NIEMLA TEXTILE FINISHING MILLS LTD. versus THE 2ND PUNJAB INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 January 1957 | [1957] 1 S.C.R. 335 | 1957 INSC 1
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 January 1957
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, S.K. DAS
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 333/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1957] 1 S.C.R. 335
- Neutral citation
- 1957 INSC 1
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
335
necessary to re-examine the witnesses who have already
been examined m court unless the court thinks it
necessary.
Appeal allowed. Case remanded for retrial.
1957
Dharmanand Pant
v.
State of Uttar
Pradesh
Govinda Almon J.
NIEMLA TEXTILE FINISHING MILLS LTD.
v.
THE 2No PUNJAB INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
(with connected appeals and petitions)
rs. R. DAS C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR,
B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAs JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947)-Constitutional
1'alidity-Legislative competency-Powers of Industrial TribunalsWhether Legislative-The Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26
Geo. 5, Ch. 42), Sch. VII, List III, Entt·ies 27, 29-Constitution of
India, Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) and (g).
The disputes between the appellants and their workmen
were referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication by the
appropriate Government, under the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. It was contended for the appellants that
the reference to the Tribunal was bad because ( l) the Act was
ultm vires. the Constitution inasmuch as its provisions are
Yiobtive of the fundamental rights enshrined in Art. 14 and Art.
19 (I) ( f) and ( g) of the Constitution, (2) the Industrial Tribunals
are legislating in the guise of adjudication, and this amounts to
delegation of the powers of legislation which it was not competent
to the Central Legislature to do so, and ( 3) the definition of the
term "industry" comprises industrial as well as non-industrial
concerns and, therefore, the Act was not within the legislative
competence of the Central Legislature under Entry 29 of List Ill
of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.
Held: (1)
The Industrial
Disputes
Act, 1947, 1s not
unconstitutional and the provisions of the Act do not contravene
Arts. 14 and 19 (l) (£) and (g) of the Constitution.
The basic idea underlying all the provisions of the Act is the
'settlement of industrial disputes and the promotion of industrial
peace so that production may not, be interrupted and the
<:ommunity in general may be benefited, and the appropriate
Government has, therefore, a discretion in the matter of making
the reference to one or other of the authorities under the Act and
also in the matter of carrying out the various provisions of the
Act, including _ the curtailment or extension of the period ot
1957
January 10
336
1957
Niemla Textile
Finishing Mills Ltd.
v.
The 2nd Punja6
Industrial Tribunal
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
op.erati~n of the . aw~rd of the Tribunal, having regard to the
ex1genc1es of the s1tuat1on and the objects to be achieved.
. (2) Industrial Tribunals while settling particular industrial
disputes refe~red to them, lay down certain general principles to
be observed in regard to the determination of bonus, reinstate~
ment of dis1nissed or discharged en1ployees and other allied topics
1nainly with the object of promoting industrial peace, but these
principles or rules of conduct, though they are applied as
precedents by the Industrial Tribunals while adjudic.iting upon
other similar industrial disputes referred to them, are not rules
of la\V and do not amount to legislation.
(3) The Act is not ultra vires the legislature, as the matters
included within the definition of the term "industry" are vvithin
the legislative competence of the Central Legislature under
Entries 27 and 29 of List lII of the Seventh Schedule to the
Government of India Act, 1935.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuR!smcTION : Civil Appeals Nos.
333-335 of 1955 and Petitions Nos. 65, 182 and 203 of
1956.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and
order dated April 15, 1955, of the Punjab High Court
at Chandigarh in Civil Writs Nos. 131-133 of 1955 and·
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
Veda Vyasa, Bhagirath Das and M. L. Kapur, for
the appellants.
Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur and N. H. Hingorani, for
the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 65 and 182 of 1955.
Veda Vyasa, Bhagirath Das and B. P. Maheshwari,
for the petitioner in Petition No. 203 of 1956.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab, Jindra Lal
and T. M. Sen, for respondent No. 2 in the Appeals
and respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in the Petitions.
Sadhan •Chandra Gupta, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh
and /anardhan Sharma, for respondent No. 3 in the
appeals and in Petitions· Nos. 182· and 203 of 1956.
Porus A. Mehta and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener
in Appeal No. 333 of 1955 (Attorney-General of India
on behalf of the Union of India).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
337
Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur, and N. H. Hingorani, for
the lnterveners in the appeals (petitioners in Petitions
Nos. 65 and 182 of 1956).
1957. January 10. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
BttAGWATI J.-These
three appeals with special
leave from the orders of the High Court of Punjab and
three petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution
challenge the vires of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(XIV of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The appellants in the three appeals are engaged in
the manufacture and production of textiles. There
were disputes between them and their workmen, and,
by two notifications each dated March 4, 1955, in
regard to the first two of them and by a notification
dated February 25, 1955, in respect of the third, the
State of Punjab, respondent No. 2, referred the said
disputes for adjudication to the 2nd Punjab Industrial
Tribunal, Amritsar, respondent No. 1, who entered
upon the said references and issued notices to the
appellants to file their written statements. The appellants in Civil Appeal No. 335 of 1955 filed their written
statement on March 31, 1955, without prejudice to
their contentions that respondent No. 2 was not competent to refer the disputes for adjudication by respondent No. 1 and that respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference. The appellants in
Civil Appeals Nos. 333 and 334 of 1955 were called'
upon to file their written statements on or beforeApril 23, 1955, which they did raising the same objections as to the competency of respondent No. 2 and
the jurisdiction of respondent No. 1.
