SURENDRA NATH KHOSLA versus DALIP SINGH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 November 1956 | [1957] 1 S.C.R. 179 | 1956 INSC 76
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 November 1956
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, S.K. DAS
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 23/1956
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1957] 1 S.C.R. 179
- Neutral citation
- 1956 INSC 76
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
SURENDRA NATH KHOSLA
v.
DA.LIP SINGH
(S. R. DAS c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA
B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAs JJ.)
179
AYYAR,
Election-Improper rejection of nomination
paper-Whether
result oj the election matet'ially affected-Presumption-Double
me1J1ber constituency-Whether election wholly void-AttestationThumb i111prem"on pf proposer and Sf:con(ier-Whether .properl:y
attested-The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (XLIII qf
1951), s, 100(1) (c)-The Representation of the People (Conduct of
Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, r. 2(2).
Twelve candidates filed nomination papers for election from
a double member constituency for the State Assembly, one of the
seats being reserved for the Schedule Castes. The thumb impressions of the proposer and seconder of a candidate were attested by
a magistrate specified in this behalf by the Election Commission.
But there had been a mistake o~ omission of the name of the
magistrate in the communication sent by the Election Commission
to the local authorities. The returning officer rejected the nomination paper on the ground that there was no proper attestation of
the thumb impressions of the proposer and seconder. An election
petitio11_ was filed to set aside the election on the ground that the
nomination paper had been rejected improperly and that this had
materially affected the result of the election. The Election Tribunal
set aside the entire election :
Held, ( i) that the magistrate having in fact been specified by
the Election Commission, the attestation by him was good attestation, and the rejection of the nomination paper was improper,
(2) that in the case of an improper rejection of a nomination paper
there was a presumption that the result of the election had been
materially affected, and ( 3) that the whole election, including that
of the Schedule Caste candidate, was void.
,Vasisht Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 509,
Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmad lshaque, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1104,
distinguished.
Chatturbhuj Vithaldas fasani v. Moreshwar Parashram, (1954)
S.C.R. 817, and Karnail, Singh v. Election Tribunal, Hissar, 10
Elec. Law Reports, 189, referred to.
CML APPELLATE JurusoICTION: Civil
Appeal
No. 23 of 1956.
Appeal against the judgment and order dated
August 26, 1955, of the Election Tribunal, Patiala, in
Election Petition No. 12 of 1954.
180
Suttndra Nlllh
Kho,/a
T,
Dalip Singh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Gopa/ Singh, for the appellants.
/agan Nath Kaushal and Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 6.
1956. November 29. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SINHA J.-This appeal by special leave is directed
against the majority judgment and order of the Election
Tribunal of Patiala, dated August 26, 1955, declaring
the two appellants' election to be void on account of
the improper rejection of the nomination paper of
Buta Singh, respondent 18.
In order to appreciate the arguments raised on behalf
of the appellants it is necessary to state the following
facts : The appellants and respondents 2 to 18 filed
their nomination papers on January 9, 1954, for election
from a double member constituency of Samana to the
Pepsu Legislative Assembly. Of the two seats, one
was reserved for the Schedule Caste and the other was
a general constituency. Scrutiny of the nomination
papers by the Returning Officer took place on January
13, 1954. The Returning Officer accepted all the
nomination papers except that of Buta Singh aforesaid
on the ground that the thumb impressions of the
proposer and the seconder had not been attested by an
officer in accordance with the Election Rules. Polling
took place on February 24, 1954, and the results
announced in the Pepsu Gazette on March 4, 1954.
