CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC. versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 24 April 1956 | [1956] 1 S.C.R. 393 | 1956 INSC 28
Key facts
- Decided
- 24 April 1956
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 585/1954
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1956] 1 S.C.R. 393
- Neutral citation
- 1956 INSC 28
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
1956
grounds on which the detention is based and the
nature of activities imputed therein to the appellant. Lau·re11ce Joac/1im
It is unnecessary, therefore, to deal in this case with Joseph D'So11za
a theoretical contention as to whether or not article
v.
22(6) of the Constitution overrides the constitutional Tile State of
Bombay
right to be furnished particulars under article 22(5)
to the extent of denying all particulars and leaving ]agannadliadas J.
the grounds absolutely vague.
All the contentions raised before us fail and this
appealis dismissed.
CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC.
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS.
(S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR,
B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.]
Sugarcane, Regulation of Supply and Purchase of-Act passed
by State Legislature and notifications issued thereunder by the State
Government-Constitutional validity-If repugnant to Parliamentary
Acts and notifications made thereunder-If violative of fundamental
rights-Parliament's power of repeal-Delegation of siich power, if
permissible-U.P. Sugarcane (Regitlation of Supply and Pitrchase)
Act, 1958 (U.P. Act XXIV of 1958), ss. 15, 16-U.P. Sugarcane
Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954-Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act LXV of 1951) as amended by
Act XXVI of 1958, ss. 18-G, 15, 16-Essentfo.l Commodities Act,
1955 (Act X of 1955), s. 16(1)(b)-Sugarcane Control Order, 1956,
cl. '1(1)-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1)(c), (J) and (g), 81,
801, 804, 254.
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the
U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act of 1953,
and two notifications issued by the State Government on September
27, 1954 and November 9, 1955, the former under sub-sec. l(a) read
with sub-sec. 2(h) of s. 16 of the impugned Act providing that where
not less than three-fourths of the canegrowers ·within the area of
operation of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society were members
thereof, the occupier of the factory to which that area is assigned
should not purchase or enter into an agreement to purchase cane
except through that society and the latter under s. 15 of the Act
assigning to different sugarcane factories specified cane-purchasing
centres for supply to them of sugarcane for the crushing season of
1955-56. They contended that the impugned Act was itltra vires the
1956
April 24
394
1956
Ch. Tika Ra1nji
and others, etc.
v.
Tl1e State of
l1ttur Pradesh
and others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
State Legislature, the subject·matter of legislation being within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament, and repugnant to Act LXV of
1951 and Act X of 1955 passed by Parliament and that as. 15 and
16(l)(a) and (2)(b) and the two notifications infringed their fundamental rights under Arts.14, 19(l)(c), (f) and (g) and 31 and violated
the provisions of Art. 301 of the Constitution.
Held, (1) that the impugned Act and the notifications issued
thereunder were intra vires the State Legislature, did not infringe
any fundamental rights of the petitioners nor violated the provi·
sions of Art. 301 of the Constitution and the petitions must be dis·
missed;
(2) that the Central Acts in respect of sugar and sugarcane and
the notifications thereunder having been enacted and made by the
Central Government in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction under
Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as
amended by the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act of 1954; the
State Legislature was not deprived of its jurisdiction thereunder and
no question of legislative incompetence of the U.P. Legislature or
its trespassing upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the centre in enacting the impugned Act could arise;
(3) that the provisions of the impugned Act compared to
those of the Central Acts clearly showed that the impugned Act
was solely concerned with the regulation o! the supply and
purchase of sug<l.rcane and in no way trenched upon the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Centre with regard to sugar and the U.P.
Legislature was, therefore, quite competent to enact it;
(4) that no question of repugnancy under Art. 254-of the
Constitution could arise where Parliamentary Legislation and
State Legislation occupied different fields and de,Jt with separate
and distinct matters even though of a cognate and allied character,
and that where, as in the present case, there was no inconsistency
in the actual terms of the acts enacted by Parliament and the
State Legislature, the test of repugnancy would be whether
Parliament and the State Legislature, in legislating under an entry
in the Concurrent List, exercised their powers over the same
subject-matter or whether the laws enacted by Parliament were
intended to be exhaustive so as to cover the entire fi.e'ld;
(5) that the provisions of s. lB·G of Act LXV of 1951 did
not cover sugarcane nor indicate the intention of the Parliament
to cover the entire field of such legislation; the expression "any
article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled industry"
used in ss. lB·G, 15 and 16 of the Act did not refer to raw
materials but only to finished products of the scheduled industries the supply and distribution of which s. 18-G was intended
to regulate, it• whole object being the equitable distribution and
availability of manufactured articles at fair prices and not to in·
vest the Central Government with the power to legislate in regard
to sugarcane;
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
1956
(6) that even assuming that sugarcane was such an article
and fell within the purview of s. 18-G of the Act, no order having
been issued by the Central Government thereunder, no question of Ch. Tika Ramji
repugnancy could arise, as repugnancy must exist as a fact and not and others, etc.
v.
as a mere possibility and the existence of such an order would be an
The State of
essential pre-requisite for it;
Uttar Pradesh
(7) that as the provisions of Act X of 1955, and those of
and others
the impugned Act and the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation qf Supply and
Purchase Order, 1954, made thereunder, relating to sugarcane were
mutually exclusive and did not impinge upon each other and the
one legislature did not trench upon the field of the other, the Centre
remaining silent where the State spoke and the State remaining
silent where the Centre spoke, there could be no inconsistency between them and no provision of the impugned Act and the Rules
made thereunder was invalidated by any of the provisions of Act
LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953 or Act X of 1955
and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, issued thereunder;
Clyde Engineering Company, Limited v. Oowburn ((1926] 37
C.L.R. 466), Ex Parte McLean ((1930] 43 C L.R. 472), Stock Motor
Plough Ltd. v. Forayth ((1932] 48 C.L.R. 128), G.P. Stewart v. B.K.
Roy Ohaudhury (A.!.R. 1939 Cal. 628) and Sh11arnakant Lal v.
Rambhajan Singh ((1939] F.C.R. 188), referred to.
(8) that the power of repeal conferred on Parliament by the
proviso to Art. 254(2) of the Constitution was a limited power and
could be exercised only by enacting a law relating to the matter dealt
with by the state law and the state law must be one of the kind
indicated in the body of Art. 254(2) itself, and as the impugned Act
did not fall within that category the proviso did not apply and the
impugned Act, the notifications made thereunder and the U. P.
Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, stood
unrepealed by s. 16(l)(b) of Act X of 1955 and cl. 7(1) of the
Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 made thereunder;
Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of Bombay ((1955] 1 S.C.R.
799), referred to.
(9) that the power of repeal conferred by the proviso to Art.
254(2) could be exercised by Parliament alone and could not be de·
legated to an executive authority and, consequently, the Central
Government acquired no power of repeal under cl. 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955;
(10) that the contention that the impugned Act infringed the
fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 inasmuch as very wide
powers were given to the Cane Commissioner which could be used
in a discriminatory manner was without any foundation since his
powers under s. 15 of the impugned Act were well defined and the
Act and Rules framed thereunder gave the canegrowers or a Cane·
growers' Co-operative Society or the occupier of a factory the right
to appe11l to the State Government against any order passed by him
396
1956
Ch. Tika RamjJ
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesli
a1iil others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956)
and thus provided a sufficient safeguard against any arbitrary exer·
oise of those powers;
(11) that equally unfounded was the contention that the im·
pugned Act and the notification dated September 27, 1954, violated
the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitu·
tion. Although the right to form an association was a fundamental
right, it did nbt necessarily follow that its negative, i.e. the right not
ta form an aS"Sociation must also be so, as all rights which an Indian
citizen had were not fundamental rights. No canegrower was com ..
polled to become a member of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society
or prevented from resigning therefrom or selling his crops elsewhere
and, consequently, the impugned Act and the notification did not
violate his fundamental right;
(12) that the powers given to the Cane Commissioner bys. 15
of the impugned Act to declare reserved or assigned areas were well·
defined and controlled by higher authorities and by no means
absolute and unguided and were not, therefore, hit by Art. 19(1)(f)
and (g) and the notification dated November 9, 1955, could not,
therefore, be impugned on that ground;
(13) that the restriction imposed by the notification dated
September 27, 1954, on canegrowers in regard to sale of sugarcane
to occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the Cane·
growers' Co-operative Society wos not less than 75 per cent. of the
total number of canegrowers was a. reasonable restriction in the
public interest, designed for the benefit of a large majority of cane·
growers, and as such came within the protection of Art. 19(6) and
did not violate Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) of the Constitution;
(14) that the impugned notifications, being intra vires the State
Legislature, could not also be challenged under Art. 31 as none of
the petitioners was deprived of his property, if any, save by auth·
ority of law.
Messr> Dwa1·ka Prasad Laxmi. Narain v. The State of Uttar
Prade•h and two others ([1954] S.C.R. 803), referred to.
(15) Nor could it be contended that the impugned Act and the
notifications contravened the provisions of Art. 301 of the Consti·
tution in view of the prnvision of Art. 304(b) which made it per·
missible for the State Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions
in the public interest.
Commonwealth of Aust..alia v. Bank of New South Wales ((1950)
A.C. 235) and Hughes and Vale Proprietary Ltd. v. State of New
South Wales and othe1·s ([1955] A.C. 241), referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 585,
599, 611, 622, 625, 565, 576 of 1954 and 48, 58, 415,
416 of 1955 and IO, 16, 37, 39 and 47 of 1956.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
397
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
G. S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and K. R.
Chowdhry, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 10, 37 and
47 of 1956.
J. N. Bannerji and V. S. Sawhney, for petitioners
in Petition No. 622 of 1954.
S. P. Sinha and K. R. Ohowdhry, for petitioners
in Petition No. 585 of 1954.
B. B. Tawakley and K. P. Gupta, for petitioners
in Petitions Nos. 565 and 576 of 1954.
K. R. Ohowdhry, for petitioners in Petitions Nos.
599 and 611of1954 and 58, 415 and 416 of 1955 and
16 and 39 of 1956.
R. Patnaik and K. R. Ohowdkry, for petitioners
in Petition No. 48 of 1955.
R. Patnaik, for petitioners in Petition No. 625 of
1954.
K. L. Misra, Advocate-General, U.P., K. B. Asthana
and 0. P. Lal, for the State of U.P. and the Cane Commissioner, U.P. in all the Petitions.
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, and
Jagdish Chandra, for the Cane-Growers' Co-operative Development .Unions in Petitions Nos. 585 and
625 of 1954 and 10 and 47. of 1956.
Jagdish Chandra, for the Cane-Growers' Co-ope-_
rative Development Unions in rest of the petitions
except Petition No. 37 of 1956.
D. N. Mukerji, for Daurala Sugar Mills (respondent No. 4) in Petitions Nos. 611 of 1954, 58, 415
and 416 of 1955.
0. N. Srivastava, for Punjab Sugar Mills in Petitions Nos. 48 of 1955 and 47of1956.
A. S. Chawla, for respondent No. 3 in Petition
No. 10 of 1956.
Ganpat Rai for respondent No. 9 in Petition No,
IO of 1956.
5~
1956
Ch. Tika Rarnfi
and others, etc.
v. The State of
Uttar P,radesh
and others
398
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
·v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
afid others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1956. April 24.
was delivered by
(1956)
The Judgment of the Court
BHAGWATI J.-These Petitions under article 32 of
the Constitution impugn the validity of the U.P.
Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act,
1953 (U.P. Act XXIV of 1953) hereinafter called the
impugned Act and the notifications dated 27th September, 1954 and 9th November, 1955 issued by the
U. P. Government thereunder.
The petitioners are sugarcane growers in the several
villages of the Districts of Meerut, Kheri, Gorakhpur
and Deoria in the State of U.P. numbering 4,724 in
the aggregate. Associated with them are the President, the Vice-Presidents and the Secretary of an
association which is styled "the Gauna Utpadak
Sangh" which is a rival body to the Co-operative
Development Unions established and recognised under
the impugned Act. The notification dated 27th
September, 1954, issued in exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-section l(a) read with sub-section
2(b) of section 16 of the impugned Act ordered that
where not less than 3/4 of the cane growers of the
area of operation of a Cane Growers Co-operative
Society are members of the Society, the occupier of
the factory for which the area is assigned shall not
purchase or enter into agreement to purcha.se citne
grown by a cane grower except through such Cane
Growers Co-operative Society. The notification dated
9th November, 1955 was issued in exercise of the
powers conferred by section 15 of the impugned Act
and reserved or assigned to the !!Ugar factories mentioned in column 2 of the Schedule annexed thereto
the cane purchasing centres (with the authorities attached to them) specified against them in column 3
for the purpose of supply of sugarcane during the
crushing season 1955-56 subject to the conditions and
explanations given therein. The former relates to
the agency of supply of sugarcane to the factories
and the latter relates to the creation of zones for particular factories. All the Petitions except Nos. 10 of
1956 and 37 of 1956 impugn the former notification
.