On April 14, 1955, however, the appellants in all the
three appeals filed writ petitions in the High Court
under Art. 226 of the Constitution against, inter alia,
respondents Nos. 1 and 2 asking for writs in the nature
of prohibition restraining respondent No. 1 from proceeding with the references, writs in the nature of
certiorari directing respondent No. 1 to transmit the
records of the proceedings for being quashed and writs
in the nature of mandamus directing respondent No. 2'
43
1957
Nie:nla Textile
Finishing
Mills Ltd.
v.
The 2nd Punjab
lnduJ trial T ribuna~
338
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
to cancel the notifications under which the said references had been made. The grounds which were urged
Finishing
in support of these applications were that their mills
Mills Ltd.
were controlled industries within the definition of the
v.
The 2nd Punjab
term contained in cl. ( ee) of s. 2 of the Act as amended
..ifndustrial Tribunal
by s. 32 of Act LXV of 1951, that they were engaged
BhagwatiJ.
in the production and manufacture of textile goods
and were a textile industry within the meaning of the
word "textiles" as mentioned in the First Schedule to
Industry (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, and
had been declared an industry of which the Union
Government had taken control within the meaning of
the said Act, that the disputes purporting to be referred
by respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 1 were industrial disputes concerning a controlled industry specified
in this behalf by the Central Government and that,
therefore, the appropriate Government for the purposes
.of the Act so far as their mills were concerned was. the
Union Government and not respondent No. 2 and that
respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction or authority to
refer the existing or apprehended disputes between
them and their workmen to respondent No. 1 and the
references being invalid there was no jurisdiction in
respondent No. l to entertain the said references.
These petitions came up for hearing before a Division
Bench of the High Court consisting of the learned
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Kapur who dismissed the
same in limine observing that they were premature,
obviously meaning that respondent No. 1 could deter. mine the objection in regard to its jurisdiction to entertain the references and unless and until it did so the
appellants had no cause of action to file the said
petitions.
It appears that on or about April 12, 1955, a Division Bench of the said High Court consisting of the
learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Falshaw had
admitted a writ pet1t10n based on the very same
· grounds and bad granted a stay of proceedings before
respondent No. 1 therein. It further appears that on
April 18, 1955, the very same Bench which dismissed
the petitions of the appellants in limine on April 15,
1955, admitted a writ petition filed by the Saraswati
Niemla Textile
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
Sugar Syndicate Ltd., inter alia, against respondent
No. 2 wherein, besides the grounds urged in their writ
petitions, an additional ground questioning the constitutionality of s. JO of the Act had also been urged and
ordered the stay of proceedings before the Industrial
Tribunal. The appellants filed on April 18, 1955,
applications before the High Court for leave to appeal
to this Court and for stay of further proceedings before
respondent No. 1. Notices were issued by the High
Court to the respondents in those applications but stay
of further proceedings was refused.
The appellants having come to know of the order
pJssed by the Division Bench of the High Court on
April 18, 1955, on the writ petition of the Saraswati
Sugar Syndicate Ltd., filed petitions on April 19, 1955,
for review of the orders dated April 15, 1955, dismissing their writ petitions in limi1te. In these petitions
for review the . appellants, with a view to bring their
applications within the ratio of the writ petition of the
Saraswati Sugar Syndicate Ltd., alleged that their
counsel had inadvertently failed to raise the contention
that s. 10 of the Act was ultra vires the Constitution.
The High Court was prepared to issue notices to the
respondents but was not prepared to grant the stay of
further proceedings with the result that on the request
of the counsel for the appellants the said petitions for
review were dismissed on April 20, 1955.
On April 25, 1955, the appellants filed petitions in
this Court for special leave to appeal under Art. 136 of
the Constitution. In these petitions for special leave,
they contended that s. 10 of the Act was void and infringed the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 14
of the Constitution "being discriminatory in its ambit".
Special leave was granted to all the three appellants
by this . Court on May 2, 1955, and an order for consolidation of these appeals was made on June 1, 1955.
This plea as to the unconstitutionality of s. 10 of
the Act was elaborated by the appellants in para 12
of their statement of the case filed before us :"That section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act
is also ultra vires of the Constitution of India, as it
conflicts with the provisions of Art. 14 of the
1957
Niemla Textile
Finishin.I!
Mills Ltd.
v.
The '2nrl Punjab
Industrial Tribunal
Bha~wati
J.
340
1957
,Viemla Textile
Finishing
Mills Ltd.
v.
The 2nd Punjab
Industrial Tribunal
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Constitution. The section is discriminatory in ambir
and scope. It confers on the appropriate Government
unregulated and arbitrary powers inasmuch as no
rules have been made to justify differentiation between parties similarly situated and circumstanced in
every respect. There is no rational basis of classification providing different procedures for dealing
with the same or similar matters. The reference to a
Board under section IO (1) (c) of the Act is certainly
more beneficial, speedy, inexpensive and less cumbersome."
Not content with merely challenging the constitutionality of s. IO of the Act, the appellants in Civil Appeal
No. 333 . of 1955 filed in this Court on October 3, 1956,
a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, being
- Petition No. 203 of 1956, challenging the vires of the
whole Act on various grounds which had not been
urged in the proceedings taken by the appellants till
then. We shall not enumerate all these grounds but
refer at the appropriate place only to those contentions which were urged before us by the learned counsel at the hearing.
