MEENAKSHI MILLS, MADURAI versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 September 1956 | [1956] 1 S.C.R. 691 | 1956 INSC 47
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 September 1956
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 124/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1956] 1 S.C.R. 691
- Neutral citation
- 1956 INSC 47
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
MEEN AKSHI MILLS, MADURAI
v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
MADRAS.
[S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR
and JAFER IMAM JJ.]
Income·ttix-Referet1ce to High Court-Question of law-In·
ference from findinqs of fact, when a qitcstion of law-Test-Profits
earned by the assessee Company by sale of aood s entered in the names
of d1immy fi1·ms aml Conipanies-Benami, Meaning of-Finding of
the stcitm of wch firms and Companies, if and when material-Ac·
crnal of liability-Manner of dealing with the profits by a registered
Company, if affects its liability--Apportionment of pmfits between
place of mannjc:,ct1tre and pince of sale, if a question of law-Indian
Incomg-tax Act, (XI of 1922), ss. 66(1). 42(1), 42(8).
A finding of fa.ct, even when it is an inference from other facts
found on evidence, is not a question of law within the meaning of
s. 66(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act that can be refei;.red to the
High Court for its deoision. Such an inference can be a question
of law only when the point for determination is a mixed question
of law and fact. On the principles established by authorities, only
such questions as relate to one or other of the following matters can
be questions of law under the section:(1) the construction of o. statute or a document of title;
(2) the legal effect of the facts found where the point for
determinatioI? ie a mixed question of lr.w and fa.ct;
(3) a finding of fact unsupporled by evidence or nnrea,ponable
r.nd perveri!e in nature.
Although a finding of fa.ct which is not supported by any evi·
dance or is unreasonable and perverse ma.y be challenged a.s an error
of la.w, where there is evidence to consider the finding of the Tribn·
na.l does not cease to be final simply because the Court may be
iI?clined to take a view different from tha.t of the Tribunal.
Great Western Railway Co. v. Bater, ((1922] 8 T. C. 231),
followed.
The soundness of a. conclusion ba.sed on a number of facts
found on evidence must be judged by the cumula.tive effect of a.11 the
facts and it is altogether a wrong approach to consider them indivi·
dually in an isolated manner in order to explain them and show
that inferences other than those drawn by the Tribunal could be
drawn from them.
00
1956
Sej>tember 26
692
1956
Meenakshi Mills,
Madurai
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
Edwards (Inspect-01' of Taxes) v. Bairstow, ([1955] 28 I.T.R.
579), referred to.
Misa.pprecia.tion of evidence does not amount to want of evi ..
dence a.nd unless the eviden'ce can be shown to be irrelevant or
Tlie Cointnissioner inadmissible, the conclusion of the Tribunal cannot be challenged
on the ground that it is based on no lega'l evidence.
of Income-tax,
Madras
The test as to whether a question is 'one of fact or one of mixed
law and fact is this that while in determining II question of fact no
application of any principle of law is required in finding either the
v.
ha.sic facts or arriving at the ultimate conclusion, in a mixed question of law and fact the ultimate conclusion has to be drawn by
applying the relevant principles of law to the basic findings,
Herbert v. Samuel Fox and Co. Ltd., ([1916] 1 A.O. 405) and
The Queen v. Special Commissioners of Income-tax ((1894] 3 T. 0. 289),
followed.
The view expressed in a number of English decisions that an
inference from facts is a question of la.w has reference really to questions of mixed law and fact.
Edwards(Inspect01· of Taxes) v. Bairstow, ([la55J 28 I.T.R. 579),
Bamford v Osborne, ([1942] A.O. 14), Thomas Fattorini (Lancashire)
Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ([l!J42) A.O. 643), and
Camer<m v. Prendergast, ([1940] A.O. 549), referred to and explained.
The Gramaphone and. Tvpewriter Oompan11 Ltd. v. Stanle11
((1908] 2 K.B. 89), held inapplicable.
Tha American Thread Compan11.v. Jo11ce, ((1911] 6 T.C. 1) and
The American Thread Company v. JOflC•, ((1918) 6 T.C. 168), relied.
on.
Nor do the observations made by the Privy Council in a number
of cases lend any snpport tp the broad contention that inferences
from facts are always and necessarily question• of law.
Ram Gopal v. Shamskhat<m, ([1892] L.R. 19 I.A. 228), Najar
Chandra Pal v. Shukur ((1918] L.R. 451.A. 183), Dhanna Mal v. Moti
Sagar, ([1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 178), Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad
Baksh, ([1929] L.R. 57 I.A. 86), Secretary of State for India in Coun·
cil v. Rameswaram Devasthanam, ((1934] L.R. 61 I.A. 163) and
Lakshmidhar Misra v. RangalaZ, ([1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 271), referred to
and esplained.
Conseqnently, in a case where, as in the present, the Appellate
Tribnno.l, on the basis of certain findings of fact, amply supported
by the evidence and eminently reasonable, came to the conclusion
that certain sales entered in the books of the assessee Company in
the names of certain intermediaries, firms and Companies, which
were bronght into existence by the assessee solely for the purpose of
concealing its own profi~s. and appeared to have done no other busi·
ness except the sales in qnestion, were fictitions and the profits
ostensibly earned by those firms and Companies were, in fact,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
1956
earned by the a.ssessee which had itself sold the goods to the real
purchasers and received the prices, and should be added to the
a.mounts shown as profits in its accounts, no question of law arose Meenakslii Mills,
Madurai
for reference under s. 66(1) of the Act.
v.
The question of benami is purely a question of fact and not a The Commissiot1cr
mixed question of law and fact as it does not involve the application of Income-tax,
of any legal principle for its determination.
Madras
Gangadhara Ayyar v. Subramania Sastrigal, (A.LR. 1949
F.C. 88) and Misrilal v. Surji, (A.I.R. 1950 P.O. 28), referred to.
The word 'benami' is used to denote two classes of transactions
which differ from each other in their legal character and incidents.
In one, the usual class, the sale is genuine and title is transferred
but the real transferee is not the ostensible transferee but another
and in the other, where the term is inaccurately applied, the sale to
the benamidar is fictitious and the title of the transferor is not in·
tended to pass. The fundamental difference between these two classes
is that while in the former title vests in the transferee, in the latter
it remains with the transferor, and when a dispute a.rises the ques·
tion as to who pa.id the consideration becomes relevant only with
respect to the former class while in the latter the only question is
whether any consideration was paid at all.
The point actually in issue in the instant case, therefore, was a
bmami in the second sense and what the Tribunal had to decide
was whether any price had at all been paid by the intermediaries for
the goods ostensibly sold to them by the assessee. It was. not neces·
sary for it to decide whether apart from the sales the intermediaries
had an independent existence of their own, for such a decision
could not in any way affect the liability of the assessee to pay the
tax.
Smith, Stone and Knight v. Birmingham Corporation, ((1939] 4
All E.R. 116), distinguished and held inapplicable.
Under the Indian Income-tax Act liability to pay the tax arises
as soon as the income accrues, whether the assessee be an indi·
vidual or a registered Company, and the manner in which
such a Company chooses to deal with the profits cannot in a.:iy way
affect its liability. The provisions- of the Indian Companies Act,
designed to protect the interests of the share-holders, cannot in any
way affect the right of the state to levy the tax. Although the point
involved was a question of law appropriate for reference under
s. 66(1), since the assessee had failed to raise it in his application
under that section, this Court would not direct a fresh rekrence in
exercise of its powers under Art. 136 of the Constitution a.s the
point was no longer in doubt in view of the decision of this' Court.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K.R.M.T.T. Thiagaraja
Chetty, ([1954] S.C.R. 258), referred to and followed.
The Tribunal was entirely right in refusing to refer the question
as to whether ss. 42(1) and 42(3) of the Indian Income·ta.x Act
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
1956
applied only to non-residents as was nrged on bebalf of the assesseo.
Those sections apply both to residents and non-residents.
l\feenakshi Mills.
Commissioner of Income·la"' v• .A.hmedbhai Umarbhai and Co.,
Madurai
((1950] S.C.R. 335), referred to and followed.
v.
The Commi'ssi'oner
Tho qnestion of apportionment of tho profits between tho place
o/ lncome·tax, of manufacture and tho place of sale and correctness of· the ratio
Madras
fixed by the Tribunal is a pure question of fact and cannot be referred
to Court under s. 66(1) of tho Act.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 124 to 126 of 1954.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and
order dated the 10th day of March 1952 of the Madras
High Court in C.M.P. Nos. 10427, 10425 and 10426 of
1951 arising out of the order dated the 23rd day of
February 1951 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench in Reference Applications Nos. 312,
310 and 311 of 1950-51.
P. R. Das, B. Sen, V. Sethuraman and S. Subramaniam for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus
A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale for the
respondent.
1956. September 26. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These appeals arise out
of orders of assessment made on the appellant by the
Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench, for the years of
account 1941-42, 1942-43 and 1943-44. The appellant
applied under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax
Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to refer to
the High Court certain questions which according to
it arose out of the orders; but the Tribunal rejected
the applications. The appellant then moved the H~h
Court under section 66(2) of the Act for an order
requiring the Tribunal to refer those questions to the
court, but the learned Judges held that the questions
on which reference was sought by the appellant were
pure questions of fact, and dismissed the applications. The matter now comes before us by way of
special appeal.
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
The facts material for the purpose of these appeals
1956
may shortly be stated. The assessee is a public com- Meenakshi Mills,
pany registered under the Indian Companies Act, and
Madurai
its Managing Agents a.re the firm of Messrs K. R.
v.
Thya.garaja Chettiar and Co., whose partners are The. Commissioner
Mr. Thya.ga.raja Chettiar and his two sons. The com- 01 Income-tax,
pany is resident and ordinarily resident in British
Madras
India, its head office being a.t Madurai in the Madras Venkatarama
State. It carries on business in the manufacture and
Ayyar J.
sale of yarn, and for the purpose of that business it
purchases cotton and occasionally sells it. Its profits
arise for the most part from the sale of yarn and to
some ex-tent from the re-sale of cotton. According
to the account books of the company, its profits
from business for the account year 1941-42 were
Rs. 9,25,364, for 1942-43 Rs. 24,09,832 and for 194344 Rs. 29,13,881. In its returns, the appellant showed
these amounts as its income chargeable to tax for the
respective years. The Department did not accept
the correctness of the figures as shown in the accounts.