The results thus announced showed that the first
appellant, Surendra Nath Khosla, had obtained 13,853
votes in the general constituency and the second appellant, Pritam Singh, had polled 13,663 votes for the
reserved seat. They having secured the largest number
of votes from their respective constituencies were
declared to have been duly elected. The other candidates got smaller number of votes which it is not
necessary• to set our here. Buta Singh aforesaid, whose
nomination paper had been rejected by the Returning
Officer, did not take any further steps. But Dalip Singh,
the first respondent, filed an election petition with the
Election Commission, respondent 19. The elect.ion
petition was enquired into by the Election Tribunal
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
181
conststmg of three persons, one of them being the
Chairman. A number of issues were joined between
the parties. The Chairman and another member of
the Tribunal decided the material issues 1 and 4 in
favour of the first respondent to the effect that the
18th respondent had been duly proposed and seconded,
that the Returning Officer had wrongly rejected his
nomination paper and that as a result of that rejection
the result of the election as a whole had been materially
affected. On those findings they declared the election
void as a whole and set aside the election of the appellants. The third member of the Tribunal, while
agreeing with the majority in their judgment on the
other issues, disagreed with them on the most material
issue in the case, namely, issue 4, and held that the
first respondent had failed to prove that the wrong
rejection of the nomination paper of the 18th respondent h:1d materially affected the result of the election.
The appellants moved this Court and obtained special
leave to appeal from the majority judgment declaring
the el-ection to be void as a whole.
The appeal was first piaced for hearing before a
Division Bench of three Judges on March 23, 1956.
That Bench directed that the papers be laid before the
Hon'ble the Chief Justice for having the case heard by
a larger Bench because in their view the case raised a
difficult and important point about election law• They
made referenGe to the full Court decision in H ari
Vishnu Karnath v. Syed A!zmad Ishaque( 1 ), which
upheld the earlier decision of this Court in Vasisht
Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra('), as authorities for
the proposition that the burden of proof is on the
person who seeks to challenge the election and that he
must prove that the result of the election has been
materially affected by the improper rejection of the
nomination paper. They indicated the difficulty of
discharging such a burden unless some sort of presumption was called in aid of the petitioner who sought to
have the election set aside.
In this Court learned counsel. for the appellants has
raised three questions for our determination: (1) That
(•) {1955] I S.C.R. 1104.
M [1~55) ' S.C.R. 509.
1951i
Surmdra Nails
,.,,,,,la
v.
DaJip Sinzh
B. P. Sinlia ].
182
1956
llr"'ndra Nalh
Kiwi/•
v.
Dalip Singh
B. P. Sinlu :J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
the first issue had been wrongly determined by the
Election Tribunal and that it should have been held
that the thumb impressions of the proposer and
seconder of the 18th respondent had not been properly
verified according to the Election Rules and that
therefore the rejection of the nomination paper by the
Returning Officer was justified by law. (2) Assuming
~at the nomination paper had been wrongJy rejected,
the fourth issue had \>een wrongly decided by the
majority in so far as it held that there was a presm,nption that the wrong rejection of the nomination had
the nl!cessary result of materially affecting the election
and that the evidence led on behalf of the appellan~
had not ri::butted that presumption. It was further
contended th:it the minority judgment on issue No.. 4
to the effect that it was for the first respondent, who
sought to have the election set aside, to prove that the
result of the election had been materially affected on
account of the wrong rejection of the nomipation
paper of the 18th respondent was correct, and that he
had failed to establish that by evidence. (3) That in
any case, the election of the second appellant in
respect of the reserved seat should not have been set
aside.
The first issue is in these terms :
"Whether respondent No. 19 (respondent No. 18
in this Court) was duly proposed and ser.onded and
thumb impressions of the proposer and the seconder
on his nomination paper were attested in accordance
with law?"
The Tribunal took the view that as a matter of fact
the respondent Buta Singh had been duly proposed and
seconded. The learned counsel for the appellants did
not challenge that finding of fact. But he contended
that the further finding of the Tribunal that the
thumb impressions of the proposer and the seconder
on the nomination paper had been attested in accordance with law is erroneous. As to the regularity of
the attestation, the matter depends upon the rules
framed under the provisions of the Representation of
the People Act, XLUI of 1951 (hereinafter referred
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
183
to as the Act), particularly r. 2(2), which is IP these
terms:
"For the purposes of the Act or these rules, a
person who is unable to write his name shall, unless
otherwise expressly provided in these rules, be deemed
to have signed .an instrument or other paper if he has
placed a mark on such instrument or other paper in
the presence of the Returning Officer or the presiding
officer or such other officer as may be specified in this
behalf by the Election Commission and such officer on
being satisfied as to his identity has attested the mark
as being the mark of such person."