A similar petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
· had been filed by the Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd., on
September 15, 1956, being Petition No. 182 of 1956,
containing iqentical grounds of attack against the
constitutionality of rhe Act. A notification had been
issued on April 27, 1956, by the State of Punjab
referring the industrial disputes between them and
their workmen for adjudication by the 2nd Industrial
Tribunal and they asked for a writ of certiorari quashing the said reference and writs of mandamus and/or
prohibition directing the State of Punjab to withdraw
the said reference from the Industrial Tribunal and
prohibiting the Industrial Tribunal from proceeding
with the same.
Petition No. 65 of 1956 had been filed on March 21,
1956, by five workmen of the Indian Sugar and
General Engineering Corporation Ltd., carrying on an
undertaking in the name and style of the Saraswati
Engineering Works. A notification had been issued by
the State of Punjab referring th~ disputes which had
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
1957
.arisen between them and their workmen to the 2nd
Niemla Textile
Industrial Tribunal and one of the matters thus
Finishing
referred for adjudication was whether the workmen
Mills Ltd.
,._
dismissed or discharged after July 15, 1955, should be
The
2nd
Pu11jab
reinstated. The petitioners were temporary hands Industrial Trib1111al
employed by the Saraswati Engineering Works in
Bhagwati J.
place of the permanent workmen who had been
dismissed or discharged after July 15, 1955, and they,
in the interests of themselves and 200 other employees
who were in the same category, apprehended that if
the Industrial Tribunal ordered the reinstatement of
the permanent workmen who had been dismissed or
discharged, they would be out of employment. They
had apparently the support of the Saraswati Engineering Works who were keen to retain them in their
employ and filed the petition challenging the constitutionality of the Act on identical grounds. Besides
thus challenging the vires of the Act, they also urged
1n their petition that the undertaking was a controlled
industry and the appropriate Government which was
.competent to make the reference was the Union
Government and not the State of Punjab. They also
.asked for the same reliefs as in Petition No. 182 of
1956.
The Attorney General of India asked for and
·obtained leave to intervene on behalf of the Union of
India at the hearing of the Civil Appeals Nos. 333 to
335 of 1955 and so did the petitioners in both the
Petitions Nos. 182 of 1956 and 65 of 1956. These
petitions along with Petition No. 203 of 1956 were set
down for hearing and final disposal after the Civil
Appeals Nos. 333 to 335 of 1955 and all of them were
heard together. This common judgment will govern
the decision in all.
It may be noted at the outset that the· question as
to the various undertakings being controlled industries
and the appropriate Government for making the
references of the industrial disputes arising between
them and their workmen being the Union Government
and not the State of Punjab which was the very basis
of the writ petitions filed in the High Court and was
.also one of the grounds on which special leave to
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1957j
1957
appeal had been obtained from this Court was ultimately abandoned in the course of the hearing before
Finishing
us
and nothing more need be said about it. The only
AJills Ltd.
v.
contention which has been urged before us in these
The 2nd Punjab
three special leave appeals and the three Art. 32 petil11d11strial Tribunal
tions is in regard to the vires of the Act.
Bhagwati J.
In order to appreciate the grounds of attack against
the constitutionality of the Act it is necessary to
briefly survey the provisions of the Act as it stood
before
the
amendments made by the Industrial
Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 1956 (XXXVI of 1956). The Act was passed, as
the preamble shows, with the express purpose of
making provision for the investigation and settlement
of industrial disputes and for certain · other purposes
defines "industry"
therein appearing. Section 2(j)
to mean any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture
or calling of employers and includes any calling,
service, employme11t, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. Section 2(k) defines a11
"industrial dispute" to mean any dispute or difference
between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen,
which is connected with the employment or nonemployment or the terms of employment or with the
conditions of labour, of any person. Chapter II of the
Act sets out the authorities under the Act and they
are (l) The Works Committee, (2) Conciliation Officers,
(3) Boards of Conciliation, (4) Courts of Enquiry, and
(5) Industrial· Tribunals. These are different authorities with different poc ers and the purposes for which
they are set up and their functions are prescribed i'>
the Act. The Works Committee consists of reprcsentati ves of employers and workmen engaged in a
particular establishmrnt and is constituted in the
prescribed manner in order to promote measures for
securing and preserving amity and good relations
between the employers and workmen and to that end
to comment upon matters of their common interest or
concern and en<leavour to compose any
material
difference of opinion in respect of such matters. The
Conciliation Officers are appointed by notification by
~Viemla Textile
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
the appropriate Government charged with the duty of
mediating , in and
promoting
the settlement of
industrial disputes. Boards of Conciliation are constituted by notification by the appropriate Government
as occasion arises for promoting the settlement of
industrial disputes. Courts of Enquiry are constituted
by notificajon by the appropriate Government as
occasion arises for enquiring into any matter appearing
to be connected with or relevant to an industrial
dispute. Industrial Tribunals are constituted by the
appropriate Government for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance . with the provisions of the
Act. Chapter III provides for reference of disputes to
Boards, Courts or Tribunals and the relevant portion
of s. 10 provides as under :
"10. (1) Where the appropriate Government is of
opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing( a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a
settlement thereof ; or
(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected
with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for
enqmry; or
( c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to
be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, to a
Tribunal for adjudication :
Provided that where the dispute relates to a public
utility service and a notice under section 22 has been
given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it
considers that the notice has been frivolously or
vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so
to do, make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this
Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced."
