LAKSHMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS LTD. versus PT. RAM SARUP
Supreme Court of India | Decided 24 October 1956 | [1956] 1 S.C.R. 916 | 1956 INSC 59
Key facts
- Decided
- 24 October 1956
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, P. GOVINDA MENON
- Bench size
- 4
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 244/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1956] 1 S.C.R. 916
- Neutral citation
- 1956 INSC 59
Text of the judgment
916
1956
October 24.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
LAKSHMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS LTD.
v.
PT. R.AM SARUP.
(and connected appeal)
[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR,
GovINDA MENON JJ.]
s. K. DAS and
Industrial Dispute-Application for permission to dismiss workmen-Jurisdiction of Appellate Tribunal-Scope of enquiry! nterim order of suspension by employer pending enquiry and receipt
of permission-If amounts to a lock-out-If amounts to punishment
-Prior permission of the Appellate Tribunal, if required-Enquiry
by General Manager-Non-co-operation by Workmen-Enquiry not
held within the prescribed time-If a breach of Standing OrdersIndustrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XL VIII of 1950),
.,. 22, 28-Indiistrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947J, s. 83( a)(b)Standing Orders, cl. L 12.
Seventy-six workers of the appellant company resorted to a
tools-down strike in sympathy with a dismissed co-worker. Re·
peated attempts to persuade them to resume work having failed the
General Manager suspended them until further orders. After mid·
day recess the Management sought to prevent the workers from
entering the mills but they violently entered the mills and the Police
bad to be called in by the company to keep the peace. Charges of
misconduct,a.nd insubordination were thereafter frame~ against the
workers and they were called upon to show cause in an open
enquiry to be held by the General Manager why disciplinary action
should not be taken against them and the order of suspension was
extended pending the enquiry. The workers took up an attitude
of total non-eel-operation and the atmosphere was tense with the
result that the enquiry could not be held within 4 days.
The
Management decided to dismiss the workers as a result of the en...
quiry but as an appeal was then pending before the Labour A11pel·
late Tribunal, the company applied to it under s. 22 of the Indus·
trial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Acit of 1950 for permission to do
so and extended the period of suspension pending receipt of such
permission. The workmen in their turn filed an application under
s. !13 of the Act to the Appellate Tribunal for requisite action to
be taken against the company for having contravened s. 22(b) of
the Act by resorting to an illegal lock·out and thereby punishing
them without its prior permission.
The Appellate Tribunal held
that the company bad not held the enquiry within the time specified
by cl. L 12 of the Standing Orders and on that ground dismissed its
application. It allowed the application of the workers holding that
the wholesale suspension of the workers and preventing them from
continuing work after the mid-day recess amounted to a lock-out
ti
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
917
1956
and punishment by the company and contravened ~· 22(b) of the
Act and directed their reinstatement. The company appealed. It
was contended on behalf of the company that there had been neither Lakshmi Devi
a breach of cl. L 12 of the Standing Orders nor a contravention of Sugar Mills Ltd.
v.
s. 22(b) of the Act.
Pt, Ram Saruj>
Held, that the contentions were correct and the appeals must
succeed.
The conduct of the company did not come within the definition
of a lock·out and even if there was any lock-out it was in con·
sequence of the illegal strike resorted to by the workmen and as such
could not be deemed to be illegal by virtue of s. 24(3) of the Indus·
trial Disputes Act, 194 7.
Moreover, even assuming that the company declared an illegal
lock-out it was not necessary for it to obtain the permission of the
Appellate Tribunal under s. 22 of the Act before it could do so.
A lock-out was neither an alteration of tb e conditions of service
within the meaning of cl. (a) nor a discharge or punishment by dismissal or otherwise within the meaning of cl. ,(b) of s. 33 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or under s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 and no permission was, therefore, required for its declaration. If the lock·out was illegal the
workmen had their remedy under s. 26 of the Industrial Disputes
Act.and in any event they had the right to have the dispute referred
for adjudication.
Jute Workers Federation, Calcutta v. Clive Jute Mills ([1951]
II L.L.J. 344) and Colliery Mazdoor Congress, Asansol v. New
Beerbhoom Coal Co. Ltd. ([1952] L.A.C. 219), approved.
-'
The Company having been declared a public utility concern,
the workets had no right to go on strike without giving a notice in
terms of s. 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 and the tools·
down strike resorted to by them was illegal and the company was
within its rights in suspending them.
Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Workers of the Buckingham
and Carnatic Co. Ltd., ([1953] S.C.R. 219), referred to.
Mere failure to hold an enquiry within the period of four days
prescribed by cl. L 12 of the Standing Orders could not determine
~he matter before the Appellate Tribunal and where, as in the
mstant case, the delay was due to the conduct of the workers it was
sufficiently explained.
Where full and free opportunity was given to the workers to be
present and defend themselves in a duly notified enquiry and they
failed to do so, the Management was quite within its right to come
to its own conclusiQn as to their guilt and the punishment to be
meted out to them and it was not open to the workmen thereafter
to urge that such enquiry was not fair or impartia.l or violated the
principles of natural justice.
918
1956
Lakshmi Devi
Sugar Mills Ud.