S.C.R.
?
.
J
:
r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
but the grounds of attack against both are common.
The impugned Act is challenged as ultra vires the
powers of the State Legislature, the subject-matter
of the Act being within the exclusive field of Parliament and also as being repugnant to Act LXV of
1951 and Act X of 1955 passed by Parliament, and
section 15 and section 16(l)(a) and2(b) and the notifications issued thereunder are challenged as unconstitutional inasmuch as they infringe the fundamental
rights guaranteed under arttcle 14, article 19(1)(c),
(f) and (g) and article 31 besides being in violation of
article 301 of the Constitution. All these Petitions
involve common questions of law and may be disposed of by one judgment.
A short history of the legislation enacted by the
Centre as well as the Province of U.P. in regard to
sugar and sugarcane will be helpful for the determination of the questions arising in these Petitions. On
8th April, 193~, the Cen~ral Legislature passed t.he
Sugar Industry (Protection) Act, 1932 (Act XIII of
1932) to provide for the fostering and developmen~
of Sugar Industry in India in pursuance of the policy
of discriminating protection of industries with due
regard to the well being of the community. As a
result of the protection thus granted to the sugar
industry, the number of sugar factories which was
31 prior thereto registered a rapid rise and by 1938
they were 139 in number. There was also a large expansion in the cultivation of sugarcane and millions
of cultivators in the Province of U.P. took to growing
sugarcane. In order to protect their interests and
for the purpose of assuring to them a fair price for
their produce, the Central Legislature enacted on 1st
May, 1934 the Sugarcane Act, 1934 (Act XV of
1934) to regulate the price at which sugarcane intended to be used in the manufacture of sugar might
be purchased by or for factories. Sugarcane was
grown in various Provinces and the declaration of
controlled areas and the fixing of minimum price for
the purchase of sugarcane intended for use in any
factory in any controlled area was of necessity left
to the Provincial Governments and the Provincial
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.•
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ.
400
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc,
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
Governments were also empowered to make rules for
the purpose of carrying into effect. the objects of the
Act including, in particular, the organisation of
growers of sugarcane into Co-operative Societies for
the sale of sugarcane to factories.
With tbe coming into operation of the Government
of India Act, 1935, there was a distribution oflegislative powers between the Dominion Legislature and
the Provincial Legislatures and agriculture (Entry
No. 20), trade and commerce within the Province
(Entry No. 27) and production, supply and distribution of goods, development of industries subject to
the provision in List I with respect to development
of certain industries under Dominion control (Entry
No. 29) were included in List II, the Provincial
Legislative List. The relevant provision in List I was
contained in Entry No. 34: "Development of industries where development under Dominion control is
declared to be in the public interest". As a result of
this distribution of legislative powers, the entire
subject-matter of Act XV of 1934 fell within the Provincial Legislative List. It was felt that Act XV of1934
was not sufficiently comprehensive for dealing with
the problems of the sugar industry and it was found
necessary to replace it by a new measure which would
provide for the better organisation of cane supplies
to sugar factories. The Governments of U.P. and
Bihar, therefore, decided in consultation with each
other to introduce legislation on similar lines for
both the Provinces which together accounted for
nearly 85 prtr cent. of production of sugar in India.
The U.P. Legislature accordingly enacted on 10th
February, 1938 the U.P. Sugar Factories Control Act,
1938 (U.P. Act I of 1938) to provide for the licensing
of the sugar factories and for regulating the supply
of sugarcane intended for use in such factories and
the price at which it may be purchased and for other
incidental matters. This Act provided for (a) the
licensing of sugar factories, (b) the regulation of the
supply of sugarcane to factories, (c) the minimum
price for sugarcane, (d) the establishment of Sugar
Control Board and Advisory Committee, and (e) a
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
1956
tax on the sale of sugarcane intended for use in factories, and repealed Act XV of 1934. This Act was Ch. Tika Ramji
to remain in force initially until 30th June, 1947 but and others, etc,
the period was extended to 30th June, 1950 by U.P.
v.
Act XIII of 1947 and to 30th June, 1952 by U.P. Act The State of
Uttar Pradesh
XXI of 1950.
and others
The Second World War intervened and an emergency was proclaimed by the Governor-General under Bl!agwati J.
section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
The Dominion Legislature acquired the power to make
laws for the Provinces with respect to any of the
matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative
List. The result was in effect to make the Provincial
Legislative List also a Concurrent Legislative List
for the operation of the Dominion Legislature but if
any provision of a Provincial law was repugnant to
any provision of the Dominion law made in exercise
of that power, the Dominion law was to prevail and
the Provincial law was to be void to the extent of
the repugnancy. The proclamation of emergency was
to operate until revoked by a subsequent proclamation and laws made by the Dominion Legislature as
above were to have effect until the expiration. of a
period of six months after the proclamation had
ceased to operate. The Defence of India Act and the
Rules made thereunder occupied the field, sugar was
made a controlled commodity in the year 1942 and
its production and distribution as well as the fixation
ofsugarprices were regulated by the Sugar Controller
thereafter. The proclamation of emergency was revo\rnd on lst April, 1946 and the laws made by the
Dominion Legislature in the field of the Provincial
Legislative List were to cease to have effect after 30th
September, 1946. On 26th March, 1946, the British
Parliament enacted the India (Central Government
and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, Chapter
39). Section 2(1)(a) provided that notwithstanding
anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the
Indian Legislature shall during the period mentioned
in section 4 of the Act have power to make laws with
respect to the following matters:
"(a) trade and commerce (whether or not within
402
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
a Province) in, and the production, supply and distribution
of, cotton and woollen textiles, paper
Ch. Tika Ramji
(including
newsprint), foodstuffs (including edible
and others, etc.
and
oils), petroleum and petroleum products,
oil
seeds
v.
Tlte State of
spare parts of mechanically propelled vehicles, coal,
Uttar Pradesh iron,
dmica;
' ....... .,,
.
st
eelan
and others
The period provided in section 4 was the period of one
year beginning with the date on which the proclamaBhagwatiJ,
tion of emergency ceased to operate or, if the Governor-General by a public notification directed, a
period of 2 years beginning with that date. There
was a proviso to that section that if and so often as
a resolution approving the extension of the said.
period was passed by both Houses of Parliament, the
same period shall be extended for a further period of
12 months from the date on which it would otherwise
expire but it was not to continue in any case for more
than 5 years from the date on which the proclamation of emergency ceased to operate.
Acting under the power reserved to it under section 2(1) (a) aforesaid, the Central Legislature enacted
on 19th November, 1946, the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act XXIV of 1946)
to provide for the continuance during the limited
period of powers to control production, supply and
distributiOn of, and trade and commerce in, certain
commodities. Section 1(3) of the Act provided that
it shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the
period mentioned in section 4 of the India (Central
Government and Legislature) Act, 1946. In the absence of a notification by the Governor-General, the
Act remained operative until 31st March, 1947 only.
The Governor-General, however, issued a notification
on 3rd March, 1947 continuing its force for ·a period
of two years from the date of the cessation of emergency. By virtue of this notification, the Act would
have remained in force till 31st March, 1948. On 18th
July, 1947, the Indian Independence Act was passed
and India became a Dominion on 15th August, 1947.
Under section 9 read with section 19(4) of the Indian
Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General passed
an order on 14th August, 1947 which substituted the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
words "Dominion Legislature" for "Both Houses of
Parliament" in the proviso to section 4 of India
(Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 and
also introduced a new section 4(a) by way of adaptation providing that the powers of the Dominion
Legislature shall be exercised by the Constituent
Assembly. On 25th February, 1948, the Constituent
Assembly passed its first Resolution extending the
operation of the Act for one year up to 31st March,
1949. On 3rd March, 1949, a second Resolution was·
passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act
by one year more up to 31st March, 1950. With the
advent of our Constitution on 26th January, 1950,
Parliament was invested under article 369 with power
for a period of 5 years from the .commencement of
the Constitution to make laws with respect to the
following matters as if they were enumerated in the
Concurrent List:
"(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and
the production, supply and distribution of, ........ foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oil), ............... "
The life of the Act was accordingly extended from
time to time up to 26th January 1955 by Acts passed
by Parliament.
Act XXIV of 1946 defined an essential commoditv
to mean any of the following classes of commodities:
"(1) Foodstuffs,. ............... "
Food crops were defined as including crops of
sugarcane.
Section 3 of the Act empowered the Central Government, so far as it appeared to it to be necessary or
expedient for maintaining or increasing the supply
of any essential commodity or for securing its equitable dis~ribution and availability at fair prices to
provide for regulating or prohibiting' the production,
supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. On 7th October, 1950, the Central
Government, in exercise of the powers conferred upon
it by section 3 of the Act, promulgated the Sugar
and Gur Control Order, 1950, inter alia empowering
it to prohibit or to restrict the export of sugarcane
from any area, to direct that no gur or sugar shall be
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The Stat• of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bhagu:ati}.
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
manufactured from sugarcane except under and in
accordance with the conditions specified in the licence
Ch. Tika Ratnji
issued in this behalf and to prohibit or to restrict the
aud others, etc.
despatch
of gur or sugar from any State or any area
v.
therein. Power was also given to fix minimum price
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
of sugarcane and no person was to sell or agree to sell
and otlic,.s
sugarcane to a producer and no producer was to purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane at a price lower
Bhag1r.:ati J,
than that notified thereunder. This power of fixing the
price of sugarcane was exercised by the Central Government from time to time by issuing notifications
fixing the minimum prices to be paid by the producers
of sugar by vacuum pan process or their agents for
sugarcane purchased by them during the 1950-51
crushing season iu various States including U.P.
On 31st October, 1951, Parliament enacted the
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951
(Act LXV of 1951) to provide for the development
and regulation of certain industries. By section 2 ,of
the Act it was declared that it was expedient in the
public interest that the Union should take under its
control the industries specified in the First SchEdule
which included in item 8 thereof the industry engaged
in the manufacture or production of sugar.
The Province of Bihar which, along with U.P.
contributed to nearly 85 per cent. of production of
sugar in India had also on its Statute Book the Bihar
Sugar Factories Control Act VII of 1937. On 10th
April, 1938, a joint meeting of the U.P. and the Bihar
Sugar Control Boards was held at which it was resolved
that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the
working of the sugarcane rnles and labour conditions
prevailing in the sugar factories in the two Provinces.
The Governments of the U.P. and Bihar accepted
this recommendation of the Sugar Control Boards and
accordingly appointed the Khaitan Committee, (1)
to examine the working of the sugarcane rules, (2)
to look into the complaints of malpractices received
from time to time in connection with the supply of
sugarcane to the sugar factories, (3) to enquire in to
the labour conditions of the sugar factories, and (4)
to suggest remedial measures for the shortcomings as
1956
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
noted in (1), (2) and (3) above. Shibban Lal Saxena,
the present President of the Ganna Utpadak Sangh
and one of the petitioners before us was also a member of that Committee. That Committee submitted
its Report in 1940 recommending inter alia abolition
of the dual system of supply and creation of a strong
co-operative organisation of the sugarcane growers
themselves as also creation of a zonal system. The
Indian Tariff Board had also, in the nieanwhile, made
its Report on the sugar industry in the year 1938
commending the advantages of a zonal system. There
was further the report of the U. P. Sugar Industry
Enquiry Committee, 1951 called the Swaminathan
Committee, which also recommended the abolition
of dual agencies of cane supplies to factories and commended the desirability of employing the agency of
t.he Co-operative Societies for the purpose. It also
recommended that the U. P. Act I of 1938 should be
amended in order to make this regulation possible.
Act LXV of 1951 was brought into force with effect
from 8th May, 1952. In view of the same, certain
provisions of U. P. Act I of 1938 became inoperative.