Chapter IV prescribes the procedure, powers and
duties of the several authorities. The Conciliation
Officers are enjoined for the purpose of bringing about
a settlement of a dispute, without delay to investigate
the dispute and all .matters affecting the merits and
the right settlement thereof and are also empowered
to do al.I such things as they think fit for the purpose of
inducing the parties to come to an amicable settlement
8-100
S. C. India/59.
1957
Niemla T <xlil1
Finish fog
Mill' ltd.
v.
T lu 2nd Punjab
Industrial Tribunal
Bhagwali ].
344
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1957]
of the dispute. If a settlement of the dispute or
of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the
Finishing
course of conciliation • proceedings, they are to send a
,\tills Ltd.
report thereof to the appropriate Government together
v.
The 2nd Punjab
with
a memorandum of the settlement signed by the
Industrial Tribunal
parties to the dispute. If no such settlement is arrived
Bhagwati J.
at, the Conciliation Officers have, as soon as practicable and after the close of the investigation, to send to
the appropriate Government a full report setting forth
the proceedings and steps taken by them for ascertain. ing the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute
and for bringing about a settlement thereof together
with a full statement of such facts and circumstances,
their findings thereon, the reasons on account of which .
in their opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at
and their recommendations for the determination of
the dispute. If, on a consideration of such report the
appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a
case for reference to a Board or Tribunal, it may make
such reference. The Boards of Conciliation to whom
a dispute may be referred under the Act are enjoined
to endeavour to bring about a settlement of the same
and for this purpose they are, in such manner as they
think fit and without delay, to investigate the dispute
and all matters affecting the merits and the right
settlement · thereof and are also empowered to do all
such things as they think fit for the purpose of inducing
the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement
of the dispute. If a settlement of the dispute or of
any of the matters is arrived at in the course of the
conciliation proceedings they are to send a report
thereof to the appropriate Government together with
a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties
to the dispute. If no such 'settlement is arrived at
they are, as soon as practicable after the close of the
investigation, to send to the appropriate Government
a full report setting forth the proceedings and steps
taken by them for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a
settlement thereof together with a full statement of
such facts and circumstances, their findings thereon,
the reasons on account of which, in their opinion, a
Nitmla Textile
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345
settlement could not be arrived at and their recommendations for the determination of the dispute. The
Courts of Enquiry are enjoined to enquire into the
matters referred to them and report thereon to the
appropriate Government. The Industrial Tribunals to
whom an industrial dispute may be referred for
adjudication are to hold their proceedings expediti<msly and, as soon as practicable on the conclusion
thereof, submit their award
to
the
appropriate
Government. Section 19, sub-ss. (3), ( 4) and ( 6)
prescribe the period of operation of awards :
"19. (3) An award shall, subject to the prov1S1ons
of this section, remain in operation for a period of one
year:
Provided that the appropriate Government may
reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit :
Provided further that the appropriate Government
may, before the expiry of the said period, extend the
period of operation by any period not exceeding one
year at a time as it thinks fit so, however, that the
total period of operation of any award does not exceed
three years from the date on which it came into
operation.
(4) Where the appropriate Government, whether
of its own motion or on the application of any party
bound by the award, considers that since the award
was made there has been a material change in the
circumstances on which it was based, the appropriate
Government may refer the award or part of it to a
Tribunal for decision whether the period of operation
should not, by reason of such change, be shortened and
the decision of the Tribunal on such reference shall
subject to the provision for appeal, be final.
( 6) Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of
operation under sub-section (3), the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two
months has elapsed from the date on which notice is
given by any party or oarties intimating its intention
to terminate the award."
Chapter V contains provisions in regard to me prohibition of strikes and lock-outs and declares what are
illegal strikes and lock-outs for the purpose of the Act,
1957
Niemla Texlil•
FiniJhing
/\:1illJ Ud.
v.
The 2nd Punjab
Industrial Tribunal
Bhagwati ].
346
1957
~Viemla Textile
Fini;hing
Mills Ltd.
v.
The 2nd Punjab
ln Justrial Tribunal
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Chapter V-A was introduced by Act XLIII of 1953,
and contains provisions in regard to the lay-off and
retrenchment of workmen. The other provisions of the
Act are not relevant for the purpose of this enquiry
and need not be referred to.
