses frnm Balasubramania,
(1) [1950) S.C.R. 583.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
applied to have the permits transferred in his name.
On October 3, 1944, he also instituted a suit in the Sub.
Court, Kumbakonam, to establish his title to the buses
against Raman and Raman Ltd., and that was decreed
in his favour on May 2, 1946. Raman and Raman
Ltd. appealed against this decision to the Madras High
Court, which by its judgment dated September 2, 1949,
reversed the decree of the Sub-Court and held that it
was entitled to the buses. While these proceedings
were. going on, the transport authorities suspended on
March 28; 1944, the permits which had been granted to
B;ilambramania an<l instead, they were issuing temporary permits from time to time to Veerappa, who had
been appointed receiver m the suit in the Sub-Court,
Kumbakonam. On March 29, 1949, the Government
decided to disc'.:>ntinue the policy of granting temporary
permits indefinitely, and accordingly granted permanent permits, to Veerappa. Then on October i4, 1949,
Veerappa applied for renewal of _these permanent
permits, and that was granted by the Regional Transport Authority on January 3, 1950. The question was
whether this order was bad on the ground that it was
inconsistent with the decision of the High Court that
it was Raman and Raman Ltd., that had obtained a
valid title to the buses. This Court held that the
ownership of the buses was only one of the factors to
be taken into account in granting the permits, and
that as the Regional Transport Authority granted the
renewal on an appreciation of all' the facts, his decision
was not liable to be questioned in proceedings under
Art. 226. It should be noted that the renewal which
was granted on January 3, 1950, was of permanent
permits granted in pursuance of the order of the
Government dated March 29, 1949, which had quite
plainly declared as a matter of policy that notwithstanding the pendency of litigation between the parties,
permanent permits should be granted to Veerappa.
There can be no questi1>n of implying thereafter a
condition that they were subject to the decision of the
Court. Moreover, the renewal was granted on January
3, 1950, after the litigation had ended on September 2,
1949, and any attack on that order could only be by
19~7
v. c. x. Bw Smlict
/;fi.
v.
T!Y Stci01!Gl
Trtw~
~.
c.imballWf
V...,.,_11
..W•J·
678
fg57
V. C. Ii. H?U Strvic1
Ltd.
"
Tht Re-gionttl
Transport
Au.tlwritJ
Coimbatore
VuJoatarama
Ayy11r].·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(i957]
way of appeal against it, and that had not been done.
We are of opinion that the decision in Veerappa Pillai
v. Raman & Raman Ltd. ( 1 ) is of no assistance to the
appellant.
In the result, we affitm the decision of the High
Court bot,'1 on the gr.ound th3t the renewal dated June
23, 1955, is a continuation of the permit granted on
December 3, 1952, and must fall to the ground when
that stood finally set aside by the judgment of the
High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954 dated March
21, 1956, and on the ground that it was an implied
condition of that renewal that it was to be subject to
the decision of the High Court in that appeal, and that
in the event which had happened, it had ceased to be
effective.
These appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs in
Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1956.
Apf!eals dismissed ..
ASGARALI. NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA
"·
February 1 g,
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(BHAGWATI,
]AGANNADHAOAS,
JAFER
IMAM,
GOVINDA
MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)
Crirninal trial-Enactment providinK for speedy trial-Specified
offences made tn'able only by Special fudges empotvcred td atvard
heavier sentences-If violates equality' befo1'e the larv-Pendency ofC.'iminal !.Aw Amendment Act, (XLVI of 1952)-Constitution of
India, Art. 14.
The appeilant and four others were being tried before the
Presidency Magistrate, Bombay for charges under s. 161 read with
116 and further read with s. 109 or s. 114 of the Indian Penal
Code.
During the pendency of the trial the Criminal
Law
Amendment Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952) was enacted by Parliament
and came into force on July 28, 1952. The Act provided for ,the
trial of all offences punishable unc!er ss. 161, 165 or 165-A, of the
Indian Penal Code, or sub-s. (2) of s. 5, of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 exclusively by Special Judges and directed
the transfer of all such trials pending on the date of the coming
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 583.
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