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
There could be no punishment so long as there was no offence
and any action of the employer to the deteriment of the workers'
interest would not amount to punishment. The law did not contemplate anything like a contingent punishment of a worker and,
consequently, where there was an interim order of suspension pend·
ing an enquiry or the grant of permission by the Appellate Tribunal, the question of pay for the period ol such suspension depending on whether or not tbe permission would be granted, such sus·
pension would not amount to punishment even where it was of an
indefinite duration so as to attract the operation of s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
Champdany J11te Mifls and Certain Workmen, ([1952) 1 L.L.J.
554), Joint Steamer Companies and Their Workmen, ([1954] II
L.L.J. 221), Assam Oil Co. Ltd. v. Appalswami, ([1954] II L.L.J.
328), Standard Vac11um Oil Co. v. Gunaseelan, M. G. ([1954] II
L.L.J. 656), relied on.
Under that section the only thing that the Appellate Tribunal
he.d to consider was whether a prima facie case had been made out
by the employer for lifting the ban imposed by the section and if,
on thG materials before it, it was satisfied that there had been a
fair enquiry in the circumstances of the case and the Management
bad bona fide come to the conclusion that the worker was guilty of
misconduct with which be had been charged and it would be detrimental to discipline and dangerous in the interests of the company
ta continue him in its employ, a. prima jacie case was made out and
the Tribunal would be bound to permit the employer to punish the
workman. It would be no part of its duty to judge whether the
punishment was harsh or excessive, except so far it might bear on
the bona fides of the Management, and could only grant the permission as sought for or refuse it and the question of the propriety of
the punishment could be decided only by the appropriate Tribunal
appointed by the Government for adjudicating the industrial dis·
pute which would ensue upon the action of the management.
Atherton West cf) Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union and
Otlwrs, ([1953] S.C.R. 780), The Automobile Products of India Ltd.
v. R11kmaji Bala it Others, ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1241) Champdany Jute
Mills and Shri Alijan, ([1952] II L.L.J. 629), R.B.S. Lachmandas
Mohan Lal if; Sons Ltd. and Chini Mill Karmachari Union, ((1952]
II L.L.J. 787) and Assam Oil Companies' Case, ([1954] L:A.C. 78),
referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 244 and 245 of 1954.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
August 19, 1952, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of
India (Calcutta) at Allahabad in Miscellaneous Cases
Nos. C-91 and 93 of 1952.
I
,_
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91!)
N. 0. Ohatterji, H.J. Umrigar, J. B. Dadachanji,
S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant
in both appeals.
Purshottam Tricumdas, R. Ganapathy Iyer and
B. P. Maheshwari, for respondents in both appeals.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Porus
A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, fo.r the Intervener.
1956. October 24.
was delivered by
.
... l
1956
Lakshmi Devi
Sugar Mills Ud,
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
The Judgment of the Court
BHAGWATI J.-These two appeals by special leave
arise out of an order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench, by which it dismissed
the application of the appellant under s. 22 of the •
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950,
hereinafter referred to as the Act for permission to
dismiss the respondents from i~s employ and allowed
" the application of the respondents under s. 23 of the
Act for reinstatement.
The respondents are 76 employees of the appellant,
a limited company of Sugar Mills, situated in village
Chitauni in the district of Deoria and were working
in the engineering department of the.mills in the mill
house, boiling house and the workshop sections. There
were disputes between the appellant and its workmen and, on the date in question, i.e., Ma,y 27, 1952,
there was pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal an appeal which was registered as Cal-101/51. It
appears that one Motilal Singh, an employee of the
appellant, had been dismissed by it sometime prior
thereto and he had been inciting the workmen to
make common cause with him, and, at a meeting
held th& previous night, some sort of action had been
decided upon. When the workmen of the appellant
entered the mills on the morning of May 27, 1952,
these 76 workmen, though they entered their respective sections of the engineering department, did not
commence any work from 7 a.m. as they should have
done. The sectional engineers in-charge asked these
workmen as to why they did not commence their
work and became aware of their intention to resort
920
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
to a tools-down strike. They reported the fact to the
Chief
Engineer who sent a slip to the General Manager
Laksh1ni Devi
informing
him that the workers had gone on a toolsSugar Mills Ud.
The General Manager thereupon perdown
strike.
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup sonally went to the workshop, mill house and the
boiling house and asked these workmen not to resort
Bhagwati J.
to such strike but the latter did not pay any heed to
his ad vice. The General Manager then asked the Chief
Engineer to persuade these workmen to commence
the work, give them time for about 2 hours till 10-30
a.m. and report to him if, in spite of his -persuasions,
they did not commence work. The persuasions of the
Chief Engineer and also of the section engineers
proved of no avail and the 76 workmen persisted in
their attitude with the result that the section engineers made their reports to the General Manager
through the Chief Engineer giving the names of the
workmen belonging to their respective sections who
had resorted to the tools-down strike with effect from 7
a.m. that day. These reports were endorsed by the
Chief Engineer and passed on to the General Manager
who, in his turn, passed an order at about 10-30 a.m.
suspending these 76 workmen till further orders. The
order for suspen.sion was communicated to these workmen through their sectional heads and was also pasted
on the notice board of the mills. There was a recess
between 11 a.m. and l p.m. and when the gates were
opened at I p.m. these 76 workmen, in spite of the
warnings of the gatekeepers and Jemadar to the contrary, rushed into the mills, entered their respective
sections and adopted a threatening attitude. The
sectional engineers made reports to the General
Manager in regard to this occurrence and these
reports also were endorsed by the Chief Engineer and
passed on by him to the General Manager. The situation which was created by these workmen by forcibly
entering their respective sections and continuing there
threatening violence was explosive and the management had to call in the police in order to avert
violence and damage to the property. The police
came in at 5 p.m. and order appears to have been
restored. There was no untoward incident that day
'
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S.C.R.