It contended that the Company had earned more profits than were disclosed in its accounts, and that it
had contrived to suppress them by resort to certain
devices. According to the Department, the scheme
evolved by the appellant for this purpose was this:
Suppose the Company sold 25 bales of yarn to X for
Rs. 50,000 at the then market rate and received the
full amount of the price. The books of the Company
would show neither the sale to X nor its receipt of
Rs. 50,000. Instead, there will be an entry in its books
showing the sale of these very bales to A for Rs.
20,000 which will be about the cost price and in the
books of A these goods will be shown as sold by it to
X for Rs. 50,000. If the sale by the Company to A
and the connected sale by A to X were genuine, the
Company would have made no profit on the sale,
whereas A would have made a profit of Rs. 30,000 on
it. But, in fact, both these sales were sham transactions; the only sale that took place was that by the
Company to X and the price actually received by it
was not Rs . .20,000 but Rs. 50,000. As a result of
these paper transactions and manipulations, the
696
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
profit of Rs. 30,000 made by the Company was sup·
pressed.
This process was reversed when -the Com·
Meenakshl Mills,
pany purchased cotton. The appellant purchased,
Madurai
let us say, 100 bales of cotton from X for a price of
v.
The Co1nmissioner Rs. 5,000, and paid that amount to X.
Neither this
of Income.tax,
purchase from X nor the payment of Rs. 5,000 to him
Madras
would appear in the books of the Company. Instead,
the books of A wil1i._show these goods as purchased by it
Vetikatarama
AyyarJ,
from X for Rs. 5,uOO, and the books of the appellant
will show a purchase from A of those very goods for Rs.
8,000. Both these sales were fictitious, the only real
transaction was the sale by X to the Company and the
price actually paid therefor by the Company was only
Rs. 5,000. By the device of sale by X to A and by A
to the Company, the cost price had been inflated by
Rs. 3,000, and the real profit had been concealed to
that extent. The accounts of the Company, therefore, did not reflect the true position as to the profits
actually made by the appellant. The names of the
intermediaries who according to the Department
played the role of A in the above illustration-and
they will hereafter be referred to simply as intermediaries-are given below with the amount of profits made on the sale of yarn in their names and concealed, or the extent of the cost price inflated on the
purchase of cotton from them, as found by the Tribunal:
1941-42
1. Meenakshi & Co.
Sale of yarn Rs. 35,830
2. Sivagami & Co.
do.
Rs. 35,443
3. Mangayarkarasi & Co.
do.
Rs. 34,579
4. Alagu & Co.
Purchase of
cotton
Rs. 34,003
1942-43
1. Meenakshi & Co.
Sale of yarn Rs. 53,635
· 2. Sivagami and Co.
do.
Rs. 58,103
3. ~ukman! & Co. Ltd. &}saleofyarnRs. 3,97;467
4. S1vagam1 & Co. Ltd.
5. Rukmani & Co., Ltd. Purchase of
cotton
Rs. 33,533
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
1943-44
1956
1. Pudukottah & Co., Ltd. Sale of yarn Rs.18,99,488 Meenakshi Mills,
Do.
Purchase of
Madurai
v.
cotton
Rs. 12,703
The Commissioner
Rs. 22,~04
2. Rukmani & Co., Ltd.
do.
of Income-tax,
Sale of yarn Rs. 1,06,436
3. Rajendra Ltd.
Madras
...
The contention of the Department was that the
amounts shown as profits made by the intermediaries
and mentioned above represented in fact the profits
actually earned by the appellant, and that they
should be added to the figures shown in its accounts
as its profits. The appellant contested this position,
and maintained that the state of affairs disclosed by
its accounts was true, that its sales in favour of the
intermediaries were genuine, and that, in fact, little
or no profits were made by it in those transactions,
that it purchased cotton only from the intermediaries
and did pay them the amounts as shown in the accounts. These contentions were closely examined by
the Income-tax Officer in the first instance, then again
by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal,
and finally by the Appellate Tribunal, and on an
elaborate consideration of the materials placed before
them, they held that the following facts were established:
I. The sale of yarn by the appellant to the intermediaries mentioned above was for a price very much
below the market rate, often for the cost price and
some times for even less. No acceptable explanation
had been given for this unusual feature. The yarn
was in that period a scarce commodity, and it was a
seller's market. The amounts lost by the Company
on these transactions during the three years, if they
were genuine, would far exceed Rs. 25 lakhs. The
sales therefore were not bona fide.
2. The firms of Meenakshi and Co., Sivagami and
Co., Mangayarkarasi and Co., and Alagu and Co.,
who were the intermediaries for the year 1941-42 were
all newly started for the first tirue in 1941. The partners of the firm were men of no means, and were all
relations of Mr. Thyagaraja Chettiar, the chief
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
partner of the Managing Agents firm and a dominant
figure
in charge of the Company's affairs. None of
Meenakshi Mills,
them
had
done any business in yarn befare. The
Madurai
personnel of these firms was drawn in different combiv.
The Commissioner nations from a group of half a dozen pe1 sons who
of Income-tax, were all the creatures of Mr. Thyagaraja Cl1ettiar.
Madras
3. During the year 1942-43, two of the firms,
Mangayarkarasi
and Co., and Alagu and Co., were
Venkatarama
closed,
and
their
place was taken by tvi o private
Ayya•J.
limited companies called Rukmani and Co .. Ltd. and
Sivagami and Co., Ltd. The shareholder 1 of these
companies were again drawn from the sma: l group of
persons who were partners of the firms, and they were
all Mr. Thyagaraja Chettiar's men. These Jompanies
declared 110 dividends, even though they rnade considerable profits and the shareholders r1 ceived no
dividends nor even sta.tements of accounts. In truth,
they had no beneficial interest in the concerns.
4. The .business of the intermediaries, both firms
and the companies, consisted solely in th1 purchase
.of yarn from the appellant and not from any other
person, and the entirety of the yarn pure ~ased was
sold by them en broc to constituents of the appellant.
Thus, the business of the intermediaries wi.s, in fact,
only a part of the business carried on by lhe appellant.
5. The sales by the appellant in favo1 r of these
intermediaries were of large quantities of yarn and
sometimes on a scale far higher than oth ir genuine
commercial transactions, as for example, the sale of
1850 bales on 17-4-1942 to Rukmani and C1,, No securities were taken from the intermediarie J for this
transaction. Having regard to the magnLude of the
business, the capital of the intermediari,~s even on
paper was negligible.
6. The intermediaries had most of then no offices
of their own. Even when they had offices, these were
arranged by the officers of the appellant. The concerns had no godowns, and their staff v·as meagre
and recruited from the employees and servants of
the appellant. Apart from signing the contracts, the
intermediaries did nothing.
....
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
699
1956
7. The profits earned by the firms were shown in
their books as cash in their possession, but on a sur- JU"enalalli Mills,
prise raid the authori_ties were unable to discoyer an_y
Madurai
cash with them. The amount shown as profits in their
v.
accounts was, in fact, in the possession of the appel- Tire Commissioner
of Income-tax
lant Company.
Madras
8, The intermediaries had, in fact, never to pay
to the appellant for any of the purchases made by Vt'nkatara11u1
them, the course of the business being that they sold . AyyarJ.
the goods purchased from the appellant to its old
customers, who paid therefor.
9. The intermediaries did not issue any delivery
orders on the appellant in favour of the customers to
whom they ostensibly sold the goods, but the goods
were despatched directly by the appellant to the
customers and delivered to them.
10. The customers to whom the goods were delivered by the appellant as aforesaid paid the full
price for which they purchased them from the intermediary firms, not to those firms with whom alone
they had privity of contract but to the appellant
direct, and these payments appear as receipts in the
books of the appellant.
11. After the Limited Companies were started in
1942-43 and 1943-44, the course of business adopted
by the appellant showed a further mystification.
There was firstly a sale of certain quantity of yarn by
the appellant to company A, which sold it in turn
to company B which in turn sold it to C, which ultimately sold it to the usual customers of the appellant. In spite of the number of links between the
appellant and the customers, the goods were directly
despatched by the former to the latter, who paid by
cheques the full amount due by them -to their seller C,
who straightaway endorsed them in favour of the
appella.nt. The intermediaries A and B did no act,
and took no part in the ultimate payment of the price
by th~ purchasers.
12. Some of the intermediaries, firms and companies had been formed in Pudukottah State. At that
time, that State was foreign territory, and the profit
91
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
earned there would become taxable only if it was
remitted to British India. Pudukottah is neither a
Meenak&hl Mills,
cotton producing area, nor was. a market for cotton
Madurai
there. The object with which the intermediaries had
v,
The Co1nmissioner been set up in Pudukottah was obviously to screen
of Income-tax,
portions of the profit earned by the appellant.
Madras
On these facts, the Tribunal came to the conclusion
that
the contentions of the Department had been
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
fully established, namely, that the intermediaries were
dummies brought into existence by the appellant for
concealing its profits, that the sales standing in their
names were sham and fictitious, and that the profits
ostensibly earned by them on those transactions were,
in fact, earned by the appellant, and should be added
to the amounts shown as profits in its accounts. The
point for decision is whether there arises out of the
order of the Tribunal any question which can be the
subject of reference under section 66(1) of the Act.
Under that section, it is only a question of law that
can be referred for decision of the court, and it is
impossible to argue that the conclusion of the Tribunal is anything but one of fact. It has been held on
the corresponding provisions in the English Incometax statutes that a finding on a question of fact is
open to attack as erroneous in law only if it is not
supported by any evidence, or if it is unreasonable
and perverse, but that where there is evidence to consider, the decision of the Tribunal is final even
though the court might not, on the materials, have
come to the same conclusion if it had the power to
substitute its own judgment. In Great Western Railway Go. v. Bater('), Lord Atkinson observed:
"Their (Commissioners') determination of questions of pure fact are not to be disturbed, any more
than are the findings of a jury, unless it shou.Jd a ppear that there was no evidence before them upon
which they, as reasonable men, could come to the
conclusion to which they have come: and this, even
though the Court of Review would on the evidence
have come to a conclusion entirely different from
theirs".
1956
(1) [1922] 8 T.O. 231, 244.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
There is no need to further elaborate this position,
1956
because the law as laid down in these observations is Meenakshi Mills,
well settled, and has been adopted in the construeMadurai
tion of section 66 of the Act. Now, the determinav.
tion of the Tribunal in the present proceedings b.eing The Co1nmissioner
one of fact, it is open to review by the court only on °1 Income-tax,
the ground that it is not supported by any evidence
Madras
or that it is perverse. The appellant understood this Venkatarama
position quite correctly, and in its application under
AyyarJ.
section 66(1) it stated the only question which it
wanted the Tribunal to refer to the court with reference
to the present controversy in the following terms:
"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances
of the case there is any legal evidence to support the
finding that the four firms, Meenakshi and Co., Sivagami and Co., Mangayarkarasi and Co., and Alagu
and Co., were benamidars for the appellant and that
the profits made by these firms were profits made by
the appellant''.