The U.P. Legislature, therefore, passed on 29th June,
1952 the U. P. Sugar Factories Control (Amendment)
Act, 1952, deleting those provisions and putting the
amended Act permanently on the Statute Book. The
U. P. Act I of 1938, as thus amended, continued in
force till, as a result of the prior enactment of Act
LXV of 1951 and the report of the Indian Tariff
Board on the Sugar Industry as well as the reports
of the Khaitan Committee and the Swaminathan
Committee mentioned above, the U. P. Legislature
enacted the impugned Act. The object of the enactment was stated to be as follows: "With the promulgation of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 with effect from 8th May, 1952, the
regulation of the sugar industry has become exclusively a Central subject. The State Governments are
now only concerned with the supply of sugarcane to
the sugar factorioes. The Bill is being introduced in
order to provide for a rational distribution of sugarcane to factories, for its development on organised
~3
1956
Ch. Tika Ratnji
and otlrers, etc,
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bhagwatij.
406
1956
Ch. Tika Rarnji
and others. etc,
v.
Tlie State of
Uttar Pradesh
and otlters
Bltagn:a(i J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
scientific lines, to protect the interests of the ca:ne
growers and of the industry and to put the new Act
permanently on the Statute Book" (Vide Statement
of objects and reasons published in the U. P. Gazette
Extraordinary dated 15th July, 1953). This is the
impugned Act the vires of which is challenged in
these Petitions. In exorcise of the rule-making power
conferred by section 28 of the Act, the U.P. Government made the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply
and Purchase) Rules, 1954. The U. P. Government also, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16 of the Act, promulgated the U.P. Sugarcane
Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, which came into
effect from 19th September, 1954. All these related
to the supply and purchase of sugarcane in U.P.
Act LXV of 1951 was amended by Act XXVI of
1953 which, by adding Chapter IIl(b), invested the
Central Government inter alia with power so far as it
appeared to it necessary or expedient for securing the
equitable distribution and availability at fair prices
of any article or class of articles relatable to any
scheduled industry to provide by notified order for
regulation of supply and distribution thereof and
trade and commerce therein.
On 1st April, 1955, Parliament enacted the Essential Commodit.ies Act, 1955 (Act X of 1955) to provide in the interests of the general public for the
control of production, supply and distribution of, and
trade and commerce in, certain commodities.· The
essential commodity there was defined to mean any
of the following classes of commodities:
"(v) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and
oils;
(xi) any other class of commodity which the
Central Government may, by notified order declare
to be an essential commodity for the purposes of this
Act, being a commodity with respect to which Parlia·
ment has power to make laws by virtue of Entry 33
in List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution;''
Foodcrops were defined as inclusive of crops of sugar-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
1956
cane. Section 3(1) empowered the Central Government, if it was of the opinion that it was necessary Cli. Tika Ramji
or expedient to do so for maintaining or increasing and others, etc.
the supply of any essential commodity or for securv.
ing its equitable distribution and availability at The Stato of
fair prices, to provide by order for regulating or Uttar Pradesh
and others
prohibiting the production, supply and distribution
thereof and trade and commerce therein. Section 3(2) Bhagwati].
(b) inter alia provided for the making of such an
order for bringing under cultivation any waste or
arable land whether appurtenant to a building or not,
for the growing thereon offoodcrops generally or of
specified foodcrops. Section 16 of the Act repealed (a)
the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, and (b)
any other law in force in any State immediately before the commencement of the Act in so far as such
law controlled or authorised the control of the production, supply and dist.ribution of, and trade and
commerce in, any essential commodity.
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of
the Act, the Central Government promulgated on 27th
August, 1955 the Sugar Control Order, 1955 and the
Sugarcane Control Order, 1955. The latter empowered
the Central Government, after consultation with such
authorities, bodies or associations as it may deem fit
by notification in the official Gazette from time to
time, to fix the price of sugarcane and direct payment
thereof and also to regulate the movement of sugarcane. The power to regulate the movement of sugarcane comprised the power to prohibit or restrict or
otherwise regulate the export of sugarcane from any
area for supply to different factories and the power
to direct that no gur (jaggery) or sugar shall be
manufactured from sugarcane except under and in
accordance with the conditions specified in a licence
issued in this behalf. Clause 7 of this order provided
that the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, published
by the Government of India in the Ministry of Food
and Agriculture, S.R.O. 735 dated 7th October, 1950,
and any order made by a State Government or other
authority re~ulating or prohibiting the production,
supply and distribution of sugarcane and trade or
408
1956
Ch. Tika Raniji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
commerce therein were thereby repealed except as
respect to things done or omitted to be done under
any such order before the commencement of the order.
These are the 1·especti ve Acts and Notifications
passed by the Centre as well as the State of U. P. in
regard to sugar and sngarcane.
Learned counsel for the petitioners urged before us:
(1) that the State of U. P. had no power to enact
the impugned Act as the Act is with respect to the
snbject of industries the control of which by the
Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest within the meaning
of Entry 52 of List I and is, therefore, within the exclnsive province of Parliament.
The impugned Act
is, therefore, ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature and is a colourable exercise of legislative power
by the State;
(2) the impngned Act is repugnant to Act LXV
of 1951 and Act X of 1955 and in the event of the
Court holding that the impugned Act was within the
legislative competence of the State Legislature, it is
void by reason of such repugnancy;
(3) the impugned Act stands repealed to the extent that it has been repealed by section 16 of Act X
of 1955 and by clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control
Order, 1955, made in exercise of the powers conferred
by section 3 of Act X of 1955;
(4) the impugned Act infringes the fundamental
right guaranteed by article 14 inasmuch as very wide
powers are given to the Cane Commissioner which
can be used in a discriminatory manner;
(5) the impugned Act and the notification dated
27th September, 1954, violate the fundamental right
guaranteed under article 19(l)(c) in that the Co-operative Societies are not volunt.ary organisations but
a cane grower is compelled to become a member of
the Society before he can sell his sugarcane to a
factory;
(6) the impugned Act and the notifications infringe the fundamental right guaranteed by article
19(1)(f) and (g) and article 31 of the Constitution;
(7) the impugned Act is void in that it confers
-
RC.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
409
very wide powers on executive officials and is a piece
of delegated legislation; and
(8) the impugned Act is destructive of the freedom of trade and commerce and thus is violative of
article 301 of the Constitution.
Re. (1): This contention relates to the legislative
competence of the U.P. State Legislature to enact
the impugned Act. It was contended that, even though
the impugned Act purported to legislate in regard to
sugarcane required for use in sugar factories, it was,
in pith and substance, and in its true nature and
effect legislation in regard to sugar industry which
had been declared by Act LXV of 1951 to be an
industry the control of which by the Union was
expedient in the public interest and was, therefore,
within the exclusive province of Parliament under
Entry 52 of List I .. The word 'industry', it was contended, was a word of very wide import and included
not only the process of m_anufacture or production
but also all things which were necessarily incidental
to it, viz., the raw materials for the industry as also
the products of that industry and would, therefore,
include within its connotation the production, supply
and distribution of raw materials for that industry
which meant sugarcane in relation to sugar industry.
It was also contended that in so far as the impugned
Act purported to legislate in regard to sugarcane
which was a necessary ingredient in the production
of sugar it was a colourable exercise of legislative
power by the State, ostensibly operating in its own
field within Entry 27 of List II but really trespassing
upon the field of Entry 52 of List I.
It was contended on behalf of the State on the
other hand that, after the advent of war and the
proclamation of emergency under section 102 of the
Government of India Act, 1935 and by the combined
operation of th.e India (Central Government and
Legislature) Act, 1946 and article 369 of the Constitution taken along with the resolutions of the Houses
of Parliament extending the life of Act XXIV of 1946
up to 26th January, 1955 and the Third Constitution
Amendment Act of 1954 amending Entry 33 of List
1956
Cit. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
.,.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
attd others
Bhagwati J.
410
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc,
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
III, the Central Legislature was operating all along
on what became in effect the Concurrent field even
in regard to sugarcane, that the investing of the
Central Government with power to legislate in this
sphere of the Provincial List did not deprive the Provincial Legislature of such power and that both the
Central Legislature as well as the State Legislatures
had legislative competence to legislate in regard to
these fields which were for the purpose of legislative
competence translated into Concurrent fields and that,
therefore, the U.P. State Legislature was competent
to enact the impugned Act which would be valid
within its own sphere except for repugnancy with
any of the provisions of the Central Legislature covering the same field.
The relevant Entries in the respective Lists of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are as follows:
List I, Entry 52: Industries, the control of which
by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be
expedient in the public illterest.
List II, Entry 24: Industries subject to the
provisions of entry 52 of List I.
Entry 27: Production, supply and distribution
of goods subject to the provisions of entry 33 of
List III.
List III, Entry 33: As it stood prior to its amendment:Trade and commerce in and production, supply
and distribution of, the products of industries where
the control of such industries by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the
public interest.
Entry 33 as amended by the Constitution Third
Amendment Act, 1954: Trade and commerce in, a.nd
the production, supply and distribution of,(a) the products of any industry where the
control of such industry by the Union is declared by
Parliament by law to be expedient in the public
interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such
products; _
(b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and
oils;
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
(c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other
concentrates;
(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned,
and cotton-seed; and
(e) raw jute.
Production, supply and distribution of goods was
no doubt within the exclusive sphere of the . State
Legislature but it was subject to the provisions of
Entry 33 of List III which gave concurrent powers
of legislation to the Union as well as the States in the
matter of trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, the products of industries where the control of such industries by the
Union was declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. The controlled industries were relegated to Entry 52 of List I which was
the exclusive province of Parliament lea Ying the other
industries within Entry 24 of List II which was the
exclusive province of the State Legislature. The prnducts of industries which were comprised in Entry
24 of List II were dealt with by the State Legisl!l-tures
which had under Entry 27 of that List power to legislate in regard to the production, supply and distribution of goods, goods according to the definition contained in article 366(12) including all raw materials,
commodities and articles. When, however it came
to the products of the controlled industries comprised
in Entry 52 of List I, trade and commerce in, and
production, supply and distribution of, these goods
became the subject-matter of Entry 33 of List III
and both Parliament and the State Legislatures had
jurisdiction to legislate in regard thereto. The
amendment of Entry 33 of List III by the Constitution
Third Amendment Act, 1954, only enlarged the scope
of that Entry without in any manner whatever
detracting from the legislative competence of Parliament and the State Legislatures to legislate in regard
to the same. If the matters had stood there, the
sugar industry being a controlled industry, legislation
in regard to the same would have been in the exclusive province of Parliament and production, supply
and distribution of the product of sugar industry,
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and ot/iers, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bhn g·.,-ati J.
412
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
viz., sugar as a finished product would have been
within Entry 33 of List III. Sugarcane would cerCh. Tika Ramji
tainly not have been comprised within Entry 33 of
and others, etc.
List
III as it was not the product of sugar industry
v.
The State of
which was a controlled industry. It was only after
Uttar Pradesh
the amendment of Entry 33 of .List III by the Conand others
stitution Third Amendment Act, 1954 that foodstuffs
including edible oilseeds and oils came to be included
BhagwatiJ.
within that List and it was possible to· legislate in
regard to sugarcane, having recourse to Entry 33 of
List III. Save for that, sugarcane, being goods, fell
directly within Entry 27 of List II and was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislatures.
Production, supply and distribution of sugarcane being thus within the exclusive sphere of the State
Legislatures, the U. P. State Legislature would be,
without anything more, competent to legislate in
regard to the same and the impugned Act would
be intra vires the State Legislature.
The argument, however, was that the word 'industry' was a word of wide import and should be construed !LS including not only the process of manufacture or production but also activities antecedent
thereto such as acquisition of raw materials and subsequent thereto such as disposal of the finished products of that industry. The process of acquiring raw
materials was an integral part of the industrial process and was, therefore, included in the connotation
of the word 'industry' and when the Central Legislature was invested with the power to legislate ih
regard to sugar industry which was a controlled industry by Entry 52 of List I, that legislative power
included also the power to legislate in regard to the
raw material of the sugar industry, that is sugarcane,
and the production, supply and distribution of sugarcane was, by reason of its being the necessary ingredient in the process of manufacture or production of
sugar, within the legislativ_e compe~ence o~ th~ Central
Legislature. Each entry m the Lists which 1s a category or head of the subject-matter of legislation must
be construed not in a narrow or restricted sense but
as widely as possible so as to extend to all ancillary
..