In this case the nomination had been attested by a
local magistrate and the Tribunal after referring to the
relevant evidence has recorded the finding that that
magistrate had been specified by the Election Commission in that behalf. The question, therefore, is
essentially one of fact But the learned counsel for
the appellants contended that, as found by the Tribunal, there had been a mistake of omission in the communication from the Election Commission to the local
election officer and that such a mistake, clerical or
accidental though it may have been, has the effect of
rendering the attestation unacceptable. We are not
prepared to acceded to that contention as sound in
principle. The Tribunal having found as a fact that
the persons whose thumb i1npressions the nomination
paper purported to bear had really proposed and
seconded the candidate and that those thumb impressions had been attested by a magistrate who had in
fact been authorised in that behalf, there is no room
for the contention that the Returning Officer was
justified in rejecting the nomination paper in question.
The first ground of attack therefore fails.
The second ground of attack is based on issue No. 4,
whir;h is in these terms :
"vVhether the rejection of the nomination paper
of respondent No. 19 (respondent No. 18 in this Court)
had materially affected the result of the election."
On this issue the majority of the Tribunal took the
view that in a case where a nomi,nation paper had
5-76 S.C. lndia/59
1956
Surendra Naih
K/11JJ/a
v.
Dalip Singh
B. P. Sinha J
184
Surmdra Ndlll
Khosla
v.
Dtllip Singh
B. P. Sinha J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19571
been improperly rejected "there is a strong presumption that the result of the election has been materially
affected. It referred to a iarge number of decisions of
different Election Tribunals both before and after the
enactment of the Act to show that the view taken in
most of the decisions was that in a case like this there
was a presumption in favour of holding" that the result
of the election had been materially affected and that
the burden lay on the person seeking to uphold the
election to prove the contrary. They gave effect to
that presumption and held that the evidence adduced
by the appellants (then respondents) did not rebut
that presumption.
The learned counsel
for
the
appellants invited our attention to the words of the
statute. Section lOO(l)(c) is in these terms:
"If the Tribunal is of opinion(c) that the result of the election has been materially
affected by the improper acceptance or reiection of any nomination,
the Tribunal shall declare the election to be wholly
void."
He argued
that the legislature has placed "improper
a.cceptance" and "improper rejection" of a nomination paper on the same footing, and the condition
precedent to the declaration of an election to be void
is that the Tribunal should be satisfied not only that
there has been an improper rejection of a nomination
paper but also that that improper rejection has materially affected the result of the election, (confining the
provisions of ~ the statute to the facts of the present
case). Reliance was also placed by him on the two
decisions of this
Court, namely, Vashisht Narain
Sharma v. Dev Chandra (supra) and Hari Vishnu
Karnath v. Syed Ahmad lshaque (supra) in support of
the proposition that the two conditions are cumulative
and must both be established and that the burden of
establishing them is on the person who seeks to have
the election set aside. He also relied upon the terms
of s. 90(3) of the Act to the effect that the provisions
of the Evidence Act shall subject to the provisions of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
185
the
Act, be deemed to apply in all respects to l:he trial
The contention further is that
Evidence Act must therefore
apply and the burden must be cast on the petitioner
before the Tribunal" to establish both the conditions
before any relief could be granted to him. In our
opinion, that argument does not advance the case of
the appellants any more than what has been laid down
by this Court in the cases referred to above. The
other provisions of the Evidence Act including the rules
of presumption must also be equally applicable. But
neither of the two cases referred to above directly
applies to the facts of the present case which is one of
improper rejection of a nomination paper. A Division
Bench of this Court has laid down in the case of
Chatturbhuj Vithaldas /asani v. Moreshwar Parashram{ 1 ) at p. 842 that the improper rejection of a
nomination pa~r "affects the whole election". A similar view was taken in the case of Karnail Singli v.