-~I
'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
921
but the management appears to have viewed the
situation with seriousness and approached the
Regional Conciliation Officer the next day in order to
ask for advice in regard to the dismissal of these
workmen. The Regional Conciliation Officer, however,
pointed out to the General Manager that, in,view of
the pendency of the appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, he had no jurisdiction to entertain any
application fol" such permission and referred the
General Manager to the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
The workmen, on the other hand, got a letter dated
May 28, 1952, addressed to the General Manager by
the General Secretary of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh
to the effect that they had gone to the gates of the
mills as usual at 7 a.m. that day to attend to their
work but they were not allowed to enter the mill premises. They charged the management with the intention to victimise them on the charge of a toolsdown strike and stated that they had neither struck
nor intended to strike but had been prevented froJ,11
attending to their work and had therefore been
advised to go back to their quarters with a view to
maintain peace. The last paragraph of that letter
was very significant. The General Manager was told
that if he did not mend his illegal mistakes and did
not take the w.orkmen back on duty he would be responsible for any breach of peace.
After receipt of that letter it was evident that the
workmen would resort to violent measures in order to
attend to their work and a breach of peace was apprehended. The management evidently continued the
police precautions and, after having waited for some
time, the General Manager furnished to these 76 workmen on June 2, 1952, a charge-sheet wherein he
charged them with having committed misconduct
within the meaning of cl. L. 1 (a) and (b) and wilful
insubordination within the meaning of cl. L. l(a), (b}
and (w) of the Standing Orders. He called upon them
to show cause within 24 hours of the receipt of the
charge-sheef why disciplinary action should not be
taken against them and gave them intimation that an
open enquiry in connection with the said charges
120
1956
Lakshmi Devi
Sugar Mills l.Jd.
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
Bhagwati J.
922
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19561
195~
would be held by him at 8 a.m. on June 6, 1952. He
also
intimated that if all the workmen arranged to
Lakshmi Devi
present
themselves earlier than June 6, 1952, he
Sugar Mills Ltd.
would take up the said enquiry earlier provided, howv.
Pt. Ram Sarup ever, an intimation was received to that effect from
them or from their Union. The workmen were to
BhagwatiJ.
remain suspended till the enquiry was finished.
The workmen addressed uniform letters to the
General Manager denying that there was any toolsdown strike on May 27, 1952, and alleging that the sectional heads and the Chief Engineer had conspired
together "under some mysterious preconceived plans"
and stated that no useful purpose would be served by
holding an enquiry on the 11th day of their suspension.
They pointed out that such indefinite period of suspension during the pendency of the appeal before the
Labour Appellate Tribunal and Reconciliation Board
was illegal and unjustified and was in utter disregard
of the Standing Orders. By their further letter dated
June 5, 1952, similarly addressed to the General Manager, they voiced their apprehension that
they would not get any justice from an enquiry held
by the management itself and asked for investigation
by an impartial tribunal. The management, however, held the enquiry as intimated at 8 a.m. on June
6, 1952. The workmen non-co-operated and did not
present themselves at the enquiry.
The General Manager immediately addressed a
letter to these workmen putting on record that in
spite of the orders conveyed by him earlier the workmen had disobeyed the same and had not appeared
at the appointed time and place for the enquiry into
the tools-down strike. He pointed out that by not
appearing in this manner they had made themselves
liable to dismissal for insubordination, and intimated
that the management was applying to the proper
authorities for permission to dismiss them pending
receipt of which the workmen would remain under
suspension. This letter was received by the workmen at 9 a.m. that day and they replied through the
General Secretary of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh
repeating that a demand had been made for an
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S.C.R.
·-
... .,..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·
923
1956
investigation by an impartial tribunal and in so far as
no impartial tribunal had been appointed they were Lakshmi Devi
not agreeable to .present themselves and submit their Sugar Mills Ltd.
defence at the enquiry which was conducted by the
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
management itself.
The appellant thereafter made the necessary appliBhagwati).
cation under s. 22 of the Act before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench, for permission to dismiss these 76 workmen. In the affidavit
which was filed in support. of that application, all the
facts hereinbefore mentioned were set out in extenso
and it was pointed out that the management, after
giving full consideration to the explanations and
offering every possible opportunity to these workmen
to explain their conduct coupled with the unreasonable attitude adopted by them, had adjudged them
guilty of misconduct under cl. L. l(a), (b) and (w) of
the Standing Orders and considered that any further
employment of these workmen would be extremely
detrimental to discipline and dangerous in the interests of the industry.
The workmen, in their turn, filed on June 9, 1952,
an application under s. 23 of the Act for requisite
action to be taken against the appellant for having
contravened s. 22(b) of the Act by inflicting on them
the punishment in the shape of harassment by resorting to an illegal lockout for an indefinite period with
effect from May 27, 1952, without obtaining the prior
permission of the Labour Appellate Tribunal .and
"thereby acting contrary to law and resorting to mala
fide actions in direct violation of the provisions of the
Standing Orders in continuation of the management's
anti-trade (Union) activities".