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably
be said to be cbmprehended in it (Vide The United
Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum and Others(1), Thakur
Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces( 2 ), and
Megh Raj and Another v. Allah Rakhia and Others( 3 )),
and the topic 'industries' should, therefore, be construed to include the raw materials which are the
necessary ingredients thereof and which form an integral part of the industrial process.
Our attention was drawn in this connection to the
definition of 'industry' in section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947):
" "Industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and
includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of
workmen"
and also to the wide construction which was put
upon the term 'industry' in the Australian Insurance
Staffs' Federation v. The Accident Underwriters'
Association and Others(4) where it was construed to
include "all forms of employment in which large number of persons are employed, the sudden cessation of
whose work might prejudicially affect the orderly
conduct of the ordinary operations of civil life". A
similarly wide interpretation was put on the word
'industry' by our Court in D. JV. Banerji v. P. R .
1llukherjee and Others( 5 ) where the dispute was between a Municipality and its employees. These interpretations of the term 'industry', however, do not
help us because in defining the word 'industry' in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as also in putting the
wide construction on the term 'industry' in [1923] 33
C.L.R. 517, as well as 1953 S.C.R. 302, they were
concerned mainly with the question whether an industrial dispute arose between employers and employees. Whether a particular concern came within
the definition of an 'employer' was determined
with respect to the criterion ultimately adopted
(1) [1940] F.O.R. 110, 134.
(2) i19J6] F CR. 111, 1111.
\3) [1947] P.C.R. 77.
(1) [1923133 O.L.R. 517.
15 [1953] 8.U R 302.
51
1956
Ch. Tika Rarnji
and others,' tc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and othei·s
Bhag1rnti J.
414
.::i
0
v.
S•••• of
UttarPraduh
and others
BTiagwatiJ.
the sudden cessation of such
orderly conduct
of the ordinar~ operations of civil life and the withdrawal of servwe would be detrimental to the industrial system of the community and might result in
its dislocation. What we are concerned with here is
·
not t he w1'd e cons t ruction
to b e put on t J1e term 'industry' as such but whether the raw materials of an
industry which form an integral part of the process
are within the topic of 'industry' which forms the
subject-matter of Item 52 of List. I as an.cillary or
subsidiary matters which can fairly or reasonably be
said to be comprehended in that topic and whether
the Central Legislature while legislating upon sugar
industry could, acting within the sphere of Entry 52
of List I, as well legislate upon sugarcane.
If both the Central Legislature and the Provincial
Legislatures were entitled to legislate in regard to this
subject of production, supply and distribution of
sugarcane, there would arise no question of
legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature in the matter of having enacted the impugned
Act. The conflict, if any, arose by reason of the interpretation which was sought to be put on the two
Entries, Entry 52 of List I and Entry 27 of List II put
in juxtaposition with each other. It. was suggested
that Item 52 of List I comprised not only legislation
in regard to sugar industry but also in regard to
sugarcane which was an essential ingredient of the
industrial process of the manufacture or production
of sugar and was, therefore, ancillary to it and was
covered within the topic. If legislation with regard
to sugarcane thus came within the exclusive province
of the Central Legislature, the Provincial Legislature
was not entitled to legislate upon the same by having
resort to Entry 27 of List II and the impugned Act
was, therefore, ultra vires the Provincial Legislature.
There was an apparent conflict between the legislative powers of the Centre and of the Provinces in this
respect which conflict could n-ot ha\•e been intended
and, therefore, a reconciliation was to be attempted
by reading the two provisions together and by inter-
.. • work might prejudicially affect the
;:,;,.:;;::
The
[1956)
which was that
19>6
c r---R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
preting and where necessary modifying the language
of one by that of the other. Reliance was placed on the
observations of the Judicial Committee in The Citizens
Insurance Company of Canada v. William Parsons(1):
"In these cases it is the duty of the Courts, how·
ever difficult it may be, to ascertain in what degree,
and to what extent, authority to deal with matters
falling within these classes of subjects exists in each
legislature, and to define in the particular case before
them the limits of their respective powers. It could
not have been the intention that a conflict should
exist; and, in order to prevent such a result, the two
sections must be read together, and the language of
one interpreted, and, where necessary, modified, by
that of the other. In this way it may, in most cases,
be found possible to arrive at a reasonable and practical construction of the language of the sections, so as
to reconcile the respective powers which they contain, and give effect to all of them.
In performing
this difficult duty, it will be a wise course for those
on whom it is thrown, to decide each case which arises
as best they can, without entering more largely upon
an interpretation of the statute than is necessary for
the decision of the particular question in hand".
and also at page 113:
"It is enough for the decision of the present case
to say that, in their view, its authority to legislate
for the regulation of trade and commerce does not
comprehend the power to regulate by legislation the
contracts of a particular business or trade, such as the
business of fire insurance in a single province ............ "
These observations were quoted with approval by
Gwyer, C. J. in Re: The Central Provinces and Berar
Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxatio~ Act, 1938
(Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938)( 2 )
and it was further held that the general power ought
not to be construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating
in the same field.
The same duty of reconciling
apparently conflicting provisions was reiterated in
(1) [1881] LR. 7 A.C. 96, 108.
(2) (1939] F.C.R. 18, 39.
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, rte.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bit a gwati J.
416
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc,
v.
The State of
Utta,. Pradesh
and others
I
-
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
Governor-General in Council v. The Province of .Madras(1):
"But it appears to them that it is right first to
consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be
effected hy giving to the language of the Federal
Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it
might in another context bear, is yet one that can
properly be given to it, and equally giving to the
language of the Provincial Legislative List a meaning which it can properly bear".
Reliance was also placed on the observations of
Gwyer, C. J. quoted in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v.
Muthuswami Goundan(2 ):
"As interpreted by the Judicial Committee, the
British North America Act presents an exact analogy
to the India Act, even to the overriding provisions in
section 100(1) of the latter: "The rule of construction
is that general language in the heads of section 92
yields to particular expressions in section 91, where
the latter are unambiguous": per Lord Haldane in
Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King( 3). The principles laid down by the Judicial Committee in a long
series of decisions for the interpretation of the two
sections of the Brit.ish North America Act may therefore be accepted as a guide for the interpretation of
similar provisions in the Government of India Act."
and it was contended that Entry 27 of List II should
be construed in a general manner as applying to production, supply and distribution of goods in general
and Entry 52 of List I should be construed as comprehending within its scope ancillary matters in
relation to the controlled industries thus excluding
production, supply and distribution of goods which
would be thus comprised within it as ancillary matters
from the sphere of Entry 27 of List II. If this construction was adopted it would avoid the apparent
conflict between the two Entries and would reconcile
the powers of the Provincial Legislatures with those
of the Central Legislature. It was, therefore, contended that the Legislation in regard to sugarcane
(1) [19f5] F.C R. 179, 191.
12) [194'0] F.C.R. 188, 201.
(3) [1921] 2 A.C. 91, 116.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
should be considered as ancillary to the legislation in
regard to sugar industry which is a controlled industry
and comprised within Entry 52 of List I and should
be excluded from Entry 27 of List II which should be
read as covering only those categories which did not
fall within Entry 52 of List I evep though on a wide
construction of the words "production, supply and
distribution of goods" they would be capable of covering the same. If this construction was put upon these
two Entries, it would follow that the subject-matter
of the impugned Act was within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament being comprised in Entry 52 of
List I and was ultra vires the U.P. State Legislature.
The answer of the State of U.P. was two-fold: (1)
after the advent of the Second World War and all
throughout up to 1955when ActX of 1955 wasenacted
by Parliament, the Centre was operating upon the Concurrent field of legislation and that whatever legisla.:
tion in regard to sugarcane was enacted by the Centre
as part of its legislative activities in regard to sugar
was not under Entry 52 of List I but was in exercise
of its legislative powers under Concurrent jurisdiction,
and (2) that the impugned Act merely confined itself
to legislation in regard to sugarcane and did not purport to legislate in regard to sugar which was
exclusively dealt with by the Centre. There was,
therefore, no trespass upon the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Centre and the impugned Act was within the
legislative competence of the State Legislature.
As has been noted above, the entire subject-matter
of Act XV of 1934 came within the Provincial Legislative List on a distribution of legislative powers
effected under the Government of India Act, 1935
and the U.P. Legislature enacted the U.P. Act I of
1938 covering the same field and repealing Act XV
of 1934. Entry 27 of List II related to production,
supply and distribution of goods and development of
industries except in regard to controlled industries,
and, in so far as in 1938 sugar was not a controlled
industry, the U.P. Legislature enacted provisions for
the licensing of the sugar factories and for regulating
the price and supply of sugarcane intended for use in
1956
Ch. Ti/1a Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bllagwati J.
418
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
such factories. With the advent of War and the proclamation of emergency under section 102 of the GovCIJ. Tika Ramjl
ernment
of India Act, 1935, the Centre was invested
tnid others, etc,
with
the
power to make laws for the Provinces with
v.
The State of
respect to any of the matters enumerated in the
Uttar Pradesh
Provincial Legislative List and the Central Legislaand others
ture as well as the Provincial Legislatures were thus
enabled to enact measures exercising concurrent jurisdiction in regard to the topics enumerated in the
Provincial Legislative List. The emergency was
about to come to an end on the 1st April, 1946 and the
British Parliament, therefore, on 26th March, 1946,
passed the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, under which, notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the
Central Legislature was, for the period specified in
·section 4 thereof, invested with the powers to make
laws with respect to (a) trade and commerce in, and
the production, supply and distribution of~ .............. ..
foodstuffs, edible oilseeds and oils ................ and this
provision in effect continued the power which had been
vested in the Central Legislature during the emergency under section 102 of the Government of India
Act, 1935. The period mentioned in section 4 of this
Act was extended from time to time up to 31st March,
1950. It was in pursuance of these powers that
the Central Legislature enacted Act XXIV of 1946 on
16th November, 1946. The essential commodities
therein comprised inter alia foodstuffs which would
include sugar as well as sugarcane and both sugar
and sugarcane, therefore, came within the jurisdiction of the Centre. Act XXIV of 1946 was continued
in force up to 31st March, 1950 under the terms of
section 4 of India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 by the notification of the GovernorGeneral and the resolutions passed by both the Houses
of Parliament but before the expiration of this extended period the Constitution was inaugurated and
under article 369 Parliament was invested with the
power to make laws inter alia with respect to trade
and commerce within a State and production, supply
and distribution of.. .............. foodstuffs, edible oi!Eeeds
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
and oils as if they were enumerated in the concurrent
list and it was by virtue of this power that Act XXIV
of 1946 was extended up to 26th January, 1955 by
diverse pieces of legislation enacted by Parliament.
Sugar and sugarcane thus continued within the jurisdiction of the Centre right up to 26th January, 1955.
When Entry 33 of List III was amended by the Constitution Third Amendment A,.ct, 1954,. foodstuffs including edible oilseeds and oils were included therein
and both Parliament and the State Legislatures
acquired concurrent jurisdiction to legislate over sugar
and sugarcane. Tradeand commerce in, and production,
supply and distribution of, sugar and sugarcane thus
could be dealt with by Parliament as well as by the
State Legislatures and it was in exercise of this jurisdiction that Parliament enacted Act X of 1955. The
list of essential commodities defined in section 2 of
the Act comprised foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds
and oils, cattlefodder, raw cotton and cotton-seed and
raw jute which were items (b), (c), (d) and (e) in
Entry 33 of List III and the products of the controlled industries, coal, textiles, iron and steel, paper,
petroleum and petroleum products and any other
class of commodity which the Central Government
may by notification or order declare to be an essential
commodity for the purposes of the Act being a commodity with respect to which Parliament has power
to make laws by virtue of Entry 33-of List III of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which were
amongst the products of the controlled industries
specified in the First Schedule to Act LXV of 1951.
It follows that Act X of 1955 was enacted by Parliament in exercise of the legislative powers conferred
upon it by Entry 33 of List III and was an exercise
of concurrent jurisdiction.
It is clear, therefore, that all the Acts and the notifications issued thereunder by the Centre in regard to
sugar and sugarcane were enacted in exercise of the
concurrent jurisdiction. The exercise of such con-
current jurisdiction would not deprive the Provincial
Legislatures of similar powers which they had under
the Provincial Legislative List and there would, there-
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
Tiie State of
Uttar P1·adesh
and others
Bhagu:atiJ.