This was for the accounting year 1941-42. The question was similarly worded for the subsequent years
also except that the names of the intermediaries were
The question as
different for the different years.
framed assumes, it will be noted, that the Tribunal
had held that the intermediaries were benamidars for
the appellant, and on this assumption were grounded
several contentions which were pressed on behalf of
the appellant.
Whether this assumption and the
contentions based thereon are weJl-founded is a different matter, and will be considered in due course.
But apart from that, it will be seen that the only
ground of attack which was directed against the
finding of the Tribunal was that there was no legal
evidence. This is of course a contention open to the
appellant; but has that been substantiated? Mr. P.
R. Das, learned counsel for the appellant, did, at the
start, put bis contention as high as that. But it became abundantly clear when his argument began to
unfold itself that it amounted to no more than this
that the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal from the
facts found by it was unsound and erroneous. He
did not, it must be stated, dispute the facts them-
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
selves, but he took them one after another, and contended that they were susceptible of inferences other
Meenakshl Mills, than those drawn by the Tribunal.
He next offered
Madurai
v.
explanations for them which would make them conTh• commissianer sistent with the contention of the appellant. And he
oflm:ome.ta%, finally wound up by saying that the conclusion
Madras
reached by the 'fribunal was not justified. This
V•nkatarama
clearly is an erroneous approach to the whole quesA:narJ.
tion. When a conclusion has been reached on an appreciation of a number of facts established by the
evidence, whether that is sound or not must be determined not by considering the weight to be attached
to each single fact in isolation, but by assessing the
cumulative effect of all the facts in their setting
in the picture as a whole. In Edwards (Inspector of
Taxes) v. Bairstow(1 ). Lord Radcliffe stated:
" .... I think that it is rather misleading to speak
of there being no evidence to support a conclusion
when in cases such as these many of the facts are
likely to be neutral in themselves, and only to take
their colour from the combination of circumstances
in which they are found to occur".
This furnishes the corrective to the course adopted
by. counsel for the appellant in his argument.
And a more serious objection to it, and one of substance is that it relates merely to matters of appreciation of evidence, and does not support the position
that there is no legal evidence in support of the finding of the Tribunal. For example, one of the facts on
which the Tribunal relied for its conclusion was that
the partners of the intermediary firms were new to
yarn business and came on the scene for the first time
in 1941. The appellant contends that no significance
could be attached to this, as the partners belonged
to the Nattukkottai Chetti caste, which was a trading
community. But surely this does not render the evidence irrelevant or inadmissible. It only affects the
weight to be attached to it. Then again, the Tribunal has made a point of it that the goods were sold
by the appellant to the intermediaries for a price far
below the market price, sometimes even below the
1956
(11 [1955]28 I.T.R. 579.
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
703
1956
cost price. The answer of the appellant to this was
that they were forward contracts and that the price Meenakshi Mills,
of yarn on the dates of those contracts was low. But
Madurai
the Tribunal declined to accept this explanation for
v.
the reason-and that, a good one-that there were The Commissioner
no contract registers from which the dates on which 01 Income-tax,
the contracts were entered into could be verified, and
Madras
that the contract notes themselves were not serially V.nkatarama
nurnbered. If this is not a matter of pure appreAyyarJ.
ciation of evidence, it is difficult to see what else is.
The Tribunal also referred to the fact that the only
business which the intermediaries did was to purchase
yarn from the appellant and sell it to its own constituents. The answer of the appe11ant to this was
that there was no need for the intermediaries to purchase from other manufacturers when all their needs
were met by the appellant and that there was nothing
unusual in their selling all their yarn to its customers.
It is unnecessary to say anything about the worth of
this contention, for that is a matter exclusively for
the Tribunal to assess. What has now to be considered is whether this circumstance on which the
Tribunal relied is or is not cogent evidence in support
of its conclusion. It will be preposterous to contend
that it is not. No useful purpose will be served by
examining the contentions of the appellant with reference to the other facts on which the Tribunal relied
for its conclusion. They are of the same pattern as
the above, and bear, at their best, on the weight to
be attached to the facts and not to their relevancy or
admissibility, and there is no question of want of
legal evidence in support of the conclusion of the
Tribunal.
Reference should also be ma.de in this connection
to another contention which was pressed by Mr. P.R.
Das at a later stage of the argument. He contended
that the facts found showed that the intermediaries
were benamida.rs not for the appellant but for Mr.
Thyagarajan Chettiar of the Managing Agents firm.
The significance of this contention lies in this that it
grants-and Mr. P.R. Das was quite frank about it
-·that the facts found did point to the fact that the
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
1956
intermediaries were dummies, leaving outstanding
for decision only the question whether on the evidence
Meenakshi Mills,
they were benamidars for the appellant or for Mr.
Madurai
Thyagarajan
Chettiar. That is a question which will
v.
The Commissione,. be separately considered. But it is manifest that this
of Income-tax,
argument is destructive of the contention of the
Madras
appellant that there is no legal evidence to support
the
conclusion of the Tribunal that the intermediaries
Venkatarama
were
mere dummies. The result then is that the
Ayyar J,
finding of the Tribunal viewed as one of fact, which
in truth it is, is supported by evidence, and is not
unreasonable and is not open to attack on any of the
grounds on which such a finding could be assailed in
a reference under section 66(1).
It was next contended for the appellant that inference from facts was a question of Jaw, and that as
the conclusion of the Tribunal that the intermediaries
were dummies and that the sales standing in their
names were sham and fictitious was itself an inference
from several basic facts found by it, it was a question
of law and that the appellant had the right under
section 66(1) to have the decision of the court on its
correctness, and support for this position was sought
from certain observations in Edwards (Inspector of
Taxes) v. Bairstow('), Bamford v. Osborne('), Thomas
Fattorini (Lancashire), Ltd. v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue('), Cameron v. Prendergast(') and
The Gramophone and Typewriter Company, Ltd. v.
Stanley('). At the first blush, it dq,es sound somewhat
of a contradiction to speak of a fipding of fact as one
of law even when that finding is an inference from
other facts, the accepted notion being that questions
of law and of fact form antithesis to each other with
spheres distinct and separate. When the Legislature
in terms restricts the power of the court to review
decisions of Tribunals to questions of law, it obviously intends to shut out questions of fact from its
jurisdiction. If the contention of the appellant is
( 1) [1955] 28 I. T .R. 579.
(2) [19<12] A.O. a: 1942 I.T.R. Supplt 27.
(3) [1942] A.O. 649: 24 T.O. 328.
14) [1940] A.O. 649: 8 I.T.R. Supplt. 75.
(5) (1908) 2 K.B. 89: 5 T.C. 358.
-
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
correct, then a finding of fact must, when it is an
7956
inference from other facts, be open to consideration Meenakshi Mills,
not only on the ground that it is not supported bY _ Madurai
evidence or perverse but also on the ground that it is
v.
not a proper conclusion to come to on the facts. In The Commissioner
other words, the jurisdiction in such cases is in the of Income-tax,
nature of a regular appeal on the correctness of the
lfiadras
finding. And as a contested assessment-and it is Venkatarama
only such that will come up before the Tribunal under
Ayyar J.
section 33 of the Act, must involve disputed questions of fast, the determination of which must
ultimately depend on findings on various preJiminary
or evidentiary facts, it must result that practically
all orders of assessment of the Tribunal couk!_ be
brought up for review before courts. That will, in
effect, be to wipe out the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact and to defeat the
policy underlying sections 66(1) and 66(2). Dne
should hesitate to accept a contention which leads
to consequences so startling, unless there are compelling reasons therefor. Far from that being the
case, both principle and authority are clearly aJverse
to it.
Considering the question on principle, when there
is a question of fact to be determined it would usually
be necessary first to decide disputed facts of a subsidiary or evidentiary character, and the ultimate conclusion will depend on an appreciation of these facts.
Can it be said that a conclusion of fact, pure and
simple, ceases to be that when it is in tutu a deduction from other facts? What can be the principle on
which a question oi fact becomes transformed into a
question oflaw when it involves an inference from
basic facts? To take an illustration, let us suppose
that in a suit on a promissory note the defence taken
is one of denial of execution. The court finds that
the disputed signature is unlike the admitted signatures of the defendant. It also finds that the attesting witnesses who speak to execution were not, in
fact, present at the time of the alleged execution.
On a consideration of these facts, the court comes to
the conclusion that the promissory note is not genuine,
706
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
[1956]
Here, there are certain facts which are ascertained, and
on these facts, a 1Jertain conclusion is reached which is
!tieenakshi Mills,
also one of fact. Can it be contended that the findMadurai
ing that the promissory note is not genuine is one of
v.
The Commissiontf' law, as it is an inference from the primary facts
of Income-tax.
found? Clearly not. But it is argued against this
Madras
conclusion that it conflicts with the view expressed
in
several English decisions, l!ome of them of the
Venkatar'ama
highest authority, that it is a question of law what
AyyarJ.
inference is to be drawn from facts. The fallacy
underlying this contention is that it fails to take into
account.the distinction which exists between a pure
question of fact and a mixed question of law and
fact, and that the observations relied on have reference to the latter and not to the former, which is
what we are concerned with in this case.
' In between the domains occupied respectively by
questions of fact and of law, there is a lai·ge area in
which both these questions run into each other, forming so to say, enclaves within each other. The questions that arise for determination in that area are
known as mixed questions ofla.w and fact. These questions involve first the ascertainment of facts on the evidence adduced and then a determination of the rights
of the parties on an application of the appropriate
principles of law to the facts ascertained. To take an
example, the question is whether the defendant has
acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession. It is found on the facts that the land is a vacant
site, that the defendant is the owrier of the adjacent
residential house and that he has been drying grains
and cloth and throwing rubbish on the plot. The
further question that has to be determined is whether
the above facts are sufficient to constitute ad>erse
possession in law. Is the user continuous or fugitive?
Is it as of right or permissive in character? Thus, for
deciding whether the defendant has acquired title by
adverse possession, the court has firstly to find on an
appreciation of the evidence what the facts are. So
far, it is a question of fact. It has then to apply the
principles of law regarding acquisition of title by
ad verse possession, and decide whether on the facts
1956
S.C.R.