Counter-affidavits were made by the workmen as
also the management in reply to both the above applications. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that
the appellant did not act in strict compliance with cl.
L. 12 of the Standing Orders and was, therefore, not
entitled to ask for permission to dismiss the 76 worktnen. It accordingly dismissed the appellant's application under s. 22 of the Act. In regard to the application of the workmen under s. 23 of the Act, it held
924
1956
Lakshmi Devi
Sugar Mills Ud;
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
that the wholesale suspension of the 76 workmen and
their prevention from resuming work at 1 p.m. after
the lunch hour amounted to a lockout and that this
conduct of the appellant amounted to punishment of
the workers whether by dismissal or otherwise and
was, therefore, in contravention of s. 22(b) of the
Act. It accordingly ordered the reinstatement of the
workmen if they presented themselves at the office of
the General Manager during office hours o.n any day
within 15 days of the order. and also ordered payment
of half the salary and allowances for the period of
non-payment, viz., from the date of their suspension
up to the date on which they were taken back in
service.
Shri N. C. Chatterjee for the appellant before us
has strenuously urged that the workmen had resorted
to the tools-down strike which was an illegal strike
and that the appellant was well within its rights in
suspending them pending enquiry and also pending
the application for permission to dismiss them made
before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Even if it
be held that the appellant had declared a lockout,
such a lockout was in consequence of the illegal strike
resorted to by the workmen and could not be deemed
to be illegal. He further urged that the management
h~d held an enquiry into the illegal strike which had
been resorted to by the workmen and found that the
workmen were guilty of misconduct and insubordination within the meaning of cl. L. l(a), (b) and (w) of
the Standing.Orders and the appellant rightly came
to the conclusion that any further employment of
these workmen would be extremely detrimental to
discipline and dangerous in the interests of the industry. He also contended that the delay_in holding the
enquiry was not un.reasonable and the suspension of
the workmen pending enquiry for more than four
days was due to sufficient reason, the atmosphere
created by the non-co-operation of the workers being
so tense as not being appropriate for the holding of
an enquiry within those four days, that there was no
breach of cl. L. 12 of the Standing Orders and that
the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error when it
-1
..
S.C.R.
,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
925
refused to grant the application under s. 22 of the
Act.
Civil Appeal No. 245 of 1954 which is directed
against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal
under s. 23 of the Act may be disposed of at once. The
Labour Appellate Tribunal was of opinion that the
conduct of the appellant in preventing the workmen
from continuing work after 1 p.m. on May 27, 1952,
came within the definition of a lockout and the workmen being employed in a public utility concern such
lockout would be illegal without a proper notice. It
was further of opinion that this conduct amounted to
punishment of a worker whether by dismissal or otherwise and was, therefore, in contravention of s. 22(b)
of the Act. This conclusion of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal was, in our opinion, based on a misapprehension of the whole position. The position had been
summed up by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the
following words:" As a matter of fact, the management never
thought of a lockout. Their idea was to suspend the
suspected persons pending enquiry for which they
gave a notice".
If this was the correct position, the conclusion
reached by the Labour Appellate Tribunal that the
conduct of the management came within the definition of a. lockout was absolutely unjustifiable. · The
Labour Appellate Tribunal recorded its inability to
come to a definite finding as to what was the position which obtained on May 27, 1952. h observed:"W e have got a number of affidavits in support
of the parties' case and there is oath against oath.
We do not find ourselves in a position to hold definitely as to what was the exact situation. But it
does appear to us that a mountain has been made of
a mole hill and conclusions have been arrived at without going deep into the matter".
Even if the parties had made a mountain of a mole
hill and had reached conclusions without going deep
into the matter, it was certainly the business of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal itself to record a finding
of fact in regard to the situation as it obtained on
1956
Lakshmi Devi
S11gar Mills Ltd.
v.
Pt. Ram Satup
926
1956
Lakshmi Devi
Sugar Mills Ud.
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
that day. This unfortunately the Labour Appellate
Tribunal did not do and it came to record its conclusion that the conduct of the management came within the definition of a lookout without realizing that
such conclusion was inconsistent with what it had
stated a li.ttle earlier thatthemanagement as a matter
of fact never thought of a lookout. We have been
taken through the whole evidence by the learned
counsel for the appellant and there is clear documentary evidence to show that the 76 workmen resorted to a tools-down strike from 7 a.m. on May 27,
1952. The reports which were made by the section
engineers and sent to the General Manager through
the Chief Engineer were clear and categoric in regard
to such tools-down strike having been resorted to by
the workmen in question and the list of the 76 workmen which was prepared by the General Manager
ordering their suspension was based on those reports.
'l'he further reports which were made by the section
engineers again sent by them to the General Manager
through the Chief Engineer in the afternoon of May
27, 1952, also were clear and categoric in regard to
the said workmen having been asked not to enter the
workshop, the boiling house and the mill house at
1 p.m. but their having entered the same threatening
violence. A faint attempt was made to charge the section engineers and the Chief Engineer with having
conspired "under some mysterious preconceived
plans" b,ut the same rested merely on a bare allegation and was•not substantiated by any tangible evidence. Even though there was some conflict of evidence in regard to the time when the notice of suspension was given by the General Manager to these
workmen and when the notice in that behalf was
pasted on the notice-board of the appellant, it is
abundantly clear on the documentary evidence above
referred to that the 76 workmen resorted to a toolsdown strike from 7 a.m. on the morning of May 27,
1952, that they were suspended till further orders
immediately after the receipt by the General Manager
of the first series of reports from the section engineers,
that they were prevented from entering the premises
..,
'I
S.C.R.