It follows from this survey of the relevant provisions
of the Act that the different authorities which an constituted under the Act are set up with different ·ends in
view and are invested with powers and duties necessary for the achievement of the purposes for which
they are set up. The appropriate Government is
invested with a discretion to choose one or the other·
of the authorities for the purpose of investigation and
settlement of industrial disputes and whether it sets up
one authority or the other for the achievement of the
desired ends depends upon its appraisement of the situation as it obtains in a particular indnstry or establishment. The Works Committees are set up with the
object of avoiding such a clash of interest or material
differences of opinion as would otherwise lead to industrial disputes. If the measures adopted by the Works
Committees do not achieve the end in view and industrial disputes arise or are apprehended to arise betwem
the employers and the workmen, Conciliation Officers
may be appointed by the appropriate Government
charged with the duty of mediating in and promoting
settlement of industrial disputes. If the Conciliation
Officers succeed in bringing about a settlement between
the employers and the workmen, such settlements are
to be signed by the parties to the disputes ; but if
in spite of the endeavours of the Conciliation Officers
properly directed in that behalf no settlement is arrived
at between the parties, the Conciliation Officers are to
send a full report in the manner indicated above so that
the appropriate Government may have before it complete materials in order to enable it to come to a conclusion whether there is a case for reference to a Board
or· Tribunal as the case may be. If the appropriate
Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board of Conciliation, it may constitute such
Board for promoting the settlement of the industrial diS>
pute consisting of a Chairman and 2 or 4 other. members
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
as it thinks fit, charged with the duty of doing all
such things as it thinks fit for the purpose of inducing
the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement
of the dispute. If the Board succeeds in arriving at a
settlement, a report thereof together with a memorandum of the settlement will be sent by it to the
appropriate Government but if no such settlement is
arrived at the Board will send to the appropriate
Government a full report in the manner indicated
above including its recommendations for the determination of the dispute. It may be noted that a reference to the Board of Conciliation is but a preliminary
step for the settlement of the industrial dispute and the
-report made by it in the event of a failure to bring
about such settlement will furnish materials to the
appropriate Government to make up its mind whether
it will refer the dispute for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal. Before, however, any such reference is
made by the appropriate Government it may set up a
Court of Enquiry for the purpose of enquiring into any
matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to
an industrial dispute. The Court of Enquiry will enquire into those matters and report thereon to the
appropriate Government within six months from the
.commencement of the enquiry. That report will furnish
materials to the appropriate Government for finally
.determining whether the industrial dispute shall be
referred by it for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. It may be that the report of the Court of Enquiry discloses circumstances under which the appropriate Government considers that it is not necessary to
refer the industrial dispute for
adjudication to the
Industrial Tribunal. In that event the matter will end
there and the appropriate Government may await
further developments before referring the industrial
dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. If,
-0n the other hand, the materials embodied in the
report of the Court of Enquiry disclose circumstances
which make it necessary for the appropriate Government to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication to
the Industrial Tribuna~ the appropriate Government
will constitute an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication
1957
Niemla Textilt
FiniJhing
Mills Ltd.
v.
The 2n11 Punjai
lnduJtrial T ribunsl
Bhagwati].
348
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19571
of the industrial dispute in accordance with the provisions
of the Act. The Industrial Tribunal would then
Niemla Textile
Finishing
adjudicate upon such dispute and submit its award to
Mill< Ltd.
the appropriate Government.
v.
The 2nd Purefab
These are the steps which are contemplated in the
Industrial Tribunal
manner indicated in s. 10 of the Act for reference of
Bhagwati J.
disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. It is not
necessary that all these steps should be taken seriatim
one after tqe other. Whether one or the otht;r of the
steps should be taken by the appropriate Government
must depend upon the exigencies of the situation, the
i1Pminence of industrial strife resulting in cessation or
interruption of industrial production and breach of
industrial peace endangering public tranquillity and
law and order. If the matter brooks delay the appropriate Government may start conciliation proceedings
culminating in a reference to a Board of Conciliation
and also Court of Enquiry, if need be, before a fullfledged reference ·is made to an Industrial Tribunal. If,
on the other hand, the matter brooks no delay the
appropriate. - Government may possibly refer the dispute
to a Board of Conciliation before referring it for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal or may straightaway
refer it for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal.
What step would be taken by the appropriate
Government in the matter of the industrial dispute
must, therefore, be determined by the surrounding circumstances, and the discretion vested in the appropriate Government for setting up one or the other of
the authorities for the purpose of investigation and
settlement of industrial disputes must be exercised by
it having regard to the exigencies of the situation and
the objects to be achieved. No hard and fast rule can
be laid down as to the setting up of one or the other of
the authorities for the purpose of bringing about the
desired end which is the settlement of industrial disputes and promotion of industrial peace and it is hardly
legitimate to say that such discretion as is vested in
the appropriate Government will be exercised "with an
evil eye and an unequal hand."
It is contended in the first instance that the provisions of the Act are violative of the fundamental
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
349
1957
rights enshrined in Art. 14 and Art. 19( 1) (f) and (g) of
the Constitution ; that it is open to the appropriate
Kiemla Texti/1
Finishin.~
Government
to
differentiate between the
parties
Mills Ltd.
similarly placed and circumstanced in every respect
v.
The 2nd Punjab
and in the absence of any rules made in this behalf Industrial
Tribunal
th<: appropriate
Government has
unregulated and
Bhagwati J.
arbitrary powers to discriminate between the parties ;
th;it there is no rational basis of classification providing, different treatment for different parties and it is
optn to the appropriate Government, in one case to
refer the industrial dispute to a Court of Enquiry, /;
and in another case to refer it to an Industrial Tribunai ; and that the procedures before the Courts of
Enquiry and b~fore the Industrial
Tribunals
are
different, the one before the Courts of Enquiry being
less onerous and less prejudicial to the parties than
that before the Industrial Tribunals. It is submitted
that the reports of the Courts of Enquiry are quite
innocuous whereas the awards of the Industrial Tribunals are binding on the parties and are backed up
by sanctions behind them, and in regard to the periods
of operation also, it is open to ·the appropriate Governmnlt, in one case to reduce the same to an extent
which will make them negligible in point of time
whereas - in another case/it is open to it to extend the
periods even upto three years from the dates on which
the awards came into operation and the appropriate
Government may, in the exercise of its unfettered and
uncontrolled discretion, adopt different measures in
the case of different parties so as to discriminate between them and work to the prejudice of those less
fortunately situated. It is also contended that these
discriminatory provisions being inextricably interwoven with the rest of the provisions. of the Act or
being such that the Central Legislature would not
have enacted the rest of the provisions of the Act
without including the same therein, the whole of the
Act is ultra vires the Constitution./
We are unable to accept these contentions. Having
regard to the provisions of the Act heteinbefore set
out it is clear that s. 10 is not discriminatory in its
ambit and the appropriate Government is at liberty
350
1957
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
as and when the occasion arises to refer the industrial
disputes arising or threatening to arise between the
employers and the workmen to one or the other of the
Mills Ltd.
authorities according to the exigencies of the situation.