..
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
1956
established by the evidence, the requirements of law
are satisfied. That is a question of law. The ulti- Meenakshi Mills,
mate finding on the issue must, therefore, be an inMadurai
ference to be drawn from the facts found, on the apv.
plication of the proper principles of law, and it will The Commissi01111r
be correct tq_ say in such cases that an inference from of Income·tax,
/.fadras
facts is a question of law. In this respect, mixed
questions of law and fact differ from pure questions Venhatara111a
of fact in which the final determination equally with
AyyarJ.
the finding or ascertainment of basic facts does not
involve the application of any principle of law. The
proposition that an inference from facts is one of
law will be correct in its application to mixed questions of law and fact but not to pure questions of
fact. The following observations of Lord Atkinson
in Herbert v. Samuel Fox and Go., Ltd. (1) clearly bring
out the principle above stated:
"' .... Your Lordships were pressed with the usual
argument, that as the County Court judge though a
judge of law and facts, ·is the sole judge of fact, his
findings cannot be disturbed if there was any evidence
before him upon which he, as a reasonable man,
could find as he has found. That argument is quite
sound if it be applied to pure findings of fact.
It is
utterly unsound if it be applied either to findings on
pure questions of law or on mixed questions of law
and fact .... It is wholly illegitimate, in my view, in
cases such as the present, by finding in the words of
the statute to endeavour to secure for a finding on a
pure question of law, or on a mixed question of law
and fact, that unassailability which properly belongs
only to a finding on a question of pure fact".
These observations were made in a case under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1904. But the same
principles have been applied to revenue cases, and it
has consistently been held that inferences from facts
may themselves be inferences of fact and not of kw,
and that such inferences are not open to review by
the court.
In The Queen v. Spscial Commissioners of Incometax(2) Esher M. R. observed:
(1) [1916) 1 A.O. 405, 413.
92
(2) [1894] 3 T.C, 289, 290·291.
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956)
" ••. .it &eems to me that that is a question of fact.
It
is
a question of the· true inference which they
M eena s • 111 s,. (C
· ·
) h a d to d raw as a mattero f ev1'd ence.
Madurai
omm1ss10ners
v.
upon the facts which they had in evidence before
Th• Commi..1on<r them. But to draw an inference of fact from evidence
0! Income·t.,,,
before you is not a question of Jaw at aJI.
The inMadras
ference is a question of fact just as much as the direct
Venkatarama
evidence of fact, and it would be an appeal against
Ayyar J,
facts, which we are not entitled to entertain and consequently there can be no Mandamus".
A clearer and more emphatic refutation of the appellant's contention cannot be found.
The law is
thus summed up in Simon's Income Tax, 1952 Edi_tion, Volume I, page 281:
"There can be no doubt that it is for the Commissioners, and for the Commissioners alone, to distJover and state the basic or 'primary' facts of the
case .... From the primary facts the .Commissioners will
almost always need to draw some inference or inferences by the exercise of reasoning, and it is this
process of inference which may, according to its
nature, be a finding of law or of fact, or mixed finding of law and fact".
The result of the authorities then is that inference
from facts would be a question of fact or of law according as the point for determination is one of pure
fact or mixed question of law and fact.
Is there anything in the authorities cited by the
appellant which militates against this conclusion? In
Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow('), the point
for determination was whether the transaction
entered into by the assessee was an adventure in the
nature of trade. The finding of the Commissioner was
tl:lat it was not. But that was rever,sed by the House
of Lords who held that on the facts found it was an
adventure in the nature of trade. The very. expression "in the nature of trade" requires that the adventure should possess certain elem11nts which ih law
would invest it with the characteristics of a trade.
The question is, therefore, one of a mixed law and
fact. That is precisely how the matter is dealt with by
7956
-k
h" M.
(I) {1955] 28 I.T.R. 579.
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
70.9
1956
Lord Radcliffe. He observes at,page 589:
"My Lords, I think that it is a question of law Meena/whi Mills,
what meaning is to be given to the words of the InMad11rai
come Tax Act 'trade, manufacture, adventure or
v.
concern in the nature of trade' and f.or that matter The Commissioner
what constitutes 'profits or gains' arising from it. of Income-tax,
Madras
Here we have a statutory phrase involving a charge
of tax and it is for the courts to interpret its meaning Venkatarama
having regard to the context in which it occurs and
Ayyarj.
to the principles which they bring to bear upon the
meaning of 'income' ".
Lord Somervell agreed with the opinion expressed by
Lord Radcliffe. The Lord Chancellor, dealing with
this aspect of the case, referred to the decisions in
Cooper v. Stubbs(1) and Jones v. Leeming(9 ), where it
had been held that whether trading activities
amounted to carrying on business was a pure question of fact, and observed at page 587:
"Yet it must be clear that to say that such an
inference is one of fact postulates that the character
of that act which is inferred is a matter of fact. To
say that a transaction is or is not an adventure in the
nature of trade is to say that it has or has not the
characteristics which distinguish such an adventure.
But it is a question of law, not offact, what are those
characteristics, or in other words, what the statutory
language means".
In the view of Viscount Simonds, therefore, the question was one of mixed law and fact. But he was also
prepared to decide the case on the footing that it was
a question of fact and observed at pp. 585-586:
"This appeal must be allowed and the assessments must be confirmed. For it is universally conceded that, though it is a pure finding of fact, it may
be set aside on grounds which have been stated in
various ways but are, I think, fairly summarised by
saying that the court should take th.at course if i~
appears that the Commissioners have acted without
any evidence or upon a view of the facts which could
not reasonably be entertained".
That is to say, even if the question was one of pure
(1) [1926) 2 K.B. 753.
(2) [1930) ,\.C. 415.
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1956
(1956]
fact, the finding of the Commissioners was liable to
be set aside on the ground that there was no evidence
Meenakshi Mills,
Madurai
in support of it or that on the evidence it was perverse.
v.
What is of significance in this is that the Lord Chancel·
The Commissioner !or dealing with·the qu~stion whether the adventure
0
1 Income.tax, was in the nature of trade as one of fact does not hold
Madras
that the ultimate finding was one of law by reason of
Venkatarama
its being one of inference from facts but treats it only
Anar J.
as a finding of fact and open to attack as such. This
decision, therefore, is no authority for the position
that where a finding is given on a question of fact
based upon an inference from facts, that is always a
question of law, and the following observation of Lord
Radcliffe at page 592 is directly against it:
"I do not think that inferences from other facts
are incapable of being themselves findings of fact
although there is value in the distinction between
primary facts and inferences drawn from them".
In Bomford v. Osborne('); the Commissioners had
held that 230 acres out of a plot of 550 acres belonging to the asses see should be separately assessed as
"gardens for the sale of produce", while the remain·
ing lands should be taxed on the basis of their annual
value. The assessee disputed the correctness of this
finding, and contended that the 230 acres in question
were not gardens as contemplated by Rule 8 of
Schedule B of the IncC?>me-tax Act, 1918. The House
of Lords agreed with this contention, and discharged
the assessment. One of the points raised on behalf
of the Crown was that the finding of the Commissioner was one of fact and was thecefore final. This
contention was repelled on the ground that whether
the lands were gardens within rule 8 was not a pure
question of fact. The following observations in the
speech of Lord Wright at page 38 may be quoted:
"It has been strenuously contended as a main
argument on behalf of the Crown that the questions
here to be discussed are questions of 'fact and degree'.
But, in my opinion, the true effect of the facts found
cannot be ascertained until the true construction of
r. 8 has been examined and its true application to
(I) (19,2] A.O. 1': (19,2] I.T.R. Supplt. 27.
s:c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
the facts ascertained. There are, in addition to inci1956
dental questions, two main questions of law, namely, Meenakshi Mills,
what is the meaning of "gardens for the sale of proMadurai
duce" and how is that meaning to be applied to
v.
acreage which is worked as e. single mixed farm in The Commissioner
one unit".
of Income-tax,
Thus, the basis of the judgment was that the quesMadras
tion decided by the Commissioners was one of mixed Vcnkatarama
law and fact, and that their determination was open
AyyarJ.
to review by the courts. There is nothing in this decision again which supports the contention of the
appellant that findings on questions of fact based on
inference from other facts should be regarded as questions of law. On the other hand, the following observations of Viscount Simon at page 22 are really
against this contention:
·
"No doubt, there are many cases in which Commissioners, having had proved or admitted before
them a series of facts, may deduce therefrom further
conclusions which are themselves conclusions of pure
fact, but in such cases the determination in point of
law is that the facts proved or admitted provide
evidence to support the Commissioner's conclusions".
These observations clearly establish that inferences
fro!ll facts found need not necessarily be inferences
of law but may be conclusions of fact, and such conclusions of fact could be att~c'ked on grounds on
which findings of fact could be attacked, namely,
there is no evidence to support them as for example,
if the conclusion does not follow even if all the.facts
found are accepted. That does not certainly support
the contention of the appellant.
In Thomas Fattorini (Lancashire), Ltd. v. Inland
Revenue Oommissioners(1), the point for decision was
whether the appellant company had failed to declare
within a reasonable time dividend out of the profits
earned by it, in which case under section 21 of the
Finance Act, 1922 the income is deemed to be income
of the members and chargeable to super-tax. The
finding of the Bqard of Referees was that distribution
of profits had not been made within a reasonable time,
(1) [1942] A.O. 643; 24 T.C. 328.
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956)
1956
but their decision was reversed by the House of Lords
on the ground that there was no evidence in support
Meenakshi Mills,
of it. Thus, there is nothing in t.he decision itself
Madurai
which has any bearing on the present controversy.
v.
Tlic Co1n1nissio11er The appellant, however, relies on the following obserof Income-tax,
vations in the speech of Lord Porter at page 667:
Madras
"!.. .. think that the final conclusion is not a fact
but
an
inference from facts previously set out, and
Vi•nkatarama
AyyarJ,
that, therefore, that conclusion is not binding upon
the tribunal to which the case is referred unless it
appears from the previous findings that there are
facts which support it. In the present case I cannot
find such support."
In the context, what these remarks mean is that
when the final conclusion is one of fact and is itself
an inference from other facts, it is open to attack on
the ground that the basic facts themselves do not
constitute evidence in support of the final conclusion
-a position which does not arise here.
Then there is the observation of Lord Maugham in
Cameron v. Prenderga8t(') that "inferences from facts
stated by the Commissioners are matters of law and
can be questioned on appeal".