,_.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
927
at I p.m. but entered the same threatening violence.
If this is the true position it follows that there was
no lockout declared by the appellant, much less an
illegal lockout. The workmen had resorted to an
illegal strike and the General Manager rightly ordered
that the workmen indulging in such strike should be
suspended pending further orders which obviously
meant pending enquiry into their conduct and the
obtaining of the permission to dismiss them as a result of such enquiry if the management thought fit.
If there was thus no illegal lockout at all, the conclusion reached by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in
,that behalf was absolutely unjustified. Even if there
had been a lockout as concluded by the Labour Appellate Tribunal the same was in consequence of the
illegal strike which had been resorted to by these
workmen and could not by virtue of s. 24(3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be deemed to be
illegal.
There is, however, a more fundamental objection
that, even if the appellant be held responsible for
having declared an illegal lockout, the lockout would
not come within the ban of s. 22 of the Act. The
Labour Appellate Tribunal had before it an earlier
decision of its own in Jute Workers Federation, Calcutta v. Clive Jute Mills(1), in which the same question had heed considered with reference to s. 33 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In that case, a lockout had been declared which involved 4,000 workers
of the company and a preliminary contention was
urged that there was no contravention of the provisions of s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal considered the question whether the lockout had (I) in fact altered the
conditions of service of the workmen to their prejudice, or (2) had the effect of discharge, or (3)
amounted to punishment of the workmen. It came
to the conclusion that a lockout had not the effect of
a discharge, for a lockout does not automatically
terminate the services of the workmen.
It did not
also amount to punishment, for punishment presup(1) [1951] II L.L.J. 344.
1956
Lakshmi De~i
Sttgar Mills Ltd.
v.
Pt. Ram SarttP
BhagwatiJ,
928
1956
Laksh1ni Devi
Sugar Mills Ud.
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
poses· an offence or misconduct. A lockout is genea security measure and may in certam cases be used as a weapon corresponding to what
the employees have in the shape of a strike and that,
therefore, s. 33(b) would not be contravened by the
company by declaring a lockout.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal then considered whether a lockout
would attract the operation of s. 33(a).
It was of
opinion that no automatic termination of the services
of the employees was brought about by a lockout and
the question was whether any of the conditions of
service was altered thereby to their prejudice. The
contention of the Union was that the conditions of
service were altered to the prejudice of the workmen
because those employees did not in fact get their pay
during the period of the lockout with the possibility
of losing it. This contention was negatived and the
Labour Appellate Tribunal was of opinion that the
conditions of their service would be altered by the
lockout if the employees lost their right to receive
their pay during the period of lockout in all circum- ·
stances but the question whether they would be entitled to get their pay during that period could not
be postulated with certainty for that would depend
on a variety of considerations. In the opinion of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal to bring a case within
s. 33(a), the questioned act of the employer must
directly and in fact alter the conditions of service to
the prejudice of the workmen concerned, that is to
say, the moment the lockout was declared. The possibility that they may or may not get their pay meant
that the lockout may or may not alter the conditions
of their service to their prejudice.
Section 33(a)
would not, therefore, be attracted by the mere fact
of a lockout. The Labour Appellate Tribunal thus
came to the conclusion that neither s. 33(a) nor s.
33(b) would be contravened by the company in declaring the lockout.
This decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal
was followed in Colliery Mazrloor Congress, Asansol,
v. New Beerbhoom. Coal Co ..Ltd.(') and t.he Labour
ra~ly adopted as
(1) [1952] L A.O. 219.
..
....
S.C.R.
.,
7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
Appellate Tribunal there held that a lockout did not
come within the ambit of s. 33 and, therefore, no permission under that section was required for declaring
a lockout.
We agree with the reasoning adopted in the above
cases and are of opinion that a lockout is neither an
alteration to the prejudice of the workmen of the conditions of service applicable to them within the meaning of cl. (a) nor a discharge or punishment whether
by dismissal or otherwise of the workmen within the
meaning of cl. (b) of s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, ors. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, and that, therefore, no permission of the Conciliation Officer, Board or Tribunal
as the case may be is necessary to be obtained before
a lockout can be declared. If the lockout is legal, no
question can at all arise. If, on the other hand, the
lockout is illegal, a remedy is provided in s. 26 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The employees
affected by a lock-out would in any event be entitled
to refer the industrial dispute arising between themselves and the employer for adjudication by adopting the proper procedure in regard thereto.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal was, therefore,
clearly in error when it came to the conclusion that
the conduct of the appellant came within the definition of a lockout and that it amounted to punishment
of the workmen whether by dismissal or otherwise
and was, therefore, in contravention of s. 22(b) of
the Act. The application of the respondents under
s. 23 of the Act was accordingly liable to be dismissed
and should have been dismissed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Civil Appeal No. 245 of 1954 will,
therefore, be allowed and the order of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal reinstating the respondents in the
service of the appellant will be set aside.
Coming now to Civil Appeal No. 244 of 1954, the
first question to determine is whether the respondents had resorted to an illegal strike. We have
already pointed out the circumstances under which
the 76 workmen resorted to the tools-down strike
from 7 a.m. on May 27, 1952, and recorded the finding
121.