420
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Utta,. Pradesh
aud others
Bltagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
fore, be no question of legislative incompetence qua
the Provincial Legislatures in regard to similar pieces
of legislation enacted by the latter. The Provincial
J,egislatures as well as the Central Legislature would·
be competent to enact such pieces of legislation
and no question of legislative competence would
arise. It also follows as a necessary corollary
that, even though Sligar industry was a controlled
industry, none of these Acts enacted by the Centre
was in exercise of its jurisdiction under Entry 52 of
List I. Industry in the wide sense of the term would
be capable of comprising three different aspects: (1)
raw materials which are an integral part of the industrial process, (2) the process of manufacture or
production, and (3) the distribution of the products
of the industry. The raw materials would be goods
which would be comprised in Entry 27 of List II.
The process of manufacture or production would be
comprised in Entry 24 of List II except where the
industry was a controlled industry when it would fall
within Entry 52 of List I and the products of the industry would also be comprised in Entry 27 of List II
except where they were the products of the controlled
industries when they would fall within Entry 33 of
List III. This being the position, it cannot be said
that the legislation which was enacted by the Centre
in regard to sugar and · sugarcane could fall within
Entry 52 of List I. Before sugar industry became a
controlled industry, both sugar and sugarcane fell
within Entry 27 of List II but, after a declaration
was made by Parliament in 1951 by Act LXV of 1951,
sugar industry became a controlled industry and the
product of that industry, viz., sugar .was comprised
in Entry 33 of List III taking it out of Entry 27
of List II. Even so, the Centre as well as the Provincial Legislatures had concurrent jurisdiction in
regard to the same. In no event could the legislation
in regard to sugar and sugarcane be thus included
within Entry 52 of List I. The pith and substance
argument also cannot be imported here for the simple
reason that, when both the Centre as well as the State
Legislatures were operating in the concurrent field,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
there was no question of any trespass upon the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Centre under Entry
52 of List I, the only question which survived being
whether, putting both the pieces of legislation enacted
by the Centre and the State Legislature together,
there was any repugnancy, a contention which will
be dealt with hereafter.
A more effective answer is furnished by comparison
of the terms of the U.P. Act I of 1938 with those of
the impugned Act. Whereas the U.P. Act I of 1938
covered both sugarcane and sugar within its compass,
the impugned Act was confined only to sugarcane,
thus relegating sugar to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Centre thereby eliminating all argument with
regard to the encroachment by the U.P. State Legislature on the field occupied by the Centre. The U.P.
Act I of 1938 provided for the establishment of a
Sugar Control Board, the Sugar Commissioner, the
Sugar Commission and the Cane Commissioner. The
impugned Act provided for the establishment of a
Sugarcane Board. The Sugar Commissioner was
named as .such but his functions under rules 106 and
107 were confined to getting information which would
lead to the regulation of the supply and purchase of
sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and had
nothing to do with the production or the disposal of
sugar produced in the factories. The Sugar Commission was not provided for but the Cane Commissioner
was the authority invested with all the powers in
regard to the supply and purchase of sugarcane. The
Inspectors appointed under the U.P. Act I of 1938
had no doubt powers to examine records maintained
at the factories showing the amount of sugarcane
purchased and crushed but they were there with a
view to check the production or manufacture of sugar
whereas the Inspectors appointed under the impugned Act were, by rule 20, to confine their activities
to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane without having anything to do with the further
process of the manufacture or production of sugar.
Chapter 3 of U.P. Act I of 1938, dealing with the
construction and extension of sugar factories, licens55
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others.
BhagwatiJ.
422
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bltagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
ing of factories for crushing sugarcane, fixing of the
price of sugar, etc., was deleted from the impugned
Act. The power of licensing new industrial undertakings was thereafter exercised by the Centre under Act
LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953, vide
sections ll(a), 12 a.nd 13, and the power of fixation
of price of sugar was exercised by the Centre under
section 3 of Act XXIV of 1946 by issuing the Sugar
Control Order, 1950. Even the power reserved to the
State Government to fix minimum prices of sugarcane under Chapter V of U.P. Act I of 1938 was
deleted from the impugned Act the same being exercised by the Centre under clause 3 of Sugar and Gur
Control Order, 1950, issued by it in exercise of the
powers conferred under section 3 of Act XXIV of 1946.
The prices fixed by the Centre were adopted by the
State Government and the only thing which the State
Government required under rule 94 was that the
occupier of a factory or the purchasing agent should
cause to be put up at each purchasing centre a notice
showing the minimum price of cane fixed by the
Government meaning thereby the Centre. The State
Government also incorporated these prices which
were notified by the Centre from time to time in the
forms of the agreements which were to be entered
between the cane growers, the cane growers co-operati ve societies, the factories and their purchasing
agents for the supply and purchase of sugarcane as
provided in the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase
Order, 1954. The only provision which was retained
by the State Government in the impugned Act for
the protection of the sugarcane growers was that contained in section 17 which provided for the payment
of price of sugarcane by the occupier of a factory to
the sugarcane growers. It could be recovered from
such occupier as if it were an arrear of land revenue.
This comparison goes to show that the impugned Act
merely confined itself to the regulation of the supply
and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar
factories and did not concern itself a.t all with the
con trolling or licensing of the sugar factories, with
the production or manufacture of sugar or with the
--
S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS
423
trade and commerce in, and the production, supply
and distribution of, sugar. If that was so, there was
no question whatever of its trenching upon the jurisdiction of the Centre in regard to sugar industry
which was a controlled industry within Entry 52 of
I~ist I and the U.P. Legislature had jurisdiction to
enact the law with regard to sugarcane and had
legislative competence to enact the impugned Act.
Re. (2): It was next contended that the provisions of the impugned Act were repugnant to the
provisions of Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955
which were enacted by Parliament and, therefore, the
law made by Parliament should prevail and the impugned Act should, to the extent of the repugnancy,
be void. Before dealing with this contention it is
necessary to clear the ground by defining the exact
connotation of the term "repugnancy". Repugnancy
falls to be considered when the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature
occupy the same field because, if both these pieces of
legislation deal with separate and distinct matters
though of a cognate and allied character, repugnancy
does not arise. So far as our Constitution is concerned,
repugnancy is dealt with in article 254 which provides:
"254. (1) If any provision of a law made by the
Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision
of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is
competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing
law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in
the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions
of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether
passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing
law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a
State specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule with respect to one of the matters enumerated
in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, ftc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ,
424
1956
Ch. Tika Ra1nji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bhagu:ati J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
Parliament or an existing law with respect to that
matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of
such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consi·
deration of the President and has received his assent,
prevail in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent
Parliament from enacting at any time any law with
respect to the same matter including a law adding to,
amending, varying or repealing the law so made by
the Legislature of the State".
We are concerned here with the repugnancy, if any,
arising by reason of both Parliament and the State
Legislature having operated in the same field in
respect of a matter enumerated in the Concurrent
List, i.e., foodstuffs comprised in Entry 33 of List III
and we are, therefore, not called upon to express any
opinion on the controversy which was raised in regard
to the exact scope and extent of article 254(1) in regard to "a law made by Parliament which Parliament
is competent to enact", as to whether the legislative
power of Parliament therein refers to List I, List III
and the residuary power of legislation vested in
Parliament under article 248 or is confined merely to
the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List (Vide
A.LR. 1942 Cal. 587 contra, Per Sulaiman, J. in 1940
F.C.R. 185 at p. 226).
Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd ed.,
p. 303, refers to three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy:(1) There may be inconsistency in the actual
terms of the competing statutes (R. v. Brisbane
Licensing Oourt, [1920] 28 C.L.R. 23).
(2) Though there may be no direct conflict, a
State law may be inoperative because the Common·
wealth law, or the award of the Commonwealth Court,
is intended to be a complete exhaustive code (Olyde
Engineering Go. Ltd. v. Oowburn, [1926] 37 C.L.R.
466).
(3) Even in the absence of intention, a conflict
may arise when both State and Commonwealth seek
to exercise their powers over the same subject matter
(Victoria v. Commonwealth, [1937] 58 C.L.R. 618; Wenn
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
v. Attorney-General (Viet.), (1948] 77 C.L.R. 84).
Isaacs, J. in Clyde Engineering Company, Limited v.
Oowburn(1) laid down one test of inconsistency as
conclusive: "If, however, a competent legislature
expressly or implicitly evinces its intention to cover
the whole field, that is a conclusive test of inconsistency where another Legislature assumes to enter
to any extent upon the same field".
Dixon, J. elaborated this theme in, Ex parte
McLean( 2 ):
"When the Parliament of the Commonwealth
and the Parliament of a State each legislate upon the
same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct
shall be, they make laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical
which each prescribes, and section 109 applies. That
this is so is settled, at least when the sanctions they
impose are diverse. But the reason is that, by prescribing the rule to be observed, the Federal statute
shows an intention to cover the subject matter and
provide what the law upon it shall be. If it appeared
that the Federal law was intended to be supplementary to or cumulative upon State law, then no inconsistency would be exhibited in imposing the same
duties or in inflicting different penalties. The inconsistency does not lie in the mere co-existence of two
laws which are susceptible of simultaneous obedience.
It depends upon the intention of the paramount
Legislature to express by its enactment, completely,
exhaustively, or exclusively, what shall be the law
governing the particular conduct or matter to which
its attention is directed.
When a Federal statute
discloses such an intention, it is inconsistent with it
for the law of a State to govern the same conduct or
matter".
To the same effect are the observations of Evatt,
J. in Stock Motor Plough Ltd. v. Forsyth( 3):
"It is now established, therefore, that State and
Federal laws may be inconsistent, although obedience
to both laws is possible. There may even be incon(I) [1926] 87 C.L.R. 466, 489,
(2) [1930] 48 C.L.R. !72, 483.
(3) (1932] 48 C.L.R. 128, 1!7.
1956
Ch. Tika Ratnji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
a11d others
BhagwatiJ.
426
1956
Ch, Tika Ramji
and others1 etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
sistency although each law imposes the very same
duty of obedience. These conclusions have, in the
main, been reached, by aseribing "inconsistency" to
a State law, not because the Federal law directly invalidates or conflicts with it, but because the Federal
law is said to "cover the field".
This is a very
ambiguous phrase, because subject matters of legislation bear little resemblance to geographical areas.
It is no more than a cliche for expressing the fact
that, by reason of the subject matter dealt with, and
the method of dealing with it, and the nature and
multiplicity of the regulations prescribed, the Federal
authority has adopted a plan or scheme which will
be hindered and obstructed if any additional regulations whatever are prescribed upon the subject by
any other authority; if, in other words, the subject is
either touched or trenched upon by State authority".
The Calcutta High Court in G. P. Stewart v. B. K.
Roy Ohaudhury(') had occasion to consider the meaning of repugnancy and B. N. Rau, J. who delivered
the judgment of the Court observed at page 632:
"It is sometimes said that two laws cannot be
said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct
conflict between them, as when one says "do" and
the other "don't", there is no true repugnancy, according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the
laws. For reasons which we shall set forth presently,
we think that this is too narrow a test: there may
well be cases of repugnancy where both laws say
"don't" but in different ways. For example, one law
may say, "No person shall sell liquor by retail, that
is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time"
and anotherlaw may say, "No person shall sell liquor
by retail, that is, in quantities of less than ten gallons
at a time". Here, it is obviously possible to obey both
laws, by obeying the more stringent of the two,
namely the second one; yet it is equally obvious that
the two laws are repugnant, for to the extent to which
a citizen is compelled to obey one of them, the other,
though not actually disobeyed, is nullified".
The learned Judge then discussed the various auth(11 A.I.B. 1989 C•I. 628.
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
orities which laid down the test of repugnancy in
Australia, Canada, and England and concluded at
page 634:
"The principle deducible from the English cases,
as from the Canadian cases, seems therefore to be
the same as that enunciated by Isaacs, J. in the
Australian 44 hour case (37 C.L.R. 466) if the dominant law has expressly or impliedly evinced its intention to cover the whole field, then a subordinate law
in the same field is repugnant and therefore inoperative. Whether and to what extent in a given case,
the dominant law evinces such an intention must
necessarily depend on the language of the particular
law".
Sulaiman, J. in Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan
Singh(1) thus laid down the principle of construct.ion
in regard to repugnancy:
"When the question is whether a Provincial
legislation is repugnant to an existing Indian law,
the onus of showing its repugnancy and the extent to
which it is repugnant should be on the party attacking its validity. There ought to be a presumption in
favour of its validity, and every effort should be made
to reconcile them and construe both so as to avoid
their being repugnant to each other; and care should
be taken to see whether the two do not really operate
in different fields without encroachment. Further,
repugnancy must exist in fact, and not depend merely
on a possibility. Their Lordships can discover no
adequate grounds for holding that there exists repugnancy between the two laws in districts of the
Province of Ontario where the prohibitions of the
Canadian Act are not and may never be in force:
(Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for
the Dominion)(~)".