Doeg this remark
mean that inferences from facts found are questions
of law in all cases, whether these inferences are- inferences of facts or of law? There being nothing in
the observation to throw any light on this question,
we must examine the facts of the case to ascertain
its true import. There, the assessee who had been a
Director in a building company for 44 years wanted
to resign his office, but he was persuaded to continue
as an advisory Director on a reduced remuneration
and a payment of £45,000, and this arrangement was
embodied in a deed. The question was whether these
amounts were taxable as profits arising from an office.
The Commissioners had held that the consideration
for the payments was the promise of the a~sessee not
to resign his office, and that therefore they were not
profits arising from any office. The House of Lords
held, affirming the judgment of the majority of the
Court of Appeal that the amounts were paid to
I!\ [1910) A.C. 549: 81.1'.R Supplt. 75, 81.
·-.
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
the assessee in consideration of his continuing ae a
7956
Director, and were therefore taxable. Thus, the only
Mills,
P oint for determination in the case was as to the Meenakshi
Madurai
character of the payments made to the appellant,
v.
and that depended on the true interpretation to be The Commissioner
put on the agreement, and that really was a question o/It1come.ta>:,
of law. There was no question of the Commissioners
Madras
recording findings on primary facts and then of draw- Venkatarama
ing further inferences therefrom. The dictum relied
AyyarJ.
on by the appellant therefore could have no reference
to the question now under consideration. It is possible that having regard to the observations following the one quoted above that "the same remark is
true as to the construction of documents", what was
meant to be conveyed was that the legal effect of
facts stated in the deed of agreement was a question
of law. In the context, it is impossible to construe
the observation as an authority in support of the
present contention of the appellant, and it should be
mentioned that there is nothing about this in the
judgments of the other members of the court.
One other argument advanced on behalf of the appellant must now be considered.
This is based on
the following observations of Cozens-Hardy M.R. in
The Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley(1):
"It is undoubtedly true that if the Commissioner~
find a fact, it is not open to this court to .question
that finding unless there is no evidence to support it.
If, however, the Commissioners state the evidence
which was before them, and add that upon such evidence they hold that t:ertain results follow, I think
it is open, and was intended by the Commissioners
that it should be open, to the court to say whether
the evidence justified what the Commissioners held.
I am satisfied that the case stated by the Commissioners falls under the latter head".
On these observations, the argument of the appellant
was that whenever the Tribunal found certain basic
facts and stated its conclusions thereon, its determi:..
nation was open to review by court, and that it was
immaterial whether these conclusions were of fact or
(1) (1908] 2 K.B. 89: 5 T.C. 858.
714
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
of law.
The answer to this contention is furnished
by
the
decision
in The American Thread Company v.
AI «naksh• •lls J
· t he true scope o f t hese observat1ons
·
Madurai
'
oyce (1) , where1n
v.
has been fully considered and authoritatively settled.
The Commissioner There, Hamilton J. pointed out that what· the obsero/ Income-tax,
vations meant was that if the Commissioners merely
Madras
stated certain findings of fact and while expressing
what according to them was their effect, did not
Vt.!nkatarama
intend
that the expression should be taken as their
AyyarJ.
finding thereon, then it must be taken that they had
referred to the decision of the court the question as
to what inference should be drawn from the basic
findings, but that if they had not merely stated the
basic findings but had also stated their conclusions
·thereon intending that they should be their determinations on the question, then those determinations,
if conclusions of fact, would be binding on the court
and that the assessee would then have been stated
out of court. Dealing with the statement of the Commissioners which was under reference before him, the
learned Judge observed at page 22:
"It appears to me, therefore, that it is quite
clear that the Commissioners have done this: they
.have stated their determination, with which the appellants are dissatisfied; they have stated the facts as
found upon which they so determined. The facts as
found they have stated in the first part of paragraph
17, and then they have stated in the previous paragraphs the materials on which they so found, and in
so doing they have invited, and only invited, the determination in point of law of the question whether
there was evidence upon which they could reasonably arrive at the conclusion at which they did ar1956
- . M'
rive".
The decision in The Gramophone and Typewriter Company Ltd. v. Stanley(") is thus really not a pronouncement on what is a question of law but on what construction was to be put on the statement of the Commissioners which was before the court. It should be
added that the situation envisaged by Cozens-Hardy
M. R. in The Gramophone and Typewriter Company
(1) [1911] 6 T.C. 1.
(2) [1908] 2 K.B. 89; 5 T.C. 858.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
715
1956
Lta. v. Stanley(1) cannot arise under section 66 of the
Act, as the Tribunal is itself charged with the duty Meenallshi Mills,
to decide whether a. question of law arises out of its
Mad11rai
order, and it cannot ·therefore merely paH it on for
v.
The Commissioner
the determination of the court.
The decision in The American Thread Company v. of Income-tax,
Madras
Joyce(9) was taken on appeal and confirmed by the
Court of 1Appeal, of which it may be noted two of the Venkatarama
AnarJ.
members, Fletcher Moulton L.J. and Buckley L.J.
were parties to the decision in The Gramophone and
Typewriter Company Ltd. v. Stanley( 1 ), and they expressed themselves in agreement with the view taken
by Hamilton J. There was a further appeal to the
House of Lords, which in confirming the decision of
the courts below expressly approved of the observations of Hamilton J. The Earl of Halsbury observed:
"It is enough to say that they (the Commissioners) have found it and that there· was evidence
upon which they might find it, and if they did find
it and if there was evidence upon which they might
find it, there is no question of appeal here at all .... I
should have been contented absolutely to say that I
entirely agree with every word of Mr. Justice Hamilton's judg!llent". (The American Thread Company v.
Joyce(s)).
This decision is particularly important as the finding
in that case was itself, as appears from the judgment
of Hamilton J., an inference from facts found and;
nevertheless, it was decided that it was a question of
fact on which the finding of the Commissioners was
fin'al.
·
I must now refer to another catena of cases relied
on by the appellant in support of its contention that
inferences from facts are questions of law. They are
decisions of the Privy Council as to when a court
of second appeal having authority to review decisions
of the lower appellate court on a question oflaw could
interfere with its findings of fact. In Ramgopal v.
Sham.skhaton('), one Daud Rao was sought to be
made liable on a mortgage to which he was not a
(1) [1908] 2 K. B. 89; 5 T. C. 368.
(S) (1918] 6 T. C. 16S, 165.
oa
(2) [1911] 6 T. C. 1.
(4) [1891-92] 19 I. A. 228,
716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
party on the ground that he had knowledge of it and
had accepted it. In holding that the acts found did
Meenakshi Mills,
Madurai
not esta bl•1sh any groun d of Jia b ility, Sir Ric h ard
v.
Couch observed:
The Commissioner
"A finding that the bond shewed that the morto/ Income-tax, gage deed was accepted by the defendant, as binding
Madras
obligation upon him, would be an inference of law, an
Venkatarama
inference which, in their Lordships' opinion, is not a
AyyarJ.
just one from the facts which the Commissioner held
to be proved. The knowledge of the mortgage, and
saying that the money due upon it was repayable, do
not amount to an agreement by him to be bound by
it. As the mortgage did not purport to be made in
any way on behalf of Daud Rao it was not a case for
ratification. A new agreement was necessary to bind
him".
Then, after referring to - the observations of Lord
Watson in Ramratan Sukal v . .llfussumat Nandu(1)
that "it has now been conclusively settled that the
third Court, which was in this case the court of the
Judicial Commissioner, cannot entertain an appeal
upon any question as to the soundness of findings of
fact by the second court; if there is evidence to be
considered, the decision of the second Court, however
unsatisfactory it might be if examined, must stand
final", Sir Richard Couch continued:
" ........ the present case does not come within that
rule. The facts found need not be questioned. It is
the soundness of the conclusion from them that is in
question, and this is a matter of Jaw".
It is this last observation that is relied upon for the
appellant. But when read along with the other passages quoted above, it clearly recognises the distinction between findings of pure questions of fact and
of mixed question of Jaw and fact.
In Najar Ohandra Pal v. Shukur(•), Lord Buckmaster observed:
"Questions of Jaw and of fact are sometimes difficult to disentangle. The proper legal effect of a
proved fact is essentially a question of Jaw, so also is
the question of admissibility of evidence and the
1956
{l) [1891-921 19 I.A. 1.
(2) [1917-18] 45 I.A. 183, 187.
.....
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
1956
question of whether any evidence has been offered by
one side or the other; but the question whether the Meenakshi Mills,
fact has been proved, when evidence for and against
Madurai
has been properly admitted, is necessarily a pure
v.
question of fact".
The Commlssicmer
The expression "the proper legal . effect of a proved 01 Income-tax,
fact" is itself Indicative that inferences from facts
Madras
are not all of them questions of law open to considera- Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
tion in second appeal but only those which involve
the application of some legal principle. The actual
decision in that case was that the question as to the
character of land was one of fact not open to consideration in second appeal.
In Dhanna Mal v. Motisagar(1), the point for determination was whether the facts proved were sufficient
to establish a right of permanent occupancy. Discussing how far a finding on that question by the
lower appellate court could be disturbed in second
appeal, Lord Blanesburgh observed at page 185:
"It is clear, however, that the proper effect of a
proved fact is a question of law, and the. question
whether a tenancy is permanent or precarious seems
to them, in a case like the present, to be a legal
inference fr:om facts and not itself a question of fact.
The High Court has described the question here as a
mixed question of law and fact-a phrase not unhappy if it carries with it the warning that, in so far
as it depends upon fact, the finding of the court of
first appeal must be accepted".
These observations again emphasise the distinction
between inferences which are themselves questions of
fact and inferences on mixed questions of law and
fact.
This question was the subject of further consideration by the Privy Council in Wali Mohammad v.
Mohammad Baksh( 2 ), Secretary of State for India
in Council v. Rameswaram Devasthanam(a)
and
Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal(4). In Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Baksh( 9 ), Sir Benod Mitter
(1) [1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 178.
(2) [1929) L.R. 57 I.A 86: 59 M.L.J. 53.
(3) [1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 163: 66 M.L.J. 595.
(4) [1949j L.R. 76 I.A. 271: 1951 M.L.J. 100.
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
exhaustively reviewed the authorities on the questions and stated the law in the following terms:
Meenakshi Mills,
"No doubt questions of law and fact are often
Mad11rai
difficult to disentangle, but the following propositions
v.
The Comminioner are clearly established:
of Income-tax,
(1) There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second
Madras
appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of facts,
however gross the error may seem to be. (See MusuVenkatara~a
AyyarJ.
mat Durga C1ioudrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri(1)).