7956
Lakshmi De'Oi
Sugar Mills Ud.
v.
Pt, Ram Sarup
Bha gu·ati J.
930
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
1956
that they not. only resorted to such strike but persisted
in their attitude in spite of the persuasions of
Lakshmi Devi
the
Chief
Engineer and the General Manager of the
~:•igar Mills Ud.
appellant. The appellant having been declared a
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
public utility concern, the workmen were not entitled
to resort to such strike without giving to the appelBhagwati J,
lant notice of the strike in terms of s. 22(1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7, and the tools-down
strike which was resorted to by them was, therefore,
an illegal strike. The fact that the strike was of a
short duration viz., from 7 a.rn. till 10-30 a.rn. would
not exculpate the respondents from the consequences
of having resorted to such illegal strike, the avowed
intention of the strikers being not to resume work
until their pre-concerted plan conceived at the meeting held on the previous night was carried out. The
strike resorted to by the workmen was of an indefinite
duration and the management, having foiled in its
attempts to persuade the workmen to resume their
work, was well within its rights to suspend these
workmen pending further orders. (Vide Buckingham
and Garnatic Go. Ltd. v. Workers of the Buckingham
and Garnatic Go. Ltd.(')) . .
The Labour Appellate Tribunal did not decide this
issue at all but only considered the alleged non-compliance by the appellant of cl. L. 12 of the Standing
Orders as determinative of the whole enquiry before
it observing that "although the delay (in holding the
enquiry) was not unreasonable, there was no doubt
that the management did violate the letter of the
rule". It further observed that there was no sufficient reason indicated for extending the period of suspension beyond the period of four days provided in
cl. L. 12 of the Standing Orders, the tension created
by the non-co-operation of the workers not having
been considered sufficient to preclude the management
from collecting materials for conducting the enquiry
within the said period of 4 days. This reasoning of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal was unsound. Having
once come to the conclusion that the delay was not
unreasonable, there was no justification for the further
\1) [1953] S.C.R. 219.
.... _
S.C.R.
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
931
1956
conclusion reached by the Labour Appellate Tribunal
that the tension created by the non-co-operation of Lakshmi Devi
the workers was not a sufficient reason for extending Sugar Mills Ltd.
the period of such suspension. The workmen had forv ••
cibly entered the premises of the mills in spite of the Pt. Ram Samfrwarnings of the watchmen and the Jemadar and had
BhagwatiJ.
also entered the workshop, the boiling house and the
mill house and continued to stay there threatening
violence. In their letter dated June 3, 1952, theyhad
also threatened the General Manager that if he did
not mend his illegal mistakes and did not take the
workmen back on duty he would be responsible for
any breach of peace. This was enough evidence of
their mentality and the management naturally enough
apprehended breach of peace at the hands of these
workmen. If this was the tense atmosphere created
by the non-co-operation of the workmen, the management was perfectly justified in postponing the enquiry
by a few days and continuing the workmen under suspension. The delay which was thus caused in furnishing the charge-sheets and giving notice of the enquiry
to these workmen on June 2, 1952, was, therefore,
sufficiently explained and if there was any one responsible for this delay it was the workmen and not the
management. It did not then lie in the mouth of the
workmen to protest against thi~ delay in the enquiry
and trot out their suspension for a period exceeding
four days as an excuse for abstaining from the enquiry.
As a matter of fact, the management intimated to the
workmen that in spite of June 6, 1952, having been
fixed as the date for the open enquiry, the management would be prepared to take up the enquiry earlier
provided an intimation was received either from the
workmen or from their Union to that effect. Instead
of responding to this gesture of the appellant the
workmen persisted in asking for an independent enquiry and non-co-operated with the management in
the enquiry which was ultimately held by it as
notified at 8 a.m. on June 6, 1952.
We are of
opinion that under the circumstances the appellant
was not guilty of having contravened cl. L. 12 of
the Standing Orders and the Labour Appellate
-032
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
1956
Tribunal was in error when it came to the contrary
conclusion
and dismissed the application of the appelLakshmi Devi
lant
under
s. 22 merely on that ground without makSugar Mills Ltd,
ing
any
further
enquiry in to the circumstances of the
v.
Pt, Ram SaruP
case. It appears that the Labour Appellate Tribunal
was driven to take this step because it found itself
BhagwatiJ.
unable to hold definitely as to what was the exact
situation on May 27, 1952. We shall only observe
that if the Labour Appellate Tribunal had really applied its mind ts> the question it would have come to
the conclusion that the respondents in fact did resort
to the illegal strike from 7 a.m. on May 27, 1952, and
that there was no contravention of cl. L. 12 of the
Standing Orders by the appellant.
The next question that falls to be determined is
whether the enquiry which was held by the management on June 6, 1952, was a fair enquiry and whether the General Manager observed the principles of
natural justice in the conduct of that enquiry. Due
notice of the enquiry was given to the respondents
by the letter of the management addressed to them
on June 2, 1952, and if the respondents did not avail
themselves of the opportunity of presenting themselves and defending their action at the enquiry they
had only themselves to blame for it. It was within
the province of the management to hold such an
enquiry after giving aue notice thereof to the respondents and to come to its own conclusion as a result
of such enquiry whether the respondents were guilty
of the charges which had been levelled against them.