In the instant case, there is no question of any inconsistency in the actual terms of the Acts enacted
by Parliament and the impugned Act. The only
questions that arise are whether Parliament and the
State Legislature sought to exercise their powers over
the same subject-matter or whether the laws enacted
(1) [1939) F.C.R. 188, 212.
(2) [1896] A.O. 348, 869-70,
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
a11d others, de.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and othef's
Bhagwati J.
428
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc,
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
' Bhagwati J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
by Parliament were intended to be a complete exhaustive code or, in other words, expressly or impliedly
evinced an intention to cover the whole field. It
would be necessary, therefore, to compare the provisions of Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI
of 1953, Act X of 1955 and the Sugar Control Order,
1955 issued thereunder with those of the impugned
Act and U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and
Purchase Order, 1954 passed thereunder.
Act LXV of 1951 was an Act to provide for the
development and regulation of certain industries the
control of which by the Union was declared by the
Act to be expedient in the public interest and it embraced the various industries mentioned in the First
Schedule to the Act. The industry engaged in the
manufacture or production of sugar was one of such
industries and under the Act the Union acquired control over the same. The Act provided for the establishment and constitution of a Central Advisory
Council for the purposes of advising it on matters
concerning the development and regulation of the
scheduled industries. It also provided for the establishment and constitution of Development Councils
for any scheduled industry or group of scheduled industries. It further provided for the regulation of
scheduled industries by registration of existing industrial undertakings and licensing of new industrial
undertakings and causing investigations to be made
in the scheduled industries or industrial undertakings.
These provisions were evidently intended to control
the scheduled industries and if the sugar industry was
one of the scheduled industries the control thereof
invol.ved the development and regulation of the sugar
ind•1stry and the registration and the licensing as
also investigation into the affairs of the undertakings
which were engaged in the production or manufacture
of sugar. It did not involve the regulation of the
supply and purchase of ~ugarcane which, though it
formed an integral part of the process of manufacture
of sugar, was merely the raw material for the industry and as such not within the purview of the Act.
If the Act bad remained as originally enacted the
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
provisions of the Act would not have been in any
manner whatever repugnant to the provisions of U.P.
Act I of 1938 because both the Acts covered different
fields. Act XXVI of 1953, however, introduced certain amendments in the Act the relevant amendment
for our purpose being section 18-G which provided as
follows:"18-G. Power to control supply, distribution, price,
etc., of certain articles.( I) The Central Government, so far as it appears
to it necessary or expedient for securing the equitable
distribution and availability at fair prices of any
article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled
industry, may, notwithstanding anything contained
in any other provision of this Act, by notified order,
provide for regulating the supply and distribution
thereof and trade and commerce therein.
...
E~p~~ti~:;{."~i~·· .thi~··· ·~~~t·i~~·: th~·. ··~·~p~~·~~ion
'article or class of articles' relatable to any scheduled
industry includes any article or class of articles imported into India which is of the same nature or description as the article or class of articles manufactured or produced in the scheduled industry".
Sugar industry being one of the scheduled industries,
it was contended for the petitioners that sugarcane
was an article relatable to the sugar industry and
was, therefore, within the scope of section 18-G and
the Central Government was thus authorised by notified order to provide for regulating the supply and
distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.
If that was so, it was next contended, the field of
legislation in regard to sugarcane was covered by this
provision of the Act and was taken away from the
jurisdiction of the State Legislatures, the avowed intention being to cover the whole field of such legislation. It was, however, urged on behalf of the State
of U. P. that articles relatable to scheduled industry
comprised only those finished products which were of
the same nature or description as the article or class
of articles manufactured or produced in the scheduled
industry and did not comprise the raw materials for
56
1956
Ch. T;ka Ramj;
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ,
430
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
the scheduled industry. Reliance was placed in support of this contention on the terms of the explanaCh. Tika Ramji
and others, etc. tion to section 18-G as also to sections 15 and 16 of
the Act where the same words "any article or class
v.
The State o/
of articles relatable to that industry" were used. In
Uttar Pratksh our opinion, the contention of the State is sound.
and other&
The structure of the whole Act LXV of 1951 related
to the development and regulation of the
BhagwatiJ.
scheduled industries and all the provisions which
were contained in the Act including those which
were introduced therein by Act XXVI of 1953 were
designed for effectuating that purpose. It is significant to note that, e\·en in section 18-G, the regulation which was intended was that of the supply and
distribution of the article or class of articles relatable
to the scheduled industry and the production of those
articles was not sought to be regulated at all. The
raw materials would certainly be essential ingredients
in the process of manufacture or production of the
articles in the scheduled industry but would not
be of the same nature or description as the article
or class of articles manufactured or produced therein.
The whole object of enactment of section 18-G
was to secure the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of such articles which by relation thereof to the article or class of articles manufactured or produced in the scheduled industry would
affect such manufacture or production or the supply
and distribution thereof or trade and commerce
·therein. Not only were the article or class of articles
relatable to the scheduled industry which were themselves manufactured or produced in this country
sought to be controlled in this manner but also the
articles or class of articles imported into India which
were of the same nature or description as the article
or class of articles manufactured or produced in the
scheduled industry, so that all these articles whether
indigenous or imported would be controlled by the
Central Government by regulating the supply and
distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein
with a view to develop and regulate and thus control
the scheduled industries in the public interest. Sec-
S.C.R.
SUPREME 'COURT REPORTS
431
tion 15 of the Act provided that where the Central
Government was of the opinion that, in respect of any
scheduled industry or industrial undertaking there had
been or was likely to be a substantial fall in the
volume of production in respect of any article or class
of articles relatable to that industry or manufactured
or produced in the industrial undertakings for which,
having regard to the economic conditions prevailing,
there was no justification, it may make or cause to
be made full and complete investigations into the circumstances of the case. If, after making or causing
to be made any such investigations, the Central Government was satisfied that action under section 16
was desirable it was to issue such- directions to the
industrial undertakings concerned as may be appropriate for regulating production of any article or
class of articles of any industrial undertakings or fixing the standard of production, requiring the industrial undertakings to take such steps as are considered necessary to stimulate thedevelopmentofthe
industry to which the undertakings relate, prohibiting the industrial undertakings from resorting to any
act or practice which may reduce its production
capacity and economic value and controlling the
prices and regulating the distribution of any article
or class of articles which has been the subject-matter
of investigation. If any article or class of articles
relatable to that industry could thus be the subjectmatter of investigation and if appropriate directions
in the manner indicated in section 16 could be given
in relation thereto, it is obvious that it would not be
within the province of the scheduled industry or
industrial undertakings to take such steps in regard
to the controlling of the prices or regulating the
distribution of these articles or class of articles unless they were within the sphere of the scheduled.industries or industrial undertakings. Raw materials
for the manufacture or production of the article or
class of articles in the scheduled industry would
certainly not be within this sphere and they would
not be able to control the prices or regulate the distribution thereof within the meaning of section 16.
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc,
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesla
and others
BhagwatiJ.
432
1956
Ch. Tika Ram/I
and others, etc,
••
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bhagwatl J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
These articles or class of articles relatable to the
scheduled industry, therefore, were finished products
and not raw materials for the manufacture or production of the articles or class of articles in the scheduled
industry. They were finished products of a cognate
character which would be manufactured or produced
in the very process of manufacture or production in
the course of carrying on that scheduled industry.
The raw materials would certainly not be included
within this category and sugarcane which is the raw
material for the manufacture or production of sugar
could, therefore, not be included in the category of
the articles or class of articles relatable to the sugar
industry. Section 18-G, therefore, did not cover the
field of sugarcane and the Central Government was
not empowered by the inttoduction of section 18-G
by Act XXVI of 1953 to legislate in regard to sugarcane. The field of sugarcane was not covered by Act
LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953 and
the legislative powers of the Provincial Legislatures
in regard to sugarcane were not affected by it in any
manner whatever. If the two fields were different
and the Central legislation did not intend at all to
cover that field, the field was clear for the operation
of State legislation and there was no repugnancy at
all between Act LXV of 1951 and the impugned Act.
Even assuming that ~ugarcane was an article or class
of articles relatable to the sugar industry within the
meaning of section 18-G of Act LXV of 1951, it is tc
be noted that no order was issued by the Central
Government in exercise of the powers vested in it
under that section and no question of repugnancy
could ever arise because, as has been noted above,
repugnancy must exist in fact and not depend merely
on a possibility. The possibility of an order under
section 18-G being issued by the Central Government
would not be enough. The existence of such an order
would be the essential prerequisite before any repugnancy could ever arise.
Act X of 1955 included within the definition of
essential commodity food stuffs which we have seen
above would include sugar as well as sugarcane. This
S.C.R.
"
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
433
Act was enacted by Parliament in exercise of the
concurrent legislative power under Entry 33 of List
III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment
Act, 1954. Foodcrops were there defined as including crops of sugarcane and section 3(1) gave the
Central Government powers to control the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities and trade and commerce therein for maintaining
or increasing the supplies thereof or for securing their
equitable distribution and availability at fair prices.
Section 3(2)(b) empowered the Central Government
to provide inter alia for bringing under cultivation
any waste or arable land whether appurtenant to a
building or not for growing thereon of foodcrops
generally or specified foodcrops and section 3(2)(c)
gave the Central Government power for controlling
the price at which any essential commodity may be
bought or sold. These provisions would certainly
bring within the scope of Central legislation the
regulation of the production of sugarcane as also the
controlling of the price at which sugarcane may be
bought or sold, and in addition to the Sugar Control
Order, 1955 which was issued by the Central Government on 27th August, 1955, it also issued the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, on the same date investing
it with the power to fix the price of sugarcane and
direct payment thereof as also the power to regulate
the movement of sugarcane.
Parliament was well within its powers in legislating in regard to sugarcane and the Central Government was also well within its powers in issuing the
Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 in the manner it did
because all this was in exercise of the concurrent
power of legislation under Entry 33 of List III. That,
however, did not affect the legislative competence of
the U. P. State Legislature to enact the law in regard
to sugarcane and the only question which remained
to be considered was whether there was any repugnancy between the provisions of the Central legislE.tion and the U. P. State legislation in this behalf. As
we have noted above, the U. P. State Government
did not at all provide for the fixation of minimum
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
Tiie State of
Uftar Pradesh
nnd others
Bha gwati J.
434
7956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc,
v.
The State oj
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT P.EPORTS
[1956]
prices for sugarcane nor did it provide for the regulation of movement of sugarcane as was done by the
Central Government in clauses (3) and (4) of the
Sugaroane Control Order, 1955. The impugned Act
did not make any provision for the same and the only
provision in regard to the price of sugarcane which
was to be found in the U. P. Sugarcane Rules, 1954,
was contained in Rule 94 which provided that a notice
of suitable size in clear bold lines showing the minimum price of cane fixed by the Government and the
rates at which the cane is being purchased by the
centre was to be put up by an occupier of a factory
or the purchasing agent as the case may be at each
purchasing centre. The price of cane fixed by Government here only meant the price fixed by the appropriatll Government which would be the Central
Government, under clause 3 of the Sugarcane Control
Order, 1955, because in fact the U. P. State Government never fixed the price of sugarcane to be purchased by the factories. Even the provisions in behalf of the agreements contained in clauses 3 and 4
of the U. P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, provided that the price was to be
t.he minimum price to be notified by the Government subject to such deductions, if any, as
may be notified by the Government from time to
time meaning thereby the Central Government,
the State Government not having made any provision in that behalf at any time whatever. The
provisions thus made by the Sugarcane Control Order,
1955, did not find their place either in the impugned
Act or the Rules made thereunder or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954,
and the provision contained in section 17 of the impugned Act in regard to the payment of sugarcane
price and recovery thereof as if it was an arrear of
land revenue did not find its place in the Sugarcane
Control Order, 1955. These provisions, therefore,
were mutually exclusive and did not impinge upon
each other there being thus no trenching upon the
field of one Legislature by the other. Our attention
was drawn to the several provisions contained in the
"
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
435
1956
Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 and the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 Ch. Tika Ramji
and the agreements annexed thereto and it was point- and others, etc.
ed out that they differed in material particulars,
v.
the provisions of the latter being more stringent than The State of
those of the former. It is not necessary to refer to Uttar Pradesh
and ot!:ers
these provisions in any detail. Suffice it to say that
none of' these provisions do overlap, the Centre being Bhagwati J.
silent with regard to some of the provisions which
have been enacted by the State and the State being
silent with regard to some of the provisions which
have been enacted by the Centre. There is no repugnancy whatever between these provisions and the
impugned Act and the Rules framed thereunder as
also the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and
Purchase Order, 1954 do not trench upon the field
covered by Act X of 1955. There being no repugnancy at all, therefore, no question arises of the operation of article 254(2) of the Constitution and no
provision of the impugned Act and the Rules made
thereunder is invalidated by any provision contained
in Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of
1953 or Act X of 1955 and the Sugarcane Control
Order, 1955 issued thereunder.