Election Tribunal, Hissar(8 ), by a Bench of five Judges
.of this Court. But, as pointed out on behalf of the
appellants, in neither of those two cases the relevant
provisions of the Act have been discussed. It appears
that though the words of the section are in general
terms with equal application to the case of improper
acceptance, as also of improper rejection of a nomination paper, case law has made a distinction between
the two classes of cases. So far as the latter class of
cases is concerned, it may be pointed out that almost
all the Election Tribunals in t11e country have consistently taken the view that there is a presumption in
the case of improper rejection of a nomination paper
that it has materially affected the result of the election. Apart from the practical difficulty, almost the
impossibility, of demonstrating that the electors would
have cast their votes in a particular way, that is to
say, that a substantial number of them would have
cast their votes in favour of the rejected candidate, the
fact that one of several candidates for an elecion had
been kept out of the arena is by itself a very material
-0f an elt:ction µ..:titim1.
ss. 101 and 102. oi the
..
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 817.
(o) 10 Elec. Law Report• 189.
1956
Suren"" NatA
K/uula
...
IMli' Shin1lt.
B. P. Sinha J.
186
1956
Sllfandra Nath
K/iosla
v.
Dalip S~h
B. P. Si""4 J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
consideration. Cases can easily be imagined where the
most desirable candidates from the point of view of
electors and the most formidable candidate from the
point of view of the other candidates may have been
wrongly kept out from seeking election. By keeping
out such a desirable candidate, the officer rejecting the
nomination paper may have prevented the electors
from voting for the best candidate available. On the
other hand, in the case of an improper acceptance of a
nomination paper, proof may easily be forthcoming to
demonstrate that the coming into the arena of an
additional candidate has not had any effect on the
election of the best candidate in the field. The conjecture therefore is permissible that the legislature
realising the difference between the two classes of cases
has given legislative sanction to the view by amending
•· 100 by the Representation of the People (Second
Amendment) Act, XXVII of 1956, and by going to
the length of providing that an improper rejection of
any nomination paper is conclusive proof of the election being void. For the reasons aforesaid, m our
opinion, the, majority decision on the fourth issue is
also correct.
Alternatively, it was argued by the learned counsel
for the appellants that if there was such a presumption, it was a rebuttable one and the Tribunal should
have held that the evidence adduced by the appellants
had rebutted that presumption. He proposed to take
us through the oral evidence adduced by them. But
we refused to go into that evidence for the simple
reason that this Court in an appeal by special leave
does not ordinarily reopen findings of fact recorded by
a competent Tribunal. It must, therefore, be held that
the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion
that the result of the election had been materially
affected by the improper rejection of the nomination
in question.
Lastly it was urged that assuming that the Tribunal
was justified in declaring the election to be void so far
as the general seat was concerned, there was no reason
to set aside the election as a whole and that, therefore,
the election of the second appellant should not have
S.C.R.
187
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
been set aside. But s. 100 in terms provides that if
the Tribunal was of the opinion, as it was in this case,
that the result of the election had been materially
affected by the improper rejection of the nomination
paper, "the Tribunal shall declare the election to be
wholly voi<l". The election in this case was in respect
of a double seat constituency and was one integral
whole. If it had to be declared void, the Tribunal
was justified in setting aside the election as a whole.
As all the contentions raised in support of the
appeal fail, it must be dismissed with costs to the contesting respondents.
Appeal dismissed.
KALUA
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(JAGANNADHADAS,
JAFER lMMAM and
MENON JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Murder-Cricumstantial
fire-arms expert-Whether conclusive.
,
GovINDA
evidence-Opinion of
One Daya Ram had been murdered by shooting with a country made pistol. The circumstantial evidence established against
, the appellant was (I) that he had a motive for the murder, (2) that
three days before the murder the appellant had held out a threat
to murder the deceased, ( 3) that a cartridge Ex. I was found near
the cot of the deceased, and ( 4) that the appellant produced a
country made pistol Ex. III from his house in circumstances
which clearly showed that he alone could have known of its existence there. The fire-arms expert examined the recovered pistol
and the cartridge and after making scientific tests was of the
definite opinion that the cartridge Ex. I had been fired from the
pistol Ex. III.
Held, drat the opinion of the fire-arms expert conclusively
proved that the cartridge Ex. I had been fired from the pistol
Ex. III.
The circumstantial evidence
111ilt of the appellant.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
Appeal No.. 135 of 1956.
was
sufficient to
establish the
JuRISDICTION:
Criminal
1956
Srwendra J(alh
Jr/i111/a
v ..
Dalip Sinili
B. P. Sinha ].
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