Tht 2nd'" Punjab
No
two cases are alike in nature and the industrial
Industrial Tribunal
disputes which arise or are apprehended to arise m
Bhagwnti].
particular establishments or undertakings require to
be treated having regard to the situation prevailing in
the same.; There cannot be any classification and the
reference to ·one or the other of the authorities has
necessarily got to be determined in the exercise of its
best discretion by the appropriate Government. Such
discretion is not an unfettered or an uncontrolled
discretion nor an unguided one because the criteria
for the exercise of such discretion are to be found
within the terms of the Act itself. The various
authorities are to be set up with particular ends in
view and it is the achievement of the particular ends
that guides the discretion of the appropriate Government in the matter of setting up one or the other of
them. The purpose sought to be achieved by the Act
has been well defined in the preamble to the Act.
The scope of industrial disputes/ is defined in s. 2(k) of
the Act and there are also provisions contained in the
other sections of the Act which relate to strikes and
lock-ours, lay-off and retrenchment as also the conditions of service, - etc., remaining unchanged during the
pendency of proceedings. These and analogous provisions sufficiently indicate the purpose and scope of
the Act as also the various industrial disputes which
may arise between the employers and their workmen
which may have to be referred for settlement to the
various authorities under the Act. The achievement
of one or the other of the objects in view by such
references to the Boards of Conciliation or Courts of
guide and
Enquiry or • Industrial/ Tribunals must
control the exercise of the discretion in that behalf by
the appropriate Government and there is no scope,
therefore, for the argument that the appropriate
Government would be in a position to discriminate
between one patty and the other.
Nunda T 1xlilt
Finishitig
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
1957
Apart from the references to be thus made to the
Boards of Conciliation, Courts of Enquiry or Industrial
Niemla Textile
Finisljing
Tribunals, the appropriate Government is also given
Mills ltd.
the powers to prescribe the period of duration of the
v.
The 2nd Punjab
award made by the Industrial
Tribunal. Normally Industrial
Tribunal
the award is to be in operation for one year from the
Bhagwali ].
date of its commencement. The circumstances, however, may have changed between the date of the
reference and the date of the award and power is
thus given to the appropriate / Government to reduce
the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit.,.Power is also given to the appropriate Government, if
the circumstances warrant that decision, to extend the
period of operation by any period not exceeding one
year at' a time as it thinks fit before the expiry of the
normal period of one year, provided however that the
total period of operation of any award does not exceed
three years from the date on which the same came
'into operation. This power is to be exercised, if, in
the opinion of the appropriate Government, the circumstances have not so changed as to warrant the parties
to the industrial dispute to ask for a change in the terms
of the award and in that event the award may continue
to be in operation for the maximum period of three
years from the date of its commencement. The case
in which there has been a material change in the
circumstances on which the award has been based is
mentioned in s. 19( 4) of the Act and there the
appropriate Government, whether of its own motion
or on an application of any of the parties bound by
the award is empowered to refer the award or a part
thereof to a Tribunal if it is satisfied about such
material change in the circumstances for a decision.
whether the period of operation should not by reason
of such change be shortened and the decision of the
Tribunal on such reference, subject to the provision for
appeal, is declared to be final. It appears therefore,
that all the various possibilities are thought of by
those who framed this legislation and wide discretion
has been given to the appropriate Government to
either
reduce the period of operation or to extend the
same having regard to the circumstances of the case or
352
1957
.Niemla T e:xtil!
Finishing
}JillJ Ltd.
v.
The 2nd Purifab
Industrial Tribunal
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
to refer the question of the reduction of the period of
operation to an Industrial. Tribunal in case there has
been a material change in the circumstances on which
the award was based. Here also it cannot be urged
that there is an unguided and unfettered discretion in
the matter of changing the period of operation of the
award. The appropriate Government cannot merely
by its own volition change the period without having
reg:>rd to the circumstances of a particular case. There
is no warrant for the suggestion that such discretion
will be exercised by the appropriate Government
arbitrarily or capriciously or so as to prejudice the
interest of any of the parties ,concerned. The basic
idea underlying all the provisions of the Act is th~
settlement of industrial disputes and the promotion of
industrial peace so that production may
not he
interrupted and the community in general may be
benefited. This is the end which has gqt to be kept in
view by the appropriate Government when exercising
the discretion which is vested in it in the matter of
making the reference to one or the other of the authorities under the Act and also in the matter of carrying
out the various provisions contained in the other
sections of_ the Act including the curtailment or extension of the period of operation of the award of the
Industrial Tribunal. We are, of opinion that there is
no substance jn the contention urged before us that
the relevant provisions of the Act and in particular
s. 10 thereof are unconstitutional and void as infringing
the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Art. 14
and Art. 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. If these
provisions are thus intra vire! there is no need to
consider the further argument advanced before us
that 'hese provisions are so inextricably interwoven
with the other provisions of the Act or are such that the
Legislature would not have enacted the other provisions of the Act without incorporating the same
therein.