(2) The proper legal effect of a proved fact is
essentially a question of law, but the question whether a fact has been proved when evidence for and
against has been properly admitted is necessarily a
pure question of fact. (Najar v. Shukur(")).
(3) Where the question to be decided is one of
fact, it does not involve an issue of law merely because documents which were not instruments of title
or otherwise the direct foundation of rights but were
really historical matters, have to be construed for the
purpose of deciding the question. (See Midnapur
Zamindary Co. v. Uma Charan Mandal(')).
(4) A seof'.\nd appeal would not lie because some
portion of the evidence might be contained in a document or documents and the first appellate court had
made a mistake as to its meaning. (See Nowbutt Singh
v. Chutter Dharee Singh(')).
Great reliance was placed by the appellants'
counsel on Dhanna Mal v. Moti Sagar(') but there,
the tenancy was admitted and the question was whether it was permanent or not, and the solution of it
depended upon what was the legal inference to be
drawn from proved facts, or in other words, the question was what was the legal effect of proved facts".
In Secretary of State/or India in Council v. Rameswaram Devasthanam(') where a finding of fact
reached by the lower appellate court on a consideration of the documentary evidence was reversed in
second appeal, Sir John Wallis in holding that the
High Court had, in interfering with the finding of
{l) [1889·90) 17 I.A. 122.
(2) [1917-18] 46 I.A. 183.
(4) 19 W.R. 222.
(3) [1918) !5 M.L.J. 663 P.C.; 29 c.w.N. 131.
(5) [19~7] L.R. 51 I.A 178.
(G) 11934] L.R ul I.A. 163.
••
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
1956
fact, acted in excess of its powers under section 100
observed:
Meenakshi Mills,
"The question is mainly one of fact, and it is
Madurai
well settled that under section 100 of the Code of
v.
Civil Procedure the High Court'has no jurisdiction to The Commissioner
reverse the findings of fact arrived at by the lower of Income-tax,
appellate court however erroneous, unless they are
Madras
vitiated by some error of law. Subsequently to the Venkatarama
date of the judgments under appeal the Board has
Ayyar J.
had occasion to emphasise the fact that this rule is
equally applicable to cases such as this in which the
findings of the lower appellate court are based on
inferences drawn from the documents exhibited in
evidence".
If an inference from documents exhibited in evidence
is a question of fact, an inference from facts found
on the evidence must equally be so.
There is one more decision of the Privy Council
bearing on this question. In Lakshmidhar Misra v.
Rangalal(1), the question was whether the finding of
the Subordinate Judge in appeal that there had been
a dedication of certain lands as cremation ground
could be reversed in second appeal. In holding that
the finding was open to review by the High Court,
Lord Radcliffe observed:
.
"Issue No. 5, (whether the land was a cremation
ground) is essentially a mixed question of law and
fact. There are findings of fact by the Subordinate
Judge which must indeed be accepted as binding in
any consideration of this matter on further appeal:
but his actual conclusion that there had been a dedication or lost grant is more properly regarded as a
proposition of law derived from those facts than as
a finding of fact itself".
These observations lend no support to the broad contention of the appellant that inferences from facts
are of necessity and always questions of law.
We have discussed the authorities at great length,
as some of the observations contained therein appear,
at first sight, to render plausible the contention of
the appellant, and it seems desirable that the true
(I) (1949] L.R. 7G I.A. 271.
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
meaning of those observations shoukl be clarified, lest
error and misconception should embarrass and fog the
Meenakshi Mills,
administration of law. The position that emerges on
Madurai
the authorities may thus be summed up:
v.
The Commissioner
(I) When the point for determination is a pure
of lncomt•tax,
question of law such as construction of a statute or
Madras
document of title, the decision of the Tribunal is open
to reference to the court under section 66(1).
Venkatarama
Ayyar ),
(2) When the point for determinationis a mixed
question of law and fact, while the finding of the
Tribunal on the facts found is final its decision as to
the legal effect of those finding is a question of law
which can be reviewed by the court.
(3) A finding on a question of fact is open to
attack under section 66(1) as erroneous in law when
there is no evidence to support it or if it is perverse.
(4) When the finding is one of fact, the fact that
it is itself an inference from other basic facts will not
alter its character as one of fact.
Applying these principles, admittedly there is no
question here of construction of any statutory provision or document of title. The issues which arise for
determination whether the sales entered in the books
of the appellant in the names of the intermediaries·
were genuine and if not, to whom the goods were sold
and for what price are all questions of fact. Their
determination does not involve the application of
legal principles to facts established in the evidence.
The findings of the Tribunal are amply supported by
evidence and are eminently reasonable. It should,
therefore, follow that there is no question which
could be referred to the court under section 66(1).
It was argued for the appellant that what the Tribunal had found was that the intermediaries, firms
and companies were benamidars for the appellant,
that a question of benami was one of mixed law and
fact, and that accordingly a finding thereon was open
to review under section 66(1). Whether that is a correct reading of what the Tribunal had found will presently be considered. Assuming that such is the finding, what is the ground for holding that a finding of
benami is one of mixed law and fact? The only basis
•
•
•
S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
1956
for such a contention is that the finding that a transaction is benami is a matter of inference from various Meenakshi Mills,
primary basic facts such as who paid the consideraMadurai
tion, who is in enjoyment of the properties and the
v.
like. But that is not sufficient to make the question Tlze Commissioner
one of mixed law and fact unless, as already stated, 01 Income-tax,
there are legal principles to be applied to the basic
Madras
findings before the ultimate conclusion is drawn. But Venkatarama
no such principles arise for application to the deterAyyar J.
mination of the question of benami, which is purely
one of fact, and none has been suggested by the appellant.
In Gangadara Ayyar v. Subramania Sastrigal(1),
the Federal Court had to consider whether concurrent
findings of benami by the courts below could be reviewed by it, and it was held that it could not be
done as the practice of the court was not to interjere
with concurrent findings of fact unless there were exceptional grounds therefor and that there were none
such in that case. It should be noted that the finding
of benami in that case was a matter of inference from
primary facts found which are set out at page 573.
But it was nevertheless held to be a question of fact. In
lliisrilal v. Surji(2), it was held by the Privy Council
that a finding of beuami was one of fact not open to
attack in second appeal. This contention of the appellant must accordingly be rejected.
It was next contended that the finding of the Tribunal that the intermediaries, firms and companies
were benamidars for the appellant was bad for the
following reasons:
(1) It had been reached without due consideration of several matters relevant for such a determination.
(2) The finding of benami in so far as it related
to the companies was bad for not considering the
tests laid down in Smith, Stone and Knight v. Binningham Gorporation( 3 ) as material for a decision on
the point.
(1) [1949] 1 ~I.L.J. 568: A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 88.
12) A.LR. 1950 P.C. 23: [1950) 11'LL.J. 294.
(3) [~939] 4 .\.KR. 116.
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
(3) On the facts found, the proper conclusion to
come
to was that the intermediaries were benamidars
.\Icenakslii Mills,
not
for
the appellant but for Mr. Thyagarajan Chettiar
Madurai
of
the
Managing
Agents firm.
v.
The Commissioner
These contentions will now be considered. As re0/ blcomc tax, gards the first con ten ti on, the argument on behalf of
Madfas
the appellant was this:- An important teat for determining whether a transaction is benami is to discover
Vcn!~atara111a
the source of consideration for the transfer. When
Ayyar }.
the question is whether firms and companies are benamidars for another person, what has to be found is
whether it was the latter who found the capital of
those concerns. The firms and companies had according to their books their own capital, and there is no
,finding that the appellant subscribed it. Another
important test of benami is to find who has been in
enjoyment of the benefits of the transaction. It has
not been shown that the profits of the ·intermediaries
had been utilised by the appellant. Therefore, the
finding that the intermediaries were benamidars of
the appellant could not stand.
Now, the assumption underlying this argument is
that the Tribunal had found in its order that the intermediaries were benamidars for the appellant, but
there is no basis for this in the order. In this con~
nection, it is necessary to note that the word 'benami'
is used to denote two classes of transactions which
differ from each other in their legal character and incidents. In one sense, it signifies a transaction which
is real, as for example when A sells properties to B
but the sale deed mentions X as the purchaser. Here
the sale itself is genuine, but the real purchaser is B,
X being his benamidar. This is the class of transactions which is usually termed as benami. But the
word 'benami' is also occasionally used, perhaps not
quite accurately, to refer to a sham transaction, as for
example, when A purports to sell his property to B
without intending that his title should cease or pass
to B. The fundamental difference between these two
classes of transactions is that whereas in the former
there is an operative transfer resulting in the vesting
of title in the transferee, in the latter there is none
1956
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
1956
such, the transferor continuing to retain the title
notwithstanding the execution of the transfer deed. Mce11aksh i Mills,
It is only in the former class of cases that it would
be necessary, when a dispute arises as to whether the
v.
person named in the deed is the real transferee or B, The Conttnissioucr
to enquire into the question as to who paid the con- oj lnco11ic~t,1x,
Madras
sideration for the transfer, X or B. But in the latter
class of cases, when the question is whether the trans- Vt:nkatara11:a
fer is genuine or sham, the point for decision would
AyyarJ.
be, not who paid the consideration but whether any
consideration was paid. Therefore, there will be force
in the contention of the appellant that a finding as
to who furnished the capital for the intermediaries
was requisite before they could be hel<l to be benamidars, if the Tribunal had held them to be benamidars
in the former sense but not in the latter. We must,
therefore, examine- what it is that the Tribunal has
actually found. Now, the Tribunal has not held that
any of the transactions with which the assessment
proceedings are concerned are benami. Indeed, the
word 'benami' does not fin.d a place anywhere in its
order. It is only in the question which the appellant
framed for reference to the court in its application
under section 66(1) that it has chosen for the first
time to introduce the word 'benamidar'. That apart,
looking at the substance of the finding, the point that
arose for determination before the taxing authorities
was what profit the appellant had made on certain
sales standing in its books in the names of the intermediaries. If the sales were true, the amounts shown in
the books as price received therefor would be the basis
for working out the profits, and that was the stand of
the appellant; but the authorities held that those sales
were sham and the entries relating to the payment of
price therefor fictitious. Then, they found that the
concerned goods were sold by the appellant directly to
its own constituents, that the price paid by them was
actually received by it, and that that should be the
basis for calculating its profits. Thus, the point which
was actually in issue in the proceedings was a question of benami in the second sense and not in the
first, and to decide that, the Tribunal had only to
91
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
find whether any price was paid by the intermediaries
for the sales and not who paid the price for them. It
:111.!ctiakshi Mills, ·
• arises
·
Madw·ai
is scarce1y necessary "to a dd t h at no question
v.
as to whether the intermediaries are benamidars for
The Commissioner the ultimate purchasers, because the claim of the
of focomc-tax,
former is that they had sold the goods to the latter
Madras
under fresh contracts at different prices. Nor could
there be a question of benami in the first sense, as
Vcnkatarat11a
Ayyar 1 .
that could arise only between a party to a deed and
another who is eo nominee not a party to it but claims
to be beneficially entitled to the properties conveyed
by the deed. Therefore, on the findings of the Tribunal, the question whether the intermediaries were
benamidars for the appellant could not arise, and the
. further question as to who found the capital for the
·intermediaries is altogether irrelevant. Likewise, on
the finding that the yarn was really sold by the appellant not to the intermediaries but to its own constituents and that they paid the price therefor to the
appellant, the question who had the benefit of the
transaction could not arise either.