If full and free opportunity was given to the respondents to present themselves at the enquiry and defend
themselves it could not be said that the enquiry was
anything but fair. No principles of natural justice
were violated and the management was at liberty to
come to its own conclusions in regard to the culpability of the respondents and also to determine what
punishment should be meted out to the respondents
for the misconduct and insubordination proved against
them. If the ban which is imposed by s. 22 of the
Act had not been in existence, the management would
have been entitled to impose the punishment on the
-
,_
S.C.R.
...
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
933
respondents and dismiss them without anything
more, if it honestly came to the conclusion that dismissal of these workmen was the only punishment
which should be meted out to them in all the circumstances of the case. The respondents would no doubt
then have been entitled to refer the industrial dispute which arose out of their dismissal for adjudication by adopting the proper procedure set out in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the Industrial
Tribunal appointed by the Government for the adjudication of such dispute would have been in a position to thrash out all the circumstances and award
to them the appropriate relief. This course was, however, not open to the appellant by reason of the
pendency of the appeal before the Labour Appellate
Tribunal and the only thing which the appellant
could do, therefore, was, after coming to its own conclusion as a result of such enquiry, to apply to the
Labour Appellate Tribunal under s. 22 of the Act for
permission to dismiss the respondents and this the
appellant did on June 8, 1952. It was not open to the
respondents then, having regard to the attitude which
they had adopted throughout in relation to the said
enquiry, to urge that the enquixy was not fair or
impartial or that the principles of natural justice had
been violated by the General Manager of the appellant in the conduct of the enquiry.
It was, however, urged on behalf of the respondents that the suspension for an indefinite period
beyond the period of four days provided in cl. L. 12
of the Standing Orders was a punitive measure and
the appellant was not justified in imposing that
punishment on them without the permission of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal. It was contended +rat
such suspension involved loss of pay by the rcoipondents and being of an indefinite duration inflicted
such harassment on them that it could not be deemed
to be anything except a punishment. We do not
accept this contention. It has been rightly held by
the Labour Appellate Tribunal that suspension without pay pending enquiry as also pending permission
of the Tribunal under the relevant section could not
1956
Lakshmi Devi
S11ga1· Mills Ltd.
v.
Pt. Ram SaruP
Bhagwati J,
934
1956
I~aksh1ni Devi
Sugar Mills Ltd,
v.
Pt. Ra1n Sf!r11p
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
be considered a punishment as such suspension without payment would only be an interim measure and
would last till the application for permission to punish
the workman was made and the Tribunal had passed
orders thereupon. If the permission was accorded
the workman would not be paid during the period of
suspension but if the permission was refused he would
have to be paid for the whole period of suspension.
There is nothing like a contingent punishment of a
workman and therefore such suspension could not be
deemed to be a punishment of the workman at all.
Such suspension would of necessity be of an indefinite
duration because to get a written permission of the
Tribunal would mean delay and no Tribunal would
likely issue any order without notice and without
hearing all the parties concerned. Orders for suspension were meant only as security measures or precautionary ones taken in the interest of the industry
itself or its employees in general. These measures
were sometimes called for immediately after an incident and any delay, however small, might defeat the
purpose for which such measures were intended. It
would therefore be necessary to adopt these measures
immediately and to suspend the workman pending
the enquiry as also the permission to be o btaincd
from the appropriate Tribunal for dismissing him if
as a result of the enquiry the management thought
fit to inflict such punishment upon him. The suspension, however, would not be a punishment by itself.
The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word
"punish" is "to cause the offender to suffer for the
offence" or "to inflict penalty on the offender" or "to
inflict penalty for the offence" (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th Ed.). Punishment can be otherwise
defined (Vide Law Lexicon by P.R. Aiyar, 1943 Ed.)
as penalty for the transgression of law, and the word
"punish" denotes or signifies some offence committed
by the person who is punished.
Any action of the
employer to the detriment of the workman's interest
would not be punishment so long as no offence was
found to have been committed by the workman. The
suspension under such circumstances, therefore, could
..
S.C.R.
-
...
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
1956
not be a punishment even though it may be of an indefinite duration and would not attract the operation Lakshmi Devi
of s. 22 of the Act. It could not be contended, there- Sugar Mills Ud.
fore, that suspension without pay even for an indefiv.
nite period pending enquiry or pending the ·permis- Pt. Ram Sarup
sion of the appropriate Tribunal to dismiss the work- BhagwatiJ.
man would be a punishment which would require permission under s. 22 of the Act before the same could
be meted out to the workman. (Vide Champdany Jute
Mills And Certain Workmen( 1 ); Joint Steamer Companies And Their Workmen( 2 ); Assam Oil Co. Ltd. v.
Appalswami(3 ); Standard Vacuum Oil Co. v. Guna- ·
seelan, M. G.( 4 )).
The scope of the enquiry before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under s. 22 of the Act has been the subject-matter of decisions by this Court in Atherton West
& Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union and Others( 5 )
and The Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji
Bala & Others( 6 ). The Tribunal before whom an application is made under that section has not to adjudicate upon any industrial dispute arising between
the employer and the workman but has only got, to
consider whether the ban which is imposed on the
employer in the matter of altering the conditions of
employment to \he prejudice of the workman or his
disuharge or punishment whether by dismissal or otherwise during the pendency of the proceedings therein
referred to should be lifted. A prima facie case has
to be made out by the employer for the lifting of
such ban and the only jurisdiction which the Tribunal has is either to give such permission or to refuse
it provided the employer is not acting mala fide or is
not resorting to any unfair practice or victimization.