Re. (3 ): It was then contended that the impugned
Act stands repealed to the extent that it has been
repealed by section 16 of Act X of 1955 and clause 7
of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 made in exercise
of the powers conferred by section 3 of Act X of 1955.
Section 16 of Act X of 1955 reads as under:
"16. (1) The following laws are hereby repealed:(a) the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955;
(b) any other law in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in so far
as such law controls or authorises the control of the
produotion, supply and distribution of, and trade
and commerce in, any essential commodity".
It is submitted that the impugned Act was "any other
law'' in force in the State of U.P. immediately before
the commencement of Act X of 1955 and stood
repealed in so far as it controlled or authorised the
436
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
control of production, supply and distribution of, and
trade and commerce in, sugarcane which was comCh. Tika Ramji
and others, etc. prised within foodstuffs an essential commodity
under Act X of 1955. Clause 7 of the Sugarcane Con••
trol Order, 1955 made in exercise of the powers conThe State of
Uttar Pradesh
ferred by section 3 of the Act provided:
and others
"7. (1) The Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950,
published with the Government of India in the
BhagwatiJ.
Ministry of Food and Agriculture S.R.O. No. 735,
dated the 7th October, 1950, and any order made by
a State Government or other authority regulating or
prohibiting the production, supply and distribution
of sugarcane and trade or commerce therein are hereby repealed, except as respect things done or omitted
to be done under any such order before the commencement of this order".
It is submitted that the U.P. ·Sugarcane Regulation
of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, made by the
U.P. Government in exercise of the powers conferred
by section 16 of the impugned Act is repealed in so
far as it regulates or prohibits the production, supply
and distribution of sugarcane or trade and commerce
therein. These are provisions for the express repeal
of the impugned Act and the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, and if the
contention of the petitioners in this behalf were
accepted it would have the effect of nullifying the
provisions of the impugned Act and also the impugned
notifications which have been issued in exercise
of the powers conferred by sections 15 and 16 of the
Act.
As regards section 16 of Act X of 1955, the validity
and effect thereof depends upon the construction to
be put on article 254(2) and the proviso thereto.
Article 254(2) deals with repugnancy between the
provisions of a law made by the State Legislature and
those of an earlier law made by Parliament or an
existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List and provides that the
law so made by the State Legislature shall, if it has
been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has received his assent, prevail in the State. A
1956
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
437
proviso, however, has been attached thereto which
says that "nothing in article 254(2) shall prevent
Parliament from enacting at any time any law with
respect to the same matter including a law adding
to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made
by the State Legislature". Ordinarily Parliament
would not ha:ve the power to repeal a law pas!!ed by
the State Legislature even though it be a law with
respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. Section 107 of the Government of India
Act, 1935 did not contain any such power. As was
observed by this Court in Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The
State of Bombay(1), this provision contained in article
254(2) "is in substance, a reproduction of section 107
(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the concluding portion whereof being incorporated in a
proviso with further additions. Discussing the nature
of the power of the Dominion Legislature, Canada,
in relation to that of the Provincial Legislature, in a
situation similar to that under section 107(2) of the
Government of India Act, it was observed by Lord
Watson in Attorney-General for Ontario v. AttorneyGeneral for the Dominion( 9), that though a law enacted
by the Parliament of Canada and within its competence would override Provincial legislation covering
the same field, the Dominion Parliament had no
authority confe'rred upon it under the Constitution
to ena.ct a statute repealing direc1ily any Provincial
statute. That would appear to have been the position
under section 107(2) of the Government of India Act
with reference to the subjects mentioned in the Ooncurrent List. Now, by the proviso to article 254(2)
the Constitution has enlarged the powers of Parliament, and under that proviso, Parliament can do
what the Central Legislature could not under section
107(2) of the Government of India Act, and enact a
law adding to, amending, varying or repealing a law
of the State, when it relates to a matter mentioned
in the Concurrent List. The position then is that
under the Constitution Parliament can, acting under
the proviso to article 2lH(2), repeal a State law".
(1) [1956] l S.C.B. 79V, 806.
67
(2) [l-89G] A.C. 348,
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ.
438
1956
Cli. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
(1956]
It is argued for the State of U.P. that, under the
proviso to article 254(2), the power to repeal a law
passed by the State Legislature is incidental to enacting a law relating to the same matter as is dealt with
in the State legislation, and that a statute which
merely repeals a law passed by the State Legislature
without enacting substantive provisions on the subject would not be within the proviso, as it could not
have been the intention of the Constitution that in a
topic within the concurrent sphere of legislation there
should be a vacuum. There is considerable force in
this contention, and there is much to be said for the
view that a repeal simpliciter is not within the proviso.
But it is unnecessary to base our decision on this
point, as the petitioners must, in our opinion, fail on
another ground. While the proviso to. article 254(2)
does confer on Parliament a power to repeal a law
passed by the State Legislature, that power is, under
the terms of the proviso, subject to certain limitations. It is limited to enacting a law with respect
to the same matter adding to, amending, varying
or repealing a "law so made by the State Legislature". The law referred to here is the law mentioned
in the body of article 254(2). It is a law made by
the State Legislature with reference to a matter in
the Concurrent List containing provisions repugnant
to an earlier law made by Parliament and with the
consent of the President. It is only such a law that
could be altered, amended or repealed under the proviso. The impugned Act is not a law relating to any
matter, which is the subject of an earlier legislation
by Parliament. It is a substantive law covering a
field not occupied by Parliament, and no question of
its containing any provisions inconsistent with a law
enacted by Parliament could therefore arise. To such
a law, the proviso has no application and section 16
(l)(b) of Act X of 1955 and clause 7(1) of the Sugar·
cane Control Order, 1955 must, in this view, be held
to be invalid.
There is also a further objection to which clause 7
(1) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 is open. The
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
439
1956
power of repeal, if any, was vested in Parliament and
Parliament alone could exercise it by enacting an Ch. Tika Ramji
appropriate provision in regard thereto. Parliament and others, etc.
could not delegate this power of repeal to any execuv.
tive authority. Such delegation, if made, would be The State of
void and the Central Government had no power, there- Uttar Pradesh
and others
fore, to repeal any order made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by BhagwatiJ.
section 16 of the impugned Act. The U.P. Sugarcane
Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954,
could not, therefore, be validly repealed by the
Central Government as was purported to be done by
clause (7) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, and
that repeal was of no effect with the result that the
U.P. Sugarcane Regulation oi Supply and Purchase
Order, 1954 stood unaffected thereby. The result,
therefore, is that there was no repeal of the impugned
Act or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and
Purchase Order, 1954 by section 16 of Act X of 1955
or by clause (7) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955
as contended by the petitioners.
Re. (4): It is pointed out that the Cane Commis~
sioner declares the reserved or assigned areas for the
factories and also transfers particular areas from one
factory to another. He is also in sole charge and
management of Cane Growers Co-operative Societies.
It is contended that the powers thus conferred upon
him are so wide that they are capable of being exercised in a discriminatory manner and therefore the
impugned Act infringes the fundamental right
guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution.
Section 15 of the Act provides:"15. (1) Without prejudice to any order made
under clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 16 the
Cane Commissioner may, after consulting the Factory
and Canegrowers Co-operative Society in the manner
to be prescribed(a) reserve any area (hereinafter called the reserved area), and
(b) assign any area (hereinafter called an
assigned area),
440
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
for the purpose of the supply of cane to a factory in
accordance with the provisions of section 16 during a
Ch. Tika Ramji
pa1'ticular
crushing season and may likewise at any
and others, etc,
time
cancel
such order or alter the boundaries of an
v.
The State of
area so reserved or assigned.
Uttar Pradesh
(2) Where any area has been declared as reserved
and others
area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall,
if so directed by the Cane Commissioner, purchase all
f3hagwati J,
the cane grown in that area, which is offered for sale
to the factory.
(3) Where any area has been declared as assigned
area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall
purchase such quantity of cane grown in that area
and offered for sale to the factory, as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner.
(4) An appeal shall lie to the State Government
against the order of the Cane Commissioner passed
under sub-section (I)".
Rule 22 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of
Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954, made by the U.P.
Government in exercise of the rule-making power
conferred by section 28 (2) of the Act however lays
down the factors which are to be taken into consideration by the Cane Commissioner in reserving an area
for or assigning an area to a factory or determining
the quantity of cane to be purchased from an area by
a factory:
(a) the distance of the area from the factory,
(b) facilities for transport of cane from the
area,
(c) the quality of cane supplied from the area
to the factory in previous years,
(d) previous reservation and assignment
orders,
(e) the quantity of cane to be crushed. in the
factory,
(f) the arrangements made by the factory in
previous years for payment of cess, cane price and
commission, and
(g) the views of the Csnegrowers' Co-operative
Society of the area.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
441
Chapter 11 of the Rules provides for the management of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies by
the Cane Commissioner and their supervision by him.
Rule 63 of that chapter however provides:" Rule 63.-An appeal against an order of the
Cane Commissioner under the provisions of this
Chapter shall lie to the State Government within one
month of the date of the communication of the order
to the Society or management concerned".
It will be thus seen that the powers given to the
Cane Commissioner under section 15 are well defined
and have got to be exercised within the limits prescribed after consulting the factories and the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies (Vi de section 15(1)) and
any order made by the Cane Commissioner thereunder
is liable to an appeal to the State Government at the
instance of the party aggrieved (Vide section 15(4)).
The same is the position in regard to the orders made
by the Cane Commissioner in the course of his management and supervision of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies and any order made by him in regard
thereto is subject to appeal to the State Government
at the instance of the party aggrieved (Vide Rule 63).
If this is the position, it cannot be urged that wide
powers are conferred on the Cane Commissioner which
can be used by him in a discriminatory manner so as
to violate the fundamental right guaranteed under
article 14. Any cane grower or a Canegrowers' Cooperative Society or the occupier of a factory can, if
aggrieved, take an appeal to the State Government
against any order passed by the Cane Commissioner
and such provision is a sufficient safeguard provided
in the Act and the Rules against any arbitrary exercise of those powers by the Cane Commissioner and
takes them out of the ban of article 14.
Re. (6): It is next contended that the impugned
Act and the notification dated 27th September, 1954
violate the fundamental right guaranteed under
article 19(1)(c) which is the right to form associations
or unions. It is urged that the Cane Growers Co-
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
•md others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ.
442
1956
Ch. Tika Ra1nji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[Hl56]
operative Societies are not voluntary organisations
but a cane grower is compelled to become a member
of the Society before he can sell his sugarcane to a
factory. The right to form associations or unions is
a positive right but in the positive right it is urged
there is necessarily implied the negative aspect which
means that a citizen has the right not to form associations or unions and cannot be compelled to become
a member of an association or a union or a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society before he can sell his
goods to the owner of a factory. Reliance is placed
in support of this contention on the following passage
in the judgment of the Madras High Court in Indian
Metal and Metallurgical Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and Another(1):"In this case, however, we are concerned with a
much narrower question, namely, whether an award
made by the Industrial Tribunal appointed under the
Industriai Disputes Act and published by the Government in accordance with the provisions of the Act
can direct the management of an industry to continue
to carry on any business against their will. If a citizen has got a right to carry on business, we think it
follows that, he must be at liberty not to carry it on
if he so chooses. A person can no more be compelled
to carry on a business than a person can be compelled to acquire or hold property ........ Mr. Bhashyam
was really unable to convince us how any one
can be compelled to carry on a business against
his will and yet be said to enjoy a right to carry
on a business''.
The following passage from Strong on 'American Constitutional Law', page 774, taken from the judgment
of Mr. Justice Murphy in West Virginia State Board v.