(2) It is next contended that some of the intermediaries were private limited companies registered
iu accordance with the provisions of the Companies
Act and were in law distinct legal entities as held in
Solomon v. Solomon & Company('), and that they
could not be held to be benamidars for the appellant
without deciding the matters mentioned· by Atkinson
.J. in Smith, Stone and Knight v. Birmingham Corporation('). The learned Judge observed at page 121:
"It seems therefore to be a question of fact in
each case, and those cases indicate that the question
is whether the subsidiary was carrying on the business as the company's business or as its own. I have
looked at a number of cases-they are all revenue
cases-to see what the courts regarded as of importance for determining that question. There is San
Paulo Brazilian Bly. Go. v. Oarte1·('), Apthorpe v. Peter
Schoenhofen Brewery Co. Ltd.('), Fmnk Jones Brew1956
(1) [1897) A.C. 22.
\3) {1896) .\.C. 31: S T.C . .l.07.
12) [1939] 4 .\.E.R. 116.
(4) [1899] .l T.C. 41.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
7956
ing Co. v. Apthorpe(1), St. Louis Breweries v. Apthorpe(9), and I find six points which were deemed Meenakshi Mills,
relevant for the determination of the question: who
Madurai
was really carrying on the business? In all the cases,
v.
the question was whether the company, an English The Comniissioner
company here, could be taxed in respect of all the of Income-ta:r,
Madras
profits made by some other company, a subsidiary
company, being carried on elsewhere. The first point Vi!nkataratna
was: \Vere the profits treated as the profits of the
Ayyar J,
Company?-when I say 'the company' I mean the
parent company-secondly, were the persons conducting the business appointed by the parent company?
Thirdly, was the company the head and the brain of
the trading venture? Fourthly, did the compal}y govern the adventure, decide what should be done and
what capital should be embarked on the venture?
Fifthly, did the company make the profits by its !!kill
and direction? Sixthly, was the company in effectual
and constant control?"
The contention of the appellant is that before the
intermediaries could be held to be benamidars for the
appellant, findings ought to have been recorded on the
six points mentioned in the judgment of Atkinson, J.
This contention proceeds on a misapprehension as to
the true scope of the above observations and of the
decisions referred to therein. In those cases, the
question was whether the profits earned by a subsidiary company X could be held to be profits earned
by the parent company A and taxed in the hands of
company A. It was held that the fact that X was a
legal entity did not stand in the way of its profits being treated as profits of A, if, as observed by Lord
Sterndale in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Samson(3), X was doing the business of A and not its
own, and various tests were laid down for ascertaining whether it was A who was running the business
of X. But here, no such question arises. The true
scope of the assessment proceedings is to discover
what profits were really made on certain sales effected
by the appellant, and the intermediaries came into
(1) (1898] 4 T.C. 6.
(2) {1898] 4 T.C. lll.
(3) (192{] 2 K. B. 492; 8 T. C. 20.
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
the picture only as the persons in whose names the
sales
were made. The question whether apart from
Niecnakslii ftfills,
those sales the intermediaries were genuine commer•lfadurai
cial bodies having existence independent of the
v.
Tltc Con11nissio1ter appellant did not arise for determination, as a findof /11co11:,,·tax,
ing that they were such bodies would have had no
iUadras
effect on the chargeability of the appellant to tax on
the profits made by it on the sales in question.
Vcnkatarania
AyyarJ.
The question of the true status of the intermediaries would have assumed practical importance if
they had done business other than the sales in question and had made profits thereon, and those profits
were sought to be taxed as profits made by the appellant. It would then be a legitimate contention for
the appellant to advance that that could not be done
unless the intermediaries were found to have been
really benamidars for .it. In that case, it would have
been important to consider who found the capital for
the concerns and who was running them. But here,
the tax is levied only on the profits ostensibly earned
by the intermediaries on the sales which stand in the
books of the appellant in their names. If those sales
are sham, then the order of assessment must stand
even if the intermediaries were real concerns, which
had found their own capital and earned their own
profits in other transactions. If an individual A
carrying on his own business lends his name to the
business transaction of B, the latter cannot escape
the obligation to pay the tax on these transactions
on the ground that A had also his own genuine business. Likewise, if companies doing their own business lend their names to business transactions of
other persons, those other persons cannot be heard to
say that. they are not taxable on the profits of these
transactions for the reason that the companies were
also carrying on their own business. Therefore, on
the finding that the sales were sham, no question
arises as to the constitution or status of the intermediaries. It is true that the Tribunal has directed
that all the profits earned by the intermediaries
should be added to the profits of the appellant but
that is because it has found that the intermediaries
1956
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
did no business other than the transactions of the
1956
appellant. And this finding clearly reveals how hollow Meenakshi Mills,
and unsubstantia1 the contentions of the appellant
Madurai
are as to the sources of capital for the intermediaries
v.
and the application of the tests laid down in Smith, The Commissioner
Stone and Knight v. Birmingham Corporation (1). It is of Income-tax,
a most unreal que.stion to raise of firms and comMadras
panies whose only business consists of sham transac- Venkatarama
tions as to who found the capital for them or who
AyyarJ.
was running them.
(3) It is next contended that though the facts
proved might justify a finding that the intermediaries
were benamidars, they did not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that they were benamidars for the appellant. It is argued that on the findings of the Tribunal that it was Mr. Thyagaraja Chettiar, the Managing Agent of the appellant, that had setup the intermediaries, that it was his relations and men who had
been put up as partners and shareholders of these
concerns, and that it was he that generally had the
control of the business, the proper inference to draw
was that the intermediaries were benamidars for Mr.
Thyagaraja Chettiar, and that in consequence their
profits were liable to be added to his and not to those
of the appellant. This argument again proceeds on
the assumption that the profits of the intermediaries
have been taxed in the hands of the appellant on the
ground that they are its benamidars. But, as already
stated, that is not the true position. What are
sought to be taxed in these proceedings are the profits
made on certain sales and not the profits made by
the intermediaries as distinct entities chargeable to
tax under section 3 of the Act, and the only relevant
points for decision are, what profits were made on
those sales and by whom. On the finding that the
appellant sold the goods direct to the ultimate purchasers and recovered the price therefor, it is only
the appellant that could be taxed for the profits made
thereon and not the Managing Agent. It is of no
consequence that in form the order is that the profits
of the intermediaries should be added to those of the
(1) [1939] 4 A.E.R.116.
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
appellant, because, as pointed out in discussing the
previous contention of the appellant of which the
ltfeenakshl Mills,
present
is but a repetition in another form, the interMadurai
v,
mediaries did no other business than the sales conThe Com1nissioner cerned in this assessment, so that the profits of the
of Income.tax,
business mean the same thing as profits made on the
Madras
concerned sales.
There is another aspect of the matter, which calls
Venkatarama
for notice. If the contention of the appellant that
A;y;yar J.
the intermediaries were benamidars for Mr. Thyagaraja Chettiar is accepted, it means that he had, by
availing himself of his position as Managing Agent,
unjustly enriched himself at the expense of the shareholders to the tune of over Rs. 25 lakhs. Now, Mr.
Thyagaraja Chettiar is the dominant member of the
firm of Managing Agents. It is this firm that has
been in management of the affairs of the company at
all times and has been representing it in the assessment
proceedings at all stages, and it is through this firm
that the appellant speaks in the present appeals. The
position then is that Mr. Thyagaraja Chettiar as
Managing Agent of the appellant charges himself in
his individual capacity with conduct which is grossly
fraudulent and infamous, so that the company might
escape its liability to tax. This, to our minds, is a
most surprising position to take. But we are not concerned here with the ethics of it and must consider it
on its merits so long as the law does not bar it. But
what are its merits? The position which the appellant took up with reference to this matter at the
several stages of the assessment has been neither
uniform nor even consistent. Thus, before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner its argument was that
the Managing Agent bad been the protector of the
interests of the company at all times, that he had
"stood by it in its lean years" and should "not therefore be presumed to have acted against the interests
of the company" and that therefore the transactions
in the names of the intermediaries should be accepted
as genuine. Before the 'fribunal, the contention was
that even if the intermediaries were bogus concerns
"it might be that someotherindividual got the bene-
,r
I
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
fit and not the company". Thus, the contention
1956
now advanced was not thought of in the earlier stages
.
h
h Meenakshi Mills,
an d was sti 11 ne b u 1ous an d in t h e ma k mg, w en t e
Madurai
matter was before the Tribunal, and it is only in the
v.
argument that it has assumed a definite and concrete The Commissioner
shape.
of Income.tax,
Dealing with the contention as advanced before it,
Madras
the Tribunal referred to several facts such as that the Venkatarama
sales in favour of the intermediaries were for unusuAyyar J.
ally large quantities and for prices far below the
market rate and even the cost of production, that
the appellant was a public company with a Board of
Directors in-charge of its business, and that they must
have known all about these transactions. Is itlikely
that the Directors would have accepted these sales
involving such huge loss to the company and carried
on regularly from month to month and year to year
during the whole of this period as proper and genuine,
unless they considered that it was the compai;iy and
not Mr. Thyagaraja Chettiar who was to have. the
benefit of them? It was argued by the learned Solicitor-General for the respondent that if on the facts
two inferences were possible and the Tribunal chose
to draw one and not the other, it was not a matter in
which the court could interfere, if the inference is one
of fact.
That is a proposition of law well settled,
and has not been disputed.