It cannot impose any conditions on the employer before such permission is granted nor can it substitute
another prayer for the one which the employer has
set out in his application. If the permission is granted,
the ban would be lifted and the employer would be
at liberty, if he so chooses thereafter, to deal out the
(1) [1952) I L.L.J. 554.
(4) [1954] II L.L J. 221.
(2) (1954] II L.L.J. 828.
(3) [1953] S.C.R. 780.
(6) [1955) 1 S.C.R. 1241,
(5) [1954] II L.L.J. 656.
936
1956
Lakshmi Devi
Sugar Mi.Us Ltd.
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
Bhagwati}.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
punishment to the workman. On such action being
taken by the employer the workman would be entitled to raise an industrial dispute which would have
to be referred to the appropriate Tribunal for adjudication 'by the Government on proper steps being
taken in that behalf. When such industrial dispute
comes to be adjudicated upon by the appropriate Tribunal, the workman would be entitled to have all the
circumstances of the case scrutinized by the Tribunal and would be entitled to get the appropriate relief
at the hands of the Tribunal. If, on the other hand,
such permission is refused, the parties would be relegated to the status quo and the employer would not
be able to deal out the puntshment which he intends
to do to the workman. Even then an industrial dispute might arise between the employer and the workman if the workman was not paid his due wages and
other benefits. Such industrial dispute also would
have to be referred to the appropriate Tribunal by
the Government and the Tribunal would award to the
workman the appropriate relief having regard to all
the circumstances of the case. The Tribunal before
whom such an• application for permission is made
under s. 22 of the Act would not be entitled to sit in
judgment on the action of the employer if once it
came to the conclusion that a prima facie case had
been made out for dealing out the punishment to the
workman. It would not be concerned with the measure
of the punishment nor with the harshness or otherwise of the action proposed to be taken by the employer except perhaps to the extent that it might
bear on the question whether the action of the
management was bona fide or was actuated by the
motive of victimization. If on the materials before
it the Tribunal came to the conclusion that a fair enquiry was held by the management in the circumstances of the case and it had bona fide come to the
conclusion that the workman was guilty of misconduct with which he had been charged a prima facie
case would be made out by the employer and the Tribunal would under these circumstances be bound to
give the requisite permission to the employer to deal
s.c.~.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
931
7956
out the punishment to the workman. If the punishment was harsh or excessive or was not such as should Lakshmi Det'i
be dealt out by the employer having regard to all the Sugar Mills Ltd,
circumstances of the case the dealing out of such
v.
punishment by the employer to the workman after Pt, Ram Sarup·
such permission was granted would be the subjectmatter of an industrial dispute to be raised by the Bhagu:ati J.
workman and to be dealt with as aforesaid. The Tribunal, however, would have no jurisdiction to go into
that question and the only function of the Tribunal
under s. 22 of the Act would be to either grant the
permission or to refuse it. (Vide Champdani Jute
Mills And Shri Alijari(1); R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan
Lal & Sons Ltd. And Chini Mill Karma.chari Union( 9 );
Assam Oil Companies' case( 3 )).
In the circumstances of the present case, once the
appellant succeeded in establishing that the workmen had resorted to an illegal strike from 7 a.m. on
May 27, 1952, that a fair enquiry into the alleged
misconduct and insubordination of the workmen had
been held by the management without violating any
principles of natural justice, that the management
had as a result of such enquiry found that the workmen had been guilty of misconduct and insubordination with which they had been charged and that the
management had come to the bona fide conclusion
that continuing the workmen in its employ was
detrimental to discipline and dangerous in the interests
of the appellant, the Labour Appellate Tribunal
ought to have held that a prima facie case for the
dismissal of the workmen had been made out by the
appellant and ought to have granted the appellant
the permission to dismiss the workmen.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the Labour
Appellate Tribunal was clearly in error in rejecting
the application of the appellant under s. 22 of the
Act and refusing it the permission to discharge the
respondents from its employ. Civil Appeal No. 244
of 1954 will, therefore, be allowed and the order of
(1) [1952] II L.L.J. 629.
(2) [1952) II L.L.J, 787.
(S) [1954] L.A.C. 78.
122
938
1956
Lakshmi Devi
Sugar Mills Ud.
v.
Pt. Ram Sarup
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissing the application under A. 22 of the Act will be set aside. The
appellant will be granted permission under s. 22 of
the Act to discharge the respondents from its employ.
Under the orders of the Court, one-half of their
salary has been already paid by the appellant to the
res~iondents from 1\11!-y 27, 1952, onwards. As a result
of this decision, the appellant would be entitled to
recover the same back from them. Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the appellant has, however, stated that the appellant would forego the recovery of that amount and would also keep the
respondents on the reserve list to be employed in the
mills as and when there were vacancies in their
permanent cadre. We hope that the respondents will
take this offer in the true spirit with which it has
been made on behalf of the appellant and behave
better in the furture. Shri N. C. Chatterjee has also
left the question of costs of both these appeals to us
and we do order that, in all the circumstances of the
case, it would be proper that each party do bear and
pay its own costs of both these appeals.
Appeals allowed.
.'
•
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