It is next contended that the Industrial Tribunals to
whom industrial disputes are referred for adjudication
by the appropriate Government are legislating in the
guise of adjudication and this amounts to delegation
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
of the powers of legislation which it was not competent
to the Central Legislature to do. The argument is
that the Industrial Courts are not bound to follow the
provisions of the ordinary law of the land as enacted
in the Indian Contract Act, the Payment of Wages
Act, the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Indian
Limitation. Act and the like, but are authorised by the
terms of the Act to lay down their own code of conduct
in regard to industrial relations and their own policy
in regard to the promotion of industrial peace. This,
it is submitted is legislation and the Legislature has
in effect abdicated its powers in favour of the Industrial Courts. The provisions in regard to reinstatement
of dismissed or discharged employees, the provisions
in regard to lay-off and retrenchment and the provisions in regard to strikes and lock-outs, amongst
others, are pointed out as introducing provisions
contrary to the positive law of the lapd and as laying
down a code of conduct or policy, and reference is
made in this behalf to a decision of the Federal Court
in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial
Tribunal, Bombay, and Others (1 ) and two decisions of
the Madras High Court, viz., The Electro Mechanical
Industries Ltd., Madras v. The Industrial Tribunal
No. 2 for Engineering Firms and Type Foundries, Fort
St. George, Madras, and Another( 2 ) and Shree Meenakshi
Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras( 3 ). It has to be remembered, however, that the functions of the Industrial
Tribunals, while adjudicating upon the industrial
disputes referred to them for adjudication, are quite
different from those of arbitration tribunals in
commercial matters. As has been observed by Ludwig
Teller in 'Labour Disputes and Collective Bargaining',
Vol. 1, p. 536 :
"Then too, industrial arbitration may involve the
extension ot an existing agreement, or the making of a
new one, or in general the creation of new obligations
or modifications of old ones, while commercial arbitration generally concerns itself with interpretation of
(2) [1950) II M.L.J. 479·
1957
Niem/a Textile
Finishing
Mills Ltd.
v.
The 2nd Punjab
Indus trial Tribunal
BhagwatiJ.
354
1957
.Niemla TexJile
FiniJhing
Mills Lid.
v.
The 2nd Punjab
Industrial Tribunal
BhagwatiJ,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
existing obligations and
(1957]
disputes relating to existing
agreements."
It was also observed by the Privy Council in
Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East
Iron Works, Ltd(), while referring to a claim for
reinstatement by a dismissed employee as one of the
typical matters in dispute between employers and
employees:
"The jurisdiction of the Board (Labour Relations
Board) .......... is not invoked by the employee for
the enforcement of his
contractual rights : those,
whatever they may be, he can assert elsewhere. But
his reinstatement, which the terms of his contract of
employment might not by themselves justify, is the
means by which labour practices regarded as unfair
are frustrated and the policy of collective bargaining
as a road to industrial peace is secured. It is in the
light of this new conception of industrial relations that
the question to be determined by the. Board must be
viewed."
After quoting these observations of the Privy
Council, Rajamannar, C. J., pointed out in Shru
Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras(') at p. 388:
"The essential object of all recent labour legislation has been not so much to lay down categorically
the mutual rights and liabilities of employer and employees as to 'provide recourse to a given form of procedure for the settlement of disputes in the interests of
the maintenance of peaceful relations between parties,
without apparent conflicts such as are likely to interrupt production and entail other dangers. It is with
this object that in the United States there has been
legislation arranging for the adjustment of .conflicting
interests by collective bargaining. In Great Britain
there have been Acts like the Industrial Courts Act,
1919, which provides for Industrial Courts to enquire
i11to and decide trade disputes. There is also provision
for Conciliation Boards under the Conciliation Act,
1896. In fact, our Industrial Disputes Act is modelled
on these two British Acts."
I•) (1949] A.C. 134.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
This being the object of the enactment of the Act
by the Central Legislature, the powers vested in the
Industrial Tribunals in the matter of the settlement of
industrial disputes referred to them for adjudication,
wide though they may be but guided as they are by
considerations of policy as indicated above, can .hardly
be characterised as legislative powers. No doubt they
lay down certain general principles to be observed in
regard to the determination of bonus, reinstatement of
dismissed or discharged employees and other allied
topics but they are enunciated mainly with the object
of promoting industrial peace while settling particular
industrial disputes referred to them. These principles
or rules of conduct, though they are applied as precedents by the Industrial Tribunals while adjudicating
upon other similar industrial disputes referred to them,
are not rules of law strictly so-called and do not
amount to legislation by the Industrial Tribunals.
Even i: the analogy of the Courts of Law be applied
to the Industrial Tribunals, the Industrial Tribunals
at best lay down or declare what the principles or the
rules of conduct governing the relations between employers and the employees should be. A declaration
of the principles or rules of conduct governing the
relationi between the parties appearing before the
Industrial Tribunals is quite different from legislation
which would be binding on all parties and indeed there
is no provision in the Act which confers on the Indus.trial Tribunals either the power to make rules which
would have statutory effect or the power to legislate
in regard to certain matters which crop up between
employers and employees. In the absence of any such
provision, the mere fact that the Industrial Tribunals,
while pronouncing awards in the several industrial
dispute1; referred for their adjudication by the appropriate Government, lay down certain principles or rules
of conduct for the guidance of employers and employees,
does not amount to exercise of any legislative power
and no question of their being invested with any
legislative powers can arise.
So far as delegated legislation is concerned, abstract
definitions of the difference between the judicial and
1957
Niemla Ttxlilr
Finishin.~
Mills /.Id.
v.