Barnette(") is also relied upon:"The freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all, except in so far as essential operations of government may require it for the
(2) 319 u.s 624, 645.
(1) A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 98, 101.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
443
1956
preservation of an orderly society ,-as in the case of
compulsion to give evidence in court".
Ch. Tika Ramji
It is urged that, if the right to carry on business and others, etc,
v.
carries with it by necessary implication a right no~ to
carry on business, if the right to speak freely carries The State of
Pradesh
with it by necessary implication the right to refrain Uttar
and others
from speaking at all, the right to form associations
or unions also carries with it by necessary implica- Bhagu:ati J.
tion the right not to form associations or unions. In
the first place, assuming that the right to form an
association implies a right not to form an association,
it does not follow that the negative right must also
be regarded as a fundamental right. The citizens of
India have many rights which have not been given
the sanctity of fundamental rights and there is nothing absurd or uncommon if the positive right alone
is made a fundamental right. The whole fallacy in
the argument urged on behalf of the petitioners lies
in this that it ignores that there is no compulsion at
all on any cane grower to become a member of the
Canegrowers' Co-operative Society. The very definition of a cane grower given in the impugned Act talks
of "a person who cultivates cane either by himself
or by members of his family or by hired labour and
who is not a member of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society". The Sugarcane Board is to consist of
inter alia 15 members to be appointed by the State
Government of whom 5 are to be the representatives
of canegrowers and the Canegrowers' Co-operative
Societies. The occupier of a factory has to maintain
a register of all such canegrowers and Canegrowers'
Co-operative Societies as shall sell cane to that factory.
The payment of commission on purchase of
cane is to be made by the occupier of a factory in
both cases, whether the purchase is made through a
Canegrowers' Co-operative Society or the purchase is
made direct from the canegrowers. The U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954,
made in exercise of the powers conferred by section
16 of the impugned Act also talks of cane growers as
well as Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies and in
444
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
the case of reserved areas both the cane growers
and the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies are entitled within 14 days of the issue of an order reserving an area for a factory to offer to supply cane
grown in the reserved area to the occupier of the
factory and Form B in Appendix II of that Order
provides the form of agreement between the cane
grower and the occupier of a· factory.
The cane
grower as well as the Canegrowers' Co-operative
Society are both within the ken of the impugned Act
and it cannot be urged that the object of the Act is
to promote Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies to the
prejudice of the cane grower himself.
The Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies are to be fostered if
at all for furthering the interests of the cane growers
and there is no conflict between the interests of the
cane growers on the one hand and those of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies on the other. Both
are equally catered for by the impugned Act but it is
only when the State Government feels that there are
circumstances justifying the issue of an order under
which the cane grown by a cane grower shall not be
purchased except through a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society, the State Government, in exercise of the
power reserved under section 16(2)(b) would issue an
order accordingly. The impugned notification dated
'27th September, 1954 specifies the circumstances
under which such a prohibitory order can be made.
If the membership of a particular Canegrowers' Cooperative Society is not less than 75 per cent. of the
total number of cane growerR within the particular
area, then and then only it is considered expedient
and desirable that all the cane purchased by an
occupier of a factory from that area should be purchased only through the agency of the particular
Canegrowers' Co-operative Society. It is with a view
to eliminate unhealthy competition between the cane
growers on the one hand and the Canegrowers' Cooperative Societies on the other and also to prevent
malpractices indulged in by the occupier of a factory
for the purpose of breaking up the Canegrowers'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
445
1956
Co-operative Society that such a provision is made
and a notification issued prohibiting the occupier of Cll. Tika Ramji
a. factory from making any purchases from the area and others, etc.
except through the Ca.negrowers' Co-operative
v.
Society. It is a reasonable provision made for the The State of
benefit of the large number of persons forming the Vttar Prades/&
and othas
members of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society
and cannot be impugned as in any manner violative BhagwatiJ.
of any fundamental right of the petitioners.
There is also another fallacy in their argument and
it lies in ignoring that no canegrower is prevented
from resigning his membership of a Canegrowers'
Co-operative Society. These are voluntary organisations which a canegrower is entitled to join or not at
his choice. If he has once joined it he is also entitled to resign his membership at his choice and the
only obstacle to his right of resignation, as has been
laid down in the bye-laws of the Society, is the fact
of his being indebted to the Society, or the fact of
his oeing a surety for debt due by another member
of the S_ociety. Until these debts are discharged and
also until the crushing season during which the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society has entered into an
agreement with the occupier of a factory is over, a
member of a Society cannot resign his membership.
These restrictions do not feUer his right to resign his
membership of the Society. If he became a member
of the Society be is bound by the bye-laws of the
Society and can only resign his membership after fulfilling all the conditions which are laid down in the
bye-laws of the Society.
The cane grower, moreover, is not prevented absolutely from selling his sugarcane. The only person
to whom he cannot sell his sugarcane is the owner
of a factory but that does not prevent him from selling· his sugarcane to any other person or for any
other purpose, e.g. the manufacture or production of
gur or rah or khandsari or any variety ~f product
other than sugar. There may be of course difficulties
in the matter of his being able to sell the same in
58
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1956
[1956]
that manner but that does not mean that there is an
absolute
restriction on his power of disposal of his
Ch. Tika Ratnji
and until he becomes a member of a Canegoods
unless
and others, etc,
growers' Co-operative Society. He is at perfect
v.
The State of
liberty not to become a member of a Canegrowers'
Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Society if he chooses not to do so and no
aud others
power on earth can compel him to become such a
Just as he is not bound to become a memmember.
Bliagwati J.
ber of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society he is
equally not hound to offer his sugarcane for sale to
the occupier of a factory even if he happens to be a
canegrower within the area reserved for that factory.
His freedom in that behalf is absolutely unrestricted
and we do not see how it can be urged that the provisions of the impugned Act and the notification
dated 27th September, 1954 are violative of his fundamental right under article 19(l)(c) of the Constitution.
Re. (6): It is further contended that the impugned
Act and the notifications infringe -the fundamental
right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f) and (g) and
article 31 of the Constitution. We may refer in this
context to the following passage from the judgment
of this Court delivered by Mukherjea, J. (as he then
was) in Messrs Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh and two others('):"Nobody can dispute that for ensuring equitable
distribution of commodities considered essential to
the community and their availability at fair prices, it
is quite a reasonable thing to regulate sale of these
commodities through licensed vendors to whom quotas
are allotted in specified quantities and who are not
permitted to sell them beyond the prices that are
fixed by the controlling authorities. The power of
granting or withholding licenses or of fixing the prices
of the goods would necessarily have to be vested in
certain public officers or bodies and they would
certainly have to be left with some amount of discretion in these matters. So far no exception can be
taken; but the mischief arises when the power con(!) [1954] S.C.R. 803, 811.
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
447
ferred on such officers is an arbitrary power unregulated by any rule or principle and it is left entirely to
the discretion of particular persons to do anything
they like without any check or control by any higher
authority. A law or order, which confers arbitrary
and uncontrolled power upon the executive in the
matter of regulating trade or business in normally
available commodities cannot but be held to be unreasonable. As has been held by this court in Ohintaman v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, the phrase
"reasonable restriction" connotes that the limitation
imposed upon a person in enjoyment of a right should
not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond
what is required in the interest of the public. Legislation, which arbitrarily or excessively invades the
right, cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness, and unless it strikes a proper balance between
the freedom guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) and
the social control permitted by clause (6) of article 19,
it must be held to be wanting in reasonableness".
The power which is given to the Cane Commissioner
under section 15 of the Act for declaring reserved or
assigned areas is well defined and guided by the considerations set out in Rule 22 of Chapter 6 of the U.P.
Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules,
1954 and is further conditioned that he has to consult
the factory and the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society,
and his orders made thereunder are subject to an
appeal to the State Government at the instance of
the party aggrieved. This cannot by any means be
treated as an uncontrolled or an unfettered power
without recourse to any higher authority in the event
of his going wrong. The power is not absolute nor is
it unguided and, therefore, does not fall within the
mischief of article 19(1)(f) and (g) and the notification dated 9th November, 1955 cannot be impugned
on that ground. The same is the position with regard
to notification dated 27th September, 1954. The restriction which is imposed upon the cane growers in
regard to sales of their sugarcane to the occupiers
of factories in areas where the membership of the
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bhagwati J.
448
19S6
Ch. Tika Ramjl
and otlrers, etc.
v.
Th• Stat• of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
BhagwatiJ~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
Canegrowers' Co-operative Society is not less than
75 per cent. of the total cane growers within the
area is, a reasonable restriction in the public interest designed for safeguarding the interests of the
large majority of growers of sugarcane in the area
and works for the greatest good of the greatest number. That being so, it comes well within the protection of article 19(6) and the impugned notification
cannot be challenged as violative of the fundamental
right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f) and (g). If
these impugned notifications are, therefore, intra
vires the State Legislature, they cannot be challenged
also under article 31 as none of the petitioners is be·
ing deprived of his property, if any, save by authority of law.
, Re. (7): It is next contended that the impugned
Act is void in that it confers very wide powers on
the executive officials and is a piece of delegated legislation. Our attention has not been drawn to any
provisions of the impugned Aot which would amount
to a delegation of legislative power to any officia.Js of
the State Government. The only provisions alleged
to contain such delegation of legislative power are
those contained in se9tion 15 and section 16(l)(b)
read with section 16(2)(b) of the impugned Act which
we have dealt with above. They are certainly no
piece of delegated legislation and the vires of the impugned Act is not affected thereby.
Re. (8): It is lastly contended that the impugned
Act is destructive of freedom of trade and commerce
and is thus violative of article 301 of the Constitution. Article 301 of the Constitution does not occur
in Part III whicJ:i deals with fundamental rights but
it is urged that if a law was enacted in violation of
the provisions of article 301 it will be no law at all
and will certainly not avail the State Government.
In effect this is an argument in furtherance of the
contention in regard to article 19(l)(f) and (g) dealt
with above but we shall deal with it separately as it
bas been urged as an independent ground of attack
S.C.R;
I
.
I
i
!.r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
449
against the constitutionality of the impugned Act
and the notifications issued thereunder. It is urged
that the impugned notifications are violative of the
freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse embodied
in article 301 of the Constitution. The petitioners
are not free to sell their sugarcane to anybody other
than the occupier of a factory or even to him except
through the agency of a Canegrowers' Co-operative
Society and are not at all entitled to sell their sugarcane to anyone outside the State. Assuming this is
so, the short answer to this contention is furnished by
the provisions of article 304 of the Constitution which
provide:
"304. Notwithstanding anything in article 301
or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law(a) ................................... .
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the
freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or
within that State as may be required in the public
interest: .................... ".
We may also refer in this context to the following
passage from the judgment of their Lordships of the
Privy Council in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank
of New South Wales( 1 ) which was quoted with approval in the later Privy Council decision in Hughes and
Vale Proprietary Ltd. v. State of New South Wales and
Others(~):-
"Every case must be judged on its own facts and
in its own setting of time and circumstance, and it
may be that in regard to some economic activities
and at some stage of social development it might be
maintained that prohibition with a view to State
monopoly was the only practical and reasonable
manner of regulation, and that inter-State trade,
commerce and intercourse thus prohibited and thus
monopolized remained absolutely free".
We have already stated in the earlier part of this
judgment that the restrictions imposed by the alleged
notifications are reasonable restrictions imposed on
(l) [1950] A.O. 235, 311.
(2) [1955] A.O. 241.
1956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc,
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bhagwati J.
450
7956
Ch. Tika Ramji
and others, etc.
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
and others
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956)
the petitioners in the public interest. We are, therefore, of opinion that this contention also is of no avail
to the petitioners.
The result, therefore, is that the impugned Act and
the notifications dated 27th September, 1954 and 9th
November, 1955issued thereunder were intra vireB the
State Legislature and are binding on the petitioners.
The Petitions must, therefore, stand dismissed. In
regard to cos ts we feel that the proper order for costs
should be that Petitions Nos. 625 of 1954, 48 of 1955
and 47 of 1956 in which the President, the VicePresident and the Secretary respectively of the Ganna
Utpadak Sangh are amongst the petitioners and
Petition No. 37 of 1956 in which Saraya Sugar Factory is the petitioner will stand dismissed with costs,
one set between all the petitions and between all the
Respondents in those petitions. The parties in the
rest of the Petitions will bear and pay their own respective costs of those Petitions.
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