Now., on the facts, two
inferences are possible. One is that the object of the
Managing Agent was to defraud the shareholders by
purchasing goods himself at a low valuation for his
own benefit and that the intermediaries were set up
by him for that purpose.
The other is that they
were set up for the purpose of concealing portions of
the profits earned by the company so as to reduce the
tax to which it was liable to be assessed. The former
involves cheating the shareholders; the latter, evading the tax due to the State.
Is it an unreasonable
inference for the Tribunal to draw that the motive
by which the Managing Agent was actuated was
the latter and not the former? Is it not more
legitimate to presume that the Managing Agent
wanted to benefit the shareholders by reducing the
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956}
tax rather than he wanted to defraud them by himself
purchasing the goods for a low price in the names
ftl.:euakslii ~ff ills,
of
the
intermediaries? If the Tribunal came to the
ltladurai'
former conclusipn and it is one which could reasonTit~ Co1111nissio1ur ably be come to on the materials, it is not one which
of l11co111e-lt1.1·,
th_e court can review, being one of fact. This ground
Jla1lrt1s
of attack also must be rejected. In the result, all the
contentions of the appellant based on the assumption
V.-uk,1ti.1ra11iii
that the intermediaries had been held to be benamiAyya,. J.
dius for the appellant must be overruled on the ground
that on the findings of the Tribunal they do not really
arise.
Lastly, it was contended that the profits earned
by the intermediaries had not been brought into the
books of the company as its income, had not been
included in its balance-sheet and bad not been distributed as dividends or added to its reserves, and,
not having been treated as its income or profits, could
not be taxed. The decisions in St. Lucia Usines
and Estates Co. ,., St. Lucia (Colonial Treasurer}('),
Commissioner of Taxes v. Melbourne Trust(') and Comniissioner of Income-tax, Bihar· and Orissa v. Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga( 8) were quoted in support
of this contention. This question is, howe\·er, no
longer res integra, and is covered by the decision of
this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. R. !tf.
T. T. Thyagaraja Chetty('). There, the assessee which
was no other than the firm of Messrs K.R.M.T.T.
Thyagaraja Chettiar and Co., the Managing Agents
of the present appellant, failed to bring into its profit and loss account a ce1·tain amount which it bad
earned as commission, and the point for decision was
whether that amount was liable to tax. The contention of the assessees was that it was not liable as it
had not been tre1ited as profits by the assessee and
the decisions in St. Luc1'.a Usines and Estates Co. v. St.
Lucz'.a (Colonial 1'rea.surer)('), Commissioner of Taxes
v. 1lfelboume 1'rust(") and Commissioner of Incometa;i;, Bihai· anrl Orissa v. Jlaharajadhiraja of Darbhrmga(') were relied on in support of this position.
But this Court disagreed with this contention, and
1956
(U [192!) A.G. 508.
(3) GO LI. HG.
I~) [191') A.C. 1001.
(4) 2! I.T.R. 625,
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
1955
held that the liability to pay tax on the income arose
when it had arisen or accrued and that how the as- Meenakshi Mills,
sessee dealt with it subsequently did not affect that
Maduf'ai
liability, and distinguished the decisions in St. Lucia
v.
Usines and Estates Co. v. St. Lucia (Colonial Treasu- The Commissionef'
rer) (1) and Commissioner of Taxes v. Melbourne of r..come-tax,
Madras
Trust(9) on the ground that they were pronouncements on the particular statutes there under con- Venkataf'aflla
sideration and were not authotities on the question
A;y;yaf' J.
of assessment of profits and gains under the Indian
Income-tax Act. Applying this decision, the appellant having been found to have sold its goods to the
ultimate purchasers and received the prices, there
can be no question but that the profits had accrued
to it both in the business and in the legal sense and
that· liability to tax had arisen. If an individual
were to sell goods and receive the price therefor, that
would be income accrued or arisen, liable to tax in
his hands even though he should have failed to enter
it in his accounts. A party cannot avoid tax by
adopting the simple expedient of not disclosing its
receipt in his books.
That will be a case of income
accrued or arisen but concealed and not of income not
accrued or arisen. This is conceded by the appellant.
But it is argued that different considerations arise in
the case of companies registered under the Indian
Companies Act, because there are provisions in the
A.ct as to how the profits are to be disposed of, such
as distribution of dividends or adding to the reserve
and until that was done, there was no accrual of income or of profits under the statute. This is to confuse
accrual of income with the disposal of it. Income
which .has accrued to an assessee might remain undisposed of by him, but the liability to tax attaches
to it under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax
Act as soon as it accrues. It is no concern of the
revenue how and when profits are disposed of by the
a.ssessees, and for this purpose it makes no difference
whether the a.ssessee is an individual or a company,
both of them being equally liable to tax on income
and profits when they have arisen or accrued. The
(1) [192!) A.O. 508.
05
(2) [191!) A.O. 1001,
732
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
1956
provisions of the Companies Act as to the disposal of
protitsh are designed
J..Ieenakshi Mills,
d to protect the interests of the
Madurai
share olders an have no effect on the right which
v.
the State has under the provisions of the Act to imThe Commissio11er pose a tax on income when it arises or accrues.
It
of Income-tax,
should also be mentioned that though the decision
Madras
in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K. R. M.
Venkatarama
T. T. Thyagaraja Ohetty(') relates to a firm and not
Ayyar J.
a company, the c;iecisions in St. Lucia Usines and
Estates Co. v. St. Lucia (Colonial Treasurer)(') and
Commissioner of Taxes v. Melbourne Trust(') which
were held to be inapplicable to the imposition of a
charge under the Indian Income-tax Act related to
comparries, and the argument and the decision proceeded on the footing that principles applicable were
the same both to firms and companies. The decision
in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K. R. M. T.
T. Thyagaraja Chetty(') must accordingly be held t_o
conclude this question against the appellant.
It must be said of this contention that it was raised
before the Tribunal.and negatived. Being a question
of law, the appellant had a rigjit to have it referred
to the court under section 66(1). But the question as
framed by the appellant in its application under section 66(1) did not specifically raise this point; nor
does it appear to have been argued in the High Court.
As the matter is now concluded by authority, it will
be an idle formality to direct the Tribunal to refer
the question for the decision of the court. The powers
of this Court in appeal under article 136 are not
intended to be exercised for such a purpose. That
disposes of the main and substantial questions that
ha;ve been agitated in these proceedings.
There is one other matter in respect of which the
appellant sought reference to the court in its application under section 66(1). The facts relating to this
matter are that during the periods of assessment with
which the appeals are concerned, the aP.pellant opened
branches in the States of · Travancore, Cochin,
Pudukkottah and Mysore, and sold yarn to its consti.ll) [195!) S.0.R. 258: [1953] 24 I.T.R. 625,
(2) [1924) A.O. 608,
(8) [191!1) A.O. 1001.
r
-
S.C.R.
•
-
__,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
tuents in those States through these branches. The
1956
oint
in
dispute
is
whether
the
profits
made
by
the
P
Meenakshi Mills,
appellant on those sales are chargeable to tax. The
Mad ..rai
contention of the appellant before the Tribunal was
v.
that the matter was governed by section 14(2)(c), and The Commissioner
that the profits could be taxed only if they were 0/ Income-ta.,.,
remitted to British India. That was not disputed by
Madras
the Department, but they contended that as the Venkatarama
appellant sold in the States goods manufactured by it
Ayyar J.
in British India, the governing provisions were sections 42(1) and 42(3), and that under these provisions, the appellant was liable to be taxed on such
portions of the profits as were apportionable to the
manufacture of the goods in British India. That was
accepted by the Tribunal, and the profits were apportioned in the ratio of 85:15. In its application
under section 66(1), the appellant raised the contention that sections 42(1) and 42(3) applied only to nonresidents, and that it was only section 14(2)(c) that
would apply to residents and applied to have that
question referred to the decision of the court. But
the Tribunal held that the decision of this Court in
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Ahmedbhai
Urnarbhai and Go. (1 ) had settled that sections 42(1)
and 42(3) applied both to residents as well as nonresidents and consequently declined to refer the
question.
The correctness of this decision does not appear to
have been contested before the High Court, the only
point dealt with in the judgment of the learned Judges
being as to the correctness of the ratio in which the
apportionment was made. Even in this Court, it was
only this question that was pressed on the strength
of the decision in Oommis.sioner of Income-tax and
PJxcess Profits Tax v. S. Sen( 2). Section 14 was mentioned in the course of the argument, but no contention was advanced that sections 42(1) and 42(3) applied only to non-residents, and the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and
Go.(1) was not even so much as referred to in the
(1 \ [1950) S.C.R. 335: [1950) I.T.R. 472.
(2) [1949) I.T.R. 355
734
SUPREME CQURT REPORTS
[1956]
course of the argument, and the appellant did not
even ask for this question being referred. That apart,
Meenokshi Mills, ,
.
f h d
C
,/ J
Madurai
m view o t e ecision in ommisBioner oJ ncome-tax
v.
v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co.('), no purpose would
Th• Commissioner be served by directing a reference of this question,
o/ lncome·ta:r, and the Tribunal was right in observing that "it is
Madra•
not even of academic interest to refer the said quesv...katarama tion to the High Court". On the question whether
Ayyar J.
the fixation of ratio was correct, we are of opinion
that it is a pure question of fact, and is not open to
reference under section 66(1).
In the result, the appeals fail, and are dismissed
with costs.
1956
1956
October 3
-
NIRANJAN SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(and connected appeal)
[BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and
GOVINDA MENON JJ.)
Criminal lrial-In,,.sligation of crime-Police Reg1tlationsOase diaty-S1tbminion of t/r.t -case diar11 I<> superior officers da11 to
da11-0ontra11ention of t/r.t rule-Whether it vitiates the trial-Utl<>r
Pradeah Polict Regulation•, r. 109.
Rule 109 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations dealing with
the investigation of crimes enjoins upon the police officer when an
investigation is closed for the day- to note the time and place at
which it closed and also lays down that throughout the investi·
gation the diary must be sent daily to the Superintendent of
Police on all days on which any proceedings are takep.
The question that bad to be decided by the court was as to
whether the appellants took part in the dacoity and the case of the
prosecution depended mainly on the identification of the appellants.
It was found that the investigating officer did not send the case
diary daily to the Superintendent of Police but only all together at
the end of the period of investigation. It was contended for the ap·
pellants that the case diary could not be relied upon ae it enabled
the officer to make alteration• during the course of the period of
investigation and that as there had been an infraction of r. 109 of
(1) [1950) S.0 R. 886; [1950] I.T.R. 472.
-
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