The 2nd P1111iab
Industrial Tribunal
Bhagwati ].
356
1957
.Nitmla Textile
Finishing
Mills Ltd.
v.
The 2nd Punjab
l1zdustrial Tribunal
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
the legislative functions have been offered (Sec the
distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Field in the Sinking- .
Fund cases(') ), but they are of little use when applied
to a situation of complicated facts. The function of
a Court is to decide cases and leading jurists recognize
that in the decision of many cases a Court must fill
interstices in legislation. A legislator cannot anticipate
every possible legal problem ; neither can he do justice
in cases after they had arisen. This inherent limitation
in the legislative process makes it essential that there
must be some elasticity in the judicial process. Even
the ordinary courts of law apply the principles of
justice, equity and good ·conscience in many cases ;
e.g., cases in tort and other cases where the law is not
codified or does not in terms cover the problem under
consideration. The Industrial Courts are to adjudicate
on the disputes between employers and their workmen
etc., and in the course of such adjudication they must
determine the "rights" and "wrongs" of the claims
made, and in so doing they are undoubtedly free to
apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, keeping in view the further principle that
their jurisdiction is invoked not for the enforcement of
mere contractual rights . but for preventing labour
practices regarded as unfair and for restoring industrial
peace on the basis of collective barganing. The process does not cease to be judicial by reason of that
elasticity or by reason of the application of the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
• It is not necessary to discuss the various authorities
to which we have been referred on the nature and
scope of the legislative process. Suffice it to say that
there is neither legislation nor delegated legislation in
the awards which are pronounced by the Industrial
Tribunals while adjudicating upon the industrial
disputes referred to them for adjudication and this
contention is devoid of any force.
It is lastly contended that the Act was not within
the legislative competence of the Central Legislature
inasmuch as the definition of the term "industry" in
(t) (1879) 99 U.S. 700, 761; 25 L. Ed. 496, 516.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
s. 2(j) of the Act comprises industrial as well as nonindustrial concerns and the Act which was expressly
enacted with the object of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes is not covered by Entry
29 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. That Entry relates to
"Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes" and
it is urged that industrial disputes being the subject
of legislation, there was no warrant for defining the
term "industry" so as to include therein labour
disputes and those too in non-industrial concerns.
The definition of industry contained in s. 2(j) of the
Act being comprehensive enough to include labour
disputes in non-industrial concerns, it is not possible
to separate the ultra vires part of that definition from
the intra vires part of it with the result that th.:: whole
of the definition must be held to be ultra vlres and in
so far as it permeated the whole of the Act, the Act as
a whole should be declared void. This argument is
sought to be supported by drawing our attention to
certain decisions of the Industrial Tribunals which
have included hospitals, educational institutions and
even the business of Chartered Accountants within
the definition of "industry" contained in the Act
and it is urged that if such non-industrial concerns
are also included in the definition of the term
"industry'', the Act is certainly ultra vires Entry 29.
We need not pause to consider whether the decisiom
of the Industrial Tribunals above referred to are
correct. Tha~ will have to be done when the question
is raised directly before us for adjudication. The fact
that the Industrial Tribunals have put an extended
construction on the term "industry" is no reason for
holding that the definition itself is bad or ultra vires.
What we have got to see is whether the definition of
the term "industry" is within the legislative competence of the Central Legislature and on a prim a facie
reading of the same we are not prepared to say that
the same is unwarranted or not covered by Entry 2~.
A wrong application of the definition to cases which
are not strictly covered by it cannot vitiate th~
definition if otherwise it is not open to challenge. lt
1~57
Niemla Ttxlile
Finishing
Mills Ltd.
v.
The 2nd Punjab
Industrial Tribunal
Bhagwati ,J.
358
1957
.,Viemla Te~h.lt:
Finishing
,itills Ltd.
v.
The 'l.nd Punjab
Industrial Tribunal
Bha!.Jwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957}
should be n(l(ed that, according to the preamble, the
Act was enacted not only for settlement of industrial
disputes but for other. purposes also. It is open to
the respondents also to justify the definition of the
term "industry" as contained in s. 2(j) of the Act by
having resort to Entry 27 of the same List which
refers to "Welfare of labour ; conditions of labour ;
provident funds ; employers' liability and workmen's
compensation ; health insurance,
including invalidity
pensions ; old age pensions". The definition of the
term "industry" including as it does any calling,
service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen, would, therfore, be
justified under this Entry even if the same is not
covered by Entry 29 above referred to. The Entries
in the Legislative Lists should not be given a narrow
construction, they include
within their scope and
ambit all ancillary matters which legitimately come
within the topics mentioned therein. In the matters
before us, moreover, the concerns or undertakings 3re
all industrial concerns and fall squarely within the
definition of the term "industry" strictly so-called
and it is not open to the pursuers, situated as they are,
to challenge the same. This contention also has no
substance and must be rejected.
It, therfore, follows that the Act is intra vires the
Constitution and Civil Appeals Nos. 333, 334 and 335
of 1955 as also Petitions Nos. 203, 182 and 65 of 1956
must be dismissed. There will, however, be one set
of costs payable by the appellants in Civil Appeals
Nos. 333 to 335 of 1955 to the respondents therein.
So far as Petitions Nos. 203 of 1956, 182 of 1956 and
65 of 1956 are concerned, each party will bear and pay
its respective costs thereoL
Appeals and petitions dismissed.
GIPN-87-100 S. C. lndia/59-24-5-60-1